Emerging Civil Society in China, 1978-2008 (Social Scientific Studies in Reform Era China)

Emerging Civil Society in China, 1978–2008 Social Scientific Studies in Reform Era China VOLUME 7 BEIJING 2011 Emer...

Author: Wang Ming

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Emerging Civil Society in China, 1978–2008

Social Scientific Studies in Reform Era China VOLUME 7

BEIJING 2011

Emerging Civil Society in China, 1978–2008 Edited by

WANG Ming

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011

This book is the result of a copublication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. These articles were translated into English from the original (Wang Ming: Emerging Civil Society in China, 1978–2008) with the financial support of the Ford Foundation and the Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Emerging civil society in China, 1978–2008 / edited by Wang Ming. p. cm. — (Social scientific studies in reform era China, ISSN 1879-7539 ; v. 7) ISBN 978-90-04-18813-6 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Civil society—China. I. Ming, Wang. II. Title. III. Series. JQ1516.E36 2011 300.951—dc22

2010048116

ISSN 1879-7539 ISBN 978 90 04 18813 6 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

CONTENTS List of Contributors ....................................................................

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Chapter One The Development of Civil Organizations and the Road to Civil Society in China ................................ Wang Ming

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Chapter Two Liu Peifeng

Expansion of the Civil Right of Association ...

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Chapter Three Legal Developments Pertaining to Civil Organizations .......................................................................... Zhu Weiguo

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Chapter Four Civil Organizations, Special Purpose Reforms and Institutional Innovations ................................................. Li Yong

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Chapter Five Reforms to Civil Organization Internal Governance ............................................................................. Huang Haoming

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Chapter Six Civil Organization-Government Relationships: Functional Cooperation and Power Dilemmas ..................... Jia Xijin

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Chapter Seven Civil Organizations’ Growth and Society’s Reconstruction ........................................................................ Tao Chuanjin

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Chapter Eight Civil Organizations and Political Reforms: China’s Logic .......................................................................... Lin Shangli

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contents

Chapter Nine The Relationship Between State and Society in the Age of Reform: Administrative Absorption of Society ..................................................................................... Kang Xiaoguang, Lu Xianying and Han Heng Appendix

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Timeline of Civil Organizations (1978–2008) .......

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Index ...........................................................................................

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Wang Ming is currently Professor at Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management, a PhD advisor, Director of the NGO Research Institute, and chief editor of the China Non-Profit Review《中国非营利评论》. From 2001–2007 he served as Assistant Dean of the School of Public Policy and Management. He received his PhD from Nagoya University in 1997. Huang Haoming currently serves as the vice-chair, secretary general and legal person of the China International Civil Organizations Cooperative Promotion Association. She also works as a researcher at the NGO Research Institute of Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management while concurrently serving as a professor at Beijing Aeronautical University’s Institute of Public Management, chair of the Asia Land Reform and Township and Village Development Civil Organization Alliance, chair of the China Social Work Association, chair of the China Civil Organizations International Exchange Promotion Association, chair of the China International Trade Association, and adviser to the China Poverty Alleviation Foundation. Jia Xijin, associate professor of Tsinghua University’s Institute of Public Management with research interests in civil society and governance. PhD. from Peking University’s Law School (Sociology), M.A. and B.A. from Peking Medical School in Clinical Care. Li Yong, vice-director of the Department of Civil Organization Administration of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and a longtime participant in the registration of China’s Civil Non-Profit Organizations. He concurrently serves as an instructor at several institutions of higher learning. Lin Shangli, professor of Fudan University’s Institute of International Relations and Public Affairs. His research interests include political theory and China’s governance. He authored dang dai zhong guo zheng zhi xing tai yan jiu (“The Study of the Form of Contemporary Chinese Politics”, 当代中国政治形态研究).

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list of contributors

Liu Peifeng, associate professor of Beijing Normal University’s Law School. Professor Liu received his PhD in law. His research interests include citizens’ rights theory and laws and supervisory systems for non-profit organizations. He authored jie she zi you ji qi xian zhi (“Freedom of Association and its Limitations”, 结社自由及其限制, 社科文献出版社, 2007). Tao Chuanjin, director of the Center for Social Welfare Studies at the Institute of Social Development and Public Policy of Beijing Normal University. Associate professor and PhD candidate advisor. Kang Xiaoguang, professor, School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development; Director, NPO Research Center of School of Public Administration, Renmin University of China. Lu Xianying, PhD candidate, School of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Renmin University of China. Han Heng, male, Lecturer and PhD, College of Public Administration, Zhengzhou University. Zhu Weiguo, MA in civil law, director of the State Council’s Office of Legal Affairs. Has participated in drafting over 60 sets of laws and administrative regulations pertaining to criminal law, civil law, administration, and social work. Author of Balance Error Theory《过失相抵论》and A Supplementary Explanation of Principles《辅助性原则解释》, among other articles.

CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ROAD TO CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA Wang Ming In the 30 years since the start of the Reform and Opening, civil organizations (民间组织) have been a unique and pervasive phenomenon. Born of the Reform and Opening, civil organizations have flourished in the waves of marketization and led citizens of this great nation to join hands in myriad ways in building, amidst transformation, a harmonious society of democracy, freedom, and universal love. This chapter defines and classifies civil organizations, identifies two major periods in their development, and uses system reforms, the public sphere and collective action as vantage points to analyze their development and shifts in China’s social foundations and systems. It finishes with a discussion of potential developments in China’s continually evolving civil society. 1. A Basic Definition of Civil Organizations and the Meaning of Civil Society 1.1. The Definition of Civil Organizations This chapter uses the term “civil organizations” to refer to various forms of organizations and their networks that have been established spontaneously, amidst this social transformation, by citizens of various social strata, and that to a certain degree have non profit, non government and social characteristics. These usually include membershipbased organizations like academic associations, research associations, [general] associations, business associations, promotional associations, and leagues, as well as non-membership-based organizations like foundations, people-run (民办) schools, people-run hospitals, people-run

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social benefit institutions, and other types of public welfare services entities.1 Generally speaking, “civil organizations” are similar to “civil society organizations” or “non-governmental organizations” in English and are part of the civil society, non profit or “third” sector that is independent of the national system’s government and the economic system’s enterprises. Naturally, China’s civil organizations are different from civil society organizations as understood in the Western parlance. In the aspects of civil agency, the standardization of the external environment and the systemization of internal governance, China’s civil organizations inevitably bear the marks of Chinese characteristics from this transformative period. Over 30 years of China’s development during the Reform and Opening, the connotations and denotations of “civil organizations” have constantly been in flux. In the 1980’s, the term primarily referred to social groups (社会团体) like academic associations, research associations, [general] associations, and foundations that appeared following the Reform and Opening. Like enterprises, although they were independent of the part-government system, they were still often dependent on party-system departments. The participants in these social groups tended to be intellectuals, farmers, individual practitioners (个体从业者), and retired party cadres. Many social groups were actually started through the agency of party-government departments and state-owned units; sometimes there even appeared situations in which party-government, state-owned units and social groups were mixed together into one. In the late 1980’s, China’s government issued laws and regulations offering a standardized framework for civil organizations. Then, entering the 1990’s, as China’s economy adopted market mechanisms, government accelerated its reforms, and social transformations swept the nation, civil organizations increasingly began to exhibit “civil” traits, even gradually, the non profit orientation that would distinguish them from enterprises. After 1998, China’s government successively drafted and issued several important regulations, forming a more mature, systemic framework. Following the introduction of the Harmonious Society Strategic Aims (构建和谐社会战略 Translator’s note: Chinese terminology, where deemed useful, has been included in parentheses following the term. In this case, because of the large number of terms, they are included in footnote form: (学会, 研究会, 协会, 商会, 促进会, 联合会, 基金会, 民办学校, 民办医院, 民办社会福利设施, 公益服务实体) 1

the development of civil organizations

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目标), civil organizations have enjoyed broader participation in the state’s and society’s public governance of China’s politics, economy, culture, and society. This has allowed civil organizations to realize their systemic, non governmental advantage over party-government institutions as well as their non profit, public welfare, or common welfare governance advantages over enterprises. This participation has also allowed them to contribute to creating a cooperative framework between party-government and private sectors, and, through this interaction, to the edification of a Harmonious Society. Thus, China’s civil organizations have emerged from the nation’s Reform and Opening, marketization campaigns, and social transformations as a civil society sector. One that is relatively independent of, interdependent with, intermingled with and yet synergistic with the state and market systems. Figure 1-1 illuminates the three sectors and the space occupied by civil organizations. We continue with a discussion of civil organizations’ current state in China based on the diagram. State, market and society are three complementary yet relatively independent systems, a unity of opposites comprising the whole of contemporary society. Agency in the state system is embodied by government institutions at various levels and public organizations; in the market system, by profit oriented enterprises; while in the social system, by non profit, non governmental, civil organizations. Amidst the current transition, China’s civil organizations have represented a massive, complex, and changing system. On a macro level, this system overlaps with the state system and with the market system; yet it has gradually developed characteristics different from both systems. According to its common usage, civil organizations, of the society system, contain four parts: civil organizations narrowly defined; civil organizations broadly defined 1; civil organizations broadly defined 2; civil organizations broadly defined 3. Of these, broad definitions 2 (including people’s groups and state-run units) and 3 (including social enterprises) are positioned within the society system at the margins with the state and market systems. They share certain overlap with the state and market systems and are also included within government departments and enterprise units. For this reason, they are not the focus of the current discussion. We have chosen to focus the present research on civil organizations as narrowly defined and as defined within broad definition 1. They are described further below:

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1.1.1. Civil Organizations in the Narrow Sense The core components of Figure 1-1 are civil organizations as commonly understood. They represent mostly social groups, foundations and people-run non enterprise units registered with various civil affairs departments according to current laws and regulations. Social organizations are member-based organizations based on and formed from social relationships; their defining characteristic is having as their base people and their social relationships. Foundations are financial groups based on and formed from financial relationships; their defining characteristic is having as their base finance and public interest relationships. People-run non enterprise units refer to social service institutions established through civil contributions. In contrast with social groups and foundations, these institutional entities directly provide social services. These three types of civil organizations are all legally required to register. Within the narrow definition of civil organizations, there is another group, “business associations”. This term refers to membershiporiented groups led by members of the business community which are not registered with civil affairs bureaus, but rather, with various levels of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce.2 That business associations are registered, in a unique arrangement and outside the prevalent laws and regulations, is related to the Federation’s special status as a “Unified Front” people’s group. Naturally, in function and operations, these business associations (商会) are similar to the industry associations among social groups (社会团体中的行业协会). At times, the two are even referred to jointly as industrial and commercial associations (工商协会).

2 The 工商联, or All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce was established in October of 1953. It can be categorized as a people’s group and “civil” business association (民间商会) under the leadership of and part of a United Front” with the CCP. Counted a part of the civil administration system, Federation organizations of various levels have already been established across China at the county level and above. According to data given by the Federation at year-end 2007, Federation organizations at the county level and up were 3130 in number (divided into 16 categories), representing 97% penetration among extant civil administration zones.


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Civil organizations in the broad sense 2 Including: • People’s Groups • State run units

Civil organizations in the narrow sense Including: • Social groups • Foundations • People-run non-enterprise units • Commerce associations

STATE

Civil organizations in the broad sense 3 Including: • Social organizations

MARKET

SOCIETY

Civil organizations in the broad sense 1 Including: • Community, base-level organizations • Agricultural associations • NPOs registered as enterprises • Affiliated entities in China of foreign organizations

Source: the author

Figure 1-1: Conceptual diagram of civil organizations

1.1.2. Civil Organizations in the Broad Sense In Figure 1-1, this part is positioned away from both the state and the market systems. By definition, this portion contains four types, including: First are community, root-level organizations (社区基层组织). These refer to civil organizations at the community level which are spontaneously formed by residents themselves and which conduct activities primarily at the community level. In urban communities (社区), these primarily are manifest as “interest associations” (兴趣协会) established by residents based on common interests, hobbies, values or needs. In village communities, they primarily are manifest as root-level organizations which conduct interactive, interest-based, and public welfare-oriented activities at the village or township level. Due to their large number, small scale and relative fluidity, community, root-level organizations do not usually receive support from the state system. At the community level, however, they enjoy high formation of social capital and resident participation as well as easy access market resources and some interaction with the market system. Most community, root-level organizations

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Second are agricultural associations (农村专业协会). These refer to non-profit, membership organizations, spontaneously formed by agricultural producers, distributors and intermediaries, centered around economic activities related to agriculture, ranching and fish farming, production of agricultural by-products, distribution, technology promulgation, and infrastructural developments. Examples include the Onion Association, Potato Association, Pig-Raisers Association, Agricultural Use Water Association and the Agricultural Technology Dissemination Association. Agricultural associations appeared in the early 1980’s and have experienced a major transformation since the mid-1990’s. Following the deepening of village reforms and the increasingly obvious effects of the market economy’s development, the number of agricultural associations is huge and, among these, growing most rapidly. For various reasons, the vast majority of agricultural associations are not registered in the civil affairs system. Third are NPOs registered with the Administration of Industry and Commerce. These refer to civil organizations primarily engaged in non profit activities that are registered as industrial and commercial enterprises. The reason for the appearance of this type is that the barriers associated with registration and regulatory compliance for civil organizations are too high. As a result, some citizens unable to register civil organizations turn to the enterprise form. These appear mostly in the major, seaboard cities, and often have both public welfare and operational elements. Many derive their funding both from social contributions and from operational revenues. These enterprise-registered NPOs aside, still other NPO civil organizations, for various reasons, are not formally registered according to the prevailing laws. Among these are enterprise alliances, collective clubs, online communities, and business owner committees. These organizations are often related to new technologies, new social forms, new social phenomena or new cultural directions. They are sometimes called “new social organizations”. Unregistered, they are often loosely-formed and temporary, but still have considerable dynamism and influence in the more developed cities and among young people. Because many of these organizations also become enterprise-registered NPOs, we analyze them together with that type. Fourth are NGOs from abroad in China. These refer to civil organizations from abroad (including those from Hong Kong, Macao and


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Taiwan) that have long-term, stable operations in Mainland China. These include institutions primarily devoted to provision of financial support, operation of public welfare projects and training, as well as professional groups active in the industrial and commercial space like foreign enterprise associations and business associations. Among these, fundraising and program-focused institutions were active as early as the 1980’s in China and have developed stable, cooperative relationships with various levels of government and other civil organizations. Consultative institutions and foreign enterprise associations have become very active mostly since China’s accession to the WTO. The eight types of civil organizations discussed in the two sections above comprise the principal part of civil organizations for the purposes of our discussion. They represent the basic state of China’s civil organizations. The state of their development, their number and their scale will be discussed in the second part. What we underscore here is that we have selected these eight types for analysis because, currently, as a system, they are most representative of and characteristic of China’s civil organizations at the current moment in China’s transformation. Further, the formation of this system is steadily propelling China’s society, in accordance with the Harmonious Society strategic framework, toward civil society. 1.2. Properties of Civil Organizations For the current discussion, we assume civil organizations to be non profit, non governmental and social. Civil organizations’ non profit orientation is what distinguishes them from enterprises and other profit-oriented organizations in the market. Strictly, non profit orientation includes three aspects: the first is possession of constraints on distribution and income, or the “non-distribution constraint” from economics, which requires that no donor, director or manager extract profit from the organization’s funds or activities.3 The second is the existence of operational and management mechanisms, known as “non-self-interest controls”, which include personal control

The non-distribution constraint (不分配约束) is a systemic norm among NPOs based on actors’ motivations and trust, which requires that profits are not distributed to the individuals or organizations controlling the NPO. See Hansmann, Henry. “Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization” in Walter W. Powell (ed.) The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, pp. 99–117, New Haven: Yale University Press.1987. 3

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mechanisms for the effective avoidance of high risk and high reward and preclude management practices which use profit and self-benefit to motivate, at all points of decision-making, execution and supervision. The third is the presence of mechanisms to protect the assets of the NPO, also known as “asset preservation mechanisms”. These preclude the civil organization from changing its assets or its assetholding structure using any financing method besides donations (forbidden activities include equity financing, investment, co-investment, or mergers or acquisitions). Should the organization cease activities and be nullified, its assets may not be transferred in any form to private individuals, including donors, and may only be used for social activities consistent with the organization’s mission. In this transformative phase, China’s civil organizations exhibit these properties to varying degrees, but, generally speaking, are all gradually, but clearly, trending towards true non profit orientation. Distinguishing civil organizations from governments and public organizations in the state system are their NGO characteristics. These are expressed in three forms. The first is that civil organizations are different from governmental or public organizations in the area of decision-making. Civil organizations are self-directed, self-governing, and independent. They are independent entities making their own decisions and governing themselves. The second is that their governance structures are unlike the top to bottom structures of the partygovernment system. They are democratic, open and society oriented. Civil organizations enjoy democratic governance and transparency. Third is that, unlike the government, civil organizations are nonmonopolistic in their operations and face market competition. They strive for core competitiveness and test their strength in the sink-orswim marketplace. Like the non profit orientation discussed above, in this transformative period, civil organizations’ NGO qualities also have certain Chinese characteristics, and are, with the passage of time, progressing gradually. Civil organizations’ social orientation reflects that these organizations are “for society”, and differentiates them from other organizations amidst human society. Social orientation is also expressed in three forms. The first is that resources are social. The resources used by the organization for subsistence and development come primarily from society. These resources, intended for “public welfare” or “common welfare”, come from society through fundraising, receipt of donations, applications for assistance, and membership fees. They also


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include human, public welfare, resources in the form of volunteering. The second is the social orientation of their products. These organizations’ products and services have strong altruistic or public welfare orientations. Their intended recipients are either unspecified members of society or disadvantaged or marginalized groups within society. The third is the social nature of their accountability. This form of organization is accountable to and supervised by society and by the public sector in all areas of their operations and management. These three properties can be understood as fundamental differences between civil organizations and governments and related institutions in the state system and enterprises in the market system. Naturally, in the current transformative period, the exact levels of non profit, NGO and social orientations expressed in particular civil organizations varies widely. Even so, these properties serve as boundaries dividing civil organizations from government entities and enterprises. 1.3. Types of Civil Organizations As determined by the definitions and properties above, civil organizations are both extremely broad in their scope and domain, and extremely complex in scale and form. Classifying them, therefore, requires a diversity of categories. We can approach classification from different angles. To take a few examples, we might separate them by structure into membership-based or non membership-based categories, by legal person form into association legal person or consortium legal person forms, by organizational properties into public welfare, common welfare or public-common welfare organizations. In China, as written above, registered civil organizations are often categorized by their legal registrations as social groups, foundations or people run non-enterprise units. Among these classifications, they can be separated further. Social organizations can be subdivided into academic, industrial (行业性), professional (专业性) and coalition (联合性) types. Foundations can be subdivided into public and non-public fundraising types. People run non-enterprise units can be subdivided into education, health, culture, technology, athletics, labor, civil affairs, intermediary social services, legal services, and other types. In order to standardize and unify management of statistics related to civil organizations, the Ministry of Civil Affairs introduced a new classification system at the end of 2006. The new system, developed by consulting the Urn’s system for classifying NPOs and integrating

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characteristics of China’s NPOs, was then applied to the annual inspections of the three types of civil organizations. At the end of 2007, the Ministry of Civil Affairs released statistical data by type of civil organization based on the new annual inspection classifications. The new classifications closely resembled the UN classifications, providing statistical support for needed international comparisons. In this article, we have tried to use the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ classification system to the extent possible. The new classification for civil organizations retained the division according to registration type into social groups, foundations and people run non-enterprise units, and also divided them into fourteen types based on the fields of their activities. According to the statistical data from 2007, their proportions were as follows: 1. Technology and research (6.9%); 2. environment (1.5%); 3. education (26%); 4. health (10.4%); 5. social services (13%); 6. culture (5.8%); 7. athletics (4.2%); 8. law (1.1%); 9. 工商业服务 (5.1%); 10. religion (1.0%); 11. agriculture and rural development (9.6%); 12. business and professional (4.2%); 13. international (0.12%); 14. other (11.9%).

1.4. The Connotations of “Civil Society” Last, given the aim of this article and the concepts discussed above, the time has come for a basic explanation of civil society. 公民社会, or gnomon shehui, is the Chinese translation of the English term “civil society”. It is a concept widely circulated worldwide and also one fraught with ambiguity. In the late 1990’s, exposure to the term increased among numerous Chinese scholars, and it began to be translated as “市民社会”, shimin shehui, or “city resident society” and used, in contrast with traditional society, to refer to a kind of modernized social model.4 With the development of civil organizations and the introduction of Harmonious Society, the concept has been imbued with

4 See 邓正来/Deng Zhenglai, et. al.,《国家与市民社会: 一种社会理论的研究路径（增订版）》/Guo jia yu shi min she hui: yi zhong she hui li lun de yan jiu lu jing (zeng ding ban) (Deng Zhenglai and Jeffrey Alexander, eds., Shanghai, 世纪出版集团/上海人民出版社/Shi ji Press and Shanghai People’s Press, 2006.1. (“The State and City Resident Society: a Research Agenda From Social Theory (Reprint Edition)”) Deng published numerous articles in the 1990’s explaining the concept of “city resident society”. They were principally published in publications like《中国社会科学季刊》/Zhongguo she hui ke xue ji kan (Hong Kong) (China Social Science Quarterly) and《中国书评》/Zhongguo shu ping. (China Book Review)


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additional meanings.5 In 2004, Edwards’s book, Civil Society, was published by Polity Press and translated into Chinese.6 The book systematically discusses various views and disagreements among scholars concerning civil society, referred to by the author as “the civil society debate”. According to his analysis, the theoretical viewpoints concerning civil society can be divided into three sets of models. The first set he calls analytical models, which emphasizes civil society as one sector amidst society as a whole. The second, normative, set portrays civil society as characterized by a social disposition based on personal ideals. The third, public sphere, model portrays civil society as a platform for public deliberation and rational dialogue in the public interest.7 With respect to the emergence of civil organizations, civil society is basically just another annotation associated with the development of civil organizations and the numerous social changes that have accompanied it. If we can avoid getting caught up in the macro, political connotations of the term “society” (社会), then civil society could easily be placed atop “civil groups” (公民社团), “civic groups” (民间社团) and “civil organizations” (民间组织)”, among other categories. In truth, the term “civil society” is not in any discernable way different from “civil organizations”. According to my understanding, and perhaps my co-authors share my view, we are willing to explain civil society in a broader and more inclusive sense. It describes a state in which civil organizations of various forms are able to develop fully; in which they, as associations formed spontaneously and autonomously by citizens, can easily receive legalized support; in which they, as a 5 Besides academic discussion, this term has also taken on applied meanings. In the first half of 2008, a propaganda mural reading “civil society/growing up together” appeared on the street in Shenzhen, signed by the CCP Shenzhen Municipal Committee Propaganda Department. Surrounding the 30 year anniversary of the start of the Reform and Opening, the Shenzhen Municipal Government plans to adopt a new image, through the concept of civil society, combining the Reform and Opening and Harmonious Society. 6 As a vigorous recommender of the book《公民社会》Civil Society, I regret that it was not, in the end and for various reasons, published as an independent volume and was instead published as a serial in《中国非营利评论》（半年刊）/Zhongguo fei ying li ping lun (“China Non Profit Review (semi-annual )”), which I edit. Of course, this form may also promote the broad dissemination and discussion of this view in China. The translator, Chen Yimei, has made a formidable contribution to the book. See 麦克尔・爱德华兹/Michael Edwards (陈一梅译/Chen Yimin, trans.), 公民社会（上）/Gong min she hui, in《中国非营利评论》/ Vol. 2, pp. 110–142. Beijing. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press. 2008.7. (“Civil Society (1 of 2)” in “China Non Profit Review”) 7 Edwards（2008) pp. 110–142.

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450000 400000 350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000 50000 2007

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Social Groups Registered by Year-end People-Run Non-Enterprise Units Registered by Year-end

Data source: Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China official website, China civil organizations net (中国民间组织网) http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/

Figure 1-2. Total number of social groups and people run non-enterprise units from 1988–2007

form of expression of citizens and their groups, can engage in communication, dialogue, discourse and engagement; and in which they, as a system for citizens to participate in social and public affairs, can, through competition, access the resources of the public sector. Because of the existence of civil organizations, citizens and citizens’ groups have been able to increase their social capital; enterprises and other forprofit organizations have been able to fulfill their social responsibility; governments and public sector entities have become more democratic, efficient, and accountable; and all of society has become more harmonious, inclusive, diverse and tolerant. We refer to this state of society, brought about by the full development of civil organizations, as civil society. 2. The Development of Civil Organizations Since the beginning of the Reform and Opening, civil organizations have undergone a winding journey beginning with their appearance and continuing through a period of enormous growth. This chapter charts that process using data from registrations and media reports. Figure 1-2 was compiled using public data from the Ministry of Civil


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Source: Compiled through analysis of search results from the authoritative China Periodicals Net and other sources (中国期刊网).

Figure 1-3: Annual Increase in major civil organizations in China, 1979–2007

Affairs and displays the numbers of civil organizations registered at year-ends.8 Because systematic data are only available beginning in 1987, we are without data for the first ten years and also without more detailed structural indices. This led us to create Figure 1-3 by compiling data from an authoritative search system9 based on media reports on the establishment and the activities of the major civil organizations.10,11 Data from both diagrams are discussed further in the analyses below.

8 This figure is complied from the most authoritative data available on changes in numbers of civil organizations since the start of the Reform and Opening. The text refers to and analyzes this figure and its data in some depth. 9 The authoritative search included: People’s Daily (人民日报), China Periodicals Full-text Database (中国期刊全文数据库), China Periodicals Full-text Database—Shi ji Periodicals (中国期刊全文数据库_世纪期刊). 10 Major civil organizations here include: academic associations, research associations, foundations, general associations, business associations, promotion associations, leagues, and friendship leagues (联谊会). 11 It should be pointed out here that these data on civil organizations are by no means complete. We cannot, therefore, compare them with official registration statistics. However, because they are drawn from authoritative media sources, their veracity and breadth of coverage are relatively reliable and they can, to a certain extent, represent the overall state of development of civil organizations at the time within China.

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From Figures 1-2 and 1-3, we can clearly see the fluctuations and period changes in the development of China’s civil organizations. Based on the scale and pace of their development, we have divided the development China’s civil organizations over the 30 years since the start of the Reform and Opening into two periods, which are discussed in turn below. 2.1. Period One: The Rise of Civil Organizations This period spans from the beginning of the Reform and Opening until 1992. In these fourteen years, China’s civil organizations experienced a truly metamorphic period from their first appearance to enormous growth in the population of organizations. The sheer force of the Reform and Opening, paired with the lack of constraints, led to a rate of extreme growth akin to an explosion of civil organizations. In Figure 1-2, we can see that from the time that the Ministry of Civil Affairs began keeping registration data in 1988 until five years later in 1992, the number of registered social groups had rocketed from fewer than 5,000 to 154,500. Within these numbers, there is without a doubt an unavoidable “booster” effect from established, but unregistered, organizations. Nevertheless, the numbers still reflect the strength of the explosive growth of the accumulated civil organizations. In Figure 1-3, we can see more broadly and more clearly the historically high numbers of civil organizations appearing in this period. This new growth began at the start of the Reform and Opening and was sustained through the 1980’s until the beginning of the 1990’s. Over this sustained, fifteen year long period of opportunity, civil organizations of all types surged in numbers amidst the tumult of the Reform and Opening, serving as an indispensable, driving force behind China’s social changes. The resurgence of academic associations offered the first sign of civil organizations after the Reform and Opening. Their appearance was also an embodiment of a kind of “[as free as] fish swimming in the broad sea and birds flying in the towering skies” associational ideal and systemic space for Chinese intellectuals who had suffered under the political persecution, thought campaigns and social limitations of the Cultural Revolution. According to incomplete statistics, in 1978, 78 academic associations, research associations and sub-associations of the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) were re-established. In 1979, the number rose to 249. As China entered the


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1990’s, a veritable “association wave” of various academic associations, scientific associations and research associations was formed and spread over every field of economic and social life. In the ten years from 1980–1989, nearly each year the number of academic civil organizations topped 300, a trend which peaked in the late 1980’s. According to 1988 data from CAST and from the State Statistical Bureau, by the end of 1987, academic-type associations under CAST numbered 146; branch scientific associations under CAST numbered 1,555; while village and township science promotion associations reached 46,569 in number. A national network of urban and rural academic associations and public science promulgation had been established.12 Among these, the most notable were the numerous and ever-spreading village and township science promotion associations, along with CAST-supported and steadily growing professional technological research associations. By 1992, farmers had spontaneously established over 120,000 agricultural technology research associations with membership numbering in the millions. Their activities involved planting, breeding, village and township enterprises, among service industries among a total of 140 different types of activities. The groups emerged as a driving force behind the promulgation of technology at the village level and the commercial economy as a whole. Along with the resurgence of academic groups and amidst the liberation of thought and the economic and social development brought on by the Reform and Opening, all types of civil organizations began to appear in the social and economic spheres. In April of 1978, the State Council approved the Ministry of Health’s and the Foreign Ministry’s Report Concerning the Restoration of the Red Cross’s Domestic Activities《关于恢复红十字会国内工作的报告》. This event affirmed the restoration of China Red Cross’s status as a provider of first-aid and rescue to the people. It also resulted in the continuation of the group’s work in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and ten other cities and raised the curtain for a flurry of activity among public welfare oriented civil organizations.13 In January of 1980, a joint notice from the United Front Work 12 田良木/Tian Liangmu, 沈晓丹/Shen Xiaodan: “中国科协国家统计局首次发布资料我国现有科技社团 146 个”/“zhongguo ke xie guo jia tong ji ju shou ci fa bu zi liao wo guo xian you ke ji she tuan 146 ge”, in ren min ri bao (3rd edition), November 6, 1988. (“The First Data Released by the State Statistical Bureau on CAST, 146 Science and Technology Groups Now Established” in “People’s Daily”) 13 In the State Council report ordering the continuation of the Red Cross’s work, mention was made of Premier Zhou Enlai’s 1950 reorganization, which defined the

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Department of CPC Central Committee, the Central Committee of the Youth League, and the All-China Women’s Federation announced the restoration of the YMCA/YWCA in eleven cities.14 In August of the same year, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the Provisional Regulations on Lawyers《律师暂行条例》, which established scores of Lawyers’ Associations across the nation. At the same time, branch associations of the China AntiTuberculosis Association were established in 24 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. Starting in 1983, civil organizations in the social and economic spheres began to climb to a peak. In April, the State Council released a set of supplementary provisions, Several Policy Regulations Concerning City and Township Non-Agricultural Individual Economy《关于城镇非农业个体经济若干政策性规定》, that mandated the development of individual laborer associations, “mass organizations managed by the individual laborers themselves”, in all administrative regions, and called on governments at all levels for their active support. This marked a new period in the development of individual laborer associations. Governments at all levels began to support establishment and development of individual laborer associations. According to news reports, by the end of June in 1985, 2,468 individual laborer associations, covering 91.3% of municipalities and counties, had been established. Already, 144 class-one associations had been established at the sub-provincial city level, for coverage of 95.4%. In addition, 19 provincial, municipal and autonomous regionlevel associations had been established, topping off a network of individual laborer associations with national coverage. At the same time, as reforms in government and city systems and national economic development proceeded apace, a new system of industrial associations, with state owned enterprises at its core, was established. With the support of government at all levels, it developed quickly. Governments also began to support the development of consumer protection associations. In 1984, the China Consumers’ Association was established

Red Cross as a “people’s health first-aid and rescue group” and mandated activities in city neighborhoods, factories and outskirts, the conducting of a patriotic health campaign, mass prevention and mass treatment, blood donation and training for wartime first-aid (including training for middle and high school aged youths). 14 After passage by the CCPCC, Document No. 26 (1980) was jointly issued on January 10, 1980 by the United Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee, the Central Committee of the Youth League, and the All-China Women’s Federation, agreeing to restore the operations of the YMCA and YWCA in 11 cities.


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and set up branch associations at all administrative levels. According to incomplete statistics, by December of 1985, 75 consumer protection associations had been established at various levels. By analyzing annual data from 1983 and 1988 using standardized classifications, we found that the proportion of industrial and commercial associations leapt from 28% to 44%, occupying the largest share of any type of association. During this period, the growth of family planning associations was also very rapid. At a congress in Beijing in March, 1986, the China Family Planning Association (CFPA), which had been established in 1980, deliberated and amended its Articles, selected a board and standing council for its 2nd term, and resolved to focus the organization’s work on the rural, local level. With support from all levels of government behind them, local branches of the CFPA developed at an astonishing pace. By 1991, 600,000 village level Associations had been organized,15 as well as special CFPA organizations targeting the floating population, which numbered 15,000.16 Together, these formed an urban and rural nework of family planning associations that covered all of society. On the August 9th, 1981, the two earliest foundations of the Reform and Opening period were established in Beijing. They were the China Children and Teenagers’ Fund, begun by the China Welfare Institute and eleven other people’s groups17 and the Overseas Chinese Tea Research and Development Foundation (华侨茶业发展研究基金会), begun through the advocacy of overseas patriot Guan Beifa (关奋发).18 15 “全国已有乡村计划生育协会 60 多万个”/“quan guo yi you xiang cun ji hua sheng yu xie hui 60 duo wan ge”, in ren min ri bao (first edition), July 23, 1991. (“Over 600,000 Family Planning Associations at the Village Level” in “People’s Daily”) 16 “流动人口计生协会有 1.5 万个”/“liu dong ren kou ji sheng xie hui you 1.5 wan ge”, in ren min ri bao (first edition), May 22, 1992. (“15,000 Floating Population Family Planning Associations” in “People’s Daily”) 17 The China Children and Teenagers’ Fund was jointly founded by the China Welfare Institute, Chinese People’s National Committee for the Defense of Children, All-China Women’s Federation, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, Chinese Communist Youth League’s Central Committee, All-China Youth Federation, China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, China Association of Science and Technology, All-China Sports Federation, All-China Overseas Chinese Federation, and All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. Its first Chairman was Kang Keqing (康克清). The foundation pursued the development of youths and teenagers by accepting donations from society at large. According to news reports, the Foundation received 3,400,000 yuan in donations in the first year. They primarily used funds to construct youth and teenager activity centers and to aid welfare work in areas with marginalized and minority children and teens. 18 The Overseas Chinese Tea Research and Development Foundation was founded on September 8, 1981 due to the advocacy of the overseas patriot Guan Beifa (关奋发).

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In the over two years that followed, more than ten more foundations would be established, including the China Soong Ching Ling Foundation,19 the China Coal Mining Culture Promulgation Foundation (中国煤矿文化宣传基金会),20 the Sun Yefang Foundation,21 the China Foundation for Disabled Persons,22 and the China Social Welfare Education Foundation.23 A wave quickly formed of foundation fundraising and social welfareoriented activities that spread, without articles nor precedent, nor regulations nor supervision, across the nation. According to incomplete statistics from September, 1987, 214 foundations had been established without going through any processes or applications. Of these, 33 were

At the time of its founding Lin Xiude (林修德) the Vice-director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, served as its Chairman, while Guan Beifa (关奋发) served as Vice-Chairman. The original board had eleven members, mostly prominent members of the tea industry and scholars. Their initial funds came from the Hong Kong Care Foundation (香港敬慎基金会) fundraising, and social donations and were used to aid the research and development of China’s tea industry. 19 The China Soong Ching Ling Foundation was founded in May of 1982, originally as the “Commemoration of the Honorary President of the People’s Republic of China Soong Ching Ling Children’s Scientific Park Foundation”. Its board first met in December of 1982 with Deng Xiaoping as Honorary Chairman, Liao Chengzhi (廖承志) as advisor, and Kang Keqing as Director. It took the name “The Commemoration of the Honorary President of the People’s Republic of China Soong Ching Ling Foundation”, and has devoted itself primarily to children’s welfare. 20 The China Coal Mining Culture Promulgation Foundation was founded on October 32, 1982 through donations of more than 2 million yuan from mining enterprises, units, institutions and groups. Funds were used to develop mining cultural activities and to increase the education level among mining workers. It mostly uses the proceeds (interest) from the foundation as bonuses for excellent artistic works and excellent mine clubs. 21 Founded on June 19, 1983, its complete name is the “Sun Yefang Economic Science Scholarship Foundation”. The foundation, which commemorates the eminent economist Sun Yefang, recognizes and awards prizes to groups or individuals who have made outstanding contributions to China’s economic sciences. It was funded with 200,000 yuan in donations from 55 economists. 22 The China Foundation for Disabled Persons was founded on March 15, 1984 due to the efforts of Deng Pufang (邓朴方), with Deng serving as Vice-Director and Cui Naifu (崔乃夫) as Director. Its mission is to advocate for respect and assistance for the disabled in China, for their enjoyment of equal rights and responsibilities in society, and for the advancement of benefits for the disabled in China. Primarily, the foundation uses donations to stage activities promoting disabled persons’ social benefits. 23 The China Social Welfare Education Foundation was established in August 29, 1984 in Beijing. The charity raises funds from society at large and uses them to support social benefit services for the elderly, disabled persons and orphans in Beijing. The Honorary Chair is Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋), while the acting Chair is Jiao Ruoyu (焦若愚).


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national in scale while 181 were local.24 In this initial period, the vast majority of foundations were pressed to stage fundraising activities, drawing upon all their influence, and even the authority of the Party, in order to survive. Society responded with assistance from all quarters. In less than half a year after their establishment in July of 1981, the China Children and Teenagers’ Fund had raised 3 million yuan. By the end of the year in 1984, the foundation had received over 30,000 donations from thousands of groups totaling over 6 million yuan.25 The Chinese Foundation for Teacher Development (originally called 中国中小学幼儿教师奖励基金会) was established in 1986. Within six years’ time it had established a multi-tiered, national foundation network in 26 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions, 12 separate city entities and 600 counties, raising 800 million yuan.26 During this period, in preparation for the 11th Asia Games in Beijing, the Asia Games Foundation was founded in September of 1987. By the time the games were held not three years later on June 3, 1991, the foundation had raised 350 million yuan from donors inside and outside China, a sum which provided 50% of the total funds needed for the games and which greatly contributed to its successful execution.27 At the same time, other groups of local-level foundations with dual functions as fundraisers and providers of social wellbeing sprung up across the country. In 1982, in Heilongjiang’s Qiqiha’er City, a group of selfemployed workers formed a loan society (互助基金会).28 In 1983, a barefoot doctors’ retirement foundation was formed in the Tongcheng commune of Fujian’s Fuding County.29 In February of 1985, the Beijing 24 Ministry of Civil Affairs Department of Civil Organization Management, 2004, p. 40. 25 “花儿会记住你的关怀——访中国儿童和少年基金会”/ “hua er hui ji zhu ni de guan huai—fang zhongguo er tong he shao nian ji jin hui”, in ren min ri bao (3rd edition), May 30, 1985. (“Snowflakes Will Remember Your Care” in “People’s Daily”) 26 “中小学幼儿教师奖励基金已达八亿元　六年共奖励优秀教师近一百万人”/“zhong xiao xue you er jiao shi jiang li ji jin er da ba yi yuan”, in ren min ri bao, September 7, 1992. (“China Teachers Development Fund Reaches 800 Million Yuan/Rewards Almost One Million Excellent Teachers Over Six Years” in “People’s Daily”) 27 “北京亚运会集资七亿元　基金会光荣完成使命”/“bei jing ya yun hui ji zi qi yi yuan/ji jin hui guang rong cheng shi ming”, in ren min ri bao, June 4, 1991. (“Beijing Asia Games Raises 700 Million Yuan/Foundation Proudly Achieves Mission” in “People’s Daily”) 28 See the 2nd edition of ren min ri bao, February 3, 1982. This kind of loan society later developed into self-employed worker loan foundations (个体户贷款基金会). 29 See 王国贤/Wang Guoxian, “巩固赤脚医生队伍的一项具体措施——赤脚医生退休基金会”/“gong gu chi jiao yi sheng dui wu de yi xiang ju ti cuo shi—chi

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Football Team Snowflake Foundation was formed by the Xiannongtan Sports Training Center and the Beijing Electrical Refrigerator Factory.30 October, 1985 brought an education foundation set up in the Xinxing Village, Li County, Hebei.31 In 1987, Nongkou village in Hangzhou established a vegetable development foundation.32 Around October of 1988, villages in Hebei’s Weichang County established some 50 “population foundations” to help resolve funding shortages for family planning programs.33 In Shenyang and Dongdan Cities, employee benefit foundations were established to ameliorate problems with State Owned Enterprises’ (SOE) benefit schemes.34 Local governments, too, established rural cooperative foundations as an important part of reforms; through their efforts, many forms of rural cooperative foundations flourished. According to incomplete statistics, by the end of 1991, 18,000 rural cooperative foundations had been established at the village and township levels with a total of 9.99 billion yuan in funds within a year, accumulated funds in circulation grew to 10.17 billion yuan.35 From this general overview, we can see that in the first period after the Reform and Opening, amidst a liberation of thinking and economic and social development, along with unceasing transformations and reforms, the nation experienced a burst, organized from the top down, of associations. These appeared across society, and mostly in the forms of academic and research associations. This organizing activity produced startling growth figures. Although it is impossible to arrive at precise figures for civil organizations during this period, the

jiao yi sheng tui xiu ji jin hui” in zhongguo yi yuan guan li, Vol. 3, 1984. (“One Specific Measure for Solidifying Barefoot Doctor Teams—the Barefoot Doctors Retirement Foundation” in “Hospital Management”) 30 See ren min ri bao (3rd edition), February 19, 1985. 31 See ren min ri bao (5th edition), October 6, 1985. This kind of foundation, which resolves village compulsory education by fundraising, later appeared nationwide. 32 See 马顺芳, 高长奎/Ma Shunfang and Gao Changkui, “杭州弄口村建立蔬菜发展基金会”/“hang zhou nong kou cun jian li shu cai fa zhan ji jin hui”, in chang zhou shu cai, Vol. 1, 1988. (“Hangzhou’s Nong Kou Village Establishes Vegetable Foundation” in “Changzhou Vegetables”) 33 See ren min ri bao (3rd edition), October 8, 1988. 34 See “建立职工福利会的作法”/“jian li zhi gong fu li hui de zuo fa”, in cai wu yue kan, Vol. 6, 1988. (“Methods for Establishing Employee Benefits Associations” in “Finance Monthly”) 35 “合作基金会在农村发挥大作用”/“he zuo ji jin hui zai tong cun fa hui da zuo yong”, in ren min ri bao (2nd edition), May 29, 1992.(“Cooperative Foundations Make a Big Contribution in Villages” in “People’s Daily”)


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analysis in this piece, using an authoritative search based on multiple channels of official data, deduces that in this 14-year period, around one million civil organizations appeared in China. 2.2. Period Two: A New Peak of Civil Organizations, Civil Organizations’ Standardized Management Period two lasted from 1993 to 2007. In these fifteen years, China’s civil organizations underwent two major changes. The first was a process of standardizing management against a backdrop of political changes. The second, which took place amidst China’s maturing market economy, deepening Reform and Opening, and spreading social transformations, was the gradual emergence of civil organizations from development among twists and turns to a new peak. 2.2.1. Standardized Management Against a Backdrop of Political Changes Much-needed standardized management and related system frameworks lagged behind the development of civil organizations during the first period. Though civil organizations during the first burst, termed the “associational revolution”, received support from the top-down system and participation from broad swaths of society, it also presented challenges to the extant system framework. Civil organizations began appearing in the hundreds of thousands. Yet regulatory, legal, and system frameworks had yet to be standardized and operating and management models and templates had yet to be unified. These factors caused bottlenecks, which, when combined with the stampede of new organizations, resulted in a state of near chaos. Such a situation, in a time of political changes, cannot but test the system’s tolerance and force questions of system design. In the late 1980s, in order to increase association registration, the State Council established a social group registration department within the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In September of 1988 and October of 1989, it released the Measures on Foundation Administration《基金会管理办法》and the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration《社会团体登记管理条例》 , respectively. These two regulations were the earliest standards for civil organizations. Upon this foundation, and in light of the Tian’anmen Square incident of 1989, these organizations walked a perilous road. In the more than 10 years on this road, many events are noteworthy, including the establishment of a civil organizations registration agency, two “cleaning up and reorganizing” campaigns,

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the release of regulations, the banning of cooperative foundations, the banning of the Falungong and other illegal organizations, and others. Amidst these changes, three contributions to the management system’s development stand out: The first was legal registration and the clean-up and reorganization of civil organizations. Civil organizations’ legal registration began in 1988. In the 21st Standing Committee Meeting of the State Council on September 9, the Measures for Administration of Foundations were passed with 14 Articles. The measures required that foundations not only have a clear social mission and registered capital, but also that they stand for audit by the central bank, the People’s Bank of China, and register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. This ended the period of unregistered foundation activity, and nationwide, for tens of thousands of foundations, signaled the beginning of a difficult period of “develop first, manage later”. In the next year, on October 13, the 49th meeting of the Standing Committee of the State Council passed the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration, similarly requiring the registration of social groups with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. These regulations were directed at the many types of social groups, more numerous, more complex and varied, and more difficult to standardize than foundations. The Ministry of Civil Affairs Social Group Management Division (民政部社会团体管理司), established in 1988, is the lone institution responsible for the registration of civil organizations designated by the State Council. Under the direction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, in the second half of 1989, the division began a campaign to identify and register foundations and social groups nationwide. Due to political changes, the registration of civil organizations underwent two instances of “clean-up and reorganization” in 1990 and 1997, which expressed the government’s political control and administrative interference in the civil organization sphere. The phrase “clean-up and reorganization” is borrowed from the enterprise management system during the Reform and Opening. In October of 1988, the CCPCC and the State Council passed a decision to clean-up and reorganize enterprises. The decision aimed to resolve various problems with enterprises, including the lack of clear divisions between the political and the enterprise and between official and commercial; the problem of internal deals; and avarice on the part of some enterprise officials. In June of 1990, the office of the State Council relayed a Ministry of Civil Affairs document concerning the clean-up and reorganization of social groups36 introducing standardized management of civil organizations, based on the earlier thinking, in 36 《国务院办公厅转发民政部关于清理整顿社会团体的请示》/guo wu yuan ban gong ting zhuan fa min zheng bu guan yu qing li zheng dun she hui tuan ti de qing shi, guo ban fa document [1990]32 (“An Inquiry Regarding Cleaning Up and Reorganizing Social organizations From the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Relayed by the State Council” from the State Council Office)


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order to resolve issues with the registration of civil organizations.37 The clean-up and reorganization was underway for one year, until June of 1991. Through the process, the number of civil organizations registered in the unified system rose from 1990’s 10,855 to 82,814 in 1991 and 154,502 by 1992, increases of 6.63 times and 13.2 times, respectively.38 By this time, the major civil organizations in various fields were all registered. The second clean-up campaign began in April of 1997. Through several years of registration efforts, the number of social groups and foundations registered surpassed 180,000. However, the system had yet to incorporate and register a class of social service organizations, termed “people-run state-owned units” (民办事业单位). In order to create a framework on the foundation of the extant system capable both of better managing social groups and foundations and also of incorporating all types of civil organizations, the State Council relayed regulations from the Ministry of Civil Affairs on the clean-up and reorganization.39 This second clean-up was underway until October of 1999. During that interval, in October of 1998, the State Council released an updated Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration《社会团体登记管理条例》 , as well as new Provisional Regulations on People-Run NonEnterprise Unit Registration and Administration《民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例》. Thusly, social groups and people-run non-enterprise units were also incorporated into the unified registration system; their addition brought growth in numbers of registered civil organizations out of a small dip and back to the normal, fast rate. In 2001 and 2002, the number of registered civil organizations reached 219,900 and 244,500, respectively, growth on 1997’s numbers of 16.34% and 34.85%.40 It could be said that the two “clean-up” campaigns had certain undesirable effects on civil organizations; however, they had positive effects on the civil organizations system framework.

According to the thinking, this clean-up and reorganization was aimed at addressing several issues. First, some social groups, influenced by bourgeoisie liberalized thinking, had some unstable factors. Second, some social groups were engaged in profit seeking activities, which interfered with the state’s normal economic programs. Third, some social groups were engaged in illegal activities or activities inconsistent with their registrations and missions. Fourth, an excess of social groups were registered with overlapping services, making appropriations at will or under false pretenses, all of which burdened local governments and enterprises. Furthermore, some “friendship” social groups grew rapidly, evolving into interest groups which impacted normal socialist economic activities and work arrangements. For a more detailed explanation, please consult the Appendix. 38 Regarding this process, Figure 3 offers a more visual representation. 39 《国务院办公厅转发民政部关于清理整顿社会团体意见的通知》/guo wu yuan ban gong ting zhuan fa min zheng bu guan yu qing li zheng dun she hui tuan ti yi jian de tong zhi, guo ban fa document [1997]. (“Notice Concerning an Opinion on Cleaning Up and Reorganizing Social organizations From the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Relayed by the State Council” from the State Council Office) 40 Ibid., 43. 37

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The second major development was a ban on rural cooperative foundations. As described above, from the mid-1980s into the late 1990’s, rural cooperative foundations spread out of control like a prairie fire. Nationwide, 18,000 rural cooperative foundations had annual deposits and disbursements of over 100 million yuan; fund growth, meanwhile, grew at nearly 30% annually. These foundations contributed to rural services, advanced of village reforms, resolved some funding shortages associated with development and accelerated of the development of public welfare oriented projects. At the same time, however, many problems remained in the areas of the supervision system, the property rights system, organization administration, fund savings and loaning and operations. As a result, the foundations’ financial risk continually grew. In October of 1994, the State Council passed an opinion from the central bank, the People’s Bank of China, regarding administration and supervision of non-financial institutions wherein rural cooperative foundations were clearly listed as non-financial institutions that should not be permitted to engage in savings and loan activities. In August of 1998, the Ministry of Agriculture and the People’s Bank of China, in accordance with the spirit of the CCPCC’s and State Council’s document, drafted and released the Notice Concerning Strengthening Administration of Rural Cooperative Foundations (关于加强农村合作基金会管理的通知) that clarified the administrative jurisdiction for rural cooperative foundations and delineated measures for a comprehensive inspection, time-limited registration and reorganization. However, because the foundations were not financial institutions, the People’s Bank had difficulty supervising them. Party-state departments at various levels were not particularly active in implementing the clean-up. Foundations themselves were not motivated to reorganize. Furthermore, the measures offered for the clean-up were not particularly effective. As a result, in the mid-1990s, the growth of rural cooperative foundations, far from being stemmed, actually accelerated. According to statistics, at year-end 1996, the number of village and township level rural cooperative foundations had grown to 45,000 with funds of almost 150 billion yuan.41 At the same time, shortcomings of foundations themselves and of the emerging property rights 赵君臣/Zhao Junchen, “一刀切农村合作基金会教训”/“yi dao qie nong cun he zuo ji jin hui jiao shun”, from CASS’s xue zhe re dian website, http://www.cass .net.cn/file/20080727128537.html. (“Lessons From A Sweeping Approach to Rural Cooperative Foundations” in “Scholar Hotspot”) 41


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system, the disorder of services, and the lack of attention to normal financial practices all contributed to increasing their potential financial risk. In January of 1999, the State Council released Document No. 3 announcing the closing of all rural cooperative foundations and the absorption of the foundations’ debt by Rural Credit Cooperatives (农村信用社). With that, the civil organization form known as rural cooperative foundations, once spontaneously established by villagers and supported by governments, whose numbers had reached tens of thousands and whose assets over ten years of growth likely reached trillions of yuan, suddenly exited the stage of history. The third major development was the formation of a dual administrative system. Upon the foundation described above, drawing on ten years of practice, China’s government put in a place a dual system for the administration and supervision of civil organizations. In 1988, at the same time that it clarified the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ domain over the registration of civil organizations, the State Council also left in place various departments’ jurisdiction over audits and daily administration of civil organizations falling into the purvey of their service areas. 1989’s Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration emphatically and concretely specified the joint responsibility of both the registration institution and the service departments over the administration and supervision of the registration and audit of social groups. This administrative framework, rooted in the “develop first, manage later” reality of the civil organization world, targeted established civil organizations receiving support from various government departments, and resulted in compromise between the departments. The goal of the new framework was to leave partial jurisdiction in the hands of those administrative departments with service areas corresponding to civil organizations’, while also achieving the goal of one, unified registration system. During the subsequent clean-up campaigns, and especially given the administrative risks of times of political change, this dual system has gradually demonstrated its advantages and grown stronger over time. The measures passed October of 1998 on social groups and people-run non-enterprise units further clarified and detailed this dual administrative system. It must be emphasized here that these three major developments and other policy measures from this period were introduced and implemented gradually over a ten-year period of considerable shocks and changes in the political landscape of the nation. These systemic changes, which took place due to political factors and administrative

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adjustments, had a large, suppressive effect on the development of civil organizations, and especially on the enthusiasm for civil association which had blossomed during the period of top-down support from the central government. From the figures and data above we can see that the development of civil organizations went into a significant downturn during this period. Especially after the State Council released its 2000 ban on “illegal organizations”, for a time, suppressing and limiting the growth of civil organizations became part of the social administration duties of some party-state institutions. This dual system, formed amidst a political and administrative system, and often abused, became one of the chief constraints and systemic obstacles to the development of civil organizations. 2.2.2. New Development Amidst the Social Transformations of the Market Economy and the Reform and Opening During this period, in which China’s economy gradually made its way down the road of market economics, the Reform and Opening deepened, and all of society experienced broad transformations, China’s civil organizations, after an extended period of twists and turns, once again reached a new peak. Figure 1-4 clearly illustrates this process. In Figure 1-4, we can see that the period of twists and turns extended almost ten years from the beginning of the 1990s. This undoubtedly is due to the negative impacts of the “clean-up and reorganization” campaigns described above.42 According to the results of our data search, civil organizations hit a low point in 1998. Our search shows that only one hundred some civil organizations were founded that year, less than one-fifth of the rate from 1985. Figure 1-2’s official data support this deduction. After a period of twists and turns, at the turn of the new century, China’s civil organizations entered a period of growth that would culminate in a new peak. Figure 1-4 clearly illustrates this trend. Starting in 1999, our search indicates that the annual increase in the number of civil organizations has grown at approximately 30% per year up until the present. Separately, according to the year-end registration

42 This kind of negative effect is difficult to see from Figure 3, which is based on official statistics. This is because official statistics capture only registered civil organizations, while the vast majority of civil organizations have not entered the registration system. While the situation has been improved upon somewhat, this issue has not been resolved under the dual management system.


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900 800 700 600 500

Foundations Associations

400 300

Academic Associations

200 100 0 93 994 995 996 997 998 999 000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

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Source: Compiled through analysis of search results from the authoritative China Periodicals Net and other sources (中国期刊网).

Figure 1-4: Annual Increase in the Three Major Types of Civil Organizations 1993–2007

data from multiple levels of registration entities, the total number of civil organizations at year-end 2007 was 386,900, growth of 171% compared with the total in 1999.43 This period of growth revealed the following phenomena: First, growth of academic associations was sluggish. Compared to the prior period, growth among academic associations was sluggish compared to growth of non-academic associations and socialist economic (社会经济类) organizations, which, during this period, quickly became the primary segment among civil organizations. According to our search, starting in the mid 1990s, the number of new socialist economic organizations each year began to surpass new academic associations. Starting in 1999, the number of the former began to grow at 30% a year until, in 2007, they outnumbered academic associations by a ratio of 4:1. Of course, after many years of development, the absolute number of academic associations is still very large. They are in the process of adapting to the times and exploring innovative ways of surviving and growing. Ministry of Civil Affairs statistics show that by

43 Official website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ China Civil Organizations Net (中国民间组织网), http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/.

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year-end 2006, academic-type social groups numbered 40,900, 21.3% of all social groups registered. Second, industrial and commercial associations grew very rapidly. With China’s market reforms and the surging growth of the whole economy, many types of industrial, commercial, and development associations sprouted up. Along with these, a new association-oriented population of enterprises and businesspeople emerged. Figures from registration institutions show that from 2002 to 2006, industrial-type social groups grew from 39,100 to 59,700, a growth of 20,600 organizations. At the same time, this type of organization’s share of all social groups grew from 29% to 31%.44 Amidst this general growth of industrial and commercial associations, the increase in groups with the backing of the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (工商联) was especially prominent. The ACFIC was restored in 1977 as a people’s group tasked with liaising between different segments of the business community. In 1988, the ACFIC updated its articles of incorporation, declaring the group “a civil commerce association [for liaising with] both at home and abroad”. From that time, the ACFIC and affiliated local organizations began developing a nationwide network of commercial associations focusing on the privately-run economy and private enterprise. According to data from the ACFIC, from its start in 1989, by 1998, ACFIC’s system of commercial associations had grown to 2000 chapters. By year-end 2007, the total number of commercial associations including all types (ACFIC, village and township, sub-district, remote-location, market, development zone, and friendship), had already exceeded 30,000.45 In China’s vast countryside, village scientific associations and agricultural research associations began appearing as early as the 1980s. Though fraught with funding difficulties, simple organizational forms, loose organization, weak management and governance, they continued to receive recognition and support from all levels of government. As the market economy developed through the 1990s, government research, exchange and trials resulted in policy support of agricultural associations (农村专业协会), which emphasized the need to “guide the farmer agricultural coopera-

Ibid. 黄孟复/Huang Mengfu, Ed., “中国商会发展报告 No.2 2008 版”/“zhongguo shang hui fa zhan bao gao No.2 2008 ban”, she hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she April, 2008, pp. 3–36. (“China Business Associations Development Report, No. 2, 2008 Edition”) 44 45


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tive technological association to become a new form of “people-run, people-managed, people’s benefit-oriented” economic organization.46 With the support of all levels of government, agricultural associations experienced unprecedented growth. Statistics show that these organizations had grown to 160,000 in number by 1996.47 Third, grassroots organizations sprouted up for the first time. In this additional, remarkable development, a new wave of social welfare oriented grassroots organizations emerged. The Chinese term “草根”, cao gen, comes from the English “Grass roots”. Grassroots organizations in China developed from local service groups based in residential communities, are very civil in character, and are concentrated in urban apartment subdivisions and rural villages. The development of China’s grassroots organizations is inextricably linked to the activities of foreign relief organizations in China. In the early 1980s, the first wave of famous international foundations and NGOs entered China by offering financial support for public welfare projects in fields germane to their organizational missions. In April of 1988, the Ford Foundation, which already had almost ten years of practical program experience in China, formally opened a representative office in Beijing and began active financial and general support of Chinese grassroots organizations. In over 20 years in China, the Ford Foundation has contributed $200 million to efforts in poverty alleviation, health care and hygiene, environmental protection, education and training, protections for underprivileged groups, root-level democracy (基层民主), public administration, and projects across all fields of public welfare. A large number of grassroots NGOs got their start and sustained development due to the Ford Foundation’s financial assistance. Besides the Ford Foundation, famous aid organizations numbering in the tens began supporting programs in China, including World Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam Hong Kong, America’s Heifer International, and others. These aid organizations, focusing on projects still in the incubation phase without access to official resources, unquestionably played a major role in these organizations’ development. Another milestone in the development of grassroots organizations took place at the end of August of 1995 with the commencement in Beijing of the “1995 Document No. 4, 1994, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. 王名、刘培峰等/Wang Ming, Liu Peifeng et al.,《民间组织通论》/ min jian zu zhi tong lun, shi shi chu ban she, September, 2004. p. 262. (“A General Theory of Civil Organizations”) 46 47

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Women’s NGO Conference”, a conference of international NGOs held at the same time and city as the UN Fourth World Conference on Women. Over the nine days of the conference, representatives of almost 30,000 NGOs interacted and exchanged ideas with 5000 Chinese participants. The conference also had the effect of impressing on China’s civil organizations, media, officials, scholars and even broader society the stature and influence NGOs might have in the international policymaking sphere. For Chinese grassroots organizations, still in their gestation period, the event doubtless had a catalytic effect. For the several years before and after this event, grassroots organizations appeared across many fields related to the underprivileged groups’ welfare, such as poverty alleviation, women’s and children’s rights, ecological and environmental protection, handicapped persons’ welfare, benefits for rural workers in cities, and AIDS relief. Amidst these early efforts, organizations like Friends of Nature (自然之友), Global Village (地球村), Green Earth (绿家园), and (爱知行), and their leaders became pioneers in China’s civil, public welfare work. Because the vast majority of grassroots organizations were not legally registered civil organizations, many registered themselves as commercial entities, and many more did not register at all. Over the years, many surveys of grassroots organizations have been conducted, as well as targeted surveys of just environmental groups, AIDS groups, and urban community groups. Still, an accurate estimate of their scale has proven elusive. As we enter the 21st Century, China’s grassroots NGOs have begun to leave more visible traces. Some organizations have split and reorganized for systemic reasons; more and more young people are getting involved in social enterprises; some institutions have explored innovations through the creation of boards of directors; a few organizations have experienced fiscal or credibility crises; due to government contracting of public services, some have also adopted a strategy of increased cooperation with the government. The undeniable reality, however, is that after over ten years of searching for their place, China’s grassroots organizations have broken ground and come to life. Fourth, foundations experienced both glory and transformation. This era of development for foundations also bore all the signs to indicate a transformation. In numbers, not long after the beginning of the 1990s, foundations took a major turn. Due to policy factors after the clean-up and reorganization of the rural cooperative foundations, starting in 1999, the central bank no longer held responsibility for the audit and administration of foundations, leaving the registration


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process in a state of paralysis. Ministry of Civil Affairs statistics show that there was a clear drop in registered foundation after 2002. In 2004, 892 foundations were registered, compared with 1268 in 2002. In actuality, during this same period, China’s foundations were also enveloped in an unprecedented swell of large-scale, public fundraising. As discussed above, the development of China’s foundations began with the Reform and Opening. Through the 1980s, the larger public welfare foundations, like the China Children and Teenager’s Fund and the China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped, were all engaged in vigorous attempts to access mass resources, using broad social mobilization to conduct public fundraising and amass resources to launch public welfare services and social relief work. After the beginning of the 1990s, this kind of fundraising and public charity giving grew unabated; however, due to market-based reforms across the whole economic system and social transformations, foundations began exploring new fundraising models. Large projects like “Project Hope”, “Spring Buds Program”, “Happiness Project”, “Project Candlelight”, and the “Cisterns Project” (母亲水窖工程) subsequently appeared. These projects have frequently had greater mobilizing power and influence, generating massive support from both inside and outside the system as well as broad participation and more social credibility. The majority of these projects boast activities spanning all of China or even multiple nations. With histories of ten or even more than ten years, the projects have become critical to foundations’ survival and development as sources of social capital and core competitiveness. Due to their leadership models, the vast majority of foundations placed most of their energy on these concrete projects, which effectively prevented their size from becoming too enormous. At the same time, they also emerged as competitors to grassroots project organizations, making it difficult for them so serve as centers for fiscal and general support. In 2004, the State Council released the Regulations on Foundation Administration《基金会管理条例》, which divided foundations into two types: public funding and non-public funding (公募, 非公募). While permitting the continued development of the former, traditional form, it also promoted in the latter a new channel for entrepreneurs and other wealthy individuals to redistribute some of their wealth. This represented a major innovation in the development of China’s social welfare work. Starting in 2005, newly registered foundations began growing noticeably. By year-end 2007, foundations registered at various levels of the party-government system numbered 1340, growth of

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50% from 2004. Among these, in only three years, no fewer than 436 non-public funding foundations had been registered, almost 30% of the total number. Some privately-owned enterprises made enormous donations, choosing to form non-public funding foundations as a way to contribute to society’s general welfare. A new era in the history of Chinese foundations has arrived. Fifth, people-run non-enterprise units (PRNEUs) were incorporated into a unified registration system. The appearance and incorporation into a unified registration system of PRNEUs was also a significant event of this period. PRNEUs refer to multiple types of service institutions that appeared following the Reform and Opening, including privately-run service entities in the fields of education, health, technical, cultural, athletic and social service, among others. As early as the 1980’s, following reforms in the technology and athletic systems, there appeared some privately-run technological research and intermediary service institutions. After Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, and along with the establishment of the market economy, social services formerly traditionally under the purvey of work units, like education, health, technological research and culture were gradually opened up to private operation. All forms of people-run state-owned units sprouted up as shoots after the spring rain. According to Ministry of Civil Affairs statistics, by 1997, there were around 700,000 people-run state-owned units in China.48 In order to standardize the administration of these social service institutions, which had some public welfare characteristics, the State Council officially coined a term, PRNEU, to describe these entities and placed them under the supervision of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In October of 1998, the State Council released the Provisional Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration and Administration《民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例》. They also set to work surveying and registering all kinds of privately-run social service institutions all over the nation. Through over two years of efforts, by year-end 2001, the Ministry of Civil Affairs had registered 82,089 PRNEUs. By year-end 2007, that number had reached 173,915, a growth of 111.86% since 2001. 48 朱勇、钟利平/Zhu Yong and Zhong Liping, “民办非企业单位: 驶向规范发展航道”/“min ban fei qi ye dan wei: shi xiang gui fan fa zhan hang dao”, in zhongguo min zheng, Vol. 1, 2000, pp. 12–15. (“People-run Non-Enterprise Units: Charting a Course for Normalized Development” in “Chinese Civil Affairs”)


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Sixth, new types of civil organizations emerged one after another. During this remarkable period of sustained, high economic growth, steady increases in living standards, maturation in the market economy, and progress in technology and transformations in most aspects of society, there appeared more and more of all types of civil organizations. These have included clubs, friendship associations, salons, motorist clubs, and all manner of associational organizations. This has especially been the case since the birth and spread of the Internet, as all types of Internet groups have formed, becoming an indisputable force influencing social life and even political life. In short, after China underwent a period of political change and the Reform and Opening withstood some testing, civil organizations also entered a new period of their history. The Chinese government set about establishing a unified registration system and a dual, standardized administration system framework, and, after some reversals, finally established a complete framework and system structure for government administration of civil organizations in the late 1990s. During this process, and after civil organizations experienced not insignificant twists and turns, amidst a maturing market economy, deepening reforms and social transformations, civil organizations gradually emerged from their serpentine path and proceeded to a new peak, exhibiting a trend with several clear characteristics. 3. Social Foundations for the Growth and Development of Civil Organizations in China Above, in our account of two periods, we offered a basic retrospective of the birth and growth of civil organizations during the first 30 years of the Reform and Opening. In this section, we offer another, tripartite, thematic division. In this section, we will proceed to analyze the social foundations of the birth and development of China’s civil organizations from the three angles of system reforms, the public sphere, and collective action. 3.1. System Reforms: Catalyst for China’s Civil Organizations The initial reason for the appearance and unprecedented growth of civil organizations surely lies at the system level.

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The starting point for the last 30 years of system reforms can be found in 1978. In the same way, any attempt to trace the development of civil organizations must begin by turning back to that page in history. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held at the end of that year, brought an end to talk of “class struggle” and “continuous revolution under the proletariat dictatorship”. At the same time, it brought about a “setting right” (拨乱反正) in thinking, politics and organizations, established a new direction in the party’s thought with economic development at its center, and raised the curtains on the Reform and Opening and a social transformation. Looking back, the “setting right” brought about by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee is the proper starting point of civil organizations. Public choice theory offers government failures as its rationale for the existence of the market and NGOs. As the top-to-bottom, authoritative state institution, the government normally bears responsibility for society’s public administration. In the process of mobilizing resources, formulating and implementing policy, and providing public services, the government may experience “failures” for various reasons. These reasons mainly include inappropriate government interventions, insufficient information, bureaucratic behavior, rent-seeking behavior, the “tyranny of the majority” inherent to the democratic process, insufficient government resources, or the habits of power. Due to these factors, the government may be unable to provide certain social goods or services, provide them inefficiently, or, to a certain extent, may harm social fairness, justice or the public interest. In the event of a “government failure” sometimes market mechanisms are needed to bring about a correction; sometimes NGOs are needed. Because of unique characteristics such as organizational systems, operational mechanisms, resource mobilization, or services provided, these entities can sometimes be a more optimal provider than government of certain forms of social services and goods needed by society. Although China’s party-government system, faced with the “setting right” at the beginning of the Reform and Opening, was completely different, in political terms, from the “failed” government in public choice theory; still, as the provider of public services and goods and the entity responsible for public administration, it was otherwise exactly the same. Precisely because it had implemented “class struggle” and “continuous revolution under the proletariat dictatorship”, which disturbed the natural, democratic order of the party and national political


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life and resulted in dogmatism and the policy of “the two whatevers”49, the party-government system, which guided public resources and almost all of society’s resources, did in fact fall into a complete “failure”. These factors rendered the party-government system unable to pursue economic development and provide public services and pushed the national economy and social life to the brink of collapse. The “setting” (拨乱) part of “setting right” referred to the process of deepening reforms in thought, politics and organizations, reflecting holistically, negating thoroughly, finding the root cause of the “failure” and preventing further magnification of the systemic failure. The “right” (反“正”) part referred to using multiple and possibly new system elements to stimulate and motivate the masses’ positivity and push the entire public administration system toward unswerving progress on the path of economic development. At that time, in villages, a new system of “contracted responsibility linking remuneration to output” (联产承包责任制) was the single most development in the reforms. Market mechanisms, discovered, in the manner of “feeling the stones when crossing a river” by chief architect of the reforms, Deng Xiaoping, and gradually introduced through village reforms, turned out to be central to “setting right” the system’s journey out of failure. Who, then, would the nation rely on to drive village reforms, to “feel the stones”, and to gradually lead Chinese society into broader system reforms? It would be China’s 800 million villagers who were once the principal force behind a revolution; who allowed the Communist Party to push from their strongholds in the countryside to take the cities; who would serve once again as a principal force, this time through privatization of farms production (包产); and, who would now drive Chinese society through a period of even greater social change. This clearly was the starting point of the Reform and Opening, as decided by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee. The system changes we so happily witnessed at the beginning of the Reform and Opening, like the experiment in Anhui’s Fengchaoxiaogang Village (凤阳小岗村), were all rooted in Chinese villagers’ simple and fearless spirit of innovation.

Translator’s note: the “two whatevers” policy (两个凡是) refers to the position adopted by Mao’s immediate successor, Hua Guofeng, that refers to the statement that “We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave”. 49

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However, as mostly manual, self-employed laborers, villagers were not well-suited to the heavy, historical task of “feeling the stones”, i.e., charting the path of China’s reforms. Intellectuals, for their part, enjoying a liberation of thought, and feeling like freed prisoners, proposed many of the philosophical, political and organizational elements of the “setting right” to the Party Central Committee. They had innumerable, yet-unrealized, dreams and were willing to throw all their scientific and technological knowledge behind the Reform and Opening’s push for social progress and reform. As the Party center clearly indicated that the reforms were to begin with the villages, the intellectuals, astute, identified the best area of overlap between them and village reforms: associations. The “setting right” also included moves to rehabilitate many intellectuals and restore various civil organizations. At the end of 1978, the official account of the “4/5 Incident”50 was also set straight. Over the course of the next two years, over three million cadres and 550,000 “rightists” were rehabilitated. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, in 1977, the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) set about reestablishing its organization and prospects. By the end of 1979, over 3 million associations had been reestablished nationwide. With the Party center and all levels of government behind them, CAST expanded the push to restore and re-develop civil organizations until its affiliate organizations were growing, at a rate of 300 a year, into an enormous national association system. At the same time, the Party center and CAST recognized the opportunity to reorient the focus of CAST on the countryside. With incentives and active measures, they encouraged the intelligentsia to get involved in rural scientific promul-

50 This refers to the mass gathering that took place in Beijing’s Tian’anmen Square in the days before and after tomb-sweeping day, 1976, mourning the passing of Zhou Enlai and voicing opposition to the Gang of Four. After Premier Zhou’s death in early 1976, during the tomb-sweeping festival, Beijing citizens spontaneously gathered in Tian’anmen Square around the Monument of the People’s Heroes, laying flower wreaths and baskets, posting writings, reciting poems, and expressing their grief at Zhou Enlai’s death. This form of spontaneous gathering quickly spread to other parts of China. The central government, controlled at the time by the Gang of Four, branded these activities “Counter-revolutionary counterattacks” and suppressed them. This incident has since been referred to as the “4/5 (April 5th) Incident” or the “Tian’anmen Incident”. In December of 1978, in the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the decision was made to rescinded mistaken documents issued by the central government concerning this incident.


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gation work, which resulted in the vigorous development of popular, rural technological research associations. Thus, at the outset of the Reform and Opening, within the systemic space existing prior to the emergence of legal and administrative systems for civil organizations, China’s 800 million rural residents and her intellectuals joined forces to form an unprecedented peak in civil organizational development. In the process described above, civil organizations clearly had emerged as a new factor in the system capable of effectively acting to resolve systemic failures. Compared with the hemorrhaging old system, fresh civil organizations appeared full of hope; compared with the slowly growing, unfamiliar, marketization reforms then being driven by hundreds of millions of villagers adopting “linking assets to households” (包产到户), civil organizations, with the Party-government system behind them, were surely far more reliable, credible and controllable. This development may also reflect a certain impulsiveness on the part of the architects of the system reforms, who, under the historical conditions, had placed a great deal of focus on civil organizations and were inclined to mobilize the “associational revolution”. Thusly, in combining the capacity of hundreds of millions of villagers with the talents of intellectuals; in combining top-down, system reform policy resources with the power of total social participation; in tapping the powerful need for organizational formation of the innumerable, aimless self-employed produced by the “setting right”, associations represented a new organizational vehicle, apart and outside of the old, failed system, capable of “feeling the stones”. Indeed, it appeared a worthy and seductive experiment. The reasons offered above in explanation of the emergence of academic and research associations are also applicable to the emergence of other types of civil organizations. Let us tentatively call this the “emergence theory” of Chinese civil organizations (中国民间组织的发生学). Civil organizations’ advantage, relative to the under-reform Party government system was that in their popular, civil nature and their autonomy and independence from the system, they were possessed of system resources separate from the system failures. Relative to another element outside the system, the power of markets, civil organizations’ advantage lay in their complex relationship to the system itself. They were at once neither completely of nor outside the Party government system, occupying the risky position of being opposed or even resistant to it, yet with countless ties to it. In the early phases of the Reform and Opening, especially as China adopted market mechanisms and society

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underwent various transformations, there was much talk of “market failures” in the official economics.51 That discussion indicated all the more the advantages of civil organizations, with their public welfare pursuits of social wellbeing and social justice. It can be said that this kind of fundamental, guiding principle has underpinned civil organizations’ development throughout the entire Reform and Opening. The Party and government-led system reforms sought economic development and efficiency but could not, at the same time, lose sight of social welfare and justice. At the same time that the system was experiencing a failure and urgently needed reforms, markets were still not reliable or effective enough to guarantee interests or justice. Thus, civil organizations were, from the beginning, viewed as allies in a united front and enjoyed recognition and tolerance from the system. For the main actors in the reforms, there were needs both to support and use civil organizations and also to limit and standardize them. Precisely because the need for civil organizations came from within the system itself, as long as the Reform and Opening proceeded, civil organizations were guaranteed system space, political tolerance and policy support. 3.2. Public Sphere: The Internal Logic of Civil Organizations’ Development However, as a systemic form, civil organizations also generate, subsequent to their appearance and development, their own internal, objective necessity that is prone to unintended shifts. Over the course of civil organizations’ development during the Reform and Opening, which factors, besides the systemic, internal need described above, have driven their internal necessity and their unceasing growth? We have borrowed the concept of the “public sphere” to offer another account of the objective necessity of civil organizations. The

51 Market failures, often used to justify government interventions, are also offered as an explanation for the appearance of NGOs. Under ideal market conditions, market mechanisms allocate resources optimally. In reality, however, market mechanisms can result in sub-optimal resource allocations or inefficiencies, known as “market failures”. Causes of market failures include: natural monopolies, externalities, exclusion, asymmetric information, transaction costs, and public goods or services. For these reasons, resource allocation through market mechanisms can be less than optimal. Correcting these failures can require government or political interventions. Sometimes, because government or political interventions might result in even worse results, NGO interventions are chosen.


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public sphere (公共空间), popularized by Habermas,52 refers to space between state and society in which citizens freely participate in social, public affairs. According to Habermas’s explanation, the public sphere is a part of the society on which humans depend for their existence. It is a social sphere characterized by public need, public intermediaries, public value, and the active participation in and influence on social, public affairs by citizens imbued with autonomy, independent character, and a consciousness of sovereignty. It is the bedrock on which a society may build a social, public sphere. In this account, civil organizations of all kinds are viewed as vehicles of “the institutionalization of a public sphere”.53 The essence of the concept is in the active participation in and influence on social, public affairs by citizens imbued with autonomy, independent character, and a consciousness of sovereignty. Put another way, citizens with a free and independent character and a consciousness of sovereignty and of public participation are the necessary foundation for civil organizations. At the onset of the Reform and Opening, an expectant Chinese society, had enormous demand for public services and Chinese intellectuals, in a frenzy of liberated thought, were extremely enthusiastic about participating in public affairs. With few systemic obstacles to stop them, academic and research associations sprung up left and right with the full support of party and government departments, began participating in social affairs like the provision of public services, and quickly attained a degree of public recognition and credibility. The public sphere to which these civil organizations owed their existence was located mostly at the margins of the state system. A large part of it was space vacated by the failed system at the start of the Reform and Opening. With the explosion in numbers of civil organizations following the introduction and deepening of reforms, and especially without complete regulations, some civil organizations may also have

52 Habermas’s representative work, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, discusses issues of the capitalist class in the public sphere. See 哈贝马斯, 曹卫东等译/Habermas, Cao Weidong et al., trans., 公共领域的结构转型/gong gong ling yu de jie gou zhuan xing, Shanghai xue lin chu ban she, January 1999. 53 Habermas thusly defines civil society: “the essential mechanisms of ‘civil society’ are formed voluntarily by non-state and non-economic actors. These organizations include churches, cultural groups and academic associations, as well as independent media, sport and leisure clubs, music associations, debate clubs, citizens forums and citizens associations. Furthermore, it includes professional groups, political parties, unions and other organizations”. Habermas, Ibid., p. 29.

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suffered abuses of resources, causing the introduction of government controls. Rural cooperative foundations, which saw their 10 years of explosive growth ended with a clean-up and reorganization campaign, were a case in point. In the 1990s, along with the introduction of market economics, the nation experienced a sustained surge of economic growth, a quickening of government reforms, and a broad social transformation. Along with the enormous increase in wealth and clear improvements in living standards, society’s demand for public goods and services also rapidly increased. Demand also expanded for more diverse forms of spiritual life, cultural life, social life, and even political life. As the sphere of citizens’ freedoms grew, citizens, increasingly exhibiting both a free and independent character and a consciousness of sovereignty, displayed an unprecedented enthusiasm for public participation. Under the conditions, and amidst this social transformation, there was a clear expansion of the public sphere at every level of society and in every field; more and more resources were concentrated in that sphere; more and more citizens participated; more and more intermediaries became focused on that sphere; and, most importantly, more and more progressive, concerned, socially responsible personages became involved. These developments contributed to a continuous expansion of the public sphere, and to the emergence of all kinds of civil organizations in spaces not only at the margins of the state system, but also between state and society, between state and market, and between market and society; they also emerge within all kinds of public fields within the state system, the social system and the market system. By attracting social resources and mobilizing broad participation, they offer a variety of public services, public welfare or general welfare services, intermediary services and other types of social services, forming a daily expanding, civil society system separate from state and market systems. Environmental protection is a representative example of the public sphere. Beginning in the 1990s, some Chinese citizens became enthusiastic about environmental protection. Among them were prominent individuals from the old system, retired officials, former company officials, university professors, reporters, some returnees from studies abroad, and, most of all, youths enthusiastic about public interest work. Through the process of launching various environmental activities, they found a sphere for social, public work activities. They founded many kinds of environmental protection civil organizations, thereby displaying their determination and realizing their ideals.


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In 1991, 1994, and 1996, a reporter a professor and a returnee scholar founded three environmental civil organizations in Liaoning and Beijing, all of which later became iconic. According to our survey, there are currently 14,000 civil organizations in China active in the area of environmental protection. Of those, more than 2000 are devoted exclusively to environmental issues. It was this combination of the public sphere, upon which civil organizations depend for their existence and growth and which was expressed as broad social demand for environmental protections, with intense public concern and common environmental values, which were expressed in the forms of resource dedication toward and mobilization behind civil organizations, which, in turn, were expressed in the forms of joint activities between civil organizations and governments and enterprises, that finally resulted in the unceasing provision of public goods and services in the important area of environmental protection. 3.3. Collective Action: The Class Foundation of Civil Organizations’ Development Our discussion brings us next to a source of group power peculiar to the era which also lies behind the development of civil organizations. Civil organizations of any era cannot but reflect the common interests and values of the social classes of their era. Thus, the process of civil organizations’ growth over time can also embody transformations in class divisions and social tensions over different periods. This process is very visible in the development of civil organizations over the last 30 years of the Reform and Opening. We have borrowed Olsen’s concept of “collective action” to explain the class basis of civil organizations’ development and the transformation of that development.54 As explained above, at the onset of the Reform and Opening, the main participants in associations were intellectuals (知识分子) and

54 Mancur Lloyd Olsen is the principal founder of public choice theory. His applied economic theories examined the case of American unions and revealed that in collective action remain problems like the prisoner’s dilemma and free riding. His Logic of Collective Action has been translated into more than ten languages and is regarded as the seminal work of public choice theory. Olsen’s collective action concept is used mostly used to analyze a fixed group. Here, his concept is used primarily to analyze the collective formation of social strata. 奥尔森, 陈郁等译/Olsen, Chen Yu, et al. trans., 集体行动的逻辑/ji ti xing dong de luo ji, Shanghai san lian shu dian, 1995.

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peasants (农民). Let’s take a closer look at these two classes and their conditions at the time. Intellectuals, generally speaking, refers to a group of people engaged in mental labor and with a sense of social responsibility. For a long time before the Reform and Opening, China’s intellectuals had been referred to as the “stinky old nine”(臭老九).55 Stripped of economic and social status, without any political rights and, in many cases, even physically forced into “cow-pens”, they had been deprived even of the right to a normal life. After the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution and the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping, science and technology became seen as means of productive force; subsequently, intellectuals’ status improved greatly and they became a part of the ruling class. At the beginning of the Reform and Opening, intellectuals underwent a “discussing the criteria of truth” (真理标准讨论) thought liberation campaign. After experiencing rehabilitation and new policies during the “setting right”, they were filled with a powerful sense of responsibility to “take the nation’s great tasks as their own”(以天下为己任) and “make good use of their time and repay with service to their country” (只争朝夕、报效祖国).56 This was most evident in the explosive numbers of academic associations established after the onset of the Reform and Opening. These associations were supported by the party and government and served as a platform for reborn intellectuals to exhibit their talents and contribute to society. In China at that time, with the economy yet unrestored, wealth yet uncreated, and power still not tied to capital, knowledge and talent, science and technology, social responsibility, credibility brought by their restored reputations, and support from the party and government were not only important resources, they were the impetus for the birth and growth of civil

55 Confucian intellectuals in ancient China were called ru (儒), and a saying went in the Yuan Dynasty that there are “eight prostitutes, nine ru, and ten beggars”, [signifying anti-Confucian sentiment prevalent in the governing class at the time]. Mao Zedong borrowed this phrase to express his disgust for intellectuals. He called for reeducation of intellectuals through labor, setting off a mass movement to reduce and suppress intellectuals, stripping them of their rights, privileges and respect. Called the “stinky old nine”, they were relegated to society’s lowliest class. 56 On March 24, 1983, People’s Daily reported that a Hubei University assistant professor, Peng Zhaofan, planned to make a political donation to the Sun Yefang Foundation. Peng was already in his seventies, had once been mislabeled a rightist and suffered attacks during the Cultural Revolution. He contributed 1,058 yuan, the total wages owed him for work during the Cultural Revolution, to the Sun Yefang Foundation in hopes of making a contribution to the modernization of China.


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organizations. For intellectuals at the time, the chances to participate in collective action through associations, to combine their individual resources into group resources, to use these organizations’ science and technology to transform productive power, to find economic sustenance through these groups’ activities, to fulfill their sense of social responsibility, to struggle for more political power, these were all central motivations behind intellectuals’ deep commitment to associations and to the constant creation of civil organizations. You might say that, at the time, intellectuals were the social class with the strongest associative spirit. Different from intellectuals, China’s peasants were, before the Reform and Opening, China’s largest and poorest class and, relatively, were limited by fewer system restrictions. As part of the alliance of workers and peasants, they once gave their lives for the revolution, bringing the red rivers and mountains of a New China. After the establishment of people’s communes, however, peasants were deprived of the land resources needed for production, and suffered concentrated exploitation and suppression in the names of “price scissors” and “communism”. When the Reform and Opening chose peasants, the logic was exactly the same as during the earlier revolution: “poverty makes people think of change”. However, when this heavy, historical responsibility fell on the shoulders of 800 million poor and unorganized peasants, forming associations was practically their only choice. After the failure of the communes, the only option was to look outside the system. At the time, intellectuals and peasants had several commonalities. They were both destitute, a “revolutionary” trait making them wellsuited to involvement in associations. They had also endured sharp reversals in social status, and the shocks had eroded their confidence in the promise and ability of individuals. Officially-supported associations, however, increased their courage and strength and the social capital of mutual support. Although the two groups’ political capital varied greatly, they were both marginalized, and both were motivated by the impulse to use associations to return to the political center. The “setting right” certainly presented these kinds of opportunities and resources. At the same time, associations offered opportunities to study, in subjects including politics, management, market operations, and cooperation with other groups and organizations. Associations became the systemic platform for these groups to develop and progress during the Reform and Opening.

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Thusly, the main tasks of the first period of civil organizations’ development fell on the shoulders of intellectuals and peasants. However, after decades of intellectual imprisonment, political persecution and poverty, and especially after suffering the persecution of the Leftist campaigns, intellectuals and peasants didn’t know what sort of creatures associations were. Driven by CAST, however, they did, on the one hand, draw on history to restore many associations, like academic associations, from the old society, and resuscitate some historical vestiges. But they also drafted prototypes, compared and assessed them with the public information available, and established an atmosphere of mutual self-improvement, until the mass movement gathering around associations became one also driven by friendly rivalries. Hence, across the nation from cities to villages at the start of the Reform and Opening, Chinese society became engaged in a dynamic, association movement with intellectuals and peasants at the head. The association movement exhibited clear “bandwagon” and “lastbus” effects as well. Among innovations at the start of the Reform and Opening, the “linking assets to households” (包产到户) system that first appeared in Anhui’s Fengyangxiaogang village was widely regarded as the most important. However, the founding of academic and research associations at that time was of equal importance. These kinds of innovations would be copied almost overnight, interacting, driving one another and expanding. Add to that momentum gained from party and government support and the propaganda machine and from a wider recognition of associations’ legality and credibility, the bandwagon effect became pervasive. As academic and research associations were set-up, carbon-copy groups with the same names would be quickly formed at the provincial, municipal, local, county, even township and village, administrative levels. In addition, within the same association, specialization committees, branch-associations, study groups and even sub-associations quickly appeared. These are typical examples of the bandwagon effect. At the same time, associations were often also impacted by the psychological drive to “squeeze onto the last bus” and “seize every minute”. Regardless of whether the timing was right or what to do or where to go, the attitude was “let’s just get on the bus and then we’ll decide.” This “last-bus” effect drove some associations forward without clear missions or group consciousness, and also resulted in some mutual suspicion or exclusion among associations, leaving these overnight associations aimless and unsus-


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tainable. As the reforms developed, China’s civil organizations, from their very start, also brought systemic shortcomings. These shortcomings, combined with the political turmoil, drove the movement toward the “clean-up and reorganization”. After experiencing political change and almost ten years of systemic transformations, however, the development of China’s civil organizations began to reach a new peak. The Reform and Opening had already entered a new period; market reforms had reached a certain scale and society’s transformation was broadly evident. At the same time that sustained, fast economic growth had endowed society with huge wealth, it also produced new social classes and social power for civil organizations to confront. Social power, in this sense, was evident in three ways: First, the participation of the political elite gradually became crucial to civil organizations’ development. The political elite here refers to members of a class of well-educated, current or former officials in party or government departments or leaders of work units. They commanded broad political and administrative resources and were also motivated by a deep sense of social responsibility. Many of these individuals had already, or would soon; devote themselves to participation in and leadership of civil organizations. The primary sources of political elites participating in civil organizations were 1) the reform of party and government institutions; 2) decisions by officials to leave their positions for the marketplace; and 3) the dependency of civil organizations on their responsible departments for administrative support and personnel. Let’s first take a look at party and government institutional reforms. Six such large-scale reforms took place in the years of 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008.57 In each case, the party-government system underwent reductions and downsizing and adjustments in government functions. Without going into the effects of each set of reforms, of relevance here are the waves of party-government officials that joined

57 邵萍英/Shao Pingying, “中国政府机构改革的历史回顾及基本经验”/“zhongguo zheng fu ji gou gai ge de li shi hui gu ji ji ben jing yan”, in 池州师专学报/chi zhou shi zhuan xue bao, Issue 6, 2005 (overall Vol. 19), pp. 89–94; 陈吉联/Chen Jilian (2005) pp. 28–29. (“Historical Reflections and Experiences of the Chinese Government’s Structural Reforms” in the Chizhou Junior Normal School College Journal”)

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civil organizations following each round of reforms. Objectively, these additions strengthened the effectiveness of civil organizations’ teams. In addition, as a result of shifts in government functions and administrative reforms, many important public resources and functions, and sometimes even whole government institutions, fell under the purvey of civil organizations. This was the case, for example, after the reforms of 1998, in which the State Council dismantled nine national, economic, administrative departments, instituting in their place ten national, industry federations. Decisions by officials to leave their positions for the market were the second major source of political elite participation in civil organizations. In 1984, 1987, 1993, and 2000, the state underwent four major waves of “resignations and market entries”. Officials numbering in the hundreds of thousands or even millions left public service for the private sector, resulting in a dynamic burst of economic activity.58 Many of these officials, however, did not really leave the public sector, choosing instead to make use of their talents and serve the public through civil organizations.59 The last source of political elites can be understood to be the system itself. In the late 1980s, the establishment of the dual administrative system for civil organizations clarified the jurisdiction of various administrative departments over civil organizations in related fields. Its establishment also offered a systemic confirmation of the administrative and personnel relationships that had evolved over time between these responsible departments and civil organizations. Over many years, however, the design also caused a “lack of division between government and society” and consequent problems of inefficiency and unwieldiness. Civil organizations’ responsible departments were not only able to ply them with administrative resources, power, functions, and other advantages, but also had certain powers with regards to hir58 晓波/Wu Xiaobo, 激荡三十年中国企业 1978–2008/ji dang san shi nian zhongguo qi ye 1978–2008 (vols. 1, 2). Zhong xin chu ban she/Zhejiang ren min chu ban she (2007 version); 章敬平/Zhang Jingping, “官员下海细细数下海官员一览”/“guan yuan xia hai xi xi shu xia hai guan yuan yi lan”, in 财富时报/cai fu shi bao, November 10, 2003. (“Thirty Years of Turmoil Chinese Enterprises 1978–2008” in Fortune Times) 59 Though we are without clear evidence to prove this process, we discovered in the recently convened “China NGOs Oral History” project that many civil organization leaders were officials courageously sent down. Examples include Shenzhen’s Guo Xiaohui (郭小惠), Hainan’s Leng Mingquan (冷明权), and Yilong, Sichuan’s Gao Xiangjun (高向军).


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ing and firing cadres, allowing them to sustain “personnel exchanges” between the different departments. One the one hand, this offered government institutions a personnel “reservoir” to help enliven their reform efforts; on the other, it strengthened administration and controls of civil organizations. Due mainly to these three channels, civil organizations were able to absorb members of the political elite from party-government institutions over the course of the Reform and Opening. With their arrival, these members brought political and administrative resources, activated and enlarged potential social resources, and devoted themselves to participation in and leadership of civil organizations, thereby emerging as a crucial force behind civil organizations as they struggled amidst the political and administrative system. Secondly, a wise intellectual elite was crucial to the sprit of civil organizations’ development. This elite refers to intellectuals with fierce senses of social responsibility. Well-suited to independent thinking, publicly-concerned and socially responsible, rich in knowledge and social influence, these intellectuals also contributed in many ways and as leaders to civil organizations, some of them event expressing their ardent support and enthusiasm for the movement. After being rehabilitated during the “setting right” and having gotten back on their feet through civil organizations, over the course of the Reform and Opening’s divisions and permutations, China’s intellectuals split. Some went overseas; some entered the market economy; and some even became officials. Those with the strongest sense of social responsibility developed into the intellectual elite referred to here. In Chinese society, this group most closely approximates Habermas’s “citizens imbued with autonomy, independent character, and a consciousness of sovereignty”.60 They formed civil organizations out of ideals and value systems, have deep passion for civil organizations, threw their wholes into the practice of civil organizations, and bravely stepped up to face all kinds of social problems. Reflecting on the moving deeds of Liang Congjie of Friends of Nature, Liao Xiaoyi of Global Village, Wang Yongchen of Green Earth, Yang Xin of Green River, Liu Detian of the Black Beak Gull Protection Association, Wang Xingjuan of Red Maple women’s’ hotlines, Tian Huiping of Stars and Rain and countless other eminent members of the intellectual elite, and the activities

60

Habermas, Ibid.

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of the eminent civil organizations they founded, we are reminded of that generation of the intellectual elite that even now is the spiritual backbone of China’s civil organizations. Their spirit of sacrifice also rallied young elite intellectuals to the cause. In recent years, increasing numbers of graduates with master’s and Ph.D. degrees and overseas educational experience have been joining civil organizations. They’ve started new organizations; participated in projects; served as volunteers; taken surveys and interviews and written reports. They’ve brought with them vigor, dynamism and knowledge; but the most key contributions of these youths to civil organizations have been their innovations, change, and hope. Third, members of the economic elite rose up to become a new social power for civil organizations. The economic elite, as used here, refers to a class of successful entrepreneurs and wealthy individuals with strong senses of social responsibility and the ability to act for the public interest. With 30 years of sustained, high economic growth and the empowerment of the national economy, living conditions in China improved markedly, the nation’s wealth spiked, and, accordingly, the amounts of households’ financial assets and very wealthy people increased at an astonishing rate. During this time, there emerged in China an enormous class of “get rich first”, successful entrepreneurs and rich individuals with huge assets at their disposal. This newlyemerged social class very quickly expressed its strong interest in being involved in social welfare-oriented activities. Data show that in recent years, both donations to foundations and participation in social welfare work on the part of Chinese enterprises, especially privately-owned enterprises, have increased dramatically. Over the same period, the number of registered, non-public-fundraising type foundations has increased; furthermore, the total assets held by registered foundations have multiplied. This was most evident when, after 2008’s Wenchuan, Sichuan earthquake a record was set with 57 billion yuan donated in two months. This effort was aided by no small number of entrepreneurs and wealthy individuals donating millions, tens of millions, or even hundreds of millions of yuan. This goes to show that concern and active participation in social welfare activities are expressions of a clearly present sense of social responsibility and character on the part of this, most wealthy class. For China’s civil organizations, this is an indispensable new social resource. What’s more, this innovative and wealthy class has demonstrated its enthusiasm and willingness to participate in social, public works and even in political life. In


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recent years, signs of active participation in social, public works on the part of entrepreneurs also can be seen amidst the development and dynamism of industrial and commercial associations, and in changes in these associations’ governance structures. According to data from civil organization administrative departments in Shenzhen, over half of the chairs of Shenzhen’s industrial and commercial associations have become deputies at various levels of the People’s Congress or Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. According to our latest survey in Shenzhen, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress, Guo Xiaohui (郭小惠) has, in just the last year, proposed over 20 policies and legislative proposals, 11 of which have been adopted and become policy measures. According to our analysis, the Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment (外商投资企业协会) that she leads already functions, to a certain degree, as a policy advocate and a think tank. Thus, against a backdrop of deepening reforms, a maturing market system, and broadening social transformations, the class foundations of civil organizations’ development had grown from intellectuals and peasants to include the political elite, the intellectual elite and the economic elite. This signifies that amidst this massive transformation, civil organizations had successfully shifted its support base to the elite classes that were capable, to a degree, of representing the broadest basic interests of the people, advanced cultural direction, advanced development of society’s productive power. With this shift, civil organizations reached a new height. This represents the true background behind the new and sustainable peak reached by China’s civil organizations in recent years. 4. China’s Road to Civil Society 4.1. Factors Affecting Civil Organizations’ Future Development Entering the 21st century, China’s unprecedented momentum and constant changes have presented Chinese civil organizations with important opportunities and challenges. These opportunities and challenges can be summarized in eight main areas: First, China’s sustained and unceasing reforms will bring civil organizations more space for development. Reform is the fundamental force

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behind contemporary China’s economic development and social progress; reforms have unlocked Chinese society’s latent forces and diverse needs, creating a broad space for civil organizations’ development. As government reforms deepen, shifts in government functions will free up new resources formerly controlled by the government for use by civil organizations at various levels. Further opportunities for civil organizations to participate in public administration and provide public goods will be created throughout the process of deepening reforms in government administration and operations systems. Trial reforms to state-owned enterprises will also involve both greater participation in and greater importation of the system and operational models of civil organizations. These, along with new models improvised by local governments for public service contracting and other forms of cooperation with civil organizations, will continue to expand the experiments and innovations in this space. At the same time, as reforms extend from the economy into society and, next, into politics, social reforms, especially political system reforms will offer civil organizations even more public space and even political space. Practice increasingly confirms that reforms have already become an irreversible historical force that will continue to push forward government reforms, social change, economic development and political civilization, all of which should create new and broader spaces for the development of civil organizations. Second, in economic growth, there is also a foundation being laid for association activities. As wealth disparity and other social issues accumulate, opportunities will emerge for civil organizations to pursue social justice. 30 years of sustained economic growth have created the “China Miracle” and produced enormous material wealth. A once poor and backward China has changed its face; people’s living conditions have now changed so much as to be unrecognizable. Generally, increases in wealth, leisure, educational attainment, information and technology have all strengthened the foundation for association activities. In another development, as wealth has accumulated, China’s Gini coefficient has also spiked, which reflects a large increase in wealth disparity. This has been accompanied by a crisis in social ethics and moral systems and social problems and tensions concerning the environment, resources and population pressures. As society develops and becomes more efficient, more and more calls are raised for equity and justice. These conditions provide opportunity for civil organizations,


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concerned, as they are, with social welfare work and social justice. In the face of these social problems, more citizens are choosing to contribute to the public interest by volunteering; more enterprises are acting out of a sense of social responsibility by participating in public interest work; and choosing public interest work is gradually becoming a fashionable way to edify oneself, serve society, explore life’s meaning, and find fulfillment. Social enterprise is also starting to produce more and more civil organizations. More and more social resources are being mobilized and concentrated in public interest work. Third, with improvements in laws and regulations, a new kind of external environment oriented toward rule of law is being formed. With this development, China’s civil organizations will receive active protections from the system, which should contribute to their healthy development. Though legal and supervisory systems for civil organizations are still rife with problems, the historical reality is that improvements are currently and gradually being made, and governments at many levels are exploring and pushing out specialized-type management, unified supervision, government purchases of civil organizations’ public services and other systemic policy measures. In recent years, the heated debate in government departments, legislative institutions, academia, civil organizations, and the media on the subject of legalization of non-profit organizations has had a positive effect in advancing legalization. 2004’s Measures for Administration of Foundations is a product of this positive exchange. Problems with the current laws and regulations have made these steps imperative, and several rules specific to industry associations, agricultural associations and other fields are currently under debate. Innovations by local governments have also contributed to the constant improvement of the entire legal and policy environment. Inevitably, a system framework beneficial to the healthy growth of civil organizations will be forthcoming in the near future. Fourth, as the market economy matures, forces from within the market system are driving the expansion of civil organizations. With that maturation, commercial and industrial associations have sprung up rapidly, serving importantly to lower transaction costs, standardize market operations, and address anti-dumping. As various interest groups emerge, and as we await improved market regulatory mechanisms, there is a need for social groups, non-profit organizations and intermediary groups, outside of government, capable of representing consumers, workers, peasants, small and medium enterprises to negotiate

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and interact and to advocate for policies seeking a balance of interests in the market economy. Separately, with the market economy producing successful entrepreneurs and wealthy individuals, society has called on them to take social responsibility and caused them to pay greater attention to social welfare as they pursue market interests. In this way, members of the economic elite imbued with senses of social responsibility will become an active force behind the development of China’s civil organizations. Fifth, globalization will bring both opportunities and challenges to China’s civil organizations. China’s ascension to the WTO has increased the openness of both the economy and society; the government, for its part, under market pressure, has speeded up its shift in function. Another source of pressure has been from international commercial and industrial associations that have entered China, bringing not only market-tried concepts and mechanisms but also forcing improvements in related laws and regulations and the current system. The increased integration into local communities on the part of international NGOs, due to their efforts to localize, has made them an active force in driving forward public service provision and the construction of a harmonious society. The debut on the global stage of Chinese enterprises has spurred internationalization of China’s commercial and industrial associations engaged in market development and resource integration. China’s increasingly important role in the international sphere has also stirred China’s civil organizations to engage in international public works and take an increasingly active role at the UN and with other institutions in the international policymaking system. Globalization has also presented many challenges to China’s civil organizations. These include increased competition from international entrants into China, increased demands on their own expertise, and increased urgency that they bolster capacity and engage in allegiances and reciprocal partnerships. China’s civil organizations will need to adapt to these international conventions and competition with increasing urgency. Sixth, in the process of marketization and social diversification, as citizens awaken to and develop their freedoms, autonomy, self-discipline, and volunteer consciousness, citizen participation will increase. China has ancient traditions of social self-organization, volunteer associations and civil, public interest work. As the economy and society develop, and as the government withdraws from various areas of social control, citizens’ opportunities to participate in many forms in the


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economy, society, and even politics, will increase, as will enthusiasm. Through this process, people’s freedoms and rights being recognized; the autonomous spirit being encouraged; methods of self-discipline being developed; and a social spirit of volunteerism being formed will result in the formation of social capital and lay important cultural foundations for the development of civil organizations. Seventh, economic society’s development has caused clear class divisions; the formation of these social classes and interest groups will drive the formation of associations and civil organizations. As economic society has developed and the distribution of social interests has changed and as social classes and interest groups have appeared, civil organizations have begun to serve as bodies through which to express desires, protect interests, participate in governance, make interactive adjustments and maneuver against other groups. In recent years, groups of investors from the same region have formed commercial associations; members of the high-income class formed wealthy individuals’ clubs; home buyers formed owners’ committees; car owners formed motorist clubs; migrant workers’ formed workers’ clubs; and residents from outside regions have formed associations. These too have contributed vital energy to the development of civil organizations. Eighth, the spread of the Internet and text-messaging have changed social relationships, with important implications for associational behavior and the development of civil organizations. In today’s information age, the Internet and text messaging have hugely changed people’s behavior. At present, China’s netizens number 253 million while mobile users number 500 million, unseating the United States to lead the world in both categories. The Internet’s emergence has exploded the amounts of information exchanged in today’s world. The advancement of search engines, BBS, blogs, MSN, QQ and all kinds of online platforms have brought revolutionary change to the forms, content, methods, speed, scope, influence, and every aspect of human relationships. In this context, Internet groups and virtual communities have sprung up; extant associations and civil organizations, too, have changed the way they use information and Internet technologies. The arrival of the Internet era has brought both opportunities and challenges for civil organizations. Separately, in the long view, the aging of the population, cultural diversification, the convergence of cities and villages and other trends in China will also, to varying degrees, present opportunities and challenges for China’s civil organizations.

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4.2. The Road Ahead for China’s Civil Society So, as they face the opportunities and challenges discussed above, what lies ahead, up the road, for China’s civil organizations and for China’s civil society? In the beginning of this chapter, we offered a definition of civil society, in the broadest and most inclusive possible terms, as a social state brought about by the full development of civil organizations. Considering the history and the current opportunities and challenges facing civil organizations, we feel that there are three possible directions for the development of civil society in China. The first possibility is a civil society led by the powerful political elites. In this hypothetical, members of the political elite would serve as the main proponents and architects of China’s civil society. With the backing of these elite members, civil organizations would more actively influence system reforms, would garner more resources and would eke out more public space amidst political, economic, social and cultural changes. Members of the political elite would also participate in and lead civil organizations to a greater degree. The healthy development of civil organizations in all fields and sectors of society would serve as a foundation for strengthening Party governance. There could be formed a new political structure composed of virtuous interactions, interdependence, mutual supervision, and balance between the Party system and civil organizations. Political standards for associations would tend to become stricter while social, economic and cultural standards would tend to become more relaxed. With a “civil organization subsector” emerging at all levels of the People’s Congress and CPPCC, civil organizations’ functions as a participant in state affairs would help to solidify their legal and systemic protections and contribute to improving the administrative system for civil organizations. While a strict, unified administrative system would guarantee the transparency of civil organizations, it would also, to a certain extent, limit their autonomous governance. As reforms of state-owned units and people’s groups draw to a close, they would be largely converted into civil organizations and fall under the purvey of their unified administrative and supervisory system. With continued improvements in the system for government contracting for public services, including systems for evaluation and enforcement, government departments would open the large part of their public services to civil organizations through transparent, public bidding. Civil organization governance would also


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become more reasonable as waves of political elites join their work and leadership. While civil organizations would continue to enjoy generous social support and broad expansion of their function in provision of public services, their leadership capacity would still be underdeveloped. As citizens’ economic demands, cultural demands and public service demands are met to a great degree, their ability to express their interests and their independent spirit would still be insufficient. This is a picture of an economically prosperous, socially stable and harmonious, politically ordered, civil society. The second possible direction is that of a civil society led by members of the intellectual elite. In this hypothetical, members of the intellectual elite would serve as the main proponents and architects of China’s civil society. With their backing, increased participation, and leadership, civil organizations would more actively seek expansion of their public space, as well as system developments that would increase political democracy. The healthy development of civil organizations in all fields and sectors of society would increase citizen participation and advance construction of a system of democratic governance. A variety of civil organizations, serving as delegates and vehicles for expression for different segments of society, would emerge as part of a new political structure characterized by maneuvering, mutual supervision, and mutual checks between civil organizations and other political forces. Political, social, economic and cultural standards for associations would all tend to become more relaxed. Laws and regulations for civil organizations would become more complete and their self-discipline, accountability and social supervisions would be strengthened. Through mechanisms for increased dialogue and communication between Party-government departments and civil organizations, some civil organizations would participate in public service provision contracts with the government, but most would still rely on fundraising for resources. A resource and support system would form, driven by broader citizen participation in fundraising and volunteerism. With more complete, democratic governance systems established, members of the intellectual elite would be elected to positions in the main civil organizations and direct their development. While civil organizations’ leadership capacity would be highly improved, their function in provision of public services would be underdeveloped. Citizens would enjoy full expression of their interests and have diverse channels of participation. We would also see increases in citizens’ autonomy, the independence of their spirit, their consciousness of sovereignty, their sense of

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responsibility for social and public affairs, and their participation. This is a picture of a politically democratic, economically and culturally diverse, socially free, and, in terms of citizens’ interests and freedoms, highly protective, civil society. The third possibility is for a civil society led by members of the economic elite and driven by wealth. In this hypothetical, members of the economic elite serve as the chief proponents and architects of China’s civil society. Driven by members of the economic elite, civil organizations would have more wealth at their disposal, would focus more on social welfare work, and would advance economic and political democracy. Civil organizations would largely become a mechanism for the expression of, and mediation between, the interests of various interest groups. With the continued development of non-public fundraising foundations, a public welfare, charity system would form with large foundations as the primary funding source, and with greater numbers of operator-organizations running programs in impoverished regions and for disadvantaged and socially marginalized groups. Due to this, society’s benefits, overall, would improve, while the ever-increasing social responsibility on the part of business leaders and wealthy individuals would contribute to reducing wealth disparity and other social tensions. With the profusion of resources, civil organizations would concentrate their efforts in the area of public interest, charitable work, and this field would flourish, extending from advanced regions to impoverished ones, from within China to regions abroad. A group of respected, socially responsible business leaders would step up to guide or lead civil organizations. In another respect, members of the economic elite would use civil organizations to promote economic democratization and political democratization, which would increase their power in negotiating with and maneuvering with respect to the Party-government system and other public departments. This, too, would improve society’s mediation mechanisms. Thus, civil organizations’ functions as a provider of public benefit and as a facilitator of social mediation would be strengthened; its use, however, as a means of expression of different social groups would be underdeveloped. This is a picture of a politically democratic, economically advanced, socially well-adjusted, culturally prosperous, civil society with a high degree of developed in the public welfare field. These three possible paths are all hypotheticals based on the current situation and on several possible trends. The possibility remains that any of these paths can be confirmed or negated by future trends. At


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the current stage, we may not be able to predict which of these paths will be taken as China makes its way toward civil society. Nevertheless, we can be certain that the momentum being built by China’s civil organizations is irreversible. The elites, political, intellectual and economic alike, are all participating in and driving forward the development of China’s civil organizations. We also believe that China, with its depth of 5,000 years of culture and 9.6 million square kilometers of natural endowments, will have the ability to accommodate developments along all kinds of possible paths. In summary, this chapter has defined and classified civil organizations, identified two major periods in their development, and then used system reforms, the public sphere and collective action as vantage points to analyze the social foundations for their appearance and development. It finishes with a discussion of potential developments in China’s continually evolving civil society. Our primary conclusion is that over 30 years of development during the Reform and Opening, China’s civil organizations have been an indispensable ally in the unified front of system reform. They occupy a certain public space and have already, with the crucial support of political, intellectual and economic elites, become a significant force in public governance and the provision of many social services. These have fundamentally determined the current and future trends in the development of civil organizations, and, necessarily, also propelled Chinese society firmly toward civil society.

CHAPTER TWO

EXPANSION OF THE CIVIL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION Liu Peifeng In conjunction with the Reform and Opening begun in the late 1970s, the resurgence of civil organizations in China has garnered the greatest attention. The rise of civil organizations is an inevitable result of the spontaneous institutional and social shifts stemming from the overall process of social transition from a collective society to a postcollective society, as well as a response to the “global social revolution.” In accordance with the growing number of civil organizations, as well as improvements in their organizational development and capacity, the role of these groups in Chinese society has become more prominent. Civil organizations have come to play an increasingly important role in public service, social mediation, policy advocacy and civic participation. Service organizations break the government monopoly on public services, in order to provide a wide variety of community-based, personalized public goods to meet the diverse needs of the community. Intermediary organizations undertake institutional transformation that is associated with the meting out of public functions, serving as the bridge between the public and the government. Advocacy organizations provide a platform of ideological emancipation and lubricant for social harmony by providing a forum for the discussion of public affairs, breaking the barriers of ideology, promoting open society and transparency, as well as enhancing community resilience and tolerance. Through these organizations, civil society is empowered to participate in the creation of new channels that exist outside of government institutions and units to enhance the degree of public policy recognition. Civil organizations serve to greatly ease the social crises of legitimacy arising from the process of transformation, while also creating conditions for filling gaps within public services to facilitate smooth transitions within Chinese society. It could be argued that the rise of civil organizations is just as exciting of a phenomenon in the second half of the 20th century as has been the rise of private economy. The rise of the private economy

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has driven the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, while the rise of civil organizations have driven the transition from a collective society to a civil society, such that marketization and democratization have become primary themes within China’s social development. From the perspective of citizen rights, the past 30 years of civil organization development have been marked by the process of expanding the right to the freedom of association. The expansion of civic association has two dimensions, the first of which is the expansion of the rights of individuals to establish organizations and to engage in capacity building, and the second of which is an expansion of the rights of civil organizations originating from the activities of associations. The right of individuals to establish organizations and the right to organize are mutually reinforcing. First of all, an individual’s freedom of association is the basis for the formation of organizations. The capacity and morphology of an individual’s right of association has a direct impact on that of the organization. Secondly, the right of the individual to association has as its fundamental purpose the provision of organized action to overcome personal, property-related and other limitations facing lone actors. If the individual’s right to freedom of association cannot be converted into the right to organize, then the significance and timeliness associated with freedom of association may be greatly reduced. Therefore, the process of understanding the achievement of an expansion of the rights of association for individuals and groups must be undertaken from the perspective of the right to organize, especially in terms of group participation, public services, public decisionmaking, and public advocacy. It should be noted that individuals and organizations possess different types of primary rights. The objectives of individuals and organizations may be the same, but once established an organization meets with demands that extend beyond those of the individual. There may even occur some organizational alienation and variations within collective action. Thus, it is imperative to have a comprehensive understanding of the right to association from the perspective of the differences between both the organization and the individual. At the same time, the core of the right of association permits individuals to establish an organization, but this permission comes from the administration. The expansion of the right of association increases the primacy of the individual and at the same time represents a pro-

expansion of the civil right of association

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cess of loosening controls and deregulation on the part of the government, such that it reflects the evolutionary process of relations between society and the state. Facing the changes that sweep the national and social stage, individuals and organizations are prisoners of history. While with the founding of New China, the collective community underwent social fracture, such that there was no direct link between contemporary and historical non-governmental and civil organizations, modalities of historical relations between state and society will continue to affect choices made in terms of individual behavior and the country’s system. Based on the foregoing considerations, this chapter will explore the expansion of the right of association from the perspective of 30 years of civil society development. This chapter is divided into three parts, the historical background of the expansion of the civic right of association, the expansion of the civic right of association and the dilemmas associated with the civic right of association. From the perspective of freedom of association, three decades of the civic right of association is a process generated by the citizens. It represents an upgrading in capacity of the citizens, as well as a re-organization under the transition from a collective society to a post-collective society. 1. Historical Background of the Right to Association 1.1. History of the Association System Prior to the Founding of New China As in the case of most of the world’s nationalities, the Chinese nation is one characterized by a desire to and a long historical tradition of associations. In the long course of historical development, freedom of association arose as a rational choice brought about by the plight of our ancestors in overcoming personal and property limitations to survive. Similar to people in other communities, when faced with difficulties in life, our ancestors’ solution to the dilemma became a choice that followed a basic sequence: individual, family, social organizations formed by association and public power. Given the relatively low level of social fractures and the high degree of homogeneity of the subject group, the family and family clan developed a public function. However, also due to government efforts to supress organizational activity, civil organization development underwent a degree of suppression and repression. In spite of this, the

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Friends of Entertainment Writers Association (huiyou yuqing de wenren jieshe), Impoverished Lives Charitable Association ( fuwei jikun de cishan jieshe), Mutual Aid Economic Association ( fuchi huzhu de jingji jieshe), and Beyond Beliefs Religious Association (xinyang chaoyue de zongjiao jieshe) are all very well developed.1 Although China has a developed set of associations, however, the government takes an attitude of suppression towards any low-level non-institutional political assembly and political expression. In the history of political initiatives, no effort was spared in breaking up a variety of forms of social and personal contact, a well as the inhibition of civic organizations, to avoid the encroachment of a divided society and multi-center rule.2 Such policies have affected the association scheme for Chinese citizenry, as well as their building of a corresponding system. The outcome of these institutional arrangements has been the formation of a “community-based” (da gongtongti benwei) society.3

1 In modern times, there has been plentiful research on the development of Chinese civil organizations conducted by Chinese and foreign scholars. Among the more influential are: 中国社团研究会/Zhongguo shetuan yanjiuhui: 中国社团发展史/ Zhongguo shetuan fazhan shi, (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 2001) (Chinese Society Research Foundation: A History of Chinese Societal Development, Contemporary China Press, 2001); 王世刚等/Wang Shigang deng: 中国社团史/A History of Chinese Society, (Anhui: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1994) (Wang Shi-gang, et al.: A History of Chinese Society, Anhui People’s Publishing House, 1994); 梁其姿/Liang Qizi: 施善与教化——明清的慈善组织/Shishan yu jiaohua—Ming qing de cishan zuzhi, (Hebei: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001) (Liang Qizi: Improvement and Reformation—Charitable Organizations During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Hebei Education Press, 2001); [日] 夫马进／[Ri] Fu Majin: 中国善会善堂史研究／Zhongguo shanhui shantang shi yanjiu, Translated by Wu Yue, (Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan, 2005) ([ Japanese] Fu Majin: The History of Benevolent Societies in China, Translated by Wu Yue, et al., The Commercial Press, 2005) 2 During the Kaiyuan period of the Tang Dynasty (唐开元), a Revenue Department edict was released saying that “should any prefecture or county government hear word of commoners in any place talking about forming cliques or arranging societies, it is ordered that local offices issue judgements strictly forbidding such activities”. In the seventh year of the Tianbao (天宝) period of the Tang, the imperial court ordered that “should talk be heard in the commoners’ quarters of the establishment of private local societies (私社), [such individuals] are living lives of beasts, using these societies to gather for feasts. It is my meaning that this is intolerable, and is hereby banned. Officials in the prefectures and counties should accordingly make arrests.” 3 秦晖/Qin Hui: 从大共同体本位到公民社会——传统中国社会及其演进的再认识/Cong da gongtongti benwei—Chuantong zhongguo shehui ji qi yanjin de zai renshi, (Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 1999, pp. 350–402) (Qin Hui: Community-Based Civil Society—Re-understanding Traditional Chinese society and Evolution, Changchun Publishers, 1999, pp. 350–402.


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The basic characteristics of the aforementioned social construct included: government reliance on dividing households, reporting on family members, migration, among other measures to curb the strengthening of clans and localized power. The government also extended its control to the lowest levels of society through the “populace household” (bianhu qimin) system and the imperial examination system, which allowed the government to promote and popularize its own values and to exert complete political and conceptual control. Under such conditions, independent social organizations not only lack an independent living space, but also lack the legitimacy necessary for independent survival. Social organizations thereby exist only on the basis of a client or isomorphic relationship with the government. For those social organizations that consist of a structure or concepts that differ from that of the government, the government always maintains a high degree of vigilance, often through inhibiting or suppressing activities to place limits on their existence and development. For those organizations that have a structure and values that are similar to those of the government, it will often take a relatively tolerant attitude, but will remain wary of any signs that these organizations are growing in power and variety.4 Since peasant uprisings and political expression often take religious forms, the government takes strict measures to suppress religious groups, particularly those that have not reached a state of “complicity” with officials. The general public, in its attempts to avoid misfortune, will undertake an apathetic attitude towards organization and political expression, such that “not talking about affairs of the state” becomes the common reaction of the populace as well as its rational choice. To sum up: First of all, the State basically undertakes an inhibitive attitude when it comes to association. The ruling class remains wary of social networks and civic self-organization. It makes a basic policy choice to restrict ascribed social organizations and a variety of civil organizations. Under such conditions, the civic right to association is not confirmed

4 In this regard, we can see this manifested in China’s familial regulations very clearly. From the existing family laws and regulations, it is evident that the primary provisions of laws and regulations are to comply with the government decree and to avoid harming the clan. In terms of different independent cases, familial laws are at times more stringent than national ones.

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by the legal system and the framework of social relations does not exist in a legal community space. Once a social crisis occurs, despite the fact that the civic organizations may not have been the source of the social crisis, the dissolution of civil organizations has often become the primary means of resolving the crisis. Secondly, the primary method of participation in Chinese society consists of the closed “elite absorption type” ( jingying xina xing) of construct, rather than an “open competitive type” (kaifang jinhzeng xing) of individualized non-organized organization participation. The “private nature” (sixing) of power is the leading social concept, with “asylum—allegiance” (bihu—xiaozhong) as the primary form of elite-led participation. A result of elite absorption is the expansion of formal organizations and redundancy within the system. Once the system lacks absorptive capacity, the elite may become marginalized, such that a social crisis could begin to stir. Thirdly, the ruling class undertakes an indifferent attitude towards participation rights and participation capabilities of the general public, while the general public demonstrates alienation from political and social participation.5 When comparing the relationship between government and civil organizations, the latter have some special characteristics. According to existing materials, in the associational territory of traditional Chinese peoples an evident split between mass culture and elite culture existed. Such groups became a forum for literati to engage in writing poetry, establish literary contacts, exchange ideas and create opportunities, such that these cultural groups became the main construct for writers’ associations. Due to the fact that the imperial examination and collegiate commission path served as a meeting place for scholars, Donglin Academy and Society of Classical Learning Restoration came to represent civic groups based largely on the college system. For the general public, associations were more focused on mutual aid, while the variety of types was rather limited. The form of these self-help associations have been influenced by popular novels, dramas 5 Studies of early associations in other countries reveal that the government’s negative attitude towards civil organizations had a certain degree of universality in feudal times. Yet, in modern western countries the process of transformation in the relationship between state and society, the government’s attitude to civil associations from suppression and tolerance assumed a trend towards norms and protection. As a result of rapid changes in modern times, China never experienced this kind of changes of thought and system.


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and traditional stories on the spread of the impact of loyalty, namely “Three Heroes and Five Gallants” (san xia wu yi), “Seven Heroes and Five Gallants” (qi xia wu yi), “Romance of the Three Kingdoms” (san guo yan yi) and “Outlaws of the Marsh” (shui hu chuan). These themes were marked by a variety of variations, similar to secret societies and some of which became part of the triads.6 For the general public, another type of association is the religious organization, in particular those of ordinary women, who as a result of feudal habits and religious activities found a more legitimate reason for gathering. These faith-based groups may have served as a means for these women to participate in public life in spite of their lack of asylum within men’s society. During the Song and Ming dynasties, given the large number of intellectuals in the middle and lower classes that faced narrow channels of social participation, the establishment of civil society became the leading public utility. As such, a large number of public charities became the focal point in the arena of civic association, especially in the economic and cultural areas of the relatively developed regions south of the Yangtze River.7 The relationship between elite civil organizations and general public civil organizations to some extent displayed a trend towards segmentation. Originally, faith-based organizations were the most likely venue for integration between popular and elite society, but data shows that the bond between scholars and top religious figures to have been close, possibly alliance bound. For example, the White Lotus Society (bailian she) of the Eastern Jin Dynasty monk Hui-yuan featured the participation of scholars, while the Huangshan Valley (huangshan gu) had a combination of two circles of clerical and secular organizations. There were no signs of ordinary peoples’ associations operating in concert,

See 王学泰/Wang Xuetai: 游民文化与中国社会/Youmin wenhua yu zhongguo shehui, (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 1999); (Wang Xuetai: Homeless Culture and Chinese Society, Beijing: Academy Press, 1999) 7 These organizations formed a more standard form of internal governance. But, in 1949, these organizations were either dissolved or incorporated by the government. [日]夫马进/[Ri] Fu Majin: 中国善会善堂史研究/Zhongguo shanhui shantang shi yanjiu, Translated by Wu Yue, (Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan, 2005) ([ Japanese] Fu Majin: The History of Benevolent Societies in China, Translated by Wu Yue, et al., The Commercial Press, 2005.); See also, 梁其姿/Liang Qizi: 施善与教化——明清的慈善组织/ Shishan yu jiaohua—Ming qing de cishan zuzhi, (Hebei: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001) (Liang Qizi: Improvement and Reformation—Charitable Organizations During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Hebei Education Press, 2001) 6

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but rather lower-level monk associations with whom they could assemble and to which people would flock. Chinese intellectuals faced with the process of social change may have also used these combinations of people in lower social strata in order to mobilize the masses, most typically towards revolution. Dr. Sun Yat-sen argued that such movements generally rely on the party and new consciousness among military elements, exchange students, overseas Chinese and other core members constituting the party. Overseas Chinese served as the main source of funding, but they were also largely dependent on financing from the US freemasons, while the new consciousness within the military was also linked to the party delegates. Once the revolution succeeded, fracture, restriction, suppression and then the start of transformation occurred in the relations between lower level associations and upper level elites. The most classic example is the establishment of the Ming dynasty and the rectification of the party as it occurred during the early years of the Republic. Many lower level associations did not garner the power to create legitimacy and space from their participation.8 Elites confront cultural barriers with lower level associations, as well as considerations of regime solidity and stability. Lower level associations are complex and varied, with some of their participants displaced and lacking in legitimate occupations, such that if not bound by some constraints these groups could run off to the mountains and forests to organize and potentially cause social unrest. Associations also suffer trappings of regional culture, as well as restrictions from the natural environment. In areas with developed communications, especially in regions with developed shipping and transportation, it is easier to engage in party gatherings. Mountain areas provide the ease and cover of green forests. In practice, civic associations feature more prominently in the South rather than in the North, with the South dominated by the party and the North more by bandits. Southern economic development tends towards obtaining ill-gotten gains through smuggling, while the North tends towards robbery and damaging those who are targeted.9 8 See 魏建猷/Wei Jianpo, 秘密结社与社会经济/Mimi jieshe yu shehui jingji, (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2007) (Wie Jianpo, Secret Associations and SocioEconomics, Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 2007) 9 See [美]裴宜理/[United States] Pei Yili: 华北的叛乱者与革命者1845–1945/ Huabei de panluanzhe 1845–1945, Translated by Chi Zihua, Et al. Beijing: Shangwu


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1.2. Associations under Collective Society After 1949, with the establishment of the people’s political power, access to a higher degree of unification emerged under Chinese society’s “social plan.”10 From the start, establishment of the people’s political power began to transform the process of civil organizations. In order to draw existing civil organizations into the orbit of socialism, on October 19, 1950, the State promulgated the Interim Measures on Social Group Registration (社会团体登记暂行办法), providing classification of civil organizations, registration scope, procedures, principles, etc. According to the regulations, the Ministry of the Interior in 1951 formulated the Provisional Measures for the implementation of Registration of Social Organizations Rules (社会团体登记暂行办法实施细则). The aforementioned two regulations had as their main purpose to clear away and dissolve existing non-governmental legal and policy provisions. For example, Article 4 of the Interim Measures clearly states: “Reactionary groups that harm the interests of the country and the people should be prohibited from establishment. For those organizations found to have reactionary members, their registration shall be revoked and they shall be dissolved.” Based on multi-party cooperation and the political system led by the Chinese Communist Party, non-mainstream political groups were disbanded. Those among civil organizations that did not adhere to socialist values and that were considered adherents of “feudalism” ( fengjian zhuyi) or “reactionary” ( fandong) were eliminated. Some civil organizations were to be modified.11 Following the clean-up and registration, civil organizations that were independent from the government essentially disappeared. China entered an era of a high degree of national integration or social integration. The establishment of the work unit and people’s commune system, allowed the State a monopoly over all specifics pertaining to social resources and social activities, thereby fundamentally banning

yin shuguan, 2007)(Pei Yili: The rebellion and the Revolutionaries in North China 1845–1945, Translated by Chi Zihua, et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2007) 10 Ibid. 11 信春鹰、张烨／Xin Chunying and Zhang Ye in [美]托马斯•西克尔主编/ [Mei] Tuomasi xikeer bian: 亚洲公益事业及其法规/Yazhou gongyi shiye ji qi fagui, (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2000, pp. 1–84) (Thomas Silk, ed. Philanthropy and Law in Asia: A Comparative Study of the Nonprofit Legal Systems in Ten Asia Pacific Societies, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999)

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civil organizations and civil society from existence within this arena. Thus, following the country’s founding, the atrophy of civil society became a social fact. In particular, “At the social level, a unified government system of social management allowed the government functions to achieve generalization and extension, such that the work unit bound every individual to the political, economic, cultural and social scope of management. This made it impossible for the individual or the group to pursue interests that exist outside the community mechanism. In this context, civil organizations could not be independent of the government’s civil organizations and were often assigned implementation of Party and government policy functions or tasks. China’s civil organizations were basically not representative of the political power of civil society, but rather forces that existed between political power and civil society. Thus, these organizations have played a complimentary role to the functions and roles of the government.”12 For this society, scholars have summed up the overall social condition.13 Basic characteristics of collective society include: 1) An extremely strong capability for social mobilization, such that the well-organized national system can be used to mobilize the country’s human and material resources in order to achieve a national goal, especially in terms of economic construction, grand projects and crisis response; 2) Lack of a role for middle class society, such that the state directly relates to the people, with the lack of a buffer or intermediary. Under such conditions social order becomes completely dependent on the level of control exerted by the country, such that when efforts are made to weaken the control of the State, the community experiences a spontaneous and anarchical tendency towards disorder; 3) Poor social autonomy and self-organizing capacity. Progressive organizations remain

Ibid., p. 85. Collective society is a concept used by sociologist Sun Liping to describe China’s broad social structure after its founding. In such a society, the State has a complete monopoly on the economy and each kind of social resource. Politics, economics and ideology, as the three centers, have a high degree of overlap. The State has comprehensive control over the society. Its three basic elements include: first, the State has a direct monopoly over most social resources. Second, horizontal socio-political differentiation is low, while the political, economic and ideological centers maintain a high degree of overlap. Ideology is general in nature. Politics are highly ideological. Economic and other social life are highly politicized. Third, from a vertical perspective, the elimination of the ruling class, formerly countries—civil elite—the people become the country’s three-tier structure—the second level of the population structure. See 孙立平/Sun Liping: 转型与断裂——改革以来中国社会结构的变迁/Zhuanxing yu duanlie—gaige yilai zhongguo shehui jiegou de bianqian, (Beijing: Tsinghua daxue chubanshe, 2004, p. 31) (Sun Liping: Transformation and Fracture—The Reform of China Since its Change of Social Structure, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2004 edition, p. 31) 12 13


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undeveloped, control systems are imperfect, such that there is a tendency towards politicization and administration of all aspects of social life. Subsystems within society lack the conditions to operate independently and the control of different functions of the system operate according to the same principles; 4) Resonance effects, such that any localized conflicts or tensions have implications for an overall or general crisis; 5) A prevalent system of social identity, such that sponsored mobility is transformed into command mobility and a rigid structure; 6) Overall ideology of social integration and tools of rationality assume a dual function, such that the contradictory nature of the functional requirements results in a weakening of the effect of each other; 7) A lack of elites, such that the level of public resistance movements is low, high in shock intensity, with a lack of bottom-up communication factoring into construction, a lack of cohesion of views among the public to facilitate organization, leading to lower levels of distance from policies and a lack of rationality.14

Basic characteristics of civil organizations under collective society included the following: First, State political power extended to the lowest level of society, squeezing the survival space of social organizations. Those independent social organizations already in existence were either dissolved, raised in stature to become political organizations, or acquired special status through political power. Otherwise, due to the compression of survival space, they were dissolved, such that these independent civil organizations lost their living space and even their necessity for existence and legitimacy. Second, civic participation was based on political mobilization and the mobilization of the entire social hierarchy. The Communist Party of China was the center of power, serving in a leadership and decision-making capacity for social participation and mobilization. People’s organizations, democratic parties and the general public in accordance with their social status had opportunities for involvement marked by different channels of participation. Inclusive and exclusive political participation and social participation were strongly premised upon identity and political loyalty, thus allowing for eligibility in noncompetitive participation. Third, participation was institutional and closed in nature. Participation occurred through work units, rural grassroots organizations, etc. Non-institutional political participation was politically prohibited

14

Ibid.

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or occurred outside the bounds of normal society. Social and political participation were the same, with very strong pan-political tendencies. Fourth, strong elite participation was a characteristic. Social elites were absorbed into the Communist Party, people’s groups and democratic parties, throughout civic life. Fifth, participation tended towards refuge and allegiance and as such the public nature of power elicited a degree of suppression.15 Due to the aforementioned factors of history and reality, the system of civil organizations in China faces a relative lack of resources, such that the Chinese people not only lack the right to freedom of association, but also lack the conceptual imagination to conceive of freedom of association. Civil organizations are extreme strangers to council governance, project operation and financial management systems. Many grassroots non-profits have a charismatic personage as a result, such that personal charm impacts the nature of the organization, such that even individual behavior and organizational behavior become difficult to distinguish clearly. Many civil organizations are family-oriented or family-governed. Due to historical and institutional factors, the degree of civic recognition of civil organizations is relatively low, as are social participation and public supervision. These factors have a direct impact on the social utility of civil organizations. 2. Expansion of the Right of Citizens to Form Associations During the late 1970s, the rise of civil organizations in China was an inevitable reflection of a crisis of legitimacy, a lack of power centraliza-

15 In modern times, de facto disintegration of political power and social disintegration presented China with a double predicament. Traditional society’s self-organizing mechanism and social integration under collective society’s anomie, when combined with organizations’ increasing ability to integrate, made it necessary for these groups to seek new ways of political organization and social integration. Collective anomie forced masters to take state power through the path of unified state power based on the realization of social integration. At that time, if one were to rely solely on civil society, to take the path of social self-organization in order to achieve reunification would have been fundamentally impossible. There is no united regime that is both unable to resist foreign invasion and unable to resolve people’s livelihood. At the same time, given the divided state of renewal it has been difficult to establish the needs of the community self-organization of social identity. However, upon achieving a nationally unified government and completing social reconstruction, whether or not society will continue to take the road towards national integration is open for discussion.


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tion and the absence of democracy. The year 1976 marked the end of a decade of civil strife that brought China to the brink of collapse, while exposing all the defects of the political and economic system that had arisen since the nation’s founding. Such a highly centralized political and economic system was not only unable to maintain longterm social stability, but also created social imbalance and institutional rigidities in its structure. Long-term civil strife and economic collapse in modern times have not only stymied the task of social integration and social reconstruction, but also confronted the new regime with a certain degree of legitimacy crisis. At the same time, social legitimacy also faced a transition from a structure based on personal charisma to a conventional form. The failure of centralization led to calls for democracy and pluralism. China’s reform movement in the late 1970s began under these background conditions. A legitimacy crisis, the failure of totalitarianism and the absence of democracy led to the calls for the rise of civil society, which through pluralization would rebuild social legitimacy, supplement the deficiencies of centralization, and through civil society democratic participation address the issue of the lack of democracy.16 In this manner, the rise of civil organizations was a conscious reflection of the upper levels of society in the face of crisis. The reform and opening up created a space for independent resource allocation and free activity that allowed for the establishment of civil society and the possibility for people to meet their own diverse needs. Many grassroots organizations in Chinese society arose from this foundation. Thus, it is evident that the modern emergence of civil organizations is a product that stems from both induced and spontaneous shifts in modern society.17

16 During the Cultural Revolution, political power associations, such as the “Mao Zedong Thought Study Group” and various types of competitive organizations continued to exist. In the early 1970s, due to the weakening of government control, book clubs and other such organizations began to appear at the lower rungs of society. However, these organizations may have been lacking in control or products of incompetence and their presence certainly does not mean that one can confirm that collective action by associations had reached the system level. 17 Varous studies have pointed out that “the government gradually lost its monopoly on social welfare resources, combined with its gradual withdrawal from the field of social welfare served as the foundation for the emergence and development of civil organizations in China. Yet, the traditional charitable spirit of providing mutual aid and the general sense of social responsibility meant that this emergence, development and committment to solving social problems was rooted in bottom-up civil organizations.” See 王名主编/Wang Ming, ed. 中国NGO研究——以个案为中心/Zhongguo

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Induced changes determined the government’s leading role in the rise of civil society, while spontaneous changes provided the development of civil organizations with their diversity and vitality. Based on long-term national traditions and the historical task of nation-states building, China’s induced social changes have determined that for a long period of time the government has remained the dominant factor in the development of civil organizations. The strength of government reform and the size of autonomous space have had a direct impact on the development of civil organizations and will determine the level of variation within civil organizations. The government-led model of civil organization or the corporatist model is the basic form for civil organizations. In the short term, China’s civil organizations will not constrain or restrict government power, but rather will only be able combine their power with the government, thereby possessing the power to bind the government. In summary, the rise of civil organizations following the reform and opening-up has been both an intended and non-intended result of government activities. Following the reforms, the basic path of social change has been divestiture and liberation. The government has divested itself of a number of functions and liberated community space, creating an opening for autonomous generation of resources and free activity. This change not only posits a form under which force is a tool of last resort, but is also based in a concept of social management rooted in the rational choice to change. In this divestiture and liberation process, civil organizations spin-off from the upper level and grassroots community level, seizing their different developmental opportunities. During the 1980s, a large number of civil organizations appeared in the economic field. In the 1990s, the lack of social services spurred the creation of a large number of private education and other arenas of reform service organizations. In 1998, institutional reform led to the spinning off of some civil organizations. The number of civil organizations has unceasingly expanded. Since the beginning of the reforms and opening up, several thousand such organizations were registered. By the end of the 1980s, this number had reached 200,000,

NGO yanjiu—Yi ge an wie zhongxin, (Lianheguo quyu fazhan zhongxin, 2000, p. 18. (Wang Ming, ed: China’s NGO Research—Individual Cases as the Center, United Nations Center for Regional Development, p. 18)


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but then precipitously dropped during several revamping campaigns the 1990s. By 2000, the numbers again reached their 1980s levels, hitting 350,000 by the end of 2007. This stage of development can be divided into several major events: political turmoil and subsequent management regulations in 1989, the “World Conference on Women” (shifu hui) in 1995, “Project Hope” (xiwang gongcheng) and the subsequent “China Youth Development Foundation” (qingji hui) event in the 1990s, the Nu River dam incident in 2004. Prior to 1989, civil organizations lacked a legal basis, but the reform and opening up ushered in a more relaxed social environment allowing civil organizations to enjoy great development. Their scale has reached in excess of 20 million, with a variety of forms. Autonomous social associations have met with enthusiasm from the community and a large arena for operation, establishing to a certain degree a pattern for future associations. In 1989, promulgation of related regulations occurred and civil organizations achieved a degree of specialization in remote management through the dual administration system. However, the subsequent “clean-up and reorganization” of civil organizations set back their development to a degree. The 1995 World Conference on Women derived its importance in part from the fact that at the same time the “Non-governmental Organization Women’s Conference” ( fei zhengfu zuzhi funu dahui) was being held, allowing domestic organizations to witness the power of NGOs and to clearly define their own clear role as opposed to the ambiguous status of previous people’s organizations and private institutions. As such, a large number of civil organizations devoted to women’s issues were created under the influence of the World Conference on Women. The “Project Hope” (xiwang gongcheng) of the late 1990s allowed society to witness the great guidance role of civil organizations in public service and public advocacy. However, the subsequent “China Youth Development Foundation” incident raised awareness that civil organizations are not blocks of territory, but rather require essential internal governance and capacity-building. Beginning in 2000, civil organizations began to pay attention to specialization and internal governance, as well as to the concept of industry self-regulation. The Nu River dam incident in 2004 marked the transformation of the functions of civil organizations as remission from the initial phase of financial crisis, to the transfer of medium-term government functions, to participation in changes to public governance.

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2.1. Analysis of the Number and Status of Civil Organizations The actual number of civil organizations is an extremely uncertain figure. This is due to the fact that a number of civil organizations are either illegal in status or lack legal status. The uncertainty surrounding their legal status affects people’s perceptions regarding the number of civil organizations.18 By the end of 2007, there were over 350,000 civil organizations registered in China. When combined with other civil organizations and their local branches, internal organization units that are not required to register, industrial and commercial sector organizations and illegal organizations that have no means of obtaining registration, the actual number of Chinese civil organizations in terms of overall volume is between five and ten times that of those registered. However, these figures constitute only those registered under the Ministry of Civil Affairs and do not reflect the existing number of civil organizations in China, much less the number of legitimate civil organizations. This is due to the fact that in spite of China’s establishment of a Ministry of Civil Affairs in the late 1980s to orchestrate its social management system, the pattern of multi-management has not been completely eliminated. At the same time, due to historical and institutional reasons, some long-standing civil organizations have achieved a special status and are not required to go through registration to acquire legal qualification. Additionally, since many civil organizations are unable to register, they drift at the border between the legal and the illegal. Officials in the Ministry of Civil Affairs have also admitted that there are many civil organizations in China that are not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. After careful consideration, it becomes apparent that Chinese civil organizations exist in over ten different incarnations: 18 In addition to the reasons behind the registration system, civil organization statistics may be less than a rational issue. Formal legal forms of civil organizations are better suited for statistics, while those groups existing at the grassroots level and informal civil organizations are difficult to measure via statistics. Civil organizations exist in a field that the formal system often is not able to penetrate, such that employment of statistics in these areas is sometimes simply impossible. The special nature of the China issue means that not only is there no means to statistically measure those civil organizations that garner a legal existence, in some cases, these departments may approve the establishment of civil organizations, and as such the legitimacy of these civil organizations comes into question.


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1) Civil organizations registered in accordance with the 1998 associations administration regulations and referred to by the aforementioned figures; 2) Non-governmental organization units, such as the school of student civil organizations, clubs of internal units, alumni associations of schools, among others. These civil organizations have the approval of the authorities, but have not registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Their internal activities are approved under the law and they maintain contact with similar types of civil organizations;19 3) Civil organizations that do not need to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, such as the Red Cross, the Bar Association, etc.; 4) Social groups participating in the Chinese Peoples’ Political and Consultative Conference, including such advisory bodies and local organizations, such as the eight democratic parties and the China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League Central Committee, the All-China Women’s Federation, the China Association of Science and Technology, the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, the China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots, the All-China Youth Federation and the China Federation of Industry and Commerce. These groups have a special political and legal status in China. While these groups are civic organizations by nature, they are not under the scope of civil organization management authorities.; 5) Civil organizations registered under the approval of preparatory agencies of the State Council and by the State Council, such as the Chinese Federation of Literary and Art Circles, the China Writers Association, the All-China Journalists Association, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, the China International Trade Promotion Association, the National Federation of the Disabled, the Soong Ching Ling Foundation, the China Law Society, the Red Cross Society of China, the Chinese Association for Enterprise Culture Construction, the Western Returned Scholars Association, the Huangpu Military Academy Alumni Association, Chinese Vocational Education Association, etc.; 6) Community civil organizations, such as the Owners’ Committee, community-based organizations for the elderly; 7) Rural civil organizations. The vast majority of civil organizations in rural China are not registered. Civil organizations in rural areas consist of two types:

19 On December 9, 2004, the Beijing College Students Federation was formally established as a civil organization, during which the General Assembly adopted the “Beijing University Student Federation of the Statute of Civil Organizations.” This led to the selection of the Loving Heart Society of Peking University, Marxism Studies Research Society of Tsinghua University, “Yandu Society” of Renmin University and another 92 civil organizations to constitute the governing unit of the Beijing College Students Federation, while 16 civil organizations formed the executive director’s unit. According to the Census and Statistics of December 9, 2004, Beijing University student civil organizations totaled 2,235, encompassing nearly 17 million students and accounting 30.9% of the students in colleges and universities throughout the city. 新华网/Xinhua Net, December 9, 2004.

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liu peifeng traditional civil organizations, such as clan organizations, and modern civil organizations, such as self-help groups of farmers and peasants and agricultural organizations (the Watermelon Association, the Apple Association, the Fisheries Association), etc.; 8) Industrial and commercial administration departments for registration of civil organizations. Under China’s system, since managing authorities in the relevant fields cannot be found, some civil organizations are only able to register in the form of businesses in the corporate sector. Numerous foreign intermediary organizations tend to adopt this form;20 9) Civil organizations formed by Chinese nationals in foreign countries that then engage in domestic activities, such as overseas Chinese residing abroad who upon their return work on behalf of the civil organizations established while abroad; 10) Civil organizations dependent on the existence of another civil organization, which as a result of registration conditions and social management reasons encounter difficulties when registering and as a result are only able to depend on other civil organizations for their existence. This leads to the formation of civic group management organizations. This characteristic is very apparent in the case of a number of academic and industry groups that have regional coverage throughout the entire country and are pursuing economies of scale and the effect of overall management, resulting in redundancy of non-government organizations. Additionally, the Ministry of Civil Affairs also designates the authority over some civic groups as associations or civil organizations, such as the China Association for Science and Technology, which is responsible for the management of science and technology civic groups. The Chinese Society of Ideological and Political Work is responsible for managing national ideological and political associations, trade unions and other associations responsible for technical staff; 11) Online civil organizations. The emergence of the Internet has also affected the existence of a number of civil organizations. Online civil organizations have also emerged, such as online forums and online environmental organizations. Due to

20 Save the Children UK was the first of the foreign business sector to register in Yunnan Province as an international civil organization. Afterwards a number of international civil organizations followed suit and entered Yunnan Province to obtain legal status. See 王名主编/Wang Ming, ed. 中国NGO研究——以个案为中心/Zhongguo NGO yanjiu—Yi ge an wie zhongxin, (Lianheguo quyu fazhan zhongxin, 2000, p. 18. (Wang Ming, ed: China’s NGO Research—Individual Cases as the Center, United Nations Center for Regional Development, p. 18) The reason behind such activities is that many foreign civil organizations in China are unable to gain access to the authorities. They are, therefore, unable to register as civil organizations. In this way, these organizations are unable to enjoy the tax structure and other treatment afforded civil organizations and other organizations. They also, of course, avoid the supervision of the civil affairs departments, which is likely to result in the alienation of these organizations or corruption. See the speech the Ministry of Civil Affairs representative 李勇先生/Mr. Li Yong at the “Seminar on Legal Issues of Civic Groups” in May 2002 at Beijing’s Fragrant Hills.


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the virtual nature of cyberspace, it is simply not possible for such civil organizations to register or to be registered.21

From this we can see that China’s civil organizations are in a very complex state of existence. There are those that have registered and those that have not registered. There are those that have a special legal status and those that do not have a special legal status. There are clan organizations of the traditional type and those with new online forms emerging. There are those registered in the civil affairs departments and those registered in other sectors of civil society. There are both legal and illegal civil organizations.22 In such a situation, the number of civil organizations is naturally an unknown. The Ministry of Civil Affairs has admitted that registered civil organizations reflect only about one-fifth of the total number.23

21 See the speech the Ministry of Civil Affairs representative 李勇先生/Mr. Li Yong at the “Seminar on Legal Issues of Civic Groups” in May 2002 at Beijing’s Fragrant Hills. 22 Distinguishing between legitimate civil organizations and illegal civil organizations in China is very difficult. According to general understanding, there are no illegal civil organizations that have obtained registration in civil affairs departments. The “Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Groups” maintains this position. However, to test this assertion with any detail is very problematic, as many civil organizations fundamentally do not want to register, such as student civil organizations, as records from school Communist Youth Leagues show. There are many cases in which civil organizations are established or maintain their legitimacy through inviting the leadership of a responsible authority or a form of government leaders to participate in their progress. Administrative behavior that is non-normative and ruled by man has also affected the existence of a civil organizations and the establishment of civil organizations. At the same time, illegal civil organizations do not mean that these civil organizations are violating laws. Many civil organizations that did not obtain license and registration still play a positive role. In China, the legitimacy of civil organizations and their legal competency is not always the same. The state of government administration and the existence of civil organizations have presented many difficult questions. For a discussion of the legitimacy of relevant civil organizations, please see 高丙中/Gao Bingzhong: “社会团体的兴起及其合法性问题/Shehui tuanti de xingqi ji qi hefaxing wenti”, in 处于十字路口的中国民间组织/Chuyu shizilukou de zhongguo minjian zuzhi, Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2001, pp. 75–91. (Gao Bingzhong: “The Rise of Social Groups and Their Legitimacy Problem,” China’s Civil organizations at the Crossroads, Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2001, pp. 75–91) 23 乔申乾、李勇/Qiao Shenqian: “中国社会团体发展的历史、现状和未来/ Zhongguo shehui tuanti fayhan de lishi, xianzhuang he weilai“ in 玉璋/Wu Yuzhang: 社会团体的法律问题 (中国法治论坛)/Shehui tuanti de falu wenti (zhongguo fazhi luntan), Beijing: Sheke wenxian, 2004. (Qiao Shenqian, “ History of the Development of Chinese Social Groups,“ in Legal Aspects of Social Groups (China’s Rule of Law Forum), Beijing: Social Science Literature, 2004)

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This demonstrates not only procedural deficiencies and processing fatigue present in the management of civil organizations, but also to some extent explicates the complexity of the issue of civil organizations. However, technical statistics on the number of civil organizations are only of relative significance. They show that Chinese society is undergoing social transformation from a social pattern of comprehensive national integration to a separation between State and society, with a growing space for autonomous civic allocation of resources and autonomous activity. Just as democracy is not some form of relation between ratios, the number of civil organizations is an inadequate indicator of the extent of civil society. The key question is the nature of civil organizations, whether these civil organizations exist independently or are dependent upon the government. If these civil organizations exist subordinate to the government, then they can only demonstrate the manner in which governmental authority achieves change and are not able to fundamentally change the government’s pattern of social integration. Only when civil organizations exist independently of the government are they able to maintain different rules of action and social concepts and exert pressure upon and limit government excesses. Only then can it be said that civil society has achieved an independent form. On the one hand, the expansion and number of civil organizations poses issues of inadequate statistics. On the other hand, it is evident that there still exists a dilemma relating to an excess of statistics. The organizational structure of some civil organizations is such that in order for their establishment they must correspond from top to bottom with the administrative management system and face an inherent lack of motivation among their members. It could be said that such organizations have been overturned. Due to the current classifications in the registration system and restrictions on organizations, another segment of organizations end up engaging in divestment of their branches. For example, the group Crane consists of 13 agencies, which on one level were established to correspond with administrative divisions, and on another level were created to correspond with management departments. Splitting the community in accordance with the administrative system, while facilitating the administrative process, is damaging for grassroots community capacity-building.


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2.2. Improvements in the Legal System and Public Policy As civil organizations develop, the building of a legal system for civil organizations is also accompanied by the need for improvement and advancement of civic development and management. Article 35 of the Constitution promulgated in 1982 contains provisions for freedom of association among Chinese citizens. Civil organizations protect this constitutional right to freedom of association for Chinese citizens. The General Principles of Civil Law promulgated in 1986 provides for four types of legal persons, among which the social group legal person offered a possible organizational form for civil organizations. Public Welfare Donation Law, Private Education Promotion Law, as well as the relevant tax laws and regulations also improved the environment for the development of civil organizations. In order to standardize the development of civil organizations, the State Council in 1988 promulgated the Measures on Foundation Administration《基金会管理办法》; in 1989, the “Provisional Regulations on the Management of Foreign Chambers of Commerce” and the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration《社 , and in 1998 again amended the Civil orga会团体登记管理条例》 nizations Ordinance and promulgated the Provisional Measures on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Administration《民办非企业单位暂行条例》. These measures were followed in 2004 by promulgation of the “Regulations on the Management Foundation.” The promulgation of these laws and regulations in new China filled the legislative gaps related to civil organizations and to a certain extent changed the situation under which civil organizations lacked a legal basis. They have played a major role in the development of such organizations, in particular in the arena of regulatory norms. In accordance with the needs of social development, these laws and regulations helped to bring China’s policies up to date in legislative and public policy terms. In addition to breakthroughs made in the current regulations, there have been a series of new initiatives put forward in areas including the development of trade associations, charity organizations, non-governmental community organizations, as well as agricultural associations. Legal improvements have been quite innovative. For example, many aspects of 2004’s Foundations measures were major breakthroughs. These included the confirmation of the public interest orientation of foundations; separated administration according to type; national treatment; allowance of the apprectiation

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of foundation assets; stimulus mechanisms; self-regulatory mechanisms, monitoring mechanisms, and tax incentives. All of these have been useful precendents for future legislative and legal modifications. As gradual improvements have been made to the legal system, to a certain extent there has been a fundamental change in the government’s awareness of civil organizations. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee explicitly put forward the goal of an harmonious society, compelling principle members to make their utmost efforts to achieve it. The meeting also raised the utility of a degree of autonomy for grassroots organizations, coordination of urban and rural interests, conflict resolution, problem solving, the role played by civil organizations, trade associations and social intermediary organizations in providing services, pursuit of norms of conduct and working together towards the formation and management of social services. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee stated: Construction of social causes should be strengthened through adherence to coordinated development; new socialist countryside construction should be promoted in earnest; the general strategy of regional development should be implemented; active employment policies should be carried out; education should top the development agenda; health care services should be enhanced; development of cultural cause and cultural industries should be accelerated; environmental protection and pollution control should be strengthened; institutional construction should be enhanced and social equality and justice should be safeguarded. The system of safeguarding democratic rights, the legal system and judicial system and mechanism, as well as systems of public finance, income distribution and social security should be improved.

The Chinese Communist Party’s 17th Party Congress also stated: “Socialist culture is thriving as never before, but the people have growing cultural needs and have become more independent, selective, changeable and diverse in thinking, setting higher requirements for the development of an advanced socialist culture. Our society has become evidently more dynamic, but profound changes have taken place in the structure of society, in the way society is organized and in the pattern of social interests, and many new issues have emerged in social development and management.” In order to achieve this, these social organizations should “assist in expanding participation by the public and report on their petitions to improve the self-governance capability of society.” To improve social management, the 17th Party Congress advocated the “need to improve the structure of social management


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comprising Party committee leadership, government responsibility, non-governmental support and public participation, and improve the system of social management at the primary level.” The excellent condition of registration and social development agencies also demonstrated a strong sense of innovation of the system. During the National Social Organizations Construction and Management Experience-Exchange Meeting held in November 2007, the Ministry of Civil Affairs Minister Li Xueju pointed out that “in the new historical period, the central government’s guiding thought on civil organizations have become increasingly clear. In terms of the principle of social organizations, policies have become increasingly comprehensive, with greater specificity of requirements on work projects that may be summed up as: development is the prerequisite, construction is the core, nurture and supervision are the basic means, and actively promoting the use of social organizations is the fundamental purpose.” In specific terms, “development is the prerequisite, that is to say development of civil organizations is the last word, the foundation of all social organization construction and management work. Without the development of civil organizations, all other endeavors becomes like still waters. We must adhere to the development of civil organizations as a top priority. This includes taking the initiative to adapt to the trend of the times, actively adapting to changing situations, grasping the laws of development, innovation and development of ideas, solving difficulties of development, as well as keeping the pace in achieving the total volume, size, structure and layout of social organizations along with China’s socialist economic, political, cultural and social construction. Building is the core, that is to say that civil organizations are essential and their construction is the central task. Implementation of the scientific concept of development must be carried out, such that social organizations transform from monitoring of their target to development of their main body. This is to further enhance their function of serving the community, clearly define governmental responsibilities and tasks, and to improve the policy system, scientific planning and correct guidance of civil organizations. Construction is meant to allow for civil organizations to actively meet the inherent requirements of a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of a harmonious socialist society, while engaging in unified construction in the right direction with special

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socialist characteristics” . . . “Cultivation and supervision are the basic means, that is to foster the one hand with one hand and supervise with the other hand.” . . . “It is essential for civil organizations to play an active role, that is simply for social organizations to play a role as basic standards of measuring work.” At the 2008 National Working Conference, Minister Li Xueju again emphasized that use of the good opportunities presented by the reforms to current system will allow for the functions of government reform to be transferred up to the social organizations. With changing concepts, legislation and public policy have also undergone great progress. In recent years, work on government legislation and regulation has appeared in main three areas: First, the timely launch of the pilot record-keeping system, which has resolved the dual management system, restricted system competition, as well as set a threshold on the high amount of funds spent in the establishment of civil organizations. This has encouraged the establishment of civil organizations, in particular in the categories of charitable and community-based civic groups. Second, there has been an assessment of civil organizations carried out to raise the level of internal governance, promote capacity building of civil organizations and to imcrease the accountability of civil organizations. Third, there has been timely amendment of administrative rules and regulations, as well as the release of a number of statutes, names, information and other published administrative guidance measures relating to civil organizations to promote a good social environment for tax incentives and the introduction of financial incentives for the development of civil organizations. 2.3. Public Participation in Civil Organizations Civil organizations, in addition to meeting the interests of individual citizens and the needs of the group, are also starting to intervene and participate in public life. Different civil organizations need to express their voice, while the social classes that they represent need someone to champion their interests. Specifically, participation has the following characteristics: First, judging from the scope of participation, in addition to the background of some of the official organizations, civil organizations participate in arenas that do not have a strong political bent. These areas


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primarily include environmental protection, education, poverty alleviation and development, etc. The most typical is the field of environmental protection. In recent years, a large number of civil organizations have become active in environmental protection, as well as in training to increase public awareness of environmental protection, represented by such groups as “Green Earth,” “Friends of Nature,” “Global Village,” and “Chongqing Green Volunteers Federation.” These groups not only carry out their own activities, but also form a loose network of common action or issue a common voice. For example, they organized 18 Chinese civil organizations at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg to target, in concert, public construction projects with impacts on China’s environment. Taking the “Federation of the Chongqing Green Volunteers” as an example, in recent years this organization has been actively involved in environmental policy-making and carried out a series of activities. These primary activities include the following: Participation in investigations to protect natural forests in Western Sichuan Province at the upper reaches of the Yangtze River has included supervision and resolution of the Western Sichuan Province Hongya deforestation incidents, leading to a comprehensive ban on logging of natural forests in Sichuan Province, as well as a decision to promote implementation of a project for national natural forest protection. There has also been participation in protection of Chongqing’s Jinfo and Jinyun Mountain Nature Reserves, which included putting an end to the destructive development of protected areas, under which the government withdrew development approvals and instituted protective measures. In solving the problem of electricity shortages in Chongqing, the Chongqing Municipal Government decided to build 300,000-kilowatts worth of coal-fired generating units in the main urban areas, which would have had serious effects on the urban environment. Under active involvement by the “Federation of Chongqing Green Volunteers,” the Chongqing Municipal Government complied with public opinion and revoked its building projects. There has also been participation in environmental education and creation of green school activities. Run in cooperation with the Government of Chongqing, these initiatives are fully underway to provide teacher training courses in environmental education for primary and secondary schools in Chongqing, providing educational programs and

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environmental education in 43 districts and counties in Chongqing and covering more than 4,000 primary and secondary schools and kindergartens. There has also been participation in, and suggestions raised to the government regarding Three Gorges Reservoir biodiversity conservation activities, such as adoption by the government of the establishment of endangered species reserve at the Furong River Canyon—The Francoisi Nature Reserve. Civil organizations have also participated in addressing strontium salt chemical pollution in West Chongqing by putting forward a proposal that has been affirmed by the government for West Chongqing strontium salt chemical sustainable development, to reduce pollution and hazards, to improve resource utilization, to increase economic effectiveness. There have also been proposals for the reforestation of barren hills, the reform of funeral customs, tree burial forests, that have been supported or adopted by the government. Generally speaking, due to these fields’ prevalence of pure public goods and low political sensitivity, combined with a basic versimilitude of philosophy with that of the government, the participation of civil organizations has gained government recognition. The State Environmental Protection Administration has stressed that civil organizations should play a role in environmental protection and that there should be establishment of a national network of environmental civil organizations. The State Family Planning Commission also stressed the role to be played by civil organizations in the area of family planning. Some other civil organizations are active in AIDS prevention, the protection of labor rights and other fields. Among the more active of these arenas is the field of protection of labor rights of workers. In 2002, one area of the Pearl River Delta witnessed the establishment of more than 10 civil organizations working to protect labor rights.24 Using Guangzhou’s Panyu Districts “Service Department for Peasant Workers” as an example, this organization that was established in 1998 mainly engaged in industrial visits, legal advice consultations and free agent activities such as labor disputes. Shenzhen’s “Institute of Contemporary Observation” engaged in investigations and research

24 黄钙/Huang qiao: “珠三角一年冒出10个NGO/Zhusanjiao yinian maochu shige NGO,” 中国经营报/Zhongguo jingying bao, December 12, 2003; 走进城市“灰色生存地带”/Zoujin chengshi “huise shengcun didai,” Banyuetan, Issue 3, 2003; (Huang Qiao: “Ten Civil organizations Come Out of the Pearl River Delta”, China Business, December 12, 2003; “Into the city, “Grey Zone Survival,” Half-Month Talk, Issue 3, 2003)


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of labor issues, including the areas of worker injury claims and other collective actions. In 2001, Fuyang in Anhui Province set up the “Rights of Farmers Association” that determined “rational rights, cultural enlightenment, science enrichment” to be the three major areas of activity for rights implementation and new village building activities. Although these organizations have had wide-ranging implications in the community, because of the tendency for a specific group of people (veterans, migrant workers, laid-off workers) to set up restrictions on organization policies, the status of these organizations has been less pronounced. Some have conducted their activities under the guise of business registration as private, industrial or commercial entities, while others simply lack a legitimate identity. The government has often assumed an attitude of acquiescence towards their activities. In recent years, the basic trend of development has been that civil organization participation has gradually pushed in from the margins of society into the center of public policy. Avoidance of sensitive issues has begun to shift towards paying attention to and participating in the discussion of sensitive issues, breaking through the restrictions imposed by policies and habits. Taking environmental protection organizations as an example, in their early days the main activities of these groups focused on the idea of promoting environmental awareness and raising public awareness of environmental protection. Using their own terminology, environmental organizations were limited to “third kind” (lao san yang) activities, such as planting trees, watching birds, picking up trash, etc. But since 2003, particularly in 2004, several major environmental civil organizations dedicated their energies towards impacting environmental decision-making. In 2003, several dam projects in western China have been resisted by civil organizations, such as the impact of Yangliuhu-related projects on Dujiangyan and the Nu River dam project. Civil organizations large and small expressed their views through seminars, forums, presentations and photo exhibitions. As a result of the impact of these environmental organizations, the former resulted in discontinuation of the project, while the latter led to an environmental assessment, during which environmental organizations voiced their perspectives.25 25 付涛/Fu Tao: “怒江之争后边的移民问题/Nujiang zhizheng houbian de yimin wenti,” Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, June 2004 (Fu Tao: “The Immigration Issues Behind the Nu River Fight,” China Development Brief, June 2004)

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Some civil organizations also took part in public events of emergency response and processing. For example, during the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, many civil organizations were involved in the relief operations.26 Also in 2003, a city in Hebei Province named Zhai, set up the “Rural Yan Yangchu College,” committed to building a new sports village, in an effort to train a corps of rural management talent. This endeavor had hopes of providing a degree of organization to farmers to increase their ability to withstand market risks and to expand rural capacity for participation in public affairs.27 Established in 2003 in Beijing, the “Cultural Center for Facilitators” (xiezuozhe wenhua zhongxin) is devoted to building capacity among migrant workers. In June and November of 2004, this group held two large-scale “National Migrant Worker Public Policy and Service Model Innovation” seminars with calls for improvements in policies. One of these, in June, 2004, was jointly organized by the Center, the Law and Policy Department of the State Administration of Work Safety, and the China Work Safety Reporter” (zhongguo anquan shengchan bao). The second was staged in cooperation with Canada’s International Development Agency. Conference participants included officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the Ministry of Health, the National Federation of Trade Unions, the State Administration of Work Safety and other agencies, as well as experts and civil organizations, academics and representatives of migrant workers. Participating members engaged in a certain degree of communication on the policy level. In addition, there are a number of civil organizations aimed at promoting grassroots democracy-building and elections, such as the “New Peoples’ Education and Research Center” (xinmin jiaoyu yanjiu zhongxin) and the “World and China Institute” (shijie yu zhongguo yanjiusuo). The former directly promotes Beijing’s Nine Bay Community Associa-

26 For specifics, please see 高小贤/Gao Xiaoxian: “NGO: 想做什么和能做什么/ NGO xiang zuo shenme he neng zuo shenme,” Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, Autumn, 2003 (Gao Xiaoxian: NGO: What they Want to Do and What They Are Capable of Doing, China Development Brief, Autumn 2003); “SARS 时期的中国 NGO/SARS shiqi de zhongguo NGO,” Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, Autumn 2003 (Chinese Civil organizations in the SARS Era, China Development Brief, Autumn 2003) 27 付涛/Fu Tao: “田埂上的新乡村试验/Tianying shang de xin xiangcun shiyan,” 中国发展简报/Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, August 2004 (Fu Tao: “A Test for New Villages on the Ridge,” China Development Brief, August 2004)


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tion for the Elderly (beijing jiu daowan shequ laoren xiehui) and training in self-governance for villagers in Hubei’s Shayang County. The latter masterminded the direct election of a mayor in 1998 in Sichuan Province’s Buyun Township in Suining City and participated directly in the design of the Zhejiang Ningbo Haishu community.28 However, it should be noted that much of the effort to promote this shift of civil organization participation in China from the margin to the center is still in its trial phase. Difficulties are still frequently encountered in the system. Officials, to a certain degree, still have a guarded attitude towards their participation. Due to the promotion of participation in public policies, some organizations have also encountered some difficulties, such as those met by environmental groups when participating in environmental activities, such as problems met by participation of the “Green Valley” organization at Yunnan Province’s Nu River. Moreover, these actions only constitute a certain direction and are not representative of the overall participation of civil organizations. Secondly, in terms of the form of participation, as a result of the differences of resources available to government-run organizations and grassroots organizations, their forms of participation are also different. Government-run organizations continue down the social collective path, while given the absence of collective resources available to grassroots organizations, they have basically taken the path of serving as pressure groups. In China, many government-run civil organizations are separate from the government, yet they used to be a part of the government or were established through the separation from the functions of government. Therefore, their relationship is marked by a certain degree of compliance with the functions of government departments. As such, their leaders come from those heads of government agencies that retire or retain some form of community network with government agencies. Between such organizations and the government there exists a good relationship of compliance and trust, resulting in the civil organization taking a combined road. The government transfers part of its functions to these organizations, while these groups provide a catalyst for

28 See 李凡主编/Li Fanzhu bian: 中国基层民主发展报告——2003/Zhongguo jiceng minzhu fazhan baogao—2003, Beijing: Falu chubanshe, 2004. (Li Fanzhu, ed., China Grassroots Democracy Development Report—2003, Law Press, 2004)

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use by the government. Government-run industry associations predominantly participate through this model. For example, the China Tungsten Industry Association, when facing major issues on industrial development, submit their proposals directly to the leadership of the State Council. In order to stop the impact of low-price dumping on national non-ferrous prices, the association held a joint session on pricing self-discipline with the Industrial Development Bureau.29 The absence of such connections and resources among grassroots civil organizations can only be resolved through other forms of participation. However, official communication is still the primary means. After entering the general community, the country remains the main controller of social power and resources. And when it comes to national cooperation, civil organizations continue to primarily play the role of “helper” and not “hinderer.” Some organizations are unable to establish such linkages and often adopt methods of evasion and avoidance, such that they are attempting to stave off contact or conflict with the government, so as not to affect their own survival. The Panyu Service Department for Peasant Workers Service is an organization for the rights of peasants and migrant workers. Due to policy reasons and sensitivities surrounding their cause, it had no choice but to circumvent the existing difficulties of registration and instead to register with industrial and commercial authorities as a business that provides clerical support migrant workers. The work in which they are engaged includes visitation and rights activities that occur mainly outside of the Panyu Pearl River Delta region to avoid conflict with the local community. The registered name of the Hainan Association of Migrant Workers is the “Migrant Workers Management Association,” so as to avoid sensitivity over questions of a specific group of people establishing such organizations, as well as to gain access to registration and to obtain legal qualifications.30 Environmental groups are engaged in causes that are low in political sensitivity and consistent with the country’s overall policy. They can adopt a variety of participatory approaches, such as lectures, through which the media draws the participation of stakeholder groups. These See 民政部民间组织管理局／Ministry of Civil Affairs Authority for Civil Organization Administration, “民间组织典型经验汇编／“The Typical Experience of Non-governmental Organization Compilation” 30 From survey information of the author. 29


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groups are then able to use the differing priorities of various government departments in the environmental policy to provide a space in which to engage in self-expression and to launch international civil organizations and intergovernmental organizations to bring pressure to bear on government decision-making. That is, their activities also have characteristics of pressure groups. However, environmental protection organizations, in taking action are also very careful to avoid affecting the interests of interest groups and when possible act through the power of government departments. From this we can see that in modern China, civil organizations’ choice of a method of action is not only an art of action, but also of survival. 3. The Dilemma of the Citizens’ Right to Association 3.1. Lack of a Legal System Civil organizations are formed upon the basis of citizens’ civic freedom of association, which thereby creates an institutional arrangement for each individual’s personal life. In sum, the laws that affect the norms of civil organizations and non-profit public policy include the Constitution and civil administrative law. Rights to freedom of association and property, as contained within the Constitution, set up a legal basis for civil organizations. Civil organizations are products of citizens’ rights to freedom of association and the consortium provides a format that allows for citizens to take action with their own property. Stipulations within the Constitution regarding citizen participation and their organization into civic groups provide a legal basis for the participation of NGOs in public life. Democratic politics require a pluralism of interest groups that through the formation of organizations are able to better express their wishes. Public governance demands the organized participation of citizens. In this sense, freedom of association and its accompanying civil organizations are the foundation of modern democratic politics, as well as the basic elements of modern public governance. Civil organizations and the consortium are products of the freedom of contract and autonomy and as such they stem primarily form private legal relations. Thus, the Civil Code serves to adjust the basic norms found in the relationship between civil organizations, to obtain

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legal status for civil organizations and to institute norms for internal governance relations and property relations. The content of civil organizations is diverse, covering all aspects of social existence. In addition to the Civil Code’s adjustment of legal relations, the varying nature of civil organizations also requires some adjustment of special civil laws. Social contributions made civil organizations carry out certain public functions, not only meeting the needs of public life, but also filling gaps in nation-state functions. As a result, modern government primarily adopts an attitude of support towards civil organizations or gives some of these civil organizations a special legal position. This is so that these civic groups will have a certain degree of priority in public decision-making, have a special legal status, undertake special representative functions, or, to a certain extent, are eligible for the privilege of exemption from liability. In addition to special participation status, the government gains greater support from civil organizations in terms of taxes and financial support. Taxation of civil organizations usually comes in the forms of duty-free tax treatment and tax reductions through charitable contributions. Financial support occurs primarily through government procurement and some forms of direct subsidy. The norms underpinning these relations have gradually evolved from administrative law. There has been great progress made in the legislation of civil organizations; however, due to the current social transition in China, legislation and policies are often also subject to a number of temporary events and restrictions on temporary social needs. These dualities have inevitably led to a piecemeal and transient system, impacting the coverage of the system. Therefore, in accordance with social development, legislation of civil organizations has not only demonstrated a number of areas of unsatisfactory performance, but has also to some extent resulted in restrictions on civil organizations’ development and bottlenecks in citizens’ associational activities. Restricted rights to association for citizens and a lack of adequate protection of the rights of civil organizations have impacted the level of improvement of social organizations. To some extent, these developments have also affected the social transformation. The fact that current reforms within the social sphere lag behind the economic sphere while social construction lags behind economic development reflects a significant correlation with lagging legislation in the social arena. Lagging performance appears in the following areas:


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First, while the Constitution provides for freedom of association for the citizenry, given gaps under the law, citizens’ right to association is a matter of fact only in the abstract. Its specific negative conditions include continued prohibition of specific groups of people and limited social categories for organizations. As a result, in addition to inequalities in political and economic resources, disadvantaged groups also face inequalities in organizational resources, deepening the extent of social inequalities. While part of the population is able to establish organizations, due to regulations set by the dual management system, they are unable to find a work supervising unit and cannot be registered. Since relevant administrative rules and regulations deem unregistered organizations to be illegal, these organizations are in fact illegal in status. Restrictions to the right of citizens to freedom of association also limits the level of social organization and to some extent also affects social transformation. The illegal status of a large number of organizations also impacts the ability to normalize the level of standards for social management. Secondly, deficiencies in the general provisions of the Civil Law regarding financial group legal persons make it difficult for foundations and other such types of organizations to align with the existing civil system in terms of internal governance and have also impacted the building of organizational capacity. Supplementing the existing laws and regulations, 2004’s Foundation Measures defined foundations as non-profit legal persons, but they failed to clarify the relationship between non-profit legal persons and social group legal persons. Thus, with these amendments to the Civil Code, reconstruction of the legal system has become very urgent. With its reconstruction, legislation in the field of non-profit organizations needs to further detail its requirements for non-profit legal persons under the Civil Code or offer references to examples of foreign legislation. At the same time the Civil Code provides principles and regulations for civil organization legal persons and financial group legal persons, outside of the Civil Code, an independent Civil Organizations Law should be drafted, and should incorporate the input of legislators and academics both. Third, civil organizations have already been engaged in a certain degree of participation in public service and public decision-making. Relevant government departments have also made absorption of NGO participation and work a part of their strategy. However, civil organization participation also lacks routine, institutionalized channels.

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Fourth, the new tax law on civil organizations and businesses and individuals donating to civil organizations has provided more generous tax advantages. However, because the existing tax policies in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are preferential rather than ex-gratia, beneficiaries include only a small number of civil organizations and activities in specific areas. As a result, the implementation of tax incentives, as well as the public good, should be approached from a legislative and public policy perspective. It should be noted that civil organizations’ and donors’ preferential tax relief is not simply a policy of financial support. Is also a social policy orientation of the government toward the legality of civil organizations. It also shows the government’s recognition of civil organizations’ legality and contributions to public social causes. This commitment also demonstrates the government’s support for public participation in social and public utilities, as well as public welfare undertakings. It constitutes the government’s realization that social management comes from transformations in the management of public participation in governance and that such transformations can also achieve improvements in governance. In terms of the government, tax incentives also indicate that a transition from controlling to guiding is underway in the community-based administration approach. This marks the fact that cognitive aspects of our social problems and social conflicts have undergone a revolution in ideology and values and also indicates that after 30 years of the reform and opening-up, China’s society has experienced fundamental changes. 3.2. Government and Civil Organizations: A Tom and Jerry Game In order to achieve social transformation and maintain social stability, the government, in addition to ideology and controls over social participation, has adopted policies of fostering, absorbing, replacing and controlling civil organizations. Support primarily occurs in civil organization social services and the transfer of government functions. In recent years, the government promulgated a series of policies on development of trade associations, community civil organizations, agricultural organizations, as well as charitable organizations. Absorption occurs primarily in the case of the aforementioned types of grassroots civil organizations as they are brought into the fold of public decision-making and government procurement channels. For example, there have been instances of cooperation between civil orga-


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nizations and the State Environmental Protection Administration in the field of environmental protection and the Ministry of Health in the field of Auto-Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) prevention and treatment. In many places, such as Nanjing and Shanghai’s Pudong, civil organizations will soon enter the frield of pension services. Government procurement and financial support in these areas will facilitate the development of civil organizations. For community civil organizations, the government has offered a channel within its records system to absorb them into the system. Another way to absorb grassroots organizations is to convert some of them into government-supported organizations, or to provide organizations a title within the system, thereby transforming it into a cooperative organization. Replacement is another alternative adopted by the government in some areas to support government-supported organizations, to compress the space of existence for civil organizations and to achieve social control. Typical examples within the system are the All-China Youth Federation and trade unions. Control primarily consists of two aspects. The first is control of a specific group of people organized by the government through policy restrictions on migrant workers, laid-off workers, and veterans associations. The second is control over the type of interests through the establishment of social organizations, limits on joint organizations and controls over organizations’ branches used to control the scale of the group. The government’s attitude towards civil organizations in transition and China’s basic social mandate is the same. Government support and absorption measures are intended to develop and to provide a broad space for civil organizations that are committed to meeting the demands of social responsibility. On the other hand, government control measures have also raised a number of the corresponding social problems. First, lack of resources and pressure on organizations in the rights and advocacy categories makes it impossible to safeguard civil rights and to enact institutional change from outside the system. There is also a deficiency in the amount of motivation for innovation coming from outside the system, impacting social transformation and innovation. Second, migrant workers, laid-off workers and other disadvantaged groups most in need of organizations face restrictions on their associational activities. Add this to their inequal share of political and economic resources, and their disadvantage increases even further. In recent years, there have been recorded efforts made by the government

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to protect vulnerable groups, but the results have not met expectations. Key problems have stemmed from inequalities in political and organizational resources, such that even with the government adopting a number of compensatory relief and preferential measures, the measures have either been implemented ineffectively or been transformed by more powerful interests. Third, as a result of the lack of organizations at certain margins of society, there have been openings created in public life. Finally, restrictions on joint organizations have made it difficult for network organizations to be established, which has impacted the efforts of civil organizations to engage in self-governance through these organizational networks. Organizational theory posits that constraints on organizations limiting the size of their expansion on the one hand also limit the expansion of the impact of these community organizations and may also limit the degree to which the organization undertakes rational actions to improve. Large-scale organizations because of their wide range of internal constraints, long-term development needs and also because of their size, have an easier time exerting an impact through which their actions gradually become more and more rational. Smaller organizations, due to their lesser innate ability to exert an impact, lack adequate channels of expression. Thus, in order to curry favor with the public and expand their social influence, their actions and difficulties of expression tend towards extremes. The emergence of a large number of such small organizations has the potential to propel the entire society towards extremes. The impact of this trend towards the extreme impacts not only the role played by organizations in social responsibility, but also affects the overall level of rationality of society as a whole. Additionally, given that a number of organizations are still under government and quasi-government status, self-governance has not effectively been established. Therefore, the lack of establishment of self-regulation through self-governance has directly impacted organizations’ ability to realize the uses of self-regulation. The existence of these factors on the one hand limits the overall growth of civil organizations, as well as the role they play in social responsibility. On the other hand, these factors also limit the ability of civil organizations to effectively supervise and constrain each other, resulting in the lack of an effective social regulatory mechanism outside that of government. This phenomenon has impacted the establishement of industry-specific


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guidelines, even system-wide guidelines, for civil organizations trying to fulfill their social responsibilities. Overall management of the situation is similar to the game played between the cat Tom and the mouse Jerry in the cartoon “Tom and Jerry.” Government increases its management capacity and to a certain extent realizes its goals, while the society also develops a separate logic regarding their own autonomous activities. Under the government’s over-regulation and supervision civil society is unable to grow, yet helplessness and tolerance on the part of the government allows civil society as a whole to grow stronger and to move gradually from wavering at the margins towards filling gaps at the center. This leads to a gradual transition towards partipiation in public governance, as well as public policy-making. But a new administration system has still not been formed. First of all, regarding governance, the dual administration system has not fundamentally changed, even with efforts towards professionalization and specialization. It is evident from the notice of annual inspection issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs that there are at least 82 departments and government authorities currently serving as work supervising units, including the Party, government, military groups, workers groups, youth groups, women’s groups, work units, as well as independent regulatory bodies, such as the State Council Development Research Center, the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, the Chinese People’s Congress Central Committee United Front Work Department, the China Disabled Persons Federation, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, the Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences, Chinese Radio, China’s Ideological Workers Political Work Study, the All-China Journalists Association, the Central Party History Research Center, the General Office of the National People’s Congress, the National Religious Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee, the Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, the Central Bureau, the Central Party School, the International Liaison Department, the General Staff of the Political Department, the General Political Department, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), and others. In this way, administrative costs are increased, as are the number of inconsistencies in the administrative process. Offside management and

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a basic lack of management may arise at any time. Illegal organizations do not disappear because of government efforts at “cleaning-up” and “reorganizing” them, but rather due to the exponential growth of legitimate organizations. Some of the unregistered organizations still can build up good relations with some departments of the Central Government, local government authorities and the local party committees. For example, the organization World Vision worked to establish good cooperative relations with the Poverty Alleviation Office of the State Council, Guangxi Province, Yunnan’s government departments and even Party agencies, with some of these contacts having up to ten years of history. The dual management system that constraining civil organizations’ development, policies restricting competition and development, and bureacratic compartmentalization still exist, and in some areas, are even worsening. Secondly, in the civil context, for those organizations with an official background, there have been concurrent trends of shrinking and swelling. This has made it such that many institutes are basically unable to carry out their activities. However, trade associations have made use of the space opened up by systemic reforms to gain a “market share.” On the one hand, they demand that the government shift its functions or grant them authorizations, while on the other hand they make use of their organizational advantages to suppress members, or serve the interests of people within the organization, resulting in alienation from the association. A large number of grassroots civil organizations are unable to register and are only able to exist because of registration modifications or as illegal organizations. Their illegal and non-normative survival also seriously affects the development of civil organizations. A large number of external and foreign civil organizations under the government’s ostrich policy adopt a strategic survival strategy, or operate under the auspices of industrial and commercial organizations, or engage in cooperative projects and support of projects, etc. Foreign staff within these organizations often engage in travel and business activities under the guise of foreign experts in order to carry out activities within China. Given their uncertain status and ambiguous staff positions, these individuals become a burden on both the activities and management of these organizations. In summary, in terms of management of civil organizations, excessive control and absence of management exist at the same time. The emergence of these issues is due to technical management reasons, but is more frequently due to the administrative system.


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3.3. Inadequacies in Participation by Civil Organizations Despite the fact that NGOs already participate in politics and society to wide degrees, a number of issues continue to plague NGO participation. Participation signifies possessing a share of rights. The “debut” of civil organization participation, however, signifies to a certain extent a redrawing of the pattern of rights. A conflict between vested interests may thus arise to some extent and may lead to a concerted response by the interested parties. Participation also requires procedural and technical institutional arrangements. Otherwise, civil organizations’ participation will be no more than token politics. First of all, there is the question of a civil organization’s status in participation. The legal status of civil organization participation remains an unresolved issue. At present, the legal status of civil organization participation is primarily based on “China’s 21st Century Agenda for Action,” which stipulates that in the process of ensuring sustainable development for the environment, civil organization participation should be encouraged. Leaders of the State Environmental Protection Administration and the State Family Planning Commission in their speeches emphasized the importance of civil organizations’ participation in environmental protection and family planning.31 The document released by the Fifteenth Chinese People’s Congress raised the issue of the role that could be played by social intermediary organizations. The report issued at the Sixteenth Chinese People’s Congress encouraged citizens’ political participation in an orderly manner. These documents both referred to involvement and participation in an orderly manner. However, participation does not mean that the participation of civil organizations, civil and orderly participation and involvement of citizens are unequivocal. The problem is whether or not society’s intermediary organizations include grassroots civil organizations, or only civil organizations and other social intermediary organizations of an official nature.

31 These government agencies absorb civil organizations, while expanding civil rights at the same time. We also must not ignore another set of connections, which consists of marginalized, weak government departments trying to attract the participation of civil organizations to influence public opinion and to seek public support, expanding their capacity for and legitimacy of their activities. From the perspective of public power arrangements, the fact that government departments seek support and legitimacy from outside institutions is also extraordinary. It demonstrates the weakening of institutional strength under social transition and the lack of legitimate resources.

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Moreover, does “orderly citizen participation” mean citizens participating through certain procedures and channels, or can it also mean participation through self-organization? If citizens participate through organizations, should this occur through existing government agencies, mass organizations and democratic parties, or through the establishment of their own independent organizations for participation and self-expression? These issues are blurred and present certain difficulties to the participation of citizens and civil organizations. From looking at the data that appear at the policy-level, the government’s attitude towards the participation and capacity of civil organizations is one of skepticism. For example, the central government’s working commission on civil organizations is known as the “Social Stability Work Conference” (shehui wending gongzuo huiyi). Restrictions, regulations, and policies limit joint linkages between civil organizations and limit the specific groups that the government allows to set up organizations. These conditions indicate that government perceptions regarding the role of non-governmental participation are problematic and demonstrate a lack of confidence in its own ability to control society. A consequence of this policy instability is that citizens establishing civil organizations and civil organizations forming alliances engage in self-suppression.32 When pursuing their own interests, citizens must rely on government-recognized organizations or find individual means of expression. This form of expression is ineffective, with high costs and suboptimal results. Non-organized participation and expression of discrete interests may suppress the outbreak of incidents by some groups and to a certain degree play a role in social stability. However, from the overall and long-term perspective, these trends have a negative impact on social stability and development. 32 “In 2003, during Beijing’s Chongwen District’s Flower Market Third Renovation Project, the elderly were willing to face threats of violence when being driven away from their homes by demolition, resulting in sudden deaths. A middle-aged laid-off woman worker located in the same hutong said, ‘How could they organize themselves in such a way, such that their very nature changed.’ These words indicate that out of the current methods of collective expression and the lack of political space, joint protection of the rights of the individual lack legitimacy.” See 付涛/Fu Tao: “城市拆迁过程中的公参与问题——以香港为例/Chengshi suqian guocheng zhong de gongzhong canyu wenti—Yi xianggang weili,“ Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, Winter 2003 (Fu Tao: “The Process of Urban Demolition and the Issue of Public Participation—The Example of Hong Kong,” China Development Brief, Winter 2003)


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Covering up a problem is not a method of solving the problem. Resolving the issue of power expression does not solve the problem. Moreover, delay, prevarication and neglect of the problem uses the logic of making social problems “bigger” in the future. Expression of discrete problems also makes government social management difficult. Given the dispersion of expression, it is difficult for the government to identify these problems when in their early phases. Once the problem grows bigger and is expressed in a disorderly and non-organizational fashion, it becomes difficult for the government to identify effective channels for mediation. It is only able to use state violence to suppress the problem, after which the government and civil society may pay a heavy price. An even more serious issue is that the “cover up—suppress” form may create a cycle of logic that impacts the long-term stability of society. In China’s social management, there seems to be a dilemma that “too tight a hold strangles, too loose a hold is chaos”, and the fact that China lacks organized and orderly social participation is directly related. Second, the scope of participation is narrow, procedures and channels are not smooth. In the current forms of participation, civil organizations participate a good deal in the community, but less in politics. Civil organizations participate in areas in which political sensitivities are low, power and interests are of low significance and that exist at the margins of society.33 These areas include environmental protection, education, poverty alleviation and development. In fact, the fields opened up by the government for civil participation are exactly these same areas. Over the years, the government has opened some areas of the community to society, but the purpose behind such spin-offs is multifaceted. Among its considerations, on the one hand there exists an aspect of government self-reform, while on the other hand the government has passed through a crisis of governance to overcome financial shortages. These intentions naturally impact the effectiveness of civil organization 33 Hu Jia is responsible for participation in the civil organization-based, AIDS prevention and control “Loving Source Center” and maintains that “Thus far, most of the focus in civil participation is on the level of protecting the interests of social groups, like those involved in a number of sensitive and difficult to discuss issues, such as AIDS, freedom of speech, etc.” See 蔡凌平/Cai Lingping: “‘人人有责’和公民参与/ ‘Renren youze’ he gongmin canyu,’ ” Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, Winter 2003, p. 13. (Cai Lingping: “ ‘Everyone has Responsibility’ and Civic Participation,” China Development Brief, Winter 2003, p. 13.

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participation. The government’s promotion in 2004 of trade associations, community organizations and agricultural associations reflected these intentions. The government and civil organizations have some areas of cooperation, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and environmental civil organizations. The Shanghai Pudong local government and community service organizations also have good cooperative relations. However, this cooperation is case-based and does not represent the overall situation. In addition to the narrowing of the scope of participation, the lack of open channels of participation is also a problem. Governmentrun industry associations are products of the reform of government institutions and they maintain a good working relationship with the government. Their statutes also contain sections on participation and industrial policy, with industry competent authorities adding the role of civil organizations into their documents.34 However, in practice, there is a lack of transparency and operational procedures on how to participate. Therefore, participation is often random, opportunistic and is unsustainable after the departure of key people. Grassroots organizations, due to the problem of their origins, lack such policy advantages. Yet, they also do everything possible to establish such links. Civil organizations invest part of their energies in the establishment of relationships. This impacts their own capacity building as well as the level of their participation. Participation maintains the characteristics of the rule of man (renzhi zhuyi), but also affects the establishment of official channels and procedures, such that there is a formation of 34 In 1994, the Ministry of Construction published “Views of the Ministry of Construction on the Strengthening the Building of Community Groups,” which deemed development and construction of civil organizations for the purpose of nation building as a central task. The main tasks of civil organizations are: 1, To actively circumvent the center of the Ministry of Construction to engage in civic group activities, to staff and aid in earnest completion of tasks entrusted by the ministries. The department should take the initiative to reflect the status of industries and make recommendations. The Ministry of Construction will act in accordance with its changing functions to engage in work that meets macro-management requirements and gradually entrust civil organizations with the following work: (1) to assist the administrative department in charge of drafting amendments in deciding relevant national standards and in promoting the implementation of these relevant standards; (2) to rectify the relationship between the spheres inside and outside of industry to promote the enterprise structure and the adjustment of industry structure; (3) to participate in the development of industry regulations, engage in pre-qualification activities and oversee business operations. See Ministry of Civil Affairs Administration for Non-Governmental Management: “Manual on the Management of Civil organizations,” July 1996. Other ministries also have similar provisions.


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a vicious cycle of “no channels—search for contacts, dependence— contempt for procedures, rules and system building.” This scenario plays a role in impacting system transformation and the formation of civil society. Third, the various aspects involved in understanding the meaning of participation affect the quality of participation and involvement. First of all, government and civil organizations have different understandings of participation. From the government’s point of view, they often understand participation as “mobilizing the masses.” Through civil organizations, the government hopes to effectively convey its intentions downward. By utilizing mobilization of civil organizations, the government seeks to properly implement policies and to enhance the effectiveness of its performance to garner endorsement by the public. For many civil organizations, however, participation is a process for expression of and policy formation for their interests. Participation means that through negotiation and consultative mechanisms under the premise of constitutional consensus, each representative of interests may reach a consensus through compromise. As such, the government perceives civil organizations more as the conduit for communicating policy and the lubricant for policy implementation. In the language of official documents, these organizations serve as the bridge and link. They are the main body of social support. Civil organizations often think of themselves as representatives of the public interest or of a particular group’s interest, as an independent social entity. A dislocation has occurred in the cognitive perception of government and civil organizations towards the role of civil organization participation. In practice, as a result of this perceptual dislocation, civil organizations involved in policy formulation or in the public expression of ideas often encounter awkwardness35 and may

In March 2001, the environmental protection organization “Green Earth” among others in Beijing organized a “hearing” on Beijing’s Kunyu River Treatment Project. Environmentally friendly interests maintain that this man-made landscape would affect natural vegetation and other biological growth. The meeting’s participants included environmental organizations, environmental experts, river residents and the Vice Mayor of Beijing was invited. The final meeting was referred to by the Vice Mayor as the “organized activities of a non-organization” and media coverage of it was prohibited.—See 冯媛/Pingyuan, Lu Xiao, “小荷才露尖尖角——中国大陆新闻媒体中的NGO/Xiao he cai lou jianjian—Zhongguo dalu xinwen meiti zhong de NGO,” Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, Issue 21, December 2004. “A Small Lotus is Showing its Head—The News Media in China’s Civil organizations,” China Development Brief, Issue 21, December 2004. 35

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encounter a degree of conflict with the government. It is evident that not only technical and procedural factors impact participation, but also cognitive factors. Second, awareness of civil organizations on behalf of members of elites has also affected the effective participation of stakeholders. At present, civil organization participation in China is still dominated by the elite. Under this elite-led participatory process, the main stakeholders often undertake a passive role in participation. Due to the low-level of linkages between interests, the government and other stakeholders remain skeptical regarding civil organization participation. Civil organizations’ activities are sometimes unable to generate marketable products, ultimately impacting civil organizations’ participatory capacity and results.36 The use of civil organizations to mobilize the public to engage in orderly participation in modern governance remains the primary issue. 3.4. Awkward Phenomena Faced in the Development of Civil Organizations The development of associations and civil organizations over 30 years has also elicited some very awkward situations. First of all, rights of associations are imbalanced, which manifests itself in two aspects, imbalances among different primary association rights and uneven development of civil organizations. Although the Constitution provides citizens with freedom of association and prioritizes the principle of equality before the law, yet a Chinese citizen’s status in associations is in fact uneven. The majority of registered social organizations are established through government promotion and the process is relatively smooth. Groups that maintain a disadvantaged position in society, like migrant workers, laid-off workers and veterans have been excluded from those associations. As a result, these people face an inequality in political, economic resources when compared to those that exist outside the organization, thus further exacerbating social inequalities.

36 Nick Young: “参与环境决策, 三种理念, 三种工具/Canyu huanjing juece, sanzhong linian, sanyhong gongju,“ Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, Autumn 2002 (Nick Young: “Participation in Environmental Decision-making, Three Concepts and Three Tools,”China Development Brief, Autumn 2002); 付涛/Fu Tao: “怒江之争后边的移民问题/Nujiang zhizheng houbian de yimin wenti,” Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, June 2004 (Fu Tao: “The Immigration Issues Behind the Nu River Fight,” China Development Brief, June 2004)


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Another group that faces issues of imbalance is overseas civil organizations that conduct activities in China. With the reforms and opening up, foreign civil organizations have also entered China, but the government’s tactic in dealing with foreign-related civil organizations is “non-recognition, non-contact, non-prohibited,” an ostrich policy. While these organizations conduct a large number of activities in China, there have been questions about their legal status. A number of these organizations are registered to be able to conduct industrial and commercial activities in the form of companies. Since the enactment of the Measures on Foundations in 2004, the situation has changed. Over 10 overseas foundations have registered offices in China, but these groups only occupy a small fraction of all the overseas civil organizations active in China. A large number of foreign civil organizations maintain an uncertain legal status, which not only affects the activities of these organizations, but also the governmental norms on social management. The second aspect of imbalances among associations relates to differences in the rights of civil organizations. Industry associations, charitable organizations, community organizations, and agricultural associations have received strong support from the government, while recreational organizations, advocacy organizations and civilian-run scientific research institutions have faced a number of tangible and intangible constraints. In terms of numbers of civil organizations registered under the National Register of civil organizations, trade associations comprise nearly half the total number. In recent years, trade associations have also undergone rapid development, with an annual growth rate of about 10%, while the overall number of civic organization categories has been decreasing. A related issue is the religious category of civil organizations, among which there are five officially recognized religious groups and relevant local agencies that have obtained registration. A large number of new religious groups have not been legally recognized, but maintain a wide presence in the social field. The imbalanced development of civil organizations is also reflected in the status of grassroots civil organizations. Grassroots civil organizations should generally be community-oriented and provide services to their respective groups. In the case of developed countries, grassroots organizations also account for the majority of civil organizations. In recent years, China’s community-oriented civil organizations have come a long way. But a part of grassroots organizations are noncommunity-oriented, but rather social support-oriented. Accordingly,

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international aid funds and social support funds maintain different orientations. Civil organizations changing their service direction or generating corresponding organizations has a classic example in the case of the AIDS arena. The capital-oriented path of organizational development is detrimental to long-term development of organizations and may also elicit certain public service gaps. Another issue arising from organizational development imbalance is that the establishment of many organizations does not form around servicing the population, but rather in urban areas near the locus of capital. This results in civil organizations being out of touch with their clients and imbalances in regional development.37 In recent years, regional imbalances in the development of civil organizations have aroused the concern of the parties concerned. And efforts have been made by some civil organizations to take action, close to the needs of the population. For example, a number of foreign civil organizations have put their focus on poverty-stricken areas of the Southwest and Northwest, which is a good start. Second, there has been a resurgence of traditionalism. This has manifested itself in the resurgence of traditional organizations and operations. In terms of organizations, with the reforms and opening up, a large number of traditional clan organizations, temple fair committees, flower fair committees, and other groups have arisen or have the potential for rebirth. In addition to the social realm, a number of regional organizations in the economic field have undergone a resurgence, such as the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce system. Currently, the people of Wenzhou have more than 150 chambers of commerce throughout the entire country. Shandong has more than 10 province-level chambers of commerce in remote areas, with the situation with other provinces being largely similar. See also: 高飏、勉丽萍/Gao Yang, Mian Liping, “政府和民间: 困局、希望并存的艾滋病防治/Zhengfu he minjian: Kunju, xiwang bingcun de aizibing fangzhi,” Zhongguo fazhan jianbao, Issue 37, 2008 (Gao Yang and Mian Liping: “The Government and Civil Society: Prevention and Treatment of AIDS, The Concurrent Existence of Predicament and Hope,” China Development Brief, Issue 37, 2008). The author of the article cited a Henan AIDS service organization built in urban areas that spent 300 yuan per month to rent an office to carry out its activities. But the leader was not effective in disseminating assistance to those affected with AIDS in the village, including one widow that lived within 3 minutes walk from his house. The author called this phenomenon “floating-on-top “grassroots” organizations” (Fu zai shangmian de “caogen” zuzhi) 37


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Another manifestation of traditionalism appears in the fact that many service organizations rely on patriarchal or family governance and management, creating an extremely embarassing phenomenon. A portion of civil organizations, at the same time they abhor certain unreasonable social practices, also engage in those same practices. The revival of traditional organizations may indicate that the community has demands in this regard and also shows an inherent imbalance within social development. The presence of clan-based loyalties may indicate that the lack of personnel in the area of non-profit organizations also stem from the lack of adequate social influence to attract a large number of talented people into the community. We should offer our sympathetic understanding of these phenomena. However, from another perspective, traditional things can be both anti-modern and incongruous with the basic concept of civil organizations. Taking for example the variety of locations of chamber of commerce, this construct, while allowing for the economic opportunity for development in a variety of locales, is also out of step with modern society. The process of modernization is meant to overcome regionalism. Its basic orientation is to pull people into a unified market system and to replace other criteria standards with currency standards. With China’s accession to the WTO and the current integration of the global economy, we must take a low-key approach to the significance of regional organizations. If businessmen are organized according to geography, rather than according to industry or trade, how will it be possible to establish uniform standards? Geographic criteria have another limitation that is difficult to overcome: what are the standards for dividing geographical criteria, standardized administrative divisions or cultural norms? In terms of standardized administrative divisions, regional and cultural differences of a province can be significant. The differences between them may exceed the differences between regions. For example, if we divide regions by culture, then contradictions between administrative divisions may be difficult to coordinate, resulting sometimes in their coming into conflict with the existing system for the administration of civil organizations. Currently, registration and supervision of civil organizations is carried out in accordance with management as meted out by different levels of administrative divisions and restricts cross-regional branches and remote institutions. In terms of the existence of regional standards, the remaining question

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is to what level is regionalization appropriate, at the provincial level, municipal level, district level or at even smaller levels. At present, in terms of the country’s policy to allow the establishment of chambers of commerce at the provincial level in different locations, this policy has already exceeded the limit. Taking the location of the Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce in a variety of regions as an example, the City of Wenzhou is a unit level, Wenzhou businessmen established 152 chambers of commerce throughout the nation, some under the auspices of Wenzhou businessmen, established under the city or county name. Some of the chambers of commerce were small in commercial scale, while others may be considered more as social organizations, rather than as chambers of commerce. The emergence of chambers of commerce in different places and their functions also revealed some other things. In spite of the emergence of the late Qing Dynasty, China had already started building a modern state power, but local feudal rule whether open or hidden, penetrated the social existence, along with various forms of regionalism and a variety of popular forms of local protectionism. We have criticized capitalism for decades and opposed bourgeois liberalization, but in a certain sense, capitalism is still very far away from us. We have feudalism, which exactly is localism and protectionism, making ex-situ chambers of commerce fertile breeding grounds for xenophobia, discrimination and uncontrolled regional preferential terms for foreign investors. The underlying logic is the same, such that the feudal lords bring about economic difficulties, yet of course now another issue has been added to the situation, namely cadre evaluation system distortions. In terms of the primary functions of chambers of commerce, the majority of these consist of assisting the government in attracting foreign investment on preferential terms, in order to increase its bargaining chips. Businessmen serve as a map to this practice and there is no cause for criticism of these practices. For a healthy society, having all the primary actors maintain their role can be fundamental to achieving social harmony. Businessmen competing to form associations and to lobby the government want equal treatment or access to super benefits may also show that the step-by-step reform of government administration has reached its end. The government monopoly over social resources, illustrates that it is a government-led, rather than a market-led, economic existence. This also runs counter to market-oriented reforms. In terms of values, the multi-varied location of chambers of commerce has shown a kind of regionalism. This is the same as the current practice of extract-


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ing historical figures for celebrity worship, in that they are low society. Ancestral worship and the push towards regionalism constitute a lower level of consciousness and concept that in terms of rationality are rather low. When viewed in the context of the reasoning behind market economy, these phenomena are not out of step. In fact, today many people are preoccupied with what appears to be their ancestors. But, in fact, this is a misreading. Chinese traditional thinking reveals a number of things relating to universalism. Confucius spoke of how, with deference to others, with respect and propriety of manners, all within the four seas would be his brethren.38

Third, civil organizations are not well-networked and are somewhat fragmented. Over 30 years of development, civil organization networks have been strengthening to a degree. Nationally, an increasingly influential network of organizations has emerged, such as a network of women’s rights organizations, foundation networks and labor networks. These organizations have been set up based on common needs, some have been established through project funding and some created through government support. Organizations have also undertaken a number of collective activities, such as the national anti-domestic violence network that has carried out legislative lobbying efforts on women’s rights issues.39 The Non-Profit Organization (NPO) Information Center has begun the construction of good faith standards among Chinese civil organizations. However, on the whole, as a result of government restrictions on linkages and on the joint establishment of regional branches, civil organizations have faced constraints in joining their efforts. In order for their overall survival, civil organizations in China have decentralized. With their linkages occurring more through meetings and training, it is very difficult for them to enact common action or to arrive at agreement over a common code of conduct. The existence of such decentralization, compartmentalizes the government’s social management, but also hampers the formation of civil society, to the long-term detriment of all of society. 孔子/Confucius, “颜渊”／“Lunyu Yanyuan,” in 论语/lun yu. (The Analects) 宋志远/Song Zhiyuan: NGO 组织网络的成员参与和权力分配的结构分析— 以 “反对家庭暴力网络” 威力/NGO zuzhi wangluo de chengyuan canyu he quanli fenpei de jiegou fenxi—Yi ‘fandui jiating baoli wangluo’ weili, in Zhongguo fei yingli pinglun, Volume 1, Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2007, 182–196 (Song Zhiyuan: Members of NGO Organization Network Participation and Structural Analysis of the Distribution of Power—The ‘Network Against Domestic Violence’ as an Example, in China’s Comment on Non-Profits, Volume I, Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2007, pp. 182–196) 38 39

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Thirty years of evolution is not only the outcome of the interaction of interests, but also the result of the promotion of ideals. Behind the complexities of social change and rise are rights. This is a fashionable term, but it has often been neglected and ignored in the social and public power vocabulary. However, with the formation of the system, benefits have been gradually incorporated into structure and routine; ideals, following the conventionalization of society, are gradually dissipating and fading. And how far can a Chinese civil society without ideals be able to progress?

CHAPTER THREE

LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS PERTAINING TO CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS Zhu Weiguo

Laws and administrative regulations are the swaddling clothes in which civil organizations have been nurtured and raised.1 These swaddling clothes have nurtured China’s civil organizations, guaranteeing their legality. As civil society’s swaddling clothes, a legal system that does not change to meet the needs of the times would only restrain civil organizations’ growth. Rapid growth on the part of civil organizations has represented a constant set of new demands for legal development. Many characteristics of these rising civil organizations: their increasing scale, the diverse array of entities, their increasing independence, their maturing capacities and growing social influence, have all driven legal developments in relevant areas. The process of improving legal frameworks for civil organizations has involved both subjective activism and 1 The concept of “civil organizations” (民间组织) used in this chapter refers to the group of Chinese non-profit organizations comprised of social groups, foundations, people-run non-enterprise units and other entities, i.e. China’s third sector organizations. Most of these organizations receive legal status as civil entities by registering or filing with Civil Affairs departments. Others do not abide by the legally mandated process for registering and filing, yet objectively they too exist as civil organizations. Still other legally registered organizations, such as public-interest public institutions, rural economic cooperative organizations and unions that, while not technically within of the scope of civil organization administration, still substantively resemble the third sector and not the other two sectors. Thus, this chapter’s emphasis on laws and administrative regulations concerning these organizations, and its bringing into view their main points is an attempt to help readers acquaint themselves with the entire background and framework behind legal developments in China’s third sector. “Civil organizations” are a phenomenon, a piece, a concept that have been produced during the thirty years of the Reform and Opening and that must not be overlooked. It must be noted that since the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP, the term “social organization” (社会组织) has replaced “civil organizations” in many usages. However, because in the law the concept of social organizations has not yet formed definite connotations and denotations and because scholars have not yet arrived at a consistent understanding of the “social organization” concept, this author continues the use of “civil organizations” and, in some contexts, occasionally uses the concept of “non-profit organizations” as well.

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objective passivity. Legal developments around civil organizations have constantly sought balance in the dichotomous relationships between promoting development and strengthening administration; relaxing controls and effective norms; service provision and practical supervision; basic trust and prudent caution. Looking back, systematically, the project of analyzing and researching laws related to civil organizations, the project of offering parameters in the legal system within which to research the birth and growth of China’s civil society is a worthy and challenging task indeed. Even answering the question of which laws and administrative regulations are part of the civil organization legal system is difficult; a mature legal system is after all an organic and indivisible network. Therefore, this chapter focuses mainly on four parts: the Constitution on citizens’ basic freedoms, the main tenets of Organizational Law, the main tenets of Tax Law, and other relevant laws and regulations. While this review is a reflection on history, hopefully, it can also guide future efforts in legal development. 1. Constitutional Regulations on Citizens’ Basic Freedoms The state of civil organizations in a society reflects to a certain extent that society’s citizens’ rights, citizens’ freedoms, and the society’s autonomy. Laws concerning civil organizations cannot depart from constitutional regulations and guarantees of citizens’ basic freedoms.2 Comrade Mao Zedong once wrote that “the People’s freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, thought, beliefs, and health are the most important freedoms”; “without People’s freedoms, then there is no true National People’s Congress truly chosen by the people; there

In a June 14, 1954 speech to the Central People’s Government Commission’s 30th Plenary Session entitle “On the Drafting of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China”, Comrade Mao Zedong said “a group needs articles of incorporation and a nation also needs articles of incorporation. The Constitution is such a general articles of incorporation, a great, fundamental law. Using this form of great, fundamental law, fixing in place the principles of people’s democracy and socialism; giving the nation’s people a clear course; and making the nation’s people feel they have a clear, definite and correct path forward will increase the nation’s people’s positivity.” This speech from Comrade Mao Zedong to a certain extent embodies the relationship between the Constitution and social groups and other civil organizations. 杨景宇/Yang Jingyu, 法治实践中的思考/fa zhi shi jian zhong de si kao, (Beijing: zhong guo fa zhi chu ban she, 2008) 6. (Reflections Amidst Implementation of Rule By Law) 2

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is no government truly chosen by the people.”3 Establishment of a legal framework for China’s civil organizations cannot depart from constitutional regulations concerning citizens’ freedoms. 1.1. Regulations Concerning Citizens’ Freedoms in the 1954 Constitution4 The 1954 Constitution was based on 1949’s “Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference”《中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领》and was an extension of the Common Program. It solidified the fruits of the People’s revolution and the new political and economic victory of the establishment of New China; it also reflects the basic needs of the nation at the time of its transition as well as people’s common hopes for the establishment of socialism.5 The 1954 Constitution was a driving force behind the establishment of the National People’s Congress system, the strengthening of people’s democratic dictatorship regime, the completion of the socialist reconstruction of ownership of means of production, speeding the formation of an independent, relatively complete socialist industrial system and national economic system.6 The 1954 Constitution consisted of a preface, four chapters and 106 articles. In the third chapter, amidst citizens’ basic rights and duties, there are several regulations concerning freedoms. Article 87 states: “citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the freedoms of speech, publish, assemble, associate, travel, and demonstrate. The State must provide the material conveniences necessary to guarantee that citizens can enjoy these freedoms.” Article 88 calls for freedom of religious beliefs; Article 89 calls for personal liberty; Article 90 states the rights to establish residences and to migrate. These regulations on citizens’ freedoms in the great, fundamental law planted the seeds for basic citizens’ rights.

3 毛泽东/Mao Zedong, “论联合政府”/“ ”, 毛泽东著作选编/mao ze dong zhu zuo xuan bian, (Beijing: zhong yang dang xiao chu ban she) 281. (Selected Writings of Mao Zedong) 4 The ‘54 Constitution was drafted by a Constitutional Drafting Commission headed by Mao Zedong. This constitution underwent discussion by all the people; across the nation, 150 million people participated in discussing it and submitted 1.16 million opinions. Yang Jingyu, Reflections, 4–5. 5 Preface, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, (1954). 6 Yang Jingyu, Reflections, 7.

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1.2. Regulations on Citizens’ Freedoms from Two Constitutions Bearing the Marks of the “Cultural Revolution”.7 The 1975 Constitution, emblazoned with the marks of the Cultural Revolution, has only 30 articles. Its Article 28 states that “citizens have the freedoms of speech, communication, press, assembly, association, travel, demonstration and strike; they have the freedom to believe in religion, or not to believe in religion or to promulgate atheism;” and that “citizens’ personal liberty and residences are inviolable. No person shall be arrested without a decision from a People’s Court or approval from a public security institution.” Compared with the 1954 Constitution, it added the freedoms to communicate and strike, while removing the freedoms to establish residence and migrate. While calling for the rights and freedoms described above, this constitution also stated that “those who do not labor must not eat” and “the proletariat must exercise full dictatorship over the capitalist class in top-level buildings and in every cultural field. Cultural education, literature and arts, sports and hygiene, and scientific research must all serve the proletariat politically.”8,9 “The State has the political right, in accordance with the law and for a certain period, to exploit landlords, rich peasants, reactionary capitalists and other bad elements,” “prosecution institutions’ functions shall be carried out by the various levels of public safety institutions,” “prosecution and the hearing of cases must all implement the mass road. For serious counterrevolutionary criminal cases, mass discussion and criticism must be mobilized.”10,11 These regulations stand in contrast to the citizens’ freedoms and rights delineated earlier and were drastic measures severely damaging citizens’ rights. Therefore, even though many freedoms were listed in the Constitution, citizens’ rights and freedoms suffered unprecedented violations. The 1978 Constitution, containing 60 articles, was drafted after the crushing of the Gang of Four and restored some of the basic principles of the 1954 Constitution. In the area of citizens’ rights and freedoms, 7 The 1975 Constitution was a revised draft proposed by a small working group consisting of Kang Sheng (康生), Zhang Chunqiao (张春桥), Wu Faxian ( 法宪) and two others. 1978’s Constitution was drafted by a Constitutional Revision Commission formed of members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee’ General Committee. Yang Jingyu, Reflections, 8–11. 8 1975 Constitution, Article 9. 9 1975 Constitution, Article 12. 10 1975 Constitution, Article 14. 11 1975 Constitution, Article 25.


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Article 45 called for the freedoms of speech, communications, assembly, association, travel, demonstration and strike and the right to “big voice [to speak out freely], big release [to air out views fully], big debates, and big character posters.”12 It also added some new content, like citizens’ rights to accuse and to petition.13 It also reinstituted prosecutors’ offices, eliminating the regulation from the 1975 Constitution regarding public security bureaus carrying out prosecutions; it implemented limitations and constraints on the powers of public security bureaus, which helped limit violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms. This constitution still “maintain[ed] continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat” and “maintain[ed] the struggle of the proletariat against the capitalist class.”14 Under the guidance of these kinds of “struggle” principles, the realization of citizens’ basic rights and freedoms was difficult. 1.3. Regulations on Citizens’ Rights in the 1982 Constitution15 The 1982 Constitution was drafted on the basis of the 1954, not the 1978, Constitution.16 Comprising 138 Articles, the new constitution contained a prominent change from earlier versions: the chapter on citizens’ basic rights and duties” was placed before that on “State 12 This “big voice, big release, big debates, and big character posters of the 1975 Constitution’s Article 13 is a new form of socialist revolution invented by the masses. The State guarantees the right of the masses to use this method, creating a vivid and lively political landscape both concentrated and democratic, both orderly and free, with both unified will and individual happiness. This is beneficial to the solidification of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership of the State and the dictatorship of the proletariat.” In 1978, “people-mass-invented revolutionary forms” like these “four bigs” were elevated to the status of a basic right. On September 10, 1980, at the Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress, a resolution was passed to amend the Constitution, eliminating from the original Article 45 the “right to use ‘big voice, big release, big debate and big character posters’ ”. (This was decided on September 10, 1980 and the same day publicized by announcement) 13 Article 45 of the 1978 Constitution states that “citizens have the right to raise accusations to State offices at all levels regarding illegal or negligent work personnel of State offices, enterprises or public institutions. When citizens’ rights are violated, they have the rights to petition State offices at all levels. No one may suppress or retaliate against these accusations or petitions.” 14 Preface, 1978 Constitution. 15 Drafting of the 1982 Constitution was mainly led directly by Peng Zhen (彭真). Like in 1954, the drafting of this constitution also involved popular discussions. The scale of the discussions, the number of participants and the breadth of those influencing the process were all unprecedented. Yang Jingyu, Reflections, 13. 16 Yang Jingyu, Reflections, 26.

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institutions”. This adjustment between citizens’ rights and state powers was not merely a change in the logical structure of the document; it signified a conceptual adjustment.17 Article 35 states: “PRC citizens have freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, travel and demonstration.” This was a restoration of the six freedoms delineated in Article 87 in 1954. It did not specify the freedoms to migrate or to strike. Reasons that migration was not mentioned again were related to China’s dual, urban-rural household registration system and to the process of urbanization. As to the reason why striking was not named as a freedom, besides the fact that SOEs still dominated the for-profit sector, the omission also reflected lawmakers’ pragmatism. Article 36 calls for the freedom of religious beliefs; 37 calls for personal liberty; and 38 calls for the freedom of dignity of character.18 Article 39 states the inviolability of the residence and 40 describes the freedom of communication. Article 47 states that citizens have the freedom to engage in scientific research, cultural and artistic works and other cultural activities and requires the State to encourage and support citizens engaging in educational, scientific, literary, artistic and other cultural work that represent contributions to the general creative work of the people. These regulations are connected with the general principles of the Constitution, citizens’ political and economic rights, which mutually comprise an integration of citizens’ rights and freedoms. From its passage in 1982 to 2008, the Constitution has been revised four times, including changes with major and positive impacts on the environment and the systems contributing to the growth of civil society. Improvements in the economic system, the protection of property rights, the development of the rule of law and guarantees on basic human rights have especially great significance both in terms of guaranteeing citizens’ rights and freedoms and promoting the development of civil organizations.

17 The concept and constitutional structure of rights before powers is a common model in Western constitutions. There are ancient foundations for this in Chinese culture as well, visible most typically in Mencius’s “the people are the most precious; the State is secondary to them; sovereigns are unimportant.” 孟子/Mencius, “尽心章句下”/“jin xin zhang ju xia,” in 孟子序说/meng zi xu shuo. (The Sayings of Mencius) 18 Article 38. “The dignity of the citizens of the PRC is inviolable. It is forbidden to engage in the humiliation, slander, false accusation or framing of citizens by any means.” This regulation was issued in the context of the Cultural Revolution and based on historical lessons from a period in which people’s dignity and character were without basic guarantees.


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The source of the Constitution’s power is its dignity. Only if constitutionally mandated, basic freedoms and rights receive practical guarantees will the Constitution be revered and believed by the citizenry. Conversely, with only the name and the hierarchical position of a great fundamental law, it is difficult to maintain its power. Constitutional dignity is rooted in human dignity. The human rights written in the constitution are the soul of all rights, the soul of constitutional government, and not an abstract concept. If the Constitution and laws do not take citizens’ fundamental freedoms and rights as their base, then it is difficult to mold a sustainable nation ruled by law. In the legal framework of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Constitution is not the basis of legal decisions. The realization and normalization of citizens’ basic freedoms as defined by basic laws and regulations must be entrusted to specialized laws and administrative regulations. Institutions administering justice do not have the power to examine the constitutionality of laws and administrative regulations. These investigative rights are the domain of lawmaking institutions. The question of how to practically guarantee the basic freedoms and rights ensconced in the constitution under the guidance of the concept of socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics, is one that will require still more efforts from China’s legal professionals. 2. Main Principles of the Organizational Law In China, normalization of civil organizations has always depended on a small number of administrative regulations on registration and administration. This author discusses these using the category of organizational law, to correspond with that increasingly important category in normalizing civil organizations, “tax law”. Organizational law bears responsibility in both areas of granting civil entity status and of administrative supervision. Following the constant development of civil organizations, makers of laws relating to them are increasingly learning from laws governing profit-seeking organizations (like company law) and are venturing beyond the bounds of organizational law for some aspects of normalizing civil entities. Examples of such aspects include the registration process and norms for internal governance structures. Three administrative regulations form the main legal basis for the current normalization of registration and administration of China’s civil organizations. Our discussion of them will also touch upon laws that

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have been replaced by the prevailing laws, for the purpose of understanding the course of development and the changes therein. 2.1. Laws and Regulations Normalizing Social Groups On October 13, 1989, at the 49th State Council Executive Meeting, the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration were passed and were implemented starting October 25, 1989. They consist of 32 articles. These regulations did not offer a legal definition of social groups, and instead listed them, demanding that “associations, academic associations, federations, research associations, foundations, friendship leagues, promotional associations and commercial associations organized within the PRC must all apply for registration according the regulations herein. After being examined, approved, and registered, they may undertake activities.”19 It also required that “social groups must not engage in profit-seeking for-profit activities.”20 1989’s Regulations did not require social groups not operating on a national-scale to meet the requirements of a legal person.21 The Regulations were revised on September 25, 1998 and were implemented beginning on October 25. The new Regulations consist of 40 articles. As currently prevailing, primary basis for normalizing the registration and administration of social groups, the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration (hereafter, the current Regulations) clarified the following administrative regulations. 2.1.1. Definition and Classification Article 2 of the current Regulations offers the following by way of definition: “social groups as referred to in these regulations refer to non-profit social organizations formed voluntarily by Chinese citizens for the realization of members’ mutual wishes that engage in activities according to their articles of incorporation.” This definition only applies to social groups established by Chinese citizens and “organizations besides State institutions”; it is silent on the subject of non-

19 Article 2, Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration《社会团体登记管理条例》, 1989. 20 Ibid., Article 4. 21 Ibid., Article 20: “those social groups meeting the conditions shall be granted legal person qualifications after the examination, approval and registration process. Nationwide social groups must meet the requirements of a legal person.”


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Chinese citizens establishing social groups in China. The definition emphasizes “voluntary”, “articles of incorporation”, “non-profitness”, “social organization”, and other aspects and clarifies some connotations of the social group concept. It represents a large improvement in logical terms from the definition via enumeration of social groups in the 1989 Regulations. In the current Regulations, the definition of social groups no longer includes foundations, setting social groups and foundations as parallel concepts, no longer concepts belonging to the same category.22 The current Regulations divide social groups into nationwide and local types. Nationwide social groups are to be registered through a State Council registration and administrative office (the Ministry of Civil Affairs), while local social groups are to be registered and administered by the registration and administrative offices of their local people’s government. Multi-administrative area social groups are to be registered and administered by people’s government offices the next level up from their localities.23 In terms of norms for organizational titles, the Regulations require that nationwide social groups’ names begin with “China”(中国), “National”(全国), “China”(中华), and must be reviewed and approved according to the relevant national regulations. Local social groups may not use “China” or “National” in their names.24 According to the current Regulations, certain kinds of social groups are exempted from their requirements. These include people’s groups (人民团体) that participate in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference; groups checked, ratified, and staffed by State Council offices and exempted by the State Council from registration; and groups established within, approved by, and conducting activities within their own institutions, groups, and enterprise public institutions. In reality, these social groups are an extremely important part of the social groups in China.

22 Article 2 of 1989’s Regulations treats foundations as one kind among social groups; 1988’s Measures on Foundation Administration defines foundations as “social group legal persons”. 23 Article 7 of the current Regulations. 24 Ibid., Article 10.

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2.1.2. Conditions for Establishment According to Article 10 of the Regulations, a group must meet the following conditions in order to establish a social group: 1) have 50 or more individual or 30 or more public institution members. In cases where there are both individual and public institution members, the total membership must not be fewer than 50; 2) have a normal name and a corresponding organizing institution. This requirement is aimed at the social group’s identity and intending offices. 3) have a fixed location. The residence requirement is one of the conditions for legal persons. The fixed location requirement makes it easier for administrative offices to perform supervision and inspections according to the law after registration is issued. 4) have full-time employees whose expertise is related to the work the group does; 5) have legal sources of assets and revenues, and, for nationwide social groups, at least 100,000 yuan in activity funds, while local social groups and those in multiple administrative areas must have at least 30,000 yuan; 6) have independent ability to meet its civil responsibilities. These requirements are in accordance with the conditions in Article 37 of the General Rules of Civil Law for legal person status.25 Satisfying these six conditions, however, does not guarantee a social group’s establishment will be approved. According to the current Regulations, a group must also satisfy the following conditions to be established as a social group: First, a group wishing to be a social group must secure the agreement of a work supervising unit. Article 3 of the current Regulations states: “in order to establish a social group, a group must first be examined and agreed to by a work supervising unit, and also be registered according to the regulations herein.” Article 9 states: “to apply for establishment of a social group, the group must be examined and agreed to by a work supervising unit and the initiator must submit a plan application to the registration and administration office.” Article 11 requires that the materials submitted to the registration and administration office as part of the plan application must include “approval documentation from a work supervising unit”. According to these requirements, if in the planning period the initiator cannot find a qualified government Article 37 of The General Rules of Civil Law《民法通则》states that a legal person must meet the following requirements: 1) be legally established; 2) have the necessary assets or funds; 3) have its own name, organizational structure and facilities; 4) be capable of independently bearing its civil responsibilities. 25


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department or organization authorized by a government department to serve as its work supervising unit, then he cannot hope to establish a social group. For groups with governmental support or backgrounds, this condition is not difficult to meet; however, for social groups initiated from civil forces, meeting this requirement is very difficult. Currently, the main reason why most civil social groups cannot register and be established is failure to find a work supervising unit. Second, there must be no other social group in the administrative area in which the group hopes to be established with the same or similar scope of work. This requirement can be deduced from Article 13 of the current Regulations, which says “registration and administration offices shall not approve plans in the following cases”. According to the regulations in the Article, if, within the administrative area in which the group hopes to be established, there is already another group with the same or similar scope of work, then there is no need to establish another; in such circumstances, the offices may refuse to approve the social group. This principle has been defined by theorists as “prohibition of same kind competition”. Because the language on this area is vague, registration and administration offices have ample discretionary power. Third, a social group’s mission and scope of work must meet requirements delineated in Article 4 of the current Regulations.26 Article 4 states that “social groups must abide by the Constitution, laws, regulations and State policies; they must not run counter to the fundamental principles of the Constitution; they must not harm national unification, safety or ethnic unity; they must not harm the national interest, social public interest or the legal interests of other organizations or citizens; they must not violate social morals or customs.”27 “Social groups must not engage in profit-driven operational activities.” Fourth, it is mandated that registration and administration offices reject applications from groups whose initiators or responsible persons

26 According to Article 13 of the current Regulations, if there is evidence showing that the social group submitting a plan application does not meet the requirements in Article 4 in terms of its mission or scope of work, then the registration and administration office shall not approve its plan. 27 The basic principles established in the Constitution are mainly embodied in its Preface.

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have political blemishes28 or are limited in their civil behaviors.29 They are also to reject untruthful applications and those to which legal and administrative regulatory prohibitions apply. 2.1.3. The Establishment and Registration Process The greatest difference in the establishment and registration process between social groups and other types of civil organizations like foundations and people-run non-enterprise units is that the process for the establishment and registration of social groups includes a preliminary plan application approval process. This process was not part of the 1989 Regulations on Registration and Administration of Social Groups and was added into the 1998 Regulations. Its aim is to “move forward” the registration and administration of social groups to avoid the disorder that social groups in planning but not yet approved might bring. According to the current Regulations, the initiator of a plan application for the establishment of a social group must submit the following documents to the registration and administration office: 1) plan application; 2) approval documentation from the work supervising unit; 3) certification of registered capital and proof of the right to use the registered location; 4) basic information on and proof of identification of the initiator and proposed director; 5) draft articles of incorporation. Social groups planning to establish must, within 6 months of the approval of their plans by the registration and administration office, hold an allmembers meeting or member representatives meeting and pass articles of incorporation, an organizational structure, a director and a legal representative, and apply to the registration and administration office for their establishment to be registered.30 Registration and administration offices must complete their examination work within 30 days of the day they receive a social group registration application demonstrating completion of planning work and the relevant documents. Those social groups meeting legal and regulatory, planning work, and articles of incorporation content requirements shall be granted and issued a Social Group Legal Person Registration Certificate《社会团体法人登记证书》.

28 Criminal punishments for which he is currently being or formerly has been stripped of political rights. 29 Without complete capacity for civil behaviors. 30 Article 14 of the current Regulations states that during the planning phase, social groups may not engage in any activities besides planning.


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2.1.4. Modifying and Cancelling Registrations According to Article 20 of the current Regulations, should any social group registration item or items need to be modified, i.e. name; location; mission, scope of work and field activity; legal representative; activity funds; or work supervising unit, it must apply for a modification of the registration with its registration and administration office within 30 days of receiving approval for the modifications from its work supervising unit. In the following cases, a social group should apply for cancellation of its registration with its registration and administration office after receiving the approval of its work supervising unit: 1) the social group’s mission as stated in its articles of incorporation has been completed; 2) voluntary dissolution of the social group; 3) divisions or mergers; 4) termination due to some other reason.31 2.1.5. Regulations on Articles of Incorporation Articles of incorporation are the constitution of a social group. They mold the social group’s structure and comprise the main internal system defining its rules. The current Regulations do not speak at length on social group articles of incorporation, and make requirements only in two main areas. The first is a list of the items a social group’s articles of incorporation must contain: 1) name and location; 2) mission, scope of work and field of activity; 3) membership qualifications, and members’ rights and duties; 4) a democratic organizational administration system and a process for creating executive institutions; 5) requirements of a director and a process for his appointment and removal; 6) principles for management and use of assets; 7) a process for revising articles of incorporation; 8) a processes for termination of the group and handling assets remaining after termination; 9) other items as required by the articles of incorporation.32 The second area in which the Regulations are explicit is the approval process for social group articles of incorporation, including approval of draft articles of incorporation during the planning and examination period and the examination and approval of revisions to articles. This method of administrative office approval of social groups’ articles of incorporation has come under some criticism. However, given the current lack of needed legal norms for social

31 32

Article 21 of the current Regulations. Article 15 of the current Regulations.

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groups’ organizational institutions and rules for activities, supervision of social groups through their articles is a more positive development than direct intervention in their activities. Besides the current Regulations, the State Council’s Ministry of Civil Affairs also drafted a Standardized Version of Social Organization Articles of Incorporation《社会团体章程示范文本》offering more specific and detailed standards for the contents of articles of incorporation. 2.1.6. Principles for Asset Management Rules in the current Regulations concerning social groups’ asset management consist mainly of the following:33 First, it is required that social groups’ funding sources be legal and that no unit or individual seize, embezzle or misappropriate social group assets. Secondly, it is required that social group monies (including both expenses and revenues collected through activities specified in the articles and in accordance with relevant regulations) must be used toward the group’s work as defined in its articles and may not be distributed to members. Next, donations and aid received must be consistent with the mission and scope of work in the articles and must be used in the timeframe and way and for the legal use agreed to with the donor or aid giver. Lastly, it is required that systems for wage and benefit compensation of full-time workers and personnel follow the State’s regulations for public institutions. This guarantees that social group management fees are held to reasonable standard and contributes to avoiding the division of social group assets among full time workers. 2.1.7. Guaranteeing Credibility34 Guaranteeing the credibility of social groups is extremely important. Relevant regulations include the following: First, the annual report system. Article 31 of the current Regulations requires each social group to submit an annual Work Report on the previous year’s activities to its work supervising unit before March 31st

Ibid., Article 29. Accountability (公信力) has the connotations of “supervision of officials” (课责), “public faith” (公信), “credibility” (公信度), “inquire-and-punish system” (问责制), and “degree of responsibility and belief ” (责信度). The current Regulations contain regulations guaranteeing the credibility of social groups. These consist primarily of regulations on supervision, openness, reporting and conflicts of interest. 33 34


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of each year. After being examined and approved by work supervising units, reports must be sent to registration and administration offices before May 31st for annual inspection. Second, specialized supervision of finances and audits. Article 30 of the current Regulations requires social groups to implement the nationally regulated financial management system and submit to supervision by finance departments. Funds from sources including governmental transfers, social donations and aid must also be supervised by audit offices. Financial audits must also be organized and performed by a group’s registration and administration office and its work supervising unit before the end of a leadership term or the handover to a new legal representative. Third, systems for information openness. It is required that groups report their receipts and uses of donations and aid to their work supervising units and also publicize relevant information to society through appropriate channels. Fourth, prohibition on conflicts of interest. A social group’s legal representative is forbidden from simultaneously serving as legal representative of any other social group.35 2.1.8. Registration and Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce Article 30 of the 1989 Regulations states: “as to measures for the registration of social groups by non-Chinese citizens and Chinese citizens outside of China, regulations will be made separately”. These separate regulations, however, have yet to be realized. The current Regulations offer no system for administering social groups involving foreign nationals or foreign matters—including also administration of activities by both social groups established by non-Chinese nationals in China and institutions set up by social groups from abroad within China. However, this does not mean that there is no system for normalizing foreign-involved social groups within China’s current legal system. Such a system not only exists, it existed before the 1989 Regulations. We refer here to the Interim Provisions on Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China《外国商会管理暂行规定》(hereafter, the Interim Provisions), which were implemented starting July 1, 1989. The Interim Provisions was a legal reflection of the economic Reform and Opening, just as 1979’s Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 《中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法》was a reflection in law of China’s policies of opening to the outside. It’s just that ten years

35

Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the current Regulations.

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passed between the first law after the Reform and Opening normalizing foreign-involved for-profit organizations and the first law normalizing non-profit organizations. The Interim Provisions were mainly intended to promote international trade and economic and technological exchanges. Therefore, the Interim Provisions clearly demanded that the missions of foreign chambers of commerce must be to promote trade, economic, and technological exchanges between their members and China and to provide convenience for their members in the research of international trade, economic and technological exchanges.36 The content of the Interim Provisions contained mainly the following: First, they defined foreign chambers of commerce. Foreign chambers of commerce refers to foreign commercial institutions established within China according to the regulations herein and their members that do not engage in any commercial activity and are non-profit groups.37 According to this definition, foreign chambers of commerce are a type of Chinese social group. Even though foreign chambers of commerce are Chinese legal persons, only “foreign commercial institutions in China and their members” could become members. Commercial institutions here refers to representative or affiliated institutions set up, according to law, by foreign companies, enterprises or other economic organizations in China, and does not include Sino-foreign equity joint ventures.38 Individual members are non-Chinese employees of commercial institutions and foreign invested enterprises joining as members in their own names, and does not include Chinese citizens. However, currently, the proportion of Chinese employees of wholly foreign-owned enterprises of the membership of foreign chambers of commerce is substantial. Second were processes for approval and registration.39 Foreign chambers of commerce would be established by nationality.40 That is

36 Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Interim Provisions on Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China《外国商会管理暂行规定》. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., Article 5. 39 Ibid., Articles 7, 8, and 9. 40 Ibid., Article 5. In reality, chambers from abroad did not limit themselves to one chamber per nation as per the law. To take the Sino-US chambers of commerce as an example, there is an American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, an American Chamber of Commerce South China in Guangdong, and Am Cham China, which in reality is the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing. The various nations are


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to say that each nation should only be allowed to establish one foreign chamber of commerce in China. To establish a foreign chamber of commerce, a group was required to submit an application to the China International Chamber of Commerce, which would then be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the PRC for examination.41 Examining offices should complete their examinations within 60 days of receiving complete application materials; approval documentation should be issued those meeting regulatory demands and conditions, while the applications of those not meeting the conditions should be returned.42 If, due to some extenuating circumstances, applications cannot be reviewed within the set time, the examination office must offer some explanation. Third, supervisory measures. These consist mostly of requirements of financial systems, annual reporting, and registration modifications and may involve punishments or dissolution.43 2.1.9. Legal Responsibilities Compared with 1989’s Regulations, the current Regulations strengthened the legal responsibilities of social groups in three main ways: First, they added new punishments to the possible measures to be taken against social groups, including “ordering the change of the personnel directly in charge”, “seizing illegal revenues” and “fines”. Second, the option of cancelling registrations was added. The current Regulations enumerate eleven situations that may call for a group’s registration to be cancelled.44 Third, they strengthened measures for fighting illegal associations. 1989’s Regulations state: “those conducting activities in the name of a social group but who have not passed examination, approval and registration and who do not heed calls to desist in their activities shall be dissolved by order of the relevant civil affairs department.”45 The current regulations expand the definition

all critical of this regulation and, through various diplomatic channels, have urged China to change this law. 41 The Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. 42 Article 4, to establish a foreign chamber of commerce, a group must: 1) have articles of incorporation reflecting the wishes of its members; 2) have a certain number of initiating members and directors; 3) have a fixed administrative location; 4) have legal sources of funding. 43 Articles 10 to 14, Interim Provisions. 44 Articles 32 to 34 of the current Regulations. 45 Article 26 of the 1989 Regulations.

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of “illegal associations” to include “[those engaging in] social group planning activities before being approved and without authorization”, “[those] engaging in activities in the name of a social group without registration”, and “[those] whose registrations have been revoked but who continue to conduct activities in the name of a social group.” They also state that such violators shall be punished by registration and administration offices and their assets seized. Cases of criminal behavior are to be prosecuted according to the fullest extent of the law while punishment for behaviors not deemed criminal are to be handled by public security offices. These regulations completed the links between public safety, law and criminal law. Article 54 of the Law of the PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public Security《中华人民共和国治安管理处罚法》, effective from March 1st, 2006, states that parties guilty of the following offenses shall be detained for ten to fifteen days and shall be fined 500 to 1000 yuan, while offenders in less serious cases shall be detained for fewer than five days and be fined less than 500 yuan: 1) in violation of State regulations, engaging in activities in the name of a social group without being registered, and, after being punished, continuing those activities; 2) continuation of activities in the name of a social group by former social groups whose registrations have been revoked; . . .”. According to these public security laws, members of illegal associations may suffer punishments restricting their personal liberties. 2.2. Laws and Rules Normalizing Foundations On February 4, 2004, at the 38th State Council Executive Meeting, the Regulations on Foundation Administration《基金会管理条例》were passed and were implemented starting June 1, 2004. These regulations replaced 1988’s Measures on Foundation Administration《基金会管理办法》. The Regulations consist of 7 chapters and 48 articles. Incorporating China’s 16 years of foundation administration experience and borrowing from the experiences of non-profit administrative laws around the world, the law represents China’s first systematic set of norms for the registration, organizational structures, asset use and management, and supervision of foundations. These Regulations, once called “not the best, but obviously still a solution,” occupy, with their distinct national flavor, a unique place among the world’s non-profit administration systems. As the chief legal basis for foundation administration, the Regulations mainly established the following rules:


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2.2.1. Definition and Classification by Type Article 2 states: “foundations, for the purposes of these regulations, shall refer to non-profit legal persons established according to the laws herein using property donated by natural persons, legal persons or other organizations for use in public-interest work.” The definition underscores foundation legal persons’ non-profit and public-interest characteristics and abandoned the formulation, from 1988’s Measures, of a foundation as “a social group legal person”. The Regulations divided foundations into those that may conduct fundraising among society at large, “public funding foundations” (公募基金会), and those that may not do so, “non-public funding foundations” (非公募基金会). At the same time, they also divided public funding foundations according to the areas in which they fundraise into nationwide public funding and local public funding foundations.46 This division by whether or not foundations have the right to fundraise among society at large does not have unassailable legal underpinnings. Rather, it was developed out of consideration for administrative and policy needs and utility. The Regulations offer different administrative measures for the two types of foundation, mainly based on: 1) whether or not they may raise funds from society at large. Public funding may; non-public funding may not;47 2) levels of funding required for establishment are different, with requirements for public funding foundations being higher and those for non-public foundations being lower, which reflects a policy of encouraging and supporting the latter;48 3) conditions for membership on boards are different. In nonpublic funding foundations, which are established using private property, close family relatives may serve on boards, but may not comprise more than one-third of board membership. In public funding foundations and those established using non-private property, close family relatives may not sit on the foundation board;49 4) legal representatives of public funding foundations must be residents within China, as must those of non-public funding foundations whose funds originated in China. Toward non-public funding foundations whose funds came from abroad, however, there are no clear restrictions on who may

46 47 48 49

Article 3, Regulations on Foundation Administration. Ibid. Ibid., Article 8. Ibid., Article 20.

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serve as legal representative;50 5) requirements of their expenditures on public-interest work are different. Public funding foundations’ annual disbursals for public-interest work must be no less than 70% of the previous year’s revenues; non-public funding foundations’ must be no less than 8% of the previous year’s fund balance.51 2.2.2. Guaranteeing the Public-Interest Orientation As non-profit legal persons, having public-interest aims is a required condition for foundations’ establishment.52 However, the Regulations do not provide rules on what public-interest means. Public Interest Work Donations Law and Trust Law, however, have both offered definitions of public-interest that we can use as a reference.53 Foundations’ nonprofit orientations have caused a social misperception that foundations may not engage in profit-generating activities. In fact, as public-interest organizations and non-profit legal persons, it’s not that foundations may not make money; it’s that they may not distribute money. The Regulations clarified the vague understanding on this point, relaxed the prohibition on “making money” through system innovations, precluded foundations from “distributing money”, and guaranteed the public-interest nature of foundations’ “spending money”. Basically, the system: 1) encourages efforts to maintain and appreciate foundation funds according to legal, secure and effective principles;54 2) makes no restrictions on the methods foundations use to maintain and appreciate their funds, leaving investment policy up to foundation boards;55 3) strictly prohibits embezzling, seizing or misappropriating of foundation

Ibid., Article 23. Ibid. 52 Ibid., Article 8. 53 Article 3 of Public Interest Work Donations Law《公益事业捐赠法》states: “publicinterest work for the purposes of this law shall refer to the following non-profit projects: 1) group or individual activities in the areas of disaster relief, poverty alleviation, and aid for the handicapped; 2) education, science, culture, hygiene and athletic work; 3) environmental protection and social, public infrastructure building; 4) other social, public and benefits works promoting social development and progress.” Article 60 of Trust Law《信托法》states: “trusts established for any one of the following publicinterest goals shall be considered a public-interest trust: 1) poverty alleviation; 2) relief for disaster victims; 3) aid for the handicapped; 4) development of sports, technology, culture, art, or athletic work; 5) development of medical and hygienic work; 6) development of environmental protection work and sustaining the ecological environment; 7) development of other public-interest work.” 54 Regulations on Foundation Administration, Article 28. 55 Ibid., Article 21. 50 51


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property;56 4) clearly defines principles concerning conflicts of interest between the foundation and its board directors and supervisory board members;57 5) strictly regulates the handling of remaining property should the foundation be dissolved;58 6) strictly regulates uses of assets;59 7) strictly regulates foundations’ public-interest expenditures and caps administrative and personnel costs.60 2.2.3. Start-up Funds Requirements Foundations are assembled funds. Thus, the scale of funding in a foundation’s possession is extremely important for the accomplishment of its public-interest mission. Conditions for the establishment of a foundation, delineated in Article 8 of the Regulations, raise the funding barriers to starting a foundation. It is there required that “start-up funds for nationwide public funding foundations must not be less than 8 million yuan; for local public funding foundations, 4 million yuan; and for non-public funding foundations, 2 million yuan. Start-up funds must be in the form of money in an account.” This formulation abandoned previous requirements of registered capital and activity funds and established the concept of start-up funds (原始基金). The different requirements for start-up funds for different types of foundations were made mainly due to the following considerations: First, to limit the growth in numbers of public funding foundations and encourage establishment of non-public funding foundations. Second, to ensure that foundations have enough funds to actively launch public-interest activities and sustain their daily operations. Third, due to considerations of the funding scales of foundations at the time. 2.2.4. Increasing the Authority and Standardization of Articles of Incorporation In an integrated and balanced way, the Regulations both increase the authority of and standardize the contents of articles of incorporation. This can be seen primarily in the following areas: First, the elevation of authority of the articles of incorporation and clarification of their restrictions on foundations can be seen in the following areas: 1) foundations must conduct public-interest activities

56 57 58 59 60

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

Article Article Article Article Article

27. 23. 33. 27. 29.

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according to their articles of incorporation;61 2) boards are the highest deciding bodies of foundations and have official powers according to law as contained in the articles of incorporation;62 3) supervisory boards must perform supervision and inspections according to the articles of incorporation;63 4) fundraising and receipts of donations must conform to foundations’ missions as defined in their articles of incorporation and the scope of their public-interest activities;64 5) Foundations must use their assets according to the mission and scope of public-interest activities and work as defined in their articles of incorporation;65 6) in the case of dissolution of a foundation, its remaining assets must also be used for public-interest goals as defined in the articles;66 7) if the board makes inappropriate decisions resulting in property losses for the foundation, directors participating in the decisions are responsible for compensating accordingly for the losses.67 Second, the Regulations offer the following norms for the content of articles of incorporation: 1) a foundation’s articles must clarify its public-interest orientation and may not specify any beneficiaries, be they natural persons, legal persons or other organizations. Foundations’ articles must clearly record the nine sections of content required by these Regulations;68 2) a foundation’s articles must be approved by the foundation’s work supervising unit and be examined and approved by its registration and administration office;69 3) a standard version of foundation articles of incorporation shall be drafted by the State Council’s Ministry of Civil Affairs.70

Ibid., Article 5. Ibid., Article 21. 63 Ibid., Article 22. 64 Ibid., Article 25. 65 Ibid., Article 27. 66 Ibid., Article 33. 67 Ibid., Article 43. 68 Ibid., Article 7. Foundation articles of incorporation must clearly contain the following items: 1) name and location; 2) mission and scope of public-interest work; 3) start-up funding amount; 4) composition of the board as well as board members’ rights, duties, qualifications, term length and process for their selection; 5) responsibilities of the legal representative; 6) responsibilities, qualifications, term length and process for selection of supervisory board members; 7) system for drafting and authorization of financial reports; 8) system for management and use of assets; 9) conditions and process for dissolving the foundation, measures for handling remaining assets. 69 Ibid., Article 15. 70 Ibid., Article 47. 61 62


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2.2.5. Guaranteeing Credibility Three system designs in the Regulations seek to guarantee foundations’ credibility: The first is the design of governance. The Regulations devote an entire chapter to “organizational structure” wherein the composition of boards, procedures for decisionmaking, and the composition and duties of supervisory boards are defined. Two points here warrant special emphasis. The first is that the number of directors on a board is limited to “from 5 to 25 people”.71 The reason for this limitation is to mold foundation boards into bodies capable of making independent decisions and to avoid boards becoming mere ornaments controlled by executive bodies. Before this regulation, many foundations had tens or even hundreds of director, making it very difficult to arrive at decisions. The Regulations’ hard posture on the number of directors forced many foundations to painfully cut down the number of directors, moves which also resulted in substantial losses of resources. The second is that the board is a foundation’s deciding body responsible for legally carrying out its duties as defined in the articles of incorporation. Modifying the articles, choosing or removing the main leaders, major fundraising and investment decisions and foundation splits or mergers are all among the major decisions that boards must make, requiring them to satisfy multiple and complex parties in order to be effective.72 These procedural requirements allow foundations to resist outside interference by collective decisions, avoid domination of internal decisionmaking by any one person, and gain the autonomy and freedom proper to a true legal person. The second designs guarantee openness of foundation activities. The primary regulations require that: 1) foundations abide by the principles of openness and transparency;73 2) registration and administration offices must publicize news of the establishment, modification to, or nullification of the registrations of all foundations, foundation affiliate institutions, foundation representative institutions or representative institutions of foreign foundations;74 3) boards must produce meeting minutes to be read and signed by the chairperson of the board;75 4) when staging fundraising campaigns, public funding foundations

71 72 73 74 75

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

Article Article Article Article Article

20. 21. 5. 19. 21.

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must publicly report the funds raised, the public-interest activities they have planned and the specific planned uses of the funds;76 5) foundations must report their management of any residual assets.77 The third design is the establishment of clear principles regarding conflicts of interest. The main components of the system include: 1) limiting the number of directors who collect salaries and forbidding supervisory board members and directors without full-time positions in the foundation from collecting compensation. These measures aim to prevent the practice of profit-seeking through high salaries for foundation decision-makers;78 2) board members, close relatives of board members and foundation finance personnel may not serve as supervisory board members;79 3) the foundation board chair, vice chair and secretary general may not hold joint positions as state workers; foundation legal representatives may not concurrently serve as legal representatives of any other organizations; 4) in situations where a board member finds his or her personal interest connected with the foundation’s, he or she may not participate in the relevant board decision; 5) foundation board members, supervisory board members and their close relatives may not engage in any transactions with the foundation they serve; 6) supervisory board members and board members without full-time positions in the foundation may not be compensated by the foundation.80 The fourth is improvements in supervisory mechanisms. Some relevant system features include: the requirement that foundations and foreign foundation representative institutions submit an annual work report to their respective registration and administration offices before March 31st of each year and undergo an annual inspection. Annual work reports must be approved by foundations’ work supervising units before they are submitted to the registration and administration offices. Annual work reports must include: a financial accounting report, an audit report by a certified accountant, a summary of fundraising, donation receipt and aid provided, and a summary of changes in personnel and organizational structure.81 After passing the annual

76 77 78 79 80 81

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

Article Article Article Article Article Article

25. 33. 20. 22. 23. 36.


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examination by their registration and administration offices, foundations and foreign foundation representative institutions must publicize their annual work reports in media designated by the registration and administration offices and make themselves available for social inquiries and supervision.82 This is ensure that foundations are responsible to their registration and administration offices and work supervising units and are also accountable to society. Foundations must submit to tax and accounting supervision according to law under the responsible tax and accounting departments. Foundations must perform financial audits before the end of each leadership term and before changing legal representatives.83 This guarantees that foundations are responsible to tax and accounting departments and bodies. Donors have the right to inquire after the use and management of donated assets, as well as to raise objections and suggestions. Foundations must answer donor inquiries in a timely and truthful fashion. In cases where foundations violate donor agreements in their use of donated assets, donors have the right to demand that foundations abide by those agreements. Otherwise, they may apply to the People’s Courts to have the act of donation abrogated and the donation agreement cancelled. These guarantee that foundations are responsible to donors. 2.2.6. Legally Required Minimum Outlays Article 29 of the Regulations states: “Annual outlays by public funding foundations in pursuit of the public-interest work specified in their articles of incorporation shall be no less than 70% of their revenues in the previous year; annual outlays by non-public funding foundations in pursuit of the public-interest work specified in their articles of incorporation shall be no less than 8% of their fund balance in the previous year. Wages and benefits for foundation personnel and administrative expenses may be no more than 10% of total annual outlays.” These three proportions have already been in use for three years; a great number of opinions on them have been heard from government administrative departments, scholars of civil organization administration and practitioners in foundations.

82 83

Ibid. Ibid., Article 37.

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Currently, some problems have been encountered in implementing the public-interest outlay proportions described above. Registration and administration offices have examined annual examination reports and discovered that over half of foundations failed to meet the legally required outlay proportions. This has especially been the case with smaller non-public funding foundations, where the difficulty of outlaying over 8% and maintaining administrative costs below 10% has proven great. If the law is strictly applied, many foundations would face stiff penalties. In this aspect, borrowing from America’s rule of extending the accounting period (to a four-year, for example, instead of one-year period) is not a bad direction. This would both be strict adherence to the law and would not diminish the law’s authority, while also addressing the real difficulties foundations face. 2.2.7. Investment Management Systems The overall thinking of the Regulations is to relax prohibitions on “making money”. In terms of foundation investing, they encourage efforts to maintain and appreciate foundation funds according to legal, secure and effective principles and make no restrictions on the methods foundations use to maintain and appreciate their funds, leaving investment policy up to foundation boards. At the same time, in order to increase the degree of diligence with which foundation decision-makers approach their duties, the Regulations require, among legal responsibilities, that should board members act against the Regulations or make inappropriate decisions resulting in property losses for the foundation, directors participating in the decisions are responsible for compensating accordingly for the losses.84 For non-public funding foundations, which cannot fundraise within society at large, the problems of investment management are even more acute. Therefore, most non-public funding foundations organize strong investment teams, drawing on professionals to participate in investment management and, using separate investment management rules as a supplement to foundation articles of incorporation, authorize investment management committees to make investment decisions. From the comparative law perspective, most legal measures to restrict appreciation on foundation investing are achieved through tax levers. Investing norms in American non-profit law on “rules restrict-

84

Ibid., Article 43.


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ing leveraged stock purchases”, “high risk investing” and “engaging in non-mission related activities” are all established through tax laws. As part of organizational law, the Regulations on Foundation Administration are not well positioned to have much effect on the problem of investment management. 2.2.8. Administration of Foreign-Involved Foundations The Regulations require the following of foreign foundations: First, foreign civil entities may establish foundations within China according to Chinese law, but they must satisfy the following conditions: 1) the foreign foundation must satisfy the usual conditions and processes for establishing a foundation; 2) foundations with a nonChinese inhabitant serving as legal representative, that is, foundations with a foreign person serving as board chair may only register in the State Council’s Ministry of Civil Affairs;85 3) foreign persons may not serve as legal representative of public funding foundations or nonpublic foundations whose funding source comes from within China;86 4) foreign persons serving as foundation board chair, vice chair or secretary general must stay in China for at least three months per year.87 Second, foreign foundations may establish representative institutions within China, but they must abide by the following requirements: 1) they must meet the conditions and complete the processes for foreign foundation representative institutions;88 2) foreign foundation representative institutions must engage in public-interest activities

Ibid., Article 6. Ibid., Article 23. 87 Ibid., Article 24. 88 Ibid., Article 13 states: “representative institutions set up by foreign foundations in China should, after securing the approval of a work supervising unit, submit the following documents to registration and administration offices: 1) application form; 2) proof of legal registration abroad and foundation articles of incorporation; 3) CV and proof of identification of the proposed person responsible for the representative institution; 4) proof of location; 5) documentation of a work supervising unit’s approval of the establishment of a representative institution. Registration and administration offices must make a decision to grant or not to grant the registration within 60 of receiving the aforementioned materials. Should registration be granted, a Foreign Foundation Representative Institution Registration Certificate《境外基金会代表机构登记证书》 should be issued. Should registration not be granted, a reason for the rejection must be given in writing. Items required for registration of foreign foundation representative institutions include: name, location, scope of public-interest work and director name.” 85 86

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suited to public-interest work in China; the foreign foundation is responsible for the civil behavior of its foreign foundation representative institutions according to Chinese law;89 3) foreign foundation representative institutions must complete tax registration according to law;90 4) foreign foundation representative institutions may not organize fundraising or accept donations within China;91 5) legal representatives of foreign foundation representative institutions must stay in China for at least three months per year.92 Allowing foreign foundation representative institutions to conduct activities suited to China’s public-interest work within China is an embodiment of international convention; strengthening administration of foreign foundations’ activities within China, however, is an embodiment of the principle of sovereignty. These rules and measures contribute to breaking the old pattern off passivity toward administration of foreign civil organizations; to China’s effectively using international civil organization administration resources and experience; and to the active participation of China’s civil organizations in the process of globalization. 2.2.9. Legal Responsibility The content in the Regulations on Foundation Administration pertaining to legal responsibility include the following: First, legal consequences for starting up foundations without authorization. According to Article 40, any foundation, foundation affiliated institution, foundation representative institution or foreign foundation representative institution conducting activities in the name of a foundation without registering or after its registration has been revoked shall be punished by registration and administration offices, its illegal assets seized, and the situation reported publicly. Compared with the punishments for illegal associations in the Regulations on Registration and Administration of Social Groups, this rule is relatively light; it is also not linked with the restrictions on personal liberty as in the Law on Administrative Penalties for Public Security. Therefore, Article 54

89 90 91 92

Ibid. Ibid., Article 14. Ibid., Article 25. Ibid., Article 24.


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of the Law on Administrative Penalties for Public Security states that it does not apply to the unauthorized establishment of foundations. Second, penalties for illegal behavior by foundations. According to Article 42 of the Regulations, any foundation, foundation affiliated institution, foundation representative institution or foreign foundation representative institution involved in any of the following cases shall receive an admonition from its registration and administration office and be ordered to cease activities. In severe cases, registration may also be revoked: 1) failure to conduct activities in accordance with the mission defined in the articles of incorporation and the scope of public-interest activities; 2) fraudulent acts in the preparation of accounting documents, the certified accountant ledger or the financial accounting report; 3) failure to modify registration according to regulations; 4) failure to meet the annual minimum level of public-interest disbursements required by these regulations; 5) failure to undergo annual examination according to these Regulations or the failure to pass the annual examination; 6) failure to comply with information publication duties or publication of false information. Should foundations or foreign foundation representative institutions exhibit any of the behaviors above, registration and administration offices should notify tax offices to demand taxes from which the foundation in question had been exempted during the offending period. Compared with relevant portions from the Regulations on Registration and Administration of Social Groups, the greatest difference is the absence in these Regulations of several types of penalties, including “ordering the change of the personnel directly in charge”, “illegal operational revenues”, “seizing illegal revenues” and “fines”; however, penalty of “demanding taxes from which the foundation in question had been exempted during the offending period” was added. Third, board responsibility. According to Article 43 of the Regulations, if the board makes inappropriate decisions resulting in property losses for the foundation, directors participating in the decisions are responsible for compensating accordingly for the losses. Foundation directors, supervisory board members or personnel who embezzle, seize or misappropriate foundation assets must return the illegally possessed assets; in cases involving criminal behavior, culprits will be prosecuted according to criminal law. Fourth, responsibilities of workers and personnel in administrative offices. According to Article 45 of the Regulations, should workers or personnel of the registration and administration offices or the work

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supervising unit abuse their official powers, be derelict of duty, or commit favoritism and irregularities, in those instances where criminal conduct is involved, those involved will be prosecuted according to criminal law; where acts do not involve criminal conduct, administrative penalties or disciplinary punishments shall be issued. 2.3. Laws and Rules Normalizing People-Run Non-Enterprise Units On October 25, 1998, the State Council issued the Provisional Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration and Administration《民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例》. The Provisional Regulations consist of 6 chapters and 32 articles and comprise a system as follows. 2.3.1. Definition and Organizational Form According to Article 2 of the Provisional Regulations, people-run nonenterprise units refers to social organizations started using non-State owned assets by enterprise public institutions, social groups and other social forces and individual citizens to engage in non-profit social service activities. According to this definition, people-run non-enterprise units have the following qualities: 1) civil nature. This is the chief difference between people-run non-enterprise units and public institutions and is manifested in two ways: first, the non-governmental nature of the initiating actor, and, second, the civil source of the initial funds; 2) non-profitness. This is the chief difference between people-run nonenterprise units and enterprises; 3) the nature of the entity. This is the chief difference between people-run non-enterprise units and social groups and foundations. Currently, people-run non-enterprise units can be divided into ten types: education, hygiene, culture, science and technology, athletics, labor, civil administration, social intermediary services, legal services and other.93 Different from social groups’ and foundations’ organizational forms, people-run non-enterprise units’ organizational forms are more flexible. According to different methods of bearing civil legal responsibility, people-run non-enterprise units can be established in as legal persons, partnerships or individual units and, accordingly, be 赵泳/Zhao Yong, “民办非企业单位的过去、现在和未来”/“min ban fei qi yu dan wei di guo qu, xian zai he wei lai,” in 眼界与洞察/yan jie yu don cha, (General Office of the State Council, 2004.1) 348. (“The Past, Present and Future of PeopleRun Non-Enterprise Units” in Outlooks and Insights) 93


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issued a People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit (Legal Person) Registration Certificate, a People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit (Partnership) Registration Certificate, or a People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit (Individual) Registration Certificate.94 2.3.2. Registration Conditions and Process Groups applying for people-run non-enterprise unit status must satisfy the following conditions: 1) have the approval of a work supervising unit; 2) have a normal name and the necessary organizational structure; 3) have a working team suitable for its scope of work; 4) have legal assets suitable for its scope of work; 5) have the necessary facilities. In order to register a people-run non-enterprise unit, initiators must submit the following documentation to a registration and administration office: 1) registration application; 2) approval documentation from a work supervising unit; 3) proof of permission to use the location; 4) proof of certified capital; 5) basic information on the proposed director and proof of identification; 6) draft articles of incorporation.95 The registration and administration office must make a decision to approve or not approve within 60 days of receiving complete application materials. Should any of the following conditions apply, registration will be denied and the reason explained to the applicant: 1) there is proof that the mission or scope of work of the applying people-run non-enterprise unit does not comply with requirements; 2) false statements were made when applying; 3) another people-run non-enterprise unit with the same or similar scope of work exists in the same administrative area. Establishing another is unnecessary; 4) the proposed director is or has 94 The ways these three forms of organizations can be held civilly responsible are defined in the General Rules of Civil Law. Article 29 states that individual commercial households, village contracted operators, and individually-operated units shall bear civil responsibilities as individual assets; household-operated units shall bear them as household assets. Article 35 states that with partnership assets, partners are responsible for complete payment according to their equity percentages unless otherwise agreed. Unless otherwise legally specified, partners are jointly responsible for their liabilities. Any partner paying a proportion of compensation exceeding his equity proportion has the right to seek repayment from the other partner or partners. Legal persons and their assets bear limited legal responsibility. 95 Article 9, Provisional Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration and Administration《民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例》. According to Article 10, articles of incorporation must include: 1) name and location; 2) mission and scope of work; 3) organizational governance system; 4) processes for choosing and removing legal representatives and responsible persons; 5) principles for the management and use of assets; 6) process for modifying the articles; 7) processes for dissolving the unit and handling remaining assets after dissolution; 8) any other items required by the articles of incorporation.

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been punished with the stripping of political powers or is without complete capacity for civil behaviors; 5) the application meets other conditions prohibited by law or administrative regulations.96 For people-run non-enterprise units granted registration, registration registered shall include unit name, location, mission and scope of work, legal representative or director, start-up funds, and work supervising unit name. Units shall, in various ways, bear their legal responsibilities according to this registration and law, and shall be given the different registration certificates. According to laws and other administrative regulations, for people-run non-enterprise units already legally examined and approved or registered by work supervising units and those which have already been issued licenses, registration processes should be expedited by registration and administration offices, and people-run non-enterprise unit registration certificates should be issued based on documentation from the work supervising unit proving issuance of a license.97 2.3.3. Rules on Supervision As with social groups and foundations, registration and administration of people-run non-enterprise units is conducted jointly by registration and administration offices and work supervising units. According to the Provisional Regulations, registration and administration offices and work supervising units are responsible for different functions. For their part, registration and administration offices are to carry out the following supervisory functions: 1) registering the establishment, modification or dissolution of people-run non-enterprise units; 2) conducting annual examinations;98 3) supervising and examining any violations of regulations and issuing administrative penalties for violations in accordance with these Regulations.99 Work supervising unit are to carry out the following supervisory functions: 1) conducting examinations Provisional Regulations, Article 11. Ibid., Article 12. 98 Ibid., Article 23 states that people-run non-enterprise units must submit the previous year’s annual work report to their work supervising units by March 31 of each year. After approving a report, a supervising unit must submit it to the non-enterprise unit’s registration and administration office by May 31 for annual examination. Content of the work reports must include the status of each unit’s compliance with law, regulations, State policy, the processes described in these Regulations, and its articles of incorporation, as well as the status of personnel and structural changes and financial management. 99 Ibid., Article 19. 96 97


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prior to the registration of the establishment, modification or dissolution of people-run non-enterprise units; 2) supervising and guiding people-run non-enterprise units’ activities in accordance with their articles of incorporation, the constitution, laws, regulations and State policies; 3) conducting the initial review of people-run non-enterprise units’ annual examinations; 4) assisting registration and administration offices and other departments in handling illegal behaviors by peoplerun non-enterprise units; 5) jointly handling liquidations of people-run non-enterprise units in coordination with other relevant departments.100 People-run non-enterprise units’ assets must come from legal sources, and no unit or individual may seize, embezzle or misappropriate people-run non-enterprise unit assets. Revenues collected from activities in accordance with articles of incorporation and the relevant State laws must be used to forward the activities specified in people-run non-enterprise units’ articles. Donations and aid received must be consistent with the unit’s mission and scope of work as defined in its articles and must be used in the period and way and for the legal uses specified by the donor or aid giver. People-run non-enterprise units must report donations received and used and aid to their work supervising units and must publicize related matters to society using a suitable method.101 People-run non-enterprise units must follow the nationally required financial management system and submit to supervision by finance departments. Assets coming from aid from the State or donations or aid from society must also undergo supervision from the relevant auditing departments. When people-run non-enterprise units modify their legal representatives or directors, their registration and administration offices and work supervising unit must perform financial audits.102 2.3.4. Legal Responsibility The legal responsibilities in the Provisional Regulations are basically the same as the administrative penalties and behaviors in the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration.103

100 101 102 103

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

Article Article Article Article

20. 21. 22. 5.

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2.4. Laws and Regulations Belonging to Organizational Law 2.4.1. Provisional Regulations on Public Institution Registration and Administration《事业单位登记管理暂行条例》 Public institutions refer to “social service organizations set up for public-interest aims, by State offices or other organizations using State resources to engage in educational, scientific and technological, cultural or hygiene activities”;104 they are non-profit organizations set up by the State. We could analyze public institutions as NPOs, but we cannot view them as civil organizations. The primary goal of 1998’s Provisional Regulations on Public Institution Registration and Administration was to achieve consistent registration of public institutions; supervisory content in these Regulations is in principle. On June 27, 2004, the State Council revised the Regulations, mainly in order to adjust the offices responsible for registration, from the original “an administrative office staffed by People’s government institutions at the county level or higher” to “a public institution administrative office under an administrative office staffed by People’s government institutions at the county level or higher.” 2.4.2. PRC Law on Rural Co-operatives《中华人民共和国农民专业合作社法》 The law was passed on October 31, 2006, in the 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth NPC, to be implemented starting July 1, 2007. Its contents included: establishment and registration, membership, organizational structure, financial management, mergers, splits, dissolution and liquidation, policy support and legal responsibilities. Rural co-operatives refer to mutual-help economic organizations formed on the basis of the rural household contracting system, formed by producers of the same type of agricultural product or suppliers or users of the same agricultural service, that are voluntarily formed and democratically administered. Rural co-operatives are comprised of members as units and belong to the category of social group legal persons. For registration and administration, however, they must seek commercial-type registrations. Therefore, even though this kind of organization is a social group legal person comprised of members

104 Article 2, Provisional Regulations on registration and administration of Public institutions《事业单位登记管理暂行条例》.


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as units, it would be inappropriate to consider rural co-operatives as NPOs. In reality, mutual-help economic organizations are positioned between for-profit and non-profit organizations and have been referred to as “mesne legal persons” or “self-interest organizations” by theorists. Rural co-operatives’ registration is not dual and overlapping like the process for civil organizations and does require pre-approval like civil organizations; in terms of administration, the relevant processes are closer to those for enterprises and other for-profit organizations. 2.4.3. Red Cross Law《红十字会法》 In the 4th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth NPC in 1993, the Chinese Red Cross Law was passed. It contains regulations on registration and administration specific to one social group. The law states: “China Red Cross is the PRC’s one unified Red Cross organization; it s a group for humanitarian, social aid work.” “The central China Red Cross is a qualified social group legal person; local and industry Red Crosses must seek social group legal status according to law.”105 Therefore, China Red Cross is categorized as a social group, and, as a typical public-interest charity organization sits squarely within non-profit organizations as well. Red Cross Law consists of 28 articles regulating organizing, function, logo, expenditures, and property, among other content. After the release of Red Cross Law, China Red Cross bolstered its constant efforts to “smooth out” its system, earnestly seeking personnel, funds and prominence and fundraising advantages during instances of disaster relief. China Red Cross’s “public personage” status became increasingly pronounced, and its resemblance to a civil organization faded. 2.4.4. Union Law《工会法》 In another example of a law directed at one particular social group, the Union Law was passed in the 5th Meeting of the Seventh NPC on April 3, 1992. The law states that “unions are a worker’s class,

105 China Red Cross is a legally-authorized non-social group organization with qualifications to engage in fundraising. Article 22 of the Red Cross Law《红十字会法》states that “the Red Cross may engage in fundraising for the launch of aid work.” China Red Cross received the most donations of any NPO both during SARS in 2003 and the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008. This is related to the Red Cross’s organizational network and donation mobilizing capacity; it has also benefitted from great government support.

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mass organization, a voluntary integration of employees.”106 Even though, as a mass organization, unions are administered according to public servant standards like the Communist Youth League and the Women’s Federation, they are still social groups in substance. Union law comprises seven chapters and 57 articles and regulates unions’ functions and mission, structure, rights and duties, base-level structure, funds and assets and legal responsibilities.107 Furthermore, two more laws normalizing base-level, mass, autonomous organizations, Village Committee Organizational Law《村民委员会组织法》and the Urban Residents Committee Organizational Law《城市居民委员会组织法》, can also be listed as being related to organizational law. The Seventeenth General Report of the Communist Party of China identifies four kinds of parallel political systems: the “baselevel, mass, autonomous system”, the “People’s Congress system, the Chinese Communist Party and multi-party cooperative and political consultative system, and the nationalities regional autonomous system”. Of these, the first, “base-level, mass, autonomous system” has a more significant political component, and is more distant from the other three categories. 3. Main Pertinent Tax Regulations108 Tax laws are more influential in normalizing and guiding civil organizations’ behavior than any other area of law. In America, non-profit

Article 2, Union Law《工会法》. Ibid., Article 4: unions must abide by and uphold the constitution, take the constitution as the basic principle for activities, take economic development as its core, sustain socialism as its road, sustain People’s democratic dictatorship, sustain the leadership of the CCP, sustain Marxist Leninist Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, sustain the Reform and Opening, and conduct work independently, autonomously and in accordance with union articles. Article 5: unions must organize and educate employees to exercise their democratic rights according to the constitution and laws, to utilize the State as master and protagonist (主人翁), and, through multiple channels, to participate in the administration of national affairs, economic and cultural work and social work; to assist the People’s government in undertaking government work, uphold the leadership of the worker class, for the political power of the People’s democratic dictatorship socialist State with the worker-peasant alliance as its foundation. Article 6: upholding workers legal interests is the basic function of unions. At the same time they uphold the interests of all the nation’s people, they must represent and uphold the legal interests of employees. 108 For taxes pertaining to civil organizations, see the next chapter. 106 107


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legal development is also manifest mostly in tax law.109 There, tax law has not only become a source of tax preferences for civil organizations, more importantly it has also become an important method for administering civil organizations. America has thus become a place where civil organization administration relies primarily on tax law and not on organizational law. In China, strengthening of NPO administration through the tax system has been a gradual awakening realized through policy implementations. The Chinese tax system collects according to tax type and does not have separate institutions for civil organizations. As legal persons, civil organizations are no different from other legal person entities; they are subject to the same, unified tax system. Currently, there are 20 types of taxes, separated into four groups by object of tax collection: goods and labor taxes (5), income taxes (3), assets taxes (8) and other taxes (4).110,111,112,113 4. Summary of Other Pertinent Regulations 4.1. Public Interest Donations System Public Interest Donations Law《公益事业捐赠法》, implemented starting September 1, 1999, clarified both categories of public-interest donations and administrative systems for donations, donation receipts and use of donated assets. According to the law, public-interest work refers to the following non-profit items: 1) activities in disaster relief, poverty alleviation and aid for the handicapped; 2) educational, scientific, cultural, hygienic and athletic work; 3) environmental protection and construction of social, public infrastructure; 4) other social, public, and beneficial work promoting social development and progress.114 Though some regulations in the Donations Law no longer fit well the 109 贝茜等; 金锦萍、朱卫国、周虹译/Bei Xi, et al.; Jin Jinping, Zhu Weiguo, Zhou Hongze, trans., 通行规则-美国慈善法指南/tong xing gui ze—mei guo ci shan fa zhi nan, (Beijing: zhongguo she hui chu ban she, 2007). (Common Regulations—a Guide to American Charity Law) 110 Value added tax, business tax, sales tax, auto purchase tax, customs tax. 111 Enterprise income tax, personal income tax, land appreciation tax. 112 Real estate tax, urban real estate tax, city and town land use tax, arable land use tax, contract tax, resource tax, auto and vessel tax, shipping tonnage tax. 113 Stamp tax, urban maintenance and construction tax, tobacco tax, fixed investment tax. 114 Public Interest Work Donations Law, Article 3.

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contours of public-interest work today, the law still contains the prevailing laws and regulations on the administration of donations and donation receipts, donated assets and their use. As administrative regulations are released, relevant sections of Contract Law《合同法》Enterprise Income Tax Law《企业所得税法》, and the Regulations on Foundation Administration《基金会管理条例》and other laws are constantly being updated. Currently, revisions of the Donations Law, especially in the areas of normalizing certification of qualified fundraising entities and their behavior and clarifying the principles and rules of fundraising, are urgently needed. 4.2. Public Interest Trust System PRC Trust Law《中华人民共和国信托法》, which was implemented beginning October 1, 2001, created separate regulations for publicinterest trusts and created a separate system for China’s public-interest trusts. Trust Law contains content specific to public-interest trusts in three areas. First, the scope of public-interest trusts. Trusts formed for any of the following public-interest aims are considered “publicinterest trusts”: 1) poverty alleviation; 2) disaster relief; 3) aid for the handicapped; 4) development of educational, scientific and technological, cultural, artistic or athletic work; 5) development of medical and hygienic work; 6) environmental protection and sustaining the ecological environment; 7) development of other social, public-interest work.115 Secondly is the approval and supervisory system for publicinterest trusts.116 Next after that is a system of checks for protecting public-interest trust assets.117 4.3. Rules on Donation Contracts PRC Contract Law, implemented starting October 1, 1999, systematically normalizes the signing, efficacy, fulfillment, modification, transfer of rights and responsibilities, and responsibilities for contractual breaches. This law is applied frequently by NPOs, especially Chapter 11 on “donation contracts”. Clauses worth mentioning include: Article

115 116 117

Trust Law, Article 60. Trust Law, Articles 62 to 73. Trust Law, Articles 63 and 72.


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186 “donors may cancel their donations at any point before transferring the rights to the donated assets. This clause does not apply to donation contracts of disaster relief, poverty alleviation, social, public-interest, or moral duty substance and notarized donation contracts”; Article 188 “In cases where the substance of the donation contract concerns disaster relief, poverty alleviation, social, public-interest, or moral duty or where the donation contract is notarized and the donor does not deliver the donated assets, the donation receiver may demand delivery”; Article 194 “donations may be conditional. For donations with conditions, donation receivers must abide by the agreed conditions.” 4.4. Rules on Labor Relations Labor Contract law, which was implemented beginning January 1, 2008, offers a legal system for systematically normalizing labor contracts. The law holistically and systematically normalizes the signing, fulfillment, modification, cancellation and termination of contracts, as well as offering separate regulations for collective contracts, labor relocations (派遣), and employment of non-full-day workers. According to the law, its regulations apply to the labor relations of people-run nonenterprise units, while the signing, fulfillment, modification, cancellation and termination of labor contracts between State offices, public institutions, social groups and the laborers with whom they establish labor relations should be implemented according to this law.118 Should other laws, administrative or State Council regulations separately issue regulations for public institutions (事业单位), then the signing, fulfillment, modification, cancellation and termination of labor contracts in public institutions should be conducted according to those rules; barring separate regulations, these functions should be executed according to the regulations in this law.119 The new Contract Law makes some new requirements of employers in the areas of labor contract signing, cancellation, economic compensation and others. For example, in cases where labor contracts are signed without set terms, it is required that there is a written labor contract, that conditions for cancelling the contract and standards for economic compensation are provided; this further protects laborers’ rights

118 119

Article 2, Labor Contract Law《劳动合同法》. Ibid., Article 16.

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and, to a certain extent, increases employer costs and restricts their options and flexibility in hiring. NPOs should fully acquaint themselves with the new Labor Contract Law, adapt to the rules therein and actively select appropriate employment strategies. 4.5. Volunteer Service System Volunteers are those who, without any motivations of collecting personal interest or legal duty, provide service and help to society and others without material reward as compensation. Volunteer service is a fulfillment of public responsibility through public participation and behaviors that can shore up shortcomings caused by market failures or government failures and expand the capabilities of social, public benefits. As volunteer activities grow in number and their effects increase in visibility, volunteer service has gained public familiarity and recognition. The China Youth Volunteer Association (中国青年志愿者协会) launched a volunteer registration system in 2001. The Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, along with the China Youth Volunteer Association issued Measures on China Youth Volunteers Registration and Administration (Trial)《中国青年志愿者注册管理办法（试行）》in March of 2002, signifying the implementation of the system nationwide. The Measures clarified the definition of registered volunteers as well as their rights and duties, qualifications, registration processes, administration and training, encouragement and praise, and guarantees of their legal rights and interests, promoting, to a certain degree, the development and normalization of Chinese volunteer service. Various local areas followed by releasing their own local laws and regulations. Besides setting standards for volunteers and their organizations, the policies manifested encouragement and support: praise and incentives were set in place for especially active volunteers who made significant achievements; the rights of volunteers were defined as the rights to be trained, to have access to information in their service field, to request that expenses be returned, to have their safety and service conditions guaranteed, and even to receive insurance paid for by their service institutions. However, at the current time, there has appeared no legislation at the State level clarifying volunteer service, leaving laws and regulations silent on some basic questions. For example, questions of limits on volunteers’ civil responsibilities and of State policy supports for


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volunteer organizations are both quite pressing. Conducting trials and explorations in the volunteer service system, and solidifying them in regulations is the matter next facing legislators. 4.6. Specialized Social Workers System A specialized social workers system is indispensable for advancing the professionalism and specialization of China’s civil organizations. While development of the system has been caught up in the Central Government around the issue of standard exams for social workers, preventing until now the release of legislation specifically on social workers, all the while, the development of social work is accelerating in places like Shanghai and Shenzhen. After the Wenchuan Earthquake, specialized social workers were crucial to the rescue and relief and post-quake reconstruction efforts. Since the policy goal of “building a great team of capable social workers” was set at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Party’s Sixteenth Central Committee, still more attention has been devoted to social workers. Currently, the State Council has already established separate offices responsible for social work in the Ministry of Civil Affairs and are preparing legislation specific to social workers. This chapter has attempted to describe the status of legal developments in China pertaining civil organizations from the four angles of basic law, organizational law, tax law and other relevant laws. Along with China’s economic and social progress come both a need for the gradual establishment and improvement of stable and dynamic legal frameworks for civil organizations as well as challenges. This framework must be capable of including and guiding diverse interests and social forces resulting from development, must resolve problems produced by development, and promote the balanced and sustainable development of economic society. Civil organizations need improved laws to have the capacity for healthy ideals, free innovation and sincere efforts; only with such an improved legal framework can civil organizations enjoy such backing. From plans currently underway and our present bank of research, it appears that the important, future systemic improvements in the area of China’s civil organizations can be summarized as follows: first, institution of philanthropy law. Following China’s rapid economic growth and the constant buildup of civil, public-interest forces, public understanding and acceptance of

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the concept of philanthropy is ever-growing.120 Especially when facing disasters, like the Wenchuan Earthquake, public enthusiasm for philanthropy will run very high, resulting in a bursting forth of civil, philanthropic forces. This will spur the progress of philanthropy legislation. Drafting of philanthropy law has already made it onto the State Council’s annual legislative agenda and the NPC Standing Committee’s five-year legislative agenda. The State Council’s Ministry of Civil Affairs has already done a great deal of legislative and comparative legal research in this area, and drafts of a framework for philanthropy law are being circulated. As the basic law for the philanthropy field, the new law must include a definition of the concept of philanthropy, philanthropic institutions, philanthropic fundraising, philanthropic trusts, philanthropic volunteerism, and philanthropic policy. The law will represent an organizational law for philanthropic institutions, a stimulus law for philanthropic momentum, and a law protecting philanthropic work. In terms of legislative mission and position, philanthropy law will bring new force to respecting philanthropic aims, protecting philanthropic enthusiasm, nurturing philanthropic consciousness, normalizing philanthropic behavior, promoting the development of diverse philanthropic work, and satisfying society’s expectations for philanthropy legislation. Its introduction will reflect the principles of putting people first, taking civil-ness as a foundation, and relying on the mass public as a support. Second are revisions to the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration and the Provisional Regulations on People-run Non-enterprise Unit Registration and Administration. These regulations were drafted or revised over ten years ago; with society’s development and reforms, some portions of the regulations are no longer well-suited to actual conditions and have led to some problems, or even, to a certain extent, have hampered the development of civil organizations. For this reason, revision of both sets of regulations has made it onto the State Council’s annual legislative agenda. The areas in most dire need of revision are: adding norms for administering “foreigninvolved” matters, improving the administrative system, strengthening internal governance, and further improving rules on activities. Lastly 1993’s China Encyclopedia《中国大百科全书》defines charity as “carrying with it strong religious and superstitious sensibilities, it currently is to do good things in order to get something good in return . . . it is only a kind of temporary, negative aid for a small number of people . . . its social consequences are disputed.” 120


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is the drafting of rules and policies supplementary to tax law. Enterprise Income Tax Law and its implementation regulations clearly state that the revenue of qualifying NPOs is tax-exempt and that publicinterest donations are deductible from taxable income. But measures on implementation of a system, on application procedures, confirmation procedures and other questions of practical application have yet to appear. We can expect that legal developments in China pertaining to civil organizations will continue to progress in the directions of organizational law and tax law. However, the level of laws, regulations and norms will continue to follow the constant development and rise or China’s civil organizations.

CHAPTER FOUR

CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE REFORMS AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS Li Yong This chapter introduces several major policies reforming civil organizations: de-administration-ization (去行政化) reforms, tax reforms, information disclosure, and evaluation. These policies signify that China’s civil organizations have already abandoned campaign-style management and are well on their way to becoming scientific, systematic, and legally established. Before discussing these reforms one at a time, we begin with an introduction to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) recent macro-policies on civil organizations in order to clarify the political foundations of reforms. 1. The CCP’s Basic Policies on Civil Organizations In the most recent period of history, the Chinese Communist Party’s guiding thought on civil organizations has become clearer, its direction and policies more comprehensive, and its requirements for work at each stage more concrete. At the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee in 2003, the Party addressed improving the socialist market economic system and raised the notion of “standardizing and developing, according to marketization principles, all types of industrial associations, commercial associations, and other autonomous organizations”. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the same Committee, in 2004, as a part of efforts to strengthen its governance capacity, the Party required that “service provision by social groups, industrial organizations, and social intermediaries be utilized; that appeals and standardized behavior play a role; and that social administration and social services join forces.” At the Fifth Plenary Session of that Committee in 2005, in connection with the State’s Eleventh Five-Year-Plan Outline, goals of “standardizing and guiding the orderly development of civil organizations” and “improving mechanisms for civil

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organization autonomy and strengthening and improving supervision of civil organizations” were clearly stated. At the Sixth Plenary Session in 2006, the meeting in which the “Socialism and Harmonious Society” scheme was introduced, stated priorities included “strengthening social organizations and social services functions. Maintaining equal focus on encouraging development and on administrative supervision; improving, fostering, aiding and administering, according-to-law, social organization policies,” “encouraging the establishment, drawing on the power of society, of people-run non-enterprise units (民办非企业单位) in the fields of education, science and technology, culture, hygiene, sports and social benefits. Developing the social functions of industrial associations, academic associations and commercial associations and other social groups and enlisting them in service for social and economic development. Developing and standardizing all types of foundations and promoting public-interest work,” “increasing the positive role residential community-based civil organizations play in residential community building,” “advancing the separation of politics and institutions, supporting the participation of social organizations in social administration and public service,” “guiding all types of social organizations in strengthening their self-building, and increasing autonomy and credibility”. At the Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, in 2007, civil organizations occupied a more prominent position and were the topic of many discussions. Meeting reports contain a clear, scientific definition of “social organization” (社会组织). This definition has helped advance a consensus on supporting this kind of organization and taking it seriously. The report importantly characterized social organizations, for the first time, as “developing base-level democracy and guaranteeing that people enjoy more and more actual democratic rights,” and mentioned “utilizing the positive role of social organizations in increasing mass public participation and reporting mass public appeals, strengthening society’s self-governance functions.” Around the topic of “promoting good and rapid national economic growth,” it laid out the aims of “developing standardized industrial associations and market intermediary organizations and strengthening the social credit system”. Around the topic of “holding the course of development of socialist democratic politics,” it not only called for strengthening society’s self-governing functions, it also called for “hastening the separation of government and market intermediary organizations.” Around the topic of “driving forward the great devel-

civil organizations, special purpose reforms

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opment and great flourishing of socialist culture”, the report mentioned “improving the social volunteerism system,” “deepening the reform of the cultural system, improving policies that support public-interest cultural work,” and “maintaining the main direction of developing publicinterest cultural work as a guarantee of people’s fundamental cultural rights.” Around the topic of “hastening and driving society-building with a focus on improving people’s lives,” it articulated “encouraging and standardizing education about ‘social force’ startups,” demanded that “with charity work as a supplement, [we] hasten the improvement of the social security system,” and mentioned the need to “maintain the public-interest nature of public health care and hygiene, and the separation between the political and the institutional, the supervisory and the executive, and the for-profit and non-profit.” The report also called for “encouraging social participation” in building out the public health and public hygiene services systems, and emphasized “[reaching] a state of social administration with strengthened Party leadership, government responsibility, social coordination, and public participation” and “focusing on the building up and administration of social organizations.” Around the topic of “always and unwaveringly taking the road of peaceful development,” the report mentioned “strengthening civil groups’ international exchanges in order to promote understanding and friendship between the Chinese people and the peoples of other nations.” These fundamental policies of the Party can be summarized as: development is the precondition, construction is the core, cultivation and supervision are the basic methods, and positively utilizing civil organizations is a fundamental goal. These fundamental policies are an important force guiding the reforms and development of civil organizations. 2. Civil Organizations’ De-administration-ization (去行政化) Reforms Compared with NPOs in Western nations, Chinese civil organizations have conspicuous and unique traits. That is, the vast majority of Chinese civil organizations are set up by governmental departments; they are born of the departmental system and administered and run by departments; “copy” organizations are established at all levels up and down the government; and personnel from administrative offices serve in full-time and part-time capacities within civil organizations. This

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is not, in the end, as strange as it may seem. For thirty-some years starting from the founding of New China, the nation continuously ran a highly-centralized planned economic system in which governmental departments pervaded every aspect of life. Work that should have fallen under the purvey of civil organizations was naturally taken up by government departments, leaving almost no activity space at all for civil organizations. After the beginning of the Reform and Opening, some civil organizations were born out of governmental departments of corresponding fields. It was inevitable that these organizations should carry with them many governmental and administrative traits. With the total advancement of the nation’s economic development and social reforms, the de-administration-ization of civil organizations became urgent and imperative. The government had already recognized that without making civil organizations truly “civil”, the government would be unable to extricate itself from many areas of social work and the goal of “small government, big society” would be difficult to realize. According to survey data over many years, “civil”izing (民间化) civil organizations has been very difficult. It not only involves the issue of reallocating powers, responsibilities and privileges proper to administrative departments; it involves the practical problems of re-assigning of large numbers of departmental personnel and reforming the working methods of the administrative offices. This kind of system transformation and re-directioning requires dauntless spirit and scientific wisdom. International models for reforms have not been applicable, making reform difficult and highly exploratory. On the topic of governments establishing civil organizations, many offer critical observations and the opinion that government departments should not use administrative resources to establish civil organizations or launch activities because it results in the substitution of government behavior for civil organizational behavior. But other scholars, informed by a historical perspective, have offered affirmation and understanding. These have posited that the voluntary transfer of some functions from government departments to civil organizations, and even the creation of some titular “associations” within government bodies, are exploratory administrative reforms, even system innovations. Compared with no reform at all, i.e. leaving functions that never should have been undertaken by government to remain under government departments, this kind of reform is far better. We hope that through reforms like reducing oversized administrative frameworks and functions and then de-administration-izing, and other


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reform measures, titular “organizations” can gradually become civil organizations. Clearly, this kind of reforms represents a transition and a long-term, difficult process. In any event, in the last twenty years, civil organizations have made great strides in de-administration-ization. 2.1. Reforming the Administrative Management System According to rules and regulations, China administers civil organizations through a dual administrative system. The “dual” refers to two administering departments: the first is to be a government unit that is engaged in work related to the organization’s activities and which is charged in part with its supervision its 业务主管单位, which we will here call its “work supervising unit”; the second is its registration and administration office. From set up and registration to daily operations, civil organizations are dually supervised by both departments. In some regions and with some departments, departments even authorize third parties to supervise, effectively resulting in a “triple” administrative system. Over years of running this kind of administrative system, there has been a fair share of controversy. Many have offered analyses of the problems produced by this kind of system. The most pressing issues are, first, the inability of many civil organizations to attain legal registration from the registration office and, second, the administrationization (行政化) of many civil organizations. The dual system is the result of caution during the Reform and Opening. It has the advantages of strengthening supervision and harnessing the resources of some supervising units’ resources to drive civil organizations’ development. Under the current circumstances, with many civil organizations’ autonomy still not developed, many government functions still not transferred and insufficient power vested in the registration office, there are many reasons for a registration and administration system of this kind. However, in recent years, the drawbacks of the dual responsibility administration system have become clearer and clearer; reform is now urgent. In order to tackle the problems of civil organizations’ development, in recent years Guangdong Province has chosen industry associations as a breach-point. Officials there passed local legislation reforming the industrial association administrative system, pushing their reforms to the front before the entire nation. Deep reforms of the

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civil organization administrative system are underway in other parts of the Nation as well. Administrative system reform measures have been issued by Chongqing, Tianjin, Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Hebei and Hubei, all with positive effects. Practice has shown that the essence of civil organization reform is administrative system reform; “civil”-ization should properly be the direction in which civil organization reforms develop. Though there have been initial, local results, difficulties facing reforms of the civil organization administrative system loom large and the road before them appears slow and long. One issue is that there is a lack of consensus. Dismantling the dual system poses challenges for the currently operating administrative system. Whether or not it should be cancelled is still steeped in controversy. Another is the inertia of the current administrative system which is a challenge for the introduction of local, trial reforms. A third is a lag of ancillary measures for civil organizations, like standards for how social security benefits and compensation should be handled for public servants transferring into civil organizations. These ancillary policies urgently need to be brought up to date. A fourth is that civil organizations need a great deal of capacity building. A number of civil organizations are not ready to be weaned of the departmental teat and do not know how clearly to separate their finances from their work supervising units, re-orient their operations toward serving their constituents, define their roles, develop services suitable for their respective developments, develop channels for resources, establish credibility, and handle relations with government departments. Faced with these questions, some civil organizations miss the “good ole” days, free of worries, in the arms of the government. Most civil organizations, however, are standing bravely at the front lines of reforms. 2.2. Reducing the Number of Leader and Cadre Part- and Full-time Employees As described above, because many civil organizations were founded by government departments, they appointed cadres from units to their own “departments” as a matter of course. Whether or not these moves were objective, it is a limiting trait of civil organizations with obvious shortcomings. It is not beneficial for separation between the government and civil organizations, the transfer of functions from government departments, the maintenance of independent legal-person status and “civil”-ness, the focus on the part of the government on


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those tasks they must undertake, or the general positive growth of civil organizations’ role in society. The Central Government has placed a great deal of importance on the issue of cadres’ part-time positions in civil organizations and issued a series of regulations restricting the practice. In 1994, the General Office of the State Council’s Notice Concerning Departmental Leaders and Comrades Not Taking Joint Positions in Social Organizations《关于部门领导同志不兼任社会团体领导职务的通知》 stated that leaders from State Council departments and committees, work offices, and directly-subsidiary institutions were no longer permitted to hold joint positions in social organizations, and that those already holding such positions should, in accordance with social organizations’ articles and regulations, resign from those positions. Special cases in which joint appointments were purported to be necessary were to require approval from the State Council. Local governments were to make decisions in abidance with the spirit of the Notice according to their own local situations. In 1998, the General Offices of the Central Party and the State Council issued a Notice Concerning Party and Government Leaders and Cadres Not Holding Joint Leadership Positions in Social Organizations《关于党政机关领导干部不兼任社会团体领导职务的通知》forbidding leaders or cadres at the county (chu, 处) level or above of Party, People’s Congress, administrative, Political Consultative Congress, legal or procuratorial institutions from holding joint leadership positions (including directorships of affiliates of social organizations) in social organizations (including social organizations from abroad). Should a joint leadership appointment be necessary, the official would be required to apply for approval in accordance with his cadre administrative powers, and after performing the procedures defined in the articles and rules of the social organization, complete the relevant procedures at the social organization’s registration office. Provinces, autonomous regions, and sub-State municipalities were to implement measures locally in accordance with the spirit of the Notice. As to the question of military leaders’ and cadres’ involvement in social organizations, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s General Political Department was instructed to draft regulations in accordance with the spirit of the Notice. Should special cases require leaders of the State Council to serve jointly in social organization leadership positions, the nominee must first submit a report directly to the State Council along with the nominee’s CV.

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In 1999, the CCP Central Committee’s Organizing Bureau’s Notice Concerning the Issue of Approving Central Administration Cadres for Joint Leadership Positions in Social Organizations《关于审批中央管理的干部兼任社会团体领导职务的有关问题的通知》required, first, that the procedure of leaders and cadres taking joint positions in social organizations be implemented strictly according to relevant documents and regulations of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and General Office of the State Council. Those taking positions as social organization board or council chairs, vice-chairs or general-secretaries should be healthy and able to conduct normal work, should usually be no more than 70 years of age, and should usually serve no more than two terms. Leaders and cadres were not to serve as legal representative for more than one social organization concurrently, and foundation leaders could not be current employees in the government. Second, appointments of Central Administration cadres to joint positions in social organizations were to be watched closely. It must be confirmed that organizations in which Central Administrative cadres would take appointments had important functions in the nation, region, industry and economy, politics or social life, were influential within and outside of China, and were formally approved by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. It must also be confirmed that the appointment is required for the work at hand, that the leader or official does not have any other joint appointments, and that the content of the work is related to the duties of the official. Only after these conditions are met and confirmed can a Central Administration official assume the joint role. In addition, employees holding joint posts in social organizations were forbidden from accepting any kind of compensation. Third, before Central Administration cadres could hold joint positions in social organizations, the social organization’s work supervising unit must discuss the matter with the cadre’s unit’s Party Group (Party Committee). Only after verification by the cadre’s unit’s cadre (human resources) department and examination and approval of the unit Party Committee (Party Group) can the application be passed on to the Central Organizing Bureau under the name of the unit Committee. In 2004, based on sections of the newly-issued Regulations for Foundation Administration《基金会管理条例》related to the condition that “foundation board chair, vice-chair or general-secretary positions may not being filled by acting State working personnel,” the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a notice specifying that no currently-serving personnel of Party, People’s Congress, government, Political Consultative


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Congress, legal or procuratorial institutions, or of any other institution legally authorized to perform administrative functions should be allowed to jointly hold a position as board chair, vice-chair or generalsecretary of a foundation. Due to the fact that joint positions held by currently-serving public servants were mostly in industrial associations, in 2007, the General Office of the State Council issued Several Opinions Relating to Hastening and Accelerating the Reform and Development of Industrial and Commercial Associations《关于加快推进行业协会商会改革和发展的若干意见》. The Notice stated that currently-serving public servants should not be permitted to serve jointly in leadership positions in industrial associations; in the case that special needs require such an appointment, it must be approved according to relevant regulations. Board membership must be decided strictly according to democratically processed elections; nominations for board chair (or council chair) must be made by board members and a chair chosen by anonymous vote at a general election at a members meeting (or members delegates meeting). In addition, multi-candidate elections should be gradually introduced. The election of business leaders as board or council chairs should be encouraged. Selection of secretary-generals may take place through election, appointment or open recruitment from society. These regulations have had a major effect in restricting the practice of State public servants holding full-time or joint positions in civil organizations. Due to the “should there be special needs” opening, however, many currently-serving Party and government leaders and cadres, after fulfilling the requirements of the clause, are still serving, in a joint capacity, as leaders of civil organizations. This is especially common in industrial associations. In September of 2007, the Ministry of Civil Affairs released a policy, the Notice Concerning the Issue of Registration and Administration of Social Organizations《关于社会团体登记管理有关问题的通知》(Ministry of Civil Affairs Letter (2007) No. 263), requiring all social organizations with a national reach to earnestly verify their directors’ employment credentials and conditions. Social organizations must, in accordance with the spirit of the Ministry of Civil Affairs Notice, Transmitted by the General Office of the State Council, on Opinions for the Clean Up and Reorganization of Social Groups 《国务院办公厅转发民政部关于清理整顿社会团体意见的通知》(General Office of the State Council (1997) No. 11) as well as their own articles and regulations, uphold the qualification requirements on social organizations’ directors’ ages and term-limits.

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Should an organization, for special reasons, require the nomination of a director in breach of these qualifying rules, they must, before the end of the previous term, receive written approval from its registration office. Directors reaching the age limit while still in term should, under most circumstances, withdraw from their positions but may still have honorary duties. According to the spirit of the Several Opinions on Hastening and Accelerating the Reform and Development of Industrial and Commercial Associations《国务院办公厅关于加快推进行业协会商会改革和发展的若干意见》(General Office of the State Council (2007) No. 36) directors of industrial and commercial associations without special permission are not to have concurrent posts as public servants, and, under most circumstances, cannot be overage or exceed term limits. Violations of the rules above by social organizations will be considered by the registration office in deciding the result of the annual basic qualification certification process. For gross violations, punishments may be decided according to the Regulations for Social Organization Registration and Administration. 2.3. Improving Internal Governance One chief way in which civil organizations differ from government departments is their possession of complete and independent internal governance structures. Whether they are social organizations, foundations, or people-run non-enterprise units, the offices responsible for their registration and administration will, from the start, set up internal governance systems and endow them with binding force. These scientific systems and strict implementation have largely corrected civil organizations’ tendency toward administration-ization (行政化). 2.3.1. The Example of Social Organizations In order to standardize social organizations’ activities, registration offices formulated a Standardized Version of Social Organization Articles of Incorporation《社会团体章程示范文本》. The Standardized Version has legal, binding force. One the one hand, it comprises rules and regulations for social organizations’ internal governance. It serves as the basis for social organizations’ internal administration and, for associations, is the highest set of principles for action. On the other hand, it is also the basis for the State’s administration of social organizations. In the Standardized Version, registration offices require that social organizations strictly adhere to democratic institutions. It specifies that the members meeting, or the members’ representatives meeting, is the


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most authoritative body in the social organization and that decisions on important matters be made by the members meeting. Members meetings and board meetings are to be held at regular intervals. Members meetings are organized by the board, presided over by the board chair and require a quorum of 2/3 of membership; decisions require a 50% majority vote. Board meetings may be held if a quorum of 2/3 of the board is present, and decisions require a 2/3 majority vote. They are held no less frequently than once per year, and, should a standing board be established, it must meet no less than once every six months. Members meetings and standing board meetings must be held in person. Board meetings should be held in person; should special circumstances require it, however, they may be held remotely using telecommunications devices. The Standardized Version also requires that social organizations clearly state conditions for assumption and loss of membership qualifications, the conditions for joining and withdrawing, and members’ rights and responsibilities. The Standardized Version also clearly states the responsibilities proper to the positions of board chair and secretary-general. The secretarygeneral position is full-time, and is filled by election on the board. The chairperson of the board is the legal representative of the organization; however, under certain special circumstances, the vice-chair or secretary-general may serve as legal representative. The legal representative must be verified by the social organization’s work supervising unit and approved by its registration office before his powers become effective, and, once approved, his name must be written into the organization’s articles. Furthermore, the Standardized Version specifies standards for the management and use of social organizations’ assets. They must account for the sources of their funds and collect membership fees according to relevant State regulations. Their expenditures must be used towards work within a scope defined in the Articles and may not be distributed to the membership. A strict financial management system must be established guaranteeing that accounting materials are legal, true, accurate, and complete and it must be supervised by the members meeting and finance departments. Funding sources may include State transfers or donations from society and must submit to supervision by auditing offices and be publicized in an appropriate way to society. Financial audits must be performed at the end of each term or when handing over the legal representative position and must be performed by the social organization’s registration office.

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The institutions described here set social organizations apart from administrative offices and demarcate a special, independent role for the legal representative. Currently, social organizations still display a number of administration-ization (行政化) tendencies; this is related to insufficiencies in internal governance institutions. Although the Standardized Version offers a very good structure for internal governance and many other forms of internal governance have been established by various social organizations, due to holistic underdevelopment, social organizational internal governance is still rife with unsolved questions. These include how to improve supervision; how to assign responsibility for faulty board decisions; how to impeach organization directors; how to improve democratic voting practices; how to introduce procedural rules for conducting and setting agendas for members meetings; how to make a fitting choice for legal representative; what the duties of directors should be; how to supervise members; how to increase transparency; how members can approach courts should the organization make wrongful decisions . . . these and other questions require constant exploration. Beyond improving these systems, social organizations also need executive skills, and to strictly and earnestly implement the Standardized Version. If these questions can be resolved, the independence of civil organizations will be all but assured. De-administration-ization reforms will draw out civil organizations’ fundamental characteristics and highlight their status and utility. With de-administration-ization, the ball is in the court of governmental departments; the impetus rests with them. Without some local government departments gracefully transferring functions to civil organizations, they organizations themselves will struggle to find space and “civil”-ization will remain unrealized. Compared with saying that deadministration-ization is civil organizations’ revolution, it would be better to say that it is a greater challenge to government departments. This is a long-term task. Naturally, energetically nurturing and developing true, local, civil organizations while at the same time undertaking de-administrationization of civil organizations from under the old system would certainly be a kind of direction. 3. Major Tax Policies Affecting Civil Organizations The system of tax exemptions and reductions for China’s civil organizations is extremely complicated, and it revolves around four consider-


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ations. The first is how to vigorously stimulate civil organizations; the second concerns the capacity of the current system to absorb changes; the third is how to supervise tax exemptions and reductions; and the fourth is how to maintain fair competition between civil and other types of organizations. These are also the chief challenges to reforming civil organizations’ tax exemption and reduction policies. Nevertheless, this section of the tax system has been developing in a positive and healthy direction in recent years; the range of preferential policies has widened, making them a real aid in civil organizations’ development. At the same time, the social effects of the preferences have gradually become visible. Following the Wenchuan Earthquake of April 12, 2008, as of July 20th of the same year, recorded, associated donation receipts from society at large within and outside China reached 58.093 billion yuan. Over the same period, China Charity and the China Red Cross received 6.1 billion yuan. Other public-interest charitable organizations received donated monies and materiel in historically vast quantities. This is related to the increase in exemptions and deductions in the income tax system. 3.1. Enterprise Income Tax Benefit Article 26, Clause 4 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law《企业所得税法》 (effective from January 1, 2008) states that “non-profit organization income meeting certain conditions” is tax-exempt income. Article 84 of the Implementation Regulations identifies seven conditions NPOs must meet to qualify. They must (1) complete the registration procedures for non-profit organizations according to law; (2) undertake public-interest or non-profit activities; (3) use all income received, besides that used for reasonable organizational expenditures, for public-interest or nonprofit work as defined by the organization’s registration or by its articles of incorporation; (4) not distribute assets or interest borne by assets; (5) upon its termination and in accordance with its registration and articles of confederation, use any remaining assets for public-interest or non-profit purposes or allow its registration and administration office to transfer them to another organization of a similar nature or mission and report the situation to society; (6) not accord givers of assets with any assets rights or retain any rights to the assets given; (7) keep employees’ wages and benefits within legally-required limits and not distribute the organization’s assets in covert forms. Separately, relevant sections of the Tax Law state that the income tax exemption also applies to revenues collected by non-profit scientific

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research institutions engaged in technological development, technology transfer and related consulting and technological services. Non-profit scientific research institutions may also apply to tax departments for a deduction for revenues from secondary operations used as investment to improve research and development conditions; approved investments can be deducted from taxable income. Regarding public-interest foundations, the Tax Law also states that interest borne by these foundations’ funds deposited in financial institutions is not taxable. However, income from sales of stock, bonds (except for national treasury bonds) and other valued securities must be added to taxable income and be taxed as enterprise income. The Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation list the following items qualifying for income tax exemptions: fund transfers to social organizations from any level of government; membership fees collected in accordance with regulations of civil or finance departments at the provincial level or higher; and donations from society at large. 3.2. Donation Deductions Article 9 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law states, “enterprises may deduct the value of public-interest-type donations made, up to 12% of annual net profits, from taxable income”. Article 51 of the Regulations on Implementing Enterprise Income Tax Law《企业所得税法实施条例》states that public-interest-type donations refer to those given to public-interest social organizations or governments or governmental departments at the county-level or higher used for public-interest work as defined by the PRC Public-Interest Work Donations Law《中华人民共和国公益事业捐赠法》. A public-interest social organization refers to any social organization like a foundation or charitable organization which meets the following conditions: (1) it is legally registered and is a qualified legal person; (2) it has public-interest work as its mission and does not aim to gain profits; (3) all its assets and their appreciation are owned by the legal person; (4) its gains and operational surpluses are primarily used for work in accordance with the goals set by the legal person; (5) in the case of termination, its remaining assets do not belong to any individual or for-profit organization; (6) it does not engage in activity unrelated to its set goal; (7) it has a complete and effective finance and accounting system; (8) its donors do not, in any form receive dis-


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tributed assets; (9) it meets any other conditions set by State Council departments responsible for finance and taxation concerning the State Council’s Ministry of Civil Affairs and other registration and administration departments. Annual net profits refer to annual enterprise accounting profits calculated according to the rules of the national unified accounting system. The deductions do not apply if donations are made directly from the taxpayer to the beneficiary. Tax benefits for individuals making donations to NPOs are as follows: (1) donations made by individuals, through domestic or overseas social organizations or government institutions, for education, disaster or poverty relief or other public-interest work may be deducted, to up to 30% percent of taxable income, from taxable income. Donations in excess of 30% of taxable income may not be deducted. The name list of acceptable social organizations is basically the same as that for enterprise deductions for donations for public-interest activities and aid. (2) Donations by individuals made to non-profit social organizations and government institutions for rural volunteer education, Red Cross work, public-interest youth centers for extracurricular activities and non-profit institutions for benefits and services for the elderly, as well as those to approved non-profit organizations may be fully deducted from pre-tax income. (3) Individual donations to unaffiliated scientific research institutes, and expenditures on higher educational research and development into new products, new technologies and new crafts may be deducted in full. (4) donations made by selfemployed persons, through domestic or overseas social organizations or government institutions, for education, disaster or poverty relief or other public-interest work may be deducted, to up to 30% percent of taxable income. The deductions do not apply if donations are made directly from the taxpayer to the beneficiary. 3.3. Circulation Tax Benefits 3.3.1. Business Tax Business tax law states that exemptions from the business tax apply to the following NPO-related activities: (1) Child-care centers, kindergartens, homes for the elderly, and education, marriage and funeral services provided by handicapped persons benefits institutions. (2) Medical services provided by hospitals clinics and other medical institutions.

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Non-profit medical, disease control, and women’s health institutions and medical and hygiene services provided according to national regulations. Revenues collected by for-profit medical services organizations used directly on improving medical and hygienic conditions. Revenues from medical services provided within three years of business registration are also tax exempt. (3) Educational labor provided through schools and other educational institutions, which here refers to regular schools, educational administrative departments approved and established at local and municipal levels and above by the people’s government or corresponding levels of the government, and any schools accredited by the government. (4) Door ticket receipts from events held at memorial halls, museums, cultural centers, art museums, exhibition centers, calligraphy centers, libraries, artifact protection units, and religious facilities. Events held at memorial halls and other venues, here, refers to events staged at their own locations belonging, for tax purposes, to the “culture and sports” item. Their door ticket receipts refer to tickets for entrance to the first door of the venue. Door ticket receipts from cultural and religious events held at religious facilities refers to entrance tickets to cultural and religious activities held at Buddhist temples, Daoist temples, mosques and churches. (5) Financial and administrative receipts and social organizations’ membership fees. (6) Revenues collected by non-profit scientific research institutions engaged in technological development, technology transfer and related consulting and technological services. 3.3.2. Value Added Tax Imported instruments and equipment directly used for scientific research, experiments and education are exempted from paying value added tax. Therefore, civil organizations importing the products above may also enjoy this preferential tax policy. 3.3.3. Customs Tax Chinese tax law states that uncompensated donations from foreign governments or organizations are exempt from import customs taxes. 3.4. Other Tax Preferences 3.4.1. Housing Tax China provides relatively advantageous housing tax exemptions and reductions to civil organizations. The Interim Regulations on Housing


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Tax《房产税暂行条例》exempt three types of civil organizations from paying housing tax: (1) Housing used by State institutions, people’s groups and the military. People’s groups (人民团体) refers to civil organizations approved, set up and registered by government offices authorized to do so by the State Council whose administrative and project expenses are paid by the State. (2) Housing used by units receiving project funding from State financial and administrative departments. Housing belonging to and self-used by work units under differential budget management regimes (差额预算管理). For units whose expenses were paid directly by State financial and administrative departments but that switch to a self-receive-self-pay system (自收自支), from the time of the switch, they are exempted from the housing tax for three years. Self-used housing refers to housing used by the units for their own work. In light of the exemption for units whose expenses are covered by the State, buildings used by enterprise-run schools, hospitals, child-care centers and kindergartens are also exempted. (3) Housing self-used for religious temples, parks and historical sites. Religious temple self-used housing refers to buildings used for religious ceremonies and living quarters within the temple for religious personnel. Park and historical site self-used housing refers to buildings provided for public visits and sight-seeing and the offices used by the units managing them. 3.4.2. City and Township Land Use Tax The primary exemptions from the city and township land use tax for civil organizations apply to the following: (1) land self-used by State institutions, people’s groups and the military. People’s groups (人民团体) refers to civil organizations approved, set up and registered by government offices authorized to do so by the State Council whose administrative and project expenses are paid by the State. Self-used land refers to land used by these units for offices and official duties. (2) Land used by units receiving project funding from State financial and administrative departments, which refers to work units whose expenses are paid by State financial and administrative departments and who use either differential budget management regimes (差额预算管理) or holistic budget management (全额预算管理) regimes. It does not include units on self-receive-self-pay or self-profit-loss systems (自收自支, 自负盈亏). Self-used land refers to land used by the units for their own work. Furthermore, land used for enterprise-run schools, hospitals, child-care centers and kindergartens is very different from that used by other enterprises. In light of the exemption for units whose

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expenses are covered by the State, these enterprises are also exempted from the land use tax. As to whether schools, hospitals, child-care centers and kindergartens run by collectives or individuals, the decision is left to tax bureaus at the provincial, autonomous regional and sub-State municipality levels. (3) Land self-used for religious temples, parks and historical sites. Religious temple self-used land refers to that used for religious ceremonies and living quarters within the temple for religious personnel. Religious temples means si (寺), miao ( ), gong (宫), guan (观), churches and other types of religious activity facilities. Park and historical site self-used land refers to that provided for public visits and sight-seeing and that beneath offices used by the units administering those sites. (4) Land self-used by non-profit medical, disease control, and women’s health institutions; government departments and enterprises, work units, social organizations, and individuals investing in and starting up non-profit elderly care, service, and benefits institutions or non-profit scientific research institutions; and enterprisefounded schools, child-care centers, kindergartens and public-interest youth centers for extracurricular activities is all exempted from the land use tax. For-profit medical service institutions using their revenues directly for the improvement of medical and hygienic conditions are also exempted from land use taxes for three years from the date of their business registration. 3.4.3. Land Appreciation Tax Real estate owners or possessors of land use rights who donate real estate rights or land use rights to NPOs many enjoy tax exemptions. 3.4.4. Tax on Occupation of Arable Land Schools, kindergartens, homes for the elderly, funeral homes, crematoriums and other NPOs using arable land are exempt from the tax on occupation of arable land. 3.4.5. Contract Tax Work units and social organizations holding land or buildings used for administrative, educational, medical or scientific purposes are exempt from the contract tax. 3.4.6. Stamp Tax Data produced from the donation of assets from an asset owner to a social benefits unit or school are exempt from the stamp tax.


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3.4.7. Vehicle Purchase Tax China’s tax regulations do not offer civil organizations any special exemption for the purchase of vehicles; the Tax Law however, states that vehicles self-produced, received through donation or in other ways attained by the tax paying person should be assessed, for tax purposes, according to the lowest calculated tax value (“按照最低计税价格核定”). 3.4.8. Vehicle and Vessel Tax Provincial, autonomous regional and sub-State municipal People’s governments may, according to the actual situation, offer regular tax reductions or tax exemptions for city and rural public transportation vehicles and vessels. 4. Civil Organizations’ Information Disclosure System: Establishment and Reforms Information disclosure is the best way for civil organizations to establish credibility and it is also a flexible administrative method. Starting in 2005, administrators of civil organizations, based on the experiences of organizations abroad, aggressively explored civil organizational information disclosure and garnered invaluable experience. They began by targeting foundation information disclosure and implemented a series of systemic mechanisms. Currently, all of society, even all of the world, can, through designated media outlets and networks, see the transparent state of China’s foundations. It could be said that foundation information disclosure mechanisms have been extremely successful, even a milestone in the history of civil organizations. 4.1. An Outline of the System In order to prevent foundation-related “public-interest scandals” and “public-interest corruption” and increase social supervision, Article 36 of the Regulations on Foundation Administration《基金会管理条例》 (issued March 8, 2004) states, “foundations and representative institutions of foundations abroad must, before March 31st of each year, submit to the registration office a Work Report for the previous year for annual inspection. The Annual Work Report must be examined and approved by the work supervising unit responsible for the foundation before it can

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be passed on to the registration and administration office responsible for the foundation.” Article 38 states, “After they pass the annual inspection by the responsible registration and administration office, the Annual Work Reports of foundations and representative institutions of foundations abroad must be published through media designated by the responsible registration office and undergo social and public examination and supervision.” In accordance with the Regulations on Foundation Administration, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the Measures on Foundation Annual Inspection and the Measures on Foundation Information Disclosure. Subsequently, the Ministry issued a Public Notice Concerning Foundations’ 2005 Annual Inspections and mandated that the China Philanthropy Times 《公益时报》and the China Society News《中国社会报》as the media in which foundations’ Annual Work Reports would be published. 4.1.1. Regulations from the Measures on Foundation Annual Inspections《基金会年度检查办法》 The content of the Annual Work Reports to be submitted by foundations and representative institutions of foundations abroad must include: a financial accounting report, a registered accountant’s audit report, a report of fundraising, donations aid receipt activity and changes in personnel and structure. The content of the financial accounting report must meet the standards of the Civil Organizations Accounting System. The registered accountant’s audit report must be processed according to unified standards by a registered accounting firm and a contract of engagement must be signed between the firm and the foundation being audited. Fundraising, donations and aid receipt activity should be reported when the foundation completes its information disclosure. Changes in personnel and structures should be accompanied by reports including modifications processed according to the relevant regulations, minutes from the year-end leadership handover meeting, and a summary of the financial audit performed before formal replacement of the foundation legal person. As part of the annual inspection report process, the registration and administration office may require supplementary explanations or materials of foundations, representative institutions of foundations abroad or related persons concerning questions in the Annual Work Report, and may also, if necessary, conduct on-site inspections. Should a foundation or representative institution of a foundation abroad fail to participate in the annual inspection without a proper


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reason, the registration and administration office must order its shutdown and report the matter to society. After completion of the annual inspection, the registration and administration office must publicize the results of the inspections and communicate them directly to the work supervising units. After passing the registration office’s annual inspection, foundations and representative offices of foundations abroad should publish their Annual Work Reports through the designated media and undergo social, public examination and supervision. 4.1.2. Regulations from the Measures on Foundation Information Disclosure《基金会信息公布办法》 Information disclosure refers to the act of foundations, or representative institutions of foundations abroad, publicizing their internal information or work and activity information to society through the media in accordance with the Regulations and its Measures. Foundations or representative institutions of foundations abroad are the obligators responsible for disclosure of this information. These obligators are responsible for seeing that the information and materials disclosed are true, accurate, full, and are not misrepresentations, misleading, or contain major omissions. These obligators must guarantee that donors and society at large can quickly and conveniently read and copy the disclosed information and materials. Pieces of information that must be disclosed to society include: the Annual Work Report of the foundation or representative institution of a foundation abroad and information about public funding foundations’ fundraising activities and public-interest project aid activities. Foundations may, on the basis of abiding by the regulations in the Measures, decide to disclose more information. The obligators must submit an Annual Work Report to their registration offices before March 31 of each year. After 30 days of examination by the registration offices, the obligators must, according to a standardized format, be responsible for seeing that their Reports’ full text and abstracts are published in the media designated by their registration offices. Obligators’ financial accounting reports may not be publicized before they are audited. After organizing public funding activities, foundations must draft public-interest activity plans and specific plans for the funds. While the fundraising activity is underway, funds raised and expenditures related to the public-interest activities should be reported in a timely fashion.

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After the activity concludes, the final count of donations received and the state of their use should be disclosed. When foundations run public-interest aid projects, they should publicize the type of public-interest project and the processes for application and review. After the conclusion of reviews, the results should be disclosed and all applicants notified. After completion of the aid projects, uses of funds should be disclosed. Project evaluations should be conducted after the fact and their results disclosed. If, in the process of publicizing information through the media, information has had, or could have, negative effects on the obligator, then that party must openly explain and clear up any questions. Besides the Annual Work Report, the organization may also choose to release information in periodicals, broadcasts, television or the Internet. The media chosen should be able to cover an area approximate to the area in which the organization conducts activities. The information disclosed should also introduce basic information about the organization and include contact or inquiry information. The obligator should set up a strong internal system for information disclosure and should appoint a person or persons to be responsible for information disclosure work. Information already disclosed should be archived and well-kept. Disclosure of information should continue until the relevant activity concludes or the project is completed. After information is disclosed, the obligator must not willfully change it; should there be any changes, the organization should adhere to strict internal management procedures and re-publicize the information with an explanation of the reasons, and make clear that the original information is invalid. Obligators must accurately reflect their activities in their Annual Work Reports and undergo supervision and examination by their registration and administration offices. Registration and administration offices must supervise and administer the information disclosed according to the law and establish a record of the veracity of obligators’ information disclosures. Should a party obligated to disclose information fail to do so or disclose false information, the situation must be corrected by its registration and administration office and punishment should be meted out according to Article 42 of the Regulations.


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4.2. An Itemized List of Information to be Disclosed by Foundations 4.2.1. Basic Information Foundation name, registration certificate number, organization code, work scope, foundation type (public funding or non-public funding), industrial type, date of establishment, initial fund amount, work supervising unit, foundation location, postal code, contact telephone number, email, fax number, website name, website URL, board chairperson, secretary general, total number of directors, total number of supervisors, number of leading persons, total number of directors currently serving in joint positions in the government, number of directors who have served in leadership positions at the provincial bureau level or higher, the numbers of affiliated institutions and representative institutions, publications, publicly-circulated publications, number of full-time employees, number of Party members, status of Party-building, party branches, the number of volunteers and volunteer hours contributed. 4.2.2. The Status of Internal Building (1) Status of projects registered, filed, and run in the current year and of the board of directors Whether modifications have been made to the name, location, work scope, original fund size, legal representative, work supervising unit, foundation type, mission, articles of incorporation, director, a representative institution, an affiliated institution’s name, or a representative institution or an affiliated institution’s location, work scope, or director. The number of board meetings mandated in the articles of incorporation, the number of board meetings actually held in the current year. (2) The System for Internal Building Whether or not there are systems for managing affiliated (representative) institutions, for managing official documents and chops, for protecting legal representative certificates, for protecting chops, for managing employees and human resources. The number of fulltime employees with employment contracts. The number of full-time employees with unemployment, retirement, work-related injury and maternity insurance. Banks at which the organization has RMBdenominated accounts, the account numbers. Banks at which the

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organization has foreign currency-denominated accounts, the account numbers. Whether or not finance and tax registrations have been completed. Which of the following types of receipts are used: administrative work receipts, membership receipts, donation receipts, tax receipts, or other. Names of financial personnel, positions, whether or not they have accounting certificates, and their specialization and technical credentials. (3) The basic status of affiliated, representative, special purpose foundation, and work institutions, including the number of each registered, the number nullified, and their total number. If operational entities had been established, their names, legal representatives or directors, industrial and commercial bureau classification type, total funds and total funds disbursed. 4.2.3. Current Status of Public-Interest Activities Funds received, aid given and the cash value of donated material. The number of projects for which aid was provided in the current year and the amounts of associated expenditures. Total revenues for the previous year, current year total expenditures, expenditures on public-interest work in the current year, expenditures for employee wages and benefits, administrative expenses, and an explanation of public-interest expenses. Report on the status of current year public-interest activities. (4) Financial accounting report Primary content includes: balance sheet, activities ledger and cash flow sheet (5) Audit reports (6) Supervisory opinions (7) Other information

CHAPTER FIVE

REFORMS TO CIVIL ORGANIZATION INTERNAL GOVERNANCE Huang Haoming Following civil organizations’ rapid rise, civil organization internal governance has become a topic of great concern. Looking back over 30 years of China’s Reform and Opening, civil organizations have been through a process of transformation from a hazy form into a clear framework. 1. A Brief History of Civil Organizations’ Governance Structures Civil organization governance has undergone radical changes in the last 30 years. After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP, in which economic development, through the Reform and Opening, was chosen as the central governing strategy of China, economic development and society building underwent sweeping changes. At the same time, civil organization governance, subject to influences from the political, legal, economic, international, social and cultural environments, also underwent many changes. Professor Li Junru (李君如), the Vice-President of the CCP Central Party School and Member of the National Political Consultative Conference believes that changes in the political environment have taken place quietly, and that this lack of conspicuous propaganda is a brilliant piece of the CCP’s governing strategy.1 Objectively speaking, without changes in the political environment, there can be no changes in the environments in which China’s economy, laws, society, and civil

邓敏/Deng Min, “中央党校副校长称我国政改不能着急”/“zhong yang dang xiao fu xiao zhang cheng wo guo zheng gai bu neng zhao ji”, (Internet: 中国新闻网/zhong guo xin wen wang, 2008.3.6.). (“Vice President of the Central Party School Says China’s Political Reforms Cannot be Hasty”) 1

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organizations develop. Changes in civil organization internal governance can be divided into three periods. 1.1. Restored Development Phase In this period, lasting for ten years from 1978 to 1988, the influence of the political environment dominated. Due to the direction and policies of the Reform and Opening, public consciousness of social participation strengthened all around. Enthusiasm for forming associations rose to at an unprecedented peak; all kinds of civil organizations sprung up left and right; and a civil organization system of an initial scale gradually formed.2 According to the materials at our disposal, the restored development phase demonstrated three main characteristics: 1.1.1. Party and State leaders devoted great attention to the restoration of a large number of prestigious, storied academic social groups and participated in starting up all kinds of public-interest foundations. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping and eight other Central comrades restored the China Association of Agriculture Science Societies (中国农学会) and eight other academic social groups whose activities had been interrupted for a time during the Cultural Revolution.3 For example, of the 26 foundations of nationwide scale founded in the six short years from 1981 to 1987, nearly all had the sponsorship and participation of State leaders. 1.1.2. A free association phenomenon was extremely pronounced. Today’s Beijing Knitting Industry Association, for example, was formed voluntarily by several enterprises in 1985, was stopped for a time for various reasons, and then was reestablished on September 2, 1989.4 The Central Government did not appoint any specific department to be responsible for the registration and administration offices. On November 17, 1984, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council issued strict controls on the establishment of nationwide-scale 2 中国社团研究会/China Social Groups Research Association, 中国社团发展史/zhongguo she tuan fa zhan shi, (Beijing: dang dai zhongguo chu ban she, 2002). (A History of China’s Social Groups). 3 中国农学会网站/China Association of Agricultural Science & Scholarship website, (2008). 4 北京针织行业协会网站/Beijing Knitting Industry Association webpage, (http:// biz.icxo.com/htmlnews/2005/08/17/650103.htm, 2008).

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organizations. In 1986 and 1987, the “Anti-Capitalist Class Liberalization” political movement was launched. 1.1.3. Continuation of government administrative methods. This was primarily manifest as a large number of social groups that, when forming, relied closely on government leaders, prominent persons, and government offices. Their institutional designs, personnel and staffing and activities mimicked those offices’ administrative practices; some groups even adopted the administrative hierarchies of those offices, dividing themselves into ministry-level (部级), bureau-level (厅局级), subbureau office-level (处级) and sub-office department-level (科级) social groups and appointing administrative cadres to each of those levels. The honorary chairs of the 26 nationwide-scale foundations were all Party and government officials at the time, while the groups’ leading executives were all important officials, famous personages or members of leaders’ families. Taking Zhejiang Province as an example, of 441 province-wide social groups, 310, or 70%, had Party and government leaders serving concurrently as their main directors. 24% of all directors were provincial-level officials (24%), while 206 were bureau-level officials (46%). Some officials took on several or even ten or more concurrent positions in social groups, resulting in more social activities and matters than they could possibly attend to. The homogeneity of civil organizations’ forms and the overburdening of officials with civil organizational functions resulted in a lack of agency in organization decision-making, a lack of dynamism, no governance to speak of, and a failure to produce the results these organizations had projected.5 1.2. Rules and Regulations Phase This phase lasted ten years, from 1988 to 1998. Creation of rules and regulations impacted the political, legal, international and economic environments, and, in aggregate, resulted in a very complicated period. It is common knowledge that the single event with the greatest impact in the political environment was the Tian’anmen Square disturbance around June 4, 1989. That event proved to be a turning point in the history of civil organizations as well. 1988 was the year that registration and administration of civil organizations was brought under

5

China Social Groups Research Association, A History of China’s Social Groups, 705.

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centralized and specialized management, “therefore, we must hasten to draft laws on news publishing, associations, gatherings, and travel; establish a system for people’s appeals; let people’s rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution receive protections; and, at the same time and according to law, stop abuses of powers and freedoms.”6 After the 13th Central Committee Meetings, the Central Committee officially entrusted the Ministry of Civil Affairs with making legislative recommendations for associations. Changes in the legal environment began with research of associations laws. The Ministry of Civil Affairs set up an “associations law drafting small group”, began surveying and investigating the state of associations, sought the opinions and needs of related departments and associations themselves, and, on a foundation of deep research and broad canvassing for opinions, drafted the PRC Associations Law《中华人民共和国结社法》. However, consensus on the main issues of association legislation remained elusive. In 1988, amidst organizational reforms in the State Council, it was again declared that the function of administering social groups should be given to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and that the Ministry should be authorized to set up a social group administration department (司). This accelerated the pace of association legislation. Within a year, in October of 1989, the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration《社会团体登记管理条例》(hereafter, the “’89 Regulations”) were issued by the State Council after nine drafts and many revisions. The ’89 Regulations ordered that after being approved by a work supervising unit (业务主管部门) and being registered with a Ministry of Civil Affairs office, that social groups’ work and daily administration would be guided by their respective work supervising units. This “dual-administration system” would persist, from 1989 to the present, for almost 20 years without significant changes. During the same period, the main changes in the economic environment were represented by Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern Tour and the CCP Central Committee’s choice and establishment of a socialist market economic system. In 1995, the UN’s Fourth World Women’s Conference was held in Beijing, a feat closely related to China’s growing international influence. Meanwhile, the ’89 Regulations, 1989’s

6 “中国共产党第十三次代表大会工作报告”/“zhongguo gong chan dang di shi san ci dai biao da hui gong zuo bao gao” (1987.10). (“Chinese Communist Party Thirteenth National Congress Work Report”)


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Measures on Foundation Administration and 1989’s Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce, all either maintained the dual-administrative system or even resulted in multi-administrative systems.7 In these ten years, civil organization governance could be said to still be in the germination phase. 1.3. Diverse Development Phase This phase has lasted from 1998 to 2008 and has spanned deep changes in the political, economic, legal and social environments. In the political environment, the main effects of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on civil organization governance were directed at the main leaders of civil organizations and strengthened the dual-administration system. One aspect of this was the introduction of the principle of separation of government and social group leadership in accordance with the “Notice Concerning Departmental Leaders and Comrades Not Taking Joint Positions in Social Groups”, issued by the State Council in 1994, and the “Notice Concerning Party and Government Leaders and Cadres Not Holding Joint Leadership Positions in Social Groups” issued in 1998 by the General Offices of the Central Party and the State Council. The recognition and attention devoted to civil organization work by the CCP Central Committee was unprecedented. Regulations on civil organizations’ incubation, development, supervision and administration came out of each of the Third to the Sixth Plenary Sessions of the Sixteenth Party Central Committee. In the Seventh Session, most importantly of all, the new concept of social organizations was introduced and their development and directions for their administration further clarified. Put simply, the shift from civil organizations to the use of social organizations has, within the context of China’s social and economic transformations, important strategic and historical significance and has had a deep impact on civil organization governance. There have been gradual legal improvements as well. These include 1999’s Public Interest Work Donations Law《公益事业捐赠法》and the new Enterprise Income Tax Law《企业所得税法》, passed in March of 2008 by the NPC. The new Tax Law adjusted the pre-tax

7 Personal Interview 003, State Bureau for Civil Organization Administration (国家民间组织管理局), 2008.

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enterprise donation deduction limit from 3% of tax due on annual profits to 12%; at the same time, it exempted the revenues of qualifying NPOs from tax liability. 1998’s Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration (hereafter, the “98 Regulations”) and 2004’s Regulations on Foundation Administration (hereafter, “Foundation Regulations”), both passed by the State Council, had special impacts on governance structures of social groups, people-run nonenterprise units, and foundations. 2004’s Foundation Regulations limited the size of Foundation boards to between 5 and 25 members. This made selection of board members painstaking for foundations.8 At the same time, the responsibilities and functions of board members were changed significantly. Zhu Weiguo (朱卫国) posits that separate arrangements can be made for board members who fall outside the size limit or who do not meet the conditions of the new regulations. For example, foundations can appoint honorary board members who do not participate directly in decision-making. Participation by too great a number of members in board decision-making is not helpful for the decision-making process or for the foundation’s operations. This way, responsibility for decisionmaking can fall to a specialized, fixed team.9 When the Fifth Board of the China Youth Development Foundation was formed in 2005, its ranks were reduced to 21 people; China Legal Aid Foundation’s board was reduced from 60 to 25;10 China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation’s was reduced from 102 to 21;11 China Children and Teenagers’ Fund’s, from 262 to 20;12 and the Shanxi Province Foundation for Poverty Alleviation’s, from 65 to 15.13

Personal Interview 004, Narada Foundation (南都基金会), 2008. Personal Interview 013, Ministry of Civil Affairs Legislative Office (国务院法制办公室), 2008. 10 Personal Interview 022, China Legal Aid Foundation (中国法律援助基金会), 2008. 11 Personal Interview 012, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (中国扶贫基金会), 2008. 12 Personal Interview 011, China Children and Teenagers’ Fund (中国儿童少年基金会), 2008. 13 山西省扶贫基金会网站/Shanxi Province Foundation for Poverty Alleviation website (http://www.sxfp.org.cn/zjh大事记.asp, 2008). 8 9


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2. Developments and Changes in Civil Organization Governance In the ten years from 1998 until today, civil organization governance has undergone a fundamental transformation. Although some of the features of the transformation were formed in their gestation period and although some parts of the transformation are superficial and have not yet come into contact with deeper problems, still, these parts are still extremely important to the transformation of civil organizations’ governance. Looking comprehensively at these developments, further consideration is rewarding. The main parts of the transformation can be seen in the following six areas: 2.1. Shift of Board Membership from Heterogeneity Toward Diversity and Specialization In the case of the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF), the structure of board membership underwent fundamental changes. A cursory look at the board’s role shows that it underwent a transformation from adorning to actually functioning.14 The regard in which the board was held also began quite shallow and gradually deepened. Below, the Foundation’s board size and structure, board responsibilities and functional structures are mapped from its foundation until the present. 2.1.1. Board Size and Structure In Table 5–1, we can see that that in Term 1, the Foundation’s board was empty, even almost non-existent. At the time, in the late 1980s, there was basically no legal footing for foundations; they did what Table 5–1: CYDF’s Board Size (units: persons)

No. of Board Members

Term 1 (?)

Term 2 (1994)

Term 3 (1997)

Term 4 (2001)

Term 5 (2005)

0

157

180

97

21

Source: CYDF

14 中国青少年发展基金会网站/China Children and Teenagers’ Fund website (http://www.cydf.org.cn/wmdlsh.asp?cc=55, 2008).

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they wanted and made their own decisions. For major decisions, they would report to the Communist Youth League Central Committee for approval. So as to the question of whether or not there was a board, there were no legal supervisions or controls, nor was there a real need for one. Terms 2 to 4 were inflated and void, with too many board members. Most board members were leaders or responsible persons from the Communist Youth League Central Committee (the foundation’s “work supervising unit”), donors, government officials, literature or sports stars, elites from enterprises, media upper managers, and members of the foundation’s operational system. The board seemed no more than an “ornament”; even the board themselves viewed it as an honorary and symbolic body. This was a period in which the board existed “in name only”. In 2002, during CYDF’s Term 4, the Foundation’s investment activities came under suspicion in the foreign media. In order to preserve the public interest, the Foundation’s acting board made a resolute decision, appearing, acquiescing, and reporting to the public at large, thereby avoiding a crisis of trust. The Foundation also learned, in the process, the irreplaceable value of civil organization boards, began imagining converting the formerly bloated and vacuous board into a true, representative decision-making body and set about researching a new governance structure.15 Table 5–2: Analysis of CYDF’s Boards, Terms 2 to5 (units: persons) Term 2 League Central Committee (Youth League) Government Social groups Foundation managers Provincial-level Youth League Committee members Provincial-level CYDF Enterprises Other TOTALS:

Term 3

Term 4

Term 5

4

4

2

2

20 9 4 34

26 16 9 34

9 13 10 1

2 3 2 0

0 33 53 157

10 26 55 180

5 18 39 97

1 5 6 21

Source: CYDF

15 Personal Interview 006, China Children and Teenagers’ Fund (中国青少年发展基金会), 2008.


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In Table 5–2, an analysis by professional and supervisory background shows that the board counted 4 from accounting/financial, 3 from business management, 8 from social work, 3 from broadcasting, 2 from education, 2 from social policy, and 1 from international relations backgrounds. This new term’s membership had more fitting professional backgrounds. Their degree of specialization increased markedly; their identification with the board strengthened; they had strong resources and professional experience; and 62% of them had served for more than two terms. In addition, three members of the board were foreign nationals. 2.1.2. Board Responsibilities It is a commonly held view that boards’ responsibilities are drafting and modifying articles of incorporation, selecting a board chair, examining work reports and financial projections and reports, and choosing and removing secretary generals. In the past, the board’s responsibilities, as defined in the Foundation’s articles, had been much the same as these. However, the Term 5’s board made significant changes to the scope of board responsibilities, mainly in the following areas: 2.1.2.1. Increased Scope. For example, “deciding organizational mission, strategy, and aims”; “deciding major work and activity plans, including plans for the raising, management and uses of funds. Deciding the financial operating principles, strategies, channels, and major investment projects”. 2.1.2.2. Increased Content. For example, in confirming annual financial projections and reports, the board added “supervising and appropriately controlling financial execution, selecting an independent accounting firm to conduct annual financial audits”; in the work report on consideration of secretary generals, the board added “inspecting the secretary general’s work, supporting the secretary general’s work and evaluating performance.” 2.1.2.3. Setting Concrete Standards. For example, “ensuring effective policies and that efficiency, process, value creation and error correction capability are manifest in the policy-making process”; “guaranteeing that the Foundation abides by laws, regulations and moral norms and is transparent and credible in order to avoid board and Foundation conflicts of interest”.

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In summary, the reduction in numbers of board members reflects maturation in civil organization governance. It was mainly a change in the political environment that played a decisive role and catalyzed specialization in the organization. 2.2. Changes and Developments in Board Culture Board members may raise suggestions regarding and take positions on agenda content and appraisals of work reports. In the case of the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, board members may also participate in the daily work of the institution and are responsible for guiding and participating in foundation work.16 The Foundation’s board members are a group with a depth of specialized knowledge, richness of practical experience, and a spirit of selfless contribution. In 2007, the majority of members guided their relative pieces of work personally, achieving excellent results and making outstanding contributions to the Foundation’s work. Board members participated personally in the Foundation’s project activities. In 2007, the Foundation’s activities focused on aid and advocacy projects. In some activities, you can directly see the effects of board members’ tireless efforts. Wang Guoliang (王国良), a board member and leader from the State Council’s Poverty Alleviation Office (the Foundation’s work supervising unit), remarkably optimized the effects of communication and coordination between civil organizations and government departments and facilitated powerful government policy support for the Foundation. After taking work at KPMG China, board member Xu Dan (徐丹) pressed for, and received a commitment from KPMG to raise its annual contributions to the New Great Wall Project from 200,000 yuan to 700,000 yuan. Board culture has also been an area of continual change. In 2007, the board of a professional civil organization with almost 20 years of experience was discussing the selection of a new secretary general. A candidate had been recommended by the board chair, but after interviews, when the time came to decide whether or not to offer the secretary general the position, the members were of varying opinions.

16 陈开枝/Chen Kaizhi, “理事会报告”/“li shi hui bao gao”, (中国扶贫基金会网站/China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation website, www.fupin.org.cn/ UserFiles/2004lishi.doc, 2008). (“Board Report”)


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Members used reasoned arguments concerning the pros and cons of selecting the candidate and, in the end, persuaded the board chair of their point of view and to continue the search for a more suitable candidate. In the meeting, board members described their reasons, tried to be pragmatic, and approached the issue out of a strong sense of responsibility, arguing heatedly. This is an embodiment of board culture. On March 10, 2007, the Shenzhen Watch Industry Association held its Tenth All-Members Meeting. Through democratic processes, they passed revisions to their articles of incorporation; furthermore, through a democratic vote, they selected a board for the Eleventh Term. The Association’s democratically-held meeting and evident reforms were fully affirmed by the Bureau Chief of the Shenzhen Bureau for Civil Organization Administration, Ge Ming (葛明).17 The rules of the Association are the basis for guaranteeing the formation of board culture and atmosphere.18 The Association further introduced fifteen rules, containing the board’s rights, responsibilities and duties. In 2008, in a working meeting with over one hundred standing board members, after hearing the secretary general’s work report, members challenged the secretary general on the institution’s personnel, organizational structure and finances. Although they did not receive answers to their satisfaction, it came as a great shock to the leaders of the board. In summary, changes and developments in board culture have had enormous impacts on civil organization governance. These internal and substantial shifts away from traditional reliance on government institutions and participation in superficial governance are, of course, inseparable from changes in the social environment. 2.3. Board Members: From Daily Administrators to Realizers of Values and Mission According to Xie Lihua (谢丽华), the board chair of the Beijing Rural Women Cultural Development Center, the value of civil organization governance is that within an organization, there is no body with Personal Interview 007, Shenzhen Municipal Bureau for Civil Organization Administration (深圳市民间组织管理局), 2008. 18 深圳市钟表行业协会网站/Shenzhen Watch Association website (http://szwa .ewatch.cn/body/council/Lshsz.aspx, 2008). 17

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higher authority than a board; the board has absolute responsibility for the civil organizations and must guarantee that the organization effectively and legally achieves its mission and reaches its goals.19 Without a board, there is no governance, and without governance, an institution cannot achieve sustainability. The era of innovation is an era of heroes; the role of the individual looms large. But the era of governance is an era of laws and procedures. The case of the Rural Women Cultural Development Center reflects changing values in governance.20 In March, 2007, the Center held its first meeting in Beijing. The board held a line-by-line discussion of its Administrative Articles of Incorporation of the Beijing Rural Women Cultural Development Center, and raised revisions. In the process of discussing the clauses, the board, with the law as their basis, deliberated earnestly, and in detail, every word choice. Amidst the contention, decision-makers displayed the rigorous, responsible, democratic, earnest attitude that a civil organization board can embody; the board truly played the role of “brain trust” for the organization. Xie Lihua feels that “from secretary general to board chair, this was not simply turning over positions; it was the completion of a transformation of Rural Women from administration to governance. It ended one era (if we take the founding to the era of heroes) and began a new era (an era of systematic governance). It indicated that there will be organizational protections for Rural Women’s sustainability and that Rural Women’s future is a bright one.” In the case of the Society of Entrepreneurs and Ecology (SEE, 阿拉善环保组织), their approach has been to make the board the core and exploit its strong ability as an integrator of resources and it ability to quickly mobilize social resources. The board’s practice of making decisions democratically by vote has attracted greater board member participation, while the board’s strength and democratic equality are beneficial both for internal balance and financial supervision. The board is not only the main decision-making body; it is also an administrative and executive entity. For this reason, too, SEE has been slow to develop a professional team.

Personal Interview 005, Beijing Rural Women Cultural Development Center (北京农家女文化发展中心), 2008. 20 Beijing Rural Women Cultural Development Center website, (http://www. nongjianv.org/web/Html/rwzx/2007-5/9/0509111857.html, 2008). 19


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From the conversation between the head of the Editorial Department of the Beijing Youth Daily, Zhang Tianwei (张天蔚) and SEE’s secretary general Yang Ping (杨平), we can see that the democratic process of civil organizations is a long one, needing realistic and feasible operational methods.21 Yang Ping feels that from the perspective of social democracy and legal development, regardless of what kind of democracy you are talking about, democracy is only possible when people are allowed to manage social affairs themselves. Thus, before democracy can be realized on a broader scope, citizens must learn democratic methods through small scale self-administration arrangements. In this process, civil organizations provide a platform for practice. The current weaknesses of civil organizations in the areas of selfgovernance and development capacity are due society’s weakness in self-governance. Even though the appeal of internal democracy within civil organizations is strong, they have not yet mastered scientific methods of governance. That is to say that there are still many problems with civil organizations’ development; much work remains in the areas of system- and culture-building. In today’s China, at the same time that people express dissatisfaction with their ability to participate in public affairs, they fail to recognize that building participatory ability is in itself a formidable task. In summary, in the process of developing civil organization governance, a “head-of-the-household system” (家长制) is inevitable, though it will result in unsustainability. Therefore, participation by many parts of society will change the bottlenecks of self-governance and self-development. 2.4. Board Meetings with Democratic Features, New Meeting Procedures China’s civil organizations are at different stages of development, vary widely by type, and have different needs for internal governance. In an interview with members of an academic social group with very a strong government background, it was discovered that the group’s board will sometimes veto recommendations for secretary general coming from

21 “NGO 组织　提供民主实践平台”/“NGO zu zhi ti gong min zhu shi jian ping tai,” in 北京青年报/bei jing qing nian bao (2008.5.3) (“NGOs Offer a Platform for Democracy in Practice” in Beijing Youth Daily online).

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its government work supervising unit.22 In elections in another board, the board denied the secretary general recommended by the previous board chair. This break from the pattern of work supervising units and closely-related units recommending leadership selections also represents a break from the pattern of boards as “rubber stamps”.23 As to new concepts of civil organization governance, Gao Xiaoxian (高小贤) says: “The Shaanxi Province Women’s Theory, Marriage, and Household Studies Association will opt for a soft landing!”24 On the one hand, there is development experience in China to refer to; on the other, boards need a development process. It doesn’t happen overnight. In the case of the Shaanxi Women’s Studies Association, several years ago, the group began organizing internal participation, democracy and sustainable women’s organization models—a series of internal system-building measures.25 Following the 1995 World Women’s Conference meeting in Beijing, the Shaanxi Women’s Studies Association had gained a certain understanding of civil organizations as well as a deeper understanding of feminism. Therefore, after the meeting, the Association made a major adjustment in their organization’s position; they shifted from being an organization focused purely on academic research and awarenessbuilding to one conducting action research and launching projects to serve women directly. Besides the strategic objective of being concerned with women, they were also concerned with the organization’s own development, hoping that the Association would become an organization of influence in policy, legislation and civil society. This reflected the two directions of the Association’s mission: promoting equality between the sexes and promoting the construction of civil society. The case of the China Computer Association is another worth considering.26 The following simple introduction has been assembled from an association reforms work report made by the Association Secretary 22 Personal Interview 008-01, China Association of Science and Technology (CAST) Scholarly Association and Academic Department (中国科学技术协会学会学术部), 2008. 23 Personal Interview 008-01, Ibid., 2008. 24 Personal Interview 009, Shaanxi Province Theory, Marriage and Household Women’s Studies Association (陕西省理论婚姻家庭妇女研究会), 2008. 25 陕西省理论婚姻家庭妇女研究会网站/ Shaanxi Province Theory, Marriage and Household Women’s Studies Association webpage (http://sxwf.nppcn.com/ profileSTATICblogname_sxwf, 2008). 26 中国计算机学会网站/China Computer Association website (http://www.ccf .org.cn/web/assembly/action/browsePage.do?channelID=2, 2008).


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General, Du Zide (杜子德) on July 4, 2008, as well as from various interviews.27 Beginning in 2006, in the interest of promotion social group development, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Chinese Association of Science and Technology (CAST) introduced plans for innovative reform trials. The China Computer Association was granted an opportunity to undertake general trial reforms and focused the trial on using internal governance to better manage its relationship with the Institute of Computing Technology, China Academy of Sciences. The trial met its projected aims. In April of 2008, in a reflection of the outcomes of the reforms, the Association successfully introduced a new board according to new internal rules. The 31 specialists appointed to the board were selected through an open competitive process, itself an important foundation of the 2008 reforms. The first chief issue in this case was the selection of member representatives. The Association’s representative meeting system, which had been in place for four years, was not a true representative meeting and was abolished as part of the reforms. Subsequently, in October of 2007, the group’s board announced that the new members’ general meeting would take the form of a standing committee of representatives serving four-year terms. Member representatives were selected from the base-level based on numbers of members. In the past, when the Association held members general meetings, they were led by an executive committee composed of the candidates of the executive board. This system was patently unfair. Now, the primary task is for the board to pass working regulations to form a board elections committee of 20 people specifically tasked with election work including confirmation of the credentials of board candidates according to eight types, which include candidates from higher education as well as Olympics candidates. To increase their objectivity, members of the elections committee may not, themselves, serve in any position. In summary, democratically-held meetings are the direction in which civil organization governance is moving. Leaders still play a decisive role; however, the mechanisms through which leaders are chosen are the key to the democratic process. Allowing for some interplay between internal factors and the external environment is the best choice.

27

Personal Interview 010, China Computer Association, 2008.

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2.5. Relationship Between Board Decisions and Participation in Implementation Going back in history, because the board chair of the China Youth Development Foundation had conventionally been filled by the currently-serving Communist Youth League Central Committee Party Secretary, the Foundation’s articles never specified the official powers of the its board chair or secretary general. When the State Council passed the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration in 1998, the Ministry of Civil Affairs also released a Standard Version of Social Group Articles of Incorporation《社会团体章程示范文本》. Because the Foundation was at the time still considered a social group, its Third Board, in its Second Session in 1999, made significant changes to the Foundation’s Articles in compliance with the Standard Version; in these changes, the official powers of the board chair and secretary general were defined for the first time. Because the board was without real operative powers, the definitions seemed very vague. In the system, the board was indisputably the first and last responsible body, but the issue was that there was no actual separation between the board’s legally-defined powers of decision and the powers and responsibilities of the government as the Foundation’s work supervising unit. In order to resolve this issue of overlapping powers, the Foundation added a process in which “candidates for board chair shall be nominated by the League Central Committee; decisions shall be made by board vote” into their Articles. That is to say that the board chair, as representative of the League Central Committee, shall participate in the board, but the chair only holds one vote. The chair has only one vote in the board, so the Articles also proceeded to define the powers of the secretary general. Those powers were stated to be “implementing policies formulated by the board, and being responsible for completing the work targets and tasks given by the board”; “implementing work development plans and major projects”; “developing and supporting client interaction and continued cooperation”; “striving to meet the Foundation’s financial goals”; “concretely taking on responsibility for asset management”; “choosing enthusiastic working personnel who have specialized knowledge”; and “taking responsibility for communicating with the board, cooperating with the board chair and the executive committee board vice-chair, and implementing information-sharing across the Foundation.” The process for a board decision can be summarized thusly: basic opinion introduced by the secretariat→general secretary and the board interact→board specialist small group research→board decision. There


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are two points of interaction in process. One is between the secretary general and the board; the other is between the board’s specialist small group and specialist groups in the secretariat and the secretary general. In reality, these two links are extremely important. On the one hand, they represent points of exchange and knowledge sharing; on the other, they reflect mutual respect between the secretariat, the board and the League Central Committee. It is on the basis of both that consensus for cooperation is reached. In traditional Chinese social groups, the secretary general is not only the institution’s leader and legal representative; he is also the lead executive coordinating implementation of the work and has some relationship with the board. The new model for the trust arrangement between the board and the secretary general is a contractual arrangement based on a hiring system. Behind a hiring system, the board must form a compensation committee to decide standards for the secretary general’s annual salary. Let’s consider the case of a Shanghai industry association offering wages for the hiring of a secretary general.28 In late April of 2003, the Shanghai Human Resources Consulting Association tossed out a “ball of silk strips”, the offer 150,000 yuan annual salary, in an open search for a secretary general. As soon as the news was published, qualified applicants came in swarms. As of May 17, 2003, 86 candidates had been introduced through their networks or had applied independently; of those, more than one-third had master’s degrees. Through evaluations, trial lectures, and expert reviews, the Association’s executive board finally chose a candidate for secretary general. The Association, launched in April of 2002, was the first remodeled, human resource intermediary industry social organization to appear at the local level. Its sources of funds and personnel are all managed using “socialized-non-governmental” (社会化) methods. Its offering 150,000/year in an open search to attract “management experts” was an event that attracted a great deal of attention. The Association’s board chair, Lu Min (陆珉) feels that as the government functionalities shift, industry associations will begin serving more and more industry service functions.29 However, currently many industry associations have not completely cast off their “government 陆一波/Lu Yibo, “15 万年薪招‘管家’ ”/“15 wan nian xin zhao ‘guan jia’”, in 解放日报/jie fang ri bao (2003.6.12.). (“150,000 Yuan/Year to Attract ‘Management Experts’ ” in Jie Fang Daily). 29 Ibid. 28

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flavor” and have still not begun providing functional service as a social intermediary. The gatekeepers still tend to be white-haired elders active only part-time in association work; under these conditions, it’s difficult for these groups to provide substantial industry services. After a year of operations, although the Association had made certain achievements in industry services and coordination, member units hoped for still more effective services like resource integration, operational standards and increased exchanges. In order to meet these goals, the Association would need a highly professional service team and use incentives structures (“pick the champion steeds at the racetrack”) to more effectively serve members. As for the secretary general chosen through an open search, the Association checked him using performance management mechanisms, thereby increasing operational effectiveness and stimulating the healthy development of the whole industry. Today, with a pattern of “small government, big society” gradually coming into view, industry associations have decreased their reliance on the government, taken on more responsibilities, and begun to play the role they should. After China’s accession to the WTO, industry associations have made visible contributions in the areas of advocating for the interests of their colleagues, improving industry self-discipline and promoting exchange with international players in their industries. It has become necessary to attract young professionals to join industry associations in order to promote their development. In summary, the process of taking board intentions off of the page and into reality depends on the responsibilities and separation of powers between boards and secretaries general. Increasing the openness and transparency of rules and the professionalism and specialization of personnel are two new directions. 2.6. Effective Channels for Changing Governance Structures The China Association for NGO Cooperation is a nationwide, NPO, federated voluntarily established and independent social group legal person.30, 31 In the sixteen years from 1992 to 2008, the Association

30 中国国际民间组织合作促进会网站/China Association for NGO Cooperation website, (http://www.cango.org/newweb/jianjie.asp, 2008). 31 “中国国际民间组织合作促进会2007年度报告”/“zhongguo guo ji min jian zu zhi he zuo cu jin hui 2007 nian du bao gao” (2008). (“China Association for NGO Cooperation 2007 Work Report”)


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underwent constant reforms in internal governance and accumulated valuable experience. Practice with governance structures revealed that there are many, diverse ways for governance to be effective. The Association’s approached to reforms can be summarized in three main themes: change, action and system-building. 2.6.1. Change from unit-dependent to autonomous board collective decision-making. The Association’s development has proceeded in step with the Reform and Opening. Under the support of the United Nations Development Programme, in 1984 an international civil organizational cooperation working group visited four European nations in search of research on feasibility and to explore channels for cooperation. In the five years from 1993 to 1998, the Association had two governing bodies with ambiguous powers. Its internal governance reflected the administrative practices of work units; unit leaders at the Exchange Center were to carry out the major decisions of the board, which resulted in unit-style administration.32 In 1998, however, when the State Council issued the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration, the Association seized the opportunity to register anew, strengthening the board system and shifting decision-making from the unit with which they registered to its own, autonomous board. 2.6.2. Diversity in board membership. As a normal social group organization, the key to board governance is the composition of board membership. Only a diverse and specialized board can assure that board governance will be scientific. The Association’s board gradually shifted from being dominated by members from the Exchange Center to being diversified. The Association’s board has 23 members, among which Exchange Center appointees have four seats (17.4%). Seven board members are female, or 30.4%, almost one-third; seven are from local or county-level civil organizations (30.4%); and four are from minority regions (17.4%). At the same time, specializations and representatives from international donor organizations were also considered. Because the membership represents different interest groups, the board is able to draw from different suggestions and opinions

32

Personal Interview 016, China Association for NGO Cooperation, 2008.

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when faced with major decisions. It can also hear members’ sincere criticisms.33 2.6.3. Separation of decision-making and implementation; clarification of the rights and responsibilities of the board and the implementing team representatives. The Association’s secretary general reports to the executive board quarterly on the state of current work and presents major projects and cooperative partnerships under consideration to the board for discussion and decisions. Thus, the executive board meets four times per year, while the all-members board or representative board meets once per year to review the annual progress of the Association’s work. The Association also established a board rewards funds in order to reward members of the operations team showing outstanding performance, encourage on the part of the operations team and ensure that decisions by the board can be effectively carried out. 2.6.4. Increase transparency in governance. Starting in 1999, the Association has conducted annual financial audits, hiring independent auditors to look at the Association’s financial work. Implementation of strict auditing systems has ensured normal governance and clear improvements in executive capacity. At the same time, the Association has reported historical cases of financial irregularities to the membership and society. This is also a warning bell for currently-serving staff that the Association must be run according to the requirements of law and norms. 2.6.5. Board members’ participation in and influence on decisionmaking. With China’s economic development, international institutions and organizations have changed their policies on aid to China. Association board member Zhang Jianyu (张建宇) introduced the idea of actively responding to these changes.34 At the end of 2006, the Association established an International Department and a Research Department. The first is tasked with expanding international cooperation on reduction of agricultural greenhouse gas emissions, developing

33 “China Association for NGO Cooperation Work Report” (http://www.cango .org/newweb/jianjie-niandubaogao1.asp, 2006). 34 Personal Interview 018, Environmental Defense Fund (美国环保协会), 2008.


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environmental protection laws, promoting environmental awareness and education, emissions credits trading, and popular participation. The second is tasked with researching improvements in civil organization governance, evaluation and self-discipline. In summary, civil organization governance is connected with the experiences of international organizations and civil organizations in the aspect of governance. The democratization of the functions now held by affiliated unit leaders is pivotal. Without the support of those leaders, it will be very difficult to conduct internal reforms of civil organizations. 3. Content of Civil Organization Governance Structures There currently exists no standard form for civil organization governance. There are conventions and norms, however, that can serve as a system for administration and controls. Confirming the status of the board (or members general meeting), the operational team and board members as the highest decision-makers in the organization, as well as effectively separating responsibilities and powers between the three and other stakeholders, will help decision-makers, executives and supervisors fulfill their duties and check one another, and will assure that the organization can operate normally. As to civil organization governance, each has his own opinion and different scholars hold unique views. Kang Xiaoguang (康晓光) feels that in the West the board is the main mechanism for NGOs’ internal governance. The board represents society’s interests, and with the highest deciding powers in the organization, can also guarantee that the NGO’s behavior is responsible to society. But this mechanism does not exist in China. Generally speaking, from Government-Organized NGOs to grassroots NGOs, none have genuine boards.35 Deng Guosheng (邓国胜) feels that the vast majority of China’s social groups were formed by the government, not by society. When a social group is founded by a government department, it is left connected to 丽莎·乔丹; 康晓光等译/Li sha qiao dan (Lisa Jordan), ed.; Kang Xiaoguang, et al., trans., 非政府组织问责：政治、原则与创新/fei zheng fu zu zhi wen ze: zheng zhi, yuan ze yu chuang xin, (Beijing: zhong guo ren min da xue chu ban she, 2008) 133. (NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations) 35

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that department as if by countless threads. In some cases, the NGO and government department are in fact the same group of people wearing two different hats. While it may appear that NGO responsible persons were chosen by election, in fact they are usually appointed by government departments. Some NGOs are without their own, independent financial accounts and their finances remain in government hands. Some NGOs are without with the autonomy to launch their own activities; decisions of what activities and how to launch them are made based on the views of NGOs’ work supervising units.”36 Qiu Changtai (丘昌泰) feels that government guides NPO activities to the point that NPOs lack independence. Especially in the Mainland, party-government departments have strong powers to control and guide NGOs and administrative interference is frequent. This has resulted in volunteer organizations’ current lack of independence and strong reliance on party-government departments. Therefore, some feel that Mainland China’s civil organizations can be called a “third sector”, apart from the government and enterprises.37 Most civil organizations registered with government departments have problems with separations. They lack separations between the government and social groups; work supervising units and social groups; Party (and Women’s Federation or Communist Youth League) and social groups; and enterprises and social groups (or foundations). For this reason, many social groups have become the resting places for laid-off (下岗) government personnel; objectively speaking, this has resulted in civil organizations’ irregular developments.38 Empirical research has shown that in Mainland China, government participatory-type and dispersed-type governance structures are most common. Internationally, the four most common structures include secretary-led, board chair-led, employee-led and collectively-led

36 邓国胜/Deng Guosheng, 民间组织评估体系：理论、方法与指标体系/min jian zu zhi ping gu ti xi: li lun, fang fa yu zhi biao ti xi, (Beijing: bei jing da xue chu ban she, 2007) 35. (Evaluation Systems for Civil Organizations: Theory, Methods and Indicator Systems) 37 丘昌泰/Qiu Changtai, 非营利部门研究：治理、部门互动与社会创新/fei ying li bu men yan jiu: zhi li, bu men hu dong yu she hue chuang xin, (Taipei: zhi sheng wen hua, 2007) 69. (NPO Sector Research: Governance, Cross-Sector Interactions and Social Innovations) 38 黄浩明/Huang Jieming, 非营利组织战略管理/fei ying li zu zhi zhan lue guan li, (Beijing: zhong guo ren minda xue chu ban she, 2003) 143. (Strategic Management of NGOs)


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governance types. (Middleton–Stone 1991; Herman and Heimovics 1990; Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin 1992)39 In China, the most prominent type is the government participatory-type of organizational governance. This is expressed mostly as industry associations, or so-called government-led civil organizations. Specifically, this can be seen in the specific makeup of current boards, the selections for secretary general and financial funding and support. Personnel are also given compensation according to the standards for public servants. The finest examples are the 33 civil organizations that have been exempted from registration by the State Council. In terms of governance structures, another form, dispersed-type governance is also quite common. This a form in which the board, secretary general, supervisory board, affiliated institutions, operational offices and the board chair are all dispersed in their work and administration and are without a guiding body. To take the China Association of Science and Technology (CAST) as an example, its work supervising academic, general and research associations, number 191, and are divided into theoretical (理), industrial (工), agricultural (农), and medical (医) types. Its branch institutions number 3400 nationally; it boasts over 5 million members; and it has 2100 full- and part-time employees.40 Simply calculating, on average each branch institution has 17.8 employees. In such an enormous and complex web of scientific work, we can see four prominent characteristics: the first is multiple disciplines. The second is reliance on multiple kinds of units; some rely on government departments, some on research institutes, some on industry associations, enterprises, or no one at all. Third is branch many branches; due to the rapid development of technology, branches of science and technology are gradually splitting. Fourth is that the association’s administration is quite loose. In most cases, the secretary general-led type only appears in civil organizations of large scale and relatively long histories. In such types the secretary general collects information from various stakeholders, then introduces ideas and formulates policies; the board (or members 39 J. Steven Ott, Understanding Nonprofit Organizations: Governance, Leadership, and Management, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001) 1, 11. 40 民政部民间组织管理局/Ministry of Civil Affairs Bureau of Civil Organization Administration, “文件资料汇编”/“wen jian zi liao hui bian”, in 全国社会组织建设与管理工作经验交流会/quan guo she hui zu zhi jian she yu guan li gong zuo jing yan jiao liu hui, (2008.1) 58. (“Compilation of Documents and Materials” in National Experience Exchange Meeting on Building and Administering Social Organizations)

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general meeting) for its part is sometimes no more than a rubber stamp with passage and approval no more than a formality. Organizations led by board chairs tend to be small, less experienced, and volunteer-led civil organizations. The board chair serves as decision-maker and controller for management and is also head of operations, while the secretary general’s duties are focused on structural and institutional service.41 Organizations led by employees are usually found in specialized, professor-type bureaucratic systems such as universities and hospitals. Some group of core specialists (like doctors or professors) has strong decision-making powers in the institution, while boards and secretary generals are no more than superficial voters. This type is also prevalent in doctor, lawyer, accountant and engineer associations. Collectively-led civil organizations, however, tend to include action coalitions, advocacy groups, and self-started civil organizations. In their systems of administration and control, the board, board members, secretary general and different levels of employees, as well as internal and external volunteers and even service recipients are all parties to the governance system, which then relies on consensus for decision-making. In China, organizations of this type include alliances, friendship associations, and promotion associations. 4. Analysis of Tensions in Changing Civil Organization Governance Structures Civil organizations’ governance structures are substantially different things from the organizations themselves and take many different structural forms. Hiding behind those of whom these structures are composed are the wishes of different interest groups. Basic tensions are usually manifested in the following three ways: 4.1. Tensions Between Board Members The last 30 years of development have been increasingly demanding for members of civil organization boards. The example of social group legal persons is often used to demonstrate governance structures of

41 Personal Interview 014, Shining Stone Community Action (北京灿雨石信息咨询中心), 2008.


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civil organization legal persons in China. Social group legal persons are founded on collectives of individuals and can be established when a members reach a degree of organization and, through selection of board members by the members general meeting, represent the interests of different stakeholders. This way, functions and mechanisms allow stakeholders to constrain supervise one another. Currently, foundations and people-run non-enterprise units are both considered financial group legal persons. Financial group legal persons are founded on collected assets with a designated purpose and are established based on regulated donation behavior. Different from social groups, foundations and people-run non-enterprise units do not have members, so their governance structures do not have members general meetings as their most authoritative bodies. Thus, they are also without the opposed relationships between decision-making bodies and implementing bodies and it should not be expected that constraint and supervision will naturally occur. Currently, public funding foundations usually set up supervisory boards in addition to the usual boards. In order to set up a supervisory board, a foundation must have 1–2 leaders from the government work supervising unit on its board. This structure, similar to an independent board of directors in an enterprise, has had positive impacts on public funding foundations’ credibility and effective governance. As for the phenomenon of a lack of separation between the donor (or donating enterprise) and foundation governance in non-public funding foundations in which the donor has concurrent positions both in a for-profit enterprise and a non-profit institution, the issue has proved a challenge for non-public funding foundation governance. People-run non-enterprise units embody the wishes of their donors to an even greater extent; their boards are little more than rubber stamps, formalities. For both non-public funding foundations or people-run non-enterprise units, the question remains of whether they will be able to establish non-governmental boards that can participate in board decision-making as the representative of the public-interest, serve as checks on the decision-making powers of internal managers and founding donors, protect society’s public-interest, guarantee information transparency and openness, and raise the credibility of both types of organizations in the eyes of the public.

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4.2. Conflicted Thinking About Board Openness and Transparency Stakeholders in civil organizations are a considerably more complex group than stakeholders in enterprises. They include boards, supervisory boards, managers, donors, beneficiaries, those with legal rights, clients, communities, the government and even different kinds of members amidst the whole of society; all are stakeholders. When it comes to the question of transparency and openness to the outside, however, boards are fraught with conflicted thinking, the main reason for which is conflict between organizations’ public-interest aims (or public-interest assets) and private owners or owners. One research institute found, in the process of conducting case analyses and surveys of public-interest institutions, that financial transparency, especially in the areas of specific wages, benefits and project costs, was a very sensitive topic. Acting on behalf of public-interest organization, this writer performed a survey in 2006 of the wages of almost 20 publicinterest organizations inside and outside China. Wages of workers in Chinese foundations were about one-eighth the wages of upper managers in the Chinese representative offices of foreign foundations.42 In Beijing, wages in grassroots civil organizations have hovered around the minimum for a basic living standard in the city. For these reasons, the state of finances in civil organizations is unsatisfactory. Take, for example, the case of a grassroots organization devoted to serving and rehabilitating shut-in patients.43 Their service fees account for 63% of their revenues; the remaining 37% come from at large donations. The organization’s director believes that the secret to their success in public fundraising is openness, publicizing financial receipts and expenditures and establishing a board to allow more members of society supervise their work. The board, in this case, helped the organization overcome its difficulties. Of course, many leaders of grassroots organizations are unaccustomed to this accountability and supervision by members of the board; in reality, however, this discomfort has created new development opportunities for grassroots organizations. One major, influential civil organization held a meeting of its executive board and made no word of mention of financial revenues or expenditures. From this example

42 Personal Interview 020, The Energy Foundation Beijing Representative Office (美国能源基金会北京办事处), 2006. 43 Personal Interview 019, Beijing Stars and Rain (北京星星雨教育研究所), 2008.


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we can see that financial openness is limited to core leaders and main executives; even their board was not privy to financial information, let alone financial transparency for all of society. A board vice-chair of a foundation told this author that their success could be summarized in one word: transparency. Just as Ms. Yang Tuan (杨团) has described.44 4.3. Oppositions Between Decision-makers, Implementers, and Supervisors A civil organization’s decision-making body is usually the board; its executive level is usually the secretariat and the daily operations team; its supervisory level usually refers to its internal supervisory system or some specially-designated externally advisory body. The role of external supervisory body is sometimes played by the superior, work supervising unit or partner unit, by governmental registration and administration offices or by forms of social supervision such as the media, donors, beneficiaries or independent supervision and evaluation institutions. Accounting or auditing firms, for example, serve as auditors for the financial portion of civil organizations’ work. Thus, the relationship between the decision-making level and the executive level, that between the board and the secretariat, involves division of official powers, financial powers, and working powers. These structural relationships have taken three main forms in Mainland China: 4.3.1. Secretariat-centered Structural Relationships This form has appeared most frequently in grassroots civil organizations, people-run non-enterprise units, or non-public funding foundations launched by joint enterprises. In such forms, the organization is first launched by an individual or group. Later, a board is formed under the guidance of the main leaders of the secretariat; the secretariat comes first and the board second. This form is beneficial both for rapid growth in an organization’s early phase and for increasing work efficiency. Disadvantages include lower capacity for resource integration, less social credibility, and difficulty of increasing constraints and controls as the organization grows. High concentration of executive powers in the hands of one person increases risks and the potential for unsustainability. 44 Personal Interview 021, China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Policy Research Center (中国社会科学院政策研究中心), 2008.

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4.3.2. Board-centered Structural Relationships This form has appeared most frequently in newly-formed civil organizations, non-public funding foundations launched by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and civil organizations with very close government ties. The initiators tend to be SOE leaders or government officials. They tend to be staffed with retired government employees, resulting in relatively weak and unprofessional executive teams. Work is supervised directly by members of boards, most of who work in part-time capacities. The advantages of this structure are rapid resource integration, expanded influence, low personnel costs, and more direct access to internal controls and supervision. Disadvantages include high difficulty of developing professional teams, high overall costs and low work efficiency. 4.3.3. Combined Structural Relationships This form appears most frequently in industry associations and academic social groups with strong government backgrounds. Due to their authorization by the government, board chairs tend to be powerful and relationships between board chairs and secretariats highly governmental, administrative and hierarchical. It is often the case that the board vice-chair serves concurrently as the secretary general. Advantages of this form include the high ability of the secretariat to understand the intentions of the board which results in higher administrative efficiency and lower overall internal costs. Disadvantages include concentration of controls and governance in the hands of internal personnel, the importation of governmental “eat from the same big pot” management (in which benefits are not tied to contribution) into social groups, and difficulty in instituting competitive mechanisms.45 In summary, in civil organization governance structures, questions of whether or not board members serve their stakeholders fairly, have a sense of responsibility, support transparency, have a spirit of contributing, collect salary, restrict personal subsidies, have highly cooperative attitudes, and are highly professional, as well as whether or not the process for their selection has taken non-governmental board members into consideration, these questions, are of utmost importance. With rapid changes in information technology, media has become the

45 Personal Interview 023, CASS Institute of American Studies (中国社会科学院美国研究所), 2008.


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primary vehicle for supervision by society; supervision of the media, meanwhile, has become increasingly important, especially relatively effective supervision by netizens. 5. Prospects for Good Civil Society Governance Summarizing experiences and lessons learned from 30 years of civil organizations, we can be confident that civil organizations will eventually achieve healthy and effective governance structures. Objectively, China’s economic growth and social progress have also advanced the healthy development of civil organizations, but organizations still face challenges when it comes to governance. Looking forward, prospects for establishing good governance in civil organizations are good, and depend on resolving two problems. The first is how organizations can manage good relationships with governments, enterprises, media, academic institutions and other organizations. The second is how civil organizations can expand internal governance capacity. 5.1. Effective Management of Stakeholder Relationships in the Governance Process 5.1.1. Government Relationships. Government departments, as civil organizations’ direct work supervising units and appointers of their board leaders and board members, play a decisive role. Cooperation between governments and qualified civil organizations in the areas of privatizing public goods and services and contracting for government services, with the organization as the athlete and the government as referee, is beneficial for society, the public, and both parties directly involved. 5.1.2. Media Relationships. All the work civil organizations do lies under the supervision of the media, which should increase organizations’ credibility. As long as China lacks third sector, independent “watchdogs”, the media must fulfill their social responsibility by supervising civil organizations. 5.1.3. Enterprise Relationships. For civil organizations, the search for cooperation with enterprises is not merely one for financial support; it is also for the opportunity to study enterprise management concepts and experiences. The experiences

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and lessons of corporate governance in particular could prove critical in helping civil organizations increase the professionalism of their governance. However, many enterprises are themselves failing in such cases are not suitable partners for cooperation. In addition, civil organizations have the responsibility to expose and criticize enterprises producing unsafe products and polluting the environment. 5.1.4. Research Institution Relationships. In recent years, many research institutions have been formed specializing in trends, theories, experiences and lessons of civil organizations. At the same time, authoritative institutions have been formed to normalize and guide them. But to date, no system has been formed for civil organization cooperation, support and research. Cooperation between civil organizations and research institutions should emphasize increasing professionalism, the use of civil organization theory as a guide and civil organizations using institutional resources to conduct trainings. At the same time, research institutions can use case studies of civil organizations to improve their theoretical work. 5.1.5. Donor and Beneficiary Relationships. Both donors and beneficiaries should participate in the supervision of civil organizations, and especially in organizational governance. This has real, practical significance in terms of helping organizations fulfill their social responsibility. Of course, the differences between different types of donations must be carefully articulated and public and non-public donations strictly distinguished. It is also essential that the rights and duties or fundraisers, donors and beneficiaries are clearly defined. Participation from all quarters of society as watchdogs over public-interest donations is beneficial for effective governance of civil organizations. 5.1.6. Relationships between Civil Organizations and the Role of Self-Organized Alliances. Chinese civil organizations are still in their initial phase and still face challenges in the areas of scale, personnel, services, service areas, service quality and more. Under these conditions, civil organizations must support one other, share effective and limited resources, share experiences and lessons in governance, and exchange opportunities for capacity building. Self-organized alliances can help organizations find mutual interest and win-wins and will contribute to civil organizations


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playing the role they should amidst China’s progressing society and developing economy. 5.2. Mechanisms for Building Governance Capacity The basic components of civil organization governance capacity include organizational systems, mechanisms for managing human resources, mechanisms for mobilizing social resources, the composition of board membership and board policy and governance frameworks. In this initial phase of civil organizations’ development, the role of governance is especially important. The key to an institution’s long-term strategy, as well as to its continued existence, is governance capacity. Practice has proven that institutional governance also has large effects on its ability to mobilize social resources. At the core of institutional governance is the question of whether it can, to a maximum degree, motivate the active and positive participation of all stakeholders and help them to share the institution’s concepts, mission and values. 5.2.1. Capacity for Innovation in Governance. An organization’s capacity for innovation in governance includes its values and its social influence. It involves the proportion of high-level people on the board and the institution’s ability to attract professionals to the board and to maintain the institution’s reputation. In a civil organization’s development, innovations in governance not only include reforming boards and making improvements in work execution and project design; they also more importantly include reforming institutional values and concepts. These all contribute to the long term, great aim of improving human lives. 5.2.2. Capacity for Coordination in Governance. This refers to external coordination, developing social resources, and the ability to realize the institution’s near and long-term goals. The reason why we talk about coordination in civil organization governance is that it involves and effects government participation, enterprise interaction and the resources of all segments of society. It especially involves the effects on civil organization governance of the individual volunteer spirit so central to civil society. If the rights of donors and the users of donations are not clearly defined, and there misconceptions on the part of board members and operational team members about resource development, then how can we expect there to be a

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motivation to contribute? Capacity for coordination is embodied in boards’ forward thinking in the design of operational systems. 5.2.3. Capacity for Sustainability in Governance. This refers to the ability of boards and leaders to form balanced mechanisms for development as they attempt to realize their dreams, missions and aims. That is, having the control and the abilities both to resolve short-term difficulties and to integrate institutional strategies and plans to achieve sustainability. Sustainability in governance includes the stability of an institution’s work, the constant growth and maturation of its team, and reasonable stability in finances. This emphasis on sustainability by no means rules out balanced and coordinated innovations. 5.2.4. Capacity for Human Resource Building in Governance. This refers to democratization of governance policies and understanding of and participation in long-range and strategic planning by workers and volunteers, as well as their sharing common concepts and values regarding services provided. Human resource-building in terms of governance should include internal training and outside studies. Internal training should include self-study, or the principle of board members’ shoring up their own shortcomings. In the area of work-related training, they should plan focused programs targeting the needs of their work. Mechanisms for outside study should include qualified civil organizations to encourage their stronger board members and workers to pursue formal studies at universities in and outside of China. Experts from inside and outside of China should be hired to deliver tailored training courses and members should conduct internships and work at civil organizations in other nations. This process of accumulating experience both at home and abroad is a way to truly create an environment for good governance-building.

CHAPTER SIX

CIVIL ORGANIZATION-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS: FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION AND POWER DILEMMAS Jia Xijin This chapter focuses on the question of functional cooperation and power dilemmas in public work, and explores changes in and characteristics of the relationship between civil organizations and governments in China since the Reform and Opening. It includes an introduction and five parts. The introduction summarizes the origins of the Reform and Opening and factors contributing to China’s social transformations. The first part observes two different paths along which China’s civil organizations have tended to develop. The second part summarizes the basic logic of the relationship between civil organizations and governments as well as unique characteristics in China. The third part discusses cooperation in public services and public finance-based civil organization-government relationships. The fourth part discusses public policy advocacy and civil organization participation in government decision-making. The last part analyzes civil organization-government relationships from the perspective of citizens’ powers. Introduction The Chinese society established in 1949 had a “totalistic society” structure.1 In China in Crisis, Tsou Tang wrote that China’s crisis in the Late Qing period was a “holistic crisis” with urgent demand for social concord and order. Under the conditions, organizational forms with centralized power and control-type order orientations received social acceptance and lent form to the structural framework of the whole of society. Society’s form after the establishment of the PRC in 1 Tsou, Tang. “Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China: a Framework for Analysis,” in Ho, Ping-ti & Tsou, Tang (ed.), China in Crisis. V.1 Book 1, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) 277–364.

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1949 was one in which the State exercised total control and monopoly over social resources. Civil organizations were later “cleaned-up and reorganized”, leaving two major groups. Legal, governmental organizations, defined as the “Eight Big” democratic party sections that participated directly in governance, and legal, civil organizations, social groups with new political rights. Of these the eight People’s Groups, designed as bridges to help the Party and the government liaise with the masses developed rapidly at all levels nationwide.2 The People’s groups together with the eight party sections were considered crucial, intermediary parts of the system.3 They enjoyed total financial support and appointment and removal of their leaders was handled by United Front (统战) departments. Within the State’s holistic framework, civil organizations have developed gradually. By 1965, nationwide-level social groups had expanded from 44 around the time of the founding to almost 100, while locallevel social groups had grown to over 6000 in number. The Cultural Revolution disrupted this process. During the Cultural Revolution, most social group activities were ceased while many groups were labeled “counter-revolutionary organizations” and punished. Meanwhile, the activities of “little red soldiers” and “red guards” flourished. The governmental-social relationship embodied by these mass associations with specially-designated political and social background is quite unique and worth analyzing. At the least, we can see that it is different from “free association” in the West: first, without being nongovernmental, without having independent and mutually-respectful relationships with the government, these organizations occupy a place in society that falls clearly within the category of government functions. Where any social functions they may have overlap or even conflict with the government, those functions are subordinate. Second,

Of the eight largest People’s groups (人民团体), the China New Democratic Youth League, and the Union were the first to be set up by the Communist Party. From 1949, more were gradually added: the Women’s Federation, Communist Youth League, Confederation of Trade Unions, China Association of Science and Technology (CAST), All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, as well as the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots, set up in 1981. All are based on membership systems except for the Women’s Federation, CAST and Federation of Taiwan Compatriots. 3 The Interim Measures on Social Group Registration and Administration 《社会团体登记管理暂行办法》were drafted based on the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference《中国人民政治协商会议共同纲领》. 2

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they do not always uphold the principle of non-violence, especially in violent times. Third, “associational freedom” is not a common right; members of the public freely organizing groups must do so using the correct political terminology. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, for example, political expressions found to be mistaken would be strictly censured; clear cases of this are Zhang Zhixin (张志新), Lin Zhao (林昭) and Yu Luoke (遇逻克). The “little red soldiers” and “red guards” of the Cultural Revolution were also different from earlier social groups in China. They were without a clear role among society’s functions. They were neither science and technology, nor cultural, nor women’s organizations, for example; they clearly represented a reversal of earlier progress in functional differentiation among civil organizations. Overall, the Cultural Revolution period was a process of political resource reallocation driven by government powers tapping into social power. Both State and society were mired in the chaotic process of reconstruction. After the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, civil organizations were resuscitated partially. After China’s course was set toward socialist modernization by 1978’s Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, Chinese society entered a new transformative period. If we can say that the high-control social structures set in place in the beginning of the PRC were the result of the “holistic crisis” of the Late Qing, then the social transformations of the Reform and Opening can be viewed as a reaction to the “economic shortages” crisis of the early years of the PRC, and especially of the Cultural Revolution period. While the high-control structures of the PRC’s early years were useful for integrating society and centralizing resources to bolster national power, rigid social structures and planned allocation of resources severely weakened society’s ability to meet people’s needs and self-adjust. These tensions appeared even more glaringly after the political smoke of the Cultural Revolution cleared. Not only was the “totalistic” government unable to supply the economic goods and social benefits needed, even basic public goods like stability and order, laws and regulations and public services, were sadly lacking. In reality, society was in a state of “having politics, but lacking government”. The process of the Reform and Opening begun in 1978 was also a process of rebuilding the government. The themes of separations between Party and government; government and enterprises; politics and programs; politics and society; government administrators and holders of State assets; and government and associations have

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been raised in every Central Committee meeting since 1983, and have been embodied in six consecutive rounds of government body reforms. Indeed, the “species-ization” of government functions and the establishment of a truly “public” government are issues that have permeated this entire transformative period.4 Civil organizations in China and their relationship with the government have appeared against just such a backdrop in the years since the Reform and Opening. 1. Two Paths in China’s Civil Organizations’ Development since the Reform and Opening After the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, civil organizations were resuscitated partially and numerous new social groups were established in the late 70s. In their development since the Reform and Opening, China’s civil organizations have taken two distinct paths. They are different and display unique Chinese characteristics in the areas of their formation, organizational characteristics, social functions, systemic constraints, and development trends. 1.1. The “Top-Down” Path The first path can be described as “top-down”. This refers to civil organizations that are organized, launched and guided by government departments or related offices. Very much like the People’s groups and other social groups set up at the beginning of the PRC by the Party and government in several fields of social activity, these top-down civil organizations were an important structure, along with the work unit system, for social integration. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, these top-down organizations continued, yet their organizational forms have undergone some changes since then. First, top-down organizations were established to meet four needs: the need for integration of social resources, the need to shift some

4 Professor Li Qiang first applied the “species” behavioral concept to government functionality. This refers to the increased specialization of the “State” and its becoming exclusively a provider of public goods amidst society’s division of labor. 李强/Li Qiang, “后全能体制下现代国家的构建”/“hou quan neng ti zhi xie xian dai guo jia de gou jian,” in 战略与管理/zhan lve yu guan li, (2001.6) 77–85). (“Building a PostTotalist Modern Nation” in Strategy and Management)


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government functions, the need to resolve personnel issues in the work unit system, and the need for exchange with foreign entities. Clearly, their goals were varied. Second, top-down organizations were imbued with many of the characteristics of government administrative units and followed their operating protocols. Their scales were massive, often having tens or even over one hundred people in an office with a government leader in the head position. No matter their superficially democratic decisionmaking structures, all important decisions were made through consultation with an organization’s main source of guanxi, i.e. the department or political leader tied to its work supervising unit. Their resources were acquired directly or indirectly within the system; organizations with the closest government relations had access to direct fund transfers from the government. Decisions on hiring and removal of people in key positions was made by relevant Party and government departments. In some instances, civil organizations worked directly in the same offices as their supervising units’; in many cases, civil organizations’ personnel were some permutation of supervising units’, under a different name. During operations, resources were often transferred through intra-system channels. Third, top-down civil organizations’ primary social function was to serve the government as government administrative or social service units, or as bridges to help the government liaise with the general public. Fourth, top-down civil organizations had unique advantages in the systemic environment, even policy monopoly status. Fifth, top-down organizations tend to be long-lived, reforming, transforming and being reborn, all in line with the government. 1.2. The “Bottom-Up” Path The second path of development for China’s civil organizations is the “bottom-up” path. This refers to organizations that, in the process of reforms, have been formed by people based on social needs and that maintain relative independence in their operations. The opening of this path is closely related to market reforms and the progress of the economy, society and democratization. The Reform and Opening opened up a space for civil autonomy; this process began with the opening of the economic sphere, then extended the open space for social activities. Finally, demand emerged from citizens wishing to selforganize and participate in society’s public-interest work.

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First, the aims of bottom-up organizations tend to be, from the start, more direct and unitary. For the most part, they are founded to meet two board kinds of demand. The first is demand for the mutual benefit produced by free behavior on the part of citizens; examples of this include literary organizations or industrial and commercial organizations formed voluntarily under the new market conditions. The second is demand for public goods in excess of what the government provides, demand that is met by social public-interest organizations. Second, in the beginning, bottom-up organizations exhibited highly individualistic spirits, and have since been becoming more normalized. Examples of improvements in governance in recent years include democratic elections held by AIDS prevention grassroots organizations with the support of the Global Fund (全球基金); civil organizations’ internal, coordinated financial disclosure measures; explorations in democratic governance by the enterprise-organized Society of Entrepreneurs and Ecology (阿拉善企业公益协会); professional, standard operating protocols for decision-making and execution put in place by the Narada Foundation (南都公益基金会); and the independent financial audits commissioned by the Fund (壹基金). Third, bottom-up civil organizations’ social functions are rooted in citizens’ self rule; the organizations are a product of citizens’ demand for fulfillment of their wishes and self-satisfaction. Their expressions in public affairs and governance reflect citizens’ choices. Fourth, bottom-up organizations face many difficulties in their systemic environments, such as the question of their legal status as well as the problem of frequently being overlooked in preferential policies and government supports. Fifth, the development of bottom-up civil organizations has reached two peaks since the Reform and Opening. The first time was in the mid-to-late 1980s, when they grew both in numbers and variety of forms, until 1989’s “clean-up and reorganization”. The second has been from 1998 until the present. In the current period, the growth of bottom-up civil organizations has been diverse, displaying rapid expansion in the number of organizations, appearance of many organizational types, elevation of organizations’ standing, increased specialization by field, broadened citizen participation, and increased professionalism. Their holistic evolution has been an embodiment of the growth of citizens’ powers.


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1.3. Tensions Between the Two Paths and the Current System The characteristics of the two types of civil organizations described above and their corresponding development paths are clearly tied to this transformative period in China, i.e. the tension between the demands of social development and the extant system. On the government’s side, it needs social organizations to provide social services and give voice to citizens. On the other hand, with the extant high-control, top-down power structure, process in the exercise of power is weak, the system is intolerant of freedoms, and, as a result, government relaxations in social administration are limited. At the same time, transfers of functions from the government to society have outstripped society’s ability to meet their demands, an imbalance which has resulted in the appearance of a large number of government-“founded” civil organizations. On the civil organization side, this tension is mainly manifest in a paradox between organizations’ social legitimacy and legal legitimacy. Most citizen-initiated organizations with social support have been cast out beyond the recognition of the law and exist in a grey area in terms of legal legitimacy, system regulations and policy support. This has limited their social credibility, their capacity building, and the normalization of their operations. Most organizations with legal legitimacy, on the other hand, were dropped “from the sky” on society by the Party and government and are instrumental to the Party’s and government’s liaising with and bridging to the general public. They therefore lack the independence and social foundation that civil organizations should have, are highly governmental and administrative in nature, and fail to meet citizens’ demands for participation and self-governance. Organizations with both social and legal legitimacy are extremely few in number. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between independently-founded organizations and legal legitimacy. 2. The Logic of the Civil Organization-Government Relationship and the China Model Regarding the question of the relationship between the State and society, and in particular of that between the State and civil society, scholars have different concepts, portraying it alternately as one of checks and balances, opposition, mutual reinforcement, complementary parts,

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Civil Society

Grassroots orgs without legal legitimacy

Social and civil organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs

Citizen-founded orgs with legal legitimacy

GovernmentOrganized NGOs (GONGOS)

Figure 1: Relationship between independently-founded organizations and legal status

and civil society participation in the State.5 Commonly-used models, however, are all based on some form of interaction between civil society and the State as independent entities; for this reason, none are well-suited to China. Another model for the relationship between State and society is based on the strength and weakness of each, and describes four situations. The first, strong government-strong society, includes postmodern nations; weak government-weak society includes anarchic “failed states” like today’s Somalia and Afghanistan; weak-government strong-society like many Western nations earlier in their histories; and strong-government weak society, like developing countries in the latter half of the 20th Century. The latter two types characterize states in the transformative processes of modernization.6 This model can gener-

5 何增科主编/He Zengke (ed.), “公民社会与第三部门研究引论”/“gong min she hui yu di san bu men yan jiu yin lun,” in 公民社会与第三部门/gong min she hui yu di san bu men, (she hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she, 2000). (“Civil Society and the Third Sector Research Introduction” in Civil Society and the Third Sector) 6 British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser Robert Cooper has divided the nations into three categories: pre-modern (post-colonial ), post-modern (Western nations), and traditional-modern; Harvard Professor and World Peace Foundation Chairman Robert Rotberg has identified more than ten “failed states”;


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ally capture the characteristics of government and society in China. The question remaining, however, is: how can a strong-government weak-society state transition into being a strong-government strongsociety state? Li Qiang et al. have introduced a distinction between state power and state capacity, and explained that state power does not necessarily signify sufficient provision of public goods, suggesting a need for further analysis of the “strong-government weak-society” relationship.7 Considering the complexity of the government-society relationship in transforming China, no unitary model can fully explain the relationship between the government and society in China and its evolving trends. However, it cannot hurt to return to the angle of basic social functions and first take a more empirical look at the relationship. Today’s modern governments use public resources and administration to create public institutions, while civil organizations are usually either public-interest-type or mutual-interest-type. The former’s function, as well as government’s is to realize public value, so this piece has approached civil organization-government relationships using a framework of public value; civil organizations refers to organizations focusing on public value. See Figure 2, which illustrates the functional “matches” between civil organizations and governments in public governance and is also an approach to building civil organizationgovernment relationships. First, on the public services supply side, how civil organization-government relationships, how their cooperation will develop to more effectively provide public goods will be based on public finance and will mostly involve methods of allocating public finances. Second, relating to public policy, there is the issue of how

Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeline Albright divided post-Cold War states into four types: advanced industrial nations, democratizing or transforming nations, failed states, and rogue states. 7 Li Qiang borrows the concept of British scholar Michael Mann that state power is a state’s autocratic power, a range of voluntary behaviors that the state’s elites may engage in without needing to enter into routine, institutional negotiations with the various groups in civil society. State capacity refers to a state’s basic power or state abilities, i.e. its actual permeation of civil society and its ability to realize political policies in the area of governance. 李强/Li Qiang, “国家能力与国家权力的悖论——兼评王绍光、胡鞍钢 ‘中国国家能力报告’ ”/“gui jia neng li yu guo jia quan li de bei lun—jian ping wang shao guang, hu an gang ‘zhongguo guo jia neng li bao gao’,” in 国家与社会/guo jia yu she hui, (Hangzhou: zhe jiang ren min chu ban she, 1998). (“The Paradox of State Capacity and State Power—with a Criticism of Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang’s ‘China State Power Report’ ” in State and Society)

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(Government’s role)

Public goods and services

Contracting for public services

(civil organizations’ function) Services

Citizen governance

Setting laws and policies

Advocacy

Public policy participation

Figure 2: Matching of civil Organization and Government Functions

civil organizations will become policy advocates to increase the public value created through government policy. Third, there is the aspect of the direction of the citizens’ power movement over almost 30 years of civil organizations’ development and mechanisms for nurturing citizens’ powers in political structures. Among the three aspects above, public service cooperation is the broadest, and includes many kinds of civil organizations. The issue at its core is the choice of specific methods of cooperation, i.e. what form of disbursal of public funding is most helpful for achieving efficiency in public services? In the area of public policy, citizen expression is not a common thing, yet in areas where bottom-up civil organizations are most active, there have been some remarkable cases. This trend should gradually continue as civil consciousness elevates and certain government departments become more open. In the area of citizens’ powers, in China’s evolving, Reform and Opening society, citizens’ powers and administrations’ powers seem to exhibit an escalating phenomenon, forming more complex power structures; this may prove a challenge for the growth of citizens’ powers and the realization of public value. At the same time, the citizens’ powers movement is present in the reallocation of public resources and participation in public policy. Figure 3 illustrates a development model for civil organization-government relationships in China. The horizontal axis reflects civil organization independence, from organizations subordinate to the government to independent civil organizations. The vertical axis reflects three levels of civil organization-government relationships: public services, public


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Civil society functions

Citizens’ powers Public policy

Development space for civil organization-government relationships

Public services “Civil-ness” (independence) of civil organizations

Figure 3: A development model for civil organization-government relationships in China

policy, and citizens’ powers. They embody expansion of the levels of civil society functions. Observation of Chinese society has revealed that civil organization independence is a precondition for elevation of their relationships with government. 3. Cooperation in Public Services: The Development of Civil OrganizationGovernment Relationships Based on Public Finance Internationally, during administrative reforms in the 1970s, European and North American states began to place higher value on privatization of public services through contracting. The practice was intended to introduce mechanisms for competition into the field of public services, increase the efficiency of public fund use and the effectiveness of public benefits. In 1998, the British Prime Minister, on behalf of the government, signed an “Agreement on Relations between the Governments of England and Wales and the Volunteer and Community Sectors” (COMPACT), the first time in history that partnership relationships between a government and civil organizations had been introduced as state policy. The COMPACT agreement includes five aspects: funding and procurement, consultation and policy appraisal, volunteering, black and minority ethnic (BME) voluntary and community organizations, and community groups. Of these, government procurement, or

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contracting of public services, was seen as the core of the agreement. In the period that followed, Scotland, Canada and Singapore among others responded with similar agreements and regulations. With the UN, the World Bank, Asia Development Bank and other international organizations’ focus on the concept of diverse governance, the “partnership” between governments and civil organizations has received widespread attention and application. China’s civil organizations have always been positioned as the bearer and receiver of functions shifted away from the government, a cooperative structure that has followed several models: the first has them appearing as an implementer answering to the government. In this capacity, civil organizations have taken orders from the government, received their tasks and personnel from the government, and depended for their activities on governmental transfers. Examples of these are the People’s groups, satellite organizations of the Party-government and other organizations directly on the payroll whose budgets are covered entirely by government transfers and whose administrative structures follow those for public servants. The second has them appearing as assistants to the government. In this model, civil organizations are set up by government and take their orders from government departments; they receive some of their budgetary funding from government departments or at least are given certain administrative privileges allowing them to collect resources through fees-for-services. The majority of organizations fitting this model are government-established civil organizations. In the third model, in order to earn the trust of the government and avoid any disadvantageous consequences, civil organizations shoulder government tasks without compensation, using their own resources to provide services needed by governments. This model can be seen in cooperation between grassroots organizations and governments. Fourth, some organizations voluntarily mobilize social resources to provide public services in areas where government is not fulfilling its proper functions. One example includes mobilizing social donations to put towards volunteer educator programs. In the fifth model, governments entrust civil organizations with certain functions and contribute a certain degree of financial support, like with government contracting. Of these, the newest concept is the last, government contracting with civil organizations. Contracting in public services is essentially a form of transfer of public finances. In this model, in order to achieve certain public service targets, instead of using public finances to fuel their own opera-


Contracting model

Relationship between the two parties

Independent entities

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Competitive

Model 3: Competitive contracting

Non-competitive

Model 2: Non-competitive contracting

Process

Dependent entities Non-competitive

Model 1: Formality contracting

Figure 4: Models of civil organization-government public service contracting in China

tions, governments establish various kinds of contractual relationships allowing civil organizations, for-profits or other entities provide the service while the government disburses finances accordingly. Put simply, using public monies, governments set public service goals; civil organizations undertake service operations; contractual relationships are forged; and a mechanism for achieving public goals is realized. The essential significance of the model is the “contractualization” of public service provision; in the model equal, independent contractual relationships are forged between two parties, governments and civil organizations. As a “contractualized” model of public service provision, service contracting depends on two main factors: the first is the independence of the two parties to the contract; the second is open competition in the process of arriving at the contract. The ways in which governments contract for public services in China today can be summarized in three models, based on the substance of the contractual relationship. The first model is “formality contracting”. Here, government engages in a contract for public services with a civil organization with independent legal status; however, the civil organization party to the agreement is in fact one with a dependent relationship with the contractor. The two parties to the agreement are not two entities with independent decision-making capacities. Though the service contract represents a contractual relationship legally, in substance it is a form of “hiring” that could be called “formality contracting”. The purpose of such contracting is often obscured without market competition or bidding processes. In service contracting in China, this form of

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“procurement” is a very common one. In examples like governmentformed “centers” and “service stations”, these organizations take on certain government functions while governments ply them with the necessary personnel and office resource support. The second model is non-competitive contracting. This model satisfies two basic conditions for contracting: independence on the part of the two contracting entities and definite aims of the service purchase contract. However, the contracting process is without choices from market competition and candidates are not chosen through competitive processes. For this reason, this model could also be called “entrusted contracting”. The two parties to the agreement in this model are independent, a government and a civil organization, and the aims of the public service procurement are explicit. In one example of this kind, in 1998 the “Luoshan Conference Center” in Shanghai was entrusted with the government’s elderly care services. The government directly provided facilities and entrusted the “Luoshan Conference Center” with providing services. In actuality, however, the “Luoshan Conference Center”, founded in 1996, was also a citizens’ service center established by the YMCA at the bequest of Pudong District’s Social Development Bureau. The service model at the Center has since undergone many new developments. The third model is competitive contracting. It meets the requirements of having two independent entities entering into an agreement, having definite contracting aims, having a process of competitive selection, and having an open bidding process. Contracts reached in this way are the standard among the public service contracting models. There are only a few examples of this model in practice in China. Among them, a representative example was the “Trial of Civil Organization and Government Cooperative Planning for Village Poverty Alleviation” launched jointly in 2005 by the State Council Office for Poverty Alleviation, the Jiangxi Provincial Office for Poverty Alleviation, China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, Asia Development Bank, and others.


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The Case of the “Trial of Civil Organization and Government Cooperative Planning for Village Poverty Alleviation” Two contracting parties: the Jiangxi Provincial Office for Poverty Alleviation entrusted China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, the successful civil organization bidder. At the same time the State Council Office for Poverty Alleviation, the Finance Ministry and the Asia Development Bank signed an accompanying memorandum. Contract aims: poverty alleviation services in 26 key impoverished villages in Jiangxi. Funding source: the Jiangxi Provincial Office for Poverty Alleviation provided 11 million yuan of poverty alleviation funding; Asia Development Bank provided 1 million dollars to support civil organizations’ expenditures; and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation provided 100,000 dollars in trial funding. Process: a group of experts brought together by the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation designed a bidding framework and process and opened the bidding to qualifying civil organizations. Applications were reviewed by an experts’ panel and confirmed by the Jiangxi Provincial Office for Poverty Alleviation. Of over ten applications, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation entered into service contracts with six institutions. Supervision: an Australian, international consulting institution, IDSS, independently conducted external supervision of service effectiveness and evaluation. In this case we can see that public service contracting was between independent entities, had clear aims, was competitive, had an open bidding process, and had third-party supervision. In its implementation, the trial still faced many specific issues including interlinked government departments and funding chains, short-term effects, lack of double-blind methods, lack of cost accounting, the issues of civil organizations not being grassroots and local, insufficient participation by community citizens in information loops, and formulaic evaluation. Nonetheless, it represents the launch of government competitive contracting for public services, and is a milestone in China.

4. Public Policy Advocacy: Civil Organization Participation in Government Decision-Making Participation in and advocacy for public policies may serve as a protection for cooperation in the public services. “Advocacy” here refers to the process of civil organizations affecting decisions on public policy and the allocation of public resources. In its widely-used form, the

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objects of advocacy are governments and their public policies. Advocacy has been seen as one of civil organizations’ central roles; they can provide systemic channels for orderly participation by citizens in public policy-making, supervision and improvement of government behavior and effective realization of public governance. Observation and evaluation of civil organizations’ roles as advocates revel two main factors that corresponding to policy processes, policy performance and policy representativeness. The first is the degree of organizations’ involvement in the policy process, the other, is their ability to represent the civil position in affecting public policy, especially their representation of the voice of disadvantaged groups. In China, civil organizations’ channels of participation with the government vary, are correlated with organization type, and can be grouped into two kinds: The first is constructive recommendations. This is the most common form of civil organization participation in the policy-making process, and is most evident in top-down civil organizations like the “Eight Big” People’s groups. In this model, civil organizations provide policy consulting and recommendations and affect public policy through various channels. The “Eight Big” People’s groups even enjoy the legal right to participate in the legislative process as members of the Political Consultative Conference. In a Tsinghua University survey of the status of NGOs in 1999, 60% of civil organizations claimed to have provided policy recommendations to government and 40% reported seeing recommendations implemented. The traits of this kind of model of participation are: policy topics, directions, frameworks and conclusions are set within the government’s holistic plans. Civil organizations, for their part, use their expert knowledge and skills to provide constructive opinions and recommendations on resolving issues. The purpose of policy participation is to better serve the purposes set by the government in their holistic plan. For example, the articles of incorporation of the eight People’s groups explicitly state that they are to seek to serve as advisor and assistant to the government. The essence of opinions and recommendations is how to do, not what to do. The second is expression of interests, which more closely approaches the advocacy behavior of civil organizations in the West. This type of advocacy has also gradually appearing among top-down civil organizations. Forms of advocacy have included lobbying visits, policy recommendations, even opposition and demonstrations. Characteristics


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of this form of dialogue include: civil organizations serve as a channel outside the government for expression of civil interests and can therefore have a power-balancing effect. The object of dialogue is to supervise and attempt to steer certain policies toward different interests; they might be members’ interests, like in the case of representatives of industry associations conducting lobbying tours or for some public interest, like the insistence by environmental protection groups that environmental evaluations be included in major engineering projects.8 These forms of dialogue are seen less frequently in top-down civil organizations due to their relatively high reliance on the government. Grassroots organizations, on the other hand, due to their civilly-rooted incentives, tend to represent civil interests more when it comes to voicing views discordant with the government’s. It is clear from these two different types of dialogue that civil organizations’ degrees of interaction with the government and their abilities to empower citizens are not completely the same. In the West, dialogue with governments is a channel through which civil organizations can advocate and empower the citizenry. In China, however, according to the analysis above, if we view the channels through which civil organizations participate in the system as the forms in which they communicate with the government and participate in the policy process; if we view advocacy as the effects of the civil position on public policy, then we will see that channels of system participation and advocacy cannot simply be equated. On the one hand, those civil organizations with access to government systems are not necessarily effective in representing the public interest or reflecting civil positions; on the other, civil organizations representing diverse civil voices and with strong advocacy agendas may not have sufficient channels for dialogue with governments. This has resulted in civil organizations being limited in their abilities to communicate civil positions, balance the powers of interest groups, and especially represent the interests of disadvantaged groups and empower citizens.

8 A typical case is the Wenzhou Smoking Paraphernalia Association’s trip to Europe. The lobbying trip, conducted by members of leading companies, targeted Europe’s anti-dumping restrictions on Chinese cigarette lighters, and achieved some results. When the State was considering discontinuing favorable investment policies, members of the Shenzhen Municipal Association of Foreign-Invested Enterprises visited Beijing on a lobbying trip, and successfully won certain policy advantages for the Association.

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jia xijin Constructive recommendations Dialogue and cooperation

Policy advocacy

Policy influence

Figure 5: Relationship between formal channels for participation and policy influence

In recent years, with the rise of bottom-up organizations and transformations in governmental attitudes toward citizen participation, new, formal channels have begun to open up for civil organizations to participate in policy-making in advocacy roles. This has been especially evident in environmental protection. Dialogue has enabled civil organizations and the government to arrive at cooperation. Although more and more advocacy behavior can be seen in constructive participation channels like the Political Consultative Conference, this trend among People’s groups and other top-down organizations is no clear. Particularly with People’s groups, their role as a tool assisting the Party and government has, if anything, become more pronounced. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the formal channels for public policy participation available to civil organizations and their policy effectiveness. In recent decades, environmental protection has been the most active field for citizen policy participation. In this example, we can see the development of citizen participation in public policy-making. In the famous examples of the Nu River Dam Project and the Yuanmingyuan Incident, it was participation by the public and by environmental protection groups that spurred the government to make scientific and more prudent policies. Good cooperation between civil organizations and the government was also evident in campaigns to protect both the Tibetan antelope and the golden monkey. In cases like blocking enterprises from destroying natural forests, environmen-


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tal protection organizations have prompted the government to enforce the law and ensured the fairness of public policy. The Chinese government has, for its part, also mounted an active response in the field of environmental protection. The PRC Environmental Impact Assessment Law《中华人民共和国环境影响评价法》, passed in 2002, clearly encourages citizen participation. In 2004 and 2006, after hearings on environmental permits and citizen participation in environmental protection, the State Environmental Protection Administration issued corresponding policies. Currently in drafting are Measures on Citizen Participation in Environmental Protection《公民参与环境保护办法》. In 2008, the Planned Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations (draft version)《规划环境影响评价条例 (征求意见稿)》were widely circulated to generate social opinions. Environmental protection organizations interacted and assisted greatly through the Internet, through forums and by inviting experts and proposed opinions on revisions. It was an example of civil organizations rationally participating in the policy process and positive dialogue with the government. This positive coordination between the government, civil organizations and citizens has played a significant role in recent developments in environmental protection in China. 5. Civil Organization-Government Relationships from the Perspective of Citizens’ Powers The previous sections have focused on governance in practice, summarizing the developments of China’s civil organizations in their cooperative relationships with the government as providers of public services and as policy advocates. Now we return to civil organizations’ own fundamental value, the angle of citizen self-governance, and analyze relationships between civil organizations and the government. 5.1. Two Basic Models of Civil Organization-Government Relationships Since the 1970s, civil organizations have risen to prominence as the “third sector”. The “three horse carriage” or “tripartite model” of government, enterprises and civil society has entered the volunteer organization theoretical framework mostly as a response to the challenges of government failures and market failures.

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In the West, however, civil society is no new phenomenon; it has more distant systemic foundations. Looking back to the Modern Era, to the 17th and 18th Centuries, civil society was introduced to differentiate between political society and civic society. In Hegel’s use, “civil/citizens’ society” is a field parallel to the state, a system of many checks and balances on state power. In his account, civil society encompasses three aspects: the market economy, volunteer organizations, and an independent judiciary. This way, the relationship between state and society is a dual one; in today’s use of “state and society” we can see that civil organizations have been understood as a mechanism for checks and balances on state power. Looking even farther back, the concept of “civil society” appeared as early as Aristotle’s Greece to explain the appearance of Greece’s city-states as “civilized societies” with “political” activities. This concept and its connotations appeared early in Western society and has had broad effects. Many thinkers have since considered civil society a kind of ideal state of society, a social order with citizens’ freedoms as its foundation, a free order. In the most extreme case there could be governance without government. Engagement between all citizens using free contracts according to the rules of recognized “law” should satisfy everyone’s needs in terms of public affairs. Take for example Kant’s “common law civil society” in which each individual pursues those things he deems to be good; the only precondition is that each individual so acting also recognizes that each other individual is also pursuing the social freedoms they deem good. The rules helping individuals coordinate between these equal freedoms are the principles of common law. Locke wrote that the only rational form of political society is a “civil society” in which a government is authorized by a voluntary federation of citizens. de Tocqueville called voluntary associations the bedrock of American democracy. Polanyi’s “natural order”, Hayek’s “naturally occurring order” and Ostrom’s “multi-centric governance” are all civil society concepts founded on the notion of some free order and emphasize social order rooted in citizens’ self-governance. As a form of idealized society, “civil society” assumes citizens freedoms to be the root of social order, the principle of common law, and the formation of society, government and state out of citizens’ free federation and self-governing behavior. Citizens free alliances, or civil organizations, are the foundation for all of social order. The notion that Western civil society has already surpassed civil organizations as the “third sector” of public governance is obviously


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related to numerous systemic preconditions in Western society. In the earliest concepts of civil society, institutional arrangements were treated with utmost importance, such as constitutional law, individual freedoms/citizens’ rights, top-bottom allocation of rights, mechanisms for democratic public policy-making, limited government and diverse values. These have already become the background to society’s functioning. Tensions they face in contemporary society stem from low government efficiency and dilemmas of social benefits; their resolution will require new mechanisms for social services and reforms in models of public administration. The systemic background of a transforming state like China, however, is different; the greatest challenge facing transforming states is rearranging structures of political power. The systemic preconditions proper to Western societies are exactly what China most urgently needs to face today. Thus, it needs all the more to begin with a logic of social order when viewing relationships between civil organizations and government. On this view, there are two basic models for civil organization-government relationships: a political society with citizens’ self-governance as its foundation and a civil sphere under centralized political power. Put another way: government, formed top-down by society or society, formed top-down by government. China’s transformations, underway since the Late Qing, are in fact a series of shocks brought on by different logics of order. It has been a transformation from top-down to bottom-up orders. Legalities of different sources of power bring with them tensions in the social order. In the last 30 of the process, the market economy has ushered in a topdown order. The next power transformation, however, is obstructed by systemic barriers. This reform process, led by administrative power, has exhibited downward shifts in public affairs, transfers of public responsibilities, difficulties in increasing citizens’ powers and continued centralization of power. The current lack of systemic space for citizens’ powers will further raise barriers to future transformations in the order. 5.2. Citizens’ Powers and Administrative Powers: Escalation over 30 Years of the Reform and Opening Looking back at the path traced by 30 years of civil society development in China, we see a series of tense, undulating arcs. According to statistics compiled by He Jianyu on trends in the establishment of social

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groups over time, the trend of China’s social groups has three main features: first, from 1949 to 1970 they gradually rippled upward, stopping from 1970 to 1980. After 1980, they arced dramatically upward, displaying the general trend of rapid growth since in civil organizations since the beginning of the Reform and Opening.9 Second, after 1980, three troughs appear in their growth, corresponding to 1984, 1990 and 1996. These represent times of tightened legal restrictions on social groups and the “clean-up and restructuring”. Third, these three trenches were still different. 1984’s dip was short-lived and development resurged quickly to a total of 200,000 groups in early 1989. The dip in 1990, related to institution of new registration rules, resulted in a drop to 116,000 organizations in 1991, a figure that reached 180,000 in 1992 and then leveled off. In the five years starting in 1996, the number of registered social groups underwent a sustained decline that did not bottom until 2001, after which it took five more years, until 2006 to return to 1996’s levels. After ten years of dips, in 2007, the number of registered social groups returned to 1989’s levels, a span of almost 20 years. In order to understand these changes, it will help to review the history of policy toward civil organizations in China. The history of China’s civil organizations begins in the Late Qing, at the beginning of the 20th Century. At that time, a number of political, economic and social organizations had been established. Research shows that from 1912 to 1921, Jiangsu Province alone had 1403 social groups. Between the founding of the PRC to the beginning of the Reform and Opening in 1978, China underwent periods of the first “clean-up and restructuring”, development and cessation. In 1950, the State Council issues the Provisional Measures on Social Group Registration and Administration《社会团体登记管理暂行办法》; then, in 1951, the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisional Measures《社会团体登记管理暂行办法实施细则》were released, mandating that the Ministry of the Interior and the corresponding levels of government be responsible for the registration and administration of social groups. After this reform of the traditional system for social groups, the number of groups registered under the new system gradu何建宇/He Jianyu, “中国的社团革命——勾勒中国人的结社的全景图”/ “zhongguo de tuan jie ge ming—gou le zhongguo ren de jie she de quan jing tu” (Chinese University of Hong Kong, PhD dissertation). (“China’s Unity Revolution—a Summary of the Associations of the Chinese People”) 9


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ally increased. At the start of the Cultural Revolution, the number of nationwide-level social groups had reached 100 and the number of local-level groups had reached 6000. After rapid growth from 1978 to 2001, civil organizations experienced both a “clean-up and restructuring” and further development. Shifts in the system following the Reform and Opening opened up new space for Chinese society. Civil society demonstrated its dynamism and developed robustly starting in 1980. Corresponding to the sizeable growth of social groups, on November 17, 1984, the Central Committee and the State Council issued a Notice Concerning the Strict Control of Nationwide-Level Organizations《关于严格控制全国性组织的通知》that clarified departmental responsibilities for social group inspections and approvals, required that nationwidelevel groups receive final approval from the State Commission for Reforming the Economic System and called for the first clean-up and restructuring since the Reform and Opening. In 1988, a Social Group Administration Office was established in the Ministry of Civil Affairs and administration of social groups became the domain of the Ministry. Even with these restrictions, by the beginning of 1989, nationwide-level social groups had reached 1600 in number, 16 times the number at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Local social groups, meanwhile, had grown from 6000 in number to 200,000, an increase of 33 times. In October of 1989, the State Council released the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration《社会团体登记管理条例》. The Regulations formally established a “dual administration system” while calling for yet another clean-up and restructuring requiring them to register once again. Following this re-registration, by year-end 1991, nationwide-level groups numbered 836 while local groups numbered 116,000. In 1992, the number of nationwide-level groups that had completed registration reached 1200 and local groups’ numbers reached 180,000, or roughly the same level as at the beginning of 1989. For the next five years, their numbers remained fairly constant. After 1996, a great deal of attention was devoted to the issue of civil organizations and the long process of cleaning-up and restructuring was begun. In July of 1996, the CCP Central Political Committee specially researched the question of civil organizations. On August 28 of the same year, the General Offices of the Central Committee and the State Council issued the “Notice Concerning Strengthening Social

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Group and People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Administration Work” and requested another restructuring of social groups and people-run non-enterprise units and stricter standards for approvals in order to control numbers. In October of 1998, after the release of the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration and the passage of the Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration and Administration, the Ministry of Civil Affairs established the Civil Organizations Administration Bureau. On January 11, 1999, the General Offices of the Central Committee and the State Council issued the “Notice Concerning Further Strengthening Social Group Administration Work” (中办发[1999]34号). The Notice called for the partial adjustment of the dual administration and separate level administration systems and required that “work supervising units” (业务主管单位) be closely responsible for civil organizations’ registration applications, political thought work, Party-building, financial and personnel management, research activities, external relations, receipts of international donations, and adherence to their articles of incorporation. In April of 2004, the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the Provisional Measures on Punishing Illegal Civil Organizations《取缔非法民间组织暂行办法》. After year after year of clean-ups and restructurings, as well as strengthening of the dual administration system, in the years from 1996 to 2001, the total number of social groups having completed legal registration dropped annually by 1.6%, 8.3%, 17.5%, 4.6%, and 1.5% respectively. Overall, their numbers dropped from 185,000 in 1996 to 129,000 in 2001. From 2001 until today, the number of registered social groups has grown annually by 3.1%, 6.8%, 7.7%, 9.8%, 10.7%, and 11.3%, respectively, and by 2007 had been restored to 207,000 in total. Despite the staggered pattern of increasing civil powers and strengthened government controls, starting in 1990, the government pursued a different line of thinking on civil organizations: nurturing their growth. In 1993, the Fourteenth Central Committee decided to bolster industrial and commercial associations; 1998’s Tenth FiveYear Plan introduced the idea of nurturing and development social intermediary organizations; in 2003, the Sixteenth Central Committee devoted considerable attention to the development of new economic organizations and social groups; and the Seventeenth Central Committee expounded on the development of social organizations. The results of these dual logics of administrative supervision and nurtured growth were carefully-considered control and selective support of civil


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organizations; at the same time, these logics also affected the registration classification system and its directions.10 The growth of civil organizations in China since the Reform and Opening and the development of their relationship with the government can be summarized as a process of escalations between citizens’ powers and administrative powers, or the government’s key control and selective support of civil organizations and civil organizations’ growth outside legal frameworks. First, the systemic shifts of the Reform and Opening opened up a new space for the growth of civil power. Civil organizations exhibited an overall trend of growth, and their demand for growth and the force of their development gradually increased. Second, as civil organizations grew, the government gradually increased its measures for civil organization administration and control; this was especially apparent in periods of loss of social control, times which were usually accompanied by drops in the development of civil organizations.11 The main aim of controlling civil organizations is political control. Politics and fields related to public policy became the main focal points of control, and restrictive measures were put in place in fields such as foreign involvement, religion, ethnic minorities, specified groups, and social science research. Third, with the progress of social reforms and the needs of the government’s transformations, the trend in civil organization policy has been a shift from a focus on control to a focus on selective support. The government’s support has been focused on industry organizations, community organizations and charitable service organizations. Important methods of the government’s selective nurture include guidance or direct participation in civil organizations, and may be accompanied by financial support, tax advantages, service contracting or policy support. The combination of key controls and selective nurture strengthened controls and administrative powers. While the government’s control and guidance

10 The relationship between administrative supervision and nurtured growth has changed as well. The original formulation of “administrative supervision and nurtured growth” is now referred to as “nurtured growth and administrative supervision” reflecting a change in the government’s attitude toward civil organizations. 11 Xie Haiding’s (谢海定) research on laws pertaining to social groups has also shown that “almost every time new legislation is issued, the number of civil organizations that have completed legal registration decreases rapidly.” 谢海定/Xie Haiding, “中国民间组织的合法性困境”/“zhongguo min jian zu zhi de he fa xing kun jing,” in 法学研究/fa xue yan jiu (2004.2). (“Legal Dilemmas of China’s Civil Organizations” in Legal Research).

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can effectively meet demand for social services, their effectiveness is limited when it comes to citizens’ demands for personal rights, including the right of association; the space the government can provide for the growth of citizens’ powers is limited. Systemic space has been gradually been exhausted by economic reforms. The tension between administrative powers and controls and the demand for citizens’ freedoms will require new system reforms to open up more space for development. 5.3. The Growth Point of Citizens’ Powers In recent years, extremely new forms and trends have become visible that are manifestations of the growth of citizens’ powers. The following developments are worth noting: First, citizens are participating in guiding interests. Unlike the “guiding participation” (导向的参与) available to citizens in early periods, like during the Nu River Incident, we are now seeing more and more participation and self-organizing around self-interests. Examples of this include property owners forming committees to protect their rights and relocated peasants expressing their appeals. In recent years, two major incidents, the Xiamen PX Project and the Beijing Haidian Liulitun Waste Incineration Plant, that generated broad participation from stakeholders in society. In both cases, organizers’ movements were swift; they used the Internet, media, and intra-system resources like the Political Consultative Conference and the People’s Congress; their mobilization capacity was substantial; and, in the end, in both instances organizers managed to affect policy outcomes. In this area, the interest incentive is the root of citizen participation. Participation in the guiding of interests is one of the main forms of citizen participation in advanced nations, an integral part of interest group politics. Legally permissible forms of citizen participation in China are evolving from completely “for-public” forms to “private” forms of interest guiding; this process can also be viewed as a kind of growth of citizens’ powers. Second, the diverse development of grassroots organizations. More and more grassroots organizations are appearing, and not just in the main public service fields like environmental protection, AIDS prevention, aid for the handicapped and elderly, agricultural economic organizations, and community building. In some very unique, micro-


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focused areas, grassroots organizations are also appearing, like Star Harbor for households that have lost their only child and 1kg.org, launched by outdoor enthusiasts. They are constantly innovating new forms of citizens’ organizations, including some that reach micro-levels overlooked by larger-scale organizations, and are forming a trend of new, diverse citizen self-organizing. Third, enterprise leaders and popular figures are participating in public-interest work. Enterprise leaders and popular figures, including retired politicians, are a powerful group. They have or can mobilize resources. Their entrance into the public-interest field, like in the traditional help model, creates powerful momentum around publicinterest work and raises the profile of social, public-interest work. At the same this group, and especially entrepreneurs, have a wealth of social innovation concepts. The rise of social entrepreneurs, for example, will contribute to the growing power of civil society and bring new opportunities. Fourth, there has been a rise of Internet-based coalitions. Even though legal restrictions on social formation of coalitions or Internet structures are still in place, in reality, many kinds of Internet-based coalitions have appeared. Because they represent a kind of demand inherent to a certain phase of civil society’s development, they have strong internal driving power. Interestingly, many government departments recognize, and even encourage and help grassroots organizations and Internet coalitions to grow. In fields like environmental protection, AIDS prevention and community development, for example, the government has actively created platforms to advance social and grassroots organizations’ development and cooperation. This phenomenon is ample proof of the necessity and real demand for Internet coalitions on the part of social organizations. Fifth, the public space provided by the media and the Internet is one in which citizens can interact. The media’s perception of the market economic system and the technological progress of the Internet are important driving forces behind the development of civil society and are crucial parts of civil society. The Internet and the media have played indispensable roles in the vast majority of actions organized through citizen participation and civil society. Sixth, a plethora of foundations, public-interest venture capital firms, incubators, capacity centers, information centers and other civil society support organizations have appeared. After the implementation of 2004’s Regulations on Foundation Administration, non-public funding

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foundations have enjoyed a positive environment for growth and have been gaining momentum. Besides the old information centers, the entry of public-interest venture capital, incubators, support-type organizations and other new innovations and concepts into China’s civil society is a boon that has the potential to help launch many involved in its development and help them do more with less. Seventh, international NGOs have entered China and China’s social organizations have begun playing a role internationally. On the one hand, this includes the arrival of the Gates Foundation and other major foundations as well as international, capacity-building organizations and others with new organizational forms that either hope to or have already arrived in China. On the other hand, China’s Foreign Ministry is also assisting qualified Chinese social organizations speed their way to United Nations Consultant status. In the development of China’s civil society, citizen participation, civil society organization, coalitions and networks, international liaisons, departmental relationships and cooperation, and platforms to support civil society have all been weak links; it also happens that citizens’ powers have been advancing in just these areas. It appears that China’s civil society is producing its own development logic and is experiencing holistic evolution. In legal and policy aspects pertaining to civil organizations, legal supervisions, preferential tax policies, opinions on promoting industry associations and discussions of a charity law are all examples of ongoing reforms and improvements. However, changes to key systems for association approval and dual administration still face major systemic challenges. As we have discussed, as citizens’ demands for freedoms and rights increase, if the social order is unable to absorb citizens’ powers, then destabilizing pressures will continue to mount. Therefore, expanding the system’s capacity for freedoms and space for citizens’ freedoms has already become key to future systemic transformations. 5.4. Principles of the Growth of Civil Organization-Government Relationships The relationship between civil organizations and the government is at its root a question about the organizing logic of the social order. That is, is a society based on a public order formed from bottom-up citizens’ autonomous self-governance, or is it based on a controlled order established on a top-down logic? In open and “information-ized” societies, the recognition and exultation of the value of individuals is an


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inviolable principle. A bottom-up, organized social construction must be the foundation for any diverse, democratic society that respects individual rights and has individual responsibilities. Therefore, the civil organizations-governments relationship should develop along the principles of dynamic citizens and social self-governance. Society must abide by the principles of promoting cognition, increasing interaction, respecting one another’s equality, cooperating in functional areas and promote civil society’s formation and growth. In its management of relationships with civil organizations, the government should keep the “assistance principle”, originated in France and Germany, in mind. The principle is based on building bottom-up relationships from individuals, to households, to communities, to local governments, and to central governments. Observation of this principle means that wherever the lower level of society can accomplish some task by itself, the next layer up should not interfere; only when the level below cannot accomplish some task should the next level up take it on. At the same time, the upper level’s role in this governance behavior should be as giver of assistance and help. In sum, it must be recognized that dynamic and responsible citizens, advanced civil organizations and civil society, and legally-limited administrative powers are the preconditions to transforming from political rule to a system of public government and to realizing public value.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS’ GROWTH AND SOCIETY’S RECONSTRUCTION Tao Chuanjin In Western society, along with development of market economies and industrialization, society experienced a change in form. Eminent writers of Western sociology such as Weber, Durkheim, Tonnies and others have described this change using their own terminology. This was taking place over 100 years ago. In China, in the 1940s, Fei Xiaotong used the formulation of a transformation from “a society of familiars” to “a society of strangers” to express similar changes.1 However, in Chinese society, the greatest changes have happened in the last 30 years since 1978. In this period of time, a market economy has been introduced; society has a new systemic foundation; and the old society has started to fundamentally collapse. This requires social rebuilding; it requires, in this time of social cracking, building of a completely new society. Viewing the growth of NGOs over the last 30 years from this angle offers us worthwhile perspectives. 1. An Era of Rural Society’s Rapid Dismantlement 1.1. Fragmentation of Rural Society He Bing’s “fragmentation” of rural society is a fitting expression for the changes modernization has brought to traditional Chinese society.2

1 费孝通/Fei Xiaotong, 乡土中国/xiang tu zhongguo, (bei jing san lian shu dian, 1981[1948]). (Rural China) 2 何兵/He Bing, 利害的分配－我们身边的法律/li hai de fen pei—wo men shen bian de fa lv, (shang hai san lian shu dian, 2005) 40–41. (Advantages and Disadvantages of Allocation: the Laws Beside Us)

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I quote him here because his concept contains two original judgments: “rural society” and “fragmentation”. What is rural society? In the author’s view “rural society is a society of familiars. People are born of them and raised by them; they sing with them and cry with them.” Typically, rural society is developed in village units. People in the village interact tightly based on relationships with common “familiars”, resulting in a village collective body.3 The village collective body takes on the functions of mutual help among villagers, providing rules for sharing village land, and providing the basis for daily social interactions. Within the village unit, the population tends to be stationary; the economy is based on subsistence; there is a degree of exclusion; and a union of blood relations and local relations is the primary state of the community. In it, the government’s administrative powers and controls are relatively weak; therefore, civil self-governance can be employed to a certain degree and leave a fairly large space for rule by the elders of the clan. However, in today’s social lives, and especially as the boundaries of economic life have overwhelmed village restrictions, ways of interacting have also broken through the old method of interacting with familiars. The change signifies the destruction of the old social patterns. This is precisely the meaning of social fragmentation. The fragmentation of traditional society is also the moment after which society no longer collects people together into one body. Following fragmentation, the distance between people increases; at the same time, shared traditions and beliefs are lost and orders between people structured around morals also crumble. Our use of social disintegration refers precisely to this point. Furthermore, the need for society’s rebuilding sits upon precisely this foundation. 1.2. The Process of Society’s Rapid and Accelerating Disintegration Beginning with the Reform and Opening Rural fragmentation, in fact, began before the Reform and Opening. Fei Xiaotong described these kinds of changes as early as 1948 in Rural China. But this period of rapid, accelerating changes began in the

3

Ibid., 1.

civil organizations’ growth and society’s reconstruction

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beginning of 1978 with the Reform and Opening. From that moment, market economic elements began to gradually enter the social domain, causing a kind of fundamental change in social relations: relationships based on reciprocity between people were replaced by self interestdriven relationships based on exchanges of equal value. “The arrivals of the Age of Commodities and democracy have come to signify the disappearance of community. Market, states, or simply modernization have wiped out the values underpinning a kind of governance based on family and belonging that has endured for all of history.”4 Also, in the market economic system, the pursuit of economic efficiency demands that people migrate out of the bounds of clans, localities and even nations. Villages are no longer a natural stage for people’s daily interactions as they once were. People entered villagetownship enterprises, migrated to counties, and entered the cities as workers. Boundaries between familiars and strangers were blurred; special social relationships came under severe attack; and regular trust relationships had yet to be formed. In this sense, rural society and market economic modernization are two systemic states that are difficult to reconcile. It must be noted here that Chinese society consists of two markedly different pieces: village society and urban society. If it is appropriate to say that village society and the currently disintegrating rural society are the same, we cannot use the same description for urban society. In fact, it may be more appropriate to use the term “renqing society” (人情的社会, could be translated “reciprocity society”) to capture the commonalities between the two. But we might adopt an even more flexible perspective and view urban society as a new form that follows the disintegration of village society. If we view it just as a transition from the rural society form to a new form, then we do not need to describe some new, specific form and we can still employ the term “rural society” as before. That the urban population was less than 20% of China’s total population at the beginning of the Reform and Opening makes it that much easier to make this decision.

4 Bowles, S.; Gintis, H. 2002. Social Capital and Community Governance. Economic Journal 112 (483): 419–436.

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1.3. The Need to Rebuild Society The disintegration of one society requires the building of another. When we come to the point when a rural society, facing the incompatibility of village and urban economies, is no longer realistic, we long for a new form of society. But what is it? Where is it? What efforts will its building require? Some consider this problem from the angle of social integration. He Bing’s strategy for rebuilding is law: “In times of extraordinary changes in morals, law becomes common belief; when traditional authority wanes daily, the court takes the place of the sacred temple.”5 The writer’s implication is that law should become the authority of the new era in realizing social integration. Coincidentally, this has also been a “prescription” for cracks in the old patterns of Western society. Durkheim, in On the Division of Labor in Society, discusses how morals must make way for laws: “pure moral norms are not longer the essence of morals. The scope of legal restoration has already expanded far beyond collective consciousness, even consciousness itself. The more the law itself is completed, more distant from collective consciousness it gets.”6 Many scholars agree with this point. They feel that morals are no longer able to play the role of organizing social structures and aligning the various forces of society. As a replacement, the only choice is to let a strengthened law play these roles. 1.4. Problems in Society’s Rebuilding As a part of restructuring society based on law, the attachment of lost authority to law seems at first to be prudent and reasonable. However, the concept of rebuilding society based on law is susceptible to three kinds of potentially fatal attacks. First, lost not only are society’s rules, but even more so, a kind of harmonious and intimate social space in which people interact, the social collective. We cannot expect the law to provide this space. If the law provides only an integrated society, but not a society with collective life, then it will fail to satisfy people. The loss of the collective body in the passage from traditional society to modern society is a somewhat heavy topic, and one that has been

He Bing, Advantages and Disadvantages, 43. 埃米尔. 涂尔干; 渠东, 译/Ai Mi Er· Tu Er Gan; Liang Dong, trans., 社会分工论/she hui fen gong lun, (shang hai san lian shu dian, 2000) 75. (Emile Durkheim, On the Division of Labor in Society). 5 6


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reflected upon in depth by scholars from ancient times until today. Social changes in Western Europe 100 years ago caused people to feel a sense of loss. In 1887, the German sociologist Tonnies, in order to call people back to their homeland, hoped to rebuild intimate, humanistic groups in which “moving about people encounter friends, they help another in keeping watch, and they assist one another in times of illness”. He also introduced the concept of “community”. The debate over whether community has been lost has not ceased since. The disintegration of the collective is perhaps expressed as increasing distance in relations between people; village neighbors, clans, households and familiars are all increasingly taking on a sense of otherness. Thus, we have searched high and low for ways to rebuild society; even so, we often encounter the quagmire of there being a locality, but no community. If we view rural society as only serving the function of social integration, then we are mistaken. Second, laws are nothing more than rules and clauses; plain clauses can be implemented in society according to people’s wishes and have the effects people wished them to have. In order for them to survive, laws must have designated social foundations; otherwise they can be used like the powers of a totalitarian state. The notion of achieving social integration by substituting laws for traditional morals is also problematic. The difficulty is that law’s survival depends on a social foundation for the implementation of rules. The effective implementation of law depends on people’s acceptance of common rules, but the mark left on Chinese by traditional, special relationships in society is exactly the opposite of this. The loose, dispersed pattern left after society’s disintegration is not enough to maintain the smooth application of law. Gao Hongjun has written that “traditional law was usually expressed as a law of custom. It was blended together with the practices of daily life; the rules and the reality were almost without conflict7 . . . the people of a given society have tacit understandings of these rules as laws. The rules are an expression of reality and reality is a vehicle of the rules; the two are in complete harmony, an integral whole. But in modern, rule of law society, there is a clear conflict between the rules and reality.”8

7 高鸿钧/Gao Hongjun, “现代法治的困境及其出路”/“xian dai fa zhi de kun jing ji qi chu lu,” in 法学研究/fa xue yan jiu, (2003, Vol. 2) 12. (“Challenges and Solutions in Modern Rule of Law” in Legal Research) 8 Ibid., 28.

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Third, the foundation of democratic politics, or more broadly speaking of participation in public governance, is not the law. We have already begun to be concerned about people’s democratic quality, ability to participate, autonomous consciousness and how they can gain a sense of empowerment. None of these issues can be resolved by the law. It is crucial here to point out that in traditional society, public society’s participation in rural public matters was based on familiarity and relationships between members of the community. Certain internal norms existed between them that allowed for internal information and the smooth resolution of many matters in the collective.9 In modern society, however, these local bonds have already disintegrated; this has led to the rise of democratic participation and principles, both of which are based on formal systems. Democracy, however, requires its own set of social resources, resources that form the foundation for people’s democratic participation and the maintenance of formal systems. As Inglehart & Welzel have demonstrated, the possibility of effective democracy is very low unless it is accompanied by deep tolerance, trusts and participation.10 Our current democratic participation exhibits and confirms this conclusion. For example, in this country, failures of people to participate in self-governance in both villages and urban communities have plagued both village society and urban society in during this transformative era of disintegration.11 Bowles, S.; Gintis, H. Social Capital. 419–436. Inglehart, R.; Welzel, C. 2003. Political Culture and Democracy—Analyzing Cross-Level Linkages. Comparative Politics 36 (1): 61–+. 11 See 赵晋泰/Zhao Jintai, “村民自治中的政治冷漠现象分析”/“cun min zi zhi zhong de zheng zhi leng mo xian xiang fen xi,” in 理论探索/li lun tan suo, (2007, Vol. 1). (“Analysis of the Problem of Political Detachment in Village SelfGovernance” in Theoretical Explorations); 雷悦/Lei Yue “以政治文化透视村民自治中的消极参与”/“yi zheng zhi wen hua xiu shi cun min zi zhi zhong de xiao ji can yu,” in 辽宁行政学院学报/liao ning xing zheng xue yuan xue bao, (2007, Vol. 2) (“Understanding Negative Participation in Village Self-Governance from the Perspective of Political Culture” in the Liaoning Institute of Administration Journal ); 罗晓蓉, 花传国/Luo Xiaorong, Hua Chuanguo, “推动城市社区参与, 促进社会和谐”/“tui dong cheng shi she qu can yu, cu jin she hui he xie,” in 江西行政学院学报/jiang xi xing zheng xue yuan xue bao, (2005, Vol. 4) (“Furthering Participation in Urban Communities, Promoting Social Harmony” in Jiangxi Institute of Administration Journal ); 马卫经, 黄泌蕾, 桂勇/Ma Weijing, Huang Milei, Gui Yong, “上海市居民社区参与意愿影响因素分析”/“shang hai shi ju min she qu can yu yi wang ying xiang yin su fen xi,” in 社会/ she hui, (2000, Vol. 6) 14–16. (“Factors Affecting Shanghai Urban Residents’ Willingness for Community Participation” in Society) 9

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2. NGOs will Become the Foundation for a New Society What we need is a completely new society upon whose foundation we can build rule of law, democracy and a most basic living collective. What form, then, should this completely new society take? In this aspect, our theoretical work tells us that there is basically only one kind of society capable of meeting these functional demands: a society based on NGOs, otherwise known as civil society. In our view, the collective relationships of rural and local areas before are currently shifting to NGOs; the role of blood and local relations will diminish and the factors making people want to form organizations will strengthen. NGOs especially are capable of keeping their “promise” to social, functional foundations and resolve the problems above. In the following sections, we will visit several recent events to get a glimpse of whether this completely new society is already beginning to form; whether we are already building it; and whether the form of new society we are aiming for will have the effects we expect. 2.1. The Needs of the Collective Body From Western society to China’s current reality, attempts to rely on local community to chart the path forward for the collective have faced more and more serious challenges. As early as 100 years ago, people’s means of existence have detached from household and community and entered organized society. In Tonnies’ concept, this is called society’s replacement of community. The replacement of local communities with modern organizations compounded with our real need for community, has forced us to return to the original significance of community: it refers to a relatively fixed system of intimate relationships between people, not a geographicallydefined, living “area” (小区). Therefore, when it is difficult for us to satisfy our need for the collective with “living areas” (生活小区), we may need to consider the formation of team-like organizations by age groups or by other organizations in our living areas. Among all organizational forms, enterprises clearly receive the most attention. When we leave our homes in pursuit of a way to sustain ourselves, we most often find ourselves in enterprise organizations. Thus, we have come to expect that our most basic emotional needs can find satisfaction there. For example, as our world becomes more and more secular, some enterprises have even taken on an aspect of

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“sacredness”; their interest in emphasizing spiritual aspects is increasing. “Enterprises provide breakfast for employees who wish to pray, organize bible study, and set missions; these measures help employees search for meaning in life and feel a sense of work security”.12 “Locuses for legal satisfaction of spiritual needs have entered the workplace; some published works include: Healing Managers, Being a Servant Leader, and Spirit of Caring”.13 Theories on organizations have posited that enterprises can satisfy people’s needs for collective bodies. Here we can see the emphasis on interpersonal relationships in organizations and how we should apply people’s needs for relationships as an incentive in order to increase efficiency in production. A school of organizational theory known as normativism posits that organizations are, or should be, collectives, guiding models or communities, or groups or cultures; it posits that organizations are locuses for sharing values, locuses for moral involvement. The boundaries between working and not working, between managers and workers, are blurred; harmony and loyalty are the wellspring of productivity.14 However, in enterprise organizations, even if they do pursue a kind of collective life, it is instrumental; the enterprise’s end goal is still to produce profit for the enterprise. Take, for example, a school or organizational theory opposed to normativism. In rationalism, productivity comes from deliberate calculations and systems; enterprises are described as machines, machinery or calculators. They can be broken into components, altered and reassembled into more effective wholes. Interestingly, these two schools have exhibited a cyclical pattern: in an economic cycle (say, a 50 year cycle), when the economy prospers, rationalism begins to appear; when the economy retracts, then emphasis on the individual tends to appear.15 We can see that attempts to satisfy people’s needs for the collective in the organizational space are unlikely to succeed in profit-seeking organizations.

12 Grant, Don, Kathleen M. O’Neil and Laura S. Stephens. 2003.Neosecularization and Craft Versus Professional Religious Authority in a Nonreligious Organization. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 42(3): 479–487. 480–481. 13 Ibid., 481. 14 Barley, Stephen R.; Kunda, Gideon. 1992. Design and Devotion: Surge of Rational and Normative Ideologies of Control in Managerial Discourse. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 363–399, 384. 15 Ibid., 391.


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In actuality, we have three kinds of organizations: public organizations with administrative organizations at their cores, enterprise organizations, and NGOs. Of the three, the hierarchy of interpersonal relationships is evident in the first. Interest relationships based on power are pronounced. These characteristics both detract from growth of the collective in these organizations. Empirical research has shown, for example, that when management to strengthen controls, the process weakens trust-building between people.16 The second kind of organization is almost as hierarchical as the first and also tends to be based on monetary incentives. These two characteristics also detract from formation of the collective. Therefore, it is difficult for the first two types of organizations to satisfy people’s needs for collective life. Besides these two, the characteristics of NGOs give us more reason to hope. We expect that people can find true satisfaction of their need for collective life here. Why is it that NGOs can be expected to have this “collective effect”? In reality, there are many types of NGOs. But among them, one kind expressly aims to create collective life for its members. Examples include the many kinds of local and community literary and entertainment organizations, associations based on various interests and all kinds of clubs. Among all these phenomena, it is worth noting that only within localities can real collectives be seen thriving. These collectives can be found in local community organizations; only here, in these “isolated island” organizations can we see living collectives. Besides these, we can see yet another kind of NGO. While they actively pursue social public-interest or non-profit aims, they also pursue formation of an internal collective made up of their team relationships. Their efforts for others are thus joined with their efforts for their own collective lives. That NGOs so often serve as vehicles through which people pursue collective life is related to the fundamental nature of NGOs. Though we cannot deny that individuals join NGOs out of a desire to participate in social public-interest administration and service, to a degree it is also out of a kind of volunteerism, a desire for autonomy, and a certain ineffectiveness of bureaucratic controls. Organization administrators must respect members’ needs for autonomy and

16 Teram, E.; Igra, U. 2005. Crazy Versus Epoxy Glueing: Control and Trust in the Merger of Human Service Organizations. Administration in Social Work 29 (1): 45–61.

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amicable relationship-building; NGO administrators are themselves after these same goals. Because NGOs are non-profit organizations and are not motivated by material self-interest, people are less likely to have conflicts of power or interests. Rather, people pursue social good, help others, and embody caring. In this process, interpersonal relationships are distanced from utilitarianism and forced controls and take on a character of mutually-checking relationships between people united in a goal. All of these factors contribute to formation of a collective among members of organizations. Continuing forward, we consider relationships between publicinterest NGOs and the recipients of their services. Relationships of this kind are usually formed of caring and friendship; in them lies the most secure foundation for naturally-occurring collective relationships. Lockhart performed empirical research comparing the community development work of for-profit organizations, secular NGOs and NGOs founded on religious beliefs.17 Secular NGOs were concerned with mutual respect and empowerment; religious NGOs’ unity was based on belief, and they were sometimes able to form deep, broad and sustainable relationships; for-profits emphasized work orientations, practical value, and the economic value and efficiency of helping people break from poverty. 2.2. Building a Society with Rules Horne has written that collectives with strong powers of assembly will be more likely to develop strong legal systems, while the latter will tend to weaken communities.18 This is a conclusion worth further consideration: law’s implementation must be built on certain social foundations; only when the “soil” of society is in place can laws and regulations sprout and grow. However, in reality, many laws are implemented in communities; over-dependency on law weakens those communities. Sun Yuwei and other have reached a further, almost

17 Lockhart, W.H. 2005. Building Bridges and Bonds: Generating Social Capital in Secular and Faith-Based Poverty-To-Work Programs. Sociology of Religion 66 (1): 45–60. 18 Horne, Christine. 2000. Community and the State: the Relationship between Normative and Legal Controls, European Sociological Review, 16(3): 225–243.


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identical conclusion: “the key to the difficulties of modern rule of law is the lack of civil society”.19 Approaching questions of rules and integration in modern society from the rule of law angle is in fact to mix up the causal relationship between them. As we require certain social foundations for the implementation of the law, we are also attempting to achieve social building through law. NGOs are different; they develop society by building parts or components of society internally. Given that NGOs can contribute to the formation of collective bodies, then they should be able to produce collective-internal rules as before and achieve a continuation of traditional society and a model for social integration rarely seen in modern society. The most striking characteristic of this model is that it no longer requires us to “pawn” ourselves to the law; we can live in a space not overly dependent on the cold clauses of the law or the bottom lines of the rules. These rules are capable of resolving many of our problems before involving the law: “if conflicts or disputes arise between members of a collective or different collectives, they are resolved through consultation, mediation and arbitration. Only when mediation fails or when matters involve the interests of the entire State should prosecution in the State’s formal judiciary be pursued.”20 Against China’s social background, we expect that NGOs can play even greater roles. This requires us to examine the special relationships unique to Chinese society. It is these special relationships that have led to China’s way of handling interpersonal relationships through reciprocity and not the law. So, how are not-special, common relationships produced? Do they start from the increasing distance between people? From their relationships going cold? This is clearly not a welcoming situation. We need non-special relationships formed under the condition of warm relations. They must be both warm and also common; furthermore, we make this harsh request of NGOs. “Warmth” has been preserved by NGOs because they have preserved the characteristics of living collectives. Can common relationships be produced at the 19 孙育玮, 张善根/Sun Yuwei, Zhang Shan’gen, “法制现代化与社会基础之重构——从乡土社会向市民社会转型的法理学思考”/“fa zhi xian da hua yu she hui ji chu zhi chong gou—cong xiang tu she hui xiang shi min she hui zhuan xing de fa li xue si kao,” in 政治与法律/zheng zhi yu fa lv, (2003, Vol. 3) 33. (“Modernization of the Legal System and Rebuilding Social Foundations—Legal Reflections on the Transformation From Rural Society to Urban Society” in Politics and Law) 20 Gao Hongjun, “Challenges and Solutions,” 28.

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same time? Scholars have defined civil society as a domain based on self-governance in which members of society voluntarily conduct certain activities and abide by contractual rules.21 Contractual relations are one example of the non-human-oriented, common relationships we have referred to. In them, we can see the characteristics of NGOs’ common relationships. In reality, associations are neither the same as extended family nor the same as local, neighborly relations. Associations require that people share the same goals. This applies to anyone meeting this requirement; but these requirements are not innate as with blood relations or quasi-innate as with local relations. Therefore, the commonness of these relationships exceeds that provided in the collective space of the past. 2.3. Citizen Participation in Democratic Politics-Building Today, the question of provision of public goods and services has to an extent become a question of democratic politics. Governance of villages, urban communities and industry associations has already or is currently shifting to practices that increasingly resemble bottom-up, electoral, representative, democratic politics. Democratic politics are an efficient way to govern public affairs; at the same time, they embody the values of “democracy” and “rights”. However, in reality, we come up against separate problems: people are insufficiently motivated to participate; what’s more, their democratic abilities are deficient. Some approach this issue from the angle of the relationship between the government and society and claim that the problem is due to the government’s not transferring sufficient powers. In fact, State withdrawal from power requires that society has the abilities and bottomup power to hold up its end of the balance. When society is not yet capable of entering into dialogue with the State power system, we cannot expect the complete withdrawal of top-down power. Thus, the problem lies also with society. This may be because members of soci-

21 邓正来等/Deng Zhenglai et al., “构建中国的市民社会”/“gou jian zhong guo de shi min she,” in 中国社会科学季刊/zhongguo she hui ke xue ji kan, (1992, Vol. 1). (“Building China’s Civil Society” in China Social Science Quarterly)


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ety are without sufficient feelings of self-efficacy; perhaps they are not that interested; perhaps their self-interest prevails and they lack public values. Considering this recently-lost aspect of traditional society, it is not difficult to understand the root of these difficulties. Traditional society, which has been based on position and status in society (身份制), lacks mechanisms for cultivating citizenship in the modern sense. After its disintegration and fragmentation, society is even less likely to produce these mechanisms. What kind of society, then, can cultivate people’s participatory and autonomous quality? You may imagine a society in which we are allowed to be autonomous and still have organized action. You may imagine an environment for action that makes us feel confident and capable. Yes, this environment is NGOs. Although there is plenty of proof of NGOs promoting people’s political participation, there are many explanations for this. First, let’s take a look at the “proof ”. As early as 1963, studies revealed the effects on political participation of volunteer associations. The same property has been observed in studies up to the present in Western European and North American nations; for research in this area, consult Teorell.22 As to the reasons, there are several theoretical explanations. These explanations may coexist; they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. First, there are three main reasons why people participate in public affairs: “others are unable to”, “others don’t want to”, and “no one is taking care of others.” The first theory offers a solution to the problem that “no one is interacting with and taking care of them”. To find people to interact with others requires formation of special relationships between people. Participation in NGOs is one way to form these kinds of connections. For example, Teorell’s empirical research has shows that people’s participation in volunteer organizations serves as a bridge to increase their interactions with the outside world and increase their “weak links” in the social network.23 These weak links then create more opportunities for participation and increase the chance that they will Teorell, J. 2003, “Linking Social Capital to Political Participation: Voluntary Associations and Networks of Recruitment in Sweden.” Scandinavian Political Studies 26 (1). 23 Ibid. 22

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remain active in their participation. These resources among people, in the form of weak relationships, have been discussed as a form of social capital and of course only as one form of social capital. In this area, another study compared NGOs with for-profit organizations and revealed that the former generates more social capital than the latter. NGOs, the study claims, are capable of creating connections across ethnicity, sex and class.24 A key work by the famous author Robert Putnam applies the idea of social capital to democratic governance and citizen participation networks.25 For Putnam, social capital and social associations are inseparably intertwined. Social capital consists primarily of features like trust, norms and networks that coordinate and smooth society’s functions.26 Through over 20 years of empirical research in Italy, Putnam developed an account of how social capital promotes democratic governance and economic prosperity. That is to say that the concept of social capital is significant not only for economists, but also for political scientists. Because it emphasizes collective action, organizational action, trust, norms and networks, social capital is important for society’s stability and development. Furthermore, in the eyes of some, even industry associations, as associations in the field of commerce, have a role in producing social capital and are a part of civil society.27 However, from our perspective, the lack of participation may have another reason; perhaps it’s not that “no one is taking care of others” but that “others are unable to” or that “others don’t want to”. This is because even in villages and communities where relationships between people are “strong links”, participation is still insufficient. Next we’ll discuss the second theoretical explanation by returning to de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.28 In the famous political work, he describes from a different angle the role of citizens’ associations Lockhart, W.H. “Building Bridges and Bonds”. Putnam, Robert D. 1993, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 26 In Putnam’s account, there are five dimensions of social capital: participation in public affairs, community volunteer activities, community organizing activities, informal contacts with friends, and normal social credibility. He later added “diversity of friends” as a kind of bridge-type social capital. 27 Goldsmith, Arthur A. 2002. Business Association and Better Governance in Africa, Public Administration and Development. 22, 39–49. 28 托克维尔/Tuo Ke Wei Er, 论美国的民主/lun mei guo de min zhu, (shang wu yin shu guan, 1988). (de Tocqueville, Democracy in America) 24 25


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in promoting democratic capacity. In his view, volunteer associations provide a realization of democracy within a local environment and allow people to form connections and produce corresponding policies, playing a role as a school in which to practice democracy. The democratic skills learned here can then be put to use in activities outside organizations, thereby changing from “don’t want to” to “want to”. The third theoretical account attempts to explain the issue of “others are unable”. The account goes that the more people that people feel like their roles are important the more they participate in collective actions; the less they feel certain of it, the less they participate.29 Therefore, the strengthened feeling of self-efficacy that accompanies participation in volunteer organizations is what promotes political participation. This effect of strengthening self-efficacy comes from NGOs’ operational autonomy. NGOs have more autonomous space, fewer controls on their actions, and place more trust in actors. This stands in stark contrast with government-commanded controls on actions. Thus, grassroots volunteer organizations promote political participation in at least three ways. In turn, they cultivate people’s democratic consciousness and increase their recognition of the value of citizenship; they provide richer social capital, the formation of which is aided by their strengthening of ties among participants; and they increase people’s sense of self-efficacy (people feeling like they are “able”) which increases the chance that they will participate. 3. A New, NGO-Based Society is Now Forming In this section, we use real events to illustrate the following conclusion: a new, NGO-based society is now forming. On the one hand, this is a natural trend manifest in the development of global society; on the other, this has been the fundamental goal of China’s Reform and Opening. This is welcome news. As we described above, an NGO-based society is our best hope for a modern society.

29 For example, Chen, Xiao-Ping; Au, Wing Tung; Komorita, S.S. 1996. Sequential Choice in a Step-Level Public Goods Dilemma: The Effects of Criticality and Uncertainty. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65(1): 37–47.

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3.1. A Natural Trend of Social Change A study by Stern and Barley compared the number and sizes of American organizations in 1852 and 1950.30 In 1852, non-governmental organizations primarily consisted of churches while there was also a small number of local, charity organizations as well as political parties. In 1952, 1.5 million workers were union members and at least half of farmers were involved in the three major agricultural associations. Most industries were dominated by a few large-scale corporations and each industry had at least one industry association; trades formed trade associations; innumerable special interest groups also vied for their interests. These organizations were not only numerous, but large in scale and well-organized. Their emergence has been called the organizational revolution. In the past, people existed in their communities and households; now, organizations have taken the place of households. People have already become members of organizations, work in organizations and live in organizations. In the organizations described by the writer, we see the prominent status of NGOs. Now, half a century later, China is witnessing a rise of the same forms that appeared in America in the 1950s: industry, agricultural and trade associations and all kinds of charity organizations. We need only point to the growth in the numbers of these three kinds of civil organizations in the last 20 years in China. 3.2. A State-Led Social Change Movement In the last 30 years, we can see the effects of bottom-up grassroots organizations; we can also see the stimulating effects of organizations from abroad on our civil society. But most fundamentally, we can see a vast number of State-led social changes. Therefore, while we often criticize the conservatism of the government’s policies NGOs, we must not overlook the fact that the government is and has been the main force behind social changes.

30 Stern, R.N.; Barley, S.R. 1996. Organizations and Social Systems: Organization Theory’s Neglected Mandate. Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (1): 146–162.


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3.2.1. Fundamental Changes in Society’s Market Economy Foundations The establishment of the market economy has been the axis of the Reform and Opening. Society based on market economics fundamentally changed the dominant patterns of rural society and hastened the disintegration of the old social foundations; we’ve discussed this above. At the same time, it was the establishment of a society based on market economics that induced significant growth of NGOs. From the Reform and Opening until today, the establishment of the market economy in Chinese society has been a step-by-step transition from planned economics to markets. In this period, society’s economic system has undergone a series of major reforms. These included many theories and principles for action including mottoes like: “state-run and collective economies are China’s basic economic forms; within a certain scope, laborers’ self-employed economy is a supplement to the public-ownership economic system”; “uphold the state-run economy’s dominant position and develop multiple economic forms”; “socialism’s theory of a planned, commodity economy is socialism’s theoretical opening phase”; “the public-ownership system shall occupy the main body while multiple forms of ownership economic systems develop together”; and “self-employed, privately-owned and other forms of non-public ownership economic systems are an important part of a socialist market economy.” We can see that the establishment of the market economy has been a difficult, step-by-step, cautious process. As a comparison, this is helpful for us to predict what kinds of difficulties we will face in building civil society. The role of the market in civil society is perplexing, but the establishment of the market economy had at least two irreplaceable effects: first, the growth of markets has led to the scaling back of State power, which has in turn carved out space for social power. Therefore, even though markets are a different sector from civil society, even though they are considered by some to be the “colonizers” of civil society, as far as its role in pushing government aside to create autonomous space, markets have had the same effect as NGOs. Second, market-type social relationships disintegrated traditional rural society, necessitating the emergence of a new kind of society. In this sense, an examination of the growth of civil society cannot but take into account the establishment of the market economy. It is precisely for this reason that the pre-Reform and Opening duality between a powerful State and rural society was transformed, after the Reforms, into today’s complex,

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embryonic form made of three sectors: government, markets and civil society. 3.2.2. NGOs Enter Industry and Commerce Subsequent to the establishment of the market economy, the appearance of social organizations (industry associations) in the core of the market economy was an inevitable trend. Although their appearance cannot be portrayed as a typical example of the emergence of civil society, it still illustrates a process of self-organization on the part of groups of social, public entrepreneurs. The appearance of the first industry associations is a process that cannot be separated from top-down State power. Before, we referred to them merely as the embodiment of the transfer of government functions; in reality, however, their appearance was actively guided and aided by the transfer of power to an entirely new kind of civil society organization and by active promotion of their growth. The social changes in this field can be summarized as changes to three channels. • Government administrative function: government department→ transferred to industry associations and other social organizations. • Government administrative function: government department→public institution→market-based for-profit intermediary organization. • Government service function: The forms here are more complex, including the transformation of public institutions into market-based for-profit organizations, the duplication of services in the market, and governmental formation of service organizations. Accompanying these changes was the growth of NGOs, the most prevalent of which were industry associations. Emerging even more prevalently were economic-type social groups and market-based people-run non-enterprise units. The earliest industry associations in China were the China Food Industry Association and the China Packaging Technology Association. After they led the way, a multitude of others followed. By 1987, there were 71 nationwide-level industry associations; by 1994, the official, registered, number rose to 160; and by year-end 1997, the industry association system counted 208 “State First Level” associations. In December of 1998, the China Industrial and Economic Association


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changed its name to the China Federation of Industrial Economics, and became the federated organization representing all of China’s industry associations.31 By April of 1999, the number of nationwidelevel industry associations had reached 480.32 Besides industry associations, there are many other organizations of this type. According to a national survey performed by our own Tsinghua University NGO Research Institute from July to October of 2002, many types of organizations provided several types of intermediary services to small and medium-sized enterprises. For a breakdown on the forms these organizations took, see Figure 8–1.33 3.2.3. Self-Governance in Villages and Social Change Systemically, the most important change to take place in villages was the introduction of village self-governance. The concept of village governance changed the top-down power channels. In a reversal, the Table 8-1: Organizational Forms of Some Service Providers (Unit: %) Service Item

social groups (社团)

Public peopleFor-profit Other institutions run nonintermediaries (事业单位) enterprise (营利中介) units (民非)

Accounting and financial proxy Start-up assistance Information and consulting Loan guarantor

9.2

18.5

9.2

53.9

9.2

31.3

40.5

9.4

18.8

0

23.1

44

8.8

20.8

3.3

11.4

45.7

2.9

31.4

8.6

31 董志凯/Dong Zhikai, “市场经济发展与市场中介组织成长”/“shi chang jing ji fa zhan yu shi chang zhong jie zu zhi cheng chang,” in 中共宁波市委党校学报/ zhong gong ning bo shi wei dang xiao xue bao, (2000, Vol. 5). (“Development of the Market Economy and Growth of Market Intermediary Organizations” in CCP Ningbo City Committee Party School Journal ) 32 常敏/Chang Min, “建全行业协会、加强行业管理, 促进行业发展”/“,” in 中共杭州市委党校学报/zhong gong hang zhou shi wei dang xiao xue bao, (2002, Vol. 1). (“Improving Industry Associations, Strengthening Industry Administration, Promoting Industry Development” in CCP Hangzhou City Committee Party School Journal ) 33 Note: 99% of the enterprises in the sample were industrial and commercial.

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government shifted legal powers to the base level, placing them in the hands villagers, and allowed a bottom-up power system to develop. Here, we can see that the role of village committees (村委会) had changed since the days of people’s communes when they represented the most local arm of government. Village committees were also different from the natural patterns of rural society. Thus, they had become a new kind of social effort and exploration. Milestones in the development of village self-governance include the passage in November 1987 in the Eleventh Session of the Sixth NPC Standing Committee of the Village Organizations Law (Trial Version)《村组法 (试行)》 and the passage on November 4, 1998 in the Fifth Session of the Ninth NPC Standing Committee of the Village Organizations Law 《村组法》, which became effective immediately. Establishment of this kind of a self-governance system was also inextricably bound to the growth of civil society. On the one hand, it decreased governmental controls at the base, village level to a degree, carving out space for society’s development. On the other, this kind of a system was set to coordinate with the market economy and eliminated much of the legacy of rural society. For example, to a certain extent, village self-governance organizations constrained the power of special relationship groups (like powerful households), thereby propelling society toward a modern, organized democratic society. In this sense, village self-governance has played a role in the growth of civil society. Against this backdrop, an enormous number of NGOs appeared in villages, focusing on recreation and administration. First among these were agricultural economic and technological organizations; these played an irreplaceable role in modernizing agricultural production and sales systems. Elderly citizens’ associations, mostly recreational in nature, could also continue their activities in various forms, as could organizations like rural water users’ associations which focused on one singular aspect of rural management. Organizations such as these developed rapidly starting in the 1990s. 3.2.4. Self-Governance and Social Change in Urban Communities Self-governance models in urban communities closely resemble their rural counterparts. As with village structures, we hope that selfgovernance models in urban communities can contribute to social transformation and the replacement of the old, government-led model. The turning point in the process of instituting an autonomous system


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in urban communities was the passage of the PRC’s Law on Urban Residents’ Committees 《中华人民共和国城市居民委员会组织法》. The law was passed in the Eleventh Session of the Seventh NPC’s Standing Committee in December 1989. Starting in early 1990, according implementation measures were drafted according to local needs at the provincial, municipal and autonomous-regional levels. Like in villages, urban community self-governance organizations were neither NGOs, nor were they governmental. Regardless of how we classify them, we can at least deduce that this form of societybuilding also represents an effort to find an effective model for rebuilding society. We hope that these organizations can be linked with NGOs’ growth and that they can help to provide favorable conditions for the growth of NGOs in urban communities. In actuality, there has been tremendous growth in the number of urban community organizations. In Jingshan Sub-District of Beijing’s Dongcheng District, for example, there are 11284 households with 31501 residents. In that sub-district alone, a number of unique local NGOs includes such examples as the Fortunate Activities Training Institute (幸福运动讲习所), Prosperous Home (家和万事兴), Home for Public Mediation (群调解之家), Huanghuamen Community All-People’s Fitness Club (黄化门社区全民健身协会), and the Association for Civilized Dog Raising (文明养犬自管会).34 The growth of urban community groups presses us to find systemic solutions that would allow these groups that have had so much difficulty registering to enjoy the benefits of being a part of the official system. These developments already signify that base-level social, public organizations have already gained certain status and importance and are awaiting a breakthrough in the self-governance framework for residents. In the process of developing the residents’ committee system upon we have pinned such high hopes, the step of withdrawing government involvement is actually quite simple; the process of building up a new civil society space, however, will be more difficult. Research shows that in societies like China’s in which traditional society rests on different foundations, it is difficult to reach our aims through direct political

34 Based on internal exchange documents on community group organizations by the Jingshan Sub-District Government in March of 2008, as well as notes from talks we had with them during the same period.

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democracy-building; even where it is implemented in communities, even where it is base-level democracy-building, there remain problems. Conversely, it is more appropriate for us to proceed with civil society-building in a different direction. This is to direct our energies at developing grassroots civil associations and organizations, or volunteer, grassroots NGOs in urban communities.35 3.2.5. Society and Public Services: the Reform of Public Institutions and the Rise of People-Run Non-Enterprise Units We have discussed the market economy, village society and urban communities. Besides these three is another field, the field of public service provision. The connotations of public service provision are broad. For our purposes here, we exclude government administrative departments; what remain are public institutions specializing in provision of public services (事业单位). This extremely important field includes provision of society-wide cultural, educational, medical and hygienic, athletic, artistic, social benefit, and social services. And this field, too, is undergoing a similar process: from State-guidance, gradually, to an unlinking from the State; toward the addition of organizational autonomy; toward changing the nature of organizations; of reorientation toward markets and society. The evolution of public institutions is multi-faceted; one aspect, their reorientation toward becoming civil NGOs is important and signifies the appearance of yet another incarnation of NGOs. Furthermore, some public institutions are being privatized and becoming for-profits, while others are incorporated within the ranks of administrative offices, yet manage their own receipts and expenditures. These changes are all intimately connected with the privatization and NGO-ization of society. The reform of public institutions has brought the rise of large numbers of service organizations and social organizations. For example, at the start of 1999, in order to satisfy a requirement to accelerate the productivity of scientific research, of the 10 State-level scientific research institutions managed by the former State Economics and Trade Commission, 131 were merged with enterprises; 40 were managed as subsidiaries to enterprises; 18 were transformed into inter-

35 Tao, Chuanjin. 2007. Civil Society Building in China’s Urban Communities: A New Approach, Social Sciences in China, 2007, pp. 147–155.


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mediary institutions; 24 were merged into universities; and 12 were transformed into large-scale enterprises directly under the Central Government. Scientific research institutions, 265 in number, belonging to 20 central departments were also reformed. 101 were converted into public-interest research institutes managed as NPOs; and 56 were transformed entirely into enterprises.36 Accompanying the reform of public institutions has been the rise of people-run non-enterprise units. “People-run non-enterprise units” (民办非企业单位) are a uniquely Chinese phenomenon without international precedent. Once informally referred to as “people-run public institutions”, they are public institutions formed outside of the government. With the rise of society’s power, we have seen a process of the replacement of public institutions by people-run non-enterprise units. The first main policy milestone pertaining to people-run non-enterprise units was the “Notice Concerning Strengthening People-Run NonEnterprise Unit Administration”《关于加强社会团体和民办非企业单位管理工作的通知》, promulgated by the General Offices of the Central Committee and the State Council in 1996. The “Interim Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration and Administration”, issued on October 25, 1998, were the first systematic set of regulations. As for the number of people-run non-enterprise units, at yearend 2007, 172,000 had registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs.37 It must be noted that the majority emerged from society and were not reincarnations of former public institutions. 3.3. NGOs’ Social Effects are Just Taking Hold We are only beginning to see the initial effects of a new society with NGOs as its foundation. However, the time has not yet arrived for an empirically-supported general theory demonstrating the effects we are predicting. For the current time, we can do no more than observe its germination.

36 王澜明/Wang Lanming, “事业单位改革的历史与现状”/“shi ye dan wei gai ge de li shi yu xian zhuang,” in 红旗文稿/hong qi wen gao, (2006, Vol. 15). (“A History of Reforms of Public Institutions and their Current State” in Red Flag Drafts) 37 Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs, Civil Organization Administration Bureau website: http://mjj.mca.gov.cn.

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3.3.1. Effects of the Community Collective The community collective is most clearly expressed in community organizations. The connotations of community collective have in fact shifted to specify community NGOs of various kinds. These NGO most commonly focus on cultural and sports activities. Their physical and recreational activities bring people together to exchange; their true significance is as expressions of the collective. The second kind of organization is people-run non-enterprise units. At one time, people viewed these people-run non-enterprise units as very similar to for-profit enterprises; in surveys today, however, individuals associated two main characteristics with them. The first is that within the organizations, people no longer have the kinds of structured, hierarchical relationships of public organizations; at the same time, they are also not profit-driven as are people in for-profit enterprises and work instead in pursuit of public goals. Therefore, of 63 people-run non-enterprise units we surveyed, members in 87.2% of them felt that their team spirit was positive. Members of one public fitness and health center, for example, felt that their organization was not hierarchical, that employees were quite unified, that they were able to resolve issues together, and would do so through exchange should they come up. Money played no significant role; people participated out of affinity and willingness, not for money. Relationships here remained quite pure, honest, and without jockeying. Distribution took place according to contribution; and members were without complaints.38 Second, people-run non-enterprise units have met the demand of harmonious society relationship-building in their relationships with those they serve. This is the exact opposite of the relationships between public organizations providing services and their service recipients that have been growing increasingly tense. We can point to two main reasons for this: the first is that people-run non-enterprise units do not depend on government resources as public organizations do; their orientation must be towards those they serve. They build up long-term service relationships with recipients; building harmonious relationships is an important part of their work. Secondly, because people-run nonA survey of people-run non-enterprise units was conducted from December 2007 to February 2008 by the School of Social Development and Public Policy at Beijing Normal University. The survey contained detailed interviews with more than 60 people-run non-enterprise units, and reached some significant conclusions. 38


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enterprise units engage in social work, they are motivated at least to some small extent by altruism; satisfying their service recipients is their goal from the start. At play here, fundamentally, are mutual understanding, humanism and care.39 The third kind of organizations is NGOs devoted to community development. While systematic data in this area are lacking, interviews have allowed us to ascertain the main characteristics of interpersonal relationships in these organizations. In the process of their work, they pursue team-building; and in team activities, members pursue their own happiness. In our interviews in 2007, these organizations are small in size, no more than 10. They are teams with the explicit purpose of not losing that kind of intimate work and life. With the exceptions of one director and one recently-joined university student, members all had backgrounds in enterprises. Members were, on the whole, already successful in enterprises, had accumulated living funds to sustain their lifestyles and turned to NGOs in their searches for a kind of collective life and collective activities. The fourth kind of organization is industry associations, which pursue their collective interests. Despite their motivations, we can still see in them manifestations of a new kind of collectivity. Managers all-powerful in their daily lives within their enterprises can be found here singing in choirs together or taking part in fashion shows on the catwalk, among other activities. 3.3.2. Effects of Promoting Political Participation and Autonomous Policy-Making It is difficult for us to hope to see these kinds of effects on any large scale. Yet, at the same time we still expect these effects to be in evidence in both village and urban communities. Scholars also are seldom able to demonstrate empirically the effects of NGO growth on civil society political participation. One point, however, has been clearly demonstrated: NGOs represent greater social autonomy, which ought to be the most important form of democracy. The democratic processes used internally in NGOs also educate people how to conduct policy-making and how to achieve goals using democratic methods.

39

Ibid.

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In the case of industry associations, for example, we have already seen how their survival depends on members’ political participation. Data from one study shows that active participation by association members is an extremely important for the future success of association organizations; even more, it is the difference between survival and death for those organizations.40 People-run non-enterprise units, in their own field, demonstrate the public’s enormous autonomy. These organizations have attracted great human resources in terms of large numbers of elite members of society as well as ordinary people; they use autonomous processes to do things that only offices of the State were authorized to do before. 3.3.3. Effects of Promoting Common Relationship-Building and Social Integration Industry associations and all kinds of administrative and service organizations serving village and urban communities are all upholders of order. We can see that some organizations, while in the process of conducting their usual public administration and providing their public services, also extend their functions into more areas of social life. Take, for example, a rural agricultural economic cooperation organization that undertook the review and selection of “five-good households” in its village or a cultural and sports entertainment organization in an urban community that was able to make significant contributions to upholding social order. Organizations’ cultures, values and concepts have, in another sense, also contributed a kind of “soft order”, providing rules and a foundation for people to engage in “grassroots”-type activities in their daily lives. These rules are far more concrete and detailed than laws and are thereby sink in more easily. In practice, it is also easy to “read” what each NGO is doing from their unique missions and concepts. From one survey of people-run non-enterprise units for example we can see the entrance of many new factors into this rising field of social service. We can see the entrance of individuals interested in poverty-relief and altruism; of social elements with modern public-interest service values;

40 陶传进/Tao Chuanjian, “行业协会如何作用到位: 会员参与决策构成分水岭”/“hang ye xie hui ru he zuo yong dao wei: hui yuan can yu jue ce gou cheng fen shui ling,” in 学会/xue hui, (2005, Vol. 1). (“The Proper Role of Industry Associations: Members’ Participation in Policy-Making Signifies Watershed” in Scholastic Association)


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of individuals motivated by traditional concepts to participate in social work; and of individuals interested in giving something back to society. Guided by these concepts, these individuals have generated unique service norms and principles for interpersonal interactions.41 They also hope that their organizational activities will facilitate the absorption of special social relationships like blood relations and local relations into the web of general relationships. Although systems of special relationships exist in NGOs much as they exist in family businesses in the market, we can see efforts to eliminate the effects of those relationships and even to eliminate interference by influential individuals in organizational matters. Effects from foreign organizations in China in this area have been especially pronounced. Organizations with democratic, internal governance are crucibles for forging common relationships. 3.4. Matters To Which Attention Should Be Paid in Social Change In some ways, we are far from being able to say that “NGOs are the foundation of society’s rebuilding”. Support for the NGO perspective can be found in several schools, trends in thinking, and angles; but they are divided dramatically even between themselves. Young and MacRae, for example, have written that vast differences persist in understandings of the meaning of civil society. For some, it means a resurgence of participatory democracy to accompany the march towards wealth; for others, it goes further and means the withdrawal of and constraints on the State. A moderate stance is that the essence of civil society is addressing market failures and being concerned with environmental problems and other work to benefit society.42 Another locus of difference is in what we take NGOs to be. Must they focus on the interests of certain groups? Must they focus on public-interest services? Clearly, different NGOs serve different functions. Put another way, no NGO can devote itself to all possible social functions simultaneously. A second source of difference is the question of what kind of social context is required for NGOs. We may not see the emergence of a

Ibid., Beijing Normal University study. Young, Nick & Pia MacRae. 2002. Three “C”s: Civil Society, Corporate Social Responsibility, and China. The China Business Review, 29(1): 34–38. 41 42

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civil society guided entirely by NPOs; NGOs, meanwhile, may serve only as a supplement to other social mechanisms such as the marketeconomic society. In different situations, we can see different results. The thought may likely occur to us that the NGO-based society we are discussing is actually one based on a foundation of market economics. As a dominant factor in the social context, the effects of the market economy will be no weaker, certainly, than those of NGOs. 4. A Broader Historical Perspective The fewer than 200 years that have passed since 1840 mark a remarkable period of history. Over this period, China has lived in a continual state of resisting foreign aggression, fighting for the survival of our people, and fighting to strengthen our people. In order to face off against the West, Chinese have “learned from the barbarians to fight the barbarians”, sought doctrines capable of saving the nation, and even torn down idols once precious to our culture. We have established an independent, national state of our own. Since the establishment of New China in 1949, we have attained uncommon accomplishments economic, technological and cultural. However, we have not yet freed ourselves of the crisis mentality left from the fight for our nation’s survival and development. Even the implementation of the Reform and Opening can be said to a certain degree to be the product of efforts to compete internationally. Questions of the domestic political system aside, it seems that competition between nations forced us to place economy-building at the center of our efforts. At the time, a prevalent saying went that competition between nations should no longer be framed as military competition, but as economic competition. At the same time, however, the saying emphasizes a kind of competition for survival. After over a century dominated by “competing” and “resisting”, the market economic system we spent over a century decrying and boycotting has finally arrived on this piece of earth called China. This is the true root of our social changes. After our pursuit of strength and development and our acceptance of a market economic system, however, we discover that the social structure we once inhabited no longer fit. That social structure, passed down from ancient times, was a special and intimate way of interacting


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based on traditional blood relationships and local relationships, between familiars and familiars. A split occurred, however, when society expanded to include interactions between strangers; moreover, the very vestiges of relationships among familiars are beginning to disintegrate amidst the great space of modern society. Here, we must consider what form our future society-building will take. How should we build it? Naturally, we have in the end realized that at least in the initial stages, the task of society-building must be driven by the State. Beyond the introduction of the market economic system, the State has also conducted “revolutionary” rebuilding in villages, cities, commerce and industry, and public services. As we’ve discussed above, this rebuilding is on its true face the introduction of NGOs into a wider array of social functions, a move that has made NGOs an indispensable force in a new society. We posit that NGOs are more than just an indispensable force in a new society. Because it is only in NGOs that people can find the collective meaning and growth as citizens necessary for survival, NGOs have become a basic component of a new society. However, these changes are often analyzed from a different angle. People have described them as the return of the State’s authority to society; in the relationship between State and society, this account describes a model in which the balance of resources is tilted towards society.43 Especially when we remember that period of State collective control before the Reform and Opening, we are more vindicated in our view of the significance of the Reform and Opening. Though the situation does truly appear this way, we must still do our best to get to investigate its true nature. Before the Reform and Opening, the structure of Chinese society was the State on the upperlevel and villages on the lower-level. Although over time the State has transferred power into different spheres of village society, the dual structure remained unchanged. After the Reform and Opening, however, the pattern changed. The change is neither the downward transfer of power from the dual structure, nor is it the expansion of a village social sphere; conversely, we see the disintegration and disappearance of village society. Instead, something else has appeared in society, so-called modern civil society. At the same time, the “third

43 For example, see Moore, R.R., 2001. China’s Fledgling Civil Society: A Force for Democratization, World Policy Journal, 18(1): 56–66.

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pole”, a market economy, has emerged as well. To adopt one Western account, it is even its own, first sector in society, followed by State and civil society. Alternately, we could adopt another, more practical account. Just as Western society experienced a transformation from traditional and community-based to modern and organization-based, the change in contemporary Chinese society is actually the replacement of rural society with civil society. In this way, these changes in Chinese society are highly similar to those that took place in Western society 100 years ago. Most all of the eminent sociologists have offered descriptions of those changes, including Weber’s opposition of customary society and legal society, Durkheim’s opposition of mechanization and organic unity, and Tonnies’s opposition of the collective and society. This kind of change is the first dimension of social change. Subsequently, we lost certain things society once provided us with: close interpersonal interactions; clear social norms and the social integration, order and stability they bring; and capacity for collective provision of social goods and services facilitated by social ties as well as the autonomy and feeling of exercising rights generated by the collective provision process. We’ve begun pursuing a civil society in the modern sense, and we’re counting on it to retain that which we’re currently losing and provide that which we need in this new era. Only at this time have people begun to realize that true social change has just begun. In this way, it is different from social changes arising from the fights for political, ethnic and economic interests. Much like Western society, Chinese society is also nostalgic; at the very least, it is unwilling to let go of its way of life, with both traditional, local, Chinese reciprocal relationships (人情) as well as moral norms. It just so happens, however, that the civil society that we pursue today can be a conduit for satisfying these feelings. We hope that this new society can satisfy our needs for the collective in our daily lives, for social morals and order, for public goods and for meaningful lives. Here, however, changes in the economy and changes in society are all government-driven. This action on the part of the government, moreover, is a reaction to pressures from the outside world.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL REFORMS: CHINA’S LOGIC Lin Shangli Political reforms are an important part of State-building. Contained within them are strategic agendas of political reforms, basic principles of political reforms and action frameworks for political reforms. In this way, political reforms are by no means isolated actions, but rather are formed through interactions between political bodies and the economy, society and culture. In the process, political reforms usually produce new economic or social forces. After appearing, these forces will, in turn, quickly demand that political reforms deepen. The appearance and growth of civil organizations in China have aptly demonstrated this political logic. Over the last 30 years, as the Reform and Opening has deeply changed Chinese society’s structure, forms of organization and ways of life, civil organizations have flourished. At the same time that they have advanced China’s political reforms, they have also deeply affected China’s political forms and structures, thereby lending unique resources and momentum to China’s march toward civil society. This transformation and development is currently underway. 1. China’s Political Reforms: Power, Systems and Life Official documents rarely, if ever, use the term “political reforms”. Currently, related concepts in use include: “political institution reforms” (政治体制改革), “political civilization-building” (政治文明建设), “political-building” (政治建设), and “political development” (政治发展). Among these, the most often used is “political institution reforms”. Since the beginning of the Reform and Opening, political institution reforms have been an important part of the overall reform agenda; since then, roughly thirty years have passed. China’s political institution reforms must originate from the strengthening and improvement of current political institutions and not from

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completely changing the current political system. The direct orientation of these actions, therefore, is not to reform China’s political institutions themselves. From the beginning, China’s political institutions have had a firmly realistic mission: to support reforms to economic institutions. In practice, this has meant that evolving political institutions have faced demands from two sides; they must obey the logic of their own needs and they must also abide by the demands made of them by evolving economic institutions. All of China’s reforms began with the relaxation and division of powers; political institutional reforms were thus an important political precondition for China’s overall reforms. The pattern of divided powers produced by political institution reforms broadly mobilized social enthusiasm for China’s reforms and created the basic momentum driving the Reform and Opening. In this way, a pattern has emerged in which the fate of China’s economic reforms hangs on reforming its political institutions. However, as China entered the 1990s, with the firm establishment and advancement of socialist market economic institutions, China’s economic reforms were developing on track. Subsequently, the relationship between economic and political reforms underwent a subtle change: a relationship in which decision-making was once dominated by economic reforms became one in which decisions began to be made jointly. Amidst this change, socialist market economic institutions gradually took on their own power and role in political reforms and began to influence and even change the direction and logic of political institution reform. The greatest such change came in 1997, when the CCP, in a change to the national strategy on domestic rule, set its sights on “building a socialist rule-of-law State”. Soon after, in the field of political reforms and development and on the foundation of political institution reforms underway, the task of “political building” was introduced with the goal of “building a socialist political civilization”. In this way, China’s political institution reforms are contributing to political building and are a part of its internal logic. Clearly, although China’s political institution reforms are not intended to change China’s politics themselves, political institution reforms have still produced real political reforms in China. Political reforms, here, refer to shifts taking place in a given political form amidst self-change, expressed through power structures and institutional arrangements, as well as general shifts in political life. China’s political institution reforms developed around institutional changes and improvements, but they quickly, along with all the reforms, fostered

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 271 new power structures and ways of political life. These developments brought about a holistic shift in the form of China’s politics manifested in three aspects: changes in power structures, the deepening of institutional change and the transformation of political life. 1.1. Changes in Power Structures Before the reforms, the Party had complete control over the State and society, control based on centralized political power and exercised through institutions and organizations. This resulted in a substantial loss of the autonomy both State and society should have. The State was unable to exercise its powers as offered in the constitution; society was unable to serve as an autonomous force checking the Party and the government. This situation has been turned around since the Reform and Opening. This owes in part to efforts from the start of the Reforms to do away with the Party’s centralized grip on power and to advance democratic and rule-of-law political institution reforms. These changes also benefitted from the key institutional conditions provided for the realization of social autonomy by socialist market economy institutions. Subsequently, the power distribution with the Party dominating everything gradually gave way to a three-legged stool distribution in which the Party, the State and society made decisions mutually and also constrained one another. This kind of change in the power structure also deeply changed the logic of China’s politics—society became the starting point in the logics of the Party’s and the State’s power and political action. 1.2. Deepening Institutional Change This has primarily been expressed as institutional change’s development from simple institutional mending and substitutions into holistic transformation and the general development of an organic unity. The holistic transformation of institutions is primarily embodied as changes in government administrative institutions, which began to change from purely organizational changes or functional transformations into an organic, unified and holistic change of organizations, functions and responsibilities. All of this, too, is in the service of building a public service-type government capable of meeting both the demands of the market economy and social development. The general development of institutions will be embodied in two respects.

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The first will be the deepening of changes to Party leadership institutions through intra-Party development of democratic resources, which should in turn advance democracy among the people. The second will be fully utilizing, through institutional innovations and optimizations, the institutional resources embodied by the People’s Congress, CCPled cooperation between the multiple parties and institutions for political mediation. Together, these will institutionally deepen democracy among the people. 1.3. Transformation of Political Life In China, political life consists of three parts: the Party, the State, and the public; political activities, accordingly, can be broken into intraParty political activities, State political activities and public political activities. Changes have taken place in all three areas during the reform process. The bureaucratic and organizational qualities of intra-Party political activities have loosened; State political activities have changed both in terms of institutional norms and the breadth of participation; and in public political life, rights have become more sacred and interests more diverse. Amidst these changes in political life, the birth and development of civil organizations have played a positive role in their advancement. Furthermore, in daily life, all forms of spontaneously, publicly-organized, self-managed, self-service, self-governing organizations and activities have increasingly participated in the political process as a force in social governance, thereby deeply changing Chinese governance structures and methods. These three phenomena show that China’s political reforms and the growth of Chinese society are intimately related. The two, in fact, are interrelated causally: political reforms advanced the growth of Chinese society; the growth of Chinese society then deepened political reforms. Society’s growth is evident in two ways: first, the independence and autonomy of individuals in society, which has provided a real and secure foundation for the growth of China’s civil society; second has been the appearance and growth of civil organizations. This has not only hugely changed the forms of social organizing and activities, it has also allowed society to contend with government and markets as a force in governance. If we can say that individuals’ independence and autonomy in society provided the logical starting point for China’s political reforms, then the appearance and development of civil organizations provided those reforms with momentum and supportive

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 273 force. This new starting point and this new propulsion effected a gradual transformation of the whole form of Chinese politics over the course of political institution reforms. 2. Civil Organizations: Political Reform Creates a “Life Sphere” Over the course of 30 years of the Reform and Opening, political changes were themselves the source of the deep changes in the economy and society. From the beginning, architects of the reforms had emphasized using political reforms to propel economic and social reforms. Deng Xiaoping once said: “without political reform, the results of reforming economic institutions cannot be guaranteed and the progress of the reform of economic institutions cannot be achieved; this would impede the development of production capacity.” In sum, he continued, “without political institution reforms, economic institution reforms will be difficult to realize.”1 The greatest contribution made by political reforms to economic reforms and the development of society was not their providing any new institutional political space to speak of; instead, it was providing a source of dynamism urgently needed by both the economy and society: initiative and creativity on the part of the people. From the start, China’s political reforms aimed to draw out people’s initiative and creativity, both in terms of their thinking and their interests. In terms of thinking, emphasizing liberating thought was a precondition to the Reform and Opening. In terms of interests, on the other hand, it was emphasized that people’s development and productive actions are based on material interest and that the pursuit of material interest is inherently reasonable. For this reason, from the beginning, political reforms raised the democracy banner, and produced a pattern of divided powers through institutional reforms. The division of powers advanced by political institution reforms is multi-dimensional embodied both as the transfer of powers from the Party to the State as with the division of Party and government and as the transfer of power from the Party and State to society as with the division of government

1 邓小平/Deng Xiaoping, “关于政治体系改革问题”/“guan yu zheng zhi ti xi gai ge wen ti,” in 邓小平文选/deng xiao ping wen xuan, (1993) Vol. 3, 176–177. (“On Reform of the Political System” in Selected Writings of Deng Xiao Ping)

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and society. At the same time that dividing powers directly reformed the relationships between the Party the State and society, the process also stimulated changes within each the Party, the State and society. These reforms and changes forced the whole body of reforms back to its logical starting point, the effects from two factors: the initiative and creativity of the people. Therefore, China’s Reform and Opening can trace its starting point, momentum and goals back to the Liberation. Today, this logic is clearly the basic principle of China’s reforms and development: putting people first (以人为本). The reason that this principle has achieved prominence and been firmly established is that economic and social reforms and development, driven from the start by political reforms, have pushed China’s development toward another Liberation even deeper than that of 1949: individual liberation. It is manifest as individuals in society being able to legally and autonomously control their own production and lives. The individual liberation and the social autonomy it has spawned have provided civil organizations with stronger social foundations and momentum. We have ample reasons to call this liberation a once-in-a-millennium change in Chinese history. The growth of civil organizations since the Reform and Opening is not just civil organization-building and development in the usual sense, but a new kind of social mechanism and the birth and growth of a new social force. The report from the CCP’s 17th National Congress, in using “social organizations” (社会组织) in place of the term “civil organizations” (民间组织), endowed social organizations with two functions: broadening both democracy and society’s self-governance.2 In offering these two definitions of social organizations, the 17th Congress report placed great importance on civil organizations as a new social mechanism and social force and indicates an intention to broadly bring their positive effects into play. How, then, can explain this “once-in-a-millenium change” brought about by China’s political reforms, in terms of the development of civil organizations? Pre-reform China was a China of work units. Work units were the basic building block of society and it was through them that the State achieved integration and governance of society. Pre-modern Chinese

2 “Utilize social organizations’ expanded mass participation, make known the positive uses of mass appeals, strengthen social self-rule functions”, see Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Party Congress.

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 275 society was village-clan society. After 1949, work unit society replaced village-clan society. Though the two forms of society were produced out of totally different economic systems and have certain differences, as forms of pre-modern collectives, both share the characteristic of having a high degree of overlap between their production spheres and living spheres. Both traditional village-clans and New China work unit organizations comprised relatively closed production spheres and closed living spheres. To take work units for example, “to the individual, this kind of social organization is not purely a workplace and not purely a source of income, but a unique kind of social organization. Social organizations of this kind typically have three social functions: political governance, allocation of social resources and specialization. In the traditional, reallocation-based economic system, work units were the fundamental structure or tool for governance.”3 The Reform and Opening allowed China to gradually exit work unit society. After the Reform and Opening, work units began to loosen and transform—a process during which their control over individuals and society began to recede. For individuals in society, this change in fact signified the splitting of the traditional, unitary pattern of productive and living spheres. As productive and social spheres separated, individuals in society gained autonomy in production and selfdetermination in life. Under the new socialist market economic regime, production sphere formed its own improved system of governance comprised of government, law and market mechanisms. In the living sphere, independent and separated off from the production sphere, the chief, internal demand for its agents, autonomous individuals in society, gradually became one for self-determination. This kind of demand quickly produced two major social forces in the life sphere: community and civil organizations. The rapid development of civil organizations and their ubiquitous, active participation in society was, to a certain degree related to the separation of the life sphere from the production sphere and its autonomous growth. This is because, after the 1990s, organizations and governance in the life sphere became a major driving force behind the development of civil organizations.

3 李路路、李汉林/Li Lulu, Li Hanlin, 中国的单位组织：资源、权力与交换/ zhongguo de dan wei zu zhi: zi yuan, quan li, yu jiao huan, (zhe jiang ren min chu ban she, 2000), 244. (China’s Work Unit Organizations: Resources, Power, and Tradeoffs).

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The increasing duality between the productive and life spheres and an accompanying expansion in the life sphere quickly became serious challenges for political reforms. These politics were formed at a time when productive and life spheres were one and when it was assumed that the political system should have absolute purvey over the reallocation of resources. At the same time, it was never assumed that the social life sphere should have any form of autonomy. The political system therefore lacked needed institutions, systems, policies and theoretical foundations for the organization and governance of the social life sphere. For an extended period, this has created conflicting interests within the political system with regards to civil organizations; politics at once recognizes the necessity of their development while also wanting to control the momentum of their development. With their broad rise, however, politics is faced with the question of how to accommodate the development of civil organizations while also creating cooperation between the Party, the government and society and helping them complement one another. 2.1. Civil Organizations and the Party: Power and Order in the Life Sphere China’s political reforms began with separation of powers; the chief task in separating powers was to overcome the high centralization of power of Party leaders. The aim of the process was not to abandon or weaken Party leaders, but rather to shift Party leaders’ political logic from one of centralized power to one of institution-building, thereby creating institutional guarantees to Party leadership. Thus, using institutions to adjust the relationships between Party, State and society was another aspect of the separation of powers. This coordination, which took place as part of China’s democratization process following the Reform and Opening, placed the creation of institutions to advance democratization at the center of the whole agenda. At the start of the reforms, the separation of powers was self-initiated by the Party; the institutional adjustments in the relationships between Party, State and society were determined by the Party itself. By the end of the 1980s, and especially beginning with the establishment of a socialist market economic institutions in the early 1990s, separation of powers became a demand originating from gradually rising forces in society. Under such circumstances, institutional adjustments in the relationships between Party, State and society were no longer determined directly by the wishes of the Party; rather, they were determined more by the

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 277 interplay and maneuvering between the Party and society. Thusly, if we look at these thirty years of political reforms from the perspective of the relationships between the Party, State and society, we clearly can see that it is a process of the Party gradually transferring powers to the State and society. As for the challenges presented by the social forces induced by the separation of powers, the Party has attempted to absorb and normalize them through institution-building, thereby, through certain institutional frameworks, redefining the relationships between the Party, the State and society. The relationship between the Party and civil organizations vividly embodies this historic transformation and internal logic. Before the reforms, the Party had never before faced the kinds of pressures that accompany the emergence of diverse and open civil organizations. This was because during that time, with the exception of officially-created People’s groups, the existence of open civil organizations was virtually impossible. However, after reforms resulted in the separation of people’s productive and life spheres, work units were suddenly compressed into the production sphere without even occupying the entire production sphere. Due to the emergence of many new economic organizational forms in the field of productive activities, neither property rights structures nor organizational forms were built according to the norms of the work unit system. After separating from the production sphere to which it had once been joined as one, the life sphere’s relationship with work units became very distant and became a completely autonomous activity space in which individuals in society could freely organize. This profound change thus amorphously and greatly shrunk the organizing space and the size of the population formerly possessed and guided by the Party; a new, large swath of “blank spots” was created inside which the Party could not lead or organize. In response, the Party began a campaign to wipe out “blank spots” that focused on establishing Party organizations in all new economic organizations and social groups. This was an attempt to ensure that the Party organization would have full coverage and recapture the territory they had lost.4 However, the evidence demonstrates that the effectiveness of these efforts fell short of expectations. In February 1998, the Organizing Department of the CCP and the Ministry of Civil Affairs jointly issued a notice on setting up Party organizations with the social groups system. The notice required that any social group passing inspection and registration by registration and administration offices and whose daily operating 4

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According to the logic of modern civilization, the emergence of civil organizations is the result of social organizing; social organizing, in turn, must be preceded by civil society, i.e. the development of market society.5 The development of market society necessarily effects changes in older social structures; but this requires a process. However, in Chinese society, this process was quite short. One important factor contributing to this was the sudden occurrence of a social group revolution (社团革命) after China’s introduction of the socialist market economy. The first evidence of this social group revolution was the development of associational organizations, or civil organizations. When the Ministry of Civil Affairs was tasked with social administration, ten years into the reforms, China’s civil organizations had already grown in staggering numbers. The number of national-scale social groups had grown to 1600 while local social groups had reached 200,000 in number. Compared with the state of social group organizations before China’s reforms, this was an earth-shaking development. In addition, the social group revolution in China merged into the “associational revolution” that quietly sweeping the globe in the late 1980s and became a part of it. According to estimates made in 2004 by Professor Wang Shaoguang, China had at that time more than 8 million social groups. This figure, which included registered and non-registered social groups, led him to conclude that “China is indeed a part of the global associational revolution.”6 The mechanisms and routes by which China’s social group revolution was able to join with the global associational revolution were made available through the organic interaction created by China’s opening and globalization. In the end, China’s social group

organizations had three or more Party members as full-time employees was to set up a Party base-level organization. A Party organization set up within a social group was to be examined and approved by the Party organization in the social group’s work supervising unit or the unit under which it was registered. Social groups were to consider the issue of setting up a Party organization during the planning phase. Work supervising units or units under which social groups were registered were required to understand and have a grasp of social groups’ situations; in cases in which Party base level organizations should have been but were not yet been set up, they were to be set up promptly. 5 马克思、恩格斯/Marx and Engels, “费尔巴哈”/“fei er ba ha,” in 马克思恩格斯选集/ma ke si en ge si xuan ji, (ren min chu ban she, 1972) Vol. 1, 69. (“Feuerbach,” in Selected Writings of Marx and Engels) 6 王绍光、何建宇/Wang Shaoguang, He Jianyu, “中国的社团革命——中国人的结社版图”/“zhongguo de she tuan gai ge—zhongguo ren de jie she ban tu,” in 浙江学刊/zhejiang xue kan, (2004, Vol. 6) 71–77. (“China’s Social Group Revolution— the Landscape of Associations of Chinese People,” in Zhejiang Scholastic Journal )

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 279 revolution was abruptly co-opted by the Party and the State and was brought to a premature end. Between 1996 and 2001, the number of social groups registered dropped sharply, although the trend was later reversed starting in 2003. Clearly, the position of China’s government on the development of social groups was one of cooption. This was intimately related to China’s government’s, and especially the CCP’s, unwavering focus on the advancement of a socialist market economy and its unwavering commitment to advancing the Reform and Opening. However, for the ruling CCP, the challenges presented by the social group revolution were quite direct because they were a shock to the social base upon which the CCP depended for governance. This was manifested in three aspects: First, the development of civil organizations took place in a space traditionally occupied by the Party. In the former structure of society, the Party had occupied nearly all social space. With the development of new social organizations, however, there appeared many organizations the Party was powerless to guide directly. Civil organizations comprised a large proportion of these. Second, civil organizations functionally replaced the Party. While they did not come into contact with State power, civil organizations did to a certain extent have a certain grasp of society and were able to serve society. In areas in which Party social services were insufficient, these services unconsciously replaced the functions previously possessed by the Party. Third, the tension between civil organizations and the Party affected the Party’s ability to integrate society. The Party’s reflexive reaction to civil organizations was to control. These attempts to control inevitably led to tension between civil organizations and the Party, which were embodied primarily as difficulty for the Party in gaining entry into civil organizations. This kind of tension has been harmful both to the Party’s fulfilling its functions and to the survival and development of civil organizations. These challenges are the inevitable result of China’s social changes and development; objectively speaking, they are evidence of social progress. Therefore, the only way for the Party to welcome this challenge is to undergo self-change and, upon this foundation, to coordinate the relationship between the Party and civil organizations and strive to allow civil organizations to become a partner and a force in

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social governance capable of complementing and cooperating with the Party. The CCP’s understanding of and counterstrategy with regard to civil organizations was not formed overnight but over a long process: In early Party documents, they were first viewed as civil organizations and some focus was placed on seriously making use of “civil organizations” in the changing government administrative system. By the 1990s, in the interest of building a socialist market economy and ensuring its normal functioning, the Party began to place a focus on “intermediary organizations” in economic life, and to place some faith in their positive role.7 Later, with the establishment and development of the socialist market economy, social groups abounded and began playing increasingly significant roles in economic management and social services. At that time, the CCP viewed civil organizations as a new kind of force in social groups and, for political purposes, referred to them as “new social organizations” (新社会组织).8 In response to the profusion of new civil organizations, the Chinese Communist Party’s initial reaction has been to control them. This control however, has not come as an attempt to limit the development of civil organizations, but rather to ensure that their development is controllable. In November of 1984, the Central Committee and the State Council jointly released a notice calling for strict controls on national-scale civil organizations. Though the measure succeeded in stemming an overflow of national-scale civil organizations, it did little to limit the proliferation of local civil organizations. This was followed by the Party’s second response: to normalize civil organizations. To this end, re-registration was required of all social groups, a measure which effectively subjected them to standardized administration. In October of 1989, the State Council repealed the Provisional Measures on Social Group Registration《社会团体登记暂行办法》, originally passed in October 1950, and issued the Regulations on Social Group Registra7 中共中央文献研究室编/CCP Central Literature and Research Office, eds., “中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定”/“zhong gong zhong yang guan yu jian li she hui zhu yi shi chang jing ji ti zhi ruo gan wen ti de jue ding,” in 十四大以来重要文献选编(上)/shi si da yi lai zhong yao wen xian xuan bian (shang), (ren min chu ban she, 1996) 519–548. (“Decisions by the CCP Central Committee Concerning Several Issues in Building a Socialist Market Economic System,” in Selected Important Literature Since the 14th Party Congress). 8 “中共中央关于加强执政能力建设的决定”/“zhong gong zhong yang guan yu jia qiang zhi zheng neng li jian she de jue ding,” in 人民日报/ren min ri bao, (September 27, 2004, first edition) (“Decisions by the CCP Central Committee Concerning Strengthening Governance Capacity Building” in People’s Daily)

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 281 tion and Administration《社会团体登记管理条列》. The Regulations were amended ten years later and re-released in October, 1998. The “general principles” of the updated Regulations offered a very clear definition of “social groups” (社会团体) that emphasized their being voluntary, self-organized, non-profit and non-governmental and specified that the China People’s Political Consultative Conference’s People’s Groups were not to be included in the category of social groups requiring registrations. These People’s Groups included unions, the Women’s Federation, and the Communist Youth League, among others. The Party’s third reaction was to increase Party leadership and guidance of civil organizations through the power of Party organizing. This would ensure the Party’s ability to affect and play a role in the politics of civil organizations. The Party chose a device with which it was most familiar and which best-suited Party organizing practices; it required that any civil organization with three or more Party members establish a Party organization. In July of 2000, the Central Organizing Department issued the Opinion Regarding Strengthening Party Building Work in Social Groups《关于加强社会团体党的建设工作的意见》, which emphasized the importance of such work. The Opinion described how social groups were an important front in the Party and the masses’ work. In affording social groups such high political status and strong political functions, the direct intent was bring social groups into the Party fold and use them as an important organizing force for Party leadership and integration. The fourth reaction the Party had to civil organizations was to attempt to integrate them and tap into their organizing power. In 2005, when Hu Jintao expounded on the construction of a Harmonious Society (和谐社会建设), he specified that the Party must reflect on and study how, under the guidance of the Party, to better utilize town and village base-level organizations, People’s Groups, social groups, industry associations, and intermediary organizations and how, thereby, to arrive at a holistic synergy in social administration.9 Clearly, the Party had already identified civil organizations as a

9 胡锦涛/Hu Jintao, “在省部级主要领导干部提高构建社会主义和谐社会能力专题研讨班上的讲话”/“zai sheng bu ji zhu yao ling dao gan bu ti gao gou jian she hui zhu yi he she hui neng li zhuan ti yan jiu ban shang de jiang hua”, 人民日报/ ren min ri bao, ( June 27, 2005, first edition). (“Speech to the Research Group on Provincial-Level Leaders and Cadres Improving Socialism and Harmonious Society Building” in People’s Daily).

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necessary and important target for cooperation and as a source of social political force. These four reactions on the part of the Party toward civil organizations took place in succession and together comprise the Party’s basic action framework for civil organizations. In this action framework, we can see that the Party had already recognized rapidly-developing civil organizations as forceful entities and political resources in the social life sphere. In addition, the Party had already begun to search for ways to coexist, coordinate and cooperate with civil organizations in order to cement its own social foundation and build a political system with itself as the guiding core in the life sphere. In this way, the Party might ensure its political effectiveness and the order of its operations in the life sphere. Generally speaking, however, the Party’s experience with and institutional arrangements for civil organizations were limited. This was evident in two ways. First, in terms of the organizational relationships between Party organizations and civil organizations, the Party has still not solved the problem of how to guide civil organizations using its own leadership and organizing systems. The second way was related to the Party’s institutional arrangements for dealing with civil organizations. In the face of rapidly proliferating civil organizations, the Party and the government have been unable to break out of a position of passivity and become a core force capable of simultaneously tolerating, driving, regulating and controlling civil organizations. For this reason, it has been unable to establish institutional relationships for effective coordination and cooperation with civil organizations. We can thus see that although the Party has been able to form a strategic framework for absorbing and integrating civil organizations and for tapping into their organizing power, a reasonable systemic relationship with civil organizations remains elusive and is still quite vague. In terms of China’s development logic, arrival at a reasonable systemic relationship depends largely on reforms to and development of the Party itself. 3. Civil Organizations and Government Reforms: Transformations in Government Result in Governance by Society Over the course of the thirty years of the Reform and Opening, the changes in China’s economy and society were no less than revolutionary. The economic paradigm shifted planned economics to social-

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 283 ist market economics; meanwhile, society changed from a work unit society into an individualistic society. The revolutionary nature of these economic and social changes determined that China’s governmental reforms would too be revolutionary. That is, these reforms would not be ordinary structural or functional fluctuations in scale or mere adjustments, but truly revolutionary transformations in the form of government. In this process of revolutionary transformations, civil organizations played an important role. Government is the actual vehicle and executor of the functions of State; therefore, the functions of government are the embodiment of the functions of State. Generally speaking, functions of State can be divided into three kinds: political functions, economic functions, and social administration functions. The survival of any society depends on governmental, organic integration of all three kinds of functions. Since the foundation of New China in 1949, the form of China’s government has undergone two transformations and has, accordingly, exhibited three patterns over three periods. In the first pattern, before the Reform and Opening, was one integrating economic and social functions around an axis of political functions. The second pattern was rooted in the launch of reforms. The core of government work shifted from class struggle to economy-building. Subsequently, the pattern of governmental functions shifted from one of integrated economic and social functions around a political axis to one of integrated political and social functions around an economic axis. This marked the first transformation in government functions. The third pattern has emerged in the current, nascent, market society period.10 In order to guarantee social harmony and growth, the pattern of governmental functions has begun to shift from one of integrated political and social

10 The terms shimin shehui (市民社会, or “market-participants society”) and gongmin shehui (公民社会, or “citizens society”) are usually both translated into English as “civil society”. In this work, however, they are two separate concepts. This work takes economic life and the field of social interaction to be comprised of shiminshehui; it is formed based on the market system and the modern property rights system and is expressed as independence and autonomy on the part of individuals in economic and social life. Gongminshehui, on the other hand, is formed from State political life; based on the maturity of modern democratic systems and the development of citizens themselves, it is expressed as State protections of citizens’ freedoms and equality and as the right of citizens to be masters of their own destinies through the exercise of the democratic system. Based on this distinction, this author posits that China fostered and developed shimin shehui first; shimin shehui provides a firm foundation for gongmin shehui. Without improvements in the democratic system and strengthening of democratic life, however, it will be difficult, in the end, for gongmin shehui to form.

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functions around an economic axis to one of integrated political and economic functions around an axis of social administration. This also represents the second transformation in the functions of China’s government; this transformation is currently underway. Different strategic approaches decided these different orientations in government-building. Under the first pattern, the orientation of government-building was toward totalistic government, emphasizing complete permeation of government power through the economy and society. Under the second pattern, the orientation of governmentbuilding was toward economy building, emphasizing the government’s role as the chief agent in economy-building, the direct provider of economic growth and the first mover. Under the third pattern, the trajectory of government-building has been toward public services-type government, emphasizing that government bears the task of national development in two dimensions. In the first, economic development, the government regulates markets and formulates and develops institutions. In the second, social development, the government plans, organizes, and guides public services. The general trend of the transformation of China’s government has been one of its releasing powers to markets and society. If this release of powers can result in effective governance and development and if the economy and society gain effective development by their release and continue to mature, then they might become forces in governance capable of cooperating with the government. Otherwise, the government’s release of powers will signify the abandonment of governance. China’s civil organizations appeared in precisely this environment after the release of government powers; yet, at the same time, because of their immaturity, they often encountered forcible government involvement. Thus, civil organizations emerged amidst both a release of government powers and strict controls. Yet their growth had a direct effect on the government’s transformation and change. This interaction between civil organizations and an ever-transforming government pervaded the entire period of the Reform and Opening. After 1949, through a series of policy announcements and institutional arrangements, the government monopolized almost all economic and social resources and achieved a position of total domination over social life. Should an individual choose not to rely on the “unit” or the “organization”, she would have no chance to survive or develop and no guarantee for her well-being. After the Reform and Opening, under State control, some government power was transferred to enter-

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 285 prises and to society; villages and cities were allowed some autonomy at the base-level; industry associations and intermediary organizations were gradually established; and people-run non-enterprise units sprung up. Outside of government control, waves of independent, microeconomic entities and self-organized “grassroots organizations” sprung up as well. Some specifics regarding these two historical processes are as follows: First, starting in 1988, in order to adapt to the needs of economic development and governmental reforms, certain functions of government began to shift to industry and commerce associations. This trend was evidenced first by the conversion of some specialized departments into industry associations, such as the China Textile Association (中国纺织总会) and the China Light Industry Association (中国轻工总会). Second, some social service and supervisory functions in the economic sphere were transferred to intermediary organizations. For example, departments responsible for industrial and commercial administration turned management of so-called “individual industrial and commercial households” (self-employed) over to a newly-created “Self-Employed Persons Association”; similarly, they shifted administrative responsibility for privately-owned enterprises over to a “Private Enterprise Owners Association”. True, these organizations resulted from top-down orders from the government and have been viewed by scholars as “quasi-administrative” and an extension of government function. Yet these organizations still served a “bridging” role in forging communication between the people and the government and contributed to the transfer of information and the resolution of issues through dialogue and mediation. They represented both a new exploration in the transformation of government functions and a channel through which civil organizations were able to form and develop. Second, after 1994, the market economy developed rapidly, inducing a wave of specialized associations, industry associations and all kinds of social groups. Most were self-formed, true examples of “bottom-up” organizations. In order to control these organizations, the government released a series of strict administrative measures to strengthen supervision over them. In effect, however, these measures were unable to incorporate fully these organizations into the scope of institutional and legal control. This was because in order to elude supervision, many civil organizations went without registering officially, resulting in many unregistered civil organizations. Under these circumstances, relations

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between the government and civil organizations became increasingly tense. Instead of being a win-win, the result was a lose-lose. Civil organizations were unable to realize healthy development; governments were unable to get the support from civil organizations they needed for their transformation. Finally, after 2000, the social life sphere produced from the development of a market economy and the accompanying social problems presented urgent demands of social governance. Responses to these demands came from three sectors: market, society and government. Among these responses, civil organizations displayed their unique advantages; they were able to more completely and more directly embed themselves in the social life sphere and to become increasingly an important force and mechanism in the governance of people’s life sphere. If we say that civil organizations before this time were more non-governmental, then we must also say that civil organizations from this time forward became more pervasive in society and increased their focus on service. This subtle shift in role has allowed civil organizations to achieve more amiable relationships with government and society and to begin to be integrated into government and society’s reasonable governance system. In summary, according to this analysis, civil organizations contributed to transformations in government in two ways. First, the rapid rise of industry associations, intermediary organizations, people-run non-enterprise units and other administrative, meditative, servicefocused organizations effected the withdrawal of government from local, specific industry management and the shift of their function over to macro-level controls. Second, the appearance of public-interest, volunteer, specialized service civil organizations spurred the government’s transformation into a public service-oriented government. Government began consciously to cooperate with civil organizations and take on public services and governance in public affairs jointly. Now, a new kind of mutuallydependent relationship has formed between civil organizationbuilding, government functions and institutional reforms. The release of certain government functions and powers also provided civil organizations with certain resources and momentum. Civil organizations, meanwhile, also provided certain support and momentum to the deepening of the government’s changes in function. Government’s transfer and release of public powers and public resources it had so long dominated to civil organizations resulted in the immediate reinforcement

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 287 and strengthening of long-wanting social administration and public services. At the same time, it also bolstered the development and build out of civil organizations. By year-end 2007, civil organizations of various types in China already numbered 380,000. 4. Civil Organizations and Social Group Action: Social Change Drive Political Reforms In China, the development of civil organizations is at once an indicator of society’s power and of social change. Social change, more precisely, provided the foundation and the conditions for the development of civil organizations. At the same time, civil organizations’ development also deepened social change. In many instances, social changes that effect political reforms do so through social movements. In the sociological sense, social movements are extra-institutional political movements in which individuals participate, that are highly organized, and that seek or oppose certain social changes.11 Clearly, social movements are collective movements with certain political significance. In these kinds of movements, the role of organizations is critical. Civil organizations are the very foundation of their momentum. To a great extent, civil organizations’ ability to represent and integrate society has determined social movements’ political effectiveness and the goals to which they can aspire. In situations in which society and government are separate, the political effects of social movements play a direct role in political reform. This is because the political effects social movements seek are resolution of social problems through institutional and policy adjustments in the political system or satisfaction of other demands produced by social development. As soon as political systems respond, either institutionally or with policies, to social movements, then they must at least to some degree make political reforms, including political reforms on the institutional level. Marx, in his analysis of modern state institutions, said: “state institutions are merely a form of coordination achieved between political and non-political states. They are a form

11 赵鼎新/Zhao Dingxin, “西方社会运动与革命理论发展之述评——站在中国的角度思考”/“xi fang she hui yun dong yu ge ming li lun fa zhan zhi shu ping,” in 社会学研究/she hui xue yan jiu (2005, Vol. 1) (“A Review of Western Social Movements and the Development of Revolutionary Theories—Reflections from China’s Perspective” in Sociological Studies).

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of contract between two necessarily and substantially different forces.”12 Put another way, state institutions are the result of coordination and agreements between state power and social power. On this account, when the political conditions sought by social movements driven by civil organizations involve adjustments between the state and society, those movements functionally advance political reforms. Due to various factors, the process of China’s Reform and Opening has also been accompanied by social group movements. These movements have borne some of the characteristics of, but have not fully become, mature social movements. This is because at the current time these movements are only in their early stages in terms of their organizing, social mobilization and political demands. They have had wide social influence, but have not become broad social movements. Because these social group movements share the characteristics of social movements, we can view them as simple forms of social movements. They also played a certain role in advancing political reforms in China’s Reform and Opening. This simple form of social movement can be further broken down into two types: rights-protection (维权) movements and environmental protection movements. Rightsprotection movements involve the several aspects of various groups’ various rights and interests. These include peasants, migrant workers, workers, the self-employed and even retired military personnel; they include civil rights and basic interests in people’s productive and personal lives. The environmental protection movement, for its part, is at once a rights-protection movement and also a public-interest social action to maintain nature and protect natural ecology. Both forms of social group action, to different degrees, have advanced China’s political reforms. First, civil organizations, rights-protection movements and political reforms. China’s rights-protection movements began with rightsprotections in the field of personal life, such as consumers’ rights, and gradually extended into the field of production, such as labor rights. It then extended into asset rights, like ownership rights; and, finally, has developed into all-dimensional rights-protection. The earliest rights-protection actions received organizational support and resources 马克思/Marx, “黑格尔法哲学评判”/“he ge er fa zhe xue ping pan”, in 马克思恩格斯全集/ma ke si en ge si quan ji, Vol. 1, 316. (“Judging Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” in The Complete Works of Marx and Engels) 12

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 289 and civil organizations have played a role from the beginning. Many rights-protection actions began as spontaneously, self-formed actions. But when these actions were unable to meet their aims, they sought institutional resources, either by forming organizations themselves or by accessing the resources of like organizations. It was under these conditions that self-formed collective actions began changing into organized social movements. Relationships between rights-protection actions and civil organizations have generally taken three forms. The first is as rights-protection organizations amidst self-form collective actions. In villages, many peasant rights-protection organizations have been formed during specific actions. After formation, these organizations are often able to broaden and deepen rights-protection actions. Some even become influential social movements.13 In the second situation, collective rights-protection actions seek out organizations’ support, such as reaching out for help from consumers associations, lawyer groups or other social organizations. Examples have included 2003’s “Hepatitis B Sufferers Rights Protection Movement” and many recent so-called “migrant workers addressing wages movements”. Third are instances in which civil organizations themselves initiate rightsprotection movements. One highly representative example is rightsprotection movements in urban residential communities. Though this form of rights-protection movement is formed largely due to individuals protecting their own personal interests, once formed and scaled up, these movements are easily linked with broader movements for public rights-protections that can actively mobilize potential political resources for rights-protections.14 The “People’s Congress Representative Work Station” event in Shenzhen, for example, was an instance

13 于建嵘/Yu Jianrong, “当代中国农民维权组织的发育和成长——基于衡阳农民协会的实证研究”/“dang dai zhong guo nong min wei quan zu zhi de fa yu he cheng zhang—ji yu heng yang nong min xie hui de shi zheng yan jiu,” in 中国农村观察/zhong guo nong cun guan cha, (2005, Vol. 2). (“The Birth and Growth of Modern Chinese Peasant Rights Protection Organizations—an Empirical Study Based on the Hengyang Peasants Association” in China Village Observer) 14 张紧跟、庄文嘉/Zhang Jin’gen, Zhuang Wenjia, “非正式政治: 一个草根 NGO的行动策略——以广州业主委员会联谊会筹备委员会为例”/“fei zheng shi zheng zhi: yi ge can gen NGO de xing dong zhan lue—yi guang zhou ye zhu wei yuan hui lian yi hui chou bei wei yuan hui wei li,” in 社会学研究/she hui xue yan jiu (2008, Vol. 2). (“Informal Politics: One Grassroots NGO’s Action Strategy—the Case of the Formation of the Guangzhou Business Owners Committee’s Friendship Association” in Sociological Studies)

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in which a business owners committee and a community homeowners committee formed a “People’s Congress Work” civil institution in order to protect the public interest of members of the community and adjacent stakeholders. Its purpose was to use a political mechanism— the People’s Congress—to better achieve rights-protection. Judging from the development of rights-protection movements and their effects, the role of civil organizations as they participated and advanced these movements has also played a role in advancing China’s political reforms more generally. First, it has advanced democracy building in China’s constitutional government and contributed to making the protection of human and civil rights the foundation and core of China’s constitutional democracy. Second, it clarified China’s political process and the value orientation of governance and emphasized that fairness and justice are the primary values of socialist institutions. Lastly, it optimized government’s institutional and policy choices for social governance and advanced the government’s own operating institutions and social administrative institutions and the optimization of public policy. Second, civil organizations, environmental protection movements and political reforms. Because the focus of environmental protection movements is people’s survival and life and the sustainability of development, they are concerned with the most basic public interests; therefore, the challenge they pose in practice to the government’s institutions and policies generally can’t be avoided or repressed. Objectively, they quite directly advance political reforms, especially in the areas of openness of government information and democracy and scientific policymaking. Since the foundation of China’s first environmental protection civil organizations, “Friends of Nature” in 1994, civil environmental organizations and they environmental movement they promote have already been underway for over ten years. Over this process, even though environmental civil organizations have played a positive role in unifying and solidifying forces behind environmental protection, advancing communication between the government and public and upholding environmental oversight and rights-protections, like other civil organizations, many environmental civil organizations have been misunderstood or even been the object of discrimination. Always, there are people worried that the development of civil organizations will weaken the government’s functions and authority and weaken social stability. This kind of thinking and related policies have mainly obstructed the positive effects of environmental civil organiza-

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 291 tions.15 But these organizations’ environmental protection movements have still had a great impact and have changed governments’ thinking. At the same time, the government has recognized their positive effect and has consciously entered into cooperative relationships with environmental civil organizations. According to statistics compiled by the All-China Environment Federation, as of 2005, the number of environmental civil organizations in China numbered 2768 with 224,000 employees.16 Experience has shown that as this continually growing force is changing people’s values, concepts and behavior, it is also deeply changing the government’s development strategy, decisionmaking institutions and policy processes, and is creating a foundation for and the possibility of new governance structures and forms of public participation. The analysis above has shown that the combination of civil organizations and social collective actions has had a direct impact on China’s political reforms. But it must be mentioned that this kind of social collective action is the product of the transformation of economic institutions and social changes. Put another way, it is brought by social development. It comes through organizing people to legally express their interests and through orderly participation; thus, it is completely separate and different from group incidents stemming from tensions or conflict. And it is for this reason that the government communicates has formed cooperation with civil organizations. Generally speaking, the effects of the combination of civil organizations with social collective actions are positive; they both benefit political reforms and democratic development and benefit the growth of society’s power. This combination of civil organizations and social, collective action has even contributed to maintaining unity between political reforms and political stability in this time of great changes and development.

15 潘洪其/Pan Hongqi, “环保总局肯定环保民间组织作用的深意”/“huan bao zong ju ken ding huan bao min jian zu zhi zuo yong de shen yi,” on 中国社会组织网/zhong guo she hui zu zhi wang, (http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn). (“The Ministry of Environmental Protection Affirms the Deep Meaning of the Usefulness of Environmental Civil Organizations” on China Social Organizations Net) 16 “中国环保民间组织发展状况蓝皮书”/“zhong guo huan bao min jian zu zhi fa zhan zhuang kuang lan pi shu” on (http://www.acef.com.cn/). (“Bluebook on the Development of China’s Environmental Civil Organizations”)

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5. Civil Organizations and Base-Level Democracy: Realization of Civil Society Within Political Reforms The China’s political reforms are oriented toward the development of socialist democracy and their core is the People’s democracy. In the common concept of Chinese politics, the form of expression of People’s democracy is that “the People have final say”. Specifically, the People are the masters of State power and the management of State affairs. Since the Reform and Opening, deep changes have taken place in the forms of economic production and social structures. Based on their own autonomous development, laborers existing in classes have gradually become free laborers existing as citizens. “The People having final say” is manifest both in their direct or indirect participation in State matters and administration and in self-administrative autonomy. The latter, an expression of China’s base-level democracy, is an important part of “the People having the final say”. Base-level democracy in China consists of three parts. The first is the democracy of base-level political power; the second is the democracy of base-level public autonomy; the third is self-rule formed among the people, like self-rule through urban owners committees. The dynamism of the growth of these three kinds of base-level democracy stem, to a large extent, from the division of people’s production spheres and life spheres, a process intended to result in orderly life sphere and improved order and governance in the life sphere. Their growth was, on the one hand, related to community building; on the other it was also related to the development of civil organizations. In China, base-level democracy is founded on selfadministration, self-education, self-service, and self-supervision and is mainly manifest around citizen participation, community governance and public services. Factors which have invigorated social, root-level civil organizations include both democratic participation at the root level as seen in social, root-level civil organizations and the social group organizations invigorating the public at the base-level; they also include those who undertake base-level democracy, such as members of residential community owners’ committees and related friendship leagues. Generally speaking, civil organizations participating in baselevel democracy can be divided into three types. The first, base-level, social, civil organizations, cannot be found in residential communities, but rather in administrative districts. The object of their participation

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 293 and influence is base-level political power, such as the now pervasive civil commercial associations. The second is organizations of private owners devoted to maintaining private interests. This type includes real estate owners’ owners committees and various kinds of associations formed by self-employed persons. The third is social group organizations autonomously formed at the base-level by the public. Surveys have shown these organizations are numerous and are mostly cultural and fitness organizations like calligraphy and painting societies, Peking opera fans groups, dance troupes, choirs, readers’ associations, morning fitness associations, and hiking clubs. It also includes social services organizations such as home appliance repair clubs, compassion societies, elderly-assistance societies, community service centers, citizens police patrol clubs, and residents’ centers. Finally, it also includes local rights-protection organizations, similar to social groups, like the Women’s Federation, the China Disabled Persons’ Federation, Committees for the Wellbeing of the Youth, elderly associations, animals associations, environmental protection associations and others.17 Regardless, these civil organizations have strongly symbiotic relationships with base-level democracy. Base-level democracy requires their support for its development; similarly, their rise and development also require the expansion and progress of base-level democracy. Amidst this symbiosis, civil organizations help the three forms of base-level democracy building come to fruition, improves its quality, and provide a democratic foundation for civil society. First, autonomous democracy. Before the reforms, autonomous democracy in China existed in only one form: base-level public autonomy. However, due to the deep permeation of State power in society, these autonomous, base-level forms were completely dominated by State administrative power, and were marginalized at the tip of State administrative power. After the Reform and Opening, with the help of civil society, in such forms as urban residents’ councils, base-level, public, autonomous institutions and functions gradually began to show

白友涛、朱玲芳/Bai Youtao, Zhu Lingfang, “城市社区民间组织发展状况调查——以南京市鼓楼区社区民间组织为例”/“cheng shi she qu min jian zu zhi fa zhan zhuang kuang diao cha—yi nan jing shi gu lou qu she qu min jian zu zhi wei li” in 社区/she qu, (2006, Vol. 2). (“A Survey of the Development of Civil Organizations in Urban Communities—the Case of Civil Organizations in Communities in the Gulou District of Nanjing City” in Community) 17

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their true colors.18 These changes were also stimulated by a kind of unprecedented democratic autonomy in urban residential communities, a form of autonomous democracy based on owners associations. Currently, at the base-level of society, besides these two forms of base-level democracy, there is yet another that is enjoying rapid growth. This is no other than autonomous industry associations, represented by commerce associations and industry associations.19 These commercial and industrial associations are both the agents of base-level democracy and its most direct promoters. Second, consultative democracy. From the beginning of the Reform and Opening, China’s base-level democracy has enjoyed substantial growth. One achievement of the period has been the emergence of many forms of democratic consultation, an emergence now transforming into a trend of substantial and positive development. Though these explorations and trials are not yet mature, their positive orientation is still worth recognizing and commending. This consultative democracy takes form among various kinds of civil organizational management and operations as well as in base-level civil practice advanced by civil organizations like the “democratic earnest discussion associations” (民主恳谈会) formed in Zhejiang’s Wenling (温岭), “peasant council work groups” (村民议事小组) in Shenzhen’s West Village Township (西乡镇) and community Internet forums.20 Currently, citizen consultation has already appeared in the following forms and mechanisms: policy-making citizen consultation, public hearing citizen consultation, advisory citizen consultation, and meditative citizen consultation.21 The existence of civil organizations has contributed to social diversity, thereby creating a need for consultative democracy. Consultative 18 上海社区发展报告 (1996–2000)/shang hai she qu fa zhan bao gao (1996–2000), (shang hai da xue chu ban she, 2000.10) 282–321. (Shanghai Community Development Report (1996–2000)). 19 陈剩勇、汪锦军、马斌著/Chen Shengyong, Wang Jinjun, Ma Binzhu, 组织化、自主治理与民主——浙江温州民间商会研究/zu zhi hua, zi zhu zhi li yu min zhu—zhe jiang wen zhou min jian shang hui yan jiu, (zhong guo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 2004.12) (Organizing, Autonomous Governance and Democracy—a Study of Civil Business Associations in Wenzhou City, Zhejiang) 20 陈剩勇、何包钢主编/Chen Shengyong, He Baogang, eds., 协商民主的发展/ xie shang min zhu de fa zhan, (zhong guo she hui ke xue chu ban she, 2006.6). (Mediating Democracy’s Development) 21 林尚立/Lin Shangli, “公民协商与中国基层民主发展”/“gong min xie shang yu zhong guo ji ceng min zhu fa zhan,” in 学术月刊/xue shu yue kan, (2007, Vol. 9). (“Citizen Mediation and the Development of Base-Level Democracy in China” in Scholastic Monthly)

civil organizations and political reforms: china’s logic 295 democracy is by nature highly open and participatory. Its development directly advances the development of civil society. Third, participatory democracy. Creation of sufficient space for citizen participation is key to guaranteeing political stability during the process of political change. Autonomy and consultation are both forms of participatory democracy. Civil organizations’ ability to integrate interests and represent have made them important mechanisms in the creation of citizens’ orderly participation. At the base-level of society, people’s political participation emerges of itself and also in civil organizations; it can take place through communities or through civil organizations. Thus, the CCP has highly emphasized the need to create the conditions to protect citizens’ orderly participation. To that end, the Party has mainly incorporated civil organizations into the process of creating citizens’ orderly participation and political building. Nurturing civil society is the basic mission of reform and development in China’s politics. Further, the political demands of a developing civil society have basically determined the fundamental direction of political reforms: toward constitutional democracy. The development of civil society admittedly requires political space and political resources, but its growth and development are of extreme importance. Thus, civil organizations will surely play an increasingly important role. In reality, although we can wee the influence and role of civil organizations in political reforms, in the broader picture of political reforms over the last 30 years, civil organizations have yet to become an independent force in political reforms. However, this situation is currently undergoing a profound change. If we say that over the last 30 years, political reforms drove the development of civil autonomy, then moving forward, civil organizations may well drive China’s political reforms and development as an independent social force. At the same time we pin on civil organizations hopes for future political reforms, we must also recognize the effects and role that civil organizations have played in the political reforms of the last 30 years, even if this was not their intended effect. The introduction of civil organizations had three kinds of effects on China’s political building and development. First, the pattern of unity between the Party, the State and society gave way to a pattern in which Party, State and society are three coexisting and mutually-developing parts. Second, there has been a transformation from non-associational politics to associational politics. Third, a

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politics of State totalism has given way to a politics in which State, market and society govern together. In light of these changes, we have good reason to pin hopes for the advancement of future political change on the development of civil organizations. Of course, for civil organizations to live up to the task of advancing China’s political reforms, its own development and maturity will be critical.

CHAPTER NINE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF REFORM: ADMINISTRATIVE ABSORPTION OF SOCIETY Kang Xiaoguang, Lu Xianying and Han Heng Starting in 1978, Mainland China has undergone broad, deep and abrupt changes. In the economy today, planned economics have given way to market economics; markets have become the dominant mechanism for distributing resources. Accompanying market reforms in the economy, politics have also undergone certain changes; the political system has changed from a totalistic system to an authoritarian system. Under the new system, although the government has still maintained a monopoly on political power and strictly controlled the public sphere, it no longer supervises and controls citizens’ personal lives and household matters. Following market reforms in the economy and changes in the government’s administrative system, the State and society began to separate; the state of complete unity between the State and society was broken. Generally speaking, in the 1980s, the paradigm of mainstream academia was a modernization theory that focused primarily on how China would realize modernization. Within this, new authoritarianism and democratic antecedence theory were two major and competing views.1 Entering the 1990s, following the progress of economic reforms and the exposure of social problems, a new paradigm focusing on the relationship between State and society received increasing attention in academia. At the same time, the term “marketparticipant society” (市民社会) was frequently discussed. Advocates of market-participant society no longer had their “eyes fixed on the upper echelons” but rather were “downward oriented”. They were more concerned with society as apart from State and hoped to propel On the conflict between New Authoritarianism and Democracy First Theory, see 刘军、李林/Liu Jun and Li Lin, 新权威主义——对改革理论纲领的论争/xin quan wei zhu yi–dui gai ge li lun gang ling de lun zheng, (Beijing: bei jing jing ji xue yuan chu ban she, 1989). (New Authoritarianism and the Controversy over the Basic Principles of Reform Theory). 1

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China’s democratization through nurturing autonomous organizations in society. As we entered the 21st Century, “third sector theory” made its appearance. This paradigm focuses on a third sector outside of the government and the market—civil organizations—and characterized the third sector as having unique advantages over the government and market and an important role to play in social life. This primary goal of this chapter is to offer some judgments concerning the state of the third sector in Mainland China and on this foundation offer a theoretical summary of the relationship between the State and society in Mainland China. In order to reach this goal, several questions must be answered. First, what is the state of China’s third sector today? What types of organizations comprise it? What are its structural features? In what kinds of activities is it engaged? What are its functions? What sorts of differences exist within it? Second, in the 30 years of the Reform and Opening, what changes have taken place in China’s third sector? How is it different from before the reforms? How does it differ from Western society? Third, why is China’s third sector the way it is today? Which factors have affected its development? What administrative approach has the government adopted toward the third sector? Why has the government adopted this approach? And which factors have affected the government’s approach? What affects have this approach had on the third sector? Fourth, what kind of relationship between the State and society is embodied in the state of China’s third sector today? What are the inherent features of this relationship? Is the type of relationship that has emerged between State and society extraordinary? By answering this series of questions, this chapter will attempt to summarize systematically the shifts that have taken place in China’s society over the 30 years of the Reform and Opening from the perspective of organizations. 1. Research Framework 1.1. The Concept of the Third Sector 1.1.1. Defining the Connotations of the Third Sector The third sector usually refers to the sum of the civil organizations outside of government and enterprises. Informed by definitions currently

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in use and integrating the state of current Mainland China, we here offer the following definition of the third sector: the third sector refers to the sum of non-governmental, non-profit and anti-society organizations. This definition contains the following several technical terms: organizations, non-governmental, non-profit, and anti-society. 1.1.2. Extensions of the Third Sector In accordance with this definition, the following types of organizations are included under the third sector: (1) People’s groups, including unions, the Communist Youth League, the Women’s Federation, China Association of Science and Technology, League of Returned Overseas Chinese, Taiwan Compatriots Friendship League, Youth League, and Federation of Industry and Commerce; (2) Social groups excepted from registering with the State, including the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, China Writers Association, All-China Journalists Association, Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Other Countries, Council for the Promotion of International Trade, China Disabled Persons Federation, Soong Ching Ling Foundation, China Law Society, China Red Cross, Thought and Political Work Research Association, European-American Classmates Association, Huang Pu Jun Xiao Tong Xue Hui, China National Association of Vocational Education, Film Association, Drama Association, Artists Association, Music Association, Opera Association, Dance Association, Photography Association, Calligraphy Association, Folk Art Association, Acrobatics Association and Television Artists Association; (3) State-run institutions; (4) Local organizations, including urban community residents committees and village committees; (5) Social groups registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, peoplerun non-enterprise units, foundations; (6) Civil organizations registered by other government departments (like owners associations, religious activities venues; (7) Non-profit organizations registered by legal persons of enterprises; (8) Branch organizations in Mainland China of third sector organizations from abroad; (9) All types of civil organizations registered under legal organizations; (10) Civil organizations operating inside work units and communities;

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(11) Hobbyist groups meeting in parks and on the streets; (12) Virtual social groups on the Internet; (13) Political opposition groups. 1.2. Descriptive Framework One of the objectives of this chapter is to describe the current state of the third sector in Mainland China. In order to do so, we must first set up a descriptive framework. The descriptive framework includes three class one indicators (structural, behavioral and functional indicators) and nine class two indicators (initiating entity, legal status, governance structures, resource structures, product type, field of activities, form of behavior, type of function, and functional impact). We describe these third sector civil organizations based on these indicators (see Table 8-1). 1.3. Explanatory Framework The chief function of the descriptive framework is to answer the question “what is the current state”. Merely answering this question is insufficient, however. We must also answer the question of why the current state is the way it is; this, in turn, requires an explanatory framework, which can be seen in Figure 8-1. The explanatory framework incorporates several aspects. First, description of the state of the third sector demonstrates that, comparatively, Mainland China’s third sector and reforms bear characteristics of Westernization; at the same time, compared with Western society, they also have pronounced Chinese characteristics. Therefore, we begin our explanation of the Westernization of the third sector from reforms, openness and government behavior; we begin our explanation of the third sector’s Chinese characteristics from the government’s administration of civil organizations. Second, what administrative approaches did the government adopt towards third sector civil orgaTable 8-1: Descriptive Indicators of the Third Sector Class One Indicators

Survey Question

Structural indicators

Initiating entity, legal status, governance structures, resource structures product type, field of activities, form of behavior type of function, functional impact

Behavioral indicators Functional indicators


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State-society Relationship

State of the third sector

Government attitude, behavior and approach

Initial conditions

Openness to the outside

Internal reforms

Cultural traditions

Figure 8-1: A General Explanatory Framework

nizations? Why adopt these approaches? How were they able to adopt these approaches? This also requires explanation. Here, we use “openness to the outside”, “reforms (transformations)”, “initial conditions for reform”, “cultural traditions”, and “civil organizations’ own properties” to explain the government’s behavior. An explanatory framework for the government’s behavior is thus established. Third, upon the foundation of these explanations of the state of the third sector and the government’s behavior, we offer a summary of the State-society relationship in Mainland China today. 2. Describing the State of the Third Sector 2.1. Classification System In accordance with the descriptive framework and in summary of case materials, civil organizations in Mainland China can be divided into 15 models.

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2.1.1. Model 1 This type includes primarily the 8 large People’s Groups and the 25 social groups exempted from registration. (1) Structural Characteristics: Formed by the government, these organizations’ legal status is as social groups exempted from registration. Their governance structures are government-dominated. Their responsible directors are appointed by the government and have certain government administrative ranks. Decisions made must be submitted by responsible directors to the government for approval. The government frequently intervenes, guiding or even directly demanding certain decisions on the part of the organization. The resource structure is singular; these organizations depend more on the government for office facilities and operating funds. Their office workers are government public servants or personnel dispatched by work units. Their wages and benefits are paid by the government. Entry-level employees are recruited through the government as well. (2) Behavioral Characteristics: They provide mutual-benefit-type public goods. Activities include: implementing Party and State laws, policies and orders; understanding and collecting opinions and suggestions from certain service recipients and communicating them back to the relevant government departments; under the government’s administration and control, launching service activities for targeted service recipients, including various kinds of entertainment activities. Their methods are like those of governmental departments; they emphasize the authority of leaders and rank systems. Modeled after the government’s administrative system, they have instituted vertical, hierarchical organizational structures. (3) Functional Characteristics: These organizations are often bridges and links for the Party and the State to liaise with the general public. Functional roles they play include helping the government achieve administration and control of recipients of services, satisfying some of the needs of their members and providing services to members. To a certain degree, they play a role in the political discourse, and, through tertiary allocation, the realization of social fairness and justice. In terms of the impact of these functions, these organizations, when compared with other forms in the third sector, are extremely powerful.


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2.1.2. Model 2 This type primarily includes officially-run religious institutions. It includes Buddhist, Daoist, Protestant, Catholic, and Islamic religious associations. (1) Structural Characteristics: institutions with national scale are set up directly by the government. Most organizations at the provincial, municipal and lower levels are set up by higher-level religious organizations and are considered social group legal persons. Their governance structures are government-dominated. Directors of the secretariats where most policy is originated are appointed by the government; major decisions must also be approved by government departments. Some organizations have established boards or quasi-boards to serve, in form, as the highest decision-making bodies. In terms of resource structures, their funding comes mostly from government transfers and contributions from local religious groups, subsidiary religious organizations, and any donations from society they might receive. Personnel in the secretariat are appointed by the government and are public servants or people dispatched from work units. Wages and benefits are paid directly by the government. Personnel changes are made by the government as well. (2) Action Characteristics: They provide mutual-benefit-type public goods, mostly according to the government’s demands; under the administration and control of the government, they launch activities related to religious belief. Their methods are similar to those of government departments. Modeled after the government’s administrative system, they have instituted vertical, hierarchical organizational structures. (3) Functional Characteristics: To a certain degree, this type of organization has satisfied a need for worshipers’ beliefs and achieved cooperation and exchange between religious groups. At the same time, it has helped the government resolve some social issues. In terms of impact, these organizations represent a monopoly over the functional provision of religious belief. Although there exist some underground religious organizations, their functional influence cannot compare with that of officially-organized religious organizations.

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2.1.3. Model 3 This type primarily includes urban residents’ committees and village committees. (1) Structural Characteristics: These organizations are set up by the government and are without legal person status. Legally, they are treated as public, autonomous organizations (群自治组织). Their governance structures are government-dominated; they are without boards and primarily execute the policies and commands of their superiors in government. Appointment of their directors is conducted according to State laws. Their resource structures are singular. Funds for operations, wages and benefits all come from government transfers; channels for these appropriations are dictated by government law. Finances are administered on these organizations’ behalf by superior government offices; the organizations themselves are without independent fiscal powers. (2) Behavioral Characteristics: Organizations of this type primarily provide mutual-benefit-type public goods in accordance with the activities undertaken by their superior government offices. The field of these organizations’ activities covers nearly every aspect of people’s lives. They are responsible to their superior government offices and are engaged primarily in implementing government policies and orders and in completing various tasks assigned by the government. They are oriented toward services for the public such as clothing, food, housing and transit. Their methods are similar to those of government departments. (3) Functional Characteristics: One the one hand, these organizations are responsible for satisfying the government’s needs and helping their superiors implement laws and policies at the base-level; on the other, in satisfying people’s basic needs like clothing, food, housing and transit, their services touch almost every aspect of people’s lives. This functionality is unparalleled elsewhere in the third sector. 2.1.4. Model 4 This type of organizations primarily includes state-owned institutions with revenues from operations. (1) Structural Characteristics: These organizations are set up by the government and are business legal persons. Their governance struc-


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tures are government-influenced. They are without boards; their main directors are appointed by the government; with important decisions, the government either participates or the organization’s decision is submitted to the government for approval. In terms of resource structure, funding comes mostly from revenue-producing operations and from government transfers. Most of the personnel in state-owned institutions are dispatched from work units; their wages are paid in whole or in part by the State and are hired by the government. Personnel not recruited in this way are hired directly by the organization in the market; their wages are paid by the organization. (2) Behavioral Characteristics: This type of organization provides semiprivate goods. Their fields of activities involve science, education, culture, hygiene and others; similarly to enterprises, they provide compensated services to members of society. These organizations respond both to the government’s demands and to society’s needs. The methods of this type of organization are extremely similar to those of enterprises; their operating logics are almost identical to those of enterprises. (3) Functional Characteristics: Organizations of this kind primarily provide services to society and the services provided are all oriented toward satisfying people’s basic, important needs. In terms of their capacity for service provision, because of the support they receive from the government, the capacity of state-run institutions is very strong compared with other organizations in the third sector. 2.1.5. Model 5 This type primarily includes revenue-producing people-run nonenterprise units. (1) Structural Characteristics: Organizations of this type are set up by individuals and are considered people-run non-enterprise legal persons. Their governance structures are autonomous within the organization; these organizations’ autonomy is strong. Choice of leaders and major decisions are mostly decided autonomously by the organization. Most have boards that are, at least in form, their organizations’ highest governing bodies; in practice, however, few boards truly decide policies. Usually, internal policies are decided by responsible directors and organization leaders; some of these

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organizations also authoritarian, dictatorial management. In terms of resource structures, these organizations’ funds come mostly from their own revenue-generating operations as well as from assistance from other organizations at home and abroad. Personnel and hiring are conducted through markets. (2) Behavioral Characteristics: Similar to state-run institutions. (3) Functional Characteristics: These organizations engage primarily in providing public services to society. Their functional influence is also similar to that of state-run institutions. 2.1.6. Model 6 This type primarily includes government-organized public-interest civil organizations and is often social groups and foundations. (1) Structural Characteristics: These organizations are set up by the government and are considered social group legal persons. Their governance structures are government-influenced; most have established boards serving, in form, as their highest decision-making bodies. Selection of executive leaders takes place in consultation with organizations’ registered work supervising units; to varying degrees, those departments also intervene in major decisions, resulting, effectively, in these organizations usually submitting drafts of major decisions for approval from superior government departments. In terms of their resource structure, funds and materiel come from donations from society. Personnel are usually hired autonomously; but, there are also cases in which government departments requite positions for certain people, including retired government workers. These organizations are adept at using the media to promote their projects and values. The government supports them to varying degrees in ways such as government procurement, publicized official visits and participation in activities. (2) Behavioral Characteristics: This type of organization provides public-interest-type public goods, mostly in areas in which both government and society take an interest, such as poverty alleviation, disaster relief, aid, development and environmental protection. In terms of methods, this type of organization responds mostly to social needs and a large number of these civil organizations emphasize participation on the part of service recipients, or participatory projects. They also emphasize volunteerism and are adept at utilizing volunteers.


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(3) Functional Characteristics: This type of organization aids in resolving all kinds of problems faced by society through the provision of social, public goods. For this reason, they play a major role in social fairness and justice. In terms of advocacy, progressive concepts and institutional innovations, these organizations have already become a major source of innovations. 2.1.7. Model 7 This type of organization includes government-organized associations, commerce associations, academic associations and other kinds of mutual-interest organizations. (1) Structural Characteristics: These organizations are set up by the government and are usually registered as social groups. Their governance structures are government-influenced, especially those set up as a result of government office reforms or functional transformations. The government intervenes to a great extent in the selection of executive leadership and in major decisions; in some cases, government officials serve directly as leaders of these institutions. In terms of resource structure, their funding comes from membership dues and from service fees from members or service recipients. Their personnel come both from free hiring and from government placements. Governments support these organizations to varying degrees in ways including government procurement of their services and through offering various social connections. (2) Action Characteristics: These organizations provide mutual-benefittype public goods; their services are provided mostly for members. However, some organizations also engage in other activities as required by the government. In terms of methods, these organizations primarily respond to members’ needs. (3) Functional Characteristics: These organizations, to a certain degree, satisfy the needs of their associational members; through forming associations, they assist in completing tasks individual members cannot complete alone, thereby satisfying members’ needs. At the same time, these organizations have taken on some parts of the government’s functionality, which is beneficial for the reform of government institutions.

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2.1.8. Model 8 Organizations of this type include various public-interest-type social groups set up by individuals and public-interest foundations. (1) Structural Characteristics: These organizations are set up by individuals; their legal status is that of social group legal persons or foundation legal persons. Their governance structures are autonomous within the organization with the organization itself selecting its own leaders and making its own major decisions. In accordance with relevant statutes, most establish boards. In terms of their resource structures, most of their funds and materiel come from other third sector organizations, as well as donations from organizations abroad. Contribution receipts are mostly connected to projects launched; government funding is scarce. Most personnel are hired freely from the market. They are adept at utilizing volunteers; they also focus on utilizing media resources. (2) Action Characteristics: These organizations primarily provide social services according to the needs of society, or public-interesttype public goods. Their fields of activity include disaster relief, aid, environmental protection, poverty alleviation, culture, and community and rural development. In terms of their methods, this type of organization launches activities though projects and focuses on project design. When engaging in projects, they emphasize recipient participation and volunteerism. (3) Functional Characteristics: Organizations of this type primarily provide public services to society and aid and alleviate various social problems. However, in terms of the quantity of public goods provided, they are weaker than government-organized organizations in the third sector. Through social reallocation, they promote social fairness and justice and have played a certain positive role in advocacy and institutional innovations. 2.1.9. Model 9 This type of organization primarily includes public-interest organizations registered under other organizations, work units and other public-interest organizations within residential communities as well as public-interest, secondary institutions under legal civil organizations. (1) Structural Characteristics: organizations of this type are set up by individuals and are without legal status. Usually, they rely on legal


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civil organizations for their existence. Their governance structures are autonomous within the organizations, and they select their own leadership and make their own major decisions. To varying degrees, however, the work unit with which it is associated or organization to which it belongs may intervene to varying degrees. Some have established boards. In terms of their resource structures, these organizations are very similar to those in Model 8. The only difference is that in this case, the associated or parent organization may provide resources such as funding, materiel and personnel and at the very least will offer them legal verification for their activities. (2) Action Characteristics: In this sense, organizations of this type differ little from those in Model 8. The greatest difference is that these organizations rely more heavily on their associated or parent institutions. In terms of their public services and the ways in which they provide service, they are quite similar to Model 8. (3) Functional Characteristics: Functionally, these organizations are similar to Model 8. 2.1.10. Model 10 Organizations of this type include various mutual-interest social groups set up by individuals, as well as religious organizations administered by the government and owners’ associations. (1) Structural Characteristics: these organizations are primarily set up by individuals and are legally considered social group legal persons. Still some other are established in accordance with State regulations but are unqualified for legal person status. Their governance structures are autonomous within the organization; these organizations select their own leadership and make their own major decisions. Civil organizations of this type with social group legal person status mostly establish boards. In terms of their resource structures, their funding comes mostly from membership dues and fees for services provided to members. Personnel are hired autonomously. (2) Action Characteristics: These organizations provide mutual-benefit public goods. Their activities primarily seek to meet the needs of members and are not intended to resolve common social problems. In terms of their methods, these organizations emphasize self-governance, democracy, participation and volunteerism.

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(3) Functional Characteristics: organizations of this type primarily provide services for members, thereby satisfying the unique needs of a segment of the public. Furthermore, they are voluntarily established by society and thereby embody the associational function. 2.1.11. Model 11 Organizations of this type include mutual-benefit organizations registered under other organizations, mutual-benefit organizations active in work units or communities and secondary institutions under publicinterest-type civil organizations. (1) Structural Characteristics: organizations of this type are set up by individuals and are without legal status. Usually, they rely on legal civil organizations for their existence. Their governance structures are organizationally autonomous; they choose their own leadership and make their own major decisions. However, they may be subject to intervention from their parent or associated organizations. In terms of their resource structures, funds come from membership dues and fees from services provided to members. Personnel are freely hired or organized by member themselves. (2) Action Characteristics: organizations of this type provide mutualbenefit public goods and aim to meet the unique needs of one segment of the public. In terms of methods, these organizations emphasize self-governance, democracy, participation and volunteerism. (3) Functional Characteristics: they meet the unique needs of one segment of the public and also, to a certain degree, satisfy the associational needs of a segment of the population. 2.1.12. Model 12 Organizations of this type include hobbyist organizations meeting in parks or on the streets and virtual communities on the Internet. (1) Structural Characteristics: formed by individuals, these groups are not registered and have no legal status. Nevertheless, the government has not prohibited their activities. In terms governance structures, these organizations select their own leadership and make their own decisions. In terms of resource structures, these organizations depend mostly on membership dues for funding. Their personnel gather voluntarily for the most part; enthusiasts provide services for everyone and take no wages.


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(2) Action Characteristics: these provide mutual-benefit public goods, mostly in the field of entertainment and hobbies. (3) Functional Characteristics: organizations of this type embody the associational function and meet social needs for entertainment and social interactions. In terms of their methods, these organizations emphasize self-governance, democracy, participation and volunteerism. 2.1.13. Model 13 Organizations of this type include civil organizations registered as enterprises. (1) Structural Characteristics: most are set up by individuals on the Mainland though some are set up by foreign parties. They have enterprise legal person status; however, they operate according to the logic of third sector civil organizations. In terms of governance structures, most have boards, select their own leadership and make their own major decisions. In terms of resource structures, funding comes primarily from social contributions and revenues from operations. Most personnel are hired freely from the market; however, these organizations are adept at utilizing volunteers and using the media for publicity. (2) Action Characteristics: these organizations are of the public-interest type and provide services to society. In terms of the products and services provided, the quantities, their methods of provision and effectiveness, they differ very little from civil organizations registered as social group legal persons. Affiliated institutions of organizations abroad tend to emphasize cooperation with the government in their activities. (3) Functional Characteristics: these organizations, no differently from individually set-up, public-interest civil organizations registered as social group legal persons, primarily provide services to society. The services they provide are very diverse and their operating methods are highly innovative. These organizations have played major roles in terms of innovative activities and advocating values. 2.1.14. Model 14 This type includes civil organizations that are set up by individuals and which are far outside of the scope of government controls. It includes, for example, advocacy groups without legal registration, rights-protection

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groups, household churches, and affiliated institutions of organizations abroad. Though they are without legal status, the government has not prohibited their activities. (1) Structural Characteristics: set up by individuals, these organizations are without legal person status and are not subsidiary to any civil organization. In terms of governance structures, most have boards. They appoint their own leadership and make their own major decisions. In terms of resource structures, funding for publicinterest organizations comes mostly from social donations, with a significant portion coming in the form of assistance from abroad. These organizations are adept at utilizing the media for publicity. (2) Action Characteristics: the activities of these organizations are mostly related to values advocacy, rights-protection, and religious beliefs. Most of their fields of activity are considered sensitive. In terms of their methods, affiliated institutions of organizations abroad tend to emphasize cooperation with the government in their activities. (3) Functional Characteristics: while mostly focusing on advocacy, some of these organizations also provide service activities for disadvantaged groups. 2.1.15. Model 15 Organizations of this type include political opposition groups. (1) Structural Characteristics: these are set up by individuals, are without legal status, and exist illegally and underground. This type of group is prohibited by the government. Choices of leadership and major decisions are made within the groups. In terms of their resource structures, the Fa Lun Gong’s resources come primarily from members and from believer donations; there is also assistance from powers abroad. (2) Action Characteristics: their activities consist primarily of antisystem activities and activities challenging the government’s authority, both forbidden. Their methods are unique, such as distributing leaflets, sit-ins or self-incineration. (3) Functional Characteristics: mostly opposing the government and challenging its authority.


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2.2. System Analysis From the structural, behavioral and functional indicators above, we have described the characteristics of the various models. Their main indicative characteristics and the differences between them are summarized in the “Civil Organization Classification Table” (Table 8-2). Examination of Table 8-2 reveals that descriptive indicators are not completely independent, they are strong associations. For example, there are strong associations between initiating entity, legal status, governance structures, and resource structures. Similarly, there are strong associations between resource structures, product properties, activities and functions. Though third sector organizations are all non-governmental and non-profit, significant differences still exist in how governmental and how for-profit they are. Samuelson once pointed out that there is a continuum from private goods to public goods: “thinking about an array of pure public goods to pure private goods is useful . . . purely private, mostly private, half private-half public, mostly public, purely, public.”2 In terms of these product suppliers, the two ends of this continuum are the second sector (the private sector) and the first sector (government departments). The third sector is the segment between the two. Within the third sector, there are civil organizations providing both “mostly private goods” and “mostly public goods”; there are also civil organizations providing “half private-half public goods”. That is to say, because they provided different goods, the degrees to which third sector organizations are “non-profit” are also different. An organization’s “degree of non-profitness” can be determined by looking at “product properties”, “resource structure”, “activities and functions” and other indicators in Table 8-2. Similarly, the degrees to which third sector organizations are “non-governmental” differ as well; they have differing degrees of “non-governmentalness”. Organizations’ “degrees of non-governmentalness”can be determined by looking at “initiating entity”, “legal status”, “governance structures”, “resource structure” and other indicators in Table 8-2. Put another way, the descriptive indicators in Table 8-2 can be amalgamated into two dimensions: a “governmental—non-governmental” dimension and a “for-profit—not-for-profit” dimension. According to 2 萨缪尔森、诺德豪斯/sa miao er sen (Samuelson) and nuo de hao si (Nordhaus), 经济学/jing ji xue, (Beijing: zhong guo fa zhan chu ban she, 1992) 1211. (Economics).

Government

Government

Government

Government

Government

Government

Government

Individuals

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Initiating entity

1

Model

governance structures

governmentdominated Government + revenue from operations

Government

Government + members

Government

resource structures

Members + government

Society + government + parties abroad

legal person organization Organizationally Society + parties within the system autonomous abroad

legal person organization governmentwithin the system influenced


legal person organization Organizationally Revenue from within the system autonomous operations + society


other legal organization within the system

legal person organization governmentwithin the system dominated

legal person organization governmentwithin the system dominated

Legal status

public-interest public goods

mutual-benefit public goods


Semi-private goods

Semi-private goods




Product properties

Table 8-2: Civil Organization Classification Table

resolving social problems

Combined industrial and social role


providing public services

providing public services

Local community services, executing government tasks

Religious beliefs

Political participation, interest groups

Activities and functions

314 kang xiaoguang, lu xianying and han heng

Individuals

Individuals

Individuals, Organization outside the parties abroad system

Individuals, Organization outside the parties abroad system

Individuals

11

12

13

14

15

resource structures

Organizationally Society + parties autonomous abroad

governance structures

Organizationally Members autonomous

Organization outside the system

Organizationally Members autonomous

Organizationally Society + members + autonomous parties abroad

Organizationally Society + parties autonomous abroad

unregistered organization Organizationally Members within the system autonomous

dependent organization within the system

legal person organization Organizationally Members within the system autonomous other legal organization within the system

Individuals

10

dependent organization within the system

Legal status

Individuals

Initiating entity

9

Model

Table 8-2 (cont.)








Product properties

Challenge the ruling party

Combined industrial and social role, religious beliefs


unique needs

unique needs

unique needs


Activities and functions

administrative absorption of society 315

governmental

316

kang xiaoguang, lu xianying and han heng I Model 1, Model 2, Model 3

II Model 4

IV Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 10

Model 9

Model 11

Model 12

III

Model 5

non-governmental

Model 13

Model 14

Model 15 not-for-profit

for-profit

Figure 8-2: Distribution of Types of Third Sector Organizations

these two dimensions, Mainland China’s third sector can be divided into four quadrants, with the 15 models identified above falling in different quadrants. We can thus illustrate the various types of organizations in the third sector in a two dimensional figure (see Figure 8-2). Organizations in Quadrant I are less non-governmental, more non-profit. Models 1, 2, and 3, fall into this quadrant. Characteristics common to these organizations are being set up by order of the government and having a certain legal status. Their autonomy is weak and the government tends to intervene more; their resources come mainly as State finances. Their methods are highly administrative, bureaucratic and hierarchical, and they have many governmental characteristics. Functionally, they mainly serve to expand participation of the political process and to provide certain public services. Clearly, these characteristics are highly similar to those of the first sector. First sector organizations are organized by the government under State


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mandate; their resources come from State finances. These organizations are all links in the administrative system; they adhere strictly to administrative ranks. Naturally, the organizations in Quadrant I are not actually “first sector organizations”; legally, they are not institutional legal persons and are not in the category of government. We may refer to them, thus, as “quasi-first sector organizations”. Within quasi-first sector organizations, we can differentiate among our models further. Organizations of type 1 are formed based primarily on shared biological traits or occupational status. Model 2 is formed based on common beliefs. Model 3 organizations are formed based on common areas of residence. Both Quadrants II and III share the characteristic of being less nonprofit. Of these, civil organizations in Quadrant II were set up by the government and are highly governmental and less autonomous, such as Model 4 (state-run institutions). Civil organizations in Quadrant III are set up by individuals, non-governmental, and highly autonomous, such as Model 5 (people-run non-enterprise units). Civil organizations in Quadrants II and III derive most of their resources from revenueproducing operations. These types emphasize market mechanisms like economic gain, supply, pricing, competition; recipients of their services gain access to them by voluntary purchase. In these ways, they are highly similar to second sector organizations. In the second sector, the dominant characteristics are that all goods are private and adherence to the logics of the market. In this sense, state-run institutions and people-run non-enterprise units, in that they have operating revenues, are similar to second sector organizations. Differently, however, organizations in the third sector are prohibited from distributing profits; furthermore, assets are not the property of the investors and instead belong to all of society. These types of third sector civil organizations can thus be called “quasi-second sector organizations”. Within quasisecond sector organizations, the difference between Quadrants II and III is the degree to which they are governmental. Civil organizations in Quadrant IV are highly non-governmental and highly non-profit, characteristics typical to the third sector in the West. These organizations are not formed by government mandate but voluntarily. In terms of their governance structures, they are subject to little intervention from the government and are highly autonomous. They emphasize volunteerism and participation. They respond mostly to society’s, not the government’s, needs. These are characteristics typical to civil organizations in the third sector in the

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West. Naturally, these types are not equivalent to Western third sector organizations. This is because many are still set up by the government. These Quadrant IV organizations can be called “quasi-Western third sector organizations”. Within quasi-Western third sector organizations, structural, behavioral and functional characteristics are all highly diverse. In terms of their structural characteristics, some are set up by the government and others by individuals. Legally, they are social group legal persons, foundation legal persons, and enterprise legal persons. Among those without legal person status, there are independent organizations and those dependent on other organizations. Some are within the administrative system for civil organizations; others exist outside of it. Their actions are characterized both by mutualinterest and public interest. In terms of their fields of activity, some are active in fields the government likes; others are active in fields toward which the government is sensitive or even fields repellent to the government. Based on these differences, we can differentiate further between Models 6–15. Horizontally, these models are differentiated by whether they are based on public or mutual interests, with publicinterest organizations to the left of mutual-benefit organizations. Vertically, government-organized types are above individually-organized types; within individually-organized types, those with legal person status are placed above those without it. In reality, the vertical axis in Figure 8-2 represents political, or the government’s power and logic; the horizontal, the power and logic of the economy or the market. Political and economic forces and logics have deep and broad impacts on the third sector. The distribution of the diagram is decided by those two kinds of forces together. Before the reforms, there was no element of society untouched by government intervention; all organizations were either “state-owned” or “state-run”. Though there was no market, market logics were already at work, eventually producing the distinction between enterprise units (企业单位) and state-run units (事业单位). Over 30 years of shifts, market mechanisms have replaced the planned system. During this process, the third sector retained Quadrants I and II and began expanding into Quadrants III and IV. The greatest change over the last 30 years has been the large increase in non-governmental elements in the third sector. This is also the most pronounced, deepest difference between the third sector in pre- and post-reform Mainland China.


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2.3. A Summary of Characteristics Above, an analysis has been offered of the third sector system. Here, on the foundation of the analysis above, we summarize the characteristics of China’s third sector. We take a look at what changes have taken place post-reforms in China and at how China’s third sector is different from those in Western societies. 2.3.1. Structural Characteristics In terms of structural characteristics, third sector organizations in Mainland China today are distributed over the four quadrants of the “Distribution of Types of Third Sector Organizations” (Figure 8-2). Prior to reforms, third sector organizations were distributed only over Quadrants I and II and took the forms of government-organized social groups and state-run units. At the time, the government had monopolized both the right and the resources to establish social groups. Social groups were under complete official control; the government was their only source of resources. In terms of internal governance and organizational structures, social groups were modeled after administrative departments; the government also had absolute control over their fields of activity and major decisions. During this period, there were very few social groups and they tended to be highly similar with few differences in internal structures. State-run units also appeared before reforms. They were directly under Party, governmental, and military offices; their leadership was appointed by the government, their funding allocated by the government, and their personnel provided by the government. Their activities were launched in lock step with government initiatives. Compared with the pre-reform period, the structure of China’s third sector has undergone major changes. First, all kinds of new forms of civil organizations have appeared in society; at the same time, the distribution of civil organizations has expanded from Quadrants I and II into Quadrants III and IV. The structural characteristics of organizations in Quadrants III and IV have also undergone changes. First, a large number of groups were established by individuals. Second, in terms of legal status, there appeared social group legal persons, foundation legal persons, people-run non-enterprise unit legal persons, enterprise legal persons, as well as many civil organizations without clear legal status. Third, in terms of governance structures, many organizations established boards like those in the West; in some cases, these boards

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played a major role in organizational decision-making. Generally speaking, these new organizations were highly autonomous, choosing their own leaders and making major decisions within the organization. Fourth, their resources came from a diverse array of sources; these included fees from services, donations from society, enterprise contributions, even assistance from abroad. This was utterly different from the “wholly government owned” state before reforms. Furthermore, the “old” government-organized social groups and state-run units structurally began to change as well. First, their autonomy became markedly stronger; government intervention in their internal governance weakened. Second, sources of resources also expanded beyond the government as some resources from society poured into government-organized social groups. As the proportion of resources coming from government transfers dropped, revenues from operations became an import source of funds for state-run units. Compared with the West, the most striking structural characteristic of China’s third sector is the pronounced mark of the government emblazoned upon it. First, throughout the third sector there are quasifirst sector organizations (Models 1, 2, and 3) as well as governmentorganized quasi-second sector organizations. These organizations were all set up by the government and are subject to government intervention in selection of personnel, resource access, governance structures, and activities. Second, in the distribution of organizations in the third sector, organizations that were set up by the government comprise the vast majority. Scholars once estimated that of 8 million social groups in China, People’s Groups and other government social groups accounted for 6.7 million of them; quasi-governmental social groups thus comprised 83.6% of the total.3 Quasi-second sector organizations are the same way. In the education sphere, for example, as of yearend 2005, the total number of people employed was 14.447 million; of those, 13.908 million worked in state-owned institutions, or 96.3% of all those employed in education.4 Third, corresponding to quasifirst sector organizations with their governmental characteristics and huge numbers, China’s third sector was almost without comparable, individually-formed civil organizations. That is to say that these kinds 3 王绍光, 何建宇/Wang Shaoguang and He Jianyu, 中国的社团革命——中国人的结社版图/zhongguo de she tuan ge ming–zhongguo ren de jie she ban tu. (China’s Associational Revolution—State of the Chinese People’s Associations). 4 China Bureau of Statistics, 中国统计年鉴 2006/zhongguo tong ji nian jian, (zhongguo tong ji chu ban she, 2006) 136. (China Statistical Report 2006 ).


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of civil organizations basically were all formed by the government; virtually none existed that were started by individuals.5 Compared with the West, another important structural characteristic of China’s third sector is the great diversity of quasi-Western third sector civil organizations. This diversity is embodied in almost all of the structural indicators including initiating entity, legal status, governance structures, and resource structures. Naturally, differences with Western third sectors still exist in terms of these indicators; the differences, however, mostly lie in the degree of government intervention in organizational affairs. 2.3.2. Behavioral Characteristics In terms of behavioral characteristics, China’s third sector has also undergone major changes since reforms. For one, it has greatly expanded the field of its activities. Before the reforms, organizations’ fields of activity were decided by the government. Now, though the activities of third sector organizations are still subject to government intervention, autonomy overall has been greatly strengthened and activities have expanded into most areas of social life. This is evident in the activities of new forms of organizations in Quadrants III and IV. These organizations are active not only in traditional areas like education, hygiene and culture; they have also launched a series of new kinds of activities in response to social issues due to China’s transformations, such as rights-protection, environmental protection and poverty alleviation. At the same time, the fields of activities of some old, government-organized groups expanded as well. For example, the Union has expanded its activities to include migrant workers; the Women’s Federation has begun some rights-protection activities. Generally, the activities of China’s third sector are broadening. They are now active not only in fields the government likes but also in fields the government is less concerned with, even fields toward which the government is sensitive or dislikes. In terms of methods, organizations in China’s third sector are very different from before the reforms. First, in terms of their methods, the new forms of organizations in Quadrants III and IV are extremely Westernized. They emphasize self-governance, independence, and the impact of the third sector on government. In their actions, they focus

5 Religious organizations are an exception. There are many household churches, but they have not been legalized.

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on equality, democracy, broad participation and volunteerism. Their methods are diverse and they are always innovating. By comparison, the methods of civil organizations before the reforms emphasized hierarchy, taking orders and top-down management; their methods lacked flexibility and innovation. However, the methods of governmentorganized organizations in Quadrants I and II underwent changes as well. For example, some organizations have sought contributions by framing their activities around public projects and have increasingly paid attention to the wishes of the people in their activities. This has especially been the case with government-organized state-run units. In order to achieve greater “market share” and to grow the numbers of those they serve, more and more have adopted marketing approaches to “package” themselves. Still, the behavioral norms of China’s third sector organizations are different from those in Western society. In terms of their fields of activity, the third sector is still engaged primarily in social services, i.e. services the government likes, such as education, poverty alleviation, environmental protection, industry services and the like. Though some organizations have engaged in sensitive activities such as rights-protections and advocacy for disadvantaged groups, activities in these areas still come under various government restrictions. The government will use series of measures to interfere with civil organizations’ activities in these areas. Naturally, there are other fields in which activities are prohibited, such as various kinds of government-opposition activities. In terms of methods, the most obvious difference with Western society is that China’s third sector organizations tend to be gentle; intense or adversarial behavior is rare. Even organizations engaging in rightsprotection restrict themselves to the methods allowed by the government such as motions or proposals; intense conflicts such as sit-ins, marches, strikes or riots are still very rare. 2.3.3. Functional Characteristics Functionally speaking, compared with the pre-reform period, the service functions in China’s third sector have expanded greatly. Not only are the types of services provided markedly broader, service capacity has grown as well. In terms of their associational function, for example, a large number of grassroots hobbyist organizations have spontaneously formed. In the area of social equality, large numbers of poverty alleviation organizations have appeared and have had publiclyrecognized effects in poverty alleviation. In the areas of advocacy,


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interest representation and rights-protection, more and more organizations are playing positive roles. China’s third sector is no longer simply a tool used by the government to execute its political aims and controls; the third sector is now focusing directly on social problems and serves in a certain representative function. Compared with Western society, the function of the third sector in China is still quite different. Generally speaking, functionally, third sectors can provide public goods, advance social justice, meet associational needs and impact public policy. However, in China’s third sector, there exists disequilibrium between official and non-official in terms of realizing these functions. In terms of providing public services, China’s government-organized, quasi-second sector civil organizations occupy a dominant position in providing public goods (i.e. state-run units and people-run non-enterprise units are strikingly different in terms of their provision of public goods). First, the number and scale of state-run units vastly outstrip people-run non-enterprise units. On the one hand, state-run units occupy the dominant position in terms of the quantity of public goods provided. In terms of advancing social justice, there are also great disparities within China’s third sector. Comparatively speaking, quasi-first sector civil organizations have played a greater role in advancing social justice. In poverty alleviation, for example, Unions, in the quasi-first sector, have made enormous contributions. The Union system has launched three major “branded” initiatives: The Deliver-Warmth Project (送温暖工程), Help Centers for Employees with Difficulties (困难职工帮扶中心) and the Golden Autumn Scholarship Program (金秋助学活动). As of February, 2008, the Deliver-Warmth Program had raised 2.958 million yuan, bringing comfort through 1.247 million interventions in challenged enterprises and 7.687 challenged homes and alleviating the poverty of 5.097 employees. Together, the All-China Union system built 2,975 Help Centers for Employees with Difficulties, covering 100% of local-level cities and 91% of county-level cities. With 4.13 billion yuan in accumulated funds, they have provided 21.033 million interventions for employees with difficulties. In their Scholarship Program, the Union has raised 2.7 billion yuan nationwide and helped 3.38 million boys and girls attend school.6 Compared to this, the contributions of

6 See the remarks of Vice Chair of the All China Workers Union Sun Chun lan (孙春兰) from the All China Union Work Meeting on Assistance, “认真学习贯彻胡

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quasi-third sector civil organizations have been small indeed. Even among quasi-third sector civil organizations, the contributions of organizations with government backgrounds have been greater than those without. For example, in 2007 alone, the government-backed China Poverty Alleviation Foundation distributed 269.96 million yuan in poverty alleviation funds, with projects in 838 counties, 327 universities and 860 hospitals. Their interventions affected 627,900 people.7 In terms of meeting society’s associational needs and impacting public policy, there is great disparity between organizations within China’s third sector. In terms of functional impact, government-backed civil organizations have much larger impacts than those without. 2.3.4. Brief Summary A comparison of the characteristics of Chinese and Western third sectors shows that China’s third sector has taken on pronounced “characteristics of Westernization” since the reforms. Yet, compared with the West, it has even more “Chinese characteristics”. That is to say that while the third sector in China no longer exhibits the totalism it did before the reforms, it also does not exhibit Western, market society (市民社会). The post-reform, “Westernized” characteristics of China’s third sector can be summarized as follows. First, third sector organizations have developed rapidly. This has meant not just continued growth of old-type organizations, but a great number of new-type organizations. Second, their structural, behavioral and functional characteristics have all shown signs of Westernization. This has been especially pronounced in new types of organizations but is also present in older organizations. Elements of Westernization include: the appearance of large numbers of non-governmentally-initiated civil organizations; organizations’ increased autonomy and more frequent introduction of board governance structures; diversity of funding sources and the

锦涛总书记重要指示精神, 扎实推进工会帮扶工作的创新发展”/“ren zhen xue xi guan che he jin tao zong shu ji zhong yao zhi shi jing shen, zha shi tui jin gong hui bang fu gong zuo de chuang xin fa zhan” (All China Federation of Trade Unions Website, http://www.acftu.org/template/10005/file.jsp?cid=318&aid=76070), viewed March 28, 2008. (“Earnestly Study and Implement General Secretary Hu Jintao Important Indicative Spirit, Solidify the Innovative Developments of Advancing Union Assistance Work”) 7 2007 Annual Report of the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (http:// www.cfpa.org.cn/aboutus/index.asp?classid=L1605).


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entry of resources from society and abroad; expansion of organizations’ fields of activity; increased emphasis on participation, equality and volunteerism. These characteristics are extremely similar to those of the third sector in the West, and are thus referred to as the “Westernization” of China’s third sector. Compared with Western society, the third sector also has pronounced Chinese characteristics, manifest primarily in terms of government involvement. For example, the mark of the government can be seen not only in the overall structure of the third sector, its activities and social functions; it can also be seen in its organizational structures and methods. 3. Explanation of the State of the Third Sector 3.1. Characteristics of Westernization: Marketization and Openness Effects The analysis above has already shown that the Westernization of China’s third sector can be seen in two areas. The first is in the sectors themselves, where new forms of organizations can be seen growing in number at dramatic rates. The second is organizationally, where signs of Westernization can be seen in the structures, behavior and functions of older organizations, and even more so in new types of organizations. The basic cause of the Westernization of the third sector has been the set of marketization and opening reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. This ushered in broad and deep changes across the economy, society, politics and culture. These were the changes that led to the formation of Western characteristics in Mainland China’s third sector. Below, we explain the Westernization of China’s third sector from the perspectives of the demand gap created by the Reform and Opening and changes in supply conditions (see Figure 8-3). 3.1.1. Causal Analysis of the Westernization of Sectors (1) Appearance of a Demand Gap China’s deepest transformation took place in its economy. The market replaced planning as the dominant mechanism for resource allocation. Wealth creation, allocation and consumption were liberated from government control. Following transformations in the economy, tremendous

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Disintegration of the old system New social problems Insufficient supply from government

opening

Changes in political environment Changes in social environment

Western characteristics of China’s third sector today

reform

Demand gap

Supply conditions

Appearance of liberal factors

Figure 8-3: Diagram of Third Sector Western Characteristics

changes also took place in the political and social spheres. These included the transformation of the function of government, reforms of institutions, and the decline of the work unit system. This transformation was a process of the continuous disintegration of the old system, especially conspicuously evident in the disintegration of the “work unit system”. Following the work unit system’s disintegration, work units became no more than the places people worked. Their role in provision of social welfare gradually weakened; many needs of members of society were no longer satisfied in the work unit and found satisfaction outside the work unit. These transformations also produced a series of new social problems like the migrant workers, wealth disparity, layoffs and unemployment, environmental degradation, moral decline, and protecting the interests of disadvantaged groups. The old system had not instituted mechanisms to resolve these problems; these new problems would require new institutions to resolve them. The government also responded actively to the decline of work units and new social problems. However, generally speaking, the basic


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trend in the political sphere has been to “pass the buck”(i.e. to transfer the majority of the functions once proper to government on to society). This is clearly evident in the government’s pursuit of a series of reforms to separate government from enterprises, government from society, and politics from public administrative work. That is to say that the government gradually opened parts of the field of social services, allowing civil organizations to participate, a transformation of the function of government. In reality, the decline of work units and marketization of the economy were also the result of government-initiated reforms. In sum, amidst these transformations and the disintegration of the work unit system, there appeared a new set of problems; the government chose only to satisfy some of the social needs created, not to satisfy all the needs of society. Under these circumstances, there emerged a great “demand gap” between supply and demand. (2) Changes in Supply Conditions These transformations not only created “pull” for the appearance of new organizations, they also created a set of conditions for their appearance. That is to say, transformations supplied not only the “pull” for new organizations; they supplied the “push” as well. In Mainland China, politics and law directly determined whether the third sector would develop and the degree and manner in which it would develop. The transformations provided a beneficial political environment for the development of the third sector. First, the political system transformed from a totalistic to an authoritarian one; the government gradually relaxed its controls on society. Second, the government legally clarified the process for establishment of new civil organizations. Although the requirements for establishment are harsh, government still legally established the right of forces in society to establish civil organizations. Furthermore, the government has communicated its plans and attitude to society through the media and encouraged the third sector to participate in social service. Therefore, from these changes in the political environment, we can see that government has been an important force in the Westernization of the third sector. Amidst these transformations, the social environment in which the third sector is developing has also undergone major changes. Social change has been evident in the appearance of “freely moving

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resources”.8 Before the reforms, the vast majority of resources were under government control. In order to gain access to certain resources, individuals or groups needed to enter the State-instituted system. Market reforms weakened the State’s control over resources and some resources gradually escaped from State monopoly and became freely moving resources. The appearance of freely moving resources has been an important condition for the emergence of new forms of civil organizations. Under the scheme in which the State has monopoly over resources, it was impossible for civil organizations to exist independent of the government; all civil organizations would depend on the State due to their restricted resources. With freely moving resources, civil organizations were able to be independent of government control because they could get the resources needed for existence outside of government. Another important change in the social environment was the emergence of a middle class. Generally speaking, faced with the same social problems, different groups offer different solutions. Civil society is a solution for resolving social problems offered by the middle class; the middle class hopes to ameliorate social tensions by developing civil society, i.e. the third sector solution, resisting the cruelty, oppression and exploitation of the lower classes by leagues of elites and, through the third sector, actively meeting the needs of society, especially the needs of the low-level public. Separately, eliminating restless elements in society by resolving social tensions also protects the interests of the upper-level elites. In the process of transformation, along with the increase of incomes and the increased reach of modern education, more and more Chinese count themselves in the middle class. This has provided a class foundation for the appearance of the third sector. Furthermore, in the process of the Reform and Opening, as the public began to have more opportunities to participate in international exchange, international training, and international meetings, some Western concepts related to government began to be propagated in China. Universities also steadily incorporated educational content from the West; courses on NGOs, NPOs and the third sector gradually became a part of university curricula. Using mass media, some pro孙立平等/Sun Liping et al., 动员与参与——第三部门募捐机制个案研究/dong yuan yu can yu—di san bu men mu juan ji zhi ge an yan jiu, (Hangzhou: zhe jiang ren min chu ban she, 1999), 8. (Mobilization and Participation—Case Studies of Third Sector Fundraising Mechanisms) 8


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ponents of liberalism inside China have also constantly promulgated ideas about liberal democracy and limited government. Following relaxations in the political environment, some third sector organizations from abroad also launched operations in Mainland China. In resolving all kinds of social problems, they were responding directly to all kinds of social needs. At the same time they were advocating for and promulgating the concepts and values of NGOs and NPOs. The promulgation of related values, concepts, knowledge and ethics provided a “moral foundation” for the development of the third sector in China. Naturally, financial assistance from foreign organizations was extremely critical to the development of new types of organizations within China. That is to say that compared with Mainland China just after the reforms, Western society had a clear advantage in terms of third sector concepts, expertise, and funding. Along with the Reform and Opening and increases in exchange with the West, the West’s advantages had a powerful “example effect” on new types of third sector organizations in China. (3) Appearance of Westernized Characteristics at the Sector Level We can see from the analysis above, that in the process of the Reform and Opening, the old “work unit social system” gradually disintegrated and it became very difficult for people to have their social needs met through work units. At the same time, amidst these transformations, as numerous social problems appeared in all areas of society, the appearance of new types of social problems signified a need for new kinds of institutional arrangements to resolve those problems. Faced with these new social problems and various new social needs, the government was both unwilling and unable to resolve directly these social problems and meet directly these social needs. Furthermore, the reform of government offices resulted in the transfer of some of the functions of government to society. Under the circumstances, there existed a giant gap between direct government supply and direct social demand. This excess demand created a great pull for the development of China’s third sector. At the same time, during the Reform and Opening, the government gradually relaxed control over society and allowed limited citizen associations. Through a series of regulations and policies, the government also encouraged various new types of organizations to take responsibility for various functions transferred from the government and meet social needs. This provided a relaxed political environment for the

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development of the third sector. Furthermore, the emergence of freely flowing funds, the expansion of China’s middle class and the change of its values, and examples set by foreign organizations all provided China’s third sector with the resources, class and values foundation needed for development. Under those conditions, with the progress of the reforms, large numbers of new types of organizations began to appear in China’s third sector, including social groups, people-run non-enterprise units, foundations and all kind of grassroots organizations. These organizations began to play an increasingly important role in resolving social problems and meeting social needs. Naturally, at the same time these organizations were appearing, older organizations were also adjusting their behavior and expanding their fields of activity. In the process of their development, these continuously-operating organizations also strengthened their service capacity and types and fields of service. 3.1.2. Causal Analysis of Westernization at the Organizational Level Western characteristics at the organizational level were manifest as organizational (legal status, governance structures, resource structures, etc.), behavioral (fields of activity, methods), and functional characteristics. Westernization in legal status can be seen in the large numbers of new types of organizations founded by individuals and the diversification of their legal statuses. The reasons for their appearance have been discussed above. The diversification of their legal statuses, for its part, was the result of legislative efforts by the government. Government regulations had already established various legal statuses for civil organizations, like social group legal persons, state-run unit legal persons, foundation legal persons, people-run non-enterprise legal persons, etc. Naturally, some government legislation was the result of studying the West and was drafted under example effects from the West. The Western characteristics in civil organizations’ governance structures could be seen in increased autonomy and the introduction of the institution of the board. At first, organizational autonomy was determined by its resource foundation. As free flowing funds appeared amidst the transformations, some organizations’ funding began to come mostly from society and not from the government. After they ceased to be dependent on the government for resources, these organizations gained some autonomy in their governance structures in relation to the government. Furthermore, foreign organizations aid-


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ing local civil organizations demanded they be autonomous and selfgoverning. Secondly, some of the founders of organizations were themselves members of the middle class and had absorbed some Western concepts or even studied abroad. They identified with and pursued autonomy. Also, because they used models from Western, third sector civil organizations as “templates” for operations, they placed strong emphasis on autonomy in management and operational processes. The appearance of boards was at once related to the example effect from abroad and also to government legislation; the government’s regulations themselves insisted on the institution of boards in civil organizations. In older third sector organizations, even though governance structures were still tightly controlled by the government, changes still took place. For example, when making major decisions, old state-run units began to extend their considerations beyond just government priorities and incorporate society’s needs as well. Changes in the governance structures of older organizations were not just the result of imitating the West; changes in government controls over them played a role as well. Westernization in resource structures was manifest mostly in diversification of sources of resources and increases in resources coming directly from society. One of the necessary conditions producing the appearance of those new types of organizations formed among the citizenry after the Reform and Opening was in fact the appearance of free flowing funds. In addition, with the deepening of the opening, there began a constant inflow of resources from abroad, including funds, materiel, personnel and experience and concepts from the third sector. These factors are the main reasons for the increasing diversification of resources in new types of organizations. In older organizations, diversification of resource structures determined both by the appearance of freely flowing funds and also by adjustments in government controls. At the same time the government aids these organizations, it also encourages them to rely on their own services to gain resources from society, to run their operations according to market principles, even to seek resources from foreign organizations for designing good projects. The Westernization of organizations’ fields of activity has been manifest mostly as a broadening of activities. This broadening has stemmed from three factors. The first was a release of certain fields due to the disintegration of the work unit system. The second was a series of new social problems brought on by the transformations; these

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new problems opened up new fields of activities for the third sector. Thirdly, the reform of government offices also released some new fields of activity. Naturally, exemplifying affects from the West also resulted in the opening of some new fields of activity, such as rights-protection for disadvantaged groups. Therefore, currently, new areas of activities in Mainland China include not only fields encouraged by the government but also some fields toward which the government has adopted a stance of tacit approval and even fields the government dislikes. The Westernization of third sector methods has been manifest mostly as increased emphases on participation, equality, volunteerism and innovation. Clearly, this is the result of studying the third sector in the West. On the one hand, the methods of Western third sectors were continuously promulgated through university education and the news media in China. On the other, organizations in China also incorporated these methods through constant exchange with Western society. As they lent aid to domestic organizations, foreign civil organizations also consistently emphasized these methods. Under these circumstances, organizations both old and new were influenced to varying degrees by Western methods. In functional terms, the Westernization of the third sector was mostly manifest as the strengthening of service functions. In the reform process, as large numbers of third sector organizations appeared and old third sector organizations cooperated with new types of organizations, the competitive process also elevated organizations’ capacities for service provision. Therefore, the service provision functions of the third sector were markedly, generally strengthened. Due to the expansion of new types of organizations into new fields of activity, the third sector gradually began to incorporate new functions, such as advocacy and rights-protection in the areas of environmental protection and services for disadvantaged populations, among others. Furthermore, in the process of launching new kinds of activities, some new organizations, while operating on the foundations of Western experience, also began to engage in new explorations incorporating local experiences. Thus, in incorporating the activity methods of China’s third sector, they also served the function of creating institutional innovations. 3.2. Chinese Characteristics: the Government’s Attitude, Approach, and Behavior From the analysis above, we can see that social transformations provided the “pull” needed to nurture the third sector. At the same time,


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it also provided tremendous “push”. Under these dual “pull-push” effects, China’s third sector has exhibited a series of Western characteristics. However, China’s reforms were government-guided reforms; its opening has been government-guided as well. Thus, China’s third sector cannot be Western-oriented and cannot fully develop in a Western direction. The government’s attitude and behavior toward the development of the third sector have had clear Chinese characteristics. The purpose of this section is to analyze the government’s behavior, the government’s basic approach to administration of civil organizations, and its effects on the development of China’s third sector. First, we’ll briefly describe the government’s legal and regulatory system for the administration of civil organizations. 3.2.1. Legal Framework In order to adapt to new trends and to control, normalize and guide the development of the third sector, the government revised earlier laws, regulations and policies and also released a series of new laws, regulations and policies. Table 8-3 contains laws and policies related to civil organizations. These regulations show that government administration touches on every aspect of civil organizations and that different government departments administer different kinds of civil organizations and different aspects of civil organizations.9 3.2.2. The Government’s Approach to Controls For an authoritarian government, the initial approach to civil organizations will be control. This is because civil organizations are the most important vehicle for collective action, which, in turn, is a great threat to authoritarian governments. Therefore, in an overview of governments’ administrative behavior, an analysis of their approaches to control is one important aspect. From this, we can identify several models of governmental control over civil organizations. (1) Quasi-Governmental Model In this model, the objects of government control are People’s Groups, social groups excepted from registration, community organizations and government-organized churches.

9

For further information, see Chapters 3 & 4.

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In terms of their registration, these organizations are set up by the government. The first two types of organizations are excepted from registration, a special, preferential treatment. The establishment, cancellation and merging, meanwhile, of community organizations are strictly controlled. In terms of administration of activities, People’s Groups, groups excepted from registration, and government-organized churches share a common characteristic. They share verticial, hierarchical structures; they receive direction from their superiors on all base-level activities. As for community organizations, administration of these organizations comes not from one government department but from many; village and township and sub-district administrations may all guide the activities of village committees and residents committees. In terms of controls over executive leadership, the executive positions of People’s Groups and social groups excepted from registration are either filled by appointment directly by Party and government departments or are held jointly by Party or government leaders. Leadership positions in community organizations are either held by appointees from superior departments or chosen by members of society within the jurisdiction of the community organizations; however, the selection process is not separate from Party and governmental controls. The choice of the leadership of churches (especially at the provincial level or above) is also tightly controlled by the government; some of their legal representatives are directly appointed by the government. In terms of control of personnel, the office personnel of People’s Groups and social groups excepted from registration are administered according to systems based on those in government offices.10 In com10 In 2006, the Central Organizing Department issued the No. 28 Document— “Opinion on Unions, Communist Youth League, Women’s Federation and other People’s Groups and Mass Groups on Consulting the《Public Servants Law》 for Administration”. The document required that workers from government offices in 21 civil organizations be administered according to the Public Servants Law of the PRC. The 21 civil organizations included were the All China Federation of Trade Unions, Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of the Chinese Communist Party, All China Women’s Federation, China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, China Writers Association, China Association of Science and Technology, All China League of Returned Overseas Chinese, China Law Society, Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Other Countries, All-China Journalists Association, All China Taiwan Compatriots Friendship League, China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, China Disabled Persons Federation, China Red Cross, China People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, China Soong Ching Ling Foundation, Huang Pu Jun Xiao Tong Xue Hui, European-American Classmates Association, China Thought and Political


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munity organizations, personnel selections, placements, wages, benefit standards and the length of terms are all decided by the government. In official churches, most full-time workers are placed from units; consideration of candidates and wages are all decided by the government. When it comes to decision-making, the main activities of People’s Groups and social groups excepted from registration are decided by their superior work supervising units; base-level organizations are engaged primarily in executing the decisions of superior work supervising units. At the same time, base-level organizations are to seek the approval of parallel-level Party and government leaders for major decisions and submit to their leadership. Base-level organizations are engaged primarily in executing the policies of their superiors in government. Generally speaking, though these organizations are autonomous and volunteer in name, in actuality government controls over these organizations are extremely similar to controls over government offices. (2) State Run Unit Model State run units (事业单位) refer to social service organizations created for the public-interest by national offices or other organizations using state-owned assets and engaging in educational, scientific, cultural or hygienic activities. The government’s control over these organizations can be identified as another type of model. In terms of registration, state run units are required to register with specialized government departments. After being approved by work supervising units, all state run units must be registered by registration and administration offices. In terms of work supervising units, state run units are usually administered by government departments. For example, state run units working in education are administered by the Education Bureau; those in culture are administered by the Cultural Bureau; and those in science and technology are administered by the Bureau of Science and Technology. In terms of their executive leadership, leaders of state run units are ordinarily appointed by parallel-level Party and government departments. In terms of personnel, the government set up a system for unit

Work Research Association, National Association of Vocational Education, China Family Planning Association.

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placements (事业编制) for state run units. The Central Office Placements Committee and local placement committees are responsible for state run unit personnel structures, leadership appointments and personnel placements. Naturally, at the same time state run units personnel appointments are also strictly controlled by their work supervising units. All their major decisions must be approved by their work supervising units. (3) Dual Administration Model The objects of both the quasi-government model and the state run unit model are older types of organizations. Since the Reform and Opening, however, many new forms of organizations have appeared within society. In response to these new types of civil organizations, the government’s basic administrative approach has been dual administration (双重管理).11 The civil organizations under the dual administration model generally fall into two categories. The first is civil organizations set up by the government; the second is civil organizations set up among the people. The steps for registering both types of organizations are basically identical; both must be approved by a work supervising unit (业务主管单位) before registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In terms of controls on executive leadership, because governmentorganized social groups are set up by the government, government departments have great influence on personnel decisions. In the few organizations where leadership is not appointed directly by the work

11 In December of 2005, Guangdong Province issued the Guangdong Province Regulations on Industry Associations 《广东省行业协会条例》. The Regulations stipulated that industry associations meeting the qualifications for establishment could proceed directly to the Ministry of Civil Affairs for registration and no longer required the approval of a work supervising unit. That is to say that the dual administration system began to loosen for this certain type of organization, changing from the former “dual administration system” to one of “singular administration”. However, this was neither an indication of general loosening of the registration and administration system for social groups nor was it an indication of that registration and administration for other types of civil organizations would develop in this way. In reality, the government’s administration of elite groups and mass/public associations was different. Industry associations were a form of elite association; only because the interests of the elites and of the government were aligned did the government relax controls on formation of associations by the elites. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, please see Kang Xiaoguang, Han Heng. “Government Absorbing Society: A Further Probe into the State-Society Relationship in Chinese Mainland”.


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supervising unit, leadership choices must still receive their approval. Comparatively speaking, civil organizations started up among the people have been subject to less interference in the selection of their leadership; leaders tend to be chosen by the organizations themselves. In terms of control over personnel, staffing of some governmentorganized civil organizations is decided by their work supervising units, while some are decided by the organizations themselves. Comparatively speaking, personnel management is more autonomous among civil organizations started up among the people; work supervising units tend to interfere less in these types of organizations. In terms of decision-making, government-organized civil organizations vary in their degrees of autonomy. Some are subject to greater interference from their work supervising units; others are relatively autonomous. The government has not interfered much with civil organizations started up among the people; however, some organizations will report to their work supervising units by choice. Furthermore, under the dual administration model, civil organizations usually are required to submit to annual reviews. In sum, dual administration is a newly-devised control model introduced in recent years by the government to handle new types of civil organizations. This control model is very different from the control models used for “old organizations”. (4) Administration-by-Specialization (归口) Model The dual administration model was implemented following 1989’s Regulations for Social Group Registration and Administration《社团登记管理条例》. Before that time, the government administered civil organizations using an administration-by-specialization model, i.e. each civil organization was supervised by a single government department judged to be relevant to that organization’s area of specialization. After the promulgation of the Regulations, a substantial number of civil organizations were brought under the dual administration model. However, not all civil organizations were brought under the new administration model; the administration-by-specialization model also existed. Under this model, registration took place not at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but at “matching” government departments. For example, newly-formed homeowners’ committees were required to register with real estate administration departments; venues for religious activities, meanwhile, were required to register with departments of religious affairs. In sum, organizations under this model were not required to

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register in one, centralized civil affairs department, but at “matching” government departments. Under the administration-by-specialization model, government control over civil organizations was not consistent. Some organizations, such as religious venues, were controlled strictly through systems of approvals. Others, such as homeowners’ associations, were controlled loosely and subjected only to certain record-keeping requirements. Generally, however, compared with the models above, government controls under this model were loose. Government departments interfered little in control over executive leadership, personnel choices and major decision-making. However, some civil organizations were subjected to annual inspection by their work supervising units; venues for religious activities, for example, were required to submit to annual inspections by religious affairs departments at their corresponding levels. In sum, the administration-by-specialization differs from the dual administration model and is its own identifiable control model. (5) Proxy Administrative (代管) Model Among the droves of civil organizations, civil organizations set up within work units or communities are an important type. In these cases, the government generally has not exercised control directly; instead, the work units or communities where the organizations were set up administer them by proxy. In terms of registration, these civil organizations are not required to register with civil affairs departments but at their respective units. Furthermore, the government is not involved in their internal management, selection of their leadership or personnel or their major decision-making; supervision over these matters is entrusted to organizations’ units. Besides civil organizations within communities and work units, some others are formed under other civil organizations or as secondtier branches of other organizations. These organizations, too, are not controlled by the government but by proxy by the organizations under which they were formed. (6) “Noninterference” (放任) Model Of all the civil organizations currently active, a vast number consists of hobbyist groups meeting in streets and parks. These groups do not register with the relevant government departments. The govern-


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ment does not administer these organizations and does not interfere in their activities, yet tacitly approves of their activities. The government’s attitude toward these organizations is one of noninterference; it allows them to form and disband on their own. In a certain sense, noninterference itself can be viewed as an approach to control. Currently, virtual communities online are also administered according to the noninterference model. (7) Prohibition Model Organizations under this model are government-recognized opposition groups. Groups of this type are forbidden from forming. Any such groups formed secretly are banned immediately upon discovery. The government’s safety departments are responsible for administering these kinds of organizations. In terms of decision-making, leadership and personnel selection, opposition groups are highly autonomous. Compared with other forms of civil organizations, the government’s control over this type of organizations is unique and strict. (8) Conclusion Above, we have summarized several models for government control of civil organizations. For relationships between control models and organization types, please see Figure 8-4. We can thus sum up the government’s approach to control as follows: First, diversified types of control We can see that the government’s approaches to control of civil organizations are not homogeneous, but diverse. Their diversity is evident in several aspects. First, their registration processes are different. Some are exempt from registration; some register with their work supervising units; some with civil affairs departments; some with industrial and commercial departments; some with other departments; some within their own units; and others are not required to register at all. Second, the units responsible for their administration (work supervising units) also appear in many types. In some cases, the government specifies work supervising units; in others, organizations identify their own work supervising units. Others are supervised by their own units; still other have no work supervising units at all. Lastly, work supervising units’ controls over civil organizations also differ significantly. In some cases, the leaders of work supervising units serve jointly as the leaders of the organizations; in others, the unit appoints organization

governmental

340

kang xiaoguang, lu xianying and han heng I Quasi-Governmental Model

Dual Administration Model

IV Dual Administration Model


Dual Administration, Administration-bySpecialization Model

Proxy Model

Proxy Model

Noninterference Model

II State Run Unit Model

III


non-governmental

Control Failure

Control Failure

Prohibition Model not-for-profit

for-profit

Figure 8-4: Distribution of Government Control Models

leadership; in still others, the supervising unit does not interfere in organizational matters at all. The existence of so many approaches signifies the lack of one cohesive control model on the part of the government; instead, different control models are applied to different types of organizations. These several approaches to control could be called classified controls. Second, control failure The government’s main control approach to civil organizations emerging since the Reform and Opening has been the dual administration model. Because civil organizations are by nature non-profit, comparatively speaking, work supervising units are saddled with the responsibility for administering civil organizations; but, they cannot receive any benefits from performing these duties. Therefore, many government departments are not willing to serve as work supervising units to civil organizations. Some civil organizations, unable to gain


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commitment from a work supervising unit, are unable to register with civil affairs offices. As a result, in order to gain the legal status necessary for operations, some civil organizations helplessly register for “enterprise status”. As for these organizations, the government merely treats them as “enterprises” for administrative purposes; they are subjected only to commercial and industrial supervision and inspections according to the “productive and operational situations” of their activities. Organizational leadership registers as “enterprise legal representatives” with the industrial and commercial departments. From the government’s perspective, these civil organizations should be brought under the dual administration system because their activities and functions are the same as civil organizations under that model. However, the government has not been able to effectively use the dual administration model to control these organizations. Therefore, the existence of “enterprisetype” civil organizations reflects the existence of “holes” in the government’s system of controls, i.e. some loss of control. Naturally, besides these “enterprise-type” civil organizations, some civil organizations are even able to stage activities without registering at all. This, too, is a manifestation of loss of control. Third, bottom line control It must be pointed out that loss of control is relative to the government’s system of controls for civil organizations; it refers to control failures in the control system for civil organizations. Actually, however, besides these controls on civil organizations, governmental public safety departments still maintain control over all organizations and individuals. That is to say that no organization may go “too far”; no organizations can openly challenge government authority. This, effectively, is a kind of “bottom line control”. Should the activities of any organization cross this bottom line, actions against them will be taken by security departments. 3.2.3. The Government’s Approach to Development For an authoritarian government, having an approach to controls is not enough. The government must also have certain measures to develop civil organizations; that is, they must implement certain active supports for them and use them to satisfy social needs. Based on government’s support of civil organizations, we have identified several governmental civil organization development models.

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(1) Continuation Model Effectively, this model is continued government use of older organizations to meet social needs. These organizations include People’s Groups, social groups excepted from registration, state run units, community organizations and government-organized churches, among others. From the beginning, at the stage in which these organizations are forming and registering, the government is extremely supportive of these organizations. They are all set up by the government itself; all of these types, in fact, existed before the Reform and Opening. Amidst the reforms, the government did not abandon these organizations, but rather has continued developing them in order to meet social needs. When the government set up these organizations, it also granted them legal status and certain tax advantages. In terms of resource expenditures and activity fund sources, these organizations all receive government support to varying extents; some even have funding guaranteed by law. The government also provides significant support in terms of personnel. Some of the office workers in People’s Groups and mass social groups (群团体) even “enjoy” compensation equivalent to government public servants’. In terms of relationships, there is also support. Because these organizations are organized by the government and because most are granted certain administrative ranks, they maintain good relationships with government departments and are able, thusly, to secure active government support when launching activities. In many cases the work undertaken by civil organizations is done so at the government’s behest. (2) Newly-Formed Model The newly-formed model includes industrial associations, governmentformed NGOs, and government-organized foundations. Similar to the continuation model, these organizations are also set up by the government. Differently however, these organization types appeared after the Reform and Opening. In terms of registration, these organizations receive active support from the government and are set up directly by the government. Industry associations, more than any, have received active encouragement from the government from the time they were set up. Generally speaking, the departments engaged in setting up organizations, or departments specified by them, have served as these civil organizations’ work supervising units. Therefore, it has been simple for these organizations


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to be granted both registration with civil affairs departments and social group legal person status. In terms of securing resources, because these organizations have tightly-interwoven relationships with the government, they are to varying extents able to get some support in terms of resources from relevant government departments, like startup costs and office accessories. Some even execute projects on behalf of the government. The government has also supplied some organizations with assistance in terms of personnel by directly assigning personnel from government departments to work in civil organizations. Generally speaking, however, the government encourages these organizations to collect resources using market methods. They are encouraged to seek resources by providing services within their industries and to hire personnel on the open market. These organizations have also received active support from the government in terms of relationships. Because they were formed by the government, these organizations are usually able to invite government officials to serve on their boards, advisory and consultative committees. At the same time, leaders from the government frequently participate in their activities. (3) Assimilation Model In the Reform and Opening process, new groups were constantly diverging in society as their interest and needs became increasingly diverse. In the face of these diverse interests and needs, the government did not mount a vigorous response; it could not, in fact, meet these needs using only its own organizations. Subsequently, all kinds of civil organizations began to appear in society. The government did not respond with restrictions and prohibitions on these spontaneously forming groups; instead, it adopted an approach of assimilation toward their development. This model was applied to all kinds of social groups formed among the people, people-run non-enterprise units, peoplerun foundations, civil organizations under the administration-byspecialization model, and civil organizations within work units. Because they were not formed by the government, they have not received the government’s active support in terms of registration. They have, however, secured the legal status necessary for activities; some have even attained social group legal person status. In a certain sense, being granted the legal status necessary for activities is in itself an important form of support.

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In terms of access to resources, because these organizations are engaged in resolving social problems and are activities providing public goods needed by society, they are to some extent functionally aligned with the government’s provision of public services. Therefore, these organizations have also been lent certain supports by the government. Compared with the continuation model, however, the government’s support of these organizations tends to be temporary, unstable and non-institutionalized. These organizations rarely receive government support in the form of personnel; they usually hire personnel from the market according to their needs. Because they are formed among the people, these organizations receive little support from the government in terms of relationships as well. In cases where civil organizations have received support in terms of relationships, it tends to be the result of high imitative on the part of the organizations and is not given voluntarily by the government. When it comes to activities, however, some government departments gaining from the activities launched have contributed some support in the form of connections. (4) Cooperative Model Among the government’s development approaches, there remains one more model: the cooperative model. This type mainly includes organizations that are set up by individuals but that have not attained the appropriate legal status and the representative institutions in Mainland China of foreign organizations. When registering, these organizations receive no support and in some cases even face restrictions. As a result, it is very difficult for them to attain social group legal person status. Some register as enterprises; others simply don’t register. The government, however, does not strictly prohibit or universally restrict their activities; it permits them. In a certain sense, permitting these activities is in itself a form of support. In terms of resource attainment, in cases in which organizations’ activities are related to the functions of certain government departments, government departments often cooperate with the organizations. In such cases, organizations may receive government funding for their activities. Similar to the assimilation model, however, this government assistance tends to be temporary and project-based, not institutionalized.


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Some civil organizations have also received governmental support in terms of relationship support; however, it is usually attained through the efforts of the organizations or through projects launched. Compared with the assimilation model, organizations within the cooperation model are without appropriate legal status. Similarly, though, these organizations are also not incorporated into the control system for civil organizations. Instead, the government maintains contact with these organizations through cooperation. (5) No Support Model In the end, the government neither assimilates all organizations nor does it cooperation with all organizations. Some organizations are neither assimilated or engaged in cooperation. One example is the large number of hobbyist groups scheduling activities on the streets or in parks. The government neither restricts these groups, nor does it require them to register. The government neither supports nor restricts them in terms of resources and relationships. They are allowed to form and disband on their own. This treatment can be characterized as the no support model. (6) Conclusion Above, we have analyzed the government’s development approaches to civil organizations. The relationships between governmental development approaches and organization types can be seen in Figure 8-5. We also offer the following summary of the government’s development approaches. First, development approaches are diversified Diversification of development models is manifest primarily in two areas. First, in response to diverse social needs, the government also adopted a diversified development approach to satisfy those needs. As a part of that approach, the continuation model uses old organizations to meet social needs; the newly-formed model, meanwhile, involves setting up new organizations to meet social needs. At the same the government used “its own” organizations to meet social needs, it has also actively used civil organizations set up by people to meet social needs. Toward individually-formed civil organizations the government adopted a strategy of assimilation, or incorporation into its own administrative framework, toward some; toward others, it adopted a

kang xiaoguang, lu xianying and han heng I

governmental

346

Continuation Model

Newly-Formed Model

Continuation Model

IV Newly-Formed Model

Assimilation Model

Assimilation Model

Assimilation Model

Assimilation Model

Cooperative, No Support Model

non-governmental

II

III

Assimilation Model



Substitution Failure not-for-profit

for-profit

Figure 8-5: Distribution of the Government’s Development Models

cooperative approach, or not incorporating but cooperating with civil organizations. In still other cases, the government has adopted a no support approach. Second, the government has adopted diverse support measures for different kinds of civil organizations. With organizations under the continuation model, government support is total. For organizations under the newly-formed model, the government contributes start up assistance and relationship support; funding support, however is scarce. To organizations under the assimilation model, the government gives only legal status for activities; resource support and relationship support is scarce. Comparatively speaking, government support given under the cooperative model is even less. Naturally, there are still other organizations which receive no government support at all. Second, Functional Substitution by Government Domination Diversified development approaches are in fact a functional substitution by government domination. Government dominance is evident


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in several aspects. First, response to many major social needs is led by government-dominated civil organizations (such as the continuation model ). Second, in terms of the quantity of social services provided, government-dominated civil organizations provide the vast majority. According a World Bank report: “China has over 1 million state run units with almost 30 million employees. The majority of state run units were formed with the aim of providing public services. At the current time, in China, participation by the non-governmental sector in public service provision is still very limited.”12 Third, the government has supported people-formed civil organizations to varying degrees. In certain defined spaces, there is a certain demand for public goods on the part of members of society. The types of public goods provided by government-dominated civil organizations are numerous and their quantities great; the smaller the space for provision by civil organizations, the smaller the demand for civil organizations. Governmentdominated provision, thus, is a kind of functional substitution. That is to say, through government-dominated provision, the government has nurtured a “controllable” civil organization system and used it to meet social needs. These organizations thus replace “autonomous” civil organizations and eliminate the need for the existence of “autonomous” civil organizations. This then avoids the appearance in society of civil organizations independent of the government and in the end accomplishes the dual goals of eliminating competing powers and meeting social needs. Third, substitution failure The central aim of functional substitution is to prevent civil organizations from escaping government control. In reality, however, there will always be some organizations that remain unincorporated into the government’s control system, or civil organizations outside the government’s control system. That is to say, there exist failures in government functional substitution. Examples include political opposition organizations, household churches and unregistered civil organizations registered as enterprises. The existence of substitution failure is, on the one hand, related to the properties of civil organizations; on the other, it is also related

12 中国: 深化事业单位改革, 改善公共服务提供/zhongguo: shen hua shi ye dan wei gai ge, (World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org.cn/Chinese/content/psu_ch1.pdf). (China: Deepening Work Unit Reforms, Improving Provisions of Public Services)

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to the government’s administrative system. The properties of some organizations, such as political opposition organizations, determine the impossibility of their being brought under the government’s administrative system. Others, like household churches, are unwilling to be brought under the government’s administrative system. Still other organizations are unable to enter the administrative system due to institutional arrangements; this group includes many groups prevented by the restrictions of the dual administration system from registering. Many of these groups cannot but register as enterprises. 3.2.4. The Interactive Effects of the Control and Development Approaches (1) Correlations Between Two Administrative Approaches In reality, there exist certain correlations between organizational models, organization types, government control approaches and development approaches (see Tables 8-3, 8-4, and 8-5). For example, the continuation development model is correlated with old-type organizations, strict government controls, and quasi-governmental or state run unit control models. The newly-formed development model is correlated with being government-formed and with the dual administration control model. That is to say that officially, newly-formed civil organizations are incorporated into the dual administration system. The assimilation model is correlated with being formed by individuals. Government control approaches to these organizations are diverse. Some are brought under the dual administration system; some are under the administration-by-specialization model; and some are under proxy administration. Even though these organizations are set up by individuals, they are administered by a government department or an institution to which administration is entrusted. That is to say, these people-formed civil organizations are all brought under the government’s control system; the government successfully “assimilates” these organizations. Factors correlated with the cooperative model include being people-initiated and being examples of control failures outside of the control system. Some are registered as enterprises while some don’t register. The no support model is correlated with the nonintervention model. Under the nonintervention model, the government neither interferes with nor supports civil organizations. Substitution failure is correlated with civil organizations existing in control failure spaces and civil organizations under the prohibition model.


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Table 8-3: Correlations Between Organizational Models, Organization Types, Government Control Approaches and Development Approaches Organizational Model

Correlated Types

Control Model

Development Model

Model 1

The 8 large People’s Groups; Quasi-Government 25 social groups excepted Model from registration

Continuation Model

Model 2

Government-organized religious organizations

Quasi-Government Model

Continuation Model

Model 3

Residents committees and village committees

Quasi-Government Model

Continuation Model

Model 4

State run units

State Run Unit Model

Continuation Model

Model 5

people-run non-enterprise units

Dual Administration Assimilation Model Model

Model 6

social groups, foundations

Dual Administration Newly-Formed Model Model

Model 7

Associations, commerce associations, academic associations

Dual Administration Newly-Formed Model Model Continuation Model

Model 8

public-interest social groups, Dual Administration Assimilation foundations Model Model

Model 9

Dependent organizations, subsidiary second-tier organizations, proxy administered organizations

Proxy Administration Assimilation Model Model

Model 10

social groups, owners’ associations, religious organizations

Dual Administration Assimilation Model Model Administration-by— Specialization Model

Model 11

Dependent organizations, subsidiary second-tier organizations, proxy administered organizations

Proxy Administration Assimilation Model Model

Model 12

Grassroots hobbyist organizations


No Support Model

Model 13

Enterprise legal persons

Control Failure

Cooperative Model Substitution Failure

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Table 8-3 (cont.) Organizational Model

Correlated Types

Control Model

Development Model

Model 14

Household churches, grassroots advocacy organizations, international organizations

Control Failure

Cooperative Model Substitution Failure

Model 15

Political opposition groups

Prohibition Model

Substitution Failure

Table 8-4: Correlations Between Control Models and Development Models Control Model

Development Model

Quasi-Governmental Model

Continuation Model

State Run Unit Model

Continuation Model


Newly-Formed Model, Assimilation Model

Administration-by-Specialization Assimilation Model Model Proxy Administration Model

Assimilation Model


No Support Model

Prohibition Model


Control Failure

Cooperative Model, Substitution Failure

Table 8-5: Correlation Between Control Models and Development Models Development Model

Control Model

Continuation Model

Quasi-Governmental Model, State Run Unit Model

Newly-Formed Model


Assimilation Model

Dual Administration Model, Administration-bySpecialization Model, Proxy Administration Model

Cooperative Model

Control Failure


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Table 8-5 (cont.) Development Model

Control Model

No Support Model



Control Failure, Prohibition Model

(2) The Logic of the Government’s Administrative Approaches From the correlations between the different approaches, we can see that increases in strictness of control are correlated with greater government supports. Conversely, weaker government controls are correlated with smaller government supports. For example, quasigovernmental and state run unit models both exhibit stricter government controls; accordingly, civil organizations under these control models also receive the most government support. Organizations under the noninterference model are subject to the least government control; accordingly, they also receive the least government support. These correlations in administrative approaches signal that behind government behavior toward these civil organizations there is a similar logic; administrative approaches are to a large extent decided by organization type. Generally speaking, the State has two functions: one is the repression function; the second is the service provision function. Only when a government serves these two functions can it realize a stable society and protect its own rule. Therefore, on the one hand, a government must use various forms of repression toward various challenging forces in order to avoid challenges to its authority from opposing forces; on the other, it must also satisfy certain social needs. Only in this way can a government preserve stability. Accordingly, civil organizations have two properties. On the one hand, organizations are the most important vehicle for collective action, which, in turn, is among the most powerful threats to authoritarian governments. Therefore, any organization has the potential capacity to challenge governmental authority. On the other hand, civil organizations have the property of providing public goods and helping to meet social needs and resolve social problems. Therefore, civil organizations also have potential to serve as the government’s helper. Because civil organizations’ properties are different, they have different capacities to challenge or potential capacity to challenge. At the same time, they also provide different types of public goods. Therefore, the relations different types of civil organizations have with the government are beneficial and harmful to varying degrees.

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Certainly, a rational government will adopt different administrative approaches to different kinds of civil organizations according to their properties. For an authoritarian government, monopolizing political power is to its greatest benefit. Under the precondition that civil organizations are guaranteed not to threaten government authority, the government will still exercise controls over civil organizations according to the public goods they provide. Therefore, from the government’s control approach, civil organizations under the quasigovernment control model all have relatively high potential capacity to challenge. Conversely, civil organizations controlled weakly, such as those under the nonintervention model, have little potential to challenge. At the same time, the government will also exercise control toward organizations depending on the properties of the public goods they provide. For example, under the state run unit model, the public goods provided are among the most important public goods. Accordingly, these organizations come under strict controls. The government’s development approaches are the same way. For example, through the continuation model and the newly-formed model, the government actively develops and provides active support for civil organizations that have strong challenging (or potentially challenging) capacities and that provide very important public goods. In this way, the government is able to substitute out the appearance of individually-founded civil organizations. Even during the pre-form, totalistic period when most civil organizations were banned, these important organizations (such as People’s Groups, local organizations, religious organizations and state run units) were still kept and then continued throughout the reforms. Naturally, in the reform process, the government also formed a series of new civil organizations in keeping with the new social environment. These civil organizations either have strong capacities to challenge (such as industry associations) or provide important social services (such as official social groups and foundations). Accordingly, toward organizations whose capacity (or potential capacity) to challenge is small or who provide less important public services, the government’s support has been small as well. In sum, there exists a correlation between the two government approaches, a correlation signifying the existence of a logic behind behavior: the government adopts varying administrative approaches for organizations with varying properties.


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3.2.5. An Explanation of the Government’s Attitude, Approaches and Behavior The controls and functional substitution implemented by the government are in reality approaches consistent with “government wishes”; the underlying goal of the government’s measures is preserving its own interests. How is it that China’s government can implement different administrative schemes according to its wishes? Our explanation turns to rationalism on the part of government, the origins of reforms, the reform process and Chinese traditional culture. That China’s government today can administer civil organizations according to there is related, first, to “rationalism”. The “government” is not an abstract entity; rather, in reality, the government is made up of a group of living people. They are “rational economic people” seeking to maximize their self-interest. This characteristic in place, all government behavior serves the maximization of the government’s or of government officials’ collective interests. The basic purpose of the government’s reforms, too, is interest maximization. This is the key to understanding government behavior; it is also the foundation for understanding the foundation of contemporary Chinese society.13 The assumption of the “rational economic man” implies that the government’s subjective motivation in administering civil organizations is its own wishes. Any government pursues its own interest; they all wish to place the development of the third sector under their own control. This is a subjective wish. Actually realizing this wish requires a certain power. China’s government just so happens to have this kind of power! Prior to reforms, the government was totalistic; in a totalistic system, the government’s power is without equal. The control system and functional substitution approaches adopted by the government have been, to a large extent, related to the origin of reforms. Naturally, the government’s administrative approach has been related to the reform process. China’s reforms have been gradual and government-guided. In government-led reforms, every aspect of policy-making is a form of

13 The government’s “rational economic man” assumption is one of the fundamental tenets of public choice theory. In reality, however, the government’s policy-making and behavior are not only for its own benefit. There may exist multiple motives in governmental policy-making and behavior, like taking on the interests of the nation and its people and wishing to improving people’s wellbeing. Thus, on the one hand, applying this assumption to the government’s behavior in administering civil organizations is appropriate; on the other, it is a simplification.

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autonomous behavior on the part of the government, the result of the government’s own choices. One might say that “rational” government, pre-reform totalism and government-led, gradual reforms mutually determined that the government would adopt an approach to administration characterized both by “subjective motives” and “objective capacity” and one consistent with its own interests. Given such circumstances, the development of China’s third sector has in fact been a kind of government-led development model. That such a government-guided development model should be able to be realized in China’s social sphere is related to Chinese traditional culture. China’s unique history and cultural traditions have directly or indirectly affected the government’s behavior and the people’s expectations of government; the government’s behavior and people’s expectations, in turn, have directly affected the development of the third sector in contemporary China. For example, notions of government rooted in Confucianism have indelibly affected the relationship between the government and the third sector. The Confucian concept of government can be summed up as “paternalistic government”. A paternalistic view of government hardly supports the view that “the less government administration, the better”; conversely, it demands that government shoulder broad responsibilities in society. Many things viewed in Western culture as “private matters” were viewed in traditional culture as the government’s responsibility. Many of the responsibilities taken on by civil organizations in modern Western society are, in China, wholly under the purvey of government. Therefore, in China’s third sector, quasi-first sector civil organizations and government-organized, quasi-second sector civil organizations have played an absolutely dominant role in the provision of public goods. Accordingly, the public also feels that the government has a responsibility to resolve many of the problems they face. It could be said that there are deep cultural foundations for broad involvement in civil organizations on the part of the government. 3.2.6. The Government’s Management Approach and the Chinese Characteristics of the Second Sector Above, we have analyzed the third sector’s Western characteristics, factors impacting its Westernization, and the government’s behavior in the administration of civil organizations. Here, we briefly consider


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ways in which the government’s administrative approach has imbued the third sector with Chinese characteristics. (1) Chinese Characteristics in the Government’s Administrative Approach and Structural Features Structurally, one marked difference between third sectors in China and the West is the existence in China of large numbers of quasi-first sector (models 2, 3, and 4) and government-organized, quasi-second sector (model 4) organizations in China. Clearly, this is related to the “continuation” model of development approach; it is precisely because the government continued these organizations through the reforms, using them to meet social needs, that these organizational forms still exist in China’s third sector today. At the same time, in order to attain their goal of functional substitution, the government also provided total support for these types of organizations. From setting them up, lending resources and activities, all aspects have been vigorously supported by the government. Against this backdrop, these organizations have not only been able to survive, but to grow tremendously. This has been the chief reason for these organizations’ huge scales. Besides these structural Chinese characteristics, there exist clear Chinese characteristics organizationally as well. That is, these organizations have a clearly distinguishable “government tint” to them; they have been impacted greatly by the government and are heavily dependent on it. Very obviously, this is related to the government’s control approach to these organizations. Within the government’s control system, these organizations are either under the quasi-governmental control model or under the state run unit control model. The government maintains strict controls over their start ups, governance structures, personnel, and daily operations. Therefore, under strict government controls, these organizations are naturally without much autonomy, are highly dependent and bear strong “hints of government”. That the quasi-first sector appears so “governmental”, that its scale is so great, is also related to the fact that China’s third sector has not produced civil organizations of a similar type. This is also intimately related to the government’s control approaches. The institutional arrangements of China’s system for administering civil organizations focuses on limiting competition; within given regions, only one organization of each type is permitted to be established. There is to be no overlap. Thus, within each area, the government first sets up civil

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organizations and actively supports them; at the same time, it also stipulates that no organizations of a “similar type” may be set up within that area. Under such an administrative scheme, some classes of organizations are dominated by “one biggie” organization. China’s third sector today has yet another structural characteristic: great diversity among quasi-Western third sector civil organizations. Organizations in Quadrant IV of the distribution of types of third sector organizations are complex and diverse. This is also related to governmental administrative approaches. Because each type of civil organizations has different properties, the government has adopted different approaches to control and development for each type of civil organization. This has also resulted in a considerable diversity among organizations in the quasi-third sector. In sum, structurally, the “official flavor” of the quasi-first sector, the “imbalance between the official and the public” in all civil organizations, the “one biggie” phenomenon in many classes of organizations and the diversity of the quasi-third sector, among other Chinese characteristics of China’s third sector, are all related to the government’s administrative approaches. (2) Chinese Characteristics of the Government’s Administrative Approaches and Behavior Behaviorally, China’s third sector has also exhibited clear Chinese characteristics. In terms of fields of activities, China’s third sector has been active primarily in social services, fields in which the government welcomes participation, such as education, poverty alleviation, and industry services. In fields the government doesn’t like, or is sensitive toward, such as rights-protection and advocacy, the third sector launches very few services. Even in the few cases where organizations get involved in sensitive areas, their methods are conciliatory; they basically rely on information dissemination and making proposals through the media and the Internet and almost never use extreme methods like sit-ins, demonstrations, marches or strikes. These behavioral Chinese characteristics are inseparable from the government’s administrative approaches. A significant number of third sector organizations were set up by the government and remain subject to strict government controls. The government plays a major role in their governance structures as well; major decisions are either made directly by the government, or require government approval. Therefore, government-organized civil organizations cannot engage in


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activities the government doesn’t like; their activities also tend to be confined to those areas in which the government welcomes activities. As for civil organizations started by individuals in society, the government controls them through dual administration. Because they are subject to administration by both work supervising units and registration and administration offices, these organizations cannot simply get involved in sensitive fields. These organizations know well that as soon as they get involved in sensitive areas, they may attract trouble that will also bring trouble to their work supervising units. Effectively, these organizations self-censor; they engage in activities only in those fields recognized by the government. Naturally, there are examples of organizations existing in spaces where the government has failed to control or substitute. These might do some things “the government doesn’t like”. Toward these, the government exercises a kind of bottom line control. Out of considerations of their own interests and to ensure opportunities for continued development, organizations generally do not overstep the government’s bottom line lightly. Thus, given these controls, civil organization activities in China’s third sector take place mostly in areas the government welcomes or at least tacitly approves. The conciliatory nature of organizations’ methods and the lack of extreme methods are related to government controls. On the one hand, organizations’ work supervising units would certainly not permit them to use extreme methods; on the other, should organizations use such methods, their registration and administration offices would not allow them to pass their annual inspections. Chinese civil organizations know this all too well; in order to ensure that their activities have a future, they would not actively overstep the government’s “bottom line”. (3) Chinese Characteristics in the Government’s Administrative Approach and Function Generally speaking, the functions of the third sector include provision of public goods, advancing equality and justice and meeting social needs. Here, we provide a brief analysis of the Chinese characteristics of these functions. The basic functions of the third sector are providing public services and meeting social needs. In this way, China’s third sector is the same as the West’s. However, there is a significant difference in the way China’s third sector provides public goods internally; in China, provision of public goods in the third sector is absolutely dominated by quasi-second sector civil organizations. Differences in terms of public

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goods provision between different types of civil organizations are due to the different development approaches the government has adopted toward different types of organizations. Toward state run units, for example, government support is total. From start up to resources and activities, the government’s support is vigorous. For people-run nonenterprise units, however, the government provides the legal status necessary to launch activities and very little more. Therefore, in the provision of public services, government-organized civil organizations play an enormous role while individually-founded organizations mostly “fill in the gaps”. Advancing social justice is an important function of the third sector; in this aspect, however, China’s third sector is very different from its Western counterparts. As before, in the area of poverty alleviation the size of the role played by quasi-third sector organizations pales in comparison to that played by old organizations (such as unions). Even within the quasi-third sector, civil organizations with official backgrounds play greater roles than those with backgrounds in society. These differences between organizations in terms of their roles in advancing social justice come from the different development approaches the government adopts toward them. For organizations like unions, for example, the government has adopted the continuation model and plied them with ample support. For organizations like government-organized social groups, the government has adopted the newly-formed model and provided substantial resources. For civil organizations started up by individuals in society, there is little government support. These differing degrees of support for different types of organizations are one of the chief reasons for the differences in their functions. Another important function of civil organizations is satisfying social needs. In this area, China’s third sector also has clear Chinese characteristics. The government meets the associational needs for groups with, say, the same professions, beliefs, or residential locations using the continuation or newly-formed models. People’s Groups, for example, or social groups excepted from registration are civil organizations based on similarities in status in society. Community organizations are responding to associational needs based on shared residential location. Government-organized religious groups are responding to associational needs based on shared beliefs. Needs for associations in the areas of interests and hobbies, for their part, are met by civil organizations originating among the people. Clearly, this is also the result of


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the government’s approaches to development and control. Generally speaking, the threats to authoritarian government emanating from different types of organizations differ. Associations formed around shared professions, beliefs or residential locations all have great capacity (or potential capacity) to challenge authoritarian political power. Therefore, for these kinds of associational needs, the government has adopted an approach of active provision. (4) Conclusion Generally speaking, over the 30 years of the Reform and Opening, China’s third sector has grown tremendously and has played an enormous role in provision of public services and the advancement of social justice. Within the third sector, however, government-organized civil organizations (or civil organizations with official backgrounds) are far more numerous and play far greater roles in the provision of social services. Civil organizations originating among the people serve only the function of “filling the gaps”. The “official-people imbalance” in China’s third sector is to a large degree related to government approaches to development. At the same time, China’s third sector primarily serves the function of providing public services and does so primarily in areas of activity the government welcomes or at least of which it tacitly approves; this is clearly related to the government’s control approaches.14 In order to avoid challenges from civil organizations to government authority and monopolize political power, the government has used a differential approach to control. In order to use civil organizations to meet social needs, the government has used a development approach we have characterized as functional substitution. This functional substitution, on the one hand, uses civil organizations to meet social needs while also maintaining the government’s rule; on the other, it also replaces market society (or civil society) in the Western sense. Accordingly, self-formed, autonomous civil organizations are left without any space in which to exist. Under this administrative approach, market society cannot exist in China in the Western sense. It is not possible

14 Among the characteristics of China’s third sector are, in a certain sense, the results of “path dependence”. In reality, the government’s approach to administration of civil organizations resembled one of “old rules for old organizations, new rules for new organizations”. This kind of administrative approach is an embodiment of “path dependence” in institutional change.

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for civil society to oppose government; and it is even less possible for revolutions like the “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe to transpire in China. In China, third sector civil organizations serve the functions of providing public services, redistributing wealth and alleviating difficulties, assisting the government in resolving social problems and satisfying social needs. That is to say, in China, the third sector is a helper to an authoritarian government, not a challenge to authoritarianism. 4. Discussion 4.1. Effectiveness of the Research Framework In earlier research, scholars have been concerned more with third sector civil organizations and people-run non-enterprise units and using these to summarize the characteristics of the third sector. Even though some have paid attention to quasi-first sector civil organizations like People’s Groups and residents’ committees and some have studied China’s state run units, seldom do they consider these types of organizations as part of the third sector. This chapter has expanded the reach of its analysis to almost every kind of organization in the third sector. The objects of its consideration include social groups, people-run non-enterprise units, foundations, organizations registered as enterprises, affiliated entities of foreign organizations, and unregistered grassroots organizations and other “new civil organizations”; but it also includes state run units, People’s Groups, area-based organizations and civil organizations with strongly governmental “flavors”. Moreover, it brings all of these into one descriptive framework and one explanatory framework. Descriptively, we have considered organizations’ legal status, governance structures, resource structures, behavior structures and functions. At the same time, we established two dichotomies “governmental—non-governmental” and “for-profit— non-profit” and used them to chart the “Distribution of Types of Third Sector Organizations”. From these holistic descriptions of the third sector, Westernized and Chinese characteristics are clearly identifiable. Westernization is described relative to the state of China before the Reform and Opening; Chinese characteristics are considered relative to Western society. In light of these characteristics, the chapter also established an explanatory framework for the third sector.


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First, Westernization was explained considering reforms, opening, and a series of changes. Second, the Chinese characteristics of the third sector were explained from the angles of the government’s attitude, approaches and behavior in the administration of civil organizations. In addition, the government’s behavior was explained, considering the properties of civil organizations, conditions at the onset of the reforms, the reform process and cultural traditions. Via these descriptions and explanations, the conclusions were reached that over the 30 years of the Reform and Opening, market society (civil society), in the Western sense, has not appeared in China; there has been no sign of revolution like the color revolutions in Eastern Europe; and the development of civil organizations in society is still taking place under the government’s control. 4.2. Administration Absorption of Society—Judgments on the Relationship Between State and Society As mentioned above, China’s third sector today differs from both prereform authoritarianism and from Western market society (civil society). So what is the relationship between State and society is apparent in China’s third sector? Here we use the concept of “administrative absorption of society” to summarize the relationship between State and society in Mainland China today. “Administration” here refers to “government” or “the State” and also to its behavior. “Society” is not used in the common sense; rather, it refers to society as associated with “market society” (civil society), the “public field”, or “cooperativism”. “Absorption” signifies the government’s preventing the appearance of social structures like market society (civil society), cooperativism, and civil society opposition to government. The primary methods for “administrative absorption of society” are “control” and “functional substitution”. In order to understand the relationship between the State and society in Mainland China one must first grasp the concept of “administrative guidance”. First, “administrative guidance” today is different from “administrative guidance” before the reforms. Given that changes have taken place in China’s economy, politics, ideology, and external environment, the government has needed to seek out a new model of “administrative guidance” in the new environment. China’s transformations have created demand for “civil organizations”. This demand cannot be eliminated now or at any time in the foreseeable future.

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This means that for the long-run this demand can only be satisfied; it cannot be suppressed. Because drastic measures are unfeasible, “prohibition” can only be achieved through “substitution”. Faced with pressures from both inside and outside China, batting at civil organizations would neither effectively suppress them, nor could it effectively resolve problems. The government cannot run the whole show, resolving endless social problems, political problems, cultural problems and all sorts of other problems. Having government alone is unfeasible; civil organizations outside of government are needed. A truly capable government is not one that can only swing the stick; it is one that can with two hands use both the stick and the carrot while at the same time enlisting and using civil organizations. When the government recognizes that simple suppression through violence is unfeasible, that “nongovernmental methods” in society are needed for holistic development, it will explore a set of models that will allow it to take advantage of “nongovernmental methods”. Under such conditions, “administrative absorption of society” should occur. Naturally, such a system, with its clear aims, complete logic and effective operations, is neither the design of any individual nor even, perhaps, the design of the government. The government may not even have realized the existence of such a system. It is a manifestation of “institutional wisdom” and an expression of “collective unconscious”. The vast majority of officials and departments are scattered, busy with their daily work, busy handling crises, making innumerable decisions. It is the aggregate of these decisions that has produced the so called “administrative absorption of society”. It is the alignment of officials’ interests and the alignment of the internal logics of institutions that have given this system its “clear aims”, “complete logic” and “effective operations”. As to the core mechanism of “administrative absorption of society”, the first is control, controlling use by the governed of nongovernmental methods to challenge government authority. The second is substitution, or the expansion of administrative mechanisms to satisfy the interests and needs of the governed. Here, the government is the decision-maker and executor of “control” and “functional substitution”. “Control” is for preventing civil organizational challenges to governmental authority and for continuing the government’s monopoly on political power. “Functional substitution” is fostering a “controllable” civil organizational system and using them to meet social needs, eliminate the necessity of “autonomous” civil organizations, function-


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ally replace “autonomous” civil organizations, and preclude the emergence in society of civil organizations independent of the government. One might say that functional substitution is a more ingenious form of control. It is a way of actively responding to social needs, functionally “replacing” the “self-rule” demanded by the governed, and thereby attaining the goal of “realizing control through substitution”. Through the simultaneous pursuit of these approaches, the government wins both stability in the authoritarian political system and economic and social development. “Administrative absorption of society” does not emphasize the separation between State and society; even less does it emphasize opposition between State and society. It emphasizes a fusion of State and society. In the process, the State uses “social methods” to enter society while the State that enters society is no longer the same as the “pure State”. However, the State’s mark is already emblazoned upon the “social methods”; as a result, there is no aspect of civil organizations untouched and uninfluenced by the State. Compared with the authoritarianism of China before the reforms, in the reform process, there has in fact emerged a certain “separation” between the State and society. However, this “separation” is “limited” in terms of “scope”. The State released control over the “private sphere” but rebuilt its control over the “public sphere”. Moreover, this “separation” was also “limited” in terms of time; after an initial “separation” between State and society, the government began re-establishing “fusion” of State and society through the “administrative absorption of society”. Social shifts since the Reform and Opening have been neither a pure expansion of autonomy nor a pure re-establishment of government control, but a re-establishment of government control amidst an increase in social autonomy. To a certain degree, it is a win-win process for both society and the State. Naturally, currently, though society has been liberated as never before, Mainland China is still an administrationdominated society. 4.3. The State-Society Relationship as a Kind of Ideal Type The State-society relationship under an “administrative absorption of society” system differs both from pre-reform authoritarianism and from Western market society (civil society). It is a new “ideal type”

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of the State-society relationship.15 We can uncover the characteristics or this “new type” of relationship by comparing it with other principal forms of the State-society relationship. We use the “civil society”, “cooperativism”, “civil society-State opposition”, and “authoritarian” models for comparison (see Table 8-6). Though contention still exists around a definition of civil society, a general view is that civil society is society, the economy and forms of moral order outside of State control.16 Civil society emphasizes a social sphere independent of the State with associations and competition among diverse civil organizations. The political order capable of guaranteeing these properties in civil society is a liberal democratic political system. In the distribution of power between the State and society, society dominates. Compared with this, under administrative absorption of society, people’s right of association is subjected to certain limitations while different groups have different rights of association. Civil organizations are neither completely voluntarily associated nor are they completely independent of government; different civil organizations have relationships with the government to varying degrees. Administrative absorption of society is also not a liberal democratic political system; rather, it is an authoritarian or post-authoritarian political system. In the distribution of power between the State and society, the State dominates. Compared with administrative absorption of society, under the cooperativist model, citizens have fuller rights of association, while civil organizations have greater autonomy. Differently from civil society, cooperativism does not emphasize a social sphere independent of the State; rather, it emphasizes communication and cooperation between the State and society. It does not emphasize competition among diverse civil organizations but monopoly by functional organizations. On the one hand, these monopolistic civil organizations represent organizations in negotiations with the State; on the other, as a form of exchange, monopolized civil organizations guarantee that their members will implement policies made.17 Under administrative absorption of society, people’s rights of association are limited. The

The “ideal type” used here follows Marx and Weber’s use. 米勒/Mi Le (Miller) eds., 布莱克维尔政治学百科全书/bu lai ke wei er zheng zhi xue bai ke quan shu, (Beijing: zhongguo zheng fa da xue chu ban she, 1992) 126. (Blackwell’s Encyclopedia of Politics). 17 Ibid, 173–176. 15 16


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Table 8-6: A Comparison of Models of the State-Society Relationship Ideal type Civil society Cooperativism comparative content

Civil societyState opposition

Administrative absorption of society

Authoritarianism

State interference in the social sphere

State does not interfere

State does not interfere, but interferes in functional organizations through legislation

State interferes in the public sphere but interference is ineffective

State interferes in the public sphere

State interferes in society, and the scope of interference includes the economic, public and private spheres

Citizens’ rights of association

Full rights under law

Full rights under law

Rights of association are legally limited but in actually are unrestricted

Rights of association are limited but different groups have different rights of association

Association is prohibited

Autonomy of civil organizations

Completely Completely autonomous autonomous

Actually autonomous

Varying degrees Complete lack of autonomy by of autonomy organization type

Method of provision of public goods

State and society cooperate

State and society cooperate

State and society Provision is each go their own dominated by way the State

Political decisionmaking and implementation

Sociallyguided with legislative bodies at the center

Socially-guided, dominated by cooperation between administrative departments and functional organizations

Policymaking and implementation is influenced through noninstitutional conflicts

State-dominated, but society has a certain space for expression

State-dominated, society has no right of expression

Distribution of power between the State and society

Society occupies the dominant position

Society occupies the dominant position, but government influence is greater than in the civil society model

State and society are matched in strength or make rival claims as equals

The state occupies the dominant position

The state occupies an absolutely dominant position

Corresponding political form

Liberal democracy

Authoritarianism Liberal in its collapsing democracy or authoritarianism phase

Typical example America

Australia, Mexico

State provides all public goods

Authoritarianism Authoritarianism or postAuthoritarianism

Transformative Mainland China Poland, Mainland today China at the time of the Tiananmen Square incident

Mainland China prior to reforms

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majority of monopoly organizations are not formed based on voluntary association among the people, but are mandated by government. Thus, these monopoly organizations do not truly represent their members’ interests; they represent the government’s interests.18 The cooperativist model is more adaptable than the administrative absorption of society model. It is compatible with liberal democratic, authoritarian or even totalistic political systems. The civil society-State opposition model attempts to capture the relationship between State and society during the Eastern European transformative period. It is associated with totalistic political systems facing collapse. In such relationships, though rights of association are restricted by law, the State’s restrictions on citizens’ rights of association are ineffective. Civil organizations are quite autonomous and openly opposed to the State; where the State would like to control these organizations, their power is insufficient. Under the administrative absorption of society model, State restrictions on citizens’ rights of association are effective, as is its ability to interfere in society. The civil society-State opposition model is associated with totalistic political systems facing collapse while the administrative absorption of society model is associated with “self-adjusting” totalistic political systems. The totalistic model is a description of the State-society relationship in Mainland China prior to reforms. In this relationship, citizens’ rights of association are prohibited and independent civil organizations are not allowed to exist. The State occupies a position of absolute dominance in the division of power between State and society. State interference in society is complete; its scope includes both the public and the personal spheres. Furthermore, all public goods are provided by the State. To a certain extent, the administrative absorption of society model inherits aspects of the totalistic model. For example, due to its dominant position in the State-society power distribution, the State still strictly controls the public sphere and monopolizes various resources necessary for collective action. Differences between the two are still clear, however. Under the administrative absorption of society model, the State no longer exercises total interference and allows lim-

18 As Foster put it, in today’s China, cooperativism exists in form only, not in substance. This is because large, monopolistic organizations do not truly represent the interests of their members but the interests of the government. Kenneth W. Foster, “Embedded within State Agencies: Business Associations in YanTai”, in the Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 47. 2002. pp. 62–63.


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ited associational freedoms; these conditions have been associated with the appearance of large numbers of civil organizations and the release of both the economy and the personal private sphere. The State no longer provides all public goods and has begun using civil organizations for provision of some public goods. The comparisons above reveal that administrative absorption of society is different from pre-reform totalism and the civil society-State opposition seen in Eastern Europe. It is even more different from the cooperativism and civil society models seen in the West. In short, it is a new model for the relationship between State and society. 4.4. The Relationship Between the Growth of the Third Sector and Democratization Third sector civil organizations have had an important influence on political development. Tocqueville, Putnam, Dahl and others have researched the relationship between the growth of civil organizations and democratization. They’ve found that civil organizations formed through voluntary association are effectively prerequisite for democracy.19 Exactly as Dahl put it, “independent civil organizations are extremely necessary things for a democratic system, at least for largescale democratic systems. As soon as the democratic process is applied at a scale as large as a nation-state, autonomous civil organizations will certainly emerge. Moreover, the emergence of this kind of civil organizations is not merely a direct result of the governance processes of the nation-state, it is also needed for the operation of the democratic process itself; its function is to minimize government coercion, guarantee political freedom and improve people’s lives.”20

19 托克维尔/tuo ke wei er (Tocqueville), 论美国的民主/lun mei guo de min zhu, (Beijing: shang wu yin shu guan, 1991). (Democracy in America); 罗伯特·D帕特南, 王列、赖海榕译/luo bo te D pa te nan (Robert D Putnam), trans. by王列、赖海榕/Wang Lie, Lai Hairong, 使民主运转起来——现代意大利的公民传统/shi min zhu yun zhuan qi lai—xian dai yi da li de gong min chuan tong, (Nanchang: jiang xi ren min chu ban she, 2001). (Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy); 罗伯特·达尔/luo bo te da er (Robert Dahl ) translated by 李柏光、林猛/Li Baiguang, Lin Meng, 论民主/ lun min zhu, (Beijing: shang wu yin shu guan, 1999). (On Democracy). 罗伯特·达尔/ luo go te da er (Robert Dahl ) trans. by 谭君久/Tan Junjiu, 多头政体——参与和反对/duo tou zheng ti—can yu he fan dui, (Beijing: shang wu yin shu guan, 2003). (Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition). 20 顾昕/Gu Xin, “以社会制约权力: 达尔的多元主义民主理论与公民社会”/“yi she hui zhi yue quan li: da er de duo yuan zhu yi min zhu li lun yu gong min she hui”,

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Political democratization in China has long been an aim of Western, international powers. During the Reform and Opening, the West’s primary strategy was to cooperate with or push Central Party leaders to originate and advance reforms. They hoped to arrive at their ideal outcomes through peaceful changes, by “subduing enemies without fighting” or “winning without fighting”. After 1989, Western powers no longer pinned their hopes on peaceful changes advanced by leaders and abandoned their original “top down” strategy. Instead, they placed their hopes on popular forces; their basic strategy was to foster the organizing powers of the population, or civil organizations, and hoped that those forces might bring about “bottom up”, peaceful change. Accordingly, Western civil and governmental assistance began to focus on civil organizations and civil society in China; they hoped to use them to promulgate Western concepts among the people, increase affinity for the West and change social foundations. It was under these circumstances in the 1990s that research on civil society swept China’s academia. At the start of the 21st Century, the color revolutions of Eastern Europe sparked another series of discussions on civil organizations and democratization. At the same time, around 2000, the “Fa Lun Gong Incident” attracted a great deal of government attention. Again, civil organizations and political development and political stability became hotly debated topics. China’s reforms have been underway for 30 years. 20 years have passed since the Tiananmen Square incident. What is the relationship between the growth of China’s civil organizations in society and China’s political development? Have they become autonomous, independent of the State? Have they advanced political democratization in China? The analysis above has offered some answers. In actuality, under the government’s administrative system, China’s civil organizations have neither escaped government control nor challenged government authority. Conversely, civil organizations are providing services, resolving social problems, maintaining social stability, and maintaining government authority. In China, there emerged neither civil societyState opposition in the Eastern European sense nor color revolutions as in Central Asia. Translator’s Afterword to “民主理论的前言”/“min zhu li lun de qian yan” from Robert Dahl’s On Democracy, 227. (“Using Society to Check Power: Dahl’s Diversist Democratic Theory and Civil Society,” Translator’s Afterword to “Foreword to a Theory of Democracy”).


369

A scattered and dispersed public is insignificant when it comes to political power. Only when organized can the public influence, or even change, the government. So, “organizing” is an extremely important political resource. In this sense, deep, internal conflicts remain between “civil organizations” and authoritarian systems. This is because monopolizing political power is basic to authoritarianism, while challenging governmental monopolies on power is one of the basic functions of civil organizations. Therefore, the conflict between authoritarian systems and civil organizations is a fundamental one; under usual circumstances, their maneuvering is considered a “zerosum game” without “win-win” solutions available to resolve the conflict between them. At one time, the CCP’s difficulties in dealing with markets, privatization and openness were also viewed as irresolvable problems. In practice, however, the CCP found a set of solutions and implemented them with success that has attracted global attention. Far from eroding the status of CCP rule, these enormous changes set in place an enduring foundation for its lasting rule. In today’s social sphere, the government has already changed the totalistic system from before the reforms, putting in its place a new system of administrative absorption of society. Has this system solved the global, epochal, “irreconcilable” issue of civil organizations and authoritarianism? Only time can give us the answer.

APPENDIX

TIMELINE OF CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS (1978–2008) 1978 • March, All-China Science Conference held in Beijing. In comments there, Deng Xiaoping emphasizes the notions that “science and technology are productive power”; intellectuals “are part of the worker class itself ”; and “of the four modernizations, the key is the modernization of science and technology”, thereby re-establishing science and technology’s importance and social recognition. As a result, the work of associations of science and technology were restored at the national, provincial, municipal and autonomous-regional levels. • April, China Red Cross reopens in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, seven other cities, dedicated to public hygiene and rescue. 1979 • April, China Society for Environmental Sciences holds first AllChina representative meeting in Chengdu, becoming China’s first national-scale environmental organization. At the same time, a series of national-scale scholarly associations were founded, including China Institute of Navigation, Chinese Society of Education, China Institute of Archaeology, Seismological Society of China and the National Statistical Society of China. • September–December, a group of international civil organizations visit China and are received by State leaders. On September 8th, Vice Premier of the State Council Fang Yi meets representatives from America’s Ford Foundation; November 9th, Vice Premier of the State Council Bao Yibo meets representatives from Germany’s Adenauer Foundation; November 22nd, Vice Premier of the State Council Jin Qiuli meets representatives from Germany’s Seidel Foundation; December 5th, Vice Chair of the People’s Congress Standing Committee Tan Zhenlin meets representatives from America’s Ambassador International Cultural Foundation.

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appendix 1980

• January, the CCP Central Committee’s United Front Department, Communist Youth League Central Committee and All-China Women’s Federation jointly re-continued YMCA/YWCA activities in eleven cities. • August, Provisional Regulations on Lawyers issued《律师暂行条例》, followed by the establishment of Lawyers Associations in ten cities. • December, due to urgent needs for public security administration, peasants in Yishan and Luocheng Villages in Guangxi’s Hechi region formed their own new organizations, villager committees, to replace rapidly disintegrating production teams and production team organizations. 1981 • July, China Society of Elderly Railroad Warriors, the first community welfare benefits social group formed after the start of the Reform and Opening, established with 157 branch organizations. • July, China Children and Teenagers’ Fund established in Beijing, China’s first national-scale public funding foundation. 1982 • May, Soong Ching Ling Foundation established in Beijing with Deng Xiaoping as Honorary Chairman, China’s first nationalscale public funding foundation established in the name of a State leader. • December, the Constitution of the PRC passed in the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress explicitly delineates citizens’ rights of association and mentions residents’ committees and village committees as base-level, public, self-governance organizations.

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1983 • April, the State Council releases supplementary provisions entitled Several Policy Regulations Concerning Township Non-Agricultural Individual Economy《关于城镇非农业个体经济若干政策性规定》 , calling for development of individual laborers’ associations by administrative region and for the active support of various levels of government. 1984 • March, China Foundation for Disabled Persons is founded in Beijing with the mission of advancing public-interest work for the disabled and Wang Zhen as its Honorary Chair. • November, CCP Central Committee and the State Council pass the Notice Concerning Strictly Controlling National-Scale Civil Organizations《关于严格控制全国性组织的通知》, establishing that social groups must be examined and approved by departments related to their specializations and finalized by the State Reform Commission. • December, China Consumers’ Association established. 1985 • April, State Ministry of Culture releases an Opinion Concerning Reforming Arts Performance Groups《关于艺术表演团体的改革的意见》. The State Council then endorsed the Opinion and set about reforming artistic performance groups. • September, Huo Yingdong Sports Foundation founded with a 100 million yuan donation from Hong Kong entrepreneur Huo Yingdong for the development of Chinese athletics. 1986 • April, the General Rules of Civil Law are passed in the Sixth Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress《民法通则》, listing social group legal persons as one of four types of legal persons.

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• April, State Council issues a Decision Concerning Reforming the Sports System (Draft)《关于体育体制改革的决定 (草案)》, promoting reforms of sports groups to gradually focus on the State and society. 1987 • June, China Population Welfare Foundation established in Beijing for the advancement of family planning and population welfare with Deng Yingchao as its Honorary Chair. • September, Asia Games Foundation set up in Beijing, China’s first foundation formed to solicit donations for a sporting event. 1988 • January, 30 privately-owned businesses in Fuzhou form an entrepreneurs’ commerce association, thought to be China’s first of its kind. • May, the Ford Foundation opens a representative office in Beijing. This was the first foreign NGO allowed to enter and launch activities in Mainland China. • July, in its Second Session, the State Institutional Organization Commission (国家机构编制委员会) decided that the Ministry of Civil Affairs should be responsible on behalf of the State Council for the functional departments for social administration and management. Beneath this was established an Office of Social Group Administration responsible for all the social groups in China. • September, first set of regulations on foundations, the Measures on Foundation Administration《基金会管理办法》, passed by the Twenty-second Executive Committee of the State Council. 1989 • April, in the Thirty-ninth Plenary Session, the State Council passed the Provisional Rules on Administration of Foreign Commercial Associations《外国商会管理暂行规定》specifying the permissible types of foreign commercial associations, qualifying conditions, and administrative processes.

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• October, in the 49th Plenary Session, the State Council passed the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration《社会团体登记管理条例》 which established the dual administrative system. • October, China Youth Development Foundation established, dedicated to assisting impoverished youths attend school. The Foundation launched “Project Hope”, a national fundraising effort and milestone in donation-driven public-interest projects. 1990 • June, the General Office of the State Council endorsed a Ministry of Civil Affairs document concerning a “clean-up and reorganization” of social groups, setting off the first national work campaign to “clean-up and reorganize” social groups. 1991 • Black-Mouthed Gull Protection Associations, founded in Panjin, Liaoning Province, by eminent local reporter Liu Detian, becomes China’s first environmental association devoted to one bird. 1992 • April, Union Law of the PRC《中华人民共和国工会法》 is passed in the Fifth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress. The law is aimed at special types of social groups. • July, China Association for NGO Cooperation founded under the approval of the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (now the Ministry of Commerce), the first civil organization formed to support exchange and cooperation between Chinese and foreign civil organizations.

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appendix 1993

• March, the Second Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee passes the Plan Concerning Reforming Party and Government Institutions 《关于党政机构改革的方案》, calling for the conversion of some former economic administration departments into industry associations to replace their function in industrial administration. • October, in its Fourth Session, the Eighth National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the Red Cross Law of the PRC《中华人民共和国红十字会法》, aimed at normalizing administration of one particular social group. • November, in its Third Plenary Session, the Fourteenth Central Committee passed a Decision Concerning Several Questions of Establishing a Socialist Market Economy《关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》, specifying that industry associations, commerce associations and other organizations should play a role. 1994 • January, Tsinghua University Education Foundation established in Beijing, China’s first foundation set up by a university. • March, “Friends of Nature” (officially the China Cultural Institute of Classical Learning-Green Culture Sub-Institute) founded, China’s first formally-registered, national-scale environmental protection civil organization originating from individuals. Its founder is the eminent historian Professor Liang Congjie. • April, China Charity is founded in Beijing with the Ministry of Civil Affairs serving as its work supervising unit, devoted to social assistance, public-interest work. Its first chairman is Ministry of Civil Affairs Minister Cui Naifu. • April, the General Office of the State Council issues a Notice Concerning Department Leader Comrades Not Holding Joint Leadership Positions in Social Groups《关于部门领导同志不兼任社会团体领导职务的通知》.

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1995 • August, the Ministry of Agriculture and the People’s Bank of China issue a Notice Concerning Strengthening Rural Cooperative Foundation Administration《关于加强农村合作基金会管理的通知》, clarifying administrative jurisdiction over rural cooperative foundations and setting in motion reorganizational measures requiring registration and inspections for cooperative foundations. • Late August–September 8, “ ‘95 NGO Women’s Forum” held concurrently in Beijing with the Fourth World Women’s Conference. Tens of thousands of representatives of women’s’ NGOs from all over the world gathered in Beijing holding thousands of meetings and panels. The meeting marked the introduction of the concept and mechanism of NGOs to China. 1996 • July, CCP Central Committee and State Council General Offices issue the Central Institutional Organization Commission Opinion Concerning Several Questions of Reforming State Run Units《中央机构编制委员会关于事业单位改革若干问题的意见》. The Opinion clarified the guiding thinking and direction of the reform of state run units and offered specific measures for making state run units less governmental, independent legal persons in the service of society. 1997 • March, the General Office of the State Economic and Trade Commission issue a Plan Concerning Selection of Several Cities for Industry Association Trials《关于选择若干城市进行行业协会试点的方案》, identifying Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xiamen and Wenzhou as trial sites. The reform direction of transferring departmental administration to industry self-administration already in place, this marked the beginning of the trial phase. • April, the General Office of the State Council endorsed a Ministry of Civil Affairs document on the “clean-up and reorganization” of social groups, setting off a second round of the “clean-up and reorganization” of social groups nationally. This “clean-up” lasted

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until October of 1999 and brought social groups, foundations and people-run non-enterprise units under a unified registration and administration system. • September, the Fifteenth Central Committee Great Report calls for “fostering and developing social intermediary organizations”. 1998 • February, the CCP Central Organizing Department and Ministry of Civil Affairs jointly release a Notice Concerning Establishing Party Organizations in Social Groups《关于在社会团体中建立党组织的通知》, requiring that CCP base-level organizations be set up in all registered social groups. • March, in its First Session, the Ninth National People’s Congress passes a Decision Concerning a Plan to Reform State Council Institutions《关于国务院机构改革方案的决定》. Accordingly, adjustments were made to the structure of the Ministry of Civil Affairs; the “Office of Social Groups and People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Administration” (社会团体和民办非企业单位管理司) was changed to the “Bureau of Civil Organization Administration” (民间组织管理局). • September, the Eighth Executive Committee of the State Council passed the Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration《社会团体登记管理条例》and the Provisional Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration《民办非企业单位登记暂行条例》offering comprehensive regulations on the registration and administration of social groups and people-run non-enterprise units. They also clarified the roles and responsibilities of registration and administration offices (登记管理机关) and work supervising units (业务主管单位), thereby strengthening the dual administration system. • October, the Tsinghua University NGO Research Center is established, the first research institute in China devoted to NGOs. Its name was later changed to the “NGO Research Institute”. 1999 • January, State Council Document No. 3 called for the unified closing of all rural cooperative foundations and for their claims and debts to be absorbed by the Rural Credit Cooperative.

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• January, State Economic and Trade Commission issues Several Opinions Concerning Accelerating Fostering and Development of Industry Associations in the Area of Commerce (Test)《关于加快培育和发展工商领域行业协会的若干意见 (试行)》, specifying 17 functions of industry associations. In addition, the definition of industry associations shifted from industry administration to industry services. • June, the Public-Interest Work Donations Law《公益事业捐赠法》 was passed by the Tenth Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress, the first time China’s highest legislative body had devoted law specifically to public-interest work. 2000 • April, Ministry of Civil Affairs promulgates the Provisional Measures on Banning Illegal Civil Organizations《取缔非法民间组织暂行办法》, and begins limiting and striking civil organizations without legal registration. • July, CCP Central Organizing Department issues an Opinion Concerning Strengthening Party Building Work in Social Groups《关于加强社会团体党的建设工作的意见》emphasizing the importance of Party-building work in social groups. 2001 • February, nine state-level bureaus under the State Economic and Trade Commission are dismantled and renamed as ten large industry associations. The former bureaus included the Bureaus of Internal Goods, Metallurgy, Building Materials, Textiles, Light Industry, Machinery, Petroleum, Non-Ferrous Metals, and Coal. • April, Trust Law《信托法》is passed by the Twenty-first Standing Committee Meeting of the Ninth National People’s Congress. The law offered the first legislation on public-interest trusts and clarified China’s public-interest trust system. • June, China Philanthropy Times《公益时报》 is published for the first time, produced by the China Social Work Association and administered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs.

380

appendix 2002

• Starting in February, negative reports about China Youth Development Foundation’s “Project Hope” in Hong Kong’s Ming Pao News and other media. This prompted individual donors to be more concerned with their donations to foundations and foundations and related departments to set in place tighter mechanisms for self-governance and accountability in public-interest organizations. • March, the Communist Youth League and the China Youth Volunteers Association promulgate Measures on China Youth Volunteer Registration and Administration (Test)《中国青志愿者注册管理办法 (试行)》, signifying the nationwide rollout of a volunteer registration system. • October, Environmental Impact Appraisal Law《环境影响评价法》 passed by the Thirtieth Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress, encouraging citizen participation. • December, Law on Promoting People-Run Education《民办教育促进法》 passed by the Thirtieth Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress. This was China’s first law devoted to educational civil organizations. 2003 • September, the Yanyangchu Village Construction Institute founded in Hebei’s Zhaicheng. Its mission is using organizing to increase villagers’ capacity to withstand market risks and participate in village public affairs. • October, the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Party Committee calls for improving the socialist market economic system, demanding that “self-governing organizations such as industry associations and commerce associations be normalized and developed according to market principles”. 2004 • February, the 39th Executive Committee of the State Council Passes the Regulations on Foundation Administration《基金会管理条例》, diving

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foundations into public funding and non-public funding foundations and introducing a systemic framework for foundation administration. • February, Ministry of Civil Affairs issues an Accounting System for Civil Non-Profit Organizations《民间非营利组织会计制度》. Offering a system to complement related laws and regulations, it resolved civil organizations’ applied accounting problems. • September, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee called for “increasing the roles of social groups, industry associations and social intermediary associations in providing services, reporting social concerns and normalizing behavior, joining the forces of social administration and social service.” • September, “Experts Conference on the Nu River Basin Hydroelectric Development Project” held in Beijing by the State Administration for Environmental Protection. A group of environment protection civil organizations doubted the construction of the dam and planned a series of anti-dam construction activities later knows as the “Nu River Incident”. This incident signified that China’s environmental protection civil organizations had begun to work to influence public policy as representatives of the public interest. 2005 • June, Heungkong Charitable Foundation formally registered in Beijing, China’s first formally-registered non-public funding foundation. • October, considering the nation’s Eleventh Five Year Plan, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee called for “normalizing and guiding the orderly development of civil organizations”, “improving civil organizations’ self-governance mechanisms, and strengthening and advancing supervision of civil organizations”. • December, Regulations on Guangdong Industry Associations《广东省行业协会条例》passed by the Guangdong People’s Congress, requiring industry associations to register directly with registration and administration offices and breaking through the dual administration system.

382

appendix 2006

• January–October, Village Poverty Alleviation Planning Project launched cooperatively between the government and NGOs. The State Council’s Poverty Alleviation Office, Asia Bank, Jiangxi’s Poverty Alleviation Office and the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation joined together in this first instance of government disbursing funds and entrusting operations and administration to a civil organization. • October, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee passes a Decision Concerning Constructing Several Questions of Socialism and Harmonious Society《关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定》. • The Decision mentioned and systematically described the concept of “social organizations” (社会组织) for the first time and called for “maintaining both fostering and development and supervision and administration, improving policies to foster, promote and legally administer social organizations.” 2007 • March, a new Enterprise Income Tax Law《企业所得税法》was passed by the Fifth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, greatly increasing the pre-tax income deduction for enterprises making public-interest donations and clarifying a qualified tax exemption policy for non-profit organizations. • March, Property Rights Law《物权法》passed by the Fifth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, offering regulations on the status of the assets of social groups and other civil organizations. • April, in response to allegations by the public and in the media about its credibility, the National Tooth Decay Prevention Group (全国牙防组), founded in 1988, is dismantled by the Ministry of Health. This “Tooth Decay Prevention Group Incident” reflected the public’s desire to be informed of public matters and the public’s capacity to engage in external supervision of civil organizations through legal channels. • May, General Office of the State Council promulgates an Several Opinions Concerning Accelerating and Advancing Development and Reforms of Industry Associations《关于加快推进行业协会商

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会改革和发展的若干意见》(also known as “Document No. 36”). The Document recognized the contributions of industry associations since the start of the Reform and Opening and introduced further reform plans centered on making them less governmental and more market-oriented. • October, Ministry of Civil Affairs issues a Notice Concerning Appraising Foundations《关于开展基金会评估工作的通知》, formally commencing a campaign to appraise national-level foundations. • October, the Central Committee’s Seventeenth Great Report holistically describes social construction centered around people’s lives, further reaffirming the concept of social groups, and emphasizing the active role of social groups in society-building, public services and political democratic construction. 2008 • March, the Government Work Report《政府工作报告》and the Opinion Concerning Deepening Reforms of Administrative and Management Systems《关于深化行政管理体制改革的意见》, passed respectively by the Eleventh National People’s Congress and the Second Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee, mention the roles social organizations can play in social administration and public services and in advancing reforms to the administrative and management system centered around export of government functions. • May, Sichuan’s Wenchuan suffered an earthquake of 8.1 magnitude. Chinese and foreign civil organizations played an active role relief post-quake reconstruction efforts. Social forces were widely mobilized. As of July 20, 2008, 58 billion yuan in donations and materiel had been collected within China and from abroad.

INDEX

*Note: Page numbers in boldface refer to information in graphics, tables, or charts. academic associations, 27–28, 307 academic group resurgence, 14–15 Accounting System for Civil Non-Profit Organizations, 381 action characteristics of third sector organizations, 303, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312 Adenauer Foundation, 371 administration-by-specialization model of control, 337–338, 343–344, 350 Administration of Industry and Commerce, 6 administrative absorption of society, 361–366 administrative approach logic, 352–353 administrative guidance, 361 administrative management system reform, 157–158 advocacy organizations, 59, 311–312 agency, 3 agricultural associations, 6, 28–29, 258 AIDS prevention, 84 All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), 4, 28 All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, 75 All-China Journalists Association, 75 All-China Science Conference, 371 All-China Women’s Federation, 75, 372 All-China Youth Federation, 75 Ambassador International Cultural Foundation, 371 annual increase of civil organizations, 27 annual report system, 122–123, 132 Annual Work Reports, 172–174 Anti-Capitalist Class Liberalization, 179 articles of incorporation, 121, 129–130 Asia Bank, 382 Asia Development Bank, 222, 223 Asia Games Foundation, 19, 374 asset management of social groups, 122 asset preservation mechanisms, 8 assimilation model of development, 343–344, 349, 350 assistance principle, 237

association activities growth, 50 associational freedom, 211 associational revolution, 14–21, 278 association formation, citizens rights to, 70–73 association movement, 44–45 Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment, 49 associations, lower level, 66 associations under collective society, 67–70 association system history, 61–66 association types, 64–65 authoritarianism, 297, 333, 341, 351–352, 360, 363–369 autonomous democracy, 293–294 autonomous space, 72 autonomy of organizations, 316–318, 330–331 bandwagon effect, 44 Bao Yibo, 371 base-level democracy, 292–295 basic policies on civil organizations (CPP), 153–155 behavioral characteristics of third sector organizations, 302, 304, 305, 306, 321–322 behavioral traditional Chinese characteristics, 356–357 Beijing College Students Federation, 75n19 Beijing Football Team Snowflake Foundation, 20 Beijing Haidian Liulitun Waste Incineration Plant, 234 Beijing Knitting Industry Association, 178 Black-Mouthed Gull Protection Association, 47, 375 board-centered structural relationships, 204 board chair-led governance, 200 board culture, 186–187 board decision process/member participation, 192–194, 196

386

index

board governance structure content, 197–200 board governance structure reform, 194–197, 200–205 board meetings/member selection, 189–191 board members, 187–189 board membership diversity, 195–196 board membership structure changes, 183–184 board member tensions, 200–205 board responsibilities, 185–186 board size and structure, 184–185 boards of directors, 131 bottom-line organization control, 340 bottom-up civil organizations, 213–215, 226, 236–237, 285 Bureau of Civil Organization Administration, 378 business associations, 4 business tax, 167–168 capacity-building in governance, 207–208 capacity centers, 235–236 Central Administration employment, 160 Central Committee’s Seventeenth Great Report, 383 Central Institutional Organization Commission Opinion Concerning Several Questions of Reforming State Run Units, 377 chambers of commerce, 104–107, 123–125 China AntiTuberculosis Foundation, 16 China Association for NGO Cooperation, 194–195, 375 China Association for Science and Technology (CAST), 14–15, 36, 75, 76, 191, 199 China Association of Agriculture Science Societies, 178 China Charity, 376 China Children’s and Teenager’s Fund, 17, 19, 31, 182, 372 China Coal Mining Culture Promulgation Foundation, 18 China Computer Association, 190–191 China Consumers’ Association, 373 China Family Planning Association (CFPA), 17 China Federation of Industrial Economics, 257 China Federation of Industry and Commerce, 75 China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots, 75

China Federation of Trade Unions, 75 China Food Industry Association, 256 China Foundation for Disabled Persons, 18, 373 China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, 182, 382 China Institute of Archaeology, 371 China Institute of Navigation, 371 China International Trade Promotion Association, 75 China Law Society, 75 China Legal Aid Foundation, 182 China Light Industry Association, 285 China Packaging Technology Association, 256 China Philanthropy Times, 379 China Population Welfare Foundation, 374 China Poverty Alleviation Foundation, 324 China Red Cross, 15, 371 China’s 21st Century Agenda for Action, 97 China Social Welfare Education Foundation, 18 China Social Work Association, 379 China Society for Environmental Sciences, 371 China Society of Elderly Railroad Warriors, 372 China Soong Ching Ling Foundation, 18 China Textile Association, 285 China Tungsten Industry Association, 88 China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped, 31 China Writers Association, 75 China Youth Development Foundation, 73, 182, 375, 380 China Youth Volunteers Association, 148, 380 Chinese Association for Enterprise Culture Construction, 75 Chinese characteristics in government, 355–357 Chinese characteristics of third sector, 332–360 Chinese Communist Party’s 17th Party Congress, 80–81 Chinese Communist Party’s Basic Policies on Civil Organizations, 153–155 Chinese Federation of Literary and Art Circles, 75 Chinese Foundation for Teacher Development, 19

index Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, 75 Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, 75 Chinese Peoples’ Political and Consultative Conference, 75 Chinese Society of Education, 371 Chinese Society of Ideological and Political Work, 76 Chinese traditional culture, effects on government, 353–354 Chinese Vocational Education Association, 75 Chongqing Green Volunteers Federation, 83–84 circulation tax benefits, 167–168 Cisterns Project, 31 citizen participation, 52–53, 250–253, 263–264 citizens’ basic freedoms, 110–115 citizens’ powers, 234–236 citizens’ powers movement, 218–219 city and township land-use tax, 169–170 civil organization assessment, 82 civil organization characteristics under collective society, 69–70 civil organization classification table, 314–315 civil organization emergence, 276–278 civil organization-government relationships, 209–237 civil organization growth, 233 civil organization history, 230–234 civil organization legislation, 89–92 civil organization legitimacy, 77–78, 77n22 civil organization networks, 107 civil organization numbers/status, 74–78 civil organization participation inadequacies, 97–102 civil organization properties, 7–9 civil organization public participation, 82–89 civil organizations, as challenges to Party, 279 civil organizations, awkward situations in development of, 102–108 civil organizations, defined, 1–7 civil organizations, emergence theory of, 37–38 civil organizations, Party control of, 280–281 civil organizations, rise of, 14–21 civil organizations, role of, 59–60

387

Civil Organizations Administration Bureau, 232 civil organization sectors, diagram, 5 Civil Organizations Ordinance, 79 civil organization timeline, 371–383 civil organization types, 9–10, 75 civil society, 245–253 Civil Society (Edwards), 11 civil society, definition, 364 civil society, historical persperctive, 227–228 civil society connotations, 10–12 civil society future paths, 54–57 civil society law, 248–250 civil society organizations, 2 civil society-State opposition model, 366 civil to social organization shift, 181 clan-based loyalties, 105 classification of civil organizations, 9–10 classification of foundations, 127–128 classification of third sector organizations, 301–312, 314–315 classified controls, 340 clean-up and reorganization of civil organizations, 22–24, 40, 45, 230, 375, 377–378 collective action concept, 41–49 collective life creation, 247 collectively-led board governance, 200 collective society associations, 67–70, 68n13 collective society characteristics, 68–69 combined structural relationships, 204 commerce associations, 307 Common Program, 111 common relationships, 249–250 Communist Youth League, 380 Communist Youth League Central Committee, 75, 184, 372 community, loss of, 242–243 community-based society, 62–63 community civil organizations, 75 community collective, 262–263 community development organizations, 263 community organizations, 5, 333–335, 342 community replacement, 245 COMPACT agreement, 219–220 competitive contracting, 222 conditions for establishment of social groups, 118–120 conflicts of interest, 123, 132 Confucian concept of government, 354 Congjie, Liang, 47

388

index

connotations of civil society, 10–12 constitional regulations on citizens’ basic freedoms, 110–115 Constitution of the PRC, 372 Constitutions (1954, 1975, and 1982), and citizens’ freedoms, 111–115 constructive recommendations, 224 consultative democracy, 294–295 consumer protection associations, 16–17 continuation model of development, 342, 349, 350, 352 contract law, 146–147 contract tax, 170 contractualized model of public services, 220–223 control failure, 340–341, 349, 350, 351 cooperative model of development, 344–345, 350, 364, 366 coordination capacity, 207–208 correlation between government support and control, 351–352 counter-revolutionary organizations, 210 Crane, 78 credibility of foundations, 131 credibility of social groups, 122–123 Cui Naifu, 376 Cultural Center for Facilitators, 86 cultural foundations to government behavior, 353–354 Cultural Revolution, 14, 71n16, 210–211, 231 customs tax, 168 de-administration-ization reforms, 155–164 Decision Concerning a Plan to Reform State Council Institutions, 378 Decision Concerning Constructing Several Questions of Socialism and Harmonious Society, 382 Decision Concerning Reforming the Sports System, 374 Decision Concerning Several Questions of Establishing a Socialist Market Economy, 376 definition and classification of social groups, 116–117 degrees of “non-profitness”, 313–318 degrees of organizational government control, 313–318 Deliver-Warmth Project, 323 demand gap, 325–326 democracy, absence of, 71 democracy, autonomous, 293–294

democracy, base-level, 292–295 democracy, consultative, 294–295 democracy, participatory, 295 Democracy in America (de Tocqueville), 252 democratically-held board meetings, 189–191 democratic participation, 244 democratic politics-building, 250–253 democratization, 60 democratization, and third-sector growth, 367–369 Deng Guosheng, 197 Deng Xiaoping, 35, 178, 180, 371, 372 Deng Yingchao, 374 descriptive indicators of third sector, 300 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisional Measures, 230 development model distribution, 346 development models, 341–351, 346, 352 disclosure of information, 171–176 dispersed-type board governance, 199 distribution of government control models, 340 distribution of government development models, 346 Diverse Development Phase, 181–183 diversity of board members, 195–196 divestiture and liberation, 72 division of political life, 272 Document No. 36, 383 donation deductions, 166–167 donations law, 144–145 Donglin Academy and Society of Classical Learning Restoration, 64 donor and beneficiary/organization relationships, 206 donor tax benefits, 167 dual-administration model of control, 336–337, 341, 349, 350 dual administrative systems, 25–26, 46, 157–158, 180, 231 economic elite, 48, 51–52, 56 economic growth, 45, 50–51 economic system reforms, 255 effects of political reform, 273–276 “Eight Big” democratic party sections, 210 Eleventh Five Year Plan, 381 elite absorption, 64 elite and popular society integration, 65 emergence theory of Chinese civil organizations, 37 employee-led board governance, 200

index employment in social organizations, 158–162 Enterprise Income Tax Law, 165–166, 181–182, 382 enterprise/organization relationships, 205–206 enterprise organizations, 245–246, 311, 341 enterprise tax benefits, 165–166 entrepreneurs, 48–49 Environmental Impact Appraisal Law, 380 environmental protection, 41, 83–84, 85, 88–89, 226–227, 288, 290–291 exclusion of groups, 102 expansion of reforms, 49–50 Experts Conference on the Nu River Basin Hydroelectric Development Project, 381 explanatory framework for third sector, 300–301 expression of interests, 224–225 families/clans, 62–63 family governance, 105 family planning, 84 family planning associations, 17 Fang Yi, 371 Fei Xiaotong, 239, 240 fields of activity Westernization, 331–332 Fifteenth Central Committee Great Report, 378 finance and audit supervision, 123 Finance Ministry, 222, 223 financial group legal persons, 201 financial transparency, 202–203 first sector organizations, 316–317 Ford Foundation, 29, 371, 374 foreign chambers of commerce, 123–125 foreign foundations, 135–136 foreign-related civil organizations, 103 formal channels of participation in policy-making, 226 formality contracting, 221–222 foundation classifications, 127–128 foundation credibility, 131–133 foundation decision making, 182 foundation employment, 160–161 foundation investment management systems, 134–135 foundation law, 126–138, 172–176 foundation legal responsibilities, 136–138

389

Foundation Measures, 91 Foundation Regulations, 182 foundations, 4, 30–32, 91, 201 foundations, characteristics of, 306 foundations, defined, 127 foundations, foreign, 135–136 foundations, government organized, 342–343 foundations, people-run, 343–344 foundation start-up requirements, 129 foundation supervision, 132–133 4/5 Incident, 36 Fourth World Women’s Conference, 377 fragmentation, 240 framework for civil organization administration, 33 freedom of association restrictions, 91 freely moving resources, 327–328 Friends of Nature, 30, 47, 83, 376 functional characteristics of third sector organizations, 302–312, 322–324 functional substitution, 347–348, 359, 362–363 functional traditional Chinese characteristics, 357–359 functions of the State, 283 fundraising, 31–32, 173–174 future of civil society, 54–57 Gao Hongjun, 243 Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 92 General Rules of Civil Law, 373 Global Fund, 214 globalization challenges/opportunities, 52 Global Village, 30, 47, 83 gnomon shehui, 10 Golden Autumn Scholarship Program, 323 governance by society, transition to, 282–287 governance capacity-building, 207–208 governance developments and changes, 183–197 governance structure Westernization, 330–331 government, Confucian concept of, 354 government absorption of grassroots organizations, 92–93 governmental function patterns, 283–284 government contracting in public services, 220–223

390

index

government control model distribution, 340 government control models, 333–339, 340, 349–351 government control of civil organizations, 93–96, 313–318, 333–339 government control of social organizations, 63–64 government dominance of civil organizations, 347 government failures, 34–35 government-formed NGOs, 342–343 government/organization relationships, 205 government-organized associations, 307 government-organized civil organizations, 336–337 government-organized foundations, 342–343 government participatory-type board governance, 199 Government Work Report, 383 grassroots organizations, 29, 71, 86–88, 92–93, 103, 202–203, 234–235. see also NGOs (non government organizations) Green Earth, 30, 47, 83 Green River, 47 Green Valley organization, 87 growth principles civil organization/ government relationships, 236–237 Guan Beifa, 17 guiding interests, 234 Guo Xiaohui, 49 Habermas, 39 Happiness Project, 31 Harmonious Strategy Aims, 2–3 He Bing, 239–240, 242 Heifer International, 29 He Jianyu, 229 Help Centers for Employees with Difficulties, 323 Heungkong Charitable Foundation, 381 historical perspective of civil society, 227–228, 266–268 history of civil organization development, 209–212 history of governance structures, 177–182 hobbyist organizations, 310, 322, 338–339 housing tax, 168–169

Huangpu Military Academy Alumni Association, 75 Huangshan Valley, 65 Huiping, Tian, 47 Hu Jintao, 281 human resource-building capacity, 208 Huo Yingdong Sports Foundation, 373 imbalance among associations, 102–108 imperial examination system, 63 incubators, 235–236 individual liberation, 274 individual right of association, 59–108 industrial and commercial associations, 4, 28, 342–343 industrial institution employment, 161 industry associations, 256–257, 263, 264, 285, 294 information centers, 235–236 information disclosure system, 171–176 information openness, 123 innovation capacity, 207 Institute of Contemporary Observation, 84–85 institutional change, 271–272 intellectual elite, 55 intellectuals, 41–42, 43–44, 47–48 interest associations, 5 Interim Measures on Social Group Registration, 67 Interim Provisions on Administration of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in China, 123–125 Interim Regulations on Housing Tax, 168–169 Interim Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration and Administration, 261 intermediary associations, 285 intermediary organizations, 59 internal building status, 175 internal governance improvements, 162–164 internal governance reform, 177–208 internal training, 208 Internet, 53, 76–77, 310 Internet-based coalitions, 235 investment management systems, 134–135 Jiangxi Provincial Office for Poverty Alleviation, 222, 223, 382 Jin Qiuli, 371 joint positions in social organizations, 158–162

index Kang Xiaoguang, 197 labor contract law, 147–148 laborer associations, 16 labor rights protection, 84–85 land appreciation tax, 170 land-use tax, 170 Lao Xiaoyi, 47 “last bus” effect, 44 law, organizational, 115–144 Law of the PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public Security, 126 Law on Promoting People-Run Education, 380 Law on Urban Residents’ Committees, 259 laws for civil society, 248–250 legal framework of civil organizations, 333 legally required minimum outlays, 133–134 legal person classification, 91 legal registration of civil organizations, 22 legal responsibilities of social groups, 125–126 legal responsibility of foundations, 136–138 legal status Westernization, 330 legal/supervisory improvements, 51 legal system improvements, 79–82 legal system reconstruction, 91 legislation of civil organizations, 89–92 legitimacy, social vs. legal, 215 Liang Congjie, 376 the Liberation, 274 “life sphere” created by reforms, 273–276, 286 Li Junru, 177 “linking assets to households” system, 44 Lin Zhao, 211 Liu Detian, 47, 375 Li Xueju, 81, 82 loss of community, 242–243 Mao Zedong, 110, 211 market competition, 52 market economic modernization, 241 market economy development, 26–33, 35, 51–52, 255–256 market failures, 38, 38n51 marketization, 60 market society development, 278 Measures for Administration of Foundations, 51

391

Measures on China Youth Volunteer Registration and Administration, 380 Measures on China Youth Volunteers Registration and Administration, 148 Measures on Citizen Participation in Environmental Protection, 227 Measures on Foundation Administration, 21, 22, 79, 374 Measures on Foundation Annual Inspections, 172–173 Measures on Foundation Information Disclosure, 173–174 Measures on Foundations, 103 media/organization relationships, 205 middle class emergence, 328 migrant worker issues/representation, 86, 88, 102 Migrant Workers Management Association, 88 Ministry of Civil Affairs, 21, 22, 74, 180, 191 Ministry of Civil Affairs’ classification system, 9–10 models for civil organization-government relationships, 227–229 models for cooperation in public services, 219–223 morals as law, 242, 243 motivation of government, 353–354 mutual-benefit organizations, 310 mutual-interest organizations, 307 mutual-interest social groups, 309 Narada Foundation, 214 National Federation of the Disabled, 75 National Statistical Society of China, 371 National Tooth Decay Prevention Group, 382 new development amidst social transformations, 26–33 newly-formed model of development, 342–343, 349, 350, 352 New Peoples’ Education and Research Center, 86 NGO-based society. see civil society NGO growth, 256–257 NGO privatization, 260 NGO Research Institute, 378 NGOs (non government organizations), 2, 6–7, 29, 34, 75, 247–250, 251–253, 342–343. see also grassroots organizations NGO social effects, 261–265

392

index

Nine Bay Community Association for the Elderly, 87 nonadministrative model of control, 338–339 non-competitive contracting, 222 non-distrubution constraint, 7 Non-Governmental Organization Women’s Conference, 73 non-government organizations (NGOs). see NGOs (non government organizations) noninterference model of control, 338–339, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352 “non-profitness” degrees, 313–318 Non-Profit Organization (NPO) Information Center, 107 non-profit organizations (NPOs), 6–10, 164–171, 313–318. see also specific organization types non-self interest controls, 7–8 normativism, 246 no support model of development, 345, 349, 351 Notice Concerning Appraising Foundations, 383 Notice Concerning Departmental Leaders and Comrades Not Taking Joint Positions in Social Organizations, 159 Notice Concerning Department Leader Comrades Not Holding Joint Leadership Positions in Social Groups, 376 Notice Concerning Establishing Party Organizations in Social Groups, 378 Notice Concerning Party and Government Leaders and Cadres Not Holding Joint Leadership Positions in Social Organizations, 159 Notice Concerning Strengthening Administration of Rural Cooperative Foundations, 24 Notice Concerning Strengthening People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Administration, 261 Notice Concerning Strengthening Rural Cooperative Foundation Administration, 377 Notice Concerning Strictly Controlling National-Scale Civil Organizations, 373 Notice Concerning the Issue of Approving Central Administration Cadres for Joint Leadership Positions in Social Organizations, 160

Notice Concerning the Issue of Registration and Administration of Social Organizations, 161 Notice Concerning the Strict Control of Nationwide-Level Organizations, 231 NPOs (non profit organizations). see non-profit organizations (NPOs) Nu River Dam incident, 73, 226, 234, 381 Office of Social Group Administration, 374 Olsen, Mancur Lloyd, 41 1kg.org, 235 online civil organizations, 76–77 On the Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim), 242 openness and transparency, 202–203 openness of foundations, 131–132 Opinion Concerning Deepening Reforms of Administrative and Management Systems, 383 Opinion Concerning Reforming Arts Performance Groups, 373 Opinion Concerning Strengthening Party Building Work in Social Groups, 379 oppositions in civil organizations, 203–205 “orderly citizen participation”, 97–99 organizational autonomy, 316–318, 330–331 organizational development models, 341–352, 346 organizational forms of service providers, 257 organizational law, 115–144 organizational-level Westernization, 330–332 organizational models, 302–312, 349–350 organizational relationship-building, 264–265 organizational structure of foundations, 131 organization participation in government decision-making, 223–227 outside study, 208 Overseas Chinese Tea Research and Development Foundation, 17 Owners’ Committee, 75 Oxfam Hong Kong, 29 Panyu Service Department for Peasant Workers Service, 88

index participation by organizations in government decision-making, 223–227 participation definitions, 101 participation inadequacies, 97–102 participatory democracy, 295 part-time employment in social organizations, 158–162 Party control of civil organizations, 280–281 party-government institutional reforms, 45–47 Party reactions toward civil organizations, 281–282 peasants, 43–44 peasant workers rights, 88 people-organized civil organizations, 336–337 people-run non-enterprise units (PRNEUs), 4, 32, 138–141, 201, 261, 262–263, 264, 305–306, 343–344, 358 People’s Bank of China, 24 People’s Congress Representative Work Station, 289–290 People’s groups, 169, 210, 299, 302, 333–335, 342 philanthropy law, 149–150 Plan Concerning Reforming Party and Government Institutions, 376 Plan Concerning Selection of Several Cities for Industry Association Trials, 377 Planned Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, 227 Plenary Sessions of the 16th Central Committee, 80 Political Consultative Conference, 226 political elite, 45–47, 54–55 political institution reforms, 269–271 political life transformation, 272–273 political opposition groups, 312 political reform, social reform-driven, 287–291 political reforms, 269–296 populace household system, 63 popular and elite society integration, 65 poverty alleviation organizations, 322 power structure changes, 271 PRC Associations Law, 180 PRC Environmental Impact Assessment Law, 227 PRC Law on Rural Co-operatives, 142–143 PRC Public-Interest Work Donations Law, 166

393

preliminary plan application approval process, 120 privatization of NGOs, 260 prohibition model of control, 339, 350, 351 Project Candlelight, 31 Project Hope, 31, 73, 375, 380 properties of civil organizations, 7–9, 351–352 Property Rights Law, 382 prospects for good civil society governance, 205–208 Provisional Measures for the implementation of Registration of Social Organizations Rules, 67 Provisional Measures on Banning Illegal Civil Organizations, 379 Provisional Measures on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Administration, 79 Provisional Measures on Punishing Illegal Civil Organizations, 232 Provisional Measures on Social Group Registration, 280 Provisional Measures on Social Group Registration and Administration, 230 Provisional Regulations on Lawyers, 16, 372 Provisional Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration, 378 Provisional Regulations on People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit Registration and Administration, 23, 32, 138–141 Provisional Regulations on People-run Non-enterprise Unit Registration and Administration, 150 Provisional Regulations on Public Institution Registration and Administration, 142 Provisional Regulations on the Management of Foreign Chambers of Commerce, 79 Provisional Rules on Administration of Foreign Commercial Associations, 374 provision function, 351 proxy administration model of control, 338, 349, 350 public choice theory, 34 public governance, 95 public institutions, 142 public-interest activities status, 176 public-interest civil organizations, 306, 308–309, 335–336

394

index

Public Interest Donations Law, 144–145 public-interest orientation, 128 public-interest outlay proportions, 133–134 public-interest social groups, 308 public-interest social organization, 166–167 Public Interest Trust System, 146 public-interest venture capital firms, 235–236 Public-Interest Work Donations Law, 181, 379 public participation of civil organizations, 82–89 public policy advocacy, 223–227 public policy improvements, 79–82 public policy movement, 218–219 public service cooperation, 219–223 public service provision, 260–261 public services movement, 218–219 public sphere concept, 38–41 Putnam, Robert, 252 Qiu Changtai, 198 quasi-first sector organizations, 317, 320 quasi-governmental model of control, 333–335, 349, 350, 352 quasi-second sector organizations, 317, 320 quasi-third sector organizations, 324 quasi-Western third sector organizations, 318, 321 record-keeping system, 82 Red Cross Law, 143, 376 Red Cross Society of China, 75 Red Maple women’s hotlines, 47 reform movement (1970s), 71 reforms, special purpose, 153–177 regional challenges to standardized administration, 106 regional imbalances in organization development, 104 registered civil organization numbers, 13 Regulations on Foundation Administration, 126–138, 160–161, 182, 380 Regulations on Guangdong Industry Associations, 381 Regulations on Implementing Enterprise Income Tax Law, 166 Regulations on Social Group Registration and Administration, 21–23, 79, 116–126, 150, 180, 182, 195, 231, 280–281, 375, 378

Regulations on the Management Foundation, 79 religious organizations, 65, 103, 303, 309, 312, 333–335, 342 Report Concerning the Restoration of the Red Cross’s Domestic Activities, 15 repression function, 351 research framework effectiveness, 360 research institution/organization relationships, 206 resignations and market entries of political elites, 46 resources, freely moving, 327–328 resource structure Westernization, 331 Restored Development Phase, 178–179 results of reforms, 49–50 right of association expansion, 59–108 rights imbalances of associations, 103 Rights of Farmers Association, 85 rights-protection groups, 312, 322 rights-protection movements, 288–290 rise of civil organizations, 14–21 role of Constitution, 115 root-level organizations, 5 Rules and Regulations Phase, 179–181 rules for civil society, 248–250 rural civil organizations, 75 rural cooperative foundations, 24–25 rural cooperatives, 142–143 Rural Credit Cooperative, 378 rural fragmentation, 240–241 rural society, 239–244 Rural Women Cultural Development Center, 188–189 Rural Yan Yangchu College, 86 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) relief work, 86 Save the Children, 29 second sector organizations, 317 secretariat-centered structural relationships, 203 secretary general-led board governance, 199 sector-level Westernization, 329–330 Seidel Foundation, 371 Seismological Society of China, 371 self-efficacy, 253 self-governance of urban communities, 258–260 self-governance of villages, 257–258 self-organized alliances, 206–207 self-regulation of civil organizations, 94 self-used housing, 169 separation of powers, 276

index Service Department for Peasant Workers, 84 service organizations, 59 service provider organizational forms, 257 “setting right” of thinking, 34, 35, 43 Several Opinions Concerning Accelerating and Advancing Development and Reforms of Industry Associations, 382 Several Opinions Concerning Accelerating Fostering and Development of Industry Associations in the Area of Commerce, 379 Several Opinions Relating to Hastening and Accelerating the Reform and Development of Industrial and Commercial Associations, 161, 162 Several Policy Regulations Concerning Township Non-Agricultural Individual Economy, 373 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) relief work, 86 Shanghai Human Resources Consulting Association, 193–194 Shanxi Province Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, 182 Shanxi Women’s Studies Association, 190 Shenzhen Watch Industry Association, 187 social autonomy, 263–264 social capital, 252 social change, state-led, 254–261 social change as driver of political reform, 287–291 social class formation, 53 social fragmentation, 240 Social Group Administration Office, 231 social group articles of incorporation, 121 social group asset management, 122 social group classification, 117 social group credibility, 122–123 social group establishment, 118–120 Social Group Legal Person Registration Certificate, 120 social group legal persons, 201 social group registration modification and cancellation, 121 social group revolution, 278–279 social groups, annual report system, 122 social groups, characteristics of, 306, 308 social groups, defined, 117 social groups, laws normalizing administration of, 116

395

social groups and people-run nonenterprise units from 1988–2007, 12 social groups excepted from registering with the State, 299, 302, 333–335, 342 social group trends, 230 social integration, 242–243, 264–265 social justice advancement, 358 social movements, 287–291 social nature of accountability, 9 social organization dissolution, 69 social organization employment, 158–162 social organization governance, 162–164 social organizations, 4, 6 social organizations, Party control of, 280 social organization taxation, 166–167 social orientation, 8–9 social problems from government control, 93 social product/service orientation, 9 social resources, 8–9 social responsibility, 47–48, 51–52 Social Stability Work Conference, 98 social welfare groups and foundations, 17–20 social workers’ legislation, 149 Society of Entrepreneurs and Ecology (SEE), 188, 214 society rebuilding, 242–244 Soong Ching Ling Foundation, 75, 372 specialized social workers system, 149–151 Spring Buds Program, 31 stakeholder relationship management, 205–207 stamp tax, 170 standardized management, 22–26 Standardized Version of Social Organization Articles of Incorporation, 122, 162–164 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 16 Star Harbor, 235 Stars and Rain, 47 State Council Office for Poverty Alleviation, 222, 223 State Council’s Ministry of Civil Affairs, 150 State Council’s Poverty Alleviation Office, 382 State Environmental Protection Administration, 84, 97 State Family Planning Commission, 84, 97

396

index

State functions, 283 State Institutional Organization Commission, 374 State-led social change, 254–261 State-owned institutions with operations revenue, 304–305 State-run unit model of control, 335–336, 349, 350 State-run units, 342, 358 State-society relationship model, 215–219, 365 status issues for civil organizations, 97 structural characteristics of third sector organizations, 302–312, 319–321 structural relationships, 203–205 structural traditional Chinese characteristics, 355–356 substitution failure, 347–348, 349, 350, 351 Sun Yat-sen, 66 Sun Yefang Foundation, 18 supply and demand. see demand gap supply condition changes, 327–329 support-type organizations, 235–236 sustainability capacity, 208 system reforms concept, 33–38 Tan Zhenlin, 371 taxation, 90, 92 tax benefits, 165–166, 167–168 tax laws, 143–144, 151, 164–171 tax on occupation of arable land, 170 tax reforms tensions over governance structure changes, 200–205 text messaging, 53 Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, 34 third sector, Chinese characteristics of, 332–360 third sector, definitions and frameworks, 298–301 third sector behavioral characteristics, 302, 304, 305, 306, 321–322, 356–357 third sector classification of organizations, 301–312 third sector descriptive framework, 300 third sector explanatory framework, 300–301 third sector functional characteristics, 302–312, 322–324, 357–359 third sector growth, and democratization, 367–369

third sector social environment changes, 327–329 third sector structural characteristics, 302–312, 319–321, 355–356 third sector sytem analysis, 313–318 third sector theory, 298 Tian’anmen Square, 36n50, 179 timeline of civil organizations, 371–383 top-down civil organizations, 212–213, 224–225 totalistic model, 366–367 trade associations, 103 traditional organization resurgence, 104–105 transformation of political life, 272–273 transparency in board governance, 196 triads, 65 Trial of Civil Organization and Government Cooperative Planning for Village Poverty Alleviation, 222, 223 trust law, 146, 379 Tsinghua University Education Foundation, 376 Tsinghua University NGO Research Center, 378 type distribution of third sector organizations, 316 types of civil organizations, 9–10, 75 Union law, 142–143, 375 Union system, 323 United Front Department, 372 United Nations Development Programme, 195 urban community self-governance, 258–260 urban residents’ committees, 304 urban society, 241 value added tax, 168 vehicle and vessel tax, 171 vehicle purchase tax, 171 village-clan society, 275 village committees, 258, 304 Village Organizations Law, 258 Village Poverty Alleviation Planning Project, 382 Village reforms, 35–36 village self-governance, 257–258 village society, 241 virtual communities, 310 volunteer service system, 148–149

index Wang Guoliang, 186 Wang Shaoguang, 278 Wang Xingjuan, 47 Wang Yongchen, 47 Wang Zhen, 373 wealth accumulation, 50–51 wealth disparity, 50–51 Wenzhou Chamber of Commerce system, 104, 106 Western characteristics of third sector, 326 Westernization, organizational-level, 329–330 Westernization, sector-level, 329–330 Westernization of third sector, 319–333 Western Returned Scholars Association, 75 White Lotus Society, 65 Women’s NGO Conference (1995), 30 work unit society, 275 work unit system, 326, 338, 343–344 World and China Institute, 86

397

World Conference on Women (1995), 73 World Summit on Sustainable Development, 83 World Vision, 29, 96 Xiamen PX Project, 234 Xu Dan, 186 Yang Ping, 189 Yang Xin, 47 Yanyangchu Village Construction Institute, 380 YMCA/YWCA, 16, 372 Yuanmingyuan Incident, 226 Yu Luoke, 211 Zhang Jianyu, 196 Zhang Tianwei, 189 Zhang Zhixin, 211 Zhou Enlai, 36n50

Emerging Civil Society in China, 1978-2008 (Social Scientific Studies in Reform Era China)

Culture and Social Transformations in Reform Era China

China's Education Development and Policy, 1978-2008 (Social Scientific Studies in Reform Era China)

Cities in China: Recipes for Economic Development in the Reform Era (Routledge Studies--China in Transition, 7.)

China: higher education reform

Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Harvard Contemporary China Series)

Banking Reform in India and China

The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society

Old age security: pension reform in China

Financial Reform and Economic Development in China

The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949

Urban China in Transition (Studies in Urban and Social Change)

China's Enterprise Reform: Changing State Society Relations After Mao (Routledge Studies in China in Transition, 3)

MIGRATION AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN CHINA (Series on Contemporary China)

Non-Governmental Organisations in Contemporary China Paving the Way to Civil Society? (Routledgecurzon Contemporary China Series)

China's Scientific Elite (Routledgecurzon Studies on China in Transition, 21)

The Democratisation of China (Routledge Studies on China in Transition)

The Consumer Revolution in Urban China (Studies on China, 22)

Voices of the Song Lyric in China (Studies on China)

Society and the Supernatural in Song China

The Social Life of Opium in China

Police Reform in China (Advances in Police Theory and Practice)

Women's Work in Rural China: Change and Continuity in an Era of Reform (Cambridge Modern China Series)

Social Transformation and Private Education in China

Marginalization and Social Welfare in China

Court Life In China

Emerging Civil Society in China, 1978-2008 (Social Scientific Studies in Reform Era China)

Culture and Social Transformations in Reform Era China

China's Education Development and Policy, 1978-2008 (Social Scientific Studies in Reform Era China)

Cities in China: Recipes for Economic Development in the Reform Era (Routledge Studies--China in Transition, 7.)

China: higher education reform

Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Harvard Contemporary China Series)

Banking Reform in India and China

The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society

Old age security: pension reform in China

Financial Reform and Economic Development in China

The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949

Urban China in Transition (Studies in Urban and Social Change)

China's Enterprise Reform: Changing State Society Relations After Mao (Routledge Studies in China in Transition, 3)

MIGRATION AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN CHINA (Series on Contemporary China)

Non-Governmental Organisations in Contemporary China Paving the Way to Civil Society? (Routledgecurzon Contemporary China Series)

China's Scientific Elite (Routledgecurzon Studies on China in Transition, 21)

The Democratisation of China (Routledge Studies on China in Transition)

The Consumer Revolution in Urban China (Studies on China, 22)

Voices of the Song Lyric in China (Studies on China)

Society and the Supernatural in Song China

The Social Life of Opium in China

Police Reform in China (Advances in Police Theory and Practice)

Women's Work in Rural China: Change and Continuity in an Era of Reform (Cambridge Modern China Series)

Social Transformation and Private Education in China

Marginalization and Social Welfare in China

Court Life In China

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