Dunkirk 1940: Operation Dynamo

DUNKIRK 1940

Operation Dynamo

A B O U T T H E A U T H O R A N D ILLUSTRATOR C O L O N E L D O U G L A S C D I L D Y , (USAF Retired), is an Air Force Academy g r a d u a t e w i t h degrees in history a n d political science, w h o a t t e n d e d t h e US A r m e d Forces Staff College a n d USAF Air War College. As part of his formal military e d u c a t i o n he has w r i t t e n several c a m p a i g n studies, most notably o n defensive operations against German invasions early in World War II. He is t h e associate editor o f LOGBOOK magazine and has w r i t t e n several articles for o t h e r American a n d British aviation history magazines. This is his f o u r t h b o o k for Osprey.

H O W A R D G E R R A R D studied at t h e Wallasey School of Art and has been a freelance designer a n d illustrator for over 20 years. He has w o r k e d for a n u m b e r o f publishers a n d is an associate m e m b e r of t h e Guild of Aviation Artists. He has w o n b o t h t h e Society o f British Aerospace Companies Award a n d t h e Wilkinson Sword Trophy a n d has illustrated a large n u m b e r of books for Osprey.

CAMPAIGN • 219

DUNKIRK 1940 Operation

Dynamo

DOUGLAS C DILDY

ILLUSTRATED BY HOWARD GERRARD Series editor

Marcus Cowper

First p u b l i s h e d in G r e a t B r i t a i n in 2 0 1 0 b y O s p r e y P u b l i s h i n g , M i d l a n d H o u s e , W e s t W a y , B o t l e y , O x f o r d 0 X 2 OPH, UK 4 4 - 0 2 2 3 r d St, S u i t e 2 1 9 , L o n g I s l a n d City, NY 1 1 1 0 1 , USA

AUTHOR'S NOTE T h e a u t h o r w o u l d like t o a c k n o w l e d g e his g r a t i t u d e f o r t h e g e n e r o u s s u p p o r t a n d assistance o f several key i n d i v i d u a l s . First a n d f o r e m o s t I o w e a deep debt of thanks to my wife, Ann, whose constant encouragement

E-mail: i n f o @ o s p r e y p u b l i s h i n g . c o m

a n d selfless s u p p o r t t h r o u g h o u t t h e process o f w r i t i n g t h i s c o m p l e x h i s t o r y h a v e b e e n i n d i s p e n s a b l e in h e l p i n g m e see it t o f r u i t i o n . A d d i t i o n a l l y

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I t h a n k M r Peter D. C o r n w e l l n o t o n l y f o r his s u p p o r t o f t h i s p r o j e c t b u t

All r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . A p a r t f r o m a n y fair d e a l i n g f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f p r i v a t e s t u d y , r e s e a r c h , c r i t i c i s m o r r e v i e w , as p e r m i t t e d u n d e r t h e C o p y r i g h t , Designs a n d Patents Act, 1988, no part o f this p u b l i c a t i o n m a y be r e p r o d u c e d , s t o r e d in a r e t r i e v a l s y s t e m , o r t r a n s m i t t e d in a n y f o r m or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, p h o t o c o p y i n g , recording or otherwise, w i t h o u t t h e prior w r i t t e n permission o f t h e c o p y r i g h t o w n e r . Enquiries s h o u l d be addressed t o t h e Publishers.

f o r t h e p r o d u c t s o f his l i f e l o n g q u e s t t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t really h a p p e n e d in t h e skies o f W e s t e r n E u r o p e in 1940. Peter's e x h a u s t i v e research a n d t h o r o u g h analysis h a v e f i n a l l y s w e p t aside t h e veil o f m y t h , p r o p a g a n d a a n d m i s i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g air c o m b a t o v e r France a n d Britain in t h a t p i v o t a l year, a n d I t h a n k h i m f o r a l l o w i n g m e t o use his c o m p r e h e n s i v e d a t a t o p o r t r a y a c c u r a t e l y t h e air b a t t l e s a b o v e D u n k i r k . S i m i l a r l y M r D o n K i n d e l l is t o b e t h a n k e d f o r t h e g e n e r o u s use o f his m e t i c u l o u s l y c o m p i l e d a n d e x c e p t i o n a l l y d e t a i l e d d a t a b a s e British and Other Navies in World War 2 Day by Day (see at w w w . n a v a l - h i s t o r y . n e t / x D K W W 2 - 3 9 0 0 l n t r o . h t m ) .

A CIP c a t a l o g u e r e c o r d f o r t h i s b o o k is a v a i l a b l e f r o m t h e British L i b r a r y .

M y t h a n k s , t o o , t o n o t e d h i s t o r i a n Dr D o n A l b e r t s f o r his critical r e v i e w , corrections and suggestions. Finally, I a m also i n d e b t e d t o a n u m b e r o f e x p e r t s w h o assisted in l o c a t i n g

ISBN: 9 7 8 1 8 4 6 0 3 4 5 7 2

p h o t o s necessary t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s b o o k p r o p e r l y . First, t o Ian Boyle f o r

E - b o o k ISBN: 9 7 8 1 8 4 9 0 8 2 6 4 8

his p r o v i s i o n o f p o s t c a r d s s h o w i n g t h e c r o s s - C h a n n e l s t e a m e r s w h i c h p r o v e d so c r u c i a l t o Dynamo's

E d i t o r i a l b y llios P u b l i s h i n g L t d , O x f o r d , UK ( w w w . i l i o s p u b l i s h i n g . c o m ) Page l a y o u t b y : T h e Black S p o t

success (see t h e Ian B o y l e C o l l e c t i o n at

w w w . s i m p l o n p c . c o . u k ) a n d t o T o m L a e m l e i n f o r his i n f o r m a t i o n a n d i m a g e s o f t h e P z K p f w 35(t) in a c t i o n a t Cassel (see T o m ' s w o r k at w w w . a r m o r p l a t e p r e s s . c o m ) . As a l w a y s t h e I m p e r i a l W a r M u s e u m ' s (IWM)

I n d e x b y F i n e l i n e E d i t o r i a l Services

p h o t o g r a p h i c a r c h i v e staff h a v e p r o v e n e x c e p t i o n a l l y h e l p f u l in l o c a t i n g

T y p e s e t in M y r i a d Pro a n d S a b o n

m a n y s p e c i f i c i m a g e s r e l a t i n g t o Dynamo.

Maps by Bounford.com

C h i e f a m o n g t h e s e are Laura

C l o u t i n g , R o s a n n a W i l k i n s o n a n d Ian P r o c t o r . A t t h e N a t i o n a l P o r t r a i t

3 D b i r d ' s - e y e v i e w s b y T h e Black S p o t

Gallery, I t h a n k M r M a t t h e w Bailey f o r p r o v i d i n g i m a g e s n o t a v a i l a b l e f r o m

Battlescene illustrations by H o w a r d Gerrard

I W M . Finally, t o p r o v i d e i m p o r t a n t i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f F r e n c h p e r s o n a l i t i e s ,

O r i g i n a t e d b y PPS G r a s m e r e L t d

I t h a n k M m e S o p h i e Massis f o r her t r a n s l a t i o n assistance a n d J o a n

P r i n t e d in C h i n a t h r o u g h W o r l d p r i n t L t d .

B o u l a n g e at t h e E t a b l i s s e m e n t d e C o m m u n i c a t i o n e t d e P r o d u c t i o n A u d i o v i s u e l l e d e la D e f e n s e . As w i t h O p e r a t i o n Dynamo

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itself, t h i s p r o j e c t

c o u l d n o t have been c o m p l e t e d w i t h o u t t h e c o m b i n e d efforts of m a n y

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p e o p l e a n d t o each of t h e m I give m y thanks.

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h u g e c o l l e c t i o n s w h i c h c o v e r all a s p e c t s o f c o n f l i c t i n v o l v i n g Britain a n d t h e C o m m o n w e a l t h s i n c e t h e start o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . T h e s e r i c h r e s o u r c e s are a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e t o s e a r c h , b r o w s e a n d b u y at w w w . i w m c o l l e c t i o n s . o r g . u k . In a d d i t i o n t o C o l l e c t i o n s O n l i n e , y o u can visit t h e Visitor Rooms w h e r e y o u can explore over 8 million p h o t o g r a p h s , t h o u s a n d s o f h o u r s o f m o v i n g i m a g e s , t h e largest s o u n d

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CONTENTS ORIGINS OF T H E C A M P A I G N

5

CHRONOLOGY

8

OPPOSING C O M M A N D E R S Allied commanders

11

- German commanders

OPPOSING FORCES

15

Allied forces - German forces - Orders of battle

OPPOSING PLANS O p e r a t i o n Dynamo

27

. The German plan to deal w i t h the Dunkirk pocket

T H E CAMPAIGN

32

T h e race is o n , S u n d a y 2 6 M a y . T h e P a n z e r s r o l l , M o n d a y 2 7 M a y The Belgians surrender, Tuesday 28 May . The L u f t w a f f e strikes, W e d n e s d a y 29 May T h e P a n z e r s t u r n a w a y , T h u r s d a y 3 0 M a y . T h e b i g g e s t d a y , F r i d a y 31 M a y The L u f t w a f f e ' s last c h a n c e , S a t u r d a y 1 J u n e . T h e F r e n c h f i g h t o n , S u n d a y 2 J u n e T h e British are g o n e , 3 a n d 4 J u n e

AFTERMATH

86

T H E BATTLEFIELD T O D A Y

90

FURTHER R E A D I N G

92

INDEX

95

ORIGINS OF T H E CAMPAIGN We have been defeated...

We are beaten;

we have lost the

battle.

French Premier Paul Reynaud to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 0730hrs, 15 May 1940

O n l y f o u r days after H e i n z Guderian's Panzers crossed the G e r m a n frontier and descended i n t o the d a r k forests o f the Ardennes they emerged at Sedan, b r o k e t h r o u g h French defences, and - surprisingly - t u r n e d t o w a r d s the Channel coast. Never i n the h i s t o r y o f w a r f a r e h a d a c a m p a i g n between such great a n d apparently equal forces been decided so s w i f t l y and conclusively as the G e r m a n conquest o f France a n d the L o w Countries i n M a y and June o f 1 9 4 0 . I n the N e t h e r l a n d s G e n e r a l der A r t i l l e r i e G e o r g v o n K i i c h l e r ' s A r m e e o b e r k o m m a n d o ( A O K ) 18 s u b d u e d the D u t c h A r m y a n d o c c u p i e d 'Fortress H o l l a n d ' i n five days o f h a r d f i g h t i n g . Against Belgium a n d the cream o f the A l l i e s ' m o b i l e armies - the B r i t i s h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force (BEF) a n d the French l e r e a n d 7e Armees - the t w o Panzer, one m o t o r i z e d a n d 16 i n f a n t r y divisions o f Generaloberst W a l t e r v o n Reichenau's A O K 6 crossed the M a a s a n d clashed w i t h French l i g h t mechanized divisions i n the G e m b l o u x G a p . M e a n w h i l e , m o v i n g stealthily t h r o u g h the d a r k hills o f the Ardennes i n southern B e l g i u m were three Panzer corps spearheaded by General der Panzertruppen H e i n z W. Guderian's X I X Armeekorps (motorisiert) ( A K (mot.)). Practically undetected these appeared o n the banks o f the Meuse River at Sedan,

RIGHT

A 4-ton lightly a r m o u r e d British Universal Carrier, t o w i n g an Ordnance QF 2-pdr Mk IX antitank g u n , being w e l c o m e d by Belgian civilians as they drive t h r o u g h Herseaux on their way t o positions on t h e Dyle Line. (IWM F4345) LEFT

Meanwhile, t h r o u g h t h e Ardennes Forest seven German armoured divisions m o v e d steadily and stealthily towards the Meuse River. T w o of these were e q u i p p e d w i t h confiscated Czech-built Skoda tanks, such as t h e PzKpfw 35(t) light tank, seen here w a i t i n g in a w o o d near Mayen before the o p e n i n g of the offensive. (Courtesy of t h e T o m Laemlein Collection)

Montherme and Dinant. After the Panzers blasted an 80km-wide (50-mile) breach in the French line, Guderian wheeled to the west while the French 2e Armee recoiled to the south. Consequently, the way was opened for Guderian's X I X , Reinhardt's X L I and Hoth's X V AK (mot.) to charge headlong across Picardy, brushing aside the Allies' scattered and weak rear-area units in their pell-mell dash to the English Channel. The French shared very few details of this unfolding disaster at the time. But in response General d'armee Gaston H. G. Billotte, commanding the Allies' Groupe d'armees 1, ordered the three Allied armies in Belgium to withdraw from the Dyle to the Senne, to the Dendre and then to the Escaut in an effort to keep the Panzers from curving in behind their now-open right flank and exposed rear areas. Around midnight on 18/19 May, Gen. Billotte visited the BEF's commander, General Lord Gort, and finally informed him in some detail of the Panzer breakthrough and the fact that 'nine, or probably ten, German armoured divisions' were plunging into the rear areas, apparently headed for the Somme Estuary. Realizing that he would soon be boxed in on both sides with his back to the sea, the veteran warhorse read the situation accurately and informed the War Cabinet via dispatch that he had three possible options: 1) continue to hold the Escaut Line and await re-establishment of his lines of communication through anticipated Allied counterattacks, 2) withdraw to the Somme to join the new French armies forming there, or 3) withdraw towards the Channel ports upon which his new lifeline depended. To explore the third contingency, at 0600hrs that Sunday morning, six of Gort's senior staff officers met to begin discussing the feasibility of a retreat to the coast. The duty of developing the concept of operations fell to acting operations officer Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Bridgeman who immediately went to work on it. Working all night and subsisting on chocolate and whiskey, Bridgeman devised a sensible, straightforward and relatively simple plan to fall back to the coast and evacuate from the ports between Boulogne and Zeebrugge. While the War Cabinet still insisted that Gort 'move southwards upon Amiens... and take station on the left of the French Army' they allowed that even if the ordered movement southwards was successful, there would still be units needing evacuation from the Channel ports. As a precautionary measure, therefore, Vice Admiral Bertram H. Ramsay, Flag Officer Commanding Dover, was instructed to assemble the shipping required and begin the planning for evacuating large numbers of British troops. On 21 May the new commandant supreme des armees alliees (Supreme Allied Commander), 73-year-old General d'armee Maxime Weygand, flew from Paris to visit the commanders of the armies trapped in the 'northern pocket' at Ypres and present his 'plan' for pinching off the German armoured spearhead through simultaneous attacks from the south and the north, thus reuniting the Allied armies. To lead the attack, the BEF was required to pull three divisions out of the line and position them for the advance to the south. In the meantime, the situation on the western side of the pocket was becoming grave. Within the next 36 hours the 2. Panzer-Division invested Boulogne, the 10. Panzer-Division appeared before Calais and the 1. PanzerDivision had driven across the Aa Canal facing Bourbourg, only 16km (10 miles) from Dunkirk. Also on the Aa Canal the 6. Panzer-Division arrived at Saint-Omer and forced a crossing there and the 8. Panzer-Division was advancing on Aire. At the south end of the line Arras was now invested

on three sides and west of the city Rommel's 7. Panzer-Division had crossed the Scarpe, pushing the 3e Division legere mecanique off the heights behind it. On the eastern side ten infantry divisions of Generaloberst Fedor von Bock's Heeresgruppe B assaulted the Belgians and pushed them back all along the 21km (13-mile) line between Menin and Desselghem, threatening to open a gap on the BEF's left flank near Courtrai. Lieutenant-General Alan F. Brooke, commanding II Corps, was alarmed and demanded reinforcements. As an extra precaution Lt. Col. Bridgeman was ordered to revise the draft evacuation plan, especially now that Boulogne and Calais were unavailable for embarkation. Bridgeman's 'second edition' foresaw the BEF retreating along three parallel routes to the coast and being lifted from the 43km (27 miles) of beaches between Dunkirk and Ostend. On 25 M a y the strategic situation for the BEF went from grave to desperate. This was occasioned first by the news that at least two divisions would be needed to plug the 13km-wide (8-mile) hole currently being blasted in the end of the Belgian line. Later Gort learned that the planned attacks from the south had been cancelled and the French were instead establishing a linear defence along the Somme, abandoning the prospect of re-linking the two halves of the Allied armies. At 1730hrs he was informed that the French commitment to the northern forces' southwards attack was reduced to merely one division, dooming it to failure. Confronted by all these factors, Lord Gort made the most momentous decision of his long and illustrious military career, and one - flying in the face of guidance from his civilian masters and military superiors - that was most fateful for the future of the British Army and his nation. After an hour of personal deliberations, he ordered the next day's attack to the south cancelled and the 5th and 50th Divisions moved north to close the breach on the north end of his eastern front, thus denying the Germans an unchallenged advance to Dunkirk and thereby protecting the BEF's avenue of retreat.

7

CHRONOLOGY

1939

1 September

Germany invades Poland, beginning World War I I .

3 September

Britain and France declare war on Germany.

10 September

17 September

12 March

Finland accepts Soviet terms, ending the Winter War.

20 March

General d'armee Gamelin, Supreme Allied Commander, adopts 'Breda Variant' of the Dyle Plan designed to meet the German invasion in Belgium while the Maginot Line holds the French frontier.

21 March

Paul Reynaud replaces Daladier as French premier following the failed Allied efforts to aid Finland.

9 April

Germany invades Denmark and Norway. Denmark capitulates that morning. Norwegian capital Oslo and five major ports are occupied.

2/3 May

British forces sent to defend Norway are defeated in detail and evacuated from Andalsnes and Namsos.

9 May

Chamberlain resigns following the failure of British intervention in Norway. Winston Churchill named Prime Minister of Britain the next day.

10 May

Fall Gelb - German invasion of the West - begins.

11 May

BEF and French lere Armee arrive at their positions along the Dyle Line.

12 May

Battle of Gembloux - German Panzers clash with French armoured cavalry in central Belgium.

British Expeditionary Force (BEF) begins arriving in France. The Soviet Union invades Poland from the east.

27 September

Warsaw surrenders.

9 October

Hitler's War Directive No. 6 orders the O K H to begin planning for the invasion of France and the Low Countries.

19 October

The O K H produces Aufmarschanweisung Fall Gelb

(Deployment Directive Case Yellow) for the Western offensive. Revised version produced ten days later. 30 November

The Soviet Union attacks Finland. The Allies begin planning to aid Finland, through Norway and Sweden if necessary.

1940 18 February

8

Generalmajor Franz Haider delivers to Hitler a completely rewritten draft O K H plan placing the Scbwerpunkt (main weight) of the attack through the Ardennes.

1 3 / 1 4 May

Battle o fSedan - Guderian breaks

2 3 May

Rear G H Q isevacuated t h r o u g h B o u l o g n e . B E F placed o nhalf rations.

t h r o u g h French defences. French forces w i t h d r a w precipitously, a n d three Panzer corps head for the coast.

2 3 - 2 6 May

T h e 10. Panzer-Division invests Calais: the 3 0 t h Brigade iso r d e r e d t oh o l d t o

1 4 May

The Netherlands capitulates.

1 7 - 1 9 May

General de brigade d e Gaulle's

the last. T h e g a r r i s o n ( 3 , 5 0 0 British and 16,500 French troops)

feeble a r m o u r e d

counterattacks

have n oeffect o n the G e r m a n

2 4 May

The O K H orders Heeresgruppe A to halt along the Canal Line.

'drive t othe sea'. 1 8 May

surrenders

o n the 26th.

BEF G H Q orders non-essential

2 5 May

Belgian line ispierced near C o u r t r a i , t h r e a t e n i n g B E F left f l a n k , a n d G o r t

personnel evacuated.

orders t w o divisions t oplug the gap. 1 9 May

BEF, French lere A r m e e and Belgians

French General d'armee

establish a n e w defensive line o n

Besson ( G r o u p e d'armees 3 ) cancels

the Scheldt/Escaut River. R e y n a u d

counterattack f r o m the south.

dismisses G a m e l i n , appoints G e n .

D u n k i r k isdevastated b y heavy

W e y g a n d as t h e S u p r e m e

Luftwaffe attacks.

Commander

Antoine

of Allied Forces. First discussion between BEF G H Q and W a r Office

2 6 May

General d'armee Blanchard orders

regarding possibility o f retreat

retirement t oa large perimeter

to Dunkirk.

Dunkirk. A t1857hrs Dynamo

2 0 May

around

Operation

ordered t ocommence. T h e

Guderian destroys most o f British

O b e r k o m m a n d o des H e e r e s

12th and 23rd Divisions

orders Heeresgruppe A t o resume

(ill-equipped

(OKH)

the offensive

L O C troops) a t Albert, Amiens and Abbeville. Reaching English Channel at Noyelles, Panzers cut off all A l l i e d forces i nthe n o r t h . D o v e r

2 7 May

O p e r a t i o n Dynamo

begins; 7,669

troops saved. Luftwaffe

Command

destroys D u n k i r k

planning for evacuation o f British

completely

harbour.

forces f r o m C h a n n e l ports begins. 2 8 May 2 1 May

2 2 May

Belgian A r m y surrenders. A t D u n k i r k

BEF armoured spoiling attack a t

1 7 , 8 0 4 t r o o p s rescued. H i t l e r signs

Arras. B E F air c o m p o n e n t evacuates

d e p l o y m e n t d i r e c t i v e f o r Fall Rot. I n

to England.

N o r w a y , Allied forces retake N a r v i k .

Churchill meets w i t h R e y n a u d and

2 9 May

Luftwaffe launches ' m a x i m u m

effort'

endorses W e y g a n d Plan for closing

sinks 2 5vessels. K r i e g s m a r i n e sinks

breach between Arras and Peronne.

t w o R N destroyers. French

Panzergruppe Kleist is transferred

joins i nthe evacuation: 4 7 , 3 1 0 troops

to Kluge's A O K 4; Guderian's

s a v e d . D e p l o y m e n t d i r e c t i v e Fall Rot

Army

Panzers advance o n Boulogne

is d i s t r i b u t e d , r e a l i g n m e n t o f

and Calais.

Wehrmacht commands

begins

a n d Panzers are w i t h d r a w n 2 2 - 2 5 May

f r o m operations against D u n k i r k .

T h e 2 .Panzer-Division invests Boulogne; the 20th Guards Brigade is e v a c u a t e d b y s e a o n t h e 2 3 / 2 4 t h ;

3 0 May

Bad weather prevents Luftwaffe

4,368 m e n saved. T h e remnant

interference; 53,823 troops evacuated.

of French 21e Division

Kriegsmarine sinks one French destroyer

d'infanterie

holds out until the 25th.

a n d severely damages a second. 9

31 May

French lere Armee surrenders at Lille, 35,000 troops captured. Biggest day for Dynamo, 68,014 troops rescued.

4 June

Last night of Dynamo-, 26,175 French troops saved; later that day 40,000 French troops surrender.

1 June

Weather clear; Luftwaffe's biggest day; one French and three R N destroyers and 27 other vessels sunk. 64,429 troops evacuated.

4-7 June

Evacuation of Allied forces from Narvik.

5 June

Fall Rot - final conquest of France - begins.

22 June

France signs Armistice with Germany, the battle of France is over, the Battle of Britain is about to begin.

2 June

26,256 troops saved. Evacuation of BEF complete.

3 June

10

26,746 French troops evacuated. Luftwaffe launches Operation Paula, a maximum offensive against French air forces around Paris.

OPPOSING C O M M A N D E R S J have no confidence

in his leadership.

When it came to handling

a large force, he seemed incapable

of seeing

the

wood for the trees. L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l A l a n F. B r o o k e c o m m e n t i n g o n his c o m m a n d e r , General L o r d G o r t , BEF C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f

ALLIED C O M M A N D E R S

General Lord Gort, o n t h e occasion of being awarded t h e French grand croix de la Legion d'honneur by General d'armee Alphonse-Joseph Georges, Commander of Allied Forces North-western France, on 8 January 1940. (IWM F2088)

B o r n J o h n Standish Surtees Prendergast Vereker i n I r e l a n d i n 1 8 8 6 , the leader o f the B r i t i s h forces i n France succeeded his f a t h e r t o peerage as the 6 t h V i s c o u n t G o r t o f L i m e r i c k i n 1 9 0 2 a n d entered the B r i t i s h a r m y as L o r d G o r t . T h r e e years later, after c o m p l e t i n g his e d u c a t i o n at H a r r o w , he was commissioned i n the Grenadier Guards. D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I he served as an operations officer o n the G H Q staff before r e t u r n i n g t o the f r o n t lines w h e r e he c o m m a n d e d the 4 t h , t h e n the 1st B a t t a l i o n s o f the G r e n a d i e r G u a r d s . W o u n d e d f o u r times he was a w a r d e d the V i c t o r i a Cross a n d t w o D i s t i n g u i s h e d Service O r d e r s . A large b u r l y m a n , L o r d G o r t h a d the w e l l - e a r n e d r e p u t a t i o n o f being indestructible a n d h a d the i n s p i r i n g visage o f a b o r n fighter. For these reasons, i n 1 9 3 7 w h e n theatrical Secretary o f State f o r W a r Isaac Leslie Hore-Belisha the ' n e w b r o o m i n the W a r O f f i c e ' - w a n t e d renewed interest i n the B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y , G o r t was selected ahead o f m o r e senior officers t o become the n e w Chief o f the I m p e r i a l General Staff (CIGS). T h e p o s i t i o n came w i t h a p r o m o t i o n t o f u l l general a n d since G o r t h a d been a lieutenant-general f o r o n l y t w o m o n t h s , the m o r e senior m e n he was ' j u m p e d ' over were quite n a t u r a l l y p i q u e d . These i n c l u d e d General Sir W i l l i a m E d m u n d Ironside, Lieutenant-General A l a n Brooke a n d Lieutenant-General J o h n G . D i l l . A d d i n g i n s u l t t o i n j u r y , I r o n s i d e was o r i g i n a l l y slated t o c o m m a n d the BEF, b u t at the last m i n u t e Hore-Belisha a p p o i n t e d G o r t instead, a n d the Viscount's t w o subordinate corps c o m m a n d e r s were B r o o k e a n d D i l l ! Consequently L o r d Gort's image suffered grievously f r o m these disaffected officers (even t h o u g h I r o n s i d e a n d D i l l were soon p r o p e r l y placed as C I G S a n d V i c e - C I G S ) , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h r o u g h the disingenuous characterizations by the a m b i t i o u s , a r r o g a n t a n d c o n t e m p t u o u s L t . G e n . B r o o k e , w h o was j o i n e d by others once things began g o i n g bad f o r the BEF. Subsequently, i n large p a r t o w i n g t o the disparaging references by these officers, L o r d G o r t is described by m a n y historians as unimaginative, preoccupied w i t h minutiae and n o t particularly inspiring. Nevertheless, G o r t p r o v e d t o be a decisive leader w i t h a keen eye f o r discerning - amidst the chaos a n d c o n f u s i o n o f c o m b a t - the c r i t i c a l element and ultimate a i m , a n d h a d the tireless d e t e r m i n a t i o n needed t o see things t h r o u g h , even if his methods were entirely c o n v e n t i o n a l . 11

LEFT Vice Admiral Bertram H o m e Ramsay. (Associated Press via I W M H U 5 7 2 7 1 )

W h i l e i t w a s L o r d G o r t ' s f o r t h r i g h t decision a n d dogged d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t saved the BEF f r o m d e s t r u c t i o n , its actual deliverance came t h r o u g h the m a s t e r f u l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l skills a n d e x e m p l a r y leadership o f Flag O f f i c e r D o v e r : V i c e A d m i r a l B e r t r a m H o m e R a m s a y . Son o f a Hussars officer,

CENTRE

R a m s a y j o i n e d the R o y a l N a v y i n 1 8 9 8 , b e c o m i n g a m i d s h i p m a n a b o a r d

French Vice-amiral Jean Abrial.

H M S CRESENT o n the N o r t h A m e r i c a n a n d West Indies S t a t i o n . V i g o r o u s ,

(ECPA Photo Marine 2693765/Gattegrio)

athletic a n d an ardent s p o r t s m a n , Ramsay easily overcame his rather slight b u i l d w i t h energy, intelligence a n d self-confidence. D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I

RIGHT

he held successful c o m m a n d s o f the m o n i t o r M - 2 5 a n d destroyer H M S BROKE

General de corps d'armee

i n the c r a c k D o v e r P a t r o l a n d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Second O s t e n d R a i d ,

M. B. Alfred Fagalde, w i t h Major-General Sir Victor M o r v e n Fortune, inspecting t h e 51st (Highland) Division's 8th Bn. The G o r d o n Highlanders at Bethune on 25 February 1940. (IWM F2743)

b e i n g m e n t i o n e d i n dispatches. A f t e r the w a r he was p r o m o t e d r a p i d l y , b e c o m i n g K i n g George V's n a v a l aide de c a m p ( A D C ) a n d f i n a l l y the H o m e Fleet C h i e f o f Staff. R e t i r i n g as a rear a d m i r a l i n December 1938 over a dispute w i t h his boss, H o m e Fleet C o m m a n d e r A d m i r a l Sir Roger Backhouse, nine m o n t h s later Ramsay was recalled as 'Flag Officer i n Charge, D o v e r ' because o f his extensive k n o w l e d g e o f C h a n n e l operations. W h e n t h a t subordinate echelon o f the N o r e C o m m a n d was elevated t o c o e q u a l status, R a m s a y was p r o m o t e d t o vice a d m i r a l , r e p o r t i n g directly t o the B o a r d o f A d m i r a l t y . A t the age o f 5 7 , Ramsay still possessed boundless energy, was a c o o l , deliberate, i n n o v a t i v e

and

implacable leader w i t h considerable administrative acumen a n d vast experience i n his area o f responsibility. C o m m a n d i n g a l l F r e n c h units - a r m y as w e l l as n a v a l - a l o n g the French coast was 6 1 - y e a r - o l d V i c e - a m i r a l Jean-Charles A b r i a l , c o m m o n l y k n o w n by his p o s i t i o n : A m i r a l N o r d . B o r n i n R e a l m o n t , near T o u l o u s e , A b r i a l entered the F r e n c h N a v y as a cadet i n 1 8 9 6 . N o t e d f o r his successes h u n t i n g U-boats d u r i n g W o r l d W a r I , a f t e r w a r d s he rose r a t h e r r a p i d l y t h r o u g h the r a n k s , b e i n g p r o m o t e d t o VICE-AMIRAL

i n 1 9 3 6 a n d c o m m a n d i n g the 3e R e g i o n

M a r i t i m e (the c o a s t a l defence area a l o n g France's M e d i t e r r a n e a n shore) at T o u l o n t h r o u g h 1 9 3 8 . I n D e c e m b e r the n e x t year he was a p p o i n t e d t o the Forces M a r i t i m e s d u N o r d , w h i c h was h e a d q u a r t e r e d at D u n k i r k a n d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the defence o f the F r e n c h C h a n n e l coast. W h i l e n o t as d y n a m i c a n d f a r - s i g h t e d as R a m s a y , A b r i a l w a s c o n f i d e n t , aggressive a n d d e t e r m i n e d t o ' h o l d o n t o D u n k i r k t i l l the last m a n a n d the last r o u n d ' . 12

AbriaPs subordinate land forces commander was General de corps d'armee M . B. Alfred Fagalde. An infantry officer, Fagalde benefited well from his mastery of English, having seen considerable service in World War I as a liaison officer with the first BEF beginning in 1914 and by the end of the Great War was sent to London as the French military attache. His experience with British troops and relationships with British officers made him appreciate that especially at this stage in the defeat of France - complete alignment of aims was the only means of survival. Originally a corps commander within General d'armee Giraud's 7e Armee, Fagalde had advanced to the Scheldt Estuary in the opening days of the campaign, and when this army was disbanded, his 16e Corps d'armee was left holding the far north end of the Belgian line, between Antwerp and the sea, and was largely intact having seen little in the way of German attacks. On 24 May, Fagalde's corps was assigned to Vice-amiral Abrial's Forces Maritimes du Nord, giving him command of all French Army forces in the area. Upon learning that the BEF was falling back to Dunkirk, Fagalde was pleased that he would be working with Lord Gort.

General der Artillerie Georg v o n Kuchler eventually c o m m a n d e d all German g r o u n d forces t h r o w n against

GERMAN

COMMANDERS

In the end, the fate of the BEF, the French lere Armee and the Belgians would lie in the hands of two German officers: General der Artillerie Georg von Kuchler and Generalmajor Wolfram von Richthofen. Kuchler eventually was given command of the German ground forces attempting to eliminate the Allies ensconced in the Dunkirk Perimeter and Richthofen was charged with destroying them from the air. Scion of a Junker family, Kuchler was a Prussian Army officer through and through. Commissioned in 1901 as a Leutnant in the artillery, he had an excellent combat record throughout World War I and by 1918 was a member of the elite GroSer Generalstab (Greater German General Staff - dissolved in the Treaty of Versailles). Continuing a steady rise under the Weimar Republic, by 1934 he commanded the 1. Infanterie-Division in East Prussia. Two years later, as a Generalleutnant and Inspector General of the service academies, he caught Hitler's eye and in turn became an ardent supporter. Against Poland, he led A O K 3 - advancing out of East Prussia as part of Bock's Heeresgruppe N o r d (see Campaign 107: Poland 1939 by Steven J . Z a l o g a , Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2002) and was awarded the Ritterkreuz (Knight's Cross) for his successes. A highly professional officer - if somewhat unkempt - he was an effective leader and efficient administrator who, especially with his combat experience and thorough knowledge in the employment of artillery supporting infantry, was the best choice for finally smashing the fortified perimeter of the Dunkirk beachhead. According to Goring's boasts it would never come to that, for the insolent and impudent British and French forces 'trapped' at Dunkirk were to be obliterated by the fearsome Stuka dive-bombers of Wolfram von Richthofen's VIII Fliegerkorps. Cousin of the famous 'Red Baron' ace of World War I, Richthofen began his military career as a cavalry officer, seeing action on both fronts before transferring to the Imperial German air service. Becoming a fighter pilot in March 1918, he served in Jasta 11 (his cousin's unit) under Goring, scoring eight aerial victories. After the war he earned a degree in aeronautical engineering from the Technical University of Hanover and a PhD

t h e Dunkirk perimeter. (IWM MH10679)

Generalmajor W o l f r a m v o n Richthofen. Generalfeldmarschall Erich v o n Manstein said Richthofen was 'the most o u t s t a n d i n g air force leader w e had in W o r l d War II'. (IWM HU55040)

13

f r o m the U n i v e r s i t y o f B e r l i n . By the t i m e G o r i n g b r o u g h t the e m b r y o n i c L u f t w a f f e i n t o the o p e n , v o n R i c h t h o f e n was an Oberst i n the Technical Bureau a n d i n 1 9 3 6 he w e n t t o Spain w i t h the C o n d o r L e g i o n rising f r o m chief o f staff t o c o m m a n d e r i n t w o years. R e t u r n i n g t o G e r m a n y i n M a y 1939 as a Generalmajor he h a d perfected the use o f air p o w e r i n c o o r d i n a t e d , close s u p p o r t o f g r o u n d t r o o p s i n the attack. G i v e n c o m m a n d o f a 'special-purpose air d i v i s i o n ' i n w h i c h m o s t o f the L u f t w a f f e ' s Stuka Gruppen w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d , R i c h t h o f e n s u p p o r t e d the Panzers o v e r r u n n i n g P o l a n d i n September a n d , t o w a r d s the end o f t h a t m o n t h , was responsible f o r the near destruction o f W a r s a w f r o m the air. Later designated V I I I F l i e g e r k o r p s , his was a m o b i l e a n d flexible c o m m a n d and i n Fall Gelb {Case Yellow', the p l a n f o r the i n v a s i o n o f France a n d the L o w C o u n t r i e s ) R i c h t h o f e n used i t h a n d i l y i n first s u p p o r t i n g Reichenau's A O K 6 p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o B e l g i u m before s h i f t i n g south t o s u p p o r t Guderian's crossing o f the M e u s e at Sedan a n d t h e n p r o v i d i n g ' f l y i n g a r t i l l e r y ' f o r the Panzer c o l u m n s c h a r g i n g across Picardy. A w a r d e d the R i t t e r k r e u z o n 23 M a y , he r e t u r n e d t o his H Q t o begin p l a n n i n g strikes against the A l l i e d defenders at B o u l o g n e a n d C a l a i s , F r e n c h forces at L i l l e a n d t h e i r c o u n t e r a t t a c k s at A m i e n s , a n d - eventually - against D u n k i r k itself.

14

OPPOSING FORCES / must not conceal from you that a great part of the BEF and its equipment

will inevitably

be lost.

BEF Commander Lord Gort to Secretary of State for War Anthony Eden, 26 May 1940

ALLIED F O R C E S The British

A convoy of lorries loaded w i t h troops make their way t h r o u g h a Belgian t o w n d u r i n g their retreat f r o m t h e Dyle Line. Unlike most French formations, the units of t h e BEF were largely motorized a l l o w i n g for battlefield m o v e m e n t s that were faster than b o t h their German adversaries and their French allies. (IWM F4396)

By 10 M a y 1 9 4 0 , the British h a d deployed 13 i n f a n t r y divisions (three o f t h e m f o r l i n e - o f - c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ( L O C ) duties a n d h a l f the rest reservist T e r r i t o r i a l A r m y units) a n d a t a n k brigade t o France as the BEF. O n t h a t date nine o f these h a d advanced i n a f r o n t three divisions w i d e t o take u p positions a l o n g 2 7 k m (17 miles) o f the D y l e River f r o m L o u v a i n t o W a v r e . A f t e r r e b u f f i n g the G e r m a n I V a n d X I A K o f Reichenau's A O K 6, the B r i t i s h were shocked t o learn o f the G e r m a n b r e a k t h r o u g h s at Sedan a n d D i n a n t a n d the need t o f a l l back t o the Escaut a n d later the Lys River. After over t w o weeks o f fighting and retreating, o n 2 6 M a y , the once-mighty A l l i e d armies i n Flanders h a d been h a m m e r e d i n t o a r o u g h boot-shaped pocket. T h e back o f the b o o t c o n f o r m e d t o the coastline f r o m Zeebrugge t o Gravelines a n d the f r o n t was f o r m e d by the Lys River as far as M e n i n . Except f o r the t o p end o f this line held by p a r t o f Fagalde's 16e C o r p s d'armee, this 9 0 k m (56-mile) f r o n t was m a n n e d by the beleaguered Belgian A r m y . T h e 6 7 k m - l o n g (42-mile) instep was held by a p o r t i o n o f the BEF - f o u r divisions (1st, 3 r d , 4 t h a n d 4 2 n d ) w i t h t w o m o r e ( 5 t h a n d 5 0 t h ) being sent t o backstop the flagging Belgian right f l a n k - as far south as Bourghelles (on the French-Belgian border). T h e French l e r e A r m e e m a n n e d the swollen toe o f the b o o t , their lines l o o p i n g south along the river Sensee t o end o n the H a u t e Deule C a n a l n o r t h o f D o u a i . T h e sole o f the b o o t f o l l o w e d the chain o f canals f r o m D o u a i t o Gravelines, ostensibly covered by f o u r B r i t i s h divisions ( 2 n d , 4 4 t h , 4 6 t h a n d 4 8 t h ) w i t h the n o r t h e r n end - f r o m Gravelines t h r o u g h W a t t e n - being held by the rest o f Fagalde's 16e C o r p s d'armee. T h u s the BEF f o u n d itself - instead o f being a homogeneous w h o l e as it h a d been o n the D y l e - split i n t o t w o parts o n opposite sides o f the 2 5 - 4 0 k m - w i d e D u n k i r k - L i l l e Pocket t h a t extended some 1 1 2 k m (70 miles) f r o m the coast. W h i l e the east side o f the p o c k e t seemed m o s t threatened because o f the rent being t o r n i n the Belgian line a r o u n d C o u r t r a i , o n the west side six Panzer divisions h a d d r i v e n t o the sea a n d wheeled i n echelon t o r u m b l e noisily u p t o all points a l o n g the C a n a l L i n e . Because I I I C o r p s c o u l d n o t hope t o cover the front's 7 2 k m l e n g t h , its f o u r divisions were b r o k e n u p i n t o their i n d i v i d u a l battalions a n d scattered t o h o l d bridges a n d small villages as strongpoints - or 'stops' as L o r d G o r t called t h e m - thus f o r m i n g a d o t t e d line f r o m L a Bassee t o Bergues. C o n s e q u e n t l y the w e s t e r n side o f the p o c k e t was o p e n t o e x p l o i t a t i o n by m o b i l e a r m o u r e d forces. 15

M a r c h i n g unceasingly, t h e French poilus of t h e 1ere A r m e e w e r e exhausted, h u n g r y and increasingly demoralized, yet t h e y m a i n t a i n e d their discipline and their d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o f i g h t t o t h e best of their ability and t h e last of their a m m u n i t i o n . (IWM F4315)

The French M e a n w h i l e at the ' b o t t o m o f the pocket' were the three corps of the French lere A r m e e . H a v i n g f o u g h t c o n t i n u o u s l y f o r almost t w o weeks, Gen. Blanchard's 12 divisions (including three badly depleted a r m o u r e d units) were o n the b r i n k o f e x h a u s t i o n . Because o f the d i s l o c a t i o n caused by the w i t h d r a w a l f r o m Belgium a n d p u n i s h i n g L u f t w a f f e air attacks o n the French r a i l w a y n e t w o r k , n o supplies h a d reached t h e m since 2 0 M a y . Quartermasters had been forced t o forage f o o d f r o m the s u r r o u n d i n g t o w n s t o feed the troops and supplies of artillery a m m u n i t i o n were v i r t u a l l y exhausted. W h i l e the l e r e A r m e e was a t t e m p t i n g a f i g h t i n g w i t h d r a w a l t o the n o r t h a l o n g w i t h the BEF, the p r i m a r y French c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the defence o f the D u n k i r k beachhead was G e n . Fagalde's 16e C o r p s d'armee. H a v i n g lost half o f one d i v i s i o n (21e D i v i s i o n d ' i n f a n t e r i e ) o n a tragic d e p l o y m e n t t o w a r d s B o u l o g n e , this corps consisted o f t w o i n t a c t i n f a n t r y divisions a n d a horsem o u n t e d reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n (18e G r o u p e de reconnaissance de corps d ' a r m e e , G R C A ) . O n 2 3 M a y Fagalde was o r d e r e d t o m o v e his H Q a n d one d i v i s i o n (68e D i v i s i o n d ' i n f a n t e r i e ) t o the west between Gravelines a n d S a i n t - O m e r , l e a v i n g the o t h e r (60e D i v i s i o n d ' i n f a n t e r i e ) w i t h the Belgians t o p r o t e c t the Bruges ( n o w Brugge) area. I n f o r m e d he was t o c o m m a n d all French g r o u n d forces along the Channel coast, Fagalde i m m e d i a t e l y w e n t t o D u n k i r k t o confer w i t h Vice-amiral A b r i a l a n d assess w h a t other units he h a d t o w o r k w i t h . M a n n i n g the area's f i x e d defences were the three reserve battalions o f the 272e Demi-brigade d'infanterie assigned t o the 1 1 , 0 0 0 - m a n Secteur f o r t i f i e de Flandres under General de brigade Eugene Barthelemy, headquartered i n the ancient w a l l e d and moated city o f Bergues, 8 . 5 k m (5 miles) south o f D u n k i r k . A d d i t i o n a l l y there were t w o t r a i n i n g b a t t a l i o n s , three l a b o u r b a t t a l i o n s a n d five battalions f r o m his decimated 21e D i v i s i o n d'infanterie (mainly the 137e RI) h o l d i n g Gravelines a n d B o u r b o u r g . For artillery Fagalde h a d six battalions o f 7 5 m m guns, five of 1 5 5 m m guns a n d t w o o f 2 5 m m a n t i - t a n k guns. 16

TOP HMS Wakeful steaming off Bray-Dunes. Commissioned in 1917, Wakeful was o n e o f 37 o l d V and W-class boats o n s t r e n g t h at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e war. They w e r e e q u i p p e d w i t h four single 4 i n . guns and t w o triple t o r p e d o tubes. (IWM HU1141) BOTTOM HMS Grafton was o n e of t h e Royal Navy's newer, larger (1,350-ton) class of destroyers, e i g h t of w h i c h w e r e c o m m i s s i o n e d in 1936. They m o u n t e d four quick-firing 4.7in. guns and e i g h t t o r p e d o tubes and had t w o q u a d - M G (.50-cal. Browning) anti-aircraft m o u n t s . (IWM FL22287)

Allied naval forces Guarding the eastern approaches to the English Channel, Dover Command's mission was primarily centred on anti-submarine and mine warfare. Ramsay began the May campaign with 11 destroyers - mostly old, small World War I types - but in a wide variety of operations along the French, Belgian and Dutch coasts one was lost and two were so badly damaged they had to be withdrawn from operations. The survivors were supplemented by three old destroyers and two modern ones, plus a similar and contemporary British-built Polish example. In the shoal-ridden Channel and tight confines of French harbours, the destroyers' shallow draught and excellent manoeuvrability proved premium assets. For mine warfare Ramsay originally had 30 minesweepers and 24 armed trawlers equipped for minesweeping. In the course of the campaign, the command would be reinforced with 2 0 additional destroyers, six newer minelaying destroyers and six fleet minesweepers. Generally, Ramsay's 39 British destroyers were of two categories; more numerous were the 20-22-year-old boats of the V and W classes. Too old, small and lightly armed for Fleet duties these 1,188-ton warships were still very useful, especially for convoy and coastal duties. Also available to Dover Command was the 1st Flotilla's newer, larger and more powerful 1,350-ton G-class boats and the 20th Flotilla's modified 1,400-ton E- and I-class minelaying destroyers. However, the Royal N a v y had yet to acquire effective fast-firing anti-aircraft weapons, making both the newer large and the older small destroyers very vulnerable to air - especially dive-bomber - attacks. Like Dover Command, Amiral N o r d had a sizeable group of large and small destroyers based at Dunkirk to guard the French side of the English Channel. These initially included four large (2,126/2,440-ton) destroyers, nine (1,298/1,356-ton) destroyers and six small (669-ton) torpedo boats, augmented by seven small 'submarine chasers' and nine naval auxiliaries. 17

RAF Supermarine Spitfires o n patrol. A m a t c h for t h e Messerschmitt Bf 109E, t h e elegantly designed and m a n o e u v r a b l e British f i g h t e r received its first taste of c o m b a t over Dunkirk, its performance l i m i t e d by t h e RAF's restrictive three-plane 'vie' f o r m a t i o n s , rigid attack tactics and t h e raw inexperience of t h e pilots. (IWM CH740)

18

Allied air forces

O n 2 1 M a y the ragged r e m n a n t o f the BEF's air c o m p o n e n t f l e w h o m e t o England. Similarly, once G r o u p e d'armees 1 was cut off i n the n o r t h the Armee de l ' A i r ' s 25e G r o u p e m e n t o f fighters (Groupes de Chasse I I I / l a n d I I / 8 , o r i g i n a l l y covering Giraud's 7e A r m e e ) was w i t h d r a w n south o f the Somme. T h a t day French a n d B r i t i s h air c o m m a n d e r s met t o revise the arrangements f o r s u p p o r t i n g the A l l i e d armies i n the n o r t h . Because the A r m e e de l'Air's Z o n e d ' O p e r a t i o n s Aeriennes N o r d ( N o r t h e r n Z o n e o f A i r O p e r a t i o n s , Z O A N ) h a d retired t o the Paris region a n d the l o w e r Seine it lacked any ability t o p r o t e c t G r o u p e d'armees 1 . T h u s , i t was agreed t h a t Z O A N , coupled w i t h the B r i t i s h A d v a n c e d A i r S t r i k i n g Force ( A A S F ) , w o u l d cover the Somme and A i s n e sectors w h i l e the U K - b a s e d 1 1 G r o u p (fighters) a n d 2 G r o u p (light bombers) s u p p o r t e d the A l l i e d armies t r a p p e d i n the n o r t h . I n a l l , R A F Fighter C o m m a n d h a d expended 3 8 6 H u r r i c a n e s and lost 5 6 p i l o t s k i l l e d a n d 18 c a p t u r e d i n the f i g h t i n g i n France. T h i s left 11 G r o u p w i t h 2 6 9 serviceable day fighters (114 Spitfires, 1 3 7 H u r r i c a n e s a n d 18 Defiants) i n 2 1 squadrons, five o f w h i c h (flying Spitfires) were retained f o r h o m e defence. T h e r e f o r e 16 squadrons w i t h a t o t a l strength o f a b o u t 2 0 0 m a c h i n e s , w o u l d p r o v i d e air cover over the A l l i e d armies t r a p p e d i n the D u n k i r k Pocket. B o m b i n g s u p p o r t w o u l d be p r o v i d e d by 2 G r o u p ' s B r i s t o l Blenheim I V t w i n - e n g i n e l i g h t b o m b e r s . H a v i n g lost 60 o f this type i n 16 days o f almost c o n t i n u o u s c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s , the G r o u p ' s six squadrons were n o w d o w n t o 6 0 serviceable examples, m a n n e d by very t i r e d aircrews.

A 10.5cm le FH 18 moves u p d u r i n g t h e advance across Belgium. Contrary t o British p r o p a g a n d a at t h e t i m e , subsequent histories and p o p u l a r belief, most of t h e forces facing t h e BEF were n o t m o d e r n mechanized units b u t 1918-style infantry f o r m a t i o n s w i t h horse-drawn artillery. (IWM HU3894)

G E R M A N FORCES After the BEF's small, but stinging, spoiling attack at Arras on the 21st, all of Guderian's superiors began worrying that the hard-charging Panzers had outstripped their infantry consorts to the point where they were now dreadfully exposed. His immediate superior - General der Kavallerie Ewald von Kleist - was worried about what the British counterattack portended and the rising tank losses being experienced in the last few days. About the same time (1640hrs on 23 May) Kleist's new boss - A O K 4 commander Generaloberst Gunther Hans von Kluge - telephoned Heeresgruppe A commander, Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt, advising that 'the troops would welcome an opportunity to close up tomorrow'. Rundstedt, who had his own reservations about continuing the unbridled offensive and wanted a period of rest and regrouping before attacking south of the Somme, consented readily and at 2000hrs Kluge telephoned both Panzergruppen HQs stating that A O K 4 would not advance during the 24th in order to allow the infantry to close up with the Panzers. That day Hitler visited Rundstedt's Heeresgruppe A HQ (a vine-encrusted townhouse in Charleville, France) and a discussion on the means to subsequently eliminate the Allied pocket ensued. Influenced by Generaloberst Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), Hitler had become worried that the Panzers would be bogged down in Flanders and wanted to preserve them for the coup de grace to be delivered against the French. Additionally, for political reasons he wanted Heeresgruppe B to push the Allied forces out of Belgium so that their final defeat would take place on French soil and not in neutral territory. Thus Hitler became even more adamant about stopping the Panzers than his generals. Returning to Felsennest (his battle HQ, a hunting lodge in the forests at Miinstereifel, south of Bonn) Hitler directed the O K H to issue a Haltbefehl^ 'halt order'. As passed to Kluge's A O K 4 it read 'By the Fiihrer's orders... hold [along] the favourable defensive line Lens-Bethune-Aire-Saint-OmerGravelines, and allow the enemy to attack it.... The principal thing now is to husband the armoured formations for later and more important tasks.' 19

LEFT S u p p l e m e n t i n g Richthofen's Stukas w e r e n e w diveb o m b i n g - c a p a b l e Junkers 88As of Keller's A m s t e r d a m - b a s e d I. G r u p p e / K a m p f g e s c h w a d e r 30. This unit's crews w e r e trained in t h e highly specialized antis h i p p i n g role and had a c c o u n t e d for several Royal Navy warships d u r i n g t h e Norwegian c a m p a i g n . (IWM MH6115) RIGHT German S-boat at speed. A r m e d w i t h t w o tubes for G7a 21 in. t o r p e d o e s and capable of 35 knots, these fast attack craft were masters at nocturnal hita n d - r u n tactics. (IWM U7)

T h u s the A l l i e d forces t r a p p e d i n the D u n k i r k - L i l l e Pocket were caught between w h a t the Germans called 'the h a m m e r a n d the a n v i l ' . To the east were the G e r m a n i n f a n t r y divisions o f Bock's Heeresgruppe B, w h i c h consisted of t w o armies: Kiichler's A O K 18, w h i c h h a d completed the conquest of H o l l a n d a n d deployed across the Scheldt t o become Bock's r i g h t w i n g , and Reichenau's A O K 6. These were entirely s l o w - m o v i n g 1918-style i n f a n t r y f o r m a t i o n s 2 1 divisions i n six corps - composed o f f o o t soldiers and horse-drawn artillery. A l l o f Bock's m o t o r i z e d a n d mechanized units - as w e l l as all O K H reserves h a d been sent a r o u n d the A l l i e d p o c k e t t o j o i n Rundstedt's drive t o the sea. H a l t i n g along the C a n a l Line t o the west were the Panzer units h o t f r o m their headlong dash t o the C h a n n e l . Facing the A l l i e d pocket, Kluge's A O K 4 c o n t r o l l e d Panzergruppe Kleist (minus X I V A K (mot.) p r o t e c t i n g the south f l a n k ) a n d the n e w l y created Panzergruppe H o t h , f o r m e r l y X V A K (mot.) n o w joined by the X V I a n d X X X I X A K (mot.) f r o m Heeresgruppe B. Three infantry corps supported t h e m . A l l t o l d , Heeresgruppe A h a d swelled t o 7 1 divisions i n 2 2 corps, but most of these were i n A O K 12 and 16, w h i c h had been left behind t o c o n t r o l the f l o w o f i n f a n t r y m a r c h i n g i n t o the extended G e r m a n salient and protect the south f l a n k along the Somme. Just as w o r r i s o m e as the lack o f i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t was the fact t h a t the Panzer units h a d become badly depleted i n their combats w i t h A l l i e d defenders and i n their drive across n o r t h e r n France. O u t o f 2,428 tanks w i t h w h i c h Kleist h a d begun the campaign (see Battle Orders 3 2 : Panzer Divisions: The Blitzkrieg Years 1939-40 by Pier Paolo Battistelli, Osprey Publishing L t d : O x f o r d , 2 0 0 7 ) , he estimated 30 per cent h a d been lost i n c o m b a t or were irreparably damaged. A n o t h e r 2 0 per cent h a d been left b e h i n d because of mechanical breakdowns or were i n need o f repair before c o n t i n u i n g across the A a . This left h i m w i t h o n l y 1,220 o p e r a t i o n a l tanks b u t w i t h the respite p r o v i d e d by the 'stop order', it was estimated t h a t the 7 3 0 reparable vehicles c o u l d be back i n their units i n three days or less.

The Luftwaffe

T h e L u f t w a f f e t o o h a d suffered heavy losses d u r i n g the o p e n i n g stages of Pall Gelb. W h i l e they h a d d r i v e n the BEF's air c o m p o n e n t f r o m the C o n t i n e n t a n d reduced the A r m e e de l ' A i r t o i m p o t e n c e , heavy a t t r i t i o n h a d eroded the G e r m a n air force's s t r e n g t h ; 6 4 1 c o m b a t a i r c r a f t (as o f 2 5 M a y ) were lost (23 per cent o f its s t a r t i n g i n v e n t o r y ) a n d serviceability was d o w n t o 50 per cent. Even w i t h t i m e l y replacements General der Flieger A l b r e c h t Kesselring, c o m m a n d i n g L u f t f l o t t e 2 , r e p o r t e d t h a t m a n y b o m b e r Gruppen (groups) w e r e reduced t o 15 serviceable a i r c r a f t (against a s t a t u t o r y strength o f 3 6 ) . 20

Nevertheless, on 24 May, when the Nazi leaders began to debate how to conclude the dramatically successful western offensive, Goring begged Hitler for a chance at glory, saying 'Mein Fiihrer, leave the destruction of the enemy surrounded at Dunkirk to me and my Luftwaffe.' Before the day ended Hitler granted Goring's request in OKW War Directive N o . 13, ordering the Luftwaffe 'to break down all resistance of the surrounded enemy forces, to prevent the escape of the British forces across the Channel, and to secure the southern flank of Heeresgruppe A.' This was easier said than done. Because the Heinkels and Dorniers were operating at the limits of their range - I and II Fliegerkorps were still largely based in Germany, some as far as 4 8 0 k m (300 miles) from Dunkirk - they were restricted to a single mission each day. General der Flieger Alfred Keller's Holland-based IV Fliegerkorps was closer but was needed to support A O K 18's assault on the Belgians and Generalleutnant Ritter von Greim's V Fliegerkorps was increasingly tasked with protecting Rundstedt's southern flank by striking the Allied forces marshalling south of the Somme. This left Richthofen's VIII Fliegerkorps as the only air command capable of executing Goring's stated intention, but even they had problems. ('wings' VIII Fliegerkorps' two Junkers 87 Stuka dive-bomber Geschwader - Stukageschwader 2 and 77) tried to follow closely behind their armoured charges, but they just could not keep up. On 24 May Stukas of Stukageschwader 2 leapfrogged to Guise, near Saint-Quentin, 170km (106 miles) from Dunkirk, while Stukageschwader 77 remained at Rocroi another 70km (43 miles) to the rear, operating at the very limits of their combat radius.

The Kriegsmarine With the German Navy's heavy surface units crippled in the ongoing Norwegian campaign and the Channel too narrow, shallow and heavily mined for large-scale U-boat operations, the Kriegsmarine was limited to using its high-speed torpedo boats or Schnellboote (or S-boote, called 'E-boats', short for 'enemy boats', by the British) for hit-and-run attacks, normally at night. Marinegruppe Kommando West, Admiral Alfred Saalwachter, had two flotillas (totalling nine) of these fast light attack craft and they moved to the main Dutch naval base at Den Helder soon after its capture. Supported by two tenders and staging from the Dutch naval base at Vlissingen (Flushing), they soon proved their worth, S.21 and S.23 sinking the large French destroyer Jaguar as it approached Dunkirk on 22/23 May, and S.34 sinking the 694-ton coastal freighter Aboukir near the North Hinder buoy six nights later. Supplementing the S-boats was a single flotilla of seven small 291-ton (341-ton submerged) Type IIC and two smaller Type IIB coastal/training U-boats. Having lost three U-boats in October 1939 to mines in the Channel, the Kriegsmarine was quite naturally reluctant to send their submarines into the shallow, shoal-ridden waters but they did station four of these small boats in what the Germans called the 'Hoofen', the south-eastern corner of the North Sea between the Kent coastline and the Scheldt Estuary.

21

ORDERS OF BATTLE (As of 30 May 1940, except when noted)

ALLIED FORCES TRAPPED IN T H E DUNKIRK-LILLE POCKET BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE - GENERAL GORT

LORD

GHQ Troops 1 st Army Tank Brigade - Brigadier Charles Norman 4th/7th Battalion The Royal Tank Regiment Not brigaded: 12th Battalion The Royal Lancers 13th/18th Battalion The King's Royal Hussars 1 st Battalion The Welsh Guards 1 st Battalion The Lothians and Border Yeomanry 9th Battalion The West Yorkshire Regiment Machine-gun units 7th Battalion The Cheshire Regiment 1 st/8th Battalion The Middlesex Regiment 4th Battalion The Gordon Highlanders 6th Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Pioneer units 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Battalions The King's Own Royal Regiment 6th Battalion The Royal Scots Fusiliers 7th Battalion The Royal Norfolk Regiment 1st/6th Battalion The South Staffordshire Regiment Artillery 1 st and 2nd Regiments RHA 32nd, 98th, 115th and 139th Field Regiments RA 1 st, 2nd, 4th, 58th, 61 st, 63rd, 65th and 69th Medium Regiments RA 1 st, 51 st and 52nd Heavy Regiments RA 1 st, 2nd and 3rd Super Heavy Regiments RA Anti-aircraft units 1 st, 4th, 6th, 69th and 85th Anti-Aircraft Regiments RA 1 st, 51 st and 58th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments RA 1st, 2nd and 3rd Searchlight Regiments RA I Corps - Lt. Gen. Michael G. H. Barker 1 st Division - Maj. Gen. The Hon. Harold R. L. G. Alexander 1st Guards Brigade 2nd Brigade 3rd Brigade 2nd, 19th and 67th Field Regiments RA 21 st Anti-Tank Regiment 42nd (East Lancashire) Division - Maj. Gen. William Holmes 125th Brigade 126th Brigade 127th Brigade 52nd and 53rd Field Regiments RA 56th Anti-Tank Regiment RA Corps troops: Machine-gun units 2nd and 4th Battalions The Cheshire Regiment 2nd Battalion The Manchester Regiment Artillery 27th and 140th Field Regiments RA 3rd and 5th Medium Regiments RA 52nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA

22

II Corps - Lt. Gen. Alan F. Brooke 3rd Division - Maj. Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery 7th Guards Brigade 8th Brigade 9th Brigade 7th, 33rd and 76th Field Regiments RA 20th Anti-Tank Regiment RA 4th Division - Maj. Gen. Dudley Johnson 10th Brigade 11th Brigade 12th Brigade 22nd, 30th and 77th Field Regiments RA 14th Anti-Tank Regiment RA 5th Division - Maj. Gen. Harold E. Franklyn 13th Brigade (15th Brigade deployed to Norway) 17th Brigade 143rd Brigade (detached from 48th Division) 9th, 91 st and 92nd Field Regiments RA 52nd Anti-Tank Regiment RA 50th Division (Northumbrian) - Maj. Gen. Giffard le Q. Martel 150th Brigade 151st Brigade 4th Battalion The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers 72nd and 74th Field Regiments RA 65th Anti-Tank Regiment RA Corps troops: Artillery 60th and 88th Army Field Regiments RA 53rd and 59th Medium Regiments RA 53rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA 2nd Survey Regiment RA Machine-gun units 2nd and 1st/7th Battalions The Middlesex Regiment 2nd Battalion The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers III Corps - Maj. Gen. S. R. Wason 2nd Division - Maj. Gen. Noel Irwin 4th Brigade - destroyed at Bethune and La Paradis, 27 May 5th Brigade - largely destroyed at La Bassee, 27 May 6th Brigade - destroyed at Robecq and Saint-Venant, 27 May 25th Brigade - detached from 50th Division 10th, 16th and 99th Field Regiments RA 13th Anti-Tank Regiment RA 2nd Light Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade 44th (Home Counties) Division - Maj. Gen. Edmund A. Osborne 131st Brigade 132nd Brigade 133rd Brigade 57th, 58th and 65th Field Regiments RA 57th Anti-Tank Regiment RA 1st Light Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade 46th (North Midland and West Riding) Division Maj. Gen. Harry Curtis 137th Brigade (2nd/5th Battalion The West Yorkshire Regiment only) 138th Brigade - nearly destroyed at Abbeville 20 May 139th Brigade 48th (South Midland) Division - Maj. Gen. Andrew F. A. N. Thorne 144th Brigade 145th Brigade - surrendered near Watou on 29 May 18th, 24th and 68th Field Regiments RA 53rd Anti-Tank Regiment RA

1st M i n e s w e e p i n g Flotilla

Corps t r o o p s :

t w o m i n e s w e e p e r s f r o m Scapa

Flow

Artillery 5 t h R e g i m e n t RHA

1 2 t h M i n e s w e e p e r Flotilla

9 7 t h Field R e g i m e n t RA

four minesweepers from

Harwich

51 st a n d 5 6 t h M e d i u m R e g i m e n t s RA 5 4 t h L i g h t A n t i - A i r c r a f t R e g i m e n t RA 3 r d Survey R e g i m e n t RA

T h a m e s Estuary D e f e n c e Flotilla t w o g u n b o a t s f r o m t h e N o r e Command 1 st M o t o r A n t i - S u b m a r i n e Boat Flotilla

Machine-gun units 7 t h B a t t a l i o n T h e Royal N o r t h u m b e r l a n d Fusiliers 1 st/9th Battalion The Manchester Regiment 1st B a t t a l i o n Princess Louise's K e n s i n g t o n R e g i m e n t

seven m o t o r anti-

submarine boats T h r e e p a d d l e a n t i - a i r c r a f t ships t h r e e a r m e d b o a r d i n g vessels 4 2 p e r s o n n e l ships E i g h t h o s p i t a l carriers

Line o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r o o p s * 1 2 t h (Eastern) D i v i s i o n - M a j . G e n . R. L. Petre 35th Brigade - destroyed at Abbeville, 20 May 36th Brigade - destroyed at Doullens, 20 May 3 7 t h B r i g a d e - largely d e s t r o y e d a t A m i e n s , 2 0 M a y , r e m n a n t s r e t i r e d s o u t h o f t h e S o m m e River 2 3 r d ( N o r t h u m b r i a n ) D i v i s i o n (-) - M a j . G e n . W i l l i a m H e r b e r t 6 9 t h B r i g a d e - b a d l y b a t t e r e d o n t h e Scarpe, 2 0 M a y ; escaped t o Dunkirk 70th Brigade - destroyed at Blairville-Mercatel, 20 M a y

T h r e e s t o r e ships 13 a r m y l a n d i n g craft Six RAF s e a p l a n e t e n d e r b o a t s O n e Belgian Navy patrol b o a t Five B e l g i a n t u g s 43 B e l g i a n t r a w l e r s Four B e l g i a n p a s s e n g e r l a u n c h e s O n e Royal N e t h e r l a n d s N a v y m o t o r b o a t 4 0 D u t c h schuyts ( w i t h RN c r e w s )

*51st Division attached t o French 3e A r m e e

One Dutch yacht

ROYAL NAVY (as o f 26 M a y 1940)

40 tugs

25 y a c h t s 61 d r i f t e r s Flag Officer D o v e r - V. A d m . B e r t r a m H o m e Ramsey

3 4 6 a s s o r t e d s m a l l craft

C a p t a i n (Destroyers) 1 9 t h D e s t r o y e r Flotilla 11 o l d e r d e s t r o y e r s D e t a c h e d f r o m 1 st D e s t r o y e r Flotilla

t w o modern

ROYAL AIR FORCE

d e s t r o y e r s p l u s o n e Polish 1 st a n d 2 n d A n t i - S u b m a r i n e S t r i k i n g Force six p a t r o l s l o o p s (coastal c o r v e t t e s ) I st M o t o r T o r p e d o Boat Flotilla

six m o t o r t o r p e d o b o a t s

4 t h M i n e s w e e p e r Flotilla

five minesweepers

5 t h M i n e s w e e p e r Flotilla

eight minesweepers

6 t h M i n e s w e e p e r Flotilla

three minesweepers

7 t h M i n e s w e e p e r Flotilla

five minesweepers

8 t h M i n e s w e e p e r Flotilla

three minesweepers

1 0 t h M i n e s w e e p e r Flotilla

six m i n e s w e e p e r s

M i n e s w e e p i n g G r o u p 51

nine minesweeping trawlers

M i n e s w e e p i n g G r o u p 61

nine minesweeping trawlers

10th A n t i - S u b m a r i n e S t r i k i n g Force

six t r a w l e r s

I I t h A n t i - S u b m a r i n e S t r i k i n g Force

six t r a w l e r s

21 st A n t i - S u b m a r i n e G r o u p

six t r a w l e r s

40th Anti-Submarine Group

six t r a w l e r s

F i g h t e r C o m m a n d - A i r C h i e f M a r s h a l Sir H u g h D o w d i n g 11 G r o u p - A i r V i c e - M a r s h a l K e i t h Park N o . 17 Sqn., 13 H u r r i c a n e s , K e n l e y N o . 19 Sqn., 13 Spitfires, H o r n c h u r c h N o . 3 2 Sqn., f o u r H u r r i c a n e s , B i g g i n Hill N o . 41 Sqn., 17 Spitfires, H o r n c h u r c h N o . 5 6 Sqn., 16 H u r r i c a n e s , N o r t h W e a l d N o . 6 4 Sqn., 13 Spitfires, K e n l e y N o . 6 5 Sqn., 1 S p i t f i r e , H o r n c h u r c h N o . 7 9 Sqn., 6 H u r r i c a n e s , B i g g i n Hill N o . 9 2 Sqn., 13 Spitfires, N o r t h o l t N o . 111 Sqn., 17 H u r r i c a n e s , N o r t h W e a l d N o . 145 Sqn., 18 H u r r i c a n e s , T a n g m e r e N o . 151 Sqn., 19 H u r r i c a n e s , N o r t h W e a l d N o . 2 1 3 Sqn., 10 H u r r i c a n e s , B i g g i n Hill N o . 2 2 2 Sqn., 15 Spitfires, H o r n c h u r c h

Reinforcing units A n t i - a i r c r a f t Cruiser HMS Calcutta f r o m t h e N o r e C o m m a n d

N o . 2 2 9 Sqn., e i g h t H u r r i c a n e s , B i g g i n Hill

I st D e s t r o y e r Flotilla t h r e e d e s t r o y e r s f r o m t h e N o r e C o m m a n d

N o . 2 3 5 Sqn., B l e n h e i m IFs, B i r c h a m N e w t o n

5 t h D e s t r o y e r Flotilla t w o d e s t r o y e r s f r o m t h e N o r e C o m m a n d

N o . 2 4 2 Sqn., 11 H u r r i c a n e s , B i g g i n Hill

9 t h D e s t r o y e r Flotilla t w o d e s t r o y e r s f r o m W e s t e r n A p p r o a c h e s

N o . 245 Sqn., N A H u r r i c a n e s , H a w k i n g e

Command

N o . 2 6 4 Sqn., 15 D e f i a n t s , D u x f o r d

I I t h D e s t r o y e r Flotilla

five destroyers f r o m Western

Approaches C o m m a n d 15th D e s t r o y e r Flotilla

N o . 6 0 9 Sqn., 18 Spitfires, N o r t h o l t one destroyer f r o m Western

Approaches C o m m a n d 16th D e s t r o y e r Flotilla

four destroyers f r o m

Portsmouth Command 17th D e s t r o y e r Flotilla

t w o destroyers f r o m Western

Approaches C o m m a n d 18th D e s t r o y e r Flotilla

one destroyer f r o m Western

Approaches C o m m a n d 2 0 t h D e s t r o y e r Flotilla

six m i n e l a y i n g d e s t r o y e r s f r o m

the Nore C o m m a n d 1 st S l o o p D i v i s i o n

o n e escort s l o o p f r o m W e s t e r n

Approaches C o m m a n d

N o . 601 Sqn., 15 H u r r i c a n e s , T a n g m e r e N o . 6 1 0 Sqn., 12 Spitfires, B i g g i n Hill N o . 6 1 6 Sqn., 12 Spitfires, H o r n c h u r c h Bomber Command 2 Group N o . 15 Sqn., B l e n h e i m IVs, W y t o n N o . 21 Sqn., B l e n h e i m IVs, W a t t i s h a m N o . 4 0 Sqn., B l e n h e i m IVs, W y t o n N o . 8 2 Sqn., B l e n h e i m IVs, W a t t i s h a m N o . 107 Sqn., B l e n h e i m IVs, W a t t i s h a m N o . 110 Sqn., B l e n h e i m IVs, W a t t i s h a m

23

Coastal Command 16 Group No. 48 Sqn., Ansons, Thorney Island No. 206 Sqn., Hudsons, Bircham Newton No. 220 Sqn., Hudsons, Thornaby No. 254 Sqn., Blenheim IVs, Detling No. 500 Sqn., Ansons, Detling Attached Fleet Air Arm squadrons NAS 801, Skuas, Detling NAS 806, Skuas, Manston NAS 815, Swordfish, Detling NAS 825, Swordfish, Detling NAS 826, Albacores, Ford FRENCH A R M Y Groupe d'armees 1 - Gen. d'armee Jean Georges Maurice Blanchard 1 ere Armee - Gen. de corps Rene Jacques Adolphe Prioux 3e Corps d'armee - Gen. de corps Fournelle de la Laurencie 1 ere Division d'infanterie motorisee - surrendered at Lille, 31 May 1940 7e GRDI 2e Division d'infanterie Nord-Africaine - surrendered at Lille, 31 May 1940 92e GRDI 12e Division d'infanterie motorisee - Gen. de brig. Louis Janssen 8e RZ 150e Rl 25e RAD 225e RAD 3e GRDI Remnant of 32e Division d'infanterie - Gen. Maurice Lucas lll/122e Rl lll/143e Rl 4e Corps d'armee - Gen. de corps Aymer - surrendered at Lille, 31 May 1940 15e Division d'infanterie motorisee lere Division d'infanterie Marocaine 4e Division d'infanterie 7e GRCA 106e RALH 604e RP 5e Corps d'armee (motorisee) - Gen. de corps Rene Altmayer surrendered at Lille, 31 May 1940 25e Division d'infanterie motorisee 5e Division d'infanterie Nord-Africaine 104e RALT 605e RP Corps de cavalerie - badly depleted in continuous combat lere Division legere mecanique - Gen. de brig. Picard 4e RC 6e RC 18e RD 4e RDP 74e RATTT 2e Division legere mecanique - Gen. de brig. Bougrain 8e RC 13e RD 29e RD 1 re RDP 71 e RATTT 24

3e Division legere Mecanique - Gen. de div. Langlois Ire RC 2e RC 12e RC 11eRDP 76e RATT 3e GRCA (motorisee) Formerly of 7e Armee - Reassigned to Forces Maritimes du Nord on 24 May 1940 16e Corps d'armee - Gen. de corps M. B. Alfred Fagalde 21 e Division d'infanterie - Gen. de brig. Felix Lanquetot 48e Rl - largely destroyed near Boulogne on 22 May 65e Rl - largely destroyed near Calais on 22 May 137e Rl 35e RAD 255e RAD 27e GRDI 60e Division d'infanterie - Gen. de brig. Deslaurens 241 eRI 270e Rl - largely destroyed during retreat between Zeebrugge and Nieuport on 29 May 271e Rl 50e RA - attached to Belgian Army, lost on 28 May ll/307e RAD 68e GRDI 68e Division d'infanterie - Gen. de div. Beaufrere 224e Rl 225e Rl 341 eRI 89e RAD 289e RAD l/307e RAD 59e GRDI 115e RALH 407e RP (from 7e Armee) 616e RP 18e GRCA Secteur fortifie de Flandres - Gen. de brig. Eugene Barthelemy 272e Demi-brigade d'infanterie - Lt. Col. Lemistre 14e RRT (one battalion only) 15e RRT (one battalion only) 221 e RRT (one battalion only) 161eRAP Groupe des Secteurs Nord (autonomous coastal defence fortress units) IV/310e Rl-Dunkirk V/310e Rl-Calais Vl/310e Rl-Boulogne Vll/310e Rl-Gravelines 21 e Centre d'instruction divisionnaire 21eBn./110e Rl 21eBn./129e Rl 147e Bataillon de Sapeurs-Mineurs FRENCH NAVY Forces Maritimes du Nord - Vice-amiral Jean-Charles Abrial 'Pas de Calais' Flotilla - Contre-amiral Marcel Landriau Two large torpedo boat destroyers Six torpedo boat destroyers Six torpedo boats Five dispatch boats (sloops) Two minesweepers Six submarine chasers Three personnel ships (detached to RN)

A u f k l . - A b t . 18

A d d i t i o n a l Ships 12 m o t o r t o r p e d o b o a t s

P z a b . - A b t . ( m o t . ) 18

13 auxiliary m i n e s w e e p e r s

Pion.-Bat. 18

7 auxiliary p a t r o l vessels Six t r o o p t r a n s p o r t s

N a c h r . - A b t . 18 2 5 4 . I n f a n t e r i e - D i v i s i o n - Gen.Lt. W a l t e r B e h s c h n i t t

12 c a r g o ships

IR454

59 t r a w l e r s

IR474 IR484 AR 2 5 4

G E R M A N FORCES

Aufkl.-Abt. 254 Pzab.-Abt. 254

GERMAN ARMY

Pion.-Bat. 2 5 4 Nachr.-Abt. 254

Heeresgruppe A - Gen.Obst. Gerd v o n Rundstedt AOK 4 - Gen.Obst. G u n t h e r Hans v o n K l u g e P a n z e r g r u p p e Kleist - G e n . E w a l d v o n Kleist XIV AK ( m o t . ) - G e n . G u s t a v v o n W i e t e r s h e i m AR ( m o t ) 782 9. P a n z e r - D i v i s i o n - Gen.Lt. Dr A l b e r t Ritter v o n H u b i c k i

A O K 18 - G e n . G e o r g v o n K u c h l e r IX AK - G e n . H e r m a n n Geyer ( f r o m A O K 6) AR ( m o t ) 6 1 7 56. I n f a n t e r i e - D i v i s i o n - Gen.Lt. Karl Kriebel IR 171

- f r o m H e e r e s g r u p p e B/AOK 18/XXXIX AK

IR 192

PR 33 (-)

IR234

SR(mot.) 10(-)

AR156

SR ( m o t ) 11 (-)

A u f k l . - A b t . 156

AR ( m o t . ) 102 (-)

PzJag.-Abt. 156

AR 9

Pion.-Bat. 156

PzJag.-Abt. ( m o t . ) 5 0 Pion.-Bat. 8 6 N a c h r . - A b t . 85

N a c h r . - A b t . 156 2 1 6 . I n f a n t e r i e - D i v i s i o n - Gen.Lt. H e r m a n n B o t t c h e r IR348

20. I n f a n t e r i e - D i v i s i o n ( m o t . ) - Gen.Lt. M a u r i z W i k t o r i n

IR396

zu H a i n b u r g - f r o m H e e r e s g r u p p e B/AOK 6/XVI AK

IR398

IR ( m o t . ) 76

AR216

IR (mot.) 80

Aufkl.-Abt. 216

AR ( m o t . ) 20 (-)

Pzab.-Abt. 216

I./AR ( m o t . ) 58

Pion.-Bat. 2 1 6

A u f k l . - A b t . 20 B e o b . - A b t . 20 Pzab.-Abt. ( m o t . ) 2 0 Pion.-Bat. 2 0 N a c h r . - A b t . 20 A t t a c h e d : IR ( m o t . ) ' G r o s s d e u t s c h l a n d '

Nachr.-Abt. 216 XXVI AK - Gen.Lt. A l b e r t W o d r i g AR ( m o t . ) 785 208. Infanterie-Division - Gen.Maj. Moritz Andreas - t o I X A K a s o f 2 J u n e 1940 IR309

IR ( m o t . ) l e i b s t a n d a r t e SS A d o l f Hitler'

IR337

11. Schiitzenbrigade (mot.) - Obst. A n g e r n - f r o m

IR338

Hoheres K o m m a n d o X X X I / D e n m a r k IR ( m o t . ) 110

AR 2 0 8

IR ( m o t . ) 111

Aufkl.-Abt. 208

MG.-Bat. (mot.) 13

PzJag.-Abt. 2 0 8

INVAR ( m o t ) 6 7 7

Pion.-Bat. 2 0 8 Nachr.-Abt. 208

H e e r e s g r u p p e B - Gen.Obst. Fedor v o n Bock

2 5 6 . I n f a n t e r i e - D i v i s i o n - Gen.Lt. G e r h a r d K a u f f m a n n IR456

AOK 6 - Gen.Obst. W a l t e r v o n R e i c h e n a u

IR476

X AK - Gen.Lt. C h r i s t i a n H a n s e n ( f r o m A O K 18)

IR481

14. I n f a n t e r i e - D i v i s i o n - Gen.Lt. Peter W y e r IR 11

AR256

IR53

Aufkl.-Abt. 256

IR 101

PzJag.-Abt. 2 5 6

AR 74 (+)

Pion.-Bat. 2 5 6

A u f k l . - A b t . 14

Nachr.-Abt. 256

PzJag.-Abt. 14 Pion.-Bat. 14 N a c h r . - A b t . 14 18. I n f a n t e r i e - D i v i s i o n - Gen.Lt. Friedrich-Carl Cranz IR30 IR51 IR54 AR18(+)

LUFTWAFFE - GENERALFELDMARSHALL H E R M A N GORING L u f t f l o t t e 2 - G e n . A l b r e c h t Kesselring ( F e r n ) / A u f k l a r u n g s g r u p p e 122 Wekusta 26

25

I Fliegerkorps- Gen. Ulrich Grauert 5. (Fern)/Aufklarungsgruppe 122 KG1,He111H KG 76, Do17Z KG 77, Do17Z JG77(-), Bf 109E l.(J)/LG2,Bf 109E ll.(J)/Tragergrp. 186, Bf 109E ZG 76 (-), Bf 11OC IV Fliegerkorps - Gen. Alfred Keller 1. (Fem)/Aufklarungsgruppe 121 LG1,He111H KG 4, He 111P KG 27, He 111P KG 54, He 111P I./KG 30,Ju88A Jagdfliegerfuhrer 2 - Gen.Lt. Hans von Doring JG 26 (+), Bf 109E JG51 (+), Bf 109E Luftflotte 3 - Gen. der Flieger Hugo Sperrle (Fern)/Aufklarungsgruppe 123 (-) Wekusta51 II Fliegerkorps- Gen. Bruno Lorzer 3. (Fern)/Aufklarungsgr.121 KG 2, Do 17Z KG 3, Do 17Z KG53,He111H VIII Fliegerkorps- Gen.Maj. Wolfram von Richthofen 2.(Fern)/Aufklarungsgr.123 StG 1 (-),Ju87B

ABBREVIATIONS AK AR Aufkl.-Abt. Beob.-Abt. GRCA GRDI JG KG LG MG.-Bat. Nachr.-Abt. Pion.-Bat. PR Pzab.-Abt. -

26

Armeekorps Artillerie-Regiment Aufklarungs-Abteilung Beobachtungs-Abteiling G r o u p e de reconnaissance de corps d'armee G r o u p e de reconnaissance de division d'infanterie Jagdgeschwader Kampfgeschwader Lehrgeschwader Maschinengewehr-Bataillon Nachrichten-Abteilung Pionier-Abteilung Panzer-Regiment Panzerabwehr Abteilung

StG 2,Ju87B StG 77,Ju87B IV.(St)/LG 1,Ju87B l.(St)/Tragergrp. 186, Ju 87B JG 2, Bf 109E JG27, Bf 109E Jagdfliegerfuhrer 3 - Obst. Gerd von Massow JG 52 (-), Bf 109E JG53, Bf 109E JG 54, Bf 109E ZG 2, Bf 11OC ZG 26 (+), Bf 11OC KRIEGSMARINE - GROSSADMIRAL ERICH RAEDER Marinegruppe Kommando West - Adm. Alfred Saalwachter Kustenbefehlshaber Sudwest (Den Helder) - V.Adm. Lothar von Arnauld 1. Schnellbootsflotilla - Kit. Heinz Birnbacher Four S-boats Tender Tsingtau 2. Schnellbootsflotilla - Kit. Rudolf Petersen Five S-boats Tender Tango Unterseebootsfuhrung - KsZ. Eberhard Godt 1. Unterseebootsflotilla - Korvettenkapitan Hans Eckermann Nine Type II coastal submarines Tender Saar

Pzjag.-Abt RADRALH RALT RAP RATTT RC RD RDP RI RP RRT RZ SR StG ZG -

Panzerjager-Abteilung R e g i m e n t d ' a r t i l l e r y divisionnaire R e g i m e n t d'artillerie l o u r d e hippomobile Regiment d'artillerie l o u r d e tractee R e g i m e n t d'artillerie de p o s i t i o n Regiment d'artillery divisionnaire tractee tous-terrains R e g i m e n t de cuirassiers R e g i m e n t de dragons Regiment de dragons portes R e g i m e n t d'infanterie Regiment de pionniers Regiment r e g i o n a u x de travailleurs R e g i m e n t de zouaves Schutzen-Regiment Stukageschwader Zerstorergeschwader

OPPOSING PLANS You are now authorized

to operate

towards

the coast

forthwith

in conjunction

with

the French

and Belgian

armies.

Secretary of State for War Anthony Eden to BEF Commander Lord Gort, just before 1900hrs, 26 M a y 1940

OPERATION

DYNAMO

The ability to rescue the BEF actually depended on two plans that met at the water's edge. The BEF had to organize a withdrawal into and defence of the Dunkirk perimeter, as well as develop an embarkation programme; Dover Command had to organize, control and protect the shipping, its routes and the embarkation points. To prevent the Luftwaffe from interrupting the desperate process, the RAF had to provide continuous, effective air cover. To orchestrate the BEF's part, Lord Gort chose III Corps commander Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Adam. His primary staff elements consisted of the BEF's quartermaster-general, chief engineer, and Lt. Col. Bridgeman. Adam was charged with surveying the ground and making all necessary plans for a defensive perimeter, organizing the means to sustain the 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 British troops, and making the preparations for effective and timely embarkations. To establish a defensible perimeter, Lord Gort sent the commander of the 48th (South Midland) Division, Major-General Andrew F. A. N . Thorne, his staff and his 144th Brigade to Dunkirk on 2 5 May. Upon arrival, Thorne found that Gen. Fagalde had already established a strong defence in depth, with what remained of 21e Division d'infanterie deployed behind the line Gravelines-Watten-Cassel and General de division Beaufrere's 68e Division d'infanterie entrenched along a secondary line of canals connecting M a r d y c k Spycker-Bergues, heavily supported by artillery. Consequently Thorne placed the 144th Brigade on the left flank of the secondary line at Wormhoudt. Working together, Adam and Fagalde quickly mapped out a defensible 48km (30-mile) perimeter using as many contiguous water barriers as possible. With Fagalde already holding the west side of the perimeter, it was naturally agreed that arriving French troops would be placed west of the Dunkirk-Bergues Canal. In the British portion Adam placed II Corps furthest east, covering the two canals forming the corner at Nieuport and extending almost to Furnes. I Corps would defend the centre around Furnes and III Corps would fill in between there and Bergues. Adam planned for the BEF to be evacuated in reverse order: III, II and I Corps with the last providing the rearguard. Embarkation assembly areas and control centres were established at three beaches: Malo-les-Bains, an eastern suburb of Dunkirk (for III Corps); Bray-Dunes Plage, 10km (6 miles) to the east (I Corps); and La Panne Bains (now De Panne), 6km (4 miles) further east (II Corps). 27

Gort's next task was to organize the orderly withdrawal into the perimeter by forces spread about both sides of the Dunkirk-Lille Pocket. On the eastern front, on the morning of 26 M a y Gort directed Major-General Harold E. Franklyn to move his 5th Division northwards to man positions along the Comines-Ypres Canal, filling the gap between the Belgians and II Corps. Required to shield the retirement routes of I Corps and rear echelon formations withdrawing from the bottom of the pocket northwards to Dunkirk, this movement was largely carried out by the GHQ motor transport companies. Franklyn's troops would be followed by Major-General Giffard Martel's 50th Division once the GHQ transport returned to pick them up. On the western side, command of III Corps was passed to Major-General S. R. Wason RA, Gort's chief of artillery. Wason could exercise only limited control over his four divisions since their brigades were scattered in small detachments and communication was problematic. Consequently, he spent most of the next two days attempting to coordinate the withdrawal effort with the French lere Armee. Realizing that there was no option open to him but to follow the British lead, at 2230hrs on 25 M a y Gen. Blanchard issued the order: 'The lere Armee, the BEF and the Belgian Army will regroup progressively behind the water-line demarcated by the Aa Canal, the Lys and the " C a n a l de Derivation" so as to form a bridgehead covering Dunkirk in breadth.' The French plan for the withdrawal was to pull the divisions of lere Armee back successively to the Scarpe, Deule Canal and Lys concurrent with the BEF retirements. Separate retreat routes were established for French and British units but because of their relative locations in the pocket and the situation each faced, often these were not used. In any event Blanchard considered the movement as simply a retreat into a more defensible pocket, a supersized fortress. As his Operational Order N o . 30 (26 May) emphasized, T h i s bridgehead will be held with no thought of retreat.' But the British thought only in terms of evacuating their defeated army. Assigned the task of planning for just this contingency, V. Adm. Ramsay had already organized the evacuation of 4,368 troops from Boulogne, 4 4 0 from Calais and had returned 23,128 non-combat personnel to England.

Thames m o t o r b o a t s u n d e r t o w by a Royal Navy t u g b o a t . Because a large n u m b e r of t r o o p s w o u l d have t o be lifted f r o m t h e beaches, Ramsay's naval and large personnel vessels w e r e a u g m e n t e d by w h a t became k n o w n as t h e 'little ships'. Note t h a t t h e davits of t h e SS President are e m p t y . (IWM HU3384)

29

Dunkirk Harbour w h e n t h e Royal Navy arrived. The SaintPol oil refinery burns fiercely in t h e b a c k g r o u n d as a paddlew h e e l minesweeper steams i n t o t h e harbour and HMS

Vanquisher

(foreground)

positions t o d o so. The east m o l e is t o t h e left, w i t h o n e vessel d o c k e d there, and t h e west m o l e w i t h its l i g h t h o u s e is t o t h e right. (IWM C1720)

Protected by his reinforced destroyer f l o t i l l a a large contingent o f impressed m e r c h a n t vessels - m a i n l y cross-Channel passenger ferries a n d r a i l w a y packet steamers -

a n c h o r e d at D o v e r , S o u t h a m p t o n a n d the D o w n s

(between

G o o d w i n Sands a n d the K e n t coastline) were organized by Ramsay's h a n d p i c k e d 1 6 - m a n DYNAMO

staff. These vessels, called 'personnel ships', were

augmented w i t h six 'coasters', 16 m o t o r i z e d barges, five Belgian tugboats and 4 0 D u t c h SCHUYTS (squat, f l a t - b o t t o m e d , s h a l l o w - d r a u g h t m o t o r i z e d coastal cargo vessels, called ' s k o o t s ' by the B r i t i s h a n d m a n n e d w i t h R N crews) anchored i n the D o w n s , plus 32 naval auxiliaries ( m o t o r t r a n s p o r t , stores and p e t r o l ships, etc.) A t this p o i n t D u n k i r k ' s p o r t facilities were still operational a n d D o v e r C o m m a n d p l a n n e d f o r these larger vessels t o shuttle i n convoys d e p a r t i n g every f o u r h o u r s between the t w o p o r t s , a n d sent the five Belgian tugs ahead t o help t h e m manoeuvre i n the t i g h t confines o f the ancient harbour. H o w e v e r , because the BEF p l a n n e d f o r some e m b a r k a t i o n t o be done f r o m the beaches east o f D u n k i r k , the A d m i r a l t y realized t h a t a huge n u m b e r o f smaller vessels w o u l d be r e q u i r e d very s o o n . T o supplement the D o v e r C o m m a n d ' s 76 s m a l l c r a f t , f o u r Belgian passenger launches a n d Ramsgate customs m o t o r b o a t s i m m e d i a t e l y available, the Small Vessels P o o l (SVP) c o m m a n d e d by Vice A d m i r a l Sir L i o n e l Preston - gathered 43 pleasure craft near Westminster Pier, b u t i t was o b v i o u s these w o u l d n o t be enough. M o s t o f the dozen staff officers o f Preston's SVP were dispatched t o the p r i n c i p a l y a c h t i n g centres, the R o y a l N a v y Reserve's south-coast t r a i n i n g establishment, a n d the Ports o f L o n d o n a n d P l y m o u t h t o r e q u i s i t i o n as m a n y seaworthy 'little ships' as c o u l d be f o u n d . I n the n e x t f e w days, f r o m every p o r t between P l y m o u t h a n d H u l l streams o f smaller vessels began t o f l o w , eventually gathering at Ramsgate, anxious t o participate i n one o f the m o s t m o n u m e n t a l events i n m a r i t i m e a n d m i l i t a r y history. I t w o u l d be the mission o f the A i r V i c e - M a r s h a l K e i t h Park's 11 G r o u p t o p r o v i d e f i g h t e r p r o t e c t i o n over the p o r t , beaches a n d ships. T o d o so, he p l a n n e d t o p r o v i d e a l t e r n a t i n g waves o f Spitfires a n d H u r r i c a n e s beginning at d a w n each day. These w o u l d l a u n c h at 5 0 - m i n u t e intervals ( f r o m 0430hrs u n t i l 1930hrs) t o cover the French coast i n s q u a d r o n strength, t y p i c a l l y 12 aircraft. P a t r o l l i n g b e y o n d the effective range o f the n e w C h a i n H o m e radar system, the relatively untested Spitfire a n d H u r r i c a n e pilots w o u l d be operating i n an aerial n o man's l a n d against the battle-hardened JAGDFLIEGER o f the L u f t w a f f e . 30

THE GERMAN PLAN T O DEAL W I T H THE DUNKIRK POCKET For all its vaunted military prowess, the German problem of how to deal with the trapped Allied forces in Flanders was not so much the lack of a plan, though no comprehensive, agreed-upon plan of action existed for this contingency, but the fact that no real operational aim was established and no one was, initially at least, placed in charge of achieving one. Ostensibly, the O K H chief of staff, Gen.Maj. Franz Haider, was responsible for developing the plan for the final phase of Fall Gelb, but disagreements at the highest levels thwarted the institution of such a plan. In his diary, Haider wrote, 'This is a complete reversal of the elements of [my] plan. I wanted to make A[rmy]Gp A the hammer and A G p B the anvil in this operation. N o w B will be the hammer and A the anvil. As A G p B is confronted with a consolidated front, progress will be slow and casualties high. The Air Force, on which all hopes are pinned, is completely dependent upon the weather.' With Haider's O K H plan thrown out of the window and no specific subordinate command charged with eliminating the trapped Allied forces there could be no development of a coherent plan to do so. Each command - two army groups, three armies and 15 corps - had their own objectives, means, and ways of destroying the enemy before them. Considering that for a while Hitler even conveniently passed the responsibility for their destruction to Goring's Luftwaffe, one is left with the profound impression that no one was really in charge. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe opened its air campaign against Dunkirk on the 25th, conducting two days of massive bombing. From this point on Luftwaffe leaders intended to bomb the cornered Allied troops into submission as they had the Polish armies surrounded in the Ilza and Bzura pockets (see Campaign 107: Poland 1939) the previous September. At the highest levels there was supreme confidence in this concept. Even Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (ObdL) chief of staff General der Flieger Hans Jeschonnek overcame his initial pessimism to become 'absolutely convinced that the Luftwaffe would succeed in destroying the British Expeditionary Force in and around Dunkirk and prevent its shipment to the British Isles'. Other leaders were less enthusiastic. Luftflotte 3's General der Flieger Hugo Sperrle - commanding II, V and VIII Fliegerkorps - was ambivalent about the operation and failed to make any detailed preparations for it. Because the greater prize - the better part of France - lay within his area of operations to the south and since O K H planning for Fall Rot (Case Red) had begun on 20 May he was far less concerned about the defeated Allied armies trapped in the pocket to the north, so he left the attack planning to his three subordinate Fliegerkorps commanders. However, because one of these was still back in Germany and another was busy covering the Somme flank, only Richthofen remained and his close air support command was too consumed with the day-to-day tasking orders from various echelons of Heeresgruppe A to make any operational plans at a higher, more strategic level. Thus it is accurate to state that the Germans had no real 'plan' to deal with the Allied forces trapped in the Dunkirk Pocket but reacted from day to day, changing their operations, orders of battle, lines of responsibilities and even their overall objectives on a completely, and uncharacteristically, ad hoc basis.

31

THE CAMPAIGN

Operation Dynamo is to commence... with the greatest vigour Signal from the Admiralty to Flag Officer Commanding Dover, 1857hrs, 26 May 1940

T H E R A C E IS O N , S U N D A Y 26 M A Y As the s o u t h e r n m o s t BEF units a n d French l e r e A r m e e began p r e p a r i n g t o retire n o r t h w a r d s t o the Scarpe, H i t l e r ' s personal m i l i t a r y staff, the O K W , t e l e p h o n e d the O K H a u t h o r i z i n g X I X A K (mot.) t o close t o w i t h i n artillery range o f D u n k i r k ' i n order t o cut off, f r o m the l a n d side, the c o n t i n u o u s f l o w o f t r a n s p o r t (evacuations a n d a r r i v a l s ) ' . H i t l e r h a d w a i t e d l o n g e n o u g h ; his h o p e d - f o r w e s t w a r d m o v e o f the A l l i e d armies h a d n o t m a t e r i a l i z e d , instead they were f i g h t i n g tenaciously a l o n g the Sensee, f r o n t i e r a n d Lys. A l o n g the C a n a l L i n e the scattered enemy units were d i g g i n g i n , n o t h u r l i n g themselves against the Panzers a r r a y e d there. A t 1 5 3 0 h r s this call was f o l l o w e d by a go order d i r e c t i n g Heeresgruppe A t o resume its offensive w i t h 'a f o r w a r d thrust f r o m the west by Panzer g r o u p s a n d i n f a n t r y divisions i n the direction[s of] T o u r n a i , Cassel [and] D u n k i r k ' . A t Chateau Bonne Etable near Bethune - site of Kluge's A O K 4 H Q - the w o r d arrived by Fieseler 156 Storch courier aircraft 45 minutes later and immediately the Panzer commanders were notified. Tank crews were alerted and as operational directives were issued, the tanks were topped up w i t h fuel and loaded w i t h a m m u n i t i o n and f o r m e d u p i n t o columns t o resume their advance. However, all this t o o k time - over 12 hours i n fact - and while most of the units in Guderian's X I X A K (mot.) had only 1 6 - 2 7 k m ( 1 0 - 1 7 miles) to go to reach D u n k i r k , they could not begin until the pre-dawn hours the next day. Guderian's m o t o r i z e d i n f a n t r y units were able t o attack m o r e immediately. T h e I R (mot.) 'Grossdeutschland' and I R (mot.) 'Leibstandarte SS A d o l f H i t l e r ' opened their attacks at B o u r b o u r g a n d W a t t e n , respectively. A t B o u r b o u r g the t e r r a i n was interlaced w i t h ditches a n d s m a l l canals a n d i n the intervening days h a d been largely f l o o d e d , g i v i n g the defending French 137e R l a decided advantage. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the t w o b a t t a l i o n s o f a r t i l l e r y (III/35e R A D and V I / 2 3 5 e R A D ) h a d been given p l e n t y o f t i m e t o sight i n their batteries and the attacks were repulsed w i t h heavy casualties. A t W a t t e n the g r o u n d was n o t so favourable a n d the defenders were n o t nearly as stout. T h e t w o reservist battalions a n d t w o t r a i n i n g battalions f r o m Gen. Barthelemy's Secteur fortifie de Flandres - even bolstered by corps artillery (1/115e R A L H ) a n d screened by elements o f t w o reconnaissance groups - were o v e r r u n or forced back t o secondary lines. Fagalde h u r r i e d t w o regular infantry battalions (I/48e R l and II/65e R l , f r o m the decimated 21e D i v i s i o n d'infanterie) a n d t w o artillery battalions (H/35e R A D a n d V / 2 3 5 e R A D ) t o Bollezeele t o halt the G e r m a n s ' advance. 32

A Waffen-SS MG 26(t) (Czechbuilt ZB vz.26 7.92mm) light m a c h i n e - g u n t e a m make their w a y t h r o u g h thick u n d e r b r u s h such as was e n c o u n t e r e d in Bois d u Ham near W a t t e n . Because OKH's 'go order' was received t o o late in t h e day t o resume Panzer operations o n 26 May, Guderian's m o t o r i z e d infantry units w e n t into action w i t h o u t a r m o u r e d support. (IWMMH1923)

Weary Belgian artillery retreating. Hard pressed by Kuchler's AOK 18, t h e Belgian A r m y had f o u g h t well and stubbornly, its retreats occasioned n o t by its o w n failures b u t by t h e French collapse t o t h e south, a l l o w i n g t h e Germans t o t u r n t h e flank of t h e Allies' Groupe d'armees 1. (IWM F4484)

At the southern end of the BEF's western battle line the battalions of the 2nd Division, widely scattered along La Bassee Canal, were faced by two motorized SS divisions (the SS-Verfugungs Division, later renamed the 2. SS-Panzer-Division 'Das Reich', and the new SS-Division T o t e n k o p P ) who limited their attacks to establishing bridgeheads at several points. The real crisis was on the eastern side of the Allied pocket where Bock's Heeresgruppe B had no interruptions in its continued attacks. King Leopold's IVe Corps attempted to hold the line from Ypres to Roulers by placing some 2,000 railway carriages end to end on the 18km (11-mile) railway connecting the two cities as an anti-tank barrier. While this held (Bock had no tanks), the rest of the Belgian line no longer had any barriers, natural or man made, and to the east of Roulers the Germans soon penetrated at Iseghem, Nevele and Ronsele. The last Belgian reserve, the lere Division de chasseurs Ardennais, was thrown into the breach and stopped the 2 2 5 . Infanterie-Division at Vynckt but a new hole soon appeared near Ecloo when the 256. Infanterie-Division fought their way across the Lys Canal de Derivation at Balgerhoeck. With no reserves remaining, three tired regiments from depleted divisions were rushed into the gaps while in the rear auxiliary troops formed a new line using ancient World War I 75mm guns taken from training centres. 33

LEFT Major-General Harold E. Franklyn outside his w i n t e r 'Phoney War' HQ at Wambrechies o n 22 January 1940. (IWM 0 1 1 8 8 ) RIGHT Luftwaffe m e d i u m b o m b e r units flying f r o m Germany were escorted by t w i n - e n g i n e Messerschmitt Bf 110C heavy fighters, such as these f r o m ll./ZG 26 flying over their base at Neuss. D e m o n s t r a t i n g their inexperience, RAF pilots flying 11 Hurricanes and t w o Spitfires w e r e shot d o w n by poorly m a n o e u v r i n g Z e r s t o r e r , w h o lost o n l y six in return. (Courtesy of t h e Vasco/Cornwell Collection)

34

By n o o n i t was apparent t h a t they c o u l d n o longer h o l d back the Germans a n d L e o p o l d r e p o r t e d t o the F r e n c h t h a t 'the Belgian A r m y is i n a serious s i t u a t i o n a n d . . . has n e a r l y reached the l i m i t s o f its e n d u r a n c e ' . T h i s was repeated a n d emphasized at 1 8 0 0 h r s w h e n G e n . B l a n c h a r d a r r i v e d at the Belgian G H Q a n d at the same t i m e a message was sent t o the BEF G H Q saying ' I n the absence o f Belgian reserves w e c a n n o t e x t e n d the b o u n d a r y n o t i f i e d yesterday any f u r t h e r t o the r i g h t . We are compelled regretfully t o say t h a t w e have n o longer any forces available t o bar the w a y f r o m Ypres.' W h i l e the spent Belgian A r m y h o l d i n g the east f l a n k o f the pocket was c r u m b l i n g under the weight of massive and incessant g r o u n d and air assaults, the fact that they h a d held north-east o f Ypres - plus inundations prepared east of the Yser Canal - p r o v i d e d enough time for G o r t t o move M a j . Gen. Franklyn's 5 t h D i v i s i o n n o r t h t o m a n the 8 k m (5-mile) length of the disused, and completely dry, C o m i n e s - Y p r e s C a n a l . T a k i n g o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f the 1 4 3 r d Brigade o n his r i g h t , F r a n k l y n stationed his o w n 1 3 t h Brigade i n the centre and the 17th Brigade o n the left. F r a n k l y n was backed by t w o regiments of artillery and all o f I C o r p s ' heavy guns. T h e 5 0 t h Division's lead u n i t , the 1 5 0 t h Brigade, f o l l o w e d the 5 t h D i v i s i o n , passing behind Franklyn's forces to occupy and defend Ypres, but w o u l d n o t arrive u n t i l the next evening. I n L o n d o n , c o n v i n c e d by an ' U l t r a ' intercept ( e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the G e r m a n ' E n i g m a ' e n c r y p t e d signals) o f the O K W ' s 'go o r d e r ' the n i g h t before, C h u r c h i l l h a d n o w a r r i v e d at the same c o n c l u s i o n as G o r t . M e e t i n g w i t h R e y n a u d he encouraged c o n t i n u e d f i g h t i n g b u t also urged a w i t h d r a w a l to the coast f o r the BEF a n d F r e n c h l e r e A r m e e . R e l u c t a n t l y the French Premier consented t o the general w i t h d r a w a l t o the coast; however, he w a s n ' t t o l d t h a t the B r i t i s h were c o n s i d e r i n g evacuating the BEF. I n fact the o n l y n o t i f i c a t i o n given t o the French leadership was at 0500hrs the n e x t day t h r o u g h the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y M i s s i o n t o the French G Q G ( G r a n d Q u a r t i e r G e n e r a l ) . A t this t i m e , o n d i r e c t i o n o f Secretary o f State f o r W a r A n t h o n y E d e n , M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir R i c h a r d H o w a r d - V y s e 'consulted' w i t h G e n . W e y g a n d r e g a r d i n g the Supreme A l l i e d C o m m a n d e r ' s desired ' d e s t i n a t i o n o f the [BEF] a n d any French units t h a t i t m i g h t p r o v e possible t o evacuate'. W e y g a n d h a d his n a v a l chief, A m i r a l Jean-Francois D a r l a n , 'study [the p o s s i b i l i t y o f ] r e - e m b a r k a t i o n ' , b u t the o n l y d i r e c t o u t c o m e was t o establish a l i a i s o n w i t h D o v e r C o m m a n d a n d g r a n t permission t o evacuate w o u n d e d , ' s u p e r f l u o u s Staff elements' a n d 'certain categories o f specialists', p r i m a r i l y t e c h n i c a l l y t r a i n e d t r o o p s such as artillerists a n d t a n k crews w h o c o u l d be better e m p l o y e d s o u t h o f the Somme.

Nevertheless, a little over t w o a n d a half hours after the Panzers were once again unleashed, the A d m i r a l t y signalled ' O p e r a t i o n Dynamo is t o commence'. T h r o u g h o u t the day Ramsay's o n g o i n g shuttle service c o n t i n u e d ; d u r i n g the m o r n i n g t w o h o s p i t a l carriers b r o u g h t h o m e 6 4 6 w o u n d e d . I n the late a f t e r n o o n six personnel ships a r r i v e d , delivering 2 5 0 service and signals troops a n d 12,000 gallons of water, and rescued 3,748 m e n w i t h the 1,182-ton French steamer Rouen t a k i n g 4 2 0 w o u n d e d poilus t o C h e r b o u r g .

T H E P A N Z E R S R O L L , M O N D A Y 27 M A Y T h e f i r s t f u l l day o f O p e r a t i o n Dynamo, the L u f t w a f f e c o m p l e t e d the d e s t r u c t i o n o f D u n k i r k as a n o p e r a t i n g seaport. F l y i n g 2 2 5 b o m b e r a n d 75 Stuka sorties a n d d r o p p i n g over 3 5 0 tons o f b o m b s , f o u r Fliegerkorps Captain William G. Tennant RN. Chief Staff Officer t o t h e First Sea Lord, T e n n a n t was a f o r m e r cruiser captain and cruiser squadron c o m m a n d e r w h o had v o l u n t e e r e d t o assist in t h e evacuation. He later c o m m a n d e d t h e battlecruiser HMS Repulse and d u r i n g

Overlord was in charge of Mulberry (artificial harbour) and PLUTO (undersea pipeline) operations. (© National Portrait Gallery, London)

( I , I I , I V a n d V I I I ) u n d e r t o o k a series o f r a i d s . T h e y began w i t h waves o f H e i n k e l I l l s ( f r o m K G 1 a n d 4) p u l v e r i z i n g D u n k i r k ' s h a r b o u r facilities, c o m p l e t i n g the d e v a s t a t i o n o f the seven d o c k i n g basins, 8 k m (5 miles) o f quays a n d 4 7 h a (115 acres) o f docks a n d warehouses. T h e next wave ( K G 54) sank the 8 , 0 3 3 - t o n F r e n c h steamer Aden near the eastern breakwater. A t 0 7 4 0 h r s Stukas (StG 2) sank the French 3 , 0 4 7 - t o n steamer Cote d'Azur a n d a n a u x i l i a r y minesweeper as w e l l as the 8 6 8 - t o n B r i t i s h 'coaster' Worthtown. F i n a l l y D o r n i e r 1 7 Z s ( K G 2 a n d 3) w r e c k e d the r a i l w a y yards a n d set f i r e t o the t o w n a n d the Saint-Pol refinery. By n o o n the p o r t was c o m p l e t e l y b l o c k e d a n d the fires raged unchecked - k i l l i n g 1,000 civilians the huge p a l l o f o i l y b l a c k s m o k e , r i s i n g 3 , 5 0 0 m ( 1 1 , 5 0 0 f t ) i n t o the air, p r o v i d i n g a beacon f o r b o t h the raiders a n d defenders. R o y a l A i r Force fighters countered w i t h 2 8 7 sorties f l o w n i n 23 missions, p a t r o l l i n g f r o m Gravelines t o Furnes w i t h occasional forays as far east as Ostend and south t o Saint-Omer. They accounted f o r seven D o 17Zs ( K G 2 and K G 3 ) , t w o J u 88s ( I I . / L G 1) a n d six H e I l l s ( K G 5 1 , K G 53 and K G 54) destroyed, b u t lost heavily t o the bombers' defensive fire and escorting fighters. B a t t l i n g 5 5 0 Messerschmitts operating i n Gruppe strength (40 fighters) R A F squadrons lost 14 H u r r i c a n e s a n d five Spitfires i n dogfights above the beaches. M o r e t h r e a t e n i n g t o A l l i e d s h i p p i n g w e r e the recently c a p t u r e d shore batteries a n d G e r m a n heavy a r t i l l e r y near Calais. Passing o n l y 2 k m (1 mile) offshore east o f Calais the 8 7 0 - t o n m o t o r vessel Sequacity was h i t f o u r times a n d s a n k , its 1 3 - m a n c r e w b e i n g rescued by a t r a m p steamer t h a t was d a m a g e d by the barrages. T w o other steamers a n d a B r i t i s h destroyer were also h i t , a n d three a d d i t i o n a l ships t u r n e d back because o f the shellfire. T h e r o u t e between D o v e r a n d D u n k i r k being used (later labelled Route Z ) was the shortest possible, o n l y 6 3 k m (40 miles), considering t h a t Ramsay and A b r i a l ' s c o m m a n d s h a d done their previous mission w e l l : s o w i n g the Channel between the D o w n s a n d N i e u p o r t w i t h 5,000 mines i n 33 large fields. Skirting t h e m t o the s o u t h , the r o u t e hugged the French coast f r o m Calais t o D u n k i r k b u t n o w G e r m a n heavy a r t i l l e r y made it unusable i n daylight. D u n k i r k c o u l d also be reached by c i r c u m n a v i g a t i n g the fields t o the n o r t h , steaming t o K w i n t e B u o y o f f O s t e n d before d o u b l i n g back via Z u y d c o o t e Pass, along the eastern edge o f the m i n e f i e l d s . W h i l e this 1 4 0 k m (87-mile) r o u t e exposed Ramsay's ships t o the L u f t w a f f e a n d S-boats, i t avoided the deadly accurate G e r m a n shore batteries. A c c e p t i n g the r i s k , at l l O O h r s Ramsay dispatched t w o personnel ships, t w o h o s p i t a l carriers a n d a pair o f destroyers via w h a t w o u l d become R o u t e Y.

36

A shorter route (88.5km, 55 miles, titled Route X ) was plotted diagonally from North Goodwin light to the north end of Ruytingen Bank then angling south through the heavily mined Ruytingen Pass. To clear the channel Ramsay sent two minesweepers, a minelaying destroyer (equipped with minesweeping gear) and a lighthouse tender (to mark the route with buoys). These were followed later by two more minesweepers, the anti-aircraft cruiser H M S Calcutta, three destroyers and two personnel ships. While these two groups made it safely it was apparent that until Ruytingen Pass could be systematically swept and marked with 'dans' (small flag-topped buoys), the longer, more exposed Route Y would be the primary course between Dunkirk and Dover. At 1900hrs arriving aboard another destroyer was Captain William G. Tennant, the Senior Naval Officer (SNO-Dunkirk), with 172 R N personnel and a communications staff, to establish the shore parties to control the embarkation process. He quickly assessed the port as unusable - the city was ablaze and the facilities completely destroyed - and signalled Dover, 'Please send every available craft to beaches East of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is problematic.' The latter part of the message w a s motivated by Brigadier Geoffrey Mansergh, II C o r p s ' chief administrative officer. Aware that the Panzer offensive had resumed, he told Tennant 'we expect the German tanks on the beaches within 24 hours - 36 at the most'. In an effort to rescue as many as possible of the 2 0 , 0 0 0 rear-area troops then inside the Dunkirk perimeter, Tennant ordered two personnel ships and the destroyers to begin evacuating troops from the beaches using their lifeboats. Responding to the urgent request, at Dover V. Adm. Ramsay ordered four paddle minesweepers and all his available smaller ships - 15 schuyts and 17 drifters - to proceed to the beaches and recalled four destroyers patrolling the eastern approaches to the Channel to do the same. The Panzer offensive on the west side of the pocket had indeed resumed. Early in the morning Guderian hurled 10. Panzer-Division's PR 4 across the Aa at Watten to assault the French infantry battalions at Bollezeele. Even with three battalions of artillery the French regulars were no match for

Leopold

m, King of

the

Belgians. (IWM HU48971)

37

Captured Belgian soldiers walk t o t h e rear w h i l e German artillery passes t h e m headed for Nieuport. A l t h o u g h t h e f i g h t i n g was over, Belgian roads were c l o g g e d w i t h t r o o p s and refugees a n d , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e late start, slowed t h e German approach t o Dunkirk. (IWM HU75891)

the armour and by the end of the day were overrun, one battalion (I/48e RI) and some artillery (II/35e R A D and I/115e RALH) surviving and withdrawing to Drincham. Similarly, north of Bourbourg the 1. Panzer-Division pulverized II/137e RI, breaking through in the afternoon to close a steel ring around Gravelines (II/310e RI) and Fort Philippe (VII/310e RI). Further south Major-General Noel Irwin's 2nd Division attempted to hold a 32km (20-mile) length of canal from Aire to La Bassee. Along this front the full fury of three Panzer and two SS divisions was unleashed. Following a devastating artillery bombardment, in the pre-dawn darkness tanks rolled through the bridgeheads and violently assaulted the scattered British battalions. Without anti-tank guns (all sent to the Dunkirk perimeter) and with very limited artillery (reassigned to II Corps) the defenders were overrun at almost every point. In the centre of the line, the battalions of the 4th Brigade were battered, surrounded and systematically destroyed by the 4. Panzer-Division and SS-Division 'Totenkopf. On the right flank the 6th Brigade was overrun by the 3. Panzer-Division and virtually wiped out by noon, the survivors seeking shelter in the Forest of Nieppe. On the left the 5th Brigade was beaten back by Rommel's 7. Panzer-Division. A small futile counterattack briefly spoiled his success, but shortly after noon Rommel launched a powerful coordinated assault that drove an armoured wedge deep towards Armentieres, the first step in the encirclement and eventual destruction of the French lere Armee at Lille. Meanwhile on the more desperately threatened east side of the pocket, at the Comines-Ypres Canal, Franklyn's three brigades were hit by the full strength of three infantry divisions. Enemy assaults were powerful and the fighting vicious. In a dramatic see-saw battle the British gave ground and counterattacked repeatedly. Finally, the fighting died down at last about midnight, giving the exhausted British troops some respite before the new day brought renewed German attacks. With the 5th Division holding throughout the day, I Corps began pulling out of line about 2200hrs with the 1st Division beginning its two-day 95km (60-mile) trek north, all the way to the Dunkirk perimeter, leaving behind three battalions as an emergency reserve for II Corps. The 42nd Division 38

Disabled British anti-aircraft guns along t h e p r o m e n a d e at Bray-Dunes. (IWM HU2286)

followed, one brigade, the 125th, stopping to set up a rearguard on the Deule Canal between Lille and Wambrechies while the others, the 126th and 127th, formed the new line on the Lys east of Armentieres. Behind them Major-General Bernard L. Montgomery's 3rd Division began its 40km (25-mile) move to take position on Franklyn's left. Transported by 2,000 troop carriers, lorries, vans and staff cars Montgomery's 13,600 men passed behind the 4th and 5th Divisions and arrived at their new positions at lOOOhrs, extending the British line north to near Noordschote. Once Montgomery had passed behind them, the 4th Division retired directly to the west, redeploying behind the Lys west of Warneton. One of its brigades, the 12th, covered the right flank of the neighbouring 5th Division and while the two others, the 10th and 11th, became Franklyn's reserves. Attempting to close the gap created by the departure of the British divisions, the French lere Armee also began its retirement to the north, but things did not work out so well. Marching on foot, hungry, exhausted, low on ammunition and harried by incessant Luftwaffe attacks, their three corps had to cross the Deule Canal between Provin and Lille in order to reach the new defensive line on the Lys. Unfortunately General de corps d'armee Aymer's 4e Corps d'armee was only able to withdraw to around Seclin, south of the canal, regrouping the next day. General de corps d'armee Rene Altmayer's 5e Corps d'armee came under heavy artillery fire and almost continual air attacks and soon became lost, frustrated and confused. More fortunate was General de corps d'armee de la Laurencie's 3e Corps d'armee, which had the advantage of following the British divisions north of Lille. By this time the Belgian Army was being forced into a pocket of its own. Their right flank was pushed back to the north-east near Passchendaele, some 13km (8 miles) from the end of the BEF line at Ypres. Closing in from the east the German X X V I AK penetrated Belgian lines at Maldegem and Ursel. In their centre, two German divisions opened a 7km (4-mile) gap between Thielt and Iseghem, counterattacks were repulsed and the Germans' route to Bruges and Ostend lay open. Communications and transport were in chaos and the throng of refugees - an estimated 3 million people in an area of 1,700km 2 (650 square miles) - made any meaningful manoeuvres impossible. 39

The Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf 109E d o m i n a t e d t h e air battles f o u g h t over Dunkirk. Fighter sweeps {FREIJAGD) a n d b o m b e r escorts {JAGDSCHUTZ) effectively w a r d e d off t h e RAF fighters, eventually s h o o t i n g d o w n 30 Hurricanes, 20 Spitfires a n d six Defiants for t h e loss of 26'Emils'. (Courtesy of t h e Lawrence Collection)

J.

Hickey

At

1230hrs

Leopold

telegraphed

Lord

Gort,

'The time

is

rapidly

a p p r o a c h i n g w h e n [we] w i l l be unable t o c o n t i n u e the f i g h t . [I] w i l l be forced t o c a p i t u l a t e t o a v o i d a collapse.' T w o h o u r s later the French liaison officers w e r e also i n f o r m e d . W i t h t h e i r backs t o the sea, a m m u n i t i o n exhausted a n d the hospitals o v e r f l o w i n g the Belgians h a d done all they c o u l d . A t 1545hrs L e o p o l d opened n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the surrender o f his a r m y a n d his n a t i o n . S h o r t l y after m i d n i g h t the k i n g accepted H i t l e r ' s d e m a n d f o r u n c o n d i t i o n a l c a p i t u l a t i o n a n d a ceasefire w e n t i n t o effect at 0 4 0 0 h r s the n e x t m o r n i n g . T h e f o r m a l surrender d o c u m e n t was signed later t h a t day.

T H E B E L G I A N S S U R R E N D E R , T U E S D A Y 28 M A Y L e o p o l d ' s c a p i t u l a t i o n o f the Belgian A r m y created a v a c u u m o f sorts o n the eastern side o f the D u n k i r k - L i l l e P o c k e t , t h o u g h one s t i l l c r o w d e d w i t h refugees a n d d i s a r m e d t r o o p s . T h e G e r m a n s w e r e s l o w t o f i l l i t . U s i n g i m p r o v i s e d m o t o r t r a n s p o r t the 2 5 6 . I n f a n t e r i e - D i v i s i o n d i d n o t begin its advance u n t i l H O O h r s , a l l o w i n g the A l l i e s t i m e t o c o b b l e together a n e w defensive line t o b l o c k t h e m . K e y t o this n e w line was General de brigade Deslaurens' 60e D i v i s i o n d ' i n f a n t e r i e , w h i c h h a d been h o l d i n g the L e o p o l d C a n a l n o r t h o f Bruges u n t i l alerted the n i g h t before t h a t the Belgian collapse was i m m i n e n t . L e a v i n g their a r t i l l e r y ( w h i c h h a d been attached t o the Belgian V C o r p s ) Deslaurens' i n f a n t r y began h e a d i n g west. R i d i n g i n commandeered Belgian lorries the 2 4 l e R l made i t t o N i e u p o r t a n d established a n e w line t o the s o u t h , b e h i n d the Yser, b u t the 2 7 0 e R l , m a r c h i n g o n f o o t , was caught, s u r r o u n d e d a n d surrendered the n e x t day. H o t o n the heels o f the F r e n c h , A u f k l . - A b t . 2 5 6 , a m o t o r c y c l e - m o u n t e d reconnaissance u n i t , a r r i v e d at N i e u p o r t a n d captured one bridge intact b u t were halted there by a vicious firefight w i t h the 1 2 t h Lancers' a r m o u r e d cars. Since there was little the Lancers c o u l d d o against a more f o r m i d a b l e assault, a makeshift force o f f o r m e r a r t i l l e r y m e n , a battery o f f o u r W o r l d W a r 118-pdrs, some Grenadiers, engineers a n d s u p p o r t troops (some 5 5 0 m e n altogether) was t h r o w n i n t o the f i g h t at N i e u p o r t . Inside the perimeter a n o t h e r catastrophe threatened the beachhead. T h e 2 n d A n t i - A i r c r a f t Brigade h a d been w i t h d r a w n t o D u n k i r k days before i n o r d e r t o f e n d o f f L u f t w a f f e attacks o n the p o r t a n d the beaches. W i t h an urgent need f o r t r o o p s t o m a n the perimeter, instructions t o the commander, M a j o r - G e n e r a l H e n r y G . M a r t i n , directed h i m t o send any spare gunners t o j o i n the i n f a n t r y a n d evacuate the w o u n d e d a n d i n j u r e d . T h e message was m i s u n d e r s t o o d a n d M a r t i n h a d all (over 100) 3.7in. anti-aircraft guns disabled a n d his gunners q u e u e d u p f o r e v a c u a t i o n , leaving the air defence o f the p o r t a n d perimeter t o smaller 4 0 m m Bofors o f the 51st L i g h t A n t i - A i r c r a f t R e g i m e n t ( w i t h a m a x i m u m effective vertical range o f 1 , 2 2 0 m , 4 , 0 0 0 f t ) a n d the T o m m i e s ' Br en guns. 40

Built in 1936 for t h e New M e d w a y Steam Packet Co. t h e MV Queen of the Channel was t h e first diesel-powered, crossChannel steamer and was t h e most m o d e r n of t h e 32 personnel ships impressed into Royal Navy service for O p e r a t i o n Dynamo. (1936 postcard f r o m t h e Ian Boyle Collection www.simplonpc.co.uk)

Fortunately the spiked anti-aircraft guns would not be needed - at least not this day. The weather deteriorated throughout the day with piles of cloud mingling with the pall of oily smoke soon to obscure the harbour and beaches. Only 75 bombing sorties were flown against Dunkirk, the largest raid arriving at lOOOhrs - K G 77 Dorniers heavily protected by Bf 109Es. The RAF's 11 Group had learned a lesson the previous day and paired its squadrons to create larger formations, though only by flying half the number of patrols (321 sorties in 11 missions). The Messerschmitt escorts (JG 3, J G 26, J G 51 and J G 54) were numerous and effective, only one Do 1 7 Z was lost to RAF fighters but in this and other sporadic clashes during the day three Spitfires, three Defiants and eight Hurricanes were shot down for the loss of only two Bf 109Es. While heavy cloud and continuous rain cloaked the Dunkirk perimeter for the rest of the day, clear skies over Lille funnelled heavy Luftwaffe attacks against the French 4e and 5e Corps d'armee. Paralyzed by repeated air raids, Gens. Aymer and Altmayer gave up retreating and elected to fight it out where they stood. General de la Laurencie, knowing the only hope lay at Dunkirk, continued to lead his 3e Corps d'armee northwards, losing his rearguard (lere Division d'infanterie motorisee) and one other division (2e Division d'infanterie Nord-Africaine) to the closing pincers formed by 7. Panzer-Division from the west and 7. Infanterie-Division from the east. At Dunkirk, beneath the blanket of smoke and clouds, the pace of the evacuation began to increase dramatically. Captain Tennant was dissatisfied with the slow, tedious process of plucking small batches of troops from the beaches. The shallow shelving and numerous sandbars prevented larger ships from approaching closer than 8 0 0 m (2,625ft) and the slow backbreaking rowing of ship's lifeboats required 6 - 1 2 hours to fill the ships to capacity. Consequently during the first full day of Dynamo only 7,669 troops 1 were evacuated. At 2200hrs the night before, Capt. Tennant directed one of the personnel ships, the modern 1,162-ton Queen of the Channel, to try docking against the harbour side of the Jetee de l'est (known as the 'east mole' to the British). This was a rocky 1,280-metre long (4,200ft) breakwater extending from the base of old fortifications to the harbour's mouth. Atop tall pilings set in the tumbled stone boulders was a wooden gangway about two metres wide. While not designed as a docking or embarkation pier, in the darkness Captain 1. There are five sources for the numbers of personnel evacuated during Operation Dynamo, none of which agrees. Used here are the numbers from The Admiralty's Historical Section, which are perhaps not the most accurate but are the highest and therefore the most often quoted. They represent the approximate numbers arriving in England from m i d n i g h t one day t o midnight the next.

41

German and Allied forces engaged around Dunkirk and Lille, 2200hrs 28 May

42

A k n o c k e d - o u t PzKpfw 35(t) o f t h e 6. Panzer-Division's PR 1 1 . (Courtesy o f t h e Thomas Laemlein Collection)

W. J . Odell eased the cross-Channel steamer to the jetty, the crew made fast a head rope and he warped alongside, secured with lines fore and aft. As Tennant watched, 600 troops shuffled down the makeshift dock and boarded Queen of the Channel via ladders and gangplanks. With this success, Tennant and his staff quickly organized berthing parties to secure the ships, set up a control system to manage the flow of men and signalled destroyers to enter the harbour, dock and load. In pairs, six of the nimble warships came alongside, embarked troops and then backed out, turned and headed for Dover at 2 2 knots. Followed by two others lifting men from the beaches, these were replaced by the four destroyers called in from their patrol stations, four more arriving from the Western Approaches and two others from Portsmouth, beginning a steady continuous cycle of embarkations and departures. The day's only major loss was the plucky Queen of the Channel. Just after dawn and just past halfway to Kwinte Buoy, she was spotted by a lone J u 88A (from I./KG 30) on an armed reconnaissance sortie and w a s sent to the bottom, her crew and 904 troops being rescued by the 1,039-ton stores ship Dorrien

Rose.

With embarkations from the east mole shifting into high gear, at llOOhrs Gen. Blanchard arrived at Gort's CP at Houtkerque to discuss the adjustments needed to compensate for the Belgian capitulation. H e w a s shocked and dismayed to learn that the BEF had orders to evacuate from Dunkirk. Also learning that most French troops were too tired to continue retreating, he directed General de corps d'armee Prioux to continue fighting where they were and, if nothing else, save the honour of the French Army. Meanwhile at the Comines-Ypres Canal Franklyn's three tired brigades were again hit by the full strength of three German infantry divisions and another day-long, see-saw battle ensued. Eventually the 17th Brigade w a s overwhelmed and two of the unit's three battalions were virtually annihilated. A late counterattack by the 4th Division's 10th Brigade prevented the same thing from happening to the 13th Brigade, and a late afternoon rainstorm brought the fighting to a close. Once the fighting had died down at 2100hrs the 4th Division - whose artillery had exhausted all their ammunition in the battle - packed up and continued northwards, marching all night to take its positions on the Dunkirk perimeter. 43

A heavily loaded drifter makes its best speed for England as Dunkirk continues t o b u r n in t h e b a c k g r o u n d . These 'little ships' b r o u g h t h o m e only 28,708 m e n , b u t t h e y p r o v i d e d t h e crucial link in ferrying w e t and weary t r o o p s f r o m t h e beaches o u t t o t h e larger vessels w a i t i n g offshore. (IWMHU2108)

N o r t h o f Y p r e s , the 3 r d D i v i s i o n h e l d the line a l o n g the Yser River t o N o o r d s c h o t e . T h e y w e r e shelled b u t n o t seriously challenged by G e r m a n i n f a n t r y w h o w e r e s t i l l m a k i n g t h e i r w a y t h r o u g h the t h r o n g o f disarmed Belgian t r o o p s a n d masses o f f r i g h t e n e d refugees. A t 2 2 0 0 h r s M o n t g o m e r y was ordered t o p u l l back a n d f o r m a n e w defensive line between N o o r d s c h o t e a n d Poperinghe w i t h M a r t e l ' s 5 0 t h D i v i s i o n o n his r i g h t . O n the western side o f the retreat corridor, the 2 , 5 0 0 - m a n remnant of the 2 n d D i v i s i o n straggled n o r t h w a r d s behind the widely spaced brigades of M a j o r General E d m u n d Osborne's 4 4 t h D i v i s i o n . I t h a d rained heavily d u r i n g the n i g h t , m a k i n g the retreat miserable f o r the A l l i e d t r o o p s , but also m a k i n g the g r o u n d very soggy, f o r c i n g the 8. Panzer-Division's heavy mechanized vehicles t o stay o n the r o a d s , l i m i t i n g their m o b i l i t y . Nevertheless, G e r m a n attacks began at d a w n , m o s t l y against the 1 3 2 n d Brigade ensconced i n the Forest of N i e p p e . T h e y were h a m m e r e d by heavy shellfire a n d as SS s t o r m t r o o p e r s a t t a c k e d the o u t l y i n g u n i t s , Panzers d r o v e across the H a z e b r o u c k C a n a l , f o r c i n g the defenders i n t o a series o f f i g h t i n g w i t h d r a w a l s . T h e spaces between Osborne's other units a l l o w e d G e r m a n mechanized u n i t s t o penetrate the line i n several places, a t t a c k i n g the b a t t a l i o n s f r o m m u l t i p l e sides simultaneously, eventually f o r c i n g t h e m t o seek the high g r o u n d called M o n t des Cats near Godewaersvelde. T h i s d o m i n a t i n g p o s i t i o n , 1 0 k m (6 miles) b e h i n d Caestre, was already occupied by t w o R A field regiments one each f r o m the 4 2 n d a n d 4 4 t h D i v i s i o n s - w h o h a d p r o v i d e d Osborne's scattered b a t t a l i o n s w i t h excellent fire s u p p o r t . T h e 4 4 t h D i v i s i o n rallied t o this h i g h g r o u n d t o d i g i n a n d defend it the f o l l o w i n g day w h i l e behind t h e m the 2 n d D i v i s i o n ' s s u r v i v o r s rested at W a t o u . M e a n w h i l e , n o r t h o f Osborne's units M a j o r - G e n e r a l Thome's 4 8 t h Division h a d a t o u g h t i m e . D e f e n d i n g W o r m h o u d t , the 1 4 4 t h Brigade was subjected to heavy b o m b a r d m e n t before the G e r m a n attacks - by the 6. Panzer-Division's SR 4 a n d I R (mot.) 'Leibstandarte SS A d o l f H i t l e r ' - commenced at lOOOhrs. Relentless assaults o v e r w h e l m e d one b a t t a l i o n a n d forced the others to fight their w a y o u t w i t h rifle, grenade and bayonet. The battered Tommies regrouped at Bambecque t h a t evening. A t the w a l l e d h i l l t o p t o w n o f Cassel, 1 4 5 t h Brigade was attacked heavily by PR 11 's Skoda 35(t) 1 0 . 5 - t o n l i g h t tanks t h r o u g h o u t the day. T h e Czechmade tanks w e n t i n w i t h o u t i n f a n t r y support and suffered grievous losses f r o m the brigade's 2 4 a n t i - t a n k guns a n d f o u r 18-pdrs (K Battery, 5 t h Regiment R H A ) f i r i n g t h r o u g h loopholes i n the t o w n ' s t h i c k medieval w a l l s . T h o u g h v i c t o r i o u s , by the end o f the day the T o m m i e s were s u r r o u n d e d .

44

At the northern end of the line, the rifle brigade (1. Schutzenbrigade) and engineers (Pion. Bat. (mot.) 37) of Guderian's 1. Panzer-Division besieged the French fortress troops (II and VII/310e RI) at Gravelines and Fort Philippe. However, anticipating the 3 0 0 k m (186-mile) movement south-east to join Generaloberst von List's A O K 12 for Fall Rot, Guderian withdrew the division's two Panzer regiments to laager along the Samer-Montreuil road near Boulogne. On the front line Guderian's Panzers were replaced by General der Infanterie Gustav von Wietersheim's XIV AK (mot.). Wietersheim left his three original motorized infantry divisions along the Somme and was given three fresh formations to use against the Dunkirk perimeter - the small 9. Panzer-Division (from Heeresgruppe B's X X X I X AK), the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) (from Heeresgruppe B's XVI AK), and the light 1 1 . Schutzenbrigade (mot.) fresh from its one-day conquest of Jutland the month before (see Campaign 183: Denmark and Norway 1940 by the same author, Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2007). Wietersheim was also given IR (mot.) 'Grossdeutschland' and IR (mot.) 'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler', two battalions of Guderian's heavy artillery and his observation aircraft squadrons. While the German commanders nearest Dunkirk reorganized their forces, the evacuations continued unabated. The loss of Queen of the Channel prompted V. Adm. Ramsay to discontinue the use of large steamers during 'hours of full daylight' and dispatched a dozen more minesweepers and 18 schuyts, some of them delivering ammunition, food, medical supplies and 10,000 gallons of water before picking up waiting troops. These, plus a total of 16 destroyers, returned with more of the 11,874 British troops embarked from the harbour and 5,930 from the beaches. Of the total at least 4 6 1 were wounded. Additionally, a small convoy of French supply ships evacuated 2,500 'specialist' troops and 4 8 0 wounded. Although one ship, the 2,954-ton Douaisien, was lost to a magnetic mine, almost all of the 1,000 aboard were rescued. During the day, however, arrivals outpaced embarkations as another 50,000 men trudged into the perimeter. Most of these were rear echelon and combat support troops. They lacked the unit cohesion and individual discipline of fighting units and soon overwhelmed Tennant's slim staff, one of whom referred to them as 'the odds and ends of an army, not the fighting soldiers'. Added to these were a throng of individual soldiers and small units separated from their larger formations and, in the absence of orders or leadership, simply headed for the funeral pyre of Dunkirk. To rescue as many as possible as soon as possible, that night R a m s a y ordered a maximum effort. To the harbour he sent seven personnel ships, three hospital carriers and two additional destroyers. To the beaches he sent 20 destroyers, 19 minesweepers, 20 scbuyts, 17 drifters, five coasters and two tugs towing 18 motorboats and 26 lifeboats. While weather and darkness precluded further Luftwaffe intervention, it encouraged the Kriegsmarine to attempt interdicting this large flow of shipping between Dunkirk and Dover. The north-east corner of Route Y was only 60km (37 miles) from the S-boats' forward base at Flushing and late that afternoon, under a mantle of dark grey skies, three of the fast attack craft departed, cruising stealthily through the scattered rain squalls to take station off Kwinte Buoy hoping to locate and sink some of the many ships passing the well-lit turning point. Their success would be the first of two major disasters to befall the Royal Navy the following day.

THE BATTLE FOR CASSEL, 28 MAY 1940 (pp. 46-47) Cassel is strategically located atop a 176m-high (577ft) 'sugarloaf-shaped hill 30km (19 miles) south of Dunkirk and is the junction of five major roads through the area. This medieval walled city was defended by t w o of the 145th Brigade's infantry battalions, its company of nine 25mm Hotchkiss anti-tank guns, the 209th Battery (reinforced), the Worcestershire Yeomanry (53rd Anti-tank Regt.) with 15 2-pdrs and a battery of four 18-pdrs from 5th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery. In the previous t w o days the defenders had transformed Cassel into a fortress by 'loopholing' the outer walls for the artillery and anti-tank guns and building barricades in the narrow streets. The infantry, 2nd Bn., the Gloucestershire Regt (2nd Glosters) and the 4th Bn., the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Regt (4th Ox and Bucks) - established a defence in depth. Once the Panzer offensive resumed Kampfgruppe Koll, built around Oberstleutnant Richard Koll's PR 11, drove directly towards Cassel. Panzer-Regiment 11 consisted of three tank battalions, each with an authorized strength of 15 PzKpfw lis, 17 PzKpfw IVs and 34 Skoda PzKpfw 35(t)s. In March 1935, the Wehrmacht confiscated 219 of the 10.5-ton Czech tanks, delivering 130 to PR 11. Only one ton heavier than the PzKpfw II, the 35(t) had a much heavier armament: one 3.7cm cannon and two 7.92mm machine guns. By the time PR 11 approached Cassel it had an estimated 20 PzKpfw lis, 25 PzKpfw IVs and 70 PzKpfw 35(t)s operational. Koll began his assault at lOOOhrs. While battalions on both flanks were held up by outposts, some two-dozen tanks advanced from the south. 48

The battle soon became a contest between British anti-tank guns and the tanks' main gun and machine guns. British 25mm and 2-pdr anti-tank rounds ricocheted off the PzKpfw 35(t)s' 25mm front armour until the gunners switched their aim to the tank tracks, or waited until the tanks passed and hit the 16mm side/15mm rear armour. Bombardier Harry Munn described the battle: We fired, they moved, halted and fired. After some 7 5 shells had been fired, [the gun loader asked] When are you going to hit the bloody thing?'. ..sol shouted to [the gun layer] 'Hit [it] in the tracks, Frank!'Just as the tank moved we fired, hitting the track propulsion wheels.... The tank halted abruptly, swinging to one side. Our next shell must have disabled the turret, as they opened the escape hatch and ran for their lives towards their lines... By the end of the day the 209th Battery had claimed 40 tanks destroyed. Finally, at midnight Koll abandoned the fruitless assault and the surviving Panzers were withdrawn. The following day PR 11 moved off to the north-east, laagering around Droogland to lick its wounds. Depicted here are the crew of disabled PzKpfw 35(t) 713(1) captured by a squad of 2nd Glosters (2), while an abandoned 18-pdr (3) still points through a loophole in the city wall. For additional details on this and several other valiant stands fought by units of the BEF, Hugh Sebag-Montefiore's wellresearched and evocative Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man is highly recommended.

TOP The RAF's image suffered badly f r o m t h e gross exaggerations of its inexperienced f i g h t e r crews. K n o w n as t h e Defiant's 'incredible victory', o n 29 May No. 264 Sqn. gunners claimed t o have d o w n e d 1 9 Stukas, 15 Bf 110s, t w o Bf 109s and a Ju 88A. Actually only o n e Ju 88A (1 A G 1) and o n e Stuka (2./StG 2) are k n o w n t o have fallen t o Defiants this day. (IWM CH884) BOTTOM One of t h e five NAS 825 Swordfish lost o n t h e Bollezeele raid, resting in a field south of Bergues, ravaged by souvenirhunters. The RAF c o m p l e t e l y lacked a d e d i c a t e d g r o u n d attack aircraft for close air s u p p o r t of t h e t r o o p s p r o m p t i n g t h e Fleet Air A r m t o fill this g a p w i t h its anachronistic W o l r d War I -type biplanes. (IWM HU58737)

T H E L U F T W A F F E STRIKES, W E D N E S D A Y 29 M A Y Attempting to counter the increasingly superior numbers of Luftwaffe aircraft met over Dunkirk, 11 Group began to launch up to four squadrons at a time in two concurrent two-squadron patrols, flying a total of 2 7 5 fighter sorties in only nine missions. Lingering low clouds discouraged enemy activity for the first nine hours of the day, but afterwards the Germans hit Dunkirk with five massive raids, taking advantage of the breaks between the large RAF fighter patrols to attack virtually unopposed twice. In 175 bombing sorties, the Luftwaffe lost four He I l l s ( l . / K G 1) and four J u 88s (II./LG 1), with the escorting Bf 109Es shooting down seven Spitfires and seven Hurricanes for the loss of six of their own. Opposing Messerschmitts similarly ravaged other British air efforts. Attempting to prevent another devastating S-boat attack, Coastal Command's 16 Group scoured the sea lanes from North Goodwin light to Ostend and Gravelines, losing three slow, under-armed Avro Ansons to II./JG 26. Similarly, late in the day the Fleet Air Arm sent ten Fairey Swordfish biplane bombers (Naval Air Squadron, or NAS, 825) to attack German artillery bombarding the port from near Bollezeele. Even flying these slow biplanes, the British pilots could not locate their target and, savaged by a Staff el of Bf 109Es (3./JG 54), five of the lumbering, vulnerable Swordfish were lost. 49

ROUTE Y MIDDLEKERKEBANK BUOY NOORD PASS

EVENTS 1 Sunset on 28 May: three S-Boats (S.25, S.30 and S.34) of 2. Schnellbootsflotilla depart Flushing to operate off Kwinte Buoy and points west. 2 2215hrs (British time) on 28 May: approaching the well-lit Kwinte Buoy, Kapitanleutnant Siegried Wuppermann deploys his flotilla using the Lauertaktik, which takes lateral spacing of one nautical mile between boats. After lying in wait for approximately one hour, he leaves Oberleutnant zur See Zimmerman idling off Kwinte Buoy and moves west w i t h S.25 and S.34. 3 2300hrs: HMS Wakeful departs the beaches off BrayDunes after embarking approximately 640 Tommies w h o are crowded below decks t o minimize topside weight. Wakeful is followed at irregular intervals by HMS Grafton (with 800 troops aboard) f r o m Bray-Dunes, and the minesweepers Gossamer (420 troops) and Lydd (300 troops) f r o m the east mole. SS Malines (2,960 tons) follows, returning empty due t o the crew's reluctance t o expose themselves t o enemy action. 4 0020hrs on 29 May: S.25 and S.34 attack patrol sloop Shearwater south of Fairy Bank. All torpedoes miss. 5 0036hrs: 'Good God! Hard a-port!' Approaching Kwinte Buoy (passing N 51° 20VE 02° 45'), Commander Fisher had just called for 20 knots (from 12 knots t h r o u g h Noord Pass) and commenced zigzagging w h e n he spots t w o torpedo tracks approaching rapidly from 150m off the starboard b o w and orders evasive manoeuvres. S.30's first torpedo passes just off the bow, but the second strikes the forward boiler room, breaking the destroyer in half and killing three officers, one petty officer, the ship's surgeon, one NAAFI worker, 92 ratings and all but one soldier on board. Having fired f r o m 600m, OsZ. Zimmerman withdraws quietly t o reload. 6 0111 hrs: 'Lifeboats away!' minesweeper Gossamer arrives on scene f r o m the south. Minutes later danlayer (converted drifter used t o mark mineswept channels w i t h small flag buoys called 'dans') Comfort (60 tons)

arrives f r o m the west. Gossamer rescues 15 survivors; Comfort rescues 16, including Cdr. Fisher. At 0200hrs danlayer Nautilus (64 tons) arrives and rescues five survivors before proceeding to La Panne. 7 0220hrs: minesweeper Lydd arrives on scene and rescues another 20 survivors. Ten minutes later destroyer Grafton arrives on scene and Commander Robinson takes c o m m a n d of the search and rescue effort at N 51 ° 227E 02° 45'. He orders Gossamer to continue t o Dover and Lydd t o circle the scene on anti-submarine patrol. At 0240hrs, w i t h Lydd to the west circling t o port, Comfort approaches from the starboard quarter so Cdr. Fisher can warn Robinson. 8 0350hrs: 'For goodness' sake, get moving - you'll be torpedoed if you lie stopped!' Cdr. Fisher warns Grafton, but it is t o o late. Attracted by the numerous distress flares and flashing signal lights, U.62 approaches from the port quarter and fires t w o torpedoes at a range of 1,000m, one of t h e m blowing off the stern abaft the after magazine bulkhead. Commander Robinson, one other officer, 14 ratings and 35 army officers are killed. 9 0307hrs: 'For God's sake, stop! We're all English!' Confusion, panic and p a n d e m o n i u m reign. The torpedo explosion sends Comfort careering out of control in a starboard circle at full throttle. Lydd continues turning t o port t o come t o the aid of Grafton, but seeing the latter was in no immediate danger and firing at a dark shape off the starboard beam, Lydd attacks what was believed

T H E S I N K I N G O F H M S WAKEFUL

to be an 'E-boat', firing w i t h its 4in. gun and Lewis machine guns (and possibly hits the Grafton's bridge by mistake), then rams Comfort, splitting the drifter in two. Four Comfort crewmen and 13 Wakeful survivors are lost. 1 0 0400hrs: responding t o the Grafton's SOS signals, Malines arrives on scene, takes aboard the 800 troops and continues t o Dover. Lydd continues to Ramsgate. Half an hour later five RN destroyers arrive. While the others continue t o Dunkirk, HMS Ivanhoe rescues the surviving 129 crewmen and scuttles Grafton with three 4.7in. shells fired into its hull. At 0515hrs, Cdr. Fisher is rescued by the Norwegian SS Hird (requisitioned by the French Navy and steaming from Dunkirk with 3,000 French troops aboard) and 'dropped off' at Dover. 11 In the vicinity of Oost Dyck Buoy hospital ship Dinard reports being attacked - possibly by S.25 and S.34 - but all torpedoes miss. 1 2 0707hrs: having searched since daybreak for a suspected U-boat between Fairey South and Kwinte Buoys, destroyer Vega attacks a submarine contact at N 5 T 2 2 7 E 02° 45'.

A N D GRAFTON,

2 8 / 2 9 M A Y 1940.

The t o r p e d o action by German S-boats a n d U-boats against t w o British destroyers and a n u m b e r of small vessels o n t h e n i g h t of 28/29 May 1940 50

ROYAL NAVY AND SUPPORTING UNITS 1

Destroyer HMS Wakeful ( C o m m a n d e r Ralph L. Fisher)

2

M i n e s w e e p e r HMS Gossamer (LieutenantC o m m a n d e r Richard C. V. Ross)

3

M i n e s w e e p e r HMS Lydd (LieutenantC o m m a n d e r Rodolf C. D. Haig) Destroyer HMS Grafton ( C o m m a n d e r Cecil E. C. Robinson) LNER Channel Ferry Malines

(Captain

G.G.Mallory) Danlayer Comfort (Skipper J. D. Mair, RNR) Drifter

Nautilus

Destroyer HMS Javelin ( C o m m a n d e r A n t h o n y F. Pugsley) Destroyer HMS Icarus ( C o m m a n d e r Colin D. M a u d ) 1 0 Destroyer HMS Vanquisher

(Lieutenant-

C o m m a n d e r C. Byron Alers-Hankey) 11 Destroyer HMS Intrepid ( C o m m a n d e r Roderick C. G o r d o n ) 1 2 Destroyer HMS Ivanhoe ( C o m m a n d e r Philip H. H a d o w ) KWINTE BUOY

D

C

V

GERMAN FORCES S-boats A 1 3 1321 hrs: U.60 attacks Polish destroyer Blyskawica at N 51° 197E 02° 07' while the latter was operating with three British destroyers. All torpedoes miss. U.60 is depth-charged but sustains no damage. Notes: 1. The wreckage of Grafton now lies in 24m of water at 51° 24' 2 8 " N / 0 2 ° 4 9 ' 1 0 " E . 2. The wreckage of Wakeful now lies in 17.5m of water at51°22'44"N/02°43'22"E.

5.30 ( O b e r l e u t n a n t z u r See W i l h e l m Zimmerman)

B

5.25 (Kapitanleutnant Siegried W u p p e r m a n n )

C

S.34 ( O b e r l e u t n a n t zur See A l b r e c h t Obermaier)

U-boat D

U.62 ( O b e r l e u t n a n t zur See Hans-Bernard Michalowski)

Conversely the Luftwaffe's dive-bombers were able to operate with near impunity. Tasked to attack 'the numerous merchant vessels in the adjacent sea area [to Dunkirk] and the warships escorting them', at 1500hrs 180 Ju 87s from VIII Fliegerkorps (now reinforced with StG 1) arrived overhead. These were intercepted by a single squadron (No. 56) of Hurricanes who lost two to the rear gunners without shooting down any of the attackers. Thirty minutes later these were followed by dive-bombing Ju 88s from I./KG 30 and II./LG 1. Another 55 J u 87s (I./StG 2 and II./StG 77) returned at 1830-1855hrs to complete the maelstrom of destruction. (Three were lost to various causes during this attack.) Targeting the many stationary vessels embarking troops from the jetty and standing just offshore, this devastating series of attacks sank one destroyer and damaged five others so badly they were withdrawn for repairs (55 R N personnel killed and 114 wounded). Off Bray-Dunes, the 1,105-ton escort sloop H M S Bide ford had 12m (40ft) of her stern completely blown off (with 16 crew and 12 troops killed, 20 crewmen wounded) and was beached to prevent sinking. On the return route two ancient 500-ton paddle-wheel minesweepers were also lost, one going down with 360 troops and most of its crew. Five personnel ships and three small trawlers were also sunk by air attack. The largest lost was the 6,787-ton Glasgow merchantman SS Clan Macalister, which arrived off Malo-les-Bains with eight new army assault landing craft. After they brought the first load of troops to the ship it was hit repeatedly and, burning fiercely, had to be abandoned. The heavy Stuka attack also caught the French's first Dynamo evacuation ships - three 1,298-ton destroyers of the 6e Division de torpilleurs - in the harbour, damaging the Mistral so badly she was withdrawn from action. The other two embarked 1,084 troops - with the Cyclone also rescuing 158 Tommies from a sinking British minesweeper - before escaping. The French also lost two large (3,200-ton) and two small (750-ton) steamers, and three of the Belgian tugboats were sunk. In spite of these heavy losses, 18 destroyers, ten personnel ships, nine minesweepers and an increasing number of smaller vessels returned with 4 7 , 3 1 0 men, of which about 1,880 were wounded. Some 13,752 were lifted from the beaches. The largest contingent - 1,856 troops - was brought home by the anti-aircraft cruiser Calcutta, which had been stationed off La Panne to protect GHQ, the evacuation beach and shipping gathered there. Having exhausted its ammunition (with negligible results) the ship received troops ferried to it by a tug, two minesweepers and eight smaller ships before heading to Dover for replenishment. While the Luftwaffe struck at Dunkirk, at Rundstedt's HQ in Charleville, Generaloberst Walter von Brauchitsch (commander-in-chief of the German army), and his chief of staff, Gen.Maj. Haider, met with the Heeresgruppe A commanders to brief the OKH's deployment directive for Fall Rot. Having signed the order the day before, Hitler and his OKW staff flew to Cambrai aerodrome where, Kesselring reported, after the Flihrer's monologue, in which he 'expressed his special thanks to all ranks... [and informed the commanders] of his future intentions', the plan was briefed to the Heeresgruppe B commanders. As soon as the generals could return to their HQs, movement orders flew to their subordinate formations, realigning the armies and air fleets for the assault across the Somme, inevitably taking their attention away from Dunkirk. Meanwhile the Allies' 48km-long (30-mile) defensive perimeter began to take shape, and just in time. During the previous evening the main body of the 2 5 6 . Infanterie-Division arrived before Nieuport and began preparations

The Germans also used LMA and LMB 4807960kg aerial mines, a field of w h i c h was seeded off Dunkirk's harbour entrance d u r i n g t h e n i g h t of 26/27 May d u r i n g 24 sorties by 9. Flieger-Division. On t h e m o r n i n g of t h e 2 9 t h , less t h a n 1 k m east of t h e harbour entrance, t h e 2,756-ton Isle of Man packet Mona's Queen hit o n e of these and sank w i t h t h e loss of 26 lives in less t h a n

for a serious assault. Fortunately about this time the 4th Division's 12th Brigade and 22nd Field Regiment RA (with 24 25-pdrs) arrived having marched all night from the Lys. They relieved the beleaguered and exhausted group of gunners, lancers and grenadiers, and repulsed the attackers. Falling in on the 12th Brigade's right was the 10th Brigade, straight from the hard fighting along the Comines-Ypres Canal the day before. N o rest for the weary, Brigadier Anderson's men were soon confronted by the 208. InfanterieDivision. Later still the 11th Brigade moved into position on Anderson's right, extending the line further towards Furnes, just as the bicycle-mounted reconnaissance troops (Radfahrer Schwadron 25) of the 56. Infanterie-Division approached that sector. Also tramping into the perimeter was Major-General Harry Curtis's small 46th Division. This understrength and undertrained unit lacked artillery and anti-tank guns and could not be expected to withstand a serious assault. Nevertheless it was one of the freshest and most cohesive units available and was deployed along the Basse Colme Canal from Bergues through to Hoymille. While the 3rd and 50th Divisions held the line from Noordschote to Poperinghe, the more substantial surviving elements of the 5th and 42nd Divisions fell back into the last rearguard line from Linde to Bambecque on the Yser. Through these lines filed the retreating units of the BEF, led by MajorGeneral the Hon. Harold R. L. G. Alexander's 1st Division. Throughout the day the 1st Guards and 3rd Brigades took up positions along the Basse Colme Canal while the 2nd Brigade went into reserve near Bray-Dunes. Following were the sad survivors of M a j . Gen. Irwin's 2nd Division, who trudged to Malo-les-Bains to begin evacuating since they had negligible combat strength left anyway. Crossing the canal on the Pont-aux-Cerfs bridge to Bray-Dunes, weary and wounded soldiers passed their weapons, mostly Bren guns, to the grim but relatively fresh defenders, the 3rd Brigade's 1st Battalion The Duke of Wellington's Regiment. South of the BEF's rearguard, the badly mauled 44th Division and 145th Brigade attempted to evacuate their positions and rejoin Gort's forces. After a pulverizing Stuka attack at 0600hrs by 60 J u 87Bs that caused over 100 casualties, M a j . Gen. Osborne knew that his battered units would not withstand the Panzer assault that was surely coming. Organized into two columns, Osborne's battered division departed Mont des Cats at lOOOhrs and reached the beaches the next day. Surrounded at Cassel, the 145th Brigade's commander, Brigadier the Hon. Nigel F. Somerset, did not receive his orders to withdraw until early that morning. By then it was too late to do so - lest they be caught and annihilated on the move in broad daylight - and the orders were changed to hold the hilltop town until the following night.

t w o minutes. (IWM HU1145)

53

HELL FROM ABOVE, 29 MAY 1940 (pp. 54-55) As the third wave of dive-bombers approached Dunkirk harbour, they were immediately attracted to the ten vessels clustered at the end of the eastern jetty. Berthed on the harbour-side of the mole were (from the end, landward) the destroyer Grenade (Commander Richard C. Boyle), six armed trawlers of Minesweeping Groups 51 and 61 (Sub-Lieutenant Robin Bill, aboard Fyldea) moored in two rows of three and the destroyer Verity (Commander Robert H. Mills). Along the sea side of the jetty were the large Isle of Man packet RMS Fenella (Captain W. Cubbon) and paddle-wheel Thames excursion steamer Crested Eagle (Lieutenant-Commander Bernard R. Booth, RNR). Beginning their attacks at 1750hrs, Grenade ( 1 ) was soon hit twice, one bomb exploding in a forward fuel tank and starting raging internal fires. Fourteen ratings were killed and another four mortally wounded. Recognizing the ship was doomed, Cdr. 'Jack' C. Clouston's Royal Naval 'pier party' slipped the ship's lines so that it would not sink at its berth but the tide swung it around until it drifted stern-first into harbour channel. Meanwhile Fenella (2), having embarked 650 troops, had a bomb plunge through her promenade deck, killing 15. Two other bombs hit the mole alongside exploding among the jetty's boulders, wrecking the engine room and perforating her hull below the waterline. The ship began to settle and list and those on board evacuated forward onto the Crested Eagle. Fenella slowly sank at its berth. Another salvo of bombs rained down upon the trawlers. The Polly Johnson (Lieutenant F. Padley, RNR; outboard in the first row) was heavily damaged by two near misses that wiped out 56

the 3in. gun crew and she soon departed in company with Arley (Skipper A. Duffield, RNR), but had to be abandoned and scuttled en route. The Brock (Skipper A. U. Setterfield, RNR) also got under way, leaving Fyldea (3) (Skipper G. Whammond, RNR) moored to the mole. The Calvi (4) (Skipper Bertram D. Spindler, RNR; outboard in the second row) had a bomb go down a ventilator shaft and through its bottom and sank upright. Further down the jetty, Verity had been straddled by bombs for about 35 minutes when Cdr. Mills, seeing that the air attacks had driven the troops from the mole, got under way empty, skirting the burning Grenade and the Calvi's wreckage as she left the harbour. Loaded with 600 shell-shocked troops Crested Eagle (5) got under way at approximately 1830hrs, pulling away from the mole in a wide turn to port and was pounced upon by the last of the Stukas. Four bombs rained upon it setting the aft end of the ancient wooden ship fiercely ablaze. LieutenantCommander Booth quickly realized his ship was doomed and ran the burning wreck aground near Zuydcoote Sanitorium where the 200 surviving troops and crew - many of them severely burned - were rescued by three minesweepers and the destroyer Sabre. Meanwhile, fearing that the sinking, blazing Grenade would block the harbour channel, Cdr. Clouston ordered trawlerJohn Cattling (6) (Skipper G. W. Aldan, DSC, RNR) to tow Grenade out of the channel. Burning fiercely from stem to stern, Grenade was pulled to the west side of the outer harbour where, at approximately 2000hrs, her magazines exploded.

Meanwhile the trap closed around the French lere Armee. Driving from the west Hopner's XVI AK (mot.) met Wager's X X V I I AK coming from the east, near Armentieres, and closed the trap on six depleted French divisions. The cavalier Gen. Prioux was captured at his command post at Steenwerk and, on 1 June, General de division Molinie would finally surrender his 35,000 troops when ammunition, food and water were exhausted. In recognition of the defenders' courageous and valiant fight, the Germans allowed them to march out with their colours flying. At Dover Operation Dynamo was almost derailed by two near-simultaneous communiques. The first was a panicked telephone call from a Royal Navy shore party officer. At 1900hrs Commander J. S. Dove telephoned from La Panne to report that the harbour was once again unusable, blocked by sunken vessels. Lacking radio contact with Tennant and having no way of confirming the distressing news, V. Adm. Ramsay ordered all the ships headed for Dunkirk that night to avoid the harbour and lift troops from the beaches. An hour later First Sea Lord Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound dealt Ramsay another blow. Shocked by the loss of and heavy damage to ten destroyers that day (two sunk by the Kriegsmarine, six knocked out by the Luftwaffe and two severely damaged in accidents) and fearing further losses would soon cripple the Navy for the lack of convoy escorts, Sir Dudley withdrew the seven surviving large destroyers from Dover Command. This left Ramsay with only 13 small World War I destroyers - reinforced by three more arriving from Plymouth - with limited deck space and paltry antiaircraft defences. Minus the larger destroyers and without the east mole to use, the smaller destroyers, minesweepers, schuyts and little ships lifting exhausted men from the waters off the exposed beaches would have to work. Fortunately they would not have to sail using the long and perilous Route Y. Once the heavy artillery of the 256. Infanterie-Division and X X V I AK (AR 256 and 785) arrived at Nieuport, they quickly saw that the stream of ships passing offshore was well within reach of their 15.5cm and 21cm guns. During the day many vessels were taken under fire and though both British and French destroyers duelled with the batteries, this route now had the same risks that forced the abandonment of Route Z . Finally the sweeping and marking of Route X through the minefields was completed and at 1606hrs Ramsay ordered all Dynamo vessels to use Route X , 'exercising navigational caution'.

Former c o m m a n d e r o f t h e battleship HMS Revenge, o n t h e A d m i r a l t y staff Rear A d m i r a l William Frederick Wake-Walker was conspicuously successful in quickly c o u n t e r i n g t h e German m a g n e t i c m i n e threat. A tireless leader later n o t e d for h o u n d i n g t h e Bismarck w i t h his 1st Cruiser Sqn., he was p r o m o t e d t o vice admiral and n a m e d Third Sea Lord in April 1942. (IWM A23581)

W i t h t h e east m o l e once again o p e n for embarkations, t h e HMS Vivacious comes alongside, squeezing b e t w e e n t h e j e t t y and t h e wreck of t h e 363-ton a r m e d m i n e s w e e p i n g trawler Calvi w h i c h was sunk d u r i n g t h e b o m b i n g t h e day before. Note a n o t h e r destroyer has d o c k e d t o t h e seaward side of t h e breakwater and as yet there are no t r o o p s t o load. (IWM HU1149)

57

ALLIED FORCES Allied army units: I

French 272e D e m i - b r i g a d e d'infanterie French 225e Regiment d'infanterie French 341 e Regiment d'infanterie French 68e Division d'infanterie HQ a n d 59e GRDI French 32e Regiment d'infanterie r e m n a n t French 16e Corps d'armee HQ British III Corps HQ British 4 6 t h Division

9

British 138th Brigade (reserve)

10 French I Bn/48e Regiment d'infanterie and Usherforce I I British 139th Brigade 12 French 137e Regiment d'infanterie 13 British 126th Brigade 14 British I Corps HQ 15 British 1st Division HQ 16 British 1 st Guards Brigade 17 British 3rd Brigade 18 British 2 n d Brigade 19 French 241 e Regiment d'infanterie 20 French 12e Division d'infanterie motorisee 21 British GHQ a n d II Corps HQ 22 British 5 t h Division r e m n a n t 23 British 23rd Division r e m n a n t 24 British 150th Brigade 25 British 151st Brigade 26 British 3rd Division HQ 27 British 9 t h Brigade 28 British 7 t h Guards Brigade 29 British 8 t h Brigade 30 British 4 t h Division HQ 31 British 10th Brigade 32 British 12th Brigade 33 British 11th Brigade

Naval vessels and other ships: 34 Destroyer HMS Malcolm 35 Destroyer HMS

Vanquisher

36 Destroyer HMS Vivacious 37 B u r n t - o u t hulk of p a d d l e - w h e e l AA ship Crested Eagle 38 Escort sloop HMS Bideford w i t h g u n b o a t HMS Locust 39 Minesweeper HMS Hebe 40 Personnel ships St. Heller, Royal Sovereign, Royal Daffodil a n d Prague 41 Hospital ships Isle of Guernsey a n d Dinard 42 French t o r p e d o boats Bourrasque, Bouclier and

58

Foudroyant

Branlebas,

KLUGE

GERMAN FORCES A

9. Panzer-Division's A u f k a r u n g s - A b t e i l u n g 9 9. Panzer-Division's Schutzen-Regiment 10 Panzer-Division's Schutzen-Regiment 11 9. Panzer-Division's Panzer-Regiment 33 9. Panzer-Division's Artillerie-Regiment 102 SS-Regiment 'Leibstandarte A d o l f Hitler' 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.) 18. Infanterie-Division 254. Infanterie-Division 14. Infanterie-Division 216. Infanterie-Division 56. Infanterie-Division 208. Infanterie-Division 256. Infanterie-Division

7 Approximately 2000hrs: in an attempt to cross the Canal de la Haute Colme and split the seam of the French defences between the 225e and 341 e Rl, the SS-Regiment 'Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler' attacks from the south. Although t i m e d t o take advantage of SR 11 's evening attack towards Spycker, the inundation south of the canal, the water obstacle of the canal itself and spirited French defence by the 3e Coy of the 225e Rl neutralize the assault.

EVENTS 1 Dawn: after devastating Luftwaffe air attacks the previous day, the fourth day of Dynamo opens w i t h fog, low overcast skies and a thick pall of oil smoke over Dunkirk harbour. These conditions preclude air raids but the previous day's damage to the east mole initially discourages evacuations from the harbour. HMS Vanquisher investigates and finds the mole damaged but still useable. Despite the late start, 24,311 troops are evacuated from the harbour during the day.

4 Mid-afternoon: loading from the surf onto the small boats becomes increasingly chaotic, resulting in swamped and capsized boats and d r o w n e d troops. Seeing the need for a pier of some sort, near La Panne Lieutenant Harold J. Dibbens leads the 102nd Provost Company and Royal Engineers' 250th Field Company in pushing a line of lorries and other abandoned vehicles into the surf, shooting the tires t o prevent t h e m from becoming buoyant and lashing planking across their tops t o form the first 'provost jetty', j u t t i n g some 150m (492ft) into the surf. So successful is this effort that on the evening of 30/31 May, another nine 'provost jetties' are constructed between Malo-les-Bains and La Panne.

2 Midday: gunboat HMS Locust begins to t o w the severely damaged escort sloop HMS Bideford back to England. They arrive 36 hours later.

5 1400-2000hrs: ordered to drive back the French 225e Rl in order t o bring their 10.5cm artillery into range of Dunkirk Harbour, light tanks from the 9. PanzerDivision's PR 33 assist their SR 11 in attacking towards Spycker. Artillery b o m b a r d m e n t begins at noon, followed by assaults t w o hours later. However, determined French defence, utilizing its well-emplaced artillery and anti-tank batteries, holds its g r o u n d . A follow-up attack at 2000hrs, a t t e m p t i n g to use nightfall to their advantage, is similarly repulsed.

3 1415hrs: steaming via Route Y four French torpedo boats evacuate troops from Quai Felix Faure. At 1645hrs the Bourrasque, while dodging German artillery fire off Nieuport, leaves the swept channel, hits a mine and sinks with the loss of 150 men.

6 Later in the evening: t o draw off French forces defending against SR 11's attacks, 9. Panzer-Division's Aufkl-Abt. 9 attacks across the disused Mardyck Canal. Again the French troops, heavily supported by artillery and anti-tank guns, repulse the assaults.

8 1500 and 2000hrs: the 18. Infanterie-Division moves up to Bergues and the Canal de la Basse Colme and launches its first attack from Warhem, which is repulsed by the 5th Bn. The Border Regiment (from 42nd Division's 126th Brigade). At dusk the 139th Brigade begins t o pull out of the line t o move to Malo-les-Bains for evacuation, their place being taken by the French 137e Rl. A renewed attack at 2000hrs, in coordination w i t h the attacks by units on the western side of the perimeter, successfully establishes a bridgehead but fierce French counterattacks drive the Germans back across the canal. 9 1600hrs: arriving at the Canal de la Basse Colme, the 254. Infanterie-Division hastily goes into the assault, a t t e m p t i n g to cross the canal at t w o places and relieve pressure on the 18. Infanterie-Division t o the west. However, the British defence is stout and the 2nd Coldstream Guards beat back the western attack while the 1 st Duke of Wellingtons defeat the one launched from Hondschoote. 1 0 2200hrs: after an initial repulse late in the day and under a strong artillery bombardment, in the early darkness elements of the 56. Infanterie-Division wade across the canal and infiltrate British defences north of Fumes, establishing a bridgehead. Once discovered, a determined counterattack by the 1 st Coldstream Guards drives the Germans back across the canal and restores the defensive line.

T H E D U N K I R K P E R I M E T E R IS C L O S E D , 3 0 M A Y 1 9 4 0 The Dunkirk defensive perimeter as it was established o n 30 May 1940, t h e Allied forces w i t h i n it, harbour embarkation facilities, t h e three beach evacuation points and t h e German units facing and attacking t h e perimeter. 59

Returning w i t h some 880 t r o o p s a b o a r d , t h e French destroyer Bourrasque

used

Route Y t o reduce t h e collision risk posed by hordes of small ships a p p r o a c h i n g Dunkirk o n Route X. D o d g i n g German shellfire off N i e u p o r t Capitaine R. G. A. Fouque inadvertently m a n o e u v r e d o u t of t h e swept channel and hit a m i n e at 1645hrs, t h e ship capsizing and sinking 15 minutes later. Only 300 t r o o p s and 122 c r e w m e n w e r e rescued. (IWM HU2280)

T H E P A N Z E R S T U R N AWAY, T H U R S D A Y 30 M A Y Luckily for the Allies, on the German side there was 'the impression here that nothing is happening today, that no one is any longer interested in Dunkirk'. This of course was due to the sudden change of direction occasioned by the Fall Rot deployment order. Although Kluge's A O K 4 HQ (whose operations officer, Oberstleutnant Rolf Wuthmann, is quoted above) directed Kleist to close to within artillery range for his 10.5cm guns, this command was busy organizing its new formations. Having lost Guderian's and Reinhardt's Panzer corps, the Panzergruppe HQ was now establishing communications with newly-assigned XVI AK (mot.) (Hopner) and X L AK (Stumme) and preparing to move to its new positions east of Amiens. Although Kleist retained Wietersheim's XIV AK (mot.), this command's newly assigned units were not fully in place. When Rundstedt's HQ pressed for an attack at 1500hrs, Kluge's staff replied that XIV AK (mot.) were ready (which they were not) but they needed Heeresgruppe B's A O K 6 to attack in support and these divisions had 'apparently pulled out to rest!' With a renewed emphasis on attacking the perimeter defences and pushing to the seashore, Kleist got XIV AK (mot.) re-energized but 9. Panzer-Division found the terrain difficult and the French defence (225e Rl) stubborn and made little progress. Generalleutnant Mauriz Wiktorim zu Hainburg (20. InfanterieDivision (mot.) commander) was told that he 'must without fail reach the coast today!' but his attacks were repulsed by the French 3 4 l e RL In any event, the effort was stillborn because the XIV AK (mot.)'s medium artillery (the 10.5cm guns) had run out of ammunition the day before! Contrary to statements by Kluge's staff, Reichenau's A O K 6 was not resting. Three divisions, the 14., 18. and 56. Infanterie-Divisionen, launched assaults across the Basse Colme Canal in the mid-afternoon (at 1500hrs and 1600hrs). The 56. Infanterie-Division was repulsed by Montgomery's 7th Guards Brigade, which had just deployed in and east of Furnes. After sunset (at 2000hrs and 2200hrs) attacks by the 18. and 56. InfanterieDivisionen resumed but only established tenuous bridgeheads that were thrown back across the canal through spirited counterattacks by the French 137e Rl and a battalion of Coldstream Guards. 60

Because t h e harbour was d e e m e d unusable, for t h e only t i m e in t h e o p e r a t i o n m o r e t r o o p s w e r e lifted f r o m t h e beaches t h a n f r o m Dunkirk. The process was aided by t h e fact t h a t most of t h e m e n w e r e f r o m c o m b a t units and m a i n t a i n e d their discipline in spite of t h e horrendous c o n d i t i o n s . (IWM HU41240)

Overall the day finally proved that the Germans' disjointed and dysfunctional command arrangements were unsatisfactory and O K H ordered a complete restructuring of the forces arrayed against Dunkirk. General der Artillerie Georg von Kiichler's A O K 18 was assigned responsibility for all operations against the 'trapped' Allied units and he was given four corps to work with. These contained seven infantry divisions, a motorized rifle brigade and the small, lightweight 9. Panzer-Division. Kiichler's reserves consisted of the 20. Infanterie-Division (mot.), IR (mot.) 'Grossdeutschland' and IR (mot.) 'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler'. While this realignment was ordered to be made effective by 0200hrs on the 31st, in those days these sorts of sweeping changes (literally) did not happen overnight and much of the following day was spent rewiring the communications network to put Kiichler in touch with his new subordinate units. To cap off a day of desultory efforts, bad weather grounded the Luftwaffe. Low clouds, fog and mist cloaked the entire coastal area with ceilings of 100m (328ft) and horizontal visibility of 100m. The tops of the cloud blanket were at 1,000m (3,280ft), completely precluding bombing operations. Fighter Command's 11 Group flew 2 5 7 sorties in nine missions but these encountered nothing but individual long-range reconnaissance aircraft, two D o 17s being shot down for no losses to enemy action. 61

Out of v i e w t o t h e left m e m b e r s of t h e 7th Guards Brigade hunker d o w n in their t r e n c h across t h e t ' C o o l e n h o f f a r m , shielding themselves against an o n g o i n g artillery barrage, their 3 0 3 - c a l . SMLE (Small Magazine Lee Enfield) rifles at t h e ready o n t h e f o r w a r d e d g e of a t r e n c h . In t h e b a c k g r o u n d a p o r t i o n of Fumes burns f r o m t h e b o m b a r d m e n t . (IWM HU1134)

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While confusion, distraction and bad weather hobbled their enemy, during the morning the Allies continued to straggle into the perimeter and embark in the thousands from the beaches between Dunkirk and La Panne. MajorGeneral MartePs 50th Division relieved Franklyn's battered 5th Division between Bulscamp and Pont-aux-Cerfs, allowing the latter to move to an assembly area near the beach. This line had little depth because behind it Les Moeres (a reclaimed sea marsh 4.8km [3 miles] wide and as much as 4.5m [15ft] deep) had been inundated, but it was bolstered by the remaining Somua heavy tanks of the 2e Division legere mecanique, which were positioned along the canal line as steel pillboxes. Going directly to the beaches for embarkation were Osborne's largely depleted 44th Division and the 23rd Division's sole surviving 69th Brigade. The brigades of the 42nd Division were to have followed, but the need for additional troops to stiffen the weak 46th Division forced M a j . Gen. Wason to divert the 126th Brigade to fill the gap between Alexander's and Curtis's divisions. Also marching into the Dunkirk perimeter were the exhausted poilus of Gen. de la Laurencie's badly depleted 3e Corps. These consisted of two regiments of the 12e Division d'infanterie motorisee with three artillery batteries, two and a half battalions of the 32e Division d'infanterie, two tractor-drawn artillery regiments (15e R A D T and 215e R A L H T ) from the lere Division d'infanterie motorisee, two divisional reconnaissance groups, and two squadrons of tanks from the lere Division legere mecanique. By noon the only major British unit south of the perimeter was Brigadier Somerset's 145th Brigade at Cassel. As darkness fell at 2130hrs the dauntless defenders moved out north-eastwards in a single column. However, they soon stumbled into elements of PR 11 - which was laagering in preparation for the southward move - and in a series of running battles through the night, the column fragmented into small groups. After sunrise Somerset, 40 officers and almost 2,000 troops were surrounded and surrendered near Watou. The remainder dispersed, finally straggling into the perimeter two to four days later. The evacuation - initially limited to lifting troops from the beaches - got off to a slow start this day. Huge numbers of troops on some beaches became frustrated and unruly at the lack of ships and the few ships present waited offshore empty beaches. Just after midnight Rear Admiral W. F. Wake-Walker

The French Navy lost four of their ' 1 5 0 0 - t o n n e ' t o r p e d o boat destroyers d u r i n g Dynamo, t w o of t h e m , Cyclone and Siroco (seen here), being t o r p e d o e d by German S-boats o n t h e same m o r n i n g . These 1,298-ton warships m o u n t e d four 5.1 in. guns and six t o r p e d o tubes. (1933 Laurent Nel postcard f r o m t h e author's collection)

arrived with an additional 83 R N personnel and, most importantly, a workable set of radios. The reinforced shore parties were able to restore some order and the radios brought a brief respite to the chronic communications failures. At first light V. Adm. Ramsay sent the destroyer Vanquisher into the harbour to evaluate the east mole. At 0551hrs Lieutenant Commander Conrad B. Alers-Hankey reported that while there were obstructions approaching and damage to the jetty, it was still usable. Taking a cautious 'one ship at a time' approach throughout most of the day, only two personnel ships, three drifters and seven destroyers lifted troops from the harbour. After 1800hrs the tempo returned with ten destroyers (four of them returning for their second load), four personnel ships, a hospital carrier and two schuyts embarking troops from the east mole while a collection of 31 miscellaneous vessels and another dozen motorboats went to the beaches. Finally, at 1530hrs, realizing the desperate nature of the situation and the need to complete the evacuation promptly, Adm. Pound returned five of the larger destroyers (two others in repair) to Ramsay's command. Without hindrance from the Luftwaffe the embarkations once again moved into high gear, helped by the increased efforts of the French Navy. That morning five 630-ton French Elan-class dispatch boats had entered the harbour followed by three torpedo boats and two destroyers, one of the latter being lost to a mine on its return voyage. Later a tug, two minesweepers and seven fishing vessels (Belgian with French Navy crews) arrived. In the afternoon a convoy of five French cargo ships evacuated 3,000 troops. Beneath the low clouds, patchy fog and light rain some 53,823 troops were rescued, of whom 8,616 were French. For the first time the numbers lifted from the beaches - 29,512 - exceeded those embarked from Dunkirk, due primarily to the night's misguided moratorium denying use of the harbour. Among those aboard the homeward bound ships were Lt. Gen. Sir Ronald Adam and his III Corps HQ staff, their planning tasks now complete. Returning with him were the decimated remains of his command: the survivors of one regular (2nd) and two Territorial (44th and 48th) divisions. With the departure of III Corps, Fagalde placed the depleted 21e Division d'infanterie (I/48e Rl, two battalions of the 137e Rl, backed up by the 35e RAD) in the line east of Bergues. The French linked with the 1st Bn. East Lancashires of the 42nd Division's 126th Brigade, which now came under command of Alexander's I Corps.

T H E BIGGEST DAY, FRIDAY 31 M A Y

Dover C o m m a n d was greatly aided by t h e French navy's ad hoc 'Pas de Calais flotilla', w h i c h rescued a total of 48,474 m e n . Here a French minesweeper (left: t w o minelaying rails e x t e n d i n g over t h e stern) and dispatch boat (right: o n e m i n e l a y i n g track) unload t r o o p s at Dover. (IWM HU56093)

German 10.5cm artillery, le FH 18 howitzers, f i n d their range. Positioning his guns along t h e Yser River, Kuchler was able t o take t h e entire perimeter, p o r t and beaches under intense and accurate shellfire. (IWM MH9409)

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By this time some 92,000 British and 156,000 French troops were cornered in and defiantly defending the Dunkirk perimeter. They were faced by approximately 120,000 Germans who finally came under the authority of a single commander, whose staff now began planning a coordinated series of assaults to break into the perimeter. On the western end of the line the 9. Panzer-Division launched a probing feint along the railway line between Bourbourg and Dunkirk. It was repelled by II /225e RI strongly supported by artillery (III/89e R A D ) . The real effort came on the eastern flank where devastating artillery barrages and three divisions attacking heavily at Bulscamp (151st Brigade), Furnes (7th Guards Brigade) and Nieuport (12th Brigade) established firm footholds on the British side of the canals. While counterattacks - supported by artillery constrained by ammunition shortages - reduced the enemy pockets, they were not eliminated. In fact the German successes might have been greater had it not been for the only examples of Allied close air support flown for the beleaguered defenders. Just after 1600hrs, as the 256. Infanterie-Division massed its forces at a crossroads near Westende to renew attacks and exploit its bridgehead at Nieuport, ten FAA (NAS 826) Fairey Albacores (obsolete biplane replacement for the ancient Swordfish) - attacked with 2501b bombs and are credited with forestalling the impending enemy assault. They were followed four hours later by nine more modern Skuas (NAS 801) attacking German pontoon bridges across the Nieuport Canal. Jumped by Messerschmitts (3./JG 20) during egress, two Skuas were lost and a third badly damaged. Hurricanes (No. 2 4 2 Sqn.) shot down three of the attacking Bf 109Es at the cost of one of their own. The RAF provided Lysander army cooperation aircraft (Nos. 2 and 16 Sqns.) attempting to locate German batteries bombarding the beaches and lost three of these to Messerschmitts (III./JG 26). Throughout the day 2 Group sent 93 Bristol Blenheims in small raids to bomb these and interdict troop columns moving towards Furnes from Ypres, suffering no losses.

TOP W h e n t h e 2 n d Bn. t h e Royal Ulster Rifles arrived at BrayDunes in t h e early m o r n i n g hours of 1 June, t h e y f o u n d t h e seas virtually e m p t y of rescue ships. Only a stranded lifeboat, t h e beached paddle minesweeper Devonia and in t h e distance t h e b u r n t - o u t personnel ship Crested Eagle c o u l d be seen. (IWM HU1137) BOTTOM The British Army's y o u n g e s t general, 48-year-old Maj. Gen. The H o n . Harold R. L.G. Alexander, DSO, was well k n o w n for his coolness under

Meanwhile, for most of the morning it appeared that the 248,000 Allied troops were truly trapped in the 1 5 5 k m 2 (60-square-mile) beachhead. The dawn brought an increasing onshore wind (force 3 strength) that generated a rising surf in the long shallows shelving the evacuation beaches. Scores of the small boats working the beaches broached, capsized and were pushed hard aground, and as the tide fell they were all left stranded and useless embarkations came to a halt. Additionally German artillery had found their range on Dunkirk harbour and made daytime embarkations there very hazardous. These conditions in turn exposed the nine personnel and three hospital ships waiting offshore to increased risk of air attack. Consequently, shortly after 0700hrs Ramsay suspended dispatching additional large ships until these had returned. During the night, Kapitanleutnant Heinz Birnbacher's 1. S-Bootsflotilla had been at work. At 0121hrs, between Westhinder and T Buoys, the 1,298-ton French destroyer Cyclone, limited by engine trouble to only 16 knots, was attacked by S.24 (Oberleutnant zur See Detlefsen) and torpedoed in the bows. Badly damaged, the ship struggled back to Dover at one-quarter of its original speed, escorted by two other French vessels. (Laid up at Brest for repairs, Cyclone was destroyed in dry dock to prevent capture.) Only 20 minutes later her sister ship, Siroco, passed T Buoy on the way to Dover with 770 troops (mostly from 16e RAD) and the colours of the 92e RI (from the 25e Division d'infanterie motorisee - smuggled out of Lille before the French surrender). Hearing aircraft overhead Capitaine Gui de Toulouse-Lautrec-Montfa slowed from 14 to 7 knots to reduce the size of his phosphorescent wake. At that moment Siroco was attacked by S.23 (Oberleutnant zur See Christiansen) and S.26 (Oberleutnant zur See Fimmen), two torpedoes hitting the stern. Shortly thereafter she capsized and sank with the loss of 59 crewmen and over 600 troops, 2 5 2 survivors being picked up by a Polish destroyer, patrol sloop Widgeon and two coasters. Additionally the only Luftwaffe raid on the harbour sank the French 2,508-ton steamer Ain el Turk, a tug and two trawlers. However, these losses did not deter the French Navy, which organized over 30 vessels - including two other cargo ships, three warships, 11 fishing vessels and 15 Belgian trawlers - in a continuous flow, retrieving most of the 14,784 poilus rescued that day, including Gen. Blanchard and his staff (aboard the 669-ton torpedo boat Bouclier).

fire. C o m m i s s i o n e d in t h e Irish Guards in 1911, in W o r l d War I he was w o u n d e d t w i c e and rose quickly t o c o m m a n d t h e 4 t h Guards Brigade. A remarkably t a l e n t e d officer and i m p e r t u r b a b l e leader he ensured t h e evacuation of t h e British rearguard. (IMW 0 1 1 3 2 )

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D A Y OF T H E D E F I A N T S , 3 1 M A Y 1 9 4 0 ( p p . 6 6 - 6 7 ) Conceived in 1935 as the replacement for the Hawker Demon, the Boulton Paul Defiant was not intended to be a 'fighter'. Instead it was designed as a 'bomber destroyer' - intended to engage only enemy bombers while its contemporary, the Hawker Hurricane, fended off escorting fighters. Mounting a Boulton Paul-built version of the French de Boysson four-gun turret and with no fixed forward-firing armament Defiant pilots were trained to close with enemy bomber formations from the flank, or by flying across their noses slightly below the bomber's level, in what was known as a 'crossover' attack. In this way the turret gunner would turn to fire 'broadside' against the enemy much like an ancient sailing manof-war. The initial attack was to be concentrated on the lead bomber, thereby disrupting the defensive cohesion of the enemy formation. At 1840hrs Squadron Leader Philip A. Hunter led a dozen Defiants to Dunkirk having coordinated with Hurricanes of No. 111 Sqn. to have them in close cover/line astern with Spitfires from No. 609 Sqn. shadowing to one side and above. Soon three of the faster Spitfires dived on a large formation of Heinkel bombers, claiming one shot down, while Hunter climbed his formation to engage and the Hurricanes turned to occupy nearby Bf 109Es. True to doctrine Hunter and three others closed from below on the flanks of a bomber in the leading group and 16 Browning .303in. machine guns chattered away riddling its belly. This aircraft (from Stab/KG 27) was last seen circling down towards

68

the sea with one engine on fire and apparently crashed offshore, it and its crew being listed as missing in action. Hunter then moved his Defiant ( 1 ) to the leader of another group of bombers, the aircraft (1G+AN) (2) of Oberleutnant Robert Kalischewski leading the 5. Staffel formation. His gunner, Leading Aircraftman F. H. King, damaged it while other Defiants engaged the remaining Heinkels as they scattered. Pilot Officer G. Hackwood and Leading Aircraftman Lillie found themselves beneath another and Lillie opened fire at 50m (164ft), exploding the left engine. This bomber is believed to be the machine that crashed near Saint-Folquin (between Dunkirk and Calais), killing all aboard. Pilot Officers E. G. Barwell and J. E. M. Williams (3) engaged another 5. Staffel machine (1G+IN) (4), riddling the underside of the pilot's cabin and reportedly it 'nosed forward and dived slowly towards the sea'. It returned to base damaged with the pilot mortally wounded. Return fire from the belly gunner damaged Barwell's aircraft, forcing him to ditch on the way home. Return fire also damaged another Defiant, the wounded gunner baling out and the pilot returning to crash-land at Manston. Failing to return were Flight Lieutenant Nicholas G. Cooke and his gunner Corporal Albert Lippert (5). This engagement proved what Defiants could do if permitted to use their practised tactics, but at a high cost.

HMS Vanquisher

loading t r o o p s

f r o m t h e east j e t t y at l o w t i d e using makeshift ladders. Note t h e portside lifeboat has been disembarked and t h e paltry anti-aircraft a r m a m e n t of a single 2 - p d r Q F M k l l (amidships b e h i n d t h e searchlight platform) and a machine g u n o n t h e bridge w i n g s . (IWM H U H 5 3 )

Once the morning haze gave way to fair, though cloudy skies the Luftwaffe returned. After noon the Germans attacked in three major waves with 195 bomber sorties, protected by 260 Messerschmitts. They were challenged by 289 RAF fighters flying in eight large (three to four squadrons) missions. These patrols were present when the three major raids arrived - at 1415hrs, 1700hrs and 1900hrs - but they failed to impede significantly the attacks, shooting down only six bombers (from K G 4 and 27, and L G 1) and four escorting Bf 109Es (III./JG 26). Conversely, return fire and Messerschmitts brought down six Spitfires, eight Hurricanes and five Defiants in these battles, the highest daily loss of the campaign. The raids were designed to support the ground assaults and supplement artillery bombardments, concentrating attacks on the masses of British troops on and near the beaches. None of the highly effective Junkers dive-bombers were used. Richthofen's VIII Fliegerkorps stood down because its commander thought that preparations for Fall Rot should take priority, while the shipsinking aces of I./KG 30 were transferred to Norway to deal with the increased Allied shipping associated with the impending assaults on German mountain troops trapped at Narvik. 69

^'""fT

On land, Gen. Georg von Kiichler attacked his new task with vigour and proved his skill as an artillerist. Arraying his corps' and divisions' 10.5cm and 15.5cm guns along the Yser River he took the harbour and the entire beach under tremendous fire. Assured of air superiority, he even used two World War I observation balloons to adjust the fall of shot! His large guns were placed so close they damaged the destroyer H M S Vivacious (off BrayDunes) with two hits, killing three and wounding 12 aboard. By midday the wind had abated and almost all the British personnel ships had returned and at 1300hrs Ramsay ordered his recently organized armada of 'little ships' gathered at Ramsgate to sail across to Dunkirk. This ragtag regatta sailed via Route X at a stately 6 knots, over 100 boats and barges being towed by a miscellany of tugs, yachts, drifters and schyuts, some of them in chains up to 12 boats long. Six Tilbury tugs towed 46 lifeboats taken from ocean liners docked in London. Another brought four RAF seaplane tender motorboats and an army motor craft. Nine more pulled 17 (some provision-laden) barges from Gravesend. The SVP's Sheerness Division contributed five motorized (Dutch and Belgian) ' X lighters', a tug and a schuyt towing 23 motorboats; Yarmouth Base sent 13 of the 19 drifters; Portsmouth Inner Patrol provided nine of the 16 yachts. Seven fast War Department launches, six Thames Estuary 'cockle' (fishing) boats, six slow hopper barges and four 'motor coasters' were also among the continuous stream that stretched 8km (5 miles) and began arriving off the beaches from 1900hrs onwards. Initially the arriving hosts of small ships and boats were in considerable disarray, tending to stop at the first place they came to where other craft were assembled (off Malo-les-Bains and Bray-Dunes). The artillery barrages deterred many from moving on to their assigned beaches near La Panne and in fact the shellfire drove off a number of small boats, their untrained and undisciplined civilian crews fleeing from the frightening bombardment. Vice Admiral Ramsay ordered the captain of one minesweeper to 'arrest any little ship returning empty', a singularly impossible task.

Ironically, even t h o u g h t h e y were t h e only Ju 87 crews specifically trained in anti-ship attacks l.(Stuka)/Tragergruppe (Carrier Group) 186 - seen here d u r i n g a pre-war training mission - was t h e last t o j o i n VIII Fliegerkorps. A t t a c h e d t o StG 1, t h e y f o r m e d part of t h e a w e s o m e 'cloud of Stukas' t h a t rained destruction u p o n t h e Allied evacuation fleet off t h e beaches. (IWM HU103326)

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A target-rich e n v i r o n m e n t : a host of s h i p p i n g waits offshore at La Panne, being o v e r f l o w n by a Coastal C o m m a n d Lockheed H u d s o n . 1 June d a w n e d a b r i g h t and clear day, perfect w e a t h e r for Stuka attacks. One destroyer heads outbound while a minesweeper, destroyer and large t u g - n o n e of w h i c h survived t h e m o r n i n g - steam t o w a r d s t h e c r o w d of schuyts, trawlers and drifters nearer t h e water's edge. (IWM CI 715)

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At 1800hrs the BEF GHQ closed down and evacuated King Albert's old seaside villa, most of the staff being ferried out to the destroyer H M S Keith. Lord Gort was initially brought to the modern 830-ton minesweeper Hebe where he observed the progress of the evacuation at Bray-Dunes for six hours before a motor anti-submarine boat sped him to Dover, arriving at 0547hrs. At 2300hrs the withdrawal of II Corps began, organized and led by M a j . Gen. Montgomery (Lt. Gen. Brooke and his staff had left the previous day). Montgomery's 3rd Division and M a j . Gen. Franklyn's badly battered 5th Division got away safely from Bray-Dunes, but Major-General Dudley Johnson's 4th Division had problems. Planned to depart from La Panne, few ships appeared offshore and by OlOOhrs only 3 0 0 - 4 0 0 of Johnson's 8,000 men had been embarked. Moving to Bray-Dunes they were unable to embark largely because the Royal Navy shore parties - who had been directed that they 'were not to risk being taken prisoner' - were convinced by the bombardments that the enemy was closing in so they re-embarked and all returned to England by 0830hrs the next morning. After a 16km march to the east mole, the tired Tommies were finally able to board the ships berthed there. In spite of all adversity some 53,230 British troops evacuated on this, the biggest day of Dynamo. Almost two-thirds of the total left from the harbour and of that number approximately 1,176 were wounded. Ship losses were light: two motorboats due to enemy action and two ALCs and ten motorboats lost by misadventure. Four destroyers were damaged in accidents but the only major Royal Navy loss was a damaged 622-ton paddle-wheel minesweeper that was intentionally beached near Bray-Dunes to form a breakwater for the smaller boats.

Troops w a t c h in anguish, or abject exhaustion, f r o m their foxholes in t h e dunes as their rescue fleet is sunk or b l o w n o u t of t h e water before their eyes. (IWM HU1528) BOTTOM Coastal C o m m a n d f l e w 171 sorties covering t h e f l o w of evacuation ships and scouting t h e shoreline f r o m Calais t o Flushing, g u a r d i n g against U-boat and S-boat attack. Five slow, u n d e r - g u n n e d and vulnerable Ansons were lost in action d u r i n g these operations. (IWMHU91217)

General Fagalde anticipated II Corps' retirement and positioned General de brigade Louis Janssen's still strong 12e Division d'infanterie motorisee along the Canal des Chats and the frontier line - a series of widely spaced bunkers that dotted the Belgian border. Major-General Martel's small but still effective 50th Division pulled back to Bray-Dunes to become I Corps' reserve behind Janssen's 8e R Z manning the frontier line. Command of the last remaining British corps was passed to M a j . Gen. Alexander, who replaced the overage (a Boer War veteran), utterly exhausted and chronically ineffectual Lieutenant-General Michael G. H. Barker. Alexander's front line consisted of six battalions; defending Bergues was the 477-man 1st Bn. The Loyal Regiment (known as 'the Loyals') from his division's 2nd Brigade. Along the Basse Colme Canal were two battalions from the 126th Brigade (now attached to the 46th Division), the 2nd Bn. The Coldstream Guards (1st Guards Brigade) and 1st Bn. Duke of Wellingtons (3rd Brigade). A large detachment from the 2nd Bn. The Sherwood Foresters (also 3rd Brigade) manned the three concrete bunkers studding the Belgian border, spanning the 3.2km (2 miles) across Les Moeres inundation. 73

T H E LUFTWAFFE'S LAST C H A N C E , SATURDAY 1 JUNE Finally learning that the prey was getting away and that his boasts would likely return empty Goring, who had been touring Dutch cities confiscating loot for his collections, rushed back to work in an attempt to re-energize his commanders and reverse the Luftwaffe's impending failure to fulfil his vainglorious promises. With clear skies to work in, the Luftwaffe struck ferociously, attacking with 160 bomber and 325 Stuka sorties, the largest numbers used during the whole campaign. Arriving in five major raids they were met by the RAF's typical defensive response: 2 6 7 fighter sorties flown in eight missions. However there were long gaps between them, resulting in little opposition, and even when the RAF was present the 420 Bf 109Es and 110 Bf 110s successfully protected their charges - only two bombers (l./KG 4 and 4./KG 76) and two Stukas (I.(St)/TrGr 186) were lost to RAF fighters while six Hurricanes and ten Spitfires were shot down. The Luftwaffe lost seven Bf 109Es and three Bf l l O C s . Consequently, diving out of clear blue skies, the heavy air assaults wreaked havoc amongst the evacuation fleet. Attacks began at 0415hrs when a formation of 40 Stukas (StG 1) arrived before 11 Group's 'dawn patrol' and attacked ships offshore, followed about three hours later (0720hrs) by an even larger raid (StG 2 and 77 accompanied by J u 88s from L G 1). By the time the RAF's next patrol arrived at 0900hrs the dive-bombers had sunk three destroyers, one minesweeper and two large naval tugs. The primary target off Bray-Dunes was the large (1,400-ton) destroyer H M S Keith, flagship of both R. Adm. Wake-Walker and Captain Edward L. Berthon, commander of Dover's 19th Destroyer Flotilla. Down to only 30 rounds of anti-aircraft a m m o by daybreak she was soon defenceless, overwhelmed and bombed by all three waves, finally capsizing with 36 dead aboard. The destroyers Basilisk and Havant were also hit (another 42 killed) and later sank or were scuttled. The destroyer Ivanhoe was hit amidships (26 killed/30 wounded) and had to be towed back to Dover, out of action for almost three months. The modern minesweeper Skipjack was hit by five bombs, sinking immediately with 2 7 5 troops trapped below decks. The large 550-ton Admiralty tug St Abbs, having rescued many of the Keith's survivors, was blown out of the water by a single bomb from a J u 88, killing 105. At lOOOhrs the carnage continued as Dorniers (KG 76) and Heinkels (KG 4) rained sticks of bombs on the huge collection of vessels. The 585-ton H M S Mosquito (built as a Yangtze River gunboat, now a part of the Thames Estuary Defence Flotilla) was hit, set on fire and abandoned, later scuttled by sister ship Locust. The 4,240-ton railway steamer Prague was returning with 3,000 French troops aboard when it was badly damaged at 1009hrs. Sinking by the stern but able to maintain some speed, Prague transferred the troops while still under way, passing them to a destroyer and two minesweepers. The steamer eventually beached off Deal. N o t needed to fend off the RAF, during the morning Luftwaffe fighters destroyed two Lysanders (Nos. 2 and 26 Sqns.) and shot down a pair of Coastal C o m m a n d Blenheim light bombers (No. 254 Sqn.) whose pilots made the unwise decision to try intercepting German bomber formations. The only loss was a Bf 109E (l./JG 20) surprised by an 'upgunned' Avro Anson (No. 500 Sqn.), which recently had additional .303in. Browning machine guns mounted in its side windows.

German fighters failed to prevent the French Aeronavale from flying an interdiction mission on behalf of the beleaguered defenders. Staging through RAF Tangmere the night before, six American-made Vought 156Fs of Escadrille AB 1 attacked enemy troops at Furnes, now well behind the lines. The French pilots all eluded Luftwaffe fighters and survived the flak, four returning to their base at Cherbourg, the other pair landing in England for the night. Four squadrons of Hurricanes (Nos. 4 3 , 1 4 5 , 2 4 5 and 609 Sqns.) were overhead at 1030hrs when the Stukas returned, but escorting Bf 109Es (II./JG 26) kept them at bay (shooting down five for the loss of two) while the Junkers attacked the arriving 1,356-ton French destroyer Foudroyant (Capitaine de corvette Pierre Fontaine) and two returning British ships. Trapped in the narrow channel of Route X where manoeuvring was impossible, Foudroyant was 'submerged in a cloud of Stukas'. Shattered by three direct hits and numerous near misses, the large French destroyer quickly capsized and sank. A French auxiliary minesweeper, tug, two trawlers and a motor yacht rescued 157 crewmen. The old 3,454-ton railway steamer Scotia and the ancient 519-ton British paddle-wheel minesweeper Brighton Queen were returning via Route X with 2,700 French troops aboard and just beyond Mardyck were attacked by a dozen bombers. Scotia quickly took three devastating hits aft and began sinking and heeling to starboard. Brighton Queen was also hit and began sinking. A destroyer, minesweeper and three drifters rescued about 2,000 survivors. Finally, at 1600hrs the last raid - by nine Stukas - caught a flotilla of four small (300-ton) French auxiliary minesweepers headed for the harbour and sank three of them. While thickening clouds inhibited further air attacks, Kiichler's big guns came into play even more against the evacuation fleet. Positioning some of his 15.5cm and 21cm artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 782) just inshore of the beach at les Huttes and le Clipon; they sank a 96-ton drifter and hit two ships in the harbour.

German heavy artillery, 17cm K 18 and 21 c m Mrs 18 (shown here), at N i e u p o r t and b e t w e e n Gravelines and Mardyke finally shut d o w n t h e Royal Navy's d a y t i m e evacuations f r o m Dunkirk and t h e beaches. (IWM MH9200)

75

Victoria Cross recipient Captain Harold Marcus Ervine-Andrews, c o m m a n d e r of B C o m p a n y , 1 st Bn. t h e East Lancashire Regiment. His heroic and successful 'last stand' at t h e Bentie-Meulen Bridge p e r m i t t e d t h e rest of t h e battalion t o w i t h d r a w and evacuate. ( I W M H U 2 6 1 1 )

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The Kriegsmarine also took their toll on the Allied shipping. Early in the morning, Kapitanleutnant Rudolf Petersen's 2. S-Bootsflotilla was out hunting once again and near South Falls shoals H M S Widgeon was attacked and missed. S.35 (Oberleutnant zur See Keecke) sank one 550-ton anti-submarine trawler near T Buoy at 0230hrs and twenty minutes later S.34 (Oberleutnant zur See Obermaier) sank another (of 540 tons) near S Buoy. On the ground Kiichler's troops began their last stage of coordinated assaults designed to crack open the perimeter. On the eastern front X X V I AK (256. and 2 0 8 . Infanterie-Divisionen) awoke to find that the British units defending Nieuport had vanished in the night. The void was filled by General der Infanterie Hermann Geyer's IX AK (56. and 216. Infanterie-Divisionen), which spent the day advancing to the frontier line. In the west the 9. PanzerDivision made some desultory attacks against the well dug-in French 68e Division d'infanterie, but these were mostly designed to occupy Beaufrere's infantry and artillery and prevent them from supporting the defenders along the southern sector. There Kiichler planned for Generalleutnant Christian Hansen's X AK to split the perimeter at the seam between the French and British forces, rolling each side back to the flank and advancing from Bergues to Dunkirk. Under devastatingly heavy artillery barrages the ferocious German ground assaults began at 0500hrs. Tremendous bombardments on Bergues destroyed the town and drove the Loyals across the canal to the north, leaving the 1,000man 14e and 15e R R T holding the blazing ruins. In heavy fighting around Hoymille the 18. Infanterie-Division stormed the Basse Colme Canal, driving back a company of Royal Warwickshires and turning the flank of the neighbouring French 1/137 e Rl. Late afternoon counterattacks by the Loyals - slogging through flooded fields in the face of withering machine-gun fire eventually stabilized the line along the canal bank. Five kilometres (3 miles) east of Bergues the 2 5 4 . Infanterie-Division's assaults forced the two battalions of the 126th Brigade from their forward positions. They retired under vicious fire to the Canal des Chats, one of them covered by Captain Harold M . Ervine-Andrews and his company of only 40 men - winning the Victoria Cross for his valiant leadership. (Only he and eight men survived the desperate last-ditch battle unscathed.) While German attacks breached the Basse Colme Canal line at several points, nightfall and exhaustion prevented exploiting the penetrations. As the fighting died down and darkness enveloped the scene British troops all along the Les Moeres salient withdrew through the French units lining the Canal des Chats; their job was done. The battered troops moved wearily to Dunkirk and Malo-les-Bains where they queued up for evacuation, becoming the last of some 64,429 men rescued that day. Over half - some 35,013 - were French troops, many of them (for the first time) carried by vessels of the Royal Navy. Of the total, 2,509 were wounded. This would be the last of the seriously wounded rescued because at 1400hrs Capt. Tennant made the difficult decision to discontinue embarking stretcher cases, except aboard dedicated hospital carriers. A stretcher occupied the same deck space as eight soldiers standing/four men sitting and England's immediate need was for able-bodied troops. With great sadness an estimated 1,200 wounded (plus one medical officer and ten orderlies for each hundred) had to be abandoned to the occupying Germans. While the rescue effort was nearly as prodigious as the previous day, it had been at tremendous cost; all told, 17 ships were lost - including four precious destroyers with two more laid up for months - and another eight seriously

French soldiers u n l o a d i n g f r o m t w o Royal Navy destroyers at Dover. (IWMHU1154)

damaged. The RAF had proved incapable of preventing the Luftwaffe's heavy attacks and the shore batteries now commanded all routes into Dunkirk as well as the harbour and waters off the beaches. The evacuation was now untenable during daylight hours and at 1800hrs Tennant, who had witnessed the carnage from atop the large French HQ bunker (Bastion 32), signalled Ramsay 'Things are getting very hot for ships... Have directed that no ships sail during daylight. Evacuation by transports therefore ceases at 0300.' Vice Admiral Dover - and the Admiralty for that matter - had of course come to the same conclusion. Just as the 'night shift' of evacuation vessels (seven destroyers and four personnel ships to serve the harbour and 11 minesweepers and a few schuyts, drifters and small craft to work off Malo-les-Bains) began sailing from England - Ramsay ordered all ships to withdraw from Dunkirk before sunrise. While the British accounting of embarkations ended with tallying the day's debarkations at midnight, the evacuation continued through the night. Boarding the ships were most of the 1st Division, the 46th Division's 126th and 139th Brigades, and I Corps artillery and support units. As ordered, at 0300hrs the last two vessels - the destroyers Whitshed and Winchelsea - pulled up their gangplanks and boarding ladders, cast off and backed out of the harbour, leaving the east mole jetty crowded with troops. The Tommies were the grim and grimy survivors of the Loyals, bone-tired from the 8km (5-mile) trek from Bergues that followed a day of non-stop bombardment and combat. Dejected, yet accepting that the evacuation was suspended for the coming day, they 'about-faced' and marched from the mole and into the dunes beyond Malo-les-Bains. There the Loyals joined about 3,500 other troops forming a last redoubt around the last portal, just in case the French collapsed during the day. Defended by a dozen 2-pdr anti-tank guns and seven Bofors, they dug in deep in the sandy dunes and waited for the day to pass and the Royal Navy to return. 77

T H E FRENCH FIGHT O N , SUNDAY 2 JUNE As the sun rose again the millpond-smooth seas off Dunkirk were almost empty, only H M S Calcutta and two sloops, and two patrols of anti-submarine trawlers guarding Route Y - and a host of wrecks along the beaches - remained. The RAF initiated the day's air activity. Covered by a four-squadron patrol, seven Lysanders located German artillery, including the two shore batteries, unmolested. Covered by another four fighter squadrons, 24 Blenheims bombed the big guns, losing three bombers (No. 107 Sqn.) to German flak. The first Luftwaffe raid - Heinkels from K G 54 and Stukas from StG 2 arrived at 0800hrs protected by fighters from four Bf 109E (JG 26 plus I./JG 27) and one Bf H O C Gruppen (II./ZG 26). The 120 German aircraft were met by five RAF squadrons (Nos. 32, 66, 92, 266 and 611 Sqns.) and a fierce air battle ensued. The Messerschmitts again prevailed, shooting down five Spitfires and one Hurricane for the loss of a single Bf 109E (3./JG 27). Flight Lieutenant R. R. Stanford Tuck (later a hero of the Battle of Britain) led N o . 92 Sqn. through the melee, 'sighted and attacked eight Heinkel 111 [s]. Shot down one and was attacked by six 109[s]...' N o . 92 Sqn. destroyed six bombers for no loss, only Tuck's Spitfire damaged. N o . 611 Sqn. accounted for the single J u 87B ( l . / S t G 2) shot down, but were mauled by the Messerschmitts losing two Spitfires shot down (pilots killed in action) and six damaged (pilots unhurt). The Allies also initiated the ground fighting. At 0600hrs the 550-man 21e Centre d'instruction divisionnaire launched a vigorous counterattack against the German bridgehead east of Hoymille, sloshing through thigh-deep water and being scythed down by machine-gun fire. Aided by two reconnaissance groups and six Somua S35 tanks, within three hours the French recaptured Notre Dame des Neiges, but only 65 men survived unscathed. Unable to hold the ground regained, they withdrew to Canal des Moeres. German attacks did not resume until the afternoon when at 1500hrs the newly arrived 6 1 . Infanterie-Division (from A O K 6's IV AK) - advancing behind PzKpfw III and IV medium tanks from 3. and 6./PR 33 (9. Panzer-Division) attacked along the main road to Spycker. French infantry (I/225e RI) fought stubbornly and 75mm gunners (III/35e RAD) fired over open sights for three hours before they were finally overrun. The Germans advanced only as far as Spycker before the fighting ended at 2300hrs. On the eastern end of the perimeter the 56. InfanterieDivision attacked the frontier line, but was repulsed with heavy losses. Stuka attacks attempted to aid a breakthrough, bombing the 12e Division d'infanterie motorisee HQ in Fort Usine and killing Gen. Janssen. Stiff defence (8e RZ) held the Germans and spirited counterattacks (by 150e RI) netted 60 prisoners. In the evening the 56. Infanterie-Division pulled out and marched south, its place filled by the 208. Infanterie-Division. Kiichler's main effort remained in the centre where the 18. Infanterie-Division resumed their attacks at Bergues at 1500hrs with a 15-minute bombardment by Stukas, immediately followed by specially trained shock troops (Pion. Bat. 18) charging through great gaps blown in the

Yet another Royal Navy destroyer, c r a m m e d w i t h t r o o p s , docks at Dover. W i t h great sacrifice these n i m b l e warships and their tireless crews rescued t h e bulk o f t h e Allied t r o o p s 102,843 m e n - evacuated d u r i n g Dynamo. (IWM H1640)

ancient Vauban walls. The dazed survivors of the two R T T battalions were overwhelmed, surrendered or scattered northwards. Meanwhile another 24 Stukas attacked Fort Vallieres, killing most of the garrison (VI/310e RI). The Germans advanced against determined resistance until a desperate counterattack halted them short of the Canal des Moeres. The Luftwaffe returned to attack ships offshore, three Ju 8 8As damaging the anti-aircraft cruiser Calcutta with near misses at 1035hrs, forcing her retirement to Sheerness four hours later. About that time another dozen Junkers caught the 2,294-ton hospital carrier Worthing approaching Dunkirk and damaged her with two near misses; she withdrew as well. One 399-ton anti-submarine trawler was also badly damaged and retired; two others were lost to mines. The RAF finally returned near dusk to cover the approach of the evacuation fleet. At 2010hrs the four squadrons met a large formation of Dorniers, Stukas and Messerschmitts. One Hurricane (No. I l l Sqn.) was lost while three Ju 87s (III./StG 2) were destroyed. The Germans attacked the 1,790-ton hospital carrier Paris (sent to replace the Worthing), the 2,060-ton Royal Daffodil and a pair of RAF seaplane tender motorboats, all approaching Dunkirk. The Paris w a s attacked by an estimated 15 bombers, who killed two crewmen and damaged the ship so badly that it withdrew and sank the next day. (Consequently, only 167 wounded, all ambulatory, were evacuated this day.) One of the R A F motorboats (No. 243) was sunk by four J u 87s and many of the night's Royal Naval pier party were killed. The Royal Daffodil was attacked by another halfdozen and damaged with a direct hit that went through the hull. She returned to Margate in a sinking condition. 79

At 2100hrs, after the Luftwaffe had retired for the evening, Ramsay's last batch of evacuation vessels - 1 1 destroyers, eight personnel ships (others were ordered, three failed to comply), 14 minesweepers, nine drifters, six scbuyts, two armed yachts, one gunboat and three tugs towing small craft - began to arrive. Almost matching this long, strung-out, slow-moving convoy was the French effort of 43 ships, including the large destroyer Leopard, two torpedo boats, six smaller warships and 34 French and Belgian fishing vessels. By midnight these ships had rescued 7,208 British troops, the last of which - the 3rd Brigade's 1st Bn. The King's Shropshire Light Infantry - boarded the 1,952-ton St. Helier and departed at 2330hrs, allowing Capt. Tennant to announce to V. Adm. Ramsay: 'Operation complete. Returning to Dover', which was reworded for posterity as 'BEF evacuated'. Major-General Alexander and his staff were picked up by R. Adm. Wake-Walker in a motor anti-submarine boat and, after checking for stragglers, ferried to the destroyer Venomous for their return to England. With the departure of Capt. Tennant's control team embarkations came to almost a complete halt - the French did not have a comparable capability. German shellfire precluded lifting troops from Malo-les-Bains and a complicated assortment of miscommunications amongst the Allies resulted in most French troops not arriving on Jetee de l'est until 0230hrs. With orders to depart promptly at 0300hrs, five destroyers and a personnel ship returned virtually empty, leaving an estimated 10,000 Frenchmen behind.

T H E BRITISH ARE GONE, 3 A N D 4 JUNE The night's debacle left Fagalde with 25,000 troops manning the shrunken perimeter and another 2 2 , 0 0 0 ready for embarkation. It was guessed that 2 0 , 0 0 0 men more were present but unaccounted for, bunched in thousands of tiny groups cloistered in cellars and cowering in the dunes. Unfortunately, this was to prove a low estimate. Again Fagalde hoped to upset the Germans' planned assaults with a preemptive spoiling attack. At 0400hrs four battalions - two from General de division M . C. Gabriel Lucas's 32e Division d'infanterie (III/122e RI and III/143e RI) and two from the 137e RI - supported by their last (six S35 and four H35) tanks. The exhausted poilus were able to push as far as Galghouck before enemy anti-tank gunners knocked out the tanks and machine guns stopped the assault. While the 6 1 . Infanterie-Division and the refreshed 2 0 8 . InfanterieDivision renewed their assaults - and made progress - on the flanks of the perimeter earlier that morning, the Germans' main effort was again in the centre. At llOOhrs Gen.Lt. Friedrich-Carl Cranz's 18. Infanterie-Division launched their attacks, supported by heavy artillery bombardments, driving the French back to Canal des Moeres. Of the I/137e RI - a unit that had been in the forefront of the fighting ever since it battled Guderian's Panzers at Bourbourg - only 50 men remained. Meanwhile, haze and heavy ground mist hampered RAF operations over Dunkirk but there was little enemy air activity anyway, the Luftwaffe stood down most units to prepare for Operation Paula, the massive afternoon offensive (640 bombers escorted by 460 Messerschmitts) against Armee de l'Air bases and French aviation industry targets around Paris. In the one rare encounter, N o . 17 Sqn. lost one Hurricane to Bf 109Es (5./JG 3) for no victories.

Knowing the night's evacuations would be the final effort overruled the chronic fatigue being suffered by all the crews - Royal Navy, merchant navy and civilian alike - so Ramsay sent everything available: all nine surviving destroyers, nine personnel ships (a tenth refused to go), eleven minesweepers, two patrol sloops and one gunboat, plus nine drifters, five schuyts and four tugs towing 14 motorboats. To bring off as many of their countrymen as possible, the French provided 63 vessels - including four destroyers, eight smaller warships, 18 trawlers and a host of fishing boats. Being slower, the small craft departed first, beginning at 1430hrs, followed two hours later by the tugs and schuyts and their chains of small boats. At 1815-1845hrs the British and French cross-Channel steamers departed, with the destroyers and other naval vessels after them. His flag flying from Motor Torpedo Boat 102, R. Adm. WakeWalker left with the destroyers, minesweepers, sloops and gunboat. To aid in controlling the flow of troops, the Royal Navy provided a pier party under Commander Herbert James Buchanan with 54 Royal Navy personnel and four French liaison officers to assist in overcoming language difficulties. Anticipating the ships' arrival, at 1900hrs HQ Forces Maritimes du N o r d shut down operations and an hour later left Bastion 32 for the Jetee de l'est. Most of them boarded the British car ferry Autocarrier and French Newhaven and were gone by midnight. Two hours later Vice-amiral Abrial and Gen. Fagalde boarded two French motor torpedo boats and headed for Dover. At 2030hrs Gen. Barthelemy's troops began slipping out of line, leaving skirmishers who would remain until 0200hrs, only the depleted battalions holding the bridges at Chapeau Rouge (II/48e, III/122e and II/137e RI) being unable to disengage. However, as his ragged, weary warriors tramped towards Malo-les-Bains, 'a vast crowd of troops materialise[d]... out of the cellars and holes streams of unarmed men appeared, emerging everywhere, converging on the Mole, until they became an immense river of men frozen almost solid at its approaches'. These were ordnance troops, transport drivers and other auxiliary

The D u t c h schuyt Oronje u n l o a d i n g t r o o p s at Ramsgate. M a n n e d by Royal Naval crews t h e 40 schuyts p e r f o r m e d y e o m a n service in t h e evacuation, recovering 22,698 m e n and losing only four of their n u m b e r in t h e entire operation. (IWMHU1518)

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GERMAN FORCES A

XIV A r m e e k o r p s (mot.) heavy artillery batteries

B

Schutzen-Brigade 9

C

6 1 . Infanterie-Division

D

Infanterie-Regiment 'Grossdeutschland' 18. Infanterie-Division 254. Infanterie-Division 14. Infanterie-Division 216. Infanterie-Division 56. Infanterie-Division 208. Infanterie-Division IX A r m e e k o r p s heavy artillery batteries 256. Infanterie-Division

ALLIED FORCES French I

272e D e m i - b r i g a d e d'infanterie 59e GRDI ll/225e Regiment d'infanterie 111/341 e Regiment d'infanterie lll/35e Regiment d'artillerie l/225e Regiment d'infanterie 341 e Regiment d'infanterie 14e and 15e Regiments regionaux de travailleurs l/48e Regiment d'infanterie a n d Usherforce

10 7e GRDA I I 18e GRCA 12 21 e Centre d e s t r u c t i o n divisionnaire 13 Vl/310e Regiment d'infanterie 14 lll/407e Regiment d'infanterie 15 lll/225e Regiment d'infanterie 16 137e Regiment d'infanterie 17 lll/122e Regiment d'infanterie 18 111/143e Regiment d'infanterie 19 92eGRDI 20 3e GRDI 21 150e Regiment d'infanterie 22 8e Regiment de zouaves 23 12e Division d'infanterie m o t o r i s e e HQ 24 Forces Maritimes d u Nord a n d 16e Corps d'armee HQ at Bastion 32

British 25 Remaining t r o o p s of t h e 1 st Division

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3 June 6 0400hrs: General Fagalde launches a spoiling attack to upset the Germans' final assaults on the defensive perimeter. Four battalions - I and 11/137e RI, and 111/122e and Ill/I 43e RI supported by six S35 and four H35 tanks. Overall the exhausted poilus are able t o push as far as Galghouck before enemy anti-tank gunners knock out the tanks and machine guns halt the assault.

NIEUPORT-BAINS

7 0600hrs: the 6 1 . Infanterie-Division resumes its assaults driving towards the Bourbourg-Dunkirk Canal. General Beaufrere throws his divisional reconnaissance group (59e GRDI) in t o stop t h e m and they hold while the rest of the 68e Division d'infanterie fall back behind the canal. The French fight w i t h great determination and prevent the Germans from crossing the canal, at Cappelle-la-Grande, until about 2000hrs. 8 110Ohrs: The 18. Infanterie-Division launch their o w n attacks, supported w i t h heavy artillery bombardments, driving the French back to, and penetrating, the Canal

BORDER DEFENCES

des Moeres line. Three depleted French battalions 111/122e, 11/137e and 111/143e RI - f o r m a last-ditch line along the Canal de Furnes at Le Chapeau Rouge.

KUCHLER

EVENTS 2 June 1 0600hrs: the 21 e Centre d'instruction divisionnaire, supported by two reconnaissance groups (7e GRDI and 18e GRCA) and six Somua S35 tanks (18e Dragons/1 ere DLM), launchess a vigorous counterattack against the German bridgehead east of Hoymille. Against withering machine-gun fire they manage to retake Notre Dame des Neiges at 0900hrs, but are badly depleted. Unable to hold the ground regained, they withdraw to Canal des Moeres. 2 1500hrs: German attacks resume when Generalleutnant Siegfried Haenicke's newly arrived 61. Infanterie-Division - advancing behind PzKpfw III and IV medium tanks of PR 33 (9. Panzer-Division) - attack along the main road to Spycker. The l/225e RI fights stubbornly while 75mm guns (lll/35e RAD), placed in the front line as anti-tank weapons, fire over open sights. After three hours of horrendous combat the French are finally overrun and the Germans advance as far as Spycker.

3 1500hrs: in the centre, Generalleutnant Friedrich-Carl Cranz's 18. Infanterie-Division resumes their attacks at Bergues with a 15-minute bombardment by Stukas, immediately followed by specially trained shock troops (Pionier-Bataillon 18) charging through great gaps blown in the ancient Vauban walls. The dazed survivors of the 14e and 15e RRT battalions are overwhelmed, the Germans capturing the ruins in t w o hours. General Barthelemy blocks the German advance with t w o infantry battalions (lll/225e and lll/407e RI) and six groups of 75mm guns. A spoiling counterattack by infantry and four Hotchkiss H35 tanks (12e Dragons) stops the German advance before it reaches Canal des Moeres. 4 1500hrs: simultaneous attacks on the perimeter's east end by 56. Infanterie-Division are repulsed by 8e RZ with heavy losses. Stuka attacks attempt to aid a breakthrough, bombing the 12e Division d'infanterie motorisee HQ in Fort Usine (also known as 'fort des dunes') and killing Gen. Janssen. Spirited counterattacks by 150e RI net 60 prisoners. In the evening the 56. Infanterie-Division is replaced by the 208. Infanterie-Division. 5 21 OOhrs: the last remaining British troops - some 4,000 men from various 1st Division units plus about 3,000 stragglers - move from their bivouac in the dunes near Malo-les-Bains to the east mole for evacuation. The last British troops depart Dunkirk at 2330hrs.

9 110Ohrs: while the 208. Infanterie-Division occupy the 12e Division d'infanterie motorisee w i t h aggressive feints, elements of the 14. Infanterie-Division cross the causeway t h r o u g h Les Moeres village and attack the t w o divisional reconnaissance groups (3e and 92e GRDI) holding the division's right flank. Fighting is fierce w i t h a platoon of H35 tanks (4e Cuirassiers/1 ere Division legere mecanique) at Uxem repulsing repeated assaults until they are all knocked out. The Germans finally capture the village at 1800hrs. 10 2030hrs: except for the depleted battalions holding the bridges at Le Chapeau Rouge, w h o are unable to disengage, Gen. Barthelemy's troops began slipping out of line, leaving skirmishers in forward positions until 0200hrs. As the 25,000 combat troops move towards the quays and moles for embarkation, they find that some 40,000 support personnel have emerged from hiding in the cellars and dunes forming an impenetrable rabble that board the waiting ships ahead of the fighting men. 11 1900hrs: HQ Forces Maritimes du Nord shut d o w n operations and depart from the east mole by midnight. At 0200hrs Vice-amiral Abrial and Gen. Fagalde board t w o French motor torpedo boats and depart. 12 0340hrs: the last Dynamo evacuation ship, HMS Shikari embarks 383 French troops, including Gen. Barthelemy. Simultaneously the 687-ton Pacifico is scuttled, temporarily blocking Dunkirk harbour.

D E F E N D I N G T H E D U N K I R K P E R I M E T E R , 2 - 4 J U N E 1940 The contracted Dunkirk defensive perimeter as it was defended on 2-4 June 1940, after the departure of the last major British units. 83

A small p o r t i o n of t h e estimated 40,000 French POWs c a p t u r e d at Dunkirk. (IWM MH2396)

84

personnel who for days had been cowering in the rubble and the dunes and they numbered an estimated 40,000, an undisciplined mob pushing themselves ahead of the rearguard and crowding onto the east mole to be embarked. To French historian Jacques Mordal (quoted above), 'No episode in the epic of Dunkirk caused more heartbreak.' German shellfire was not a factor this last night - their troops were too close to risk it - but the glut of vessels crowding into Dunkirk harbour created an extreme collision hazard, one trawler being sunk and two naval vessels badly damaged. Additionally at the west mole the World War I minesweeper Kellet ran aground in the darkness and was so badly damaged she could embark only 30 troops. Even the flat-bottomed, 452-ton schuyt Lena grounded in the mud and had to be abandoned. At the end of the east mole, once the initial congestion was resolved the personnel ships docked and loaded first, although the strong wind and fast tides resulted in slower manoeuvring and longer stays dockside. They departed followed by the minesweepers, schuyts, trawlers and drifters, accompanied by the last of the Belgian tugs, the crews of the four lost being carried to Dover by the Goliath. Finally the destroyers warped alongside the east mole for their last loads. At 0318hrs the destroyer Express backed out of the harbour with 6 1 1 troops and the Royal Naval pier party aboard, completing her sixth run back to England. Trying to make up for a failed attempt the previous morning, at about 0300hrs two blockships approached the harbour entrance, escorted by the old destroyer Shikari, M T B 107 and MA/SB 10. H M S Shikari moved to the

east mole where she embarked 383 French troops, including Gen. Barthelemy. As Shikari backed out of the harbour at 0340hrs, Lieutenant-Commander G. H. F. Owles fired the charges that sank the 687-ton Pacifico, successfully - though only temporarily - closing Dunkirk harbour. The last shipping loss of Operation Dynamo occurred at 0615hrs when the 348-ton French auxiliary minesweeper Emil Deschamps, carrying 817 troops, hit a mine only 8km (5 miles) east of Foreness. The 801-ton steamer King George V and the 710-ton minesweeper Albury rescued 107 survivors. During 3 June and the night that followed, some 4 6 , 7 9 2 French (and six British stragglers) were evacuated to England, a tremendously successful effort in spite of all the problems both ashore and afloat. Unfortunately another 40,000 - almost all of Beaufrere's valiant rearguard - remained. German ground assaults on the reduced perimeter resumed at dawn, but by this point the defenders realized continued resistance was futile and white flags began appearing everywhere. The 18. Infanterie-Division quickly crossed the Canal des Moeres and into the devastated city, advanced elements riding in trucks drove all the way to the base of the east mole arriving at 0930hrs to find so many French troops massed there it was difficult to round them up quickly. Shortly before ten o'clock Gen.Lt. Cranz drove up to the red brick Hotel de Ville, Gen. Beaufrere's final HQ, in the centre of the debris-clogged city. The French commander traded his steel helmet for the gold-leaf general's kepi for the surrender ceremony. Accepting the French capitulation, Cranz asked, 'Where are the English?' 'Not here,' Beaufrere answered, 'They are in England.'

85

AFTERMATH I felt that, fighting

however

units

the situation

of the BEF

might

to be quickly

develop reformed

valuable at

cadres

had

been

withdrawn

which

would

enable

the

home.

General the Viscount Gort Report to the War Cabinet, 1 June 1940

By any measure Operation Dynamo was a huge success as a naval evacuation. Royal Naval sources say 308,888 troops were transported by British ships; French histories report 4 8 , 4 7 4 were carried by French ships, 26,314 of these directly to French ports. When the 108,982 Tommies arrived at Dover (according to V. Adm. Ramsay's 'Dover Report'; 77,605 also arrived at smaller ports from Margate to Brighton) their journey was not yet over. Most of the ships docked two to three deep at the port's eight cross-Channel berths at the Admiralty Pier where the disembarking troops were counted by Landing Control (annotating names and units) and crossed 2 0 0 m (656ft) to the trains waiting at the Marine Station. Alerted three days prior, by 23 May the Railway Executive Committee had assembled 186 ten-coach troop trains from the Southern, Great Western, London, Midland and Scottish, and London North Eastern railways and established a joint military-civilian control centre at Redhill, Surrey. The men were transported to large military camps west of London - at Aldershot, Blandford, Dorchester, Oxford, Tetbury and Tidworth - in an impressively immense and efficient railway operation. For the French there was no time for rest. Leaving behind approximately 6,000 dead and 40,000

U p o n arriving at port, Dunkirk's survivors w e r e t r a n s p o r t e d by an aggressive and robust railways system t o six different military camps. After a short rest t h e y w o u l d be r e g r o u p e d and units reconstituted and prepared t o return t o war. (IWMH1657)

86

2.

00

The bulk of the 120,000 troops returned to France were shipped from Plymouth to Brest in daily convoys by five French naval auxiliaries and six large transports. Additional French troops were transported to Cherbourg via a twice-daily shuttle service of three British and three Dutch steamers. These returned to Southampton with approximately 5,000 British troops each day. Upon disembarkation at Brest, the French troops were carried by train from Brest via Rennes and Laval, to Le Mans, with infantrymen being shipped north from l_e Mans to between Caen and Lisieux and 'specialist troops' continuing through Chartres to Fiambouillet. Upon completion of operations around Dunkirk AOK18 moved to Lille to become Heeresgruppe B reserve.

20 miles

0 I

I 0

25km

LEFT 'We lost our l u g g a g e ' (Churchill). The BEF had t o leave b e h i n d almost all of t h e army's m o d e r n e q u i p m e n t . Near Bray-Dunes a Bedford OX 30-cwt lorry has been disabled and a Vickers Mk VI light tank driven i n t o a canal. (IWM HU58729) RIGHT Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay, architect of Dynamo. Ramsay's success led directly t o his a p p o i n t m e n t t o organize t h e Allies' return t o t h e C o n t i n e n t in O p e r a t i o n Overlord. P r o m o t e d t o admiral and n a m e d Naval C o m m a n d e r in-Chief of t h e Allied Expeditionary Force, sadly Ramsay was n o t t o see t h e fruits of his successes as he was killed in t h e crash of his Lockheed Hudson Mk V staff transport (AM550) o n 2 January 1945. (IWM A23440)

88

captured at Dunkirk, some 122,000 French troops were evacuated to British ports. They arrived exhausted, hungry, demoralized and were immediately disarmed by British military police (un affront injustifie - though disembarking Tommies were as well) before being herded onto trains. They were taken by rail to Salisbury then to the nearby Tidworth army camp. There they were fed, clothed and briefly billeted in the 30,000-man camp, 20 schools in Southampton and individual homes in three neighbouring towns. While roughly 2,000 of them remained in Britain on account of wounds or for other reasons, the rest were quickly returned to France to continue the fight. Less than 48 hours after arriving in England, most were transported to Southampton and Plymouth for their voyage home. (Some of the poilus were taken from disembarkation directly to these two ports, resulting in a stay of less than 24 hours). From Plymouth the five small Elan-class dispatch boats and six large (5,800-/10,172-ton) transports ferried most of them to Brest. From Southampton three British and three Dutch ships shuttled others to Cherbourg (from where they returned with about 5,000 Tommies on each run). From the French ports some 100,000 infantrymen and artillerists were moved to the region between Caen and the Seine to be reformed into divisions. Although they were in terrible shape, had to be rearmed and were hopelessly mixed in units from 17 different divisions, Gen. Georges attempted to create a corps of four divisions from them. The 'specialists' from the divisions legeres mecaniques were regrouped south-west of Paris, received new equipment directly from the factories and formed two small mechanized divisions. However, by this time the Panzers were overrunning the rest of France and fewer than half saw combat against Germany again. In total, Dynamo and the evacuations preceding it brought home 221,504 British troops. Within three weeks Operations Aerial and Cycle evacuated another 1 4 4 , 1 7 1 south of the Somme, mostly men of the BEF's rear area logistics personnel but also those of the 1st Armoured (but only 21 tanks), 52nd (Lowland) and 1st Canadian Divisions. The remaining BEF formation

- the 51st (Highland) Division - was captured intact at Saint-Valery-en-Caux on 12 June while awaiting evacuation. Adding to these the nearly 10,000 troops withdrawn from Norway meant the British had sufficient numbers to man 16 infantry divisions, but it would take three weeks to reconstitute the BEF divisions. Even then it was possible to equip fully only three of them. For example, there were only 54 anti-tank guns, 4 2 0 field guns and 163 heavy guns available in the UK. While lacking hardware, Britain had the huge benefit of recovering the core of the professional army and this cadre had the benefit of being experienced in the horrors, rigours and requisites of modern mobile combat. While successful, Dynamo was a costly operation, especially for the naval forces. By the time it ended at 1423hrs on 4 June the Allies had lost 2 4 0 vessels with another 45 badly damaged. M o s t grievous of course were Royal Navy and French destroyer losses. Six British and three French warships of this category were sunk and 26 damaged. was an expensive learning experience. A close For the RAF Dynamo examination of Luftwaffe loss reports and unit operational records reveals that British fighters destroyed 4 2 bombers and 36 fighters over Dunkirk. (Additionally, four Stukas and two Ju 88s are known to have fallen to ships' anti-aircraft fire.) In return Air Vice-Marshal Park's 11 Group lost 84 fighters to Messerschmitts and bombers' defensive fire, thus costing more than one fighter for each enemy aircraft downed. Fighter Command's front-line strength was reduced to only 331 Spitfires and Hurricanes with 36 in reserve. However, the traumatic and costly experience paid off - as much as the advantage of radar - in the RAF's victory over the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain. But regardless of the cost to the Royal Navy and RAF Operation Dynamo was a success - and a crucial element in the eventual Allied defeat of Nazi Germany - even if it did not constitute a victory over the Wehrmacht. As Churchill so rightly stated, 'We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of victory. Wars are not won by evacuations.'

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY Seventy years separate today from the titanic struggle that took place at Dunkirk, Bray-Dunes, La Panne and Nieuport in the climactic events of the late spring, 1940. As is all too common, the ground upon which men fought and died - or escaped and lived to fight another day - has been masked by the ever-expanding spread of growing civilization, nurtured by the six and a half decades of peace that followed. This is made even more marked by the need to rebuild almost everything following destruction experienced in 1940 and the even greater devastation suffered during the stubborn German defence of the area four years later. Consequently, Dunkirk itself has been almost completely transformed and the inner port area replaced with a new one of a whole new design. The outer harbour, however, remains virtually unchanged. The most prominent feature - the l,280m-long (4,200ft) east mole - still stands, but concrete pilings have replaced the original timber ones. Access is easy and the walk out gives pause when one considers that some 2 3 9 , 5 5 5 men were saved from this harbour. The gangway goes approximately 800m (2,600ft) out, the Germans having blown a gap in the jetty to ensure that any Allied commandos would have to disembark within machine-gun range of the bunkers at the base of the 'mole'.

Looking back at Dunkirk f r o m t h e end of t h e 8 0 0 m (875-yard) concrete w a l k w a y m o u n t e d a t o p t h e east m o l e j e t t y . Dunkirk n o w rests peacefully, most of its skyline - centred o n t h e spires of t h e Saint Eloi cathedral - restored and e x p a n d e d in t h e seven decades since D y n a m o . (Author's collection)

90

Several memorials c o m m e m o r a t e t h e events and sacrifice at Dunkirk, Bray-Dunes and De Panne d u r i n g those t r a u m a t i c days of May and June 1940. The main o n e is located at t h e base of t h e East Mole and glorifies t h e sacrifice of t h e Allied aviators, sailors and soldiers d u r i n g t h e Bataille de D u n k e r q u e . The steps in t h e b a c k g r o u n d lead t o t h e east mole, t h e end of w h i c h , w i t h its t i n y w h i t e lighthouse, may be seen e x t e n d i n g into t h e far distance. (Author's collection)

Indeed one of the difficulties with identifying Allied defences is the fact that the Germans spent four years fortifying the area, all the while expecting the Allies' return to happen next door at Calais. Consequently care must be taken to prevent confusing defences constructed by the Nazis for those originally built by the French. Vice-amiral Abrial's HQ - the famous Bastion 32 - may be visited, its cavernous gun galleries now housing the Dynamo-Dunkerque Memorial du Souvenir (www.dynamo-dunkerque.com) and museum. Though small it is well stocked and well worth the visit. Similarly the impressive exterior of Fort des Dunes, from which Gen. Janssen directed the defence of the beachhead's eastern sector after the departure of II Corps, can be viewed but it is closed to visitors. Moving east down the beaches the pleasant peaceful seaside hotels belie the horrific contest that took place on these beaches. The suburban sprawl of a now expansive Malo-les-Bains has overrun the dunes in which the last redoubt of British defenders bivouacked during their last night on French soil. Further east the central portion of the Vancauwenberghe Sanatorium, a landmark for arriving ships, remains original but the wings are post-war reconstruction and considerably shorter. Bray-Dunes has many new hotels lining the sea front promenade but the occasional original building still lends a whiff of the town's 1940s atmosphere. The pre-war bandstand - the reporting point for embarking troops - has been rebuilt as an overlook mounting a large marble memorial to the heroic defence of the 12e Division d'infanterie motorisee. and smaller brass plaques commemorating the loss of the destroyer Bourrasque and submarine Doris (pre-Dynamo). At De Panne the bandstand is replaced by a similar beach overlook, this one sporting a Belgian flag. The site of King Albert's Koninklyke Villa, destroyed during the fighting in 1 9 4 4 , now supports a massive Belgian memorial to King Leopold I. 91

FURTHER READING Much has been written about Dunkirk but few have attempted to incorporate the many sides (four nations in conflict and all facets: air, land and sea) of the whole story. Therefore a compendium of previous publications must be studied to provide a comprehensive understanding of the events filling those traumatic days. It is best to begin with the official British military histories: Major Lionel Frederic Ellis's The War in France and Flanders 1939-1940 ( H M S O : London, 1 9 5 4 ) and the Royal Navy's Naval

Staff

History

- Battle

Summary

No. 41

originally compiled and edited in 1 9 4 9 by W. J . R. Gardner but reprinted (as The Evacuation

from

Dunkirk:

Operation

Dynamo,

(Frank C a s s Publishers:

London, 2 0 0 0 ) without changes. While national bias dramatically colours British military histories, the Germans almost universally saw Dunkirk as a 'sideshow' and hence it is largely unreported in German publications. For appreciating the German Army perspective, see Telford Taylor's March

of Conquest:

German

Victories

in Western

Europe,

1940

(Simon

and Schuster: N e w York, 1958). Because Dynamo w a s such an iconic British military experience many books cover the horrific human experience of having participated in or been rescued by the operation. Arguably the best at this is American historian Walter Lord in his The Miracle of Dunkirk (Viking Press: N e w York, 1982). Few of these popular histories focus on the maritime side of the operation, the best being David Devine's The Nine Days of Dunkirk (W. W. Norton & Company: N e w York, Inc., 1959). Having captained a 30ft Thames motor cruiser in the evacuation, Devine provides by far the most detailed and nautical description of the maritime operations. The best account of French participation in the campaign and their own evacuation is Jacques Mordal's Dunkerque (Editions France-Empire: Paris, 1968). Much more useful for the English-only reader is Francois de Lannoy's Dunkerque 1940 (Editions Heimdal: Bayeux, 2 0 0 4 ) . While the narrative is French, the concise text uses readily recognizable military terms and unit designations, and the abundance of m a p s , charts, photos and sidebars make it easily understandable. Air power played a key roll in the campaign but is largely under-represented in literature. All the above-mentioned references use aggregate figures and daily summary ' b o x scores' to represent the aerial contest. At a more detailed level, telling the RAF's side of the story is N o r m a n Franks' Air Battle Dunkirk, 26 May-3 June 1940 (Grub Street: London, 2 0 0 0 ) . For real information regarding the units, engagements and losses occurring in the nine days of air combat over Dunkirk, study the excellent The Battle of France Then and Now (Battle of Britain International Ltd: Old Harlow, 2007) by Peter D. Cornwell. Finally, the most balanced and informative overall account - though still without significant detail from the German side - is Robert Jackson's Dunkirk: The British Evacuation, 1940 (Arthur Barker: London, 1976). For the serious student of this grand, multi-faceted contest, all of the books mentioned below are highly recommended. Belgium: The Official

Account

of What

Happened,

1939-1940

(Evans Brothers

Limited: London, 1941) Battistelli, Pier Paolo, Battle Orders 3 2 : Panzer Divisions: The Blitzkrieg 1939-40 (Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2007)

Years

Bekker, C a j u s , The Luftwaffe

War Diaries:

The German

Air Force

in World

War II

(Doubleday &C Company: N e w York, 1968) Benoist-Mechin, J a c q u e s , Sixty

1940

Days

that Shook

the West:

The Fall of

France,

translated by Peter Wiles (G. P. Putnam's Sons: N e w York, 1963)

Bingham, Victor R , 'Blitzed!'

The Battle

of France,

1940 (Air Research

May-June

Publications: Walton on Thames, 1990) Boatner, M a r k M . , Ill, The Biographical

Dictionary

of World

War II

(Presidio Press: N o v a t o , C A , 1996) Bond, Brian, France and Belgium 1939-1940 (Associated University Presses, Inc.: C r a n b u r y , N J , 1979) Caldwell, Donald, The JG 26 War Diary, Volume One 1939-1942 (Grub Street: London, 1996) Churchill, Winston S., The Second

World

War, Volume

II Their

Finest

Hour

(Cassell & C o . Ltd.: London, 1949) Coastal

Command: Command

The Air Ministry in the Battle

Account

of the Part Played

of the Seas,

by

Coastal

(The M a c M i l l a n

1939-1942

Company: N e w York, 1943) Collier, Richard, The Sands of Dunkirk (E. P. Dutton & C o . , Ltd: N e w York, 1961) Cornwell, Peter D., The Battle of France Then and Now (Battle of Britain International Ltd: Old Harlow, 2 0 0 7 ) Corum, James S., T h e Other Richthofen', World War II, Vol. 2 3 , N o . 3, August/September 2008 Dallies-Labourdette, Jean-Philippe, S-Boote:

German

E-boats

in

action

(1939-1945) trans. Janice Lert (Histoire et Collections: Paris, 2 0 0 3 ) Divine, David, The Nine Days of Dunkirk (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.: New York, 1959) 'Dunkirk Evacuation', After the Battle N o . 3, August 1 9 7 3 , Battle of Britain International Ltd, p p . 13-21 Ellis, M a j o r L. E , The War in France

and Flanders

1939-1940

( H M S O : London, 1954) Franks, N o r m a n L. R., Air Battle

Dunkirk,

26 May-3

June

1940

Dunkirk:

Operation

(Grub Street: London, 2000) Gardner, W. J . R., td.^The

Evacuation

from

Dynamo,

26 May-4 June 1940 (Frank Cass Publishers: London, 2 0 0 0 ) Gardner, W. J . R., 'The Death of Admiral Ramsay', After the Battle N o . 8 7 , August 1 9 9 5 , Battle of Britain International Ltd, p p . 4 4 - 5 3 Gelb, N o r m a n , Dunkirk:

The Complete

Story

of the First Step in the

Defeat

of Hitler (William M o r r o w and Company, Inc.: N e w York, 1989) Guderian, General Heinz, Panzer Leader trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (E. P. Dutton & C o . , Inc.: N e w York, 1952) Hooten, E. R., Phoenix

Triumphant:

The Rise and Rise

of the

Luftwaffe

(Arms & Armour Press: London, 1994) H o m e , Alistair, To Lose A Battle: France, 1940 (Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1969) Jackson, Robert, Air War over France 1939-40 (Ian Allan Ltd: London, 1974) —, Dunkirk: The British Evacuation, 1940 (Arthur Barker: London, 1976) Kesselring, Field-Marshal Albert, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring, translation of Soldat bis zum letzten Tag by William Kimber Ltd (Presido Press: N o v a t o , C A , 1989) Kindell, D o n , British

and Other

Navies

in World

War 2, M a y 1 9 4 0 , Part 4,

and June 1940, Part 1 as published on website: http://www.navalhistory.net/xDKWW2-4005-14MAY04.htm and http://www.navalhistory.net/xDKWW2-4006-l 9JUNO 1 .htm Lannoy, Francois de, Dunkerque 1940 (Editions Heimdal: Bayeux, 2 0 0 4 )

Looseley, Rhiannon, 'Le Paradis apres l'Enfer: the French Soldiers Evacuated from Dunkirk in 1940', History Today, Vol. 56, June 2 0 0 6 Lord, Walter, The Miracle of Dunkirk (Viking Press: N e w York, 1982) Macksey, Kenneth, Guderian: Panzer General (Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal Ltd: London, 2 0 0 3 ) Nafziger, George E , The German

Order

of Battle:

Infantry

in World

War II

(Greenhill Books, Lionel Leventhal Ltd: London, 2000) Nafziger, George E , The German

Order

of Battle:

Panzers

and Artillery

in

World War II (Greenhill Books, Lionel Leventhal Ltd: London, 1999) Powaski, Ronald E., Lightning War: Blitzkrieg in the West, 1940 (Castle Books: Edison, N J , 2 0 0 6 ) Ritgen, Oberst a.D. Helmut, Vanguard 2 : The 6th Panzer Division 1937-45 (Osprey Publishing Ltd: London, 1982) Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh, Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, M A , 2 0 0 6 ) Shirer, William L., The Collapse

of France

of the Third

Republic:

An Inquiry

into the

Fall

in 1940 (Simon and Schuster: N e w York, 1969)

Smith, Peter C , Stuka:

Luftwaffe

Dive-Bomber

Units

1939-1941

(Ian Allan Ltd:

London, 2 0 0 6 ) —, Stuka

Sqn.: Stukagruppe

77 - the Luftwaffe's

Tire

Brigade*

(Tatrick Stephens

Ltd: Wellingborough, 1990) Tarnstrom, Ronald L., French Arms (Trogen Books: Lindsborg, K A , 2 0 0 1 ) Taylor, Telford, March

1940

of Conquest-.

The German

Victories

in Western

Europe,

(Simon and Schuster: N e w York, 1958)

Whitley, M . J . , Destroyers

of World

War Two: An International

(Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, M D , 2 0 0 2 ) Williamson, Gordon, N e w Vanguard 5 9 : German E-boats (Osprey Publishing Ltd: Oxford, 2002)

Encyclopedia

1939-45

INDEX Figures in bold refer to illustrations

Boulogne 6, 7, 14, 16, 2 9 , 4 5 B o u r b o u r g , fighting at 6, 16, 3 2 , 3 8 , 6 4 , 80

Aa Canal, crossing of 6, 2 0 , 2 9 , 3 7 AA cruisers: Calcutta 3 7 , 5 2 , 7 8 , 79 Abrial, Vice-amiral Jean-Charles 1 2 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 16,36,81,91 Advanced Air Striking Force (RAF) 18 A d a m , Lt. Gen. Sir R o n a l d 2 7 , 63 Aeronavale, mission flown by 75 aircraft 3 6 , 6 9 , 74 Avro Anson 4 9 , 7 3 , 74 Blackburn Skua 64 Boulton Paul Defiant 1 8 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 9 , 6 6 - 7 , 68, 69 Bristol Blenheim 18, 6 4 , 78 Dornier D o 1 7 Z 2 1 , 3 6 , 4 1 , 7 4 , 79 Fairey Albacore 64 Fairey Swordfish 4 9 , 4 9 , 64 Hawker Hurricane 18, 3 0 , 3 4 , 3 6 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 9, 5 2 , 6 4 , 6 8 , 6 9 , 74, 7 5 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 89 Heinkel He 111 2 1 , 4 9 , 6 6 - 7 , 6 8 , 7 4 , 78 Junkers J u 8 7 Stuka 1 3 , 1 4 , 2 0 , 2 1 , 36, 49, 52, 53, 5 4 - 5 , 56, 7 1 , 72, 74, 7 5 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 89 Junkers J u 88A 2 0 , 3 6 , 4 3 , 4 9 , 4 9 , 5 2 , 74, 7 9 , 89 Lockheed H u d s o n 7 2 , 88 Messerschmitt Bf 1 0 9 E 18, 36, 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 9 , 4 9 , 64, 6 8 , 6 9 , 74, 7 5 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 80, 89 Messerschmitt Bf H O C 3 4 , 4 9 , 7 4 , 78 Supermarine Spitfire 18, 1 8 , 3 0 , 3 4 , 3 6 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 9 , 6 8 , 74, 7 8 , 8 9 V o u g h t 1 5 6 F 75 Westland Lysander 6 4 , 7 4 , 78 Alexander, M a j . Gen. The H o n . H a r o l d 5 3 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 7 3 , 80 anti-submarine trawlers, use of 7 6 , 7 8 , 79 Ardennes Forest, Panzers in 4, 5 armed minesweeping trawlers, use of 5 7 Calvi 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 , 5 7 armed yachts, use of 7 1 , 80 A r m e e d e l ' A i r 1 8 , 2 0 , 80 Armentieres 3 8 , 3 9 , 5 7 army assault landing craft, use of 5 2 , 7 2 army motor craft, use of 71 Arras, fight for 6 - 7 , 19 auxiliary minesweepers 3 6 , 7 5 , 85 barges, use of 3 0 , 71 Barthelemy, Gen. Eugene 16, 3 2 , 8 1 , 85 Barwell, Pit. Off. E. G. 6 6 - 7 , 68 Basse Colme Canal 5 3 , 6 0 , 7 3 , 76 Beaufrere, Gen. 2 7 , 7 6 , 85 Belgian Army 13, 14, 3 3 - 4 , 33 inaction 1 5 , 2 9 , 3 3 - 4 , 3 3 , 4 4 retreat and surrender 7, 3 8 , 3 9 , 4 0 Belgium 3 0 , 3 3 - 4 , 3 8 , 3 9 , 73 Allied forces in 5 , 6, 13, 1 5 , 16, 19 German advance in 5 - 6 , 14, 19, 3 9 surrender of 4 0 Bergues, defence of 1 5 , 16, 2 7 , 4 9 , 5 3 , 6 3 , 73, 76, 77, 78-9 Bethune, BEF forces at 1 2 , 19, 3 2 Blanchard, Gen. 16, 2 9 , 3 4 , 4 3 , 65 Bock, Generaloberst Feodor von 7, 2 0 , 33 Bollezeele, fighting at 3 2 , 3 7 - 8 , 4 9 , 4 9

Bray-Dunes, evacuations from 2 7 , 3 9 , 5 3 , 6 5 , 7 1 , 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 4 , 91 Brest, French t r o o p s return to 88 Bridgeman, Lt. C o l . L o r d 6, 7, 2 7 British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 5 actions/deployment of 5 , 6, 7, 1 5 , 1 9 , 27, 28, 2 9 , 3 1 , 3 2 , 33, 34, 3 7 , 3 8 , 39, 40, 43, 44, 4 6 - 7 , 48, 52, 53, 60, 62, 62, 63, 64, 73, 76, 77 evacuation of 7, 2 7 , 3 0 , 3 4 , 3 7 , 4 0 , 5 4 - 5 , 56, 62, 63, 65, 72, 73, 77, 7 8 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 88 motorized transport 5 , 1 5 , 3 9 , 4 0 , 88 numbers evacuated from 4 4 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 6 3 , 65, 72, 79, 79, 80, 84, 85, 88, 90 order of battle (30 M a y ) 2 2 - 3 retreat of forces 4, 6, 7, 1 5 , 1 5 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 8-9, 40, 44, 53, 62, 6 5 , 73, 76, 77 t r o o p s ' anger at lack of ships 6 2 , 6 5 troops lost at sea 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 , 74 B r o o k e , Lt. Gen. Alan F. 7, 1 1 , 7 2 Calais 6, 7, 14, 2 9 , 3 6 , 73 Canal des C h a t s , defence of 7 3 , 76 Canal des M o e r e s 7 8 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 85 Canal Line, Panzers advance 1 5 , 19, 2 0 , 3 2 car ferries: Autocarrier 81 cargo/stores/supply ships, use of 4 3 , 4 5 Cassel, assault on 3 2 , 4 4 , 4 6 - 7 , 4 8 , 5 3 , 6 2 Cherbourg, evacuations from 3 6 , 7 5 , 88 Churchill, P M Winston 4, 5 , 3 4 , 89 coastal freighters: Aboukir 21 'coasters'/'motor coaster' 3 0 , 3 6 , 4 5 , 6 5 , 71 C o m i n e s - Y p r e s C a n a l , defence of 2 9 , 3 4 , 3 8 , 4 3 , 53 destroyers, use of 17, 3 6 , 3 7 , 4 3 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 5 7 , 57, 60, 63, 69, 7 1 , 72, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 7 7 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 8 4 , 80 Basilisk 74; Bourrasque 6 0 , 9 1 ; Cyclone 5 2 , 6 3 , 6 5 ; Express 84; Foudroyant 75; Grafton 17, 5 0 - 1 ; Grenade 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 ; Havant 74; Ivanhoe 74; jaguar 2 1 ; Keith 7 2 , 74; Leopard 8 0 ; Mistral 5 2 ; Sabre 5 6 ; Shikari 8 4 - 5 ; Vanquisher 3 0 , 6 3 , 6 9 ; Venomous 80; Verity 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 ; Vivacious 5 7 , 7 1 ; Wakeful 17, 5 0 - 1 ; Whitshed 7 7 ; Winchelsea 77 Deule C a n a l , defence of 2 9 , 3 9 Dinant, G e r m a n breakthrough at 6, 15 dispatch b o a t s , use of 5 2 , 6 3 , 6 4 , 7 8 , 88 Dover 4 5 , 5 7 , 7 2 ships sail to 3 0 , 5 2 , 6 4 , 6 5 , 7 7 , 7 9 , 86 troops unloaded at 6 4 , 7 7 , 8 1 , 86 drifters 3 7 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 6 3 , 7 1 , 7 5 , 7 7 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 84 Dunkirk, evacuation from 7, 3 0 air defence of 4 0 , 4 1 , 80 assessment of as unusable 3 7 , 5 7 , 6 1 bombardment/bombing/mining of 3 1 , 3 6 , 37, 40, 44, 49, 53, 5 4 - 5 , 56, 64, 64, 65, 69, 7 1 , 74, 75, 75, 77 daytime hazards 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 , 6 5 , 7 7 disposition of forces a r o u n d 4 2 embarkation facilities 2 7 , 3 7 , 5 8 - 9

evacuation from 3 0 , 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 5 7 , 57, 6 1 , 62, 63, 6 5 , 69, 69, 72, 73, 76, 77, 77, 78, 79, 80, 8 1 , 84-5 evacuation points

58-9

halt to e m b a r k a t i o n s 6 5 , 75 last vessels leave 7 7 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 8 4 - 5 numbers evacuated from 4 4 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 6 3 , 65, 72, 79, 79, 80, 84, 85, 88, 90 surviving features of 9 0 , 9 0 , 9 1 temporary closing of 5 7 , 7 5 , 85 t r o o p s left behind 7 6 , 7 7 , 84 Dunkirk-Lille Pocket, defence of 1 5 , 16, 1 8 , 2 0 , 27, 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 1 , 3 7 - 8 , 4 0 Dunkirk perimeter 1 3 , 2 7 , 5 2 , 5 3 attacks on 4 1 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 5 8 - 9 , 6 0 , 6 4 , 6 4 , 7 0 , 7 1 , 7 6 , 7 8 , 8 0 , 8 2 - 3 , 85 defence of 2 9 , 3 7 , 3 8 , 4 0 , 4 5 , 5 8 - 9 , 6 2 , 6 4 , 8 0 , 8 2 - 3 , 85 Dyle Line/River, forces on 5 , 1 5 , 15 English Channel evacuation routes (X, Y and Z ) 3 5 , 3 5 , 3 6 - 7 , 4 5 , 5 7 , 6 0 , 6 1 , 7 5 , 78 mines in 2 1 , 3 6 , 3 7 , 5 7 , 6 0 , 6 3 , 85 Ervine-Andrews, C a p t . H . M . V C 7 6 , 76 F a g a l d e , Gen. M . B. Alfred 1 2 , 13, 1 5 , 16, 27, 32, 63, 73, 8 0 , 8 1 Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) 1 4 , 2 0 , 3 1 Fall Rot (Case Red) 3 1 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 6 0 , 6 9 fast launches, use of 71 fishing b o a t s , use of 6 3 , 6 5 , 7 1 , 8 0 , 81 Fleet Air A r m , attacks by 4 9 , 4 9 , 64 Forest of N i e p p e , BEF troops in 3 8 , 4 4 Fortune, M a j . Gen. Sir Victor M o r v e n 12 Franklyn, M a j . Gen. H a r o l d E. 2 9 , 3 4 , 3 4 , 38, 39, 43, 62, 72 French Army actions/deployment of 6, 7, 1 3 , 1 5 , 16, 16, 18, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 3 7 - 8 , 39, 40, 4 1 , 45, 52, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 73, 7 6 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 88 evacuation of 3 4 , 4 5 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 7 6 , 7 7 , 8 1 , 8 5 , 88 numbers left behind 8 0 , 8 4 , 8 5 order of battle (30 M a y ) 2 4 reformation/redeployment of 8 7 , 88 retreat of 1 8 , 2 9 , 3 2 , 3 4 , 3 8 , 3 9 French N a v y ('Pas de Calais flotilla') 2 4 attacks on ships 2 1 , 5 2 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 8 9 , 91 evacuation by 5 2 , 6 3 , 6 4 , 6 5 , 8 0 , 86 frontier line, defence of 7 3 , 7 6 , 78 Furnes, fighting at 2 7 , 3 6 , 5 3 , 6 0 , 6 4 , 6 4 , 75 Georges, Gen. Alphonse-Joseph 1 1 , 88 G e r m a n Army actions/deployment of 5 - 7 , 1 5 , 19, 2 0 , 2 1 , 3 1 , 32, 33, 33, 37, 37, 38, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 43, 44, 45, 46-7, 48, 49, 52-3, 57, 60, 60, 6 1 , 62, 62, 64, 64, 65, 69, 7 1 , 7 5 , 76, 7 8 - 9 , 8 0 , 85 order of battle (30 M a y ) 2 5 Panzers, advance of 5 , 14, 19, 2 0 , 3 2 , 3 7 - 8 , 3 7 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 5 3 , 80 realignment/restructuring of 5 2 , 6 1 Goring, Reichsmarschall 14, 2 1 , 3 1 , 74

95

Gort, Gen. L o r d 6, 7, 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 1 , 13, 1 5 , 2 7 , 29, 34, 40, 43, 53, 72 Gravelines, fighting for 1 5 , 16, 1 9 , 2 7 , 3 6 , 3 8 , 4 5 , 4 9 , 75 Guderian, Gen. Heinz W. 5 , 6, 14, 19, 3 2 , 3 3 , 3 7 - 8 , 4 5 , 6 0 , 80 H e r s e a u x , BEF forces p a s s through 5 Hitler, Adolf 13, 1 9 , 2 0 , 2 1 , 3 1 , 3 2 , 4 0 , 5 2 H o l l a n d , supply of schuyts 3 0 hospital carriers 3 6 , 4 5 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 7 6 , 79

Paris 7 9 ; Worthing 7 9 Hoymille, fighting near 5 3 , 7 6 , 78 Hunter, Sqn. Ldr. Philip A. 6 6 - 7 , 68 Irwin, M a j . Gen. N o e l 3 8 , 53 Iseghem, penetration at 3 3 , 3 9

minesweepers of 3 0 , 3 7 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 6 3 , 6 4 , 7 2 , 7 2 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 7 7 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 84, 85 Albury 8 5 ; Hebe 7 2 ; Kellet 84; Skipjack 74 M o n t des C a t s , defence of 4 4 , 53 M o n t g o m e r y , M a j . Gen. Bernard L. 3 9 , 4 4 , 60, 72 m o t o r anti-submarine boats 7 2 , 80 m o t o r t o r p e d o b o a t s , use of 8 1 , 84 m o t o r vessels/yachts, use of 3 6 , 75 m o t o r b o a t s 2 9 , 3 0 , 4 5 , 6 3 , 7 1 , 7 2 , 81 motorized ' X lighters', use of 7 1 Nieuport fighting at 2 7 , 3 6 , 3 8 , 4 0 , 5 2 - 3 , 6 4 , 76 G e r m a n artillery fire from 5 7 , 6 0 , 75 N i e u p o r t C a n a l , b o m b i n g of bridges 64 N o o r d s c h o t e , defence of 3 9 , 4 4 , 53

J a n s s e n , General 7 3 , 7 8 , 9 1 Kalischewski, Obit. R o b e r t 6 6 - 7 , 68 King, L A C K H . 6 6 - 7 , 6 8 Kleist, Gen. Ewald von 1 9 , 2 0 , 6 0 Kluge, Generaloberst Giinther H a n s von 19, 2 0 , 3 2 , 6 0 Kriegsmarine ( G e r m a n N a v y ) 2 1 , 6 5 , 76 anti-shipping operations 2 0 , 2 0 , 2 1 , 3 6 , 4 5 , 4 9 , 5 0 - 1 , 5 7 , 6 3 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 6 5 , 7 3 , 76 order of battle (30 M a y ) 2 6 S-boats 2 0 , 2 1 , 3 6 , 4 5 , 4 9 , 5 0 - 1 , 5 7 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 7 3 , 76 U-boats 2 1 , 5 0 - 1 , 7 3 Kiichler, Gen. G e o r g von 5 , 13, 1 3 , 2 0 , 3 3 , 6 1 , 64, 7 1 , 75, 76, 78-9 L a Bassee C a n a l , action at 1 5 , 3 3 , 3 7 , 38 La Panne, evacuations from 2 7 , 5 2 , 5 7 , 6 2 , 7 1 , 72, 72 Laurencie, Gen. 3 9 , 4 1 , 6 2 L e o p o l d III, King of the Belgians 3 3 , 3 4 , 3 7 , 40,91 Les M o e r e s inundation/salient 6 2 , 7 3 , 76 lifeboats, use of 4 1 , 4 5 , 6 5 , 6 9 , 7 1 lighthouse tender, use of 3 7 Lille, fight for 14, 3 8 , 3 9 , 4 1 , 4 2 , 6 5 'little ships', use of 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 7 , 4 4 , 5 2 , 5 7 , 60, 65, 7 1 , 72, 77, 80 Luftwaffe 14 anti-shipping operations 2 0 , 3 6 , 4 3 , 5 2 , 53, 57, 6 5 , 7 1 , 74, 75, 79 b o m b i n g operations 16, 2 0 , 3 1 , 3 6 , 4 0 , 40, 4 1 , 49, 52, 5 4 - 5 , 56, 65, 6 6 - 7 , 6 8 , 6 9 , 7 4 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 89 dive-bombing operations 13, 14, 2 1 , 3 6 , 4 1 , 4 9 , 4 9 , 5 2 , 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 , 7 1 , 7 4 , 7 8 , 79 effects of weather on operations 3 1 , 4 1 , 4 5 , 4 9 , 61 fighter operations 3 0 , 3 4 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 9 , 5 2 , 6 4 , 6 9 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 89 order of battle (30 M a y ) 2 5 - 6 Lys Canal/River, defence of 1 5 , 2 9 , 3 2 , 3, 3 9 , 53 Malo-les-Bains, evacuations from 2 7 , 5 2 , 53, 7 1 , 7 6 , 77, 8 0 , 8 1 , 9 1 Manstein, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von 13 M a r g a t e , troops return to 7 9 , 86 Martel, M a j . Gen. Giffard 2 9 , 4 4 , 6 2 , 73 mines, use of 3 6 , 4 5 , 5 3 , 5 7 , 6 0 , 6 3 , 7 9 , 85

96

observation balloons, use of 7 1 O K H , actions of 19, 2 0 , 3 1 , 3 2 , 3 3 , 52,61 O K W , actions of 1 9 , 2 1 , 3 2 , 3 4 , 5 2 Operation Dynamo Admiralty signal to commence 36 aims/planning and preparation 2 7 , 2 9 near derailment of 5 7 number of ships involved 86 O s b o r n e , M a j . Gen. E d m u n d 4 4 , 5 2 , 53 packet steamers, use of 3 0 Fenella 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 ; Mona's Queen 53 paddle minesweepers 3 0 , 3 7 , 5 2 , 6 5 , 7 2 , 75 Brighton Queen 7 5 ; Devonia 65 patrol s l o o p s , use of 5 2 , 6 5 , 8 1

Bideford 5 2 ; Widgeon 6 5 , 76 personnel ships 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 6 , 3 7 , 4 1 , 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 6 5 , 7 1 , 7 7 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 84 Crested Eagle 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 , 6 5 Pont-aux-Cerfs bridge, crossing of 5 3 , 6 2 Portsmouth Inner Patrol, yachts from 7 1 Pound, First Sea L o r d Sir Dudley 5 7 , 63 R A F seaplane tender m o t o r b o a t s 7 1 , 7 9 railway steamers, use of 3 0 , 3 6 , 7 4 , 75 Prague 7 4 ; Scotia 7 5 railways, transport of t r o o p s 8 6 , 8 6 , 88 R a m s a y , V. A d m . Bertram 6, 1 2 , 1 2 , 17, 2 9 , 30, 36, 37, 4 5 , 57, 63, 65, 7 1 , 77, 80, 8 1 , 8 6 , 88 R a m s g a t e , use of port 3 0 , 7 1 , 8 1 R e y n a u d , Premier Paul 5 , 34 Richthofen, Generalmajor Wolfram von 13-14, 1 3 , 2 0 , 2 1 , 3 1 , 5 2 , 69 R o m m e l , General Erwin 3 7 , 38 Royal Air Force operations Army C o o p e r a t i o n C o m m a n d 6 4 , 7 4 , 78 Bomber C o m m a n d 1 8 , 2 3 , 6 4 , 7 8 C o a s t a l C o m m a n d 2 4 , 4 9 , 7 2 , 7 3 , 7 4 , 88 Fighter C o m m a n d 18, 1 8 , 2 3 , 2 7 , 3 0 , 3 4 , 36, 40, 4 1 , 49, 49, 52, 6 1 , 64, 68, 69, 7 4 , 7 5 , 7 7 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 8 0 , 89 order of battle (30 M a y ) 2 3 - 4 Royal Daffodil, attack on 7 9 Royal N a v a l Reserve 3 0 Royal N a v y (Dover C o m m a n d ) 5 7 , 74 berthing parties, role of 4 3 control team, return of to England 80 Landing Control, w o r k of 86

losses 17, 17, 2 0 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 7 1 , 7 4 , 7 9 , 89 mining/anti-mine operations 17, 3 6 , 3 7 order of battle (30 M a y ) 23 pier parties, role of 7 9 , 8 1 , 84 ships/vessels for evacuation 12, 17, 17, 2 0 , 2 3 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 34, 36, 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 , 2, 4 - 5 , 56, 5 7 , 7 1 , 74, 79, 79, 8 1 , 8 1 , 89 shore parties 3 7 , 5 7 , 6 3 , 72 withdrawal of destroyers from 5 7 Rundstedt, Generaloberst Gerd von 19, 2 0 , 2 1 , 5 2 , 60 Saint-Omer, forces at 6, 16, 19, 36 Saint-Pol oil refinery, burning of 3 0 , 36 Scheldt Estuary, crossing of 13, 2 0 , 2 1 schuyts, use of 3 0 , 3 7 , 4 5 , 5 7 , 6 3 , 7 1 , 7 2 , 77, 8 0 , 8 1 , 8 1 , 8 4 Small Vessels Pool (SVP) 3 0 , 71 Somerset, Brig. Nigel F. 5 3 , 6 2 Southampton, French troops leave 88 Spycker, G e r m a n advance on 2 7 , 78 steamers 3 0 , 3 6 , 4 1 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 6 5 , 8 1 , 85

Ain el Turk 6 5 ; King George V 8 5 ; Queen of the Channel 4 1 , 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 tanks 1 4 , 2 0 , 3 4 , 4 6 - 7 , 4 8 , 8 8 H 3 5 8 0 ; PzKpfw II 3 7 , 4 8 ; PzKpfw III 7 8 ; PzKpfw IV 4 8 , 7 8 ; PzKpfw 35(t) 4, 4 3 , 4 4 , 4 6 - 7 , 4 8 ; S35 6 2 , 7 8 , 8 0 ; V i c k e r s M k V I 88 Tennant R N , C a p t . William G. 3 6 , 3 7 , 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 , 5 7 , 7 6 , 7 7 , 80 T h a m e s Estuary Defence Flotilla 74 Locust 7 4 ; Mosquito 74 T h o r n e , M a j . Gen. Andrew 2 7 , 4 4 torpedo boat destroyers: (Siroco) 6 3 , 6 5 torpedo boats, use of 17, 6 3 , 6 5 , 80 Bouclier 65 trawlers, use of 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 , 6 5 , 7 2 , 7 5 , 8 1 , 84 Arley 5 6 ; Brock 5 6 ; Cattling John 5 4 - 5 , 56;Fyldea 5 4 - 5 , 5 6 ; Pacifico 8 5 ; Polly Johnson 5 4 - 5 , 56 tugs 3 0 , 4 5 , 5 2 , 63, 6 5 , 7 1 , 7 2 , 74, 80, 8 1 , 84 Goliath 84; St Abbs 7 4 ; St Helier 80 Wake-Walker, Rear A d m . William F. 5 7 , 6 2 - 3 , 74, 8 0 , 81 Wason R A , M a j . Gen. S. R. 2 9 , 6 2 Watten, fight for 3 2 , 3 7 weaponry anti-aircraft guns 17, 1 7 , 3 8 , 3 9 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 5 3 , 6 9 , 7 7 , 89 anti-tank guns 5 , 16, 4 8 , 7 7 artillery 16, 19, 2 0 , 2 7 , 3 3 , 3 3 , 34, 36, 3 8 , 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 46-7, 48, 52, 53, 5 7 , 6 0 , 6 2 , 6 5 , 7 1 , 7 5 , 7 5 , 7 8 , 89 machine guns 17, 3 3 , 4 0 , 4 6 - 7 , 4 8 , 5 3 , 6 6 - 7 , 6 8 , 6 9 , 7 4 , 80 rifles 4 4 , 6 2 torpedoes 1 7 , 2 0 , 5 0 - 1 , 6 3 , 6 5 Westende, Fleet Air A r m bombing of 64 Weygand, Gen. M a x i m e 6, 3 4 Wietersheim, Gen. Gustav von 4 5 , 60 Williams, Pit. Off. J . E. M . 6 6 - 7 , 68 Yarmouth Base, drifters from 71 Ypres, defence of 6, 3 3 , 3 4 , 3 9 , 64 Yser River, defences on 4 0 , 4 4 , 5 3 , 6 4 , 71

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Accounts of history's reatest conflicts, detailing the command strategies, tactics a

opposing

forces throughout

,paign r.

DUNKIRK 1940 Operation Dynamo The evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from the beaches of Dunkirk in May and June 1940 has achieved a fabled status in British military history. The nine-day struggle to decide the fate of the trapped British and French forces saw fierce battles across air, land and sea, as the advancing Germans fought to overrun the Allied armies before they could be evacuated from the French coast. In the face of ferocious attack, the valiant efforts of the Royal Navy and civilian cruisers saved the expeditionary force from annihilation and preserved for Great Britain the means to carryon the fight against Hitler's Germany. This comprehensive account of Operation

Dynamo is brought to life by archive photography, new maps and original artwork.

Full colour battlescenes _ Illustrations _ 3-dimensional 'bird's-eye-views' _ Maps

US$19.95 UKl14.99 CAN $22.95 ISBN

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