Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language

Traditional and analytical philosophy L EC T UR E S ON THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF L A N G U A G E

ERNST T U G E N D H A T

Traditional and analytical philosophy L ECT URE S ON THE P H I L O S O P H Y OF L A N G U A G E T R A N S L A T E D BY P. A. G O R N E R

C A M B R I D G E U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS CAMBRIDGE LONDON

NEW YORK

MELBOURNE

SYDNEY

NEW ROCHELLE

Published by the Press Syndicate o f th e U niversity o f C am bridge T h e Pitt B uilding, T ru rh p in g to n S treet, C am bridge CB2 1RP 32 East 5 7 th Street, New Y ork, NY 10022, USA 296 B eaconsfield P arade, M iddle Park, M elbourne 3206, A ustralia. © S u h rk a m p 1976 E nglish tran sla tio n © C a m b rid g e U niversity press 1982 F irst pub lish ed 1982 P rin ted in T h e U n ited States o f A m erica by Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., B in g h am to n , N.Y. T h is book was originally pub lish ed in G e rm an in 1976 by S u h rk a m p u n d e r the title Vorlesungen zur E inführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data T u g e n d h a t, E rn st T ra d itio n a l a n d analytical philosophy. 1. L an g u ag es— Philosophy I. T itle II. V o rle su n g en z u r E in fü h ru n g in die sprachanalytische Philosophie. English 401 P I 06 ISB N 0 521 22236 2

T O T H E M E M O R Y OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Contents

P reface T ra n s la to r’s p refac e P art I

ix xi

Introduction: confrontation of analytical philosophy with traditional conceptions of philosophy 1 A q u estio n o f m e th o d 3 2 A p h ilo so p h e r in search o f a con cep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y 12 3 O ntology an d sem antics 21 4 H as fo rm a l sem antics a fu n d a m e n ta l questio n ? 35 5 C onsciousness an d speech 50 6 T h e a rg u m e n t w ith th e p h ilo so p h y o f consciousness co n tin u ed 65 7 A practical co n cep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y 76

P art II 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15

A first step: analysis of the predicative sentence P re lim in ary reflections on m e th o d an d preview o f th e co u rse o f th e investigation 93 H u sse rl’s th e o ry o f m e a n in g 107 C ollapse o f th e tra d itio n a l th e o ry o f m e a n in g 121 P redicates: th e first step in th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f an analytical con cep tio n o f th e m e an in g o f sentences. T h e d isp u te be­ tw een nom inalists a n d conceptualists 133 T h e basic p rin cip le o f analytical p hiloso p h y . T h e d isp u te co n tin u ed . P red icates a n d q u asi-p red icates 150 T h e m e a n in g o f a n expressio n a n d th e circu m stan ces o f its use. D isp u te with a behaviouristic co n cep tio n 163 T h e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an asserto ric sen ten ce. A rg u m e n t with G rice a n d S earle 177 Positive acco u n t o f th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f asserto ric sen­ tences in term s o f th e tru th -re la tio n 192

Contents

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27

28

V lll

S u p p lem en ts 207 ‘A n d ’ an d ‘o r ’ 227 G en eral sentences. R esum ption of th e p ro b lem o f p redicates 243 T h e m o d e of em ploym ent o f predicates. T ra n sitio n to sin­ gular term s 257 W hat is it fo r a sign to stand fo r an object? T h e trad itio n al account 270 T h e function o f singular term s 284 Russell and Straw son 297 W hat i s ‘identification’? 310 Specification an d identification. Specification an d tru th 323 S patio -tem p o ral identification and the constitution o f the object-relation 337 S u p p lem en ts 348 I T h e connection betw een object-relation, situationin d e p e n d e n c e a n d the truth-capacity o f assertoric speech 348 II R eciprocal d e p e n d en c e of the identification o f spatiote m p o ral objects and th e identification o f spatio-tem poral positions 357 Results 372 I T h e analytical concept o f an object 375 II T h e m ode o f em ploym ent of predicative sentences an d th e explan atio n o f the w ord ‘tru e ’ 381 T h e n e x t steps 391 N otes B ibliography In d ex o f nam es In d e x o f subjects

411 429 434 436

Preface

In so-called analytical o r language-analytical philosophy th e re is little reflection on its own foun d atio n s, a n d today less th an b efo re. For the m ost part the problem s treated are inherited problem s w hich are not questioned. Partly this is d u e to a lack o f historical consciousness. A way o f philosophizing can only becom e a fu n d am e n tal philosophical posi­ tion by c o n fro n tin g it with earlier conceptions o f philosophy. T his reflection on fo undations is not ju s t an additional act o f self-clarification. It is a condition o f a philosophy’s ability to perceive the task that has always b een the genuinely philosophical task: the ex am in atio n o f existing questions, m ethods and basic concepts, an d the d ev elo p m en t o f new ones. T h ese lectures aim to provide an im petus in this direction. T hey th e re fo re have the ch aracter o f an in tro d u ctio n . By m eans o f a con­ fro n ta tio n with trad itio n al p hilosophy’s fu n d am e n tal o rien tatio n to the subject-object schem a they attem p t to bring questions w hich already exist in analytical philosophy into the context o f a specifically languageanalytical fu n d am e n tal question. As reg a rd s co n ten t they move in a field o f investigation th at is by no m eans new; an d even in this field they take only a first step. T h e book is directed at th ree d iffe re n t groups o f read ers. T h e rea d er w hom it addresses directly in the fo rm o f lectures is the philosophical b eg in n er, fo r w hom it could serve as an in tro d u ctio n to th e p h ilo so p h ­ ical way of thinking. At the sam e tim e it is directed , if only in an oblique way, at the re a d e r who is already well-versed in linguistic analysis. A bove all, how ever, it is directed at those who, b ein g m ore o r less fam il­ iar with trad itio n al philosophical m odes o f conception, miss in analyti­ cal philosophy a fu n d am e n tal q uestion which can be co m p ared with the g reat trad itio n al approaches. T his book seeks to bu ild a b rid g e fo r such rea d ers, by try in g to show th a t analytical philosophy contains a fu n d a ­

Preface

x

m ental question w hich can1 not only com pare w ith the trad itio n al ap p ro ach es b u t actually proves to be su p e rio r to th em . T his aim is a reflection o f my own d ev e lo p m e n t, which sta rted out fro m H eid e g g er an d led to language-analytical philosophy. I becam e convinced th a t H e id e g g e r’s question ab o u t th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f ‘B e in g ’ can only acquire a concrete an d realizable m ean in g w ithin the fram ew ork o f a language-analytical philosophy. A lth o u g h th e re is h ardly any m en tio n o f H eid e g g er in these lectures I owe to him the specific m ode o f access with w hich I ap p ro a ch the p roblem s o f analyti­ cal philosophy. For this reason th e book is ded icated to him . It has its o rigin in lectures I gave in H eid e lb e rg in the S u m m er sem ester o f 1970. A lthough I have re-w ritten an d e x p a n d e d th e tex t it seem ed to m e sensible to reta in the lecture-form . Starnberg, March 1976.

E.T.

Translator’s Preface

My aim th ro u g h o u t this tran slatio n has been to co m bine accuracy with readability, b u t at tim es the latter q uality has h ad to take seco n d place. W h en ev er possible long sentences have b een b ro k e n dow n in to several s h o rte r ones, b u t in som e cases to have d o n e this w ould have significantly a lte re d the sense o f w hat is being said. As fo r my tran slatio n o f individual w ords th e follow ing re q u ire som e co m m ent. For Vorstellung I have used ‘re p re s e n ta tio n ’ r a th e r th a n ‘id e a’, for to have ch osen the la tte r w ould have m ade it im possible to tran slate th e verbal fo rm s vorstellen, vorgestellt etc. I co n sid ered th e m o re literal ‘p re se n ta tio n ’, b u t in the e n d settled fo r ‘re p re se n ta tio n ’ b ecau se o f the c u rren c y it has acq u ired th ro u g h K em p S m ith ’s tran slatio n o f the Critique o f Pure Reason. F o r both Bezugnahme, bezugnehmen an d Ver­ weisung, verweisen I have h a d to use ‘re fe re n c e ’, ‘r e f e r ’. For th e m ost p a rt it is clear fro m the co n tex t w hich sense is in te n d e d , b u t w h ere th e re is th e possibility o f co n fu sio n I have p u t th e G erm a n term in brackets. F or gegenständlich I have used the artificial ‘o b jectu al’ because ‘objective’ w ould have been positively m isleading. Gegenständlich m eans so m eth in g like ‘having th e ch a racter o f an object’. It has n o th in g to do w ith ‘objec­ tive5 in the sense in w hich, fo r exam p le, a ju d g m e n t may be objective (ra th e r th an subjective). In tran slatin g q u o tatio n s fro m H u sse rl’s Logische Untersuchungen I have in the m ain follow ed J. N. F in d lay ’s tran slatio n . In th e case o f W ittgenstein I have sim ply r e p ro d u c e d the s ta n d a rd E nglish tran sla­ tions w ithout m ak in g any changes. I w ould like to th a n k P rofessor T u g e n d h a t fo r the th o ro u g h n e ss o f his com m ents at every o f th e tran slatio n , my frie n d s Eric M atthew s an d G uy Stock for som e very help fu l discussions o f points re la tin g to th e tran slation, an d th e G e rm a n A cadem ic E x ch an g e Service (DAAD) fo r en a b lin g m e to have two p erio d s o f study in G erm an y with c o n seq u e n t

Translator's preface

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benefit to my know ledge o f G erm a n philosophy an d th e G erm an la n ­ guage. Finally, I wish to th a n k P rofessor H ans W e rn e r A rn d t o f th e U niversity o f M an n h eim for having first d raw n my a tte n tio n to P ro fe s­ sor T u g e n d h a t’s book. P. A. G O R N E R

University o f Aberdeen

P art O ne Introduction: confrontation of analytical philosophy with traditional conceptions of philosophy

LECTURE 1

A question of m ethod

‘In tro d u c tio n to language-analytical p h ilo so p h y ’ - th a t is am b ig u o u s. F ro m a le ctu re-c o u rse with this title o n e m ig h t ex p e ct a survey o f a philosophical m o v em en t, an historical o r system atic g u id e to th e p h ilo ­ sophical lite ra tu re com m only called language-analytical. T h is is n o t w hat I shall be d o in g , p articu la rly as such in tro d u c tio n s to lan g u ag eanalytical ph ilo so p h y already e x ist.1 T h e title can also be in te rp re te d in a n o th e r sense, by u n d e rs ta n d in g ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ in th e sense o f p h ilo so p h ­ ical activity. T h e title w ould th e n d e n o te an in tro d u c tio n to la n g u ag eanalytical philosophizing. O n e in tro d u c e s so m eo n e to a p a rtic u la r activity by d e m o n stra tin g it to him by m eans o f an exam p le, so th a t h e can im itate it. So I w ould have to d e m o n stra te to you a ch aracteristic language-analytical line o f th o u g h t in a way th a t w ould enab le you to follow it a n d stim u late you to ca rry o u t sim ilar p a tte rn s o f a rg u m e n t yourself. A n d in d e e d this is so m e th in g I in te n d to do. B u t such a d e m o n stra tio n by m eans o f an e x a m p le can n o t, ta k en by itself, suffice fo r an in tro d u c tio n if th e activity in q u estio n is a way o f d o in g philosophy. A way o f d o in g philo so p h y is n o t re la te d to o th e r ways o f d o in g p h i­ losophy in th e way th a t o n e fo rm o f d a n c e is re la te d to o th e r form s. F o rm s o f d an c e a re n o t m u tu ally exclusive o r inclusive. O n th e sam e e v e n in g one can, w ith equal en th u sia sm , d an c e a ta n g o , a b oogie a n d a ro ck ’n ’ roll - a n d sim ply n o t b o th e r w ith th e waltz. B u t o n e ca n n o t p h ilo so p h ize in o n e way w ith o u t having rejected o r in c o rp o ra te d the o th ers. A d an c e can be o u t o f date; b u t it is n o t o n th a t ac co u n t in c o r­ rect. In p h ilo so p h y , on th e o th e r h an d , as in every science, th e co n c ern is w ith tru th . F o r this reaso n , alth o u g h ways o f d o in g p h ilo so p h y can be m o d e rn o r o ld -fa sh io n e d , w o rry in g ab o u t this is th e business n o t o f th e p h ilo so p h e r b u t o f th e h isto rian . I f I am asked w hy I d o p h ilo so p h y in this way r a th e r th a n th a t I c a n n o t answ er: ‘B ecause it is u p to d a te ’, b u t

Introduction

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only: ‘Because it is th e correct way.’ B ut this im plies an obligation to ju stify the claim to be correct. T o in tro d u c e som eone to a way o f do in g philosophy, th e re fo re , involves rela tin g it to o th e r ways o f d o in g p h i­ losophy and, by m eans o f such a co n fro n tatio n , d e m o n stratin g its cor­ rectness. B ut this m eans th at o n e m ust d eb a te the idea o f philosophy as such. I f o n e ’s aim is to in tro d u c e som eone to a p articu la r way o f do in g p h i­ losophy one ca n n o t sim ply p resu p p o se the concep t o f philosophy. T o in tro d u c e so m eone to a p articu lar way o f philosophizing is, hence, always also to in tro d u c e som eone to philosophizing as such. If it is tru e th a t o n e can only in tro d u c e som eone to languageanalytical philosophy, o r any o th e r so rt o f philosophy, by co n trastin g it with o th e r ways o f d o in g philosophy, th e n this affects the question o f w hich line o f th o u g h t is to be chosen to illustrate it. We ca n n o t be co n ­ te n t with ju s t any exam ple. In co n fro n tin g language-analytical philos­ o p hy with o th e r ways o f philosophizing we are n o t ju s t co n fro n tin g m ethods. T h e im p o rta n t philosophical positions o f the past always took as th e ir sta rtin g -p o in t certain fu n d a m e n ta l substantive questions a ro u n d which th e w hole field o f possible philosophical questions was o rg anized. In th e case o f language-analytical philosophy it may be less clear w hat its cen tral substantive question is, in d e ed w h eth er it has one. B u t th en we m ay expect th a t it m ig h t be precisely in the co n fro n tatio n with earlier philosophical positions th a t language-analytical philosophy will find its ow n central question. A n d this m eans th a t it is only in this c o n fro n tatio n th a t it will find itself. I f this is co rrec t we c a n n o t assum e th a t language-analytical philoso­ phy is already a fixed q u an tity w hich we can first in tro d u c e an d th en co n tra st with e a rlier positions in an ap p en d ix . N o w h ere is it laid dow n w hat language-analytical philosophy is. I f we so u g h t to arriv e at a defi­ n ition o f ‘language-analytical p h ilo so p h y ’ by a process o f in d u ctio n an d ab straction fro m the existing philosophical lite ra tu re which is d escribed as language-analytical, th e n at best we w ould achieve an em pty ch arac­ terization; it could n o t serve as the basis fo r a con crete way o f philoso­ phizing. So do I w ant to in tro d u c e you to som eth in g w hich does n o t yet exist? In th e case o f philosophy this is not as ab su rd as it sounds. A philosophy is only con stitu ted in philosophizing. I t follows fro m this th a t philoso­ p h izing, an d a way o f philosophizing, is an activity which only becom es w hat it is in th e process o f being in tro d u c ed . B u t in th a t case we m u st ab an d o n yet an o th e r preju d ice: if w hat is b ein g in tro d u c e d does n o t exist p rio r to its in tro d u c tio n th e n clearly

A question of method

5

the p erson w ho wishes to in tro d u ce o th ers to this activity can n o t him self have it at his disposal. H e can only in tro d u c e o th e rs by at th e sam e time in tro d u c in g him self. P erh ap s these reflections strike you as incredible an d as a p o o r p ed a­ gogical trick. Does not the p reten sio n o f seeking to in tro d u ce som eone to som ething which does no t yet exist, and is first co n stitu ted in the in tro d u c tio n , rem in d one o f M ü n c h h au se n ’s atte m p t to pull him self up by his own bootstraps? C an I seriously wish to assert th a t I w ant to in tro d u c e you to som ething with w hich I am m yself n ot yet acquainted? O bviously on e can n o t look fo r som ething o f which o n e does n o t already have a vague prelim inary conception (Vorbegriff). A nd obviously I do have a vague p relim inary conception o f linguistic analysis. B u t th en no d o u b t so do you. O n the o th e r h an d , it is u n clear to us, an d in general, in w hat linguistic analysis, as a philosophical position, really consists. We can n o t expect to rem ove this unclarity by g ettin g an answ er from som ew here, b u t only by d ee p en in g th e existing prelim in ary conception. A nd it may n o t be im plausible to expect th a t precisely fro m a co n fro n ­ tation of linguistic analysis - initially on th e basis o f th e vague prelim i­ n ary conception we have o f it - with im p o rta n t earlier philosophical positions th e re will em erge its own substantive fu n d am e n tal question. T o arrive at this fu n d am e n tal question is th e aim o f th e in tro d u cto ry p a rt o f these lectures (Lectures 1-7). In th e m ain p a rt which follows we shall, by analysing th e predicative sta tem en t-fo rm , take a first step in an sw ering this question. L et us begin, th e n , with th a t vague prelim in ary u n d e rsta n d in g (Vor­ verständnis) w hich everyone can be assum ed to have, inasm uch as it is sim ply an explication o f its designation. Clearly ‘language-analytical ph ilo so p h y ’ refers to a way o f d oing philosophy which involves the belief th a t the problem s o f philosophy can be solved, o r m ust be solved, by m eans of an analysis o f language. Im m ediately th e question arises: by m eans o f w hat sort o f an analysis o f language? T h e analysis o f language w ould seem to be th e task o f linguistics. Does this m ean, th en , th a t philosophy, if it is u n d e rsto o d as linguistic analysis, becom es linguistics o r a p a rt o f linguistics? O r is the analysis o f la nguage carried o u t in philosophy d iffe re n t fro m th a t car­ ried o u t in linguistics? A nd, if so, how is th e d iffe ren ce to be ch a racter­ ized? N otice how , from the very b eginning, o u r e n terp rise becom es m o re com plicated. L anguage-analytical philosophy finds itself con­ fro n te d , not only with a d em an d to legitim ate itself vis-a-vis o th e r con­ ceptions o f philosophy, b u t also with th e d em an d to define its relatio n ­ ship to a closely-connected em pirical science.

Introduction

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We have h e re a specific instance o f a difficulty philosophy has always, faced when trying to define itself: how is it to define its relationship to th e sciences? It is characteristic of m o d e rn philosophy th at this question arises not ju s t in general in relation to all sciences, b u t in a special way in relation to o n e p articu la r science. F or classical m o d ern philosophy, particularly since K ant, this science was psychology. Now it is linguistics. P erhaps th e re is an o th e r way of d o in g philosophy for w hich sociology occupies a c o rresp o n d in g position. In m o d ern philosophy this peculiar collision with a specific em pirical science results from w hat is called its reflective character. It conceives o f its enquiries as consisting n o t in the d irect them atization o f such an d such objects b u t in sim ultaneous reflection on how these objects can be given to us, how they becom e accessible to us. In classical m o d e rn philosophy th e field o f givenness reflected u p o n was conceived as consciousness, a dim ension o f rep resen tatio n s o r ideas; w hereas in the new conception o f philosophy it is conceived as th e sp h ere o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f o u r linguistic expressions. In every instance philosophy finds its sp h ere o f reflection already occupied by a p articu lar em pirical science. A nd so each tim e th e question arises: how is this sphere, if, from th e point o f view o f philosophy, it is n o t ju st one sp h e re am ong others, accessible to a specifically philosophical m ode o f study? I know o f no satisfactory answ er to the questio n o f how languageanalytical philosophy is to be distinguished fro m the em pirical science o f linguistics. Such an answ er can certainly n o t be given with the aid o f traditional distinctions betw een philosophy an d science, since this answ er w ould have to d e p e n d essentially on th e new conception o f p h i­ losophy. Anyway at the p rese n t stage o f this in tro d u ctio n we clearly lack all the presuppositions fo r m eaningfully tackling this question. All one can really say at p rese n t is: language-analytical philosophy differs from th e em pirical science o f linguistics in that it has to justify itself as p h i­ losophy, an d , hence, finds itself co n fro n ted by o th e r philosophical positions. I re tu rn to th e nom inal definition of ‘language-analytical philosophy’ as a philosophy which seeks to solve the problem s o f philosophy by m eans o f an analysis o f language. How can we get f u rth e r if we start from this first prelim inary u n d ersta n d in g ? We can tu rn to the p erso n who hears this definition for the first tim e a n d see w hat his initial rea c­ tion is. I f he is a thinking p erson he will im m ediately raise th e following objection (it is th e sta n d ard objection th a t is always b ro u g h t against th e

A question of method

7

language-analytical conception of philosophy). ‘It is clear,’ h e will say, ‘th a t verbal explan atio n s b elong to philosophy. T h e y have always done so. B ut they re p re se n t only a prelim inary stage an d serve m erely to rem ove the unclarity an d am biguity in th e use o f philosophical term s. T h is can only be a transitional stage on th e way to th e things with which we a re concern ed . A fter all, language is only a m ed iu m , an d if a philos­ op h y reg a rd s th e analysis o f linguistic usage as n o t ju s t a p relim in ary task, bu t as its real task, th e n it has clearly lost contact with th e su b stan ­ tial questions, th e things them selves.’ W e begin th e n with th e negative in which th e idea o f a languageanalytical philosophy first ap p ears to an outsider. H ow ever, th e objec­ tion ju s t raised only rem ains on th e p erip h e ry . It speaks o f things in c o n tra st to w ords w ithout saying w hat sort o f things it m eans, an d w h ere they a re to be fo u n d . Only w hen we get o u r th in k in g p erso n to ex plain w hat he m eans will we have tak en a first step into th e real field o f dispute. In which extra-linguistic sphere, we will ask him , are th e th in g s th e m ­ selves to which h e refers to be sought? If he is n o t a p h ilo so p h er, b u t sim ply a th in k in g person, then he will m ost likely reply: ‘T h e things them selves? C learly they are given to us by ex perien ce. A n d th e appeal n o t to rem ain with m ere w ords had this m eaning: to reach know ledge on e m ust have reco u rse to ex p e rien ce.’ W ith refe re n c e to em pirical know ledge th e objection, th u s in te r­ p re te d , seem s plausible, in d e ed conclusive. Precisely w hat it says is tru e o f an em pirical science: explanations o f w ords a re necessary, b u t they co nstitute only a transitional stage in research. H e re the things th e m ­ selves are th e facts o f a s p h e re o f scientific experien ce. B u t if th e objec­ tion is p u t fo rw ard as an objection to a conceptio n o f philosophy, th e n this can only'm ean eith er (a) th at on e denies th a t philosophy is a specific d im ension o f enquiry which is n o t reducible to th e em pirical sciences (in which case it is not an objection specifically to language-analytical philosophy, b u t to philosophy as such) o r (b) th a t o n e su pposes th a t philosophy has its own, an d hence non-em pirical, m ode o f ex perience. I f th e objection is not sim ply from a th in k in g p erso n , b u t fro m a p h i­ lo sopher, th e n th e second o f these alternatives m u st be th e on e he has in m ind. T h e justification o f th e above objection can n o t, th e re fo re , be ra tio n ­ ally discussed w ithout going into th e question o f th e specific subjectm a tte r o f philosophy, a n d w hat it is ab o u t this su b ject-m atter which distinguishes philosophy from th e em pirical sciences. A d o m in an t, th o u g h no t u n d isp u te d , view of philosophy in th e history o f philosophy

Introduction

8

is th a t it has to do, n o t with em pirical know ledge, b u t with a p rio n know ledge, th a t its propositio n s a re valid a p r io n , i.e. they can n o t be verified, or falsified, by (sensory) experience. O f course, this description applies equally to logic an d m athem atics; so it can n o t be used to define philosophy. M oreover, such an ex tern al d escriptio n rem ains unsatisfac­ tory so long as o n e does n o t ask on w hat essential fe a tu re o f philosophy it is g ro u n d e d . T h o se who have described the subject-m atter o f philosophy as a priori (Plato was th e first) have d o n e so because they believed th at all u n d e r ­ sta n d in g contains p resu p p o sitio n s we norm ally do not atten d to, b u t w hich w hen a tte n d e d to a p p e a r as som ething we know, fo r we can n o t conceive th at it could be d iffe ren t. B u t w hen we w ant to express this know ledge we becom e p e rp le x ed . A classical ex am ple o f this (used again by W ittg en stein 2) is St A u g u stin e’s rem ark ab o u t tim e. ‘W hat th en is tim e? I f no o n e asks m e, I know w hat it is. I f I wish to explain it to him w ho asks m e, I do n o t know .’3 H e re then we seem to have a sp h ere o f know ledge w here o u r ig n o ran ce rests not on in ad eq u ate ex p erien ce b u t on the fact th a t we a re dealin g with aspects o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g which are too close to us a n d too obvious. W hat we are h ere striving fo r is n o t th e ex p lan atio n o f so m e th in g th a t is not yet u n d ersto o d , b u t the clarification o f w hat is alread y u n d ersto o d . A n d this clarification can only be achieved by reflection on o u r u n d e rsta n d in g itself, n o t by ex p e­ rience. T h is explication o f the subject-m atter o f philosophy (th o u g h still, o f course, wholly abstract an d thesis-like) also enables one to see how p h i­ losophy differs fro m o th e r a p rio n form s o f know ledge. Logic an d m athem atics are also a p rio ri , b u t they do not seek to articu late som e­ th in g we already know; ra th e r they ask about w hat is im plied by things which we already know, o r which we can hypothetically assum e. St A u g u stin e’s re m a rk about tim e is n o t applicable to th e sentences o f logic an d m athem atics. Since K ant th e analytic an d the synthetic a priori have b een d istin ­ gu ished. S entences are called analytic a priori if th e ir tru th o r falsity rests solely on th e m ean in g o f the linguistic expressions co n tain ed in th em . T h u s we arriv e at analytic a p rio ri sentences by linguistic analysis or, m o re precisely, by th e analysis o f th e m ean in g of o u r linguistic expressions. By contrast, sentences w ould be synthetic a p rio n if, tho u g h not em pirical, th e ir tru th did not rest sim ply on the m ean in g o f the expressions co n tain ed in them . So it now becom es clear b oth which conception o f philosophy u n d e r­ lies th e language-analytical position a n d which altern ativ e th e objection

A question of method

9

raised to it boils dow n to. L anguage-analytical philosophy co rresp o n d s to th e traditional conception o f philosophy as an a priori fo rm o f knowl­ ed ge an d in te rp re ts the a priori as an analytic a priori. W ith referen c e to the explanation o f the subject-m atter o f philosophy ju s t given this m eans th at th e know ledge p resu p p o se d in all u n d e rsta n d in g is to be u n d ersto o d as know ledge o f th e m eaning o f the linguistic expressions in which u n d e rsta n d in g is articulated. A nd the objection to th e lan­ guage-analytical positon, as now becom es a p p a re n t, comes dow n to the alternative: e ith e r deny th a t th e re is an a priori subject-m atter o r claim th at th e re is a synthetic a priori. In th e objection as it was first abstractly fo rm u lated w ere com bined (th o u g h at first this was n o t noticed) two diam etrically o p p o sed posi­ tions, one em pirical and th e o th e r m etaphysical. T h e only p ro p e r way o f dealin g with th e objection is to discuss each o f th em separately. A gainst the em piricist th e linguistic analyst can arg u e th a t in language we actually have a sp h ere o f th e a priori as this was ju s t described: we know w hat o u r linguistic expressions m ean w ithout always being able to articulate w hat we thus know ; w here we succeed th e re resu lt analytic statem ents. B ut on w hat should a synthetic a priori rest? It seems th a t o n e m ust conceive, in the sp h e re o f th e a priori, an analogue o f sense-experience. In this way th e re arises the idea of a non-em pirical ex p erien ce, a sp ir­ itual seeing, an intellectual intuition. Plato and A ristotle called this intellectual intuition nous; an d in L atin this was tran slated as intuitus. M ore or less explicitly this idea o f an intellectual in tu itio n plays an im p o rta n t role in large parts o f th e philosophical trad itio n . In o u r tim e it has been taken u p and theoretically developed by p h enom enology. T h e language-analytical thesis th a t th e re is only an analytic, only a lin­ guistic a priori can th e re fo re be seen as a counter-thesis to th e idea o f an intellectual intuition. T h e re is o f course an o th e r conception o f a synthetic a priori which does no t involve an appeal to intellectual intuition. T h is is th e K antian conception. K ant rejected th e idea o f a non-em pirical ex p erien ce, an intellectual intuition. H e also related all non-analytic know ledge to em pirical experience. H ow ever, he believed th a t o ne can know syn­ thetic propositions a priori relatin g to experience. T h e ir validity is n o t a p p re h e n d e d in an intellectual intuition b u t rests on th e fact th a t they fo rm u late the conditions of th e possibility o f experience. H ow ever, it is d o u b tfu l w h eth er K an t’s a tte m p t to find an alternative to th e analytical an d intuitive conceptions o f philosophy is successful. T h e p ro p o sitio n s which K ant rep rese n ts as conditions o f th e possibility o f ex p erien ce can

Introduction

10

also be in te rp re te d as analytic. T o th e ‘conditions o f th e possibility’ o f ex p erien ce belongs precisely w hat is analytically co n tain ed in th e m e a n ­ ing o f ‘e x p e rie n c e ’. T h u s o ne can say th a t w hat K ant has d o n e is to analyse a ce rtain co n c ep t o f experience. S um m arizing we can say: su p p o sin g (a) th a t th e critique o f th e K a n t­ ian conception o f a synthetic a priori (which I have h e re m erely h in te d at) h ad b ee n ca rrie d th ro u g h a n d (b) th at th e id ea o f an intellectual in tu itio n h a d been re fu te d , th en th e language-analytical co n cep tio n o f d o in g philosophy w ould have b ee n show n to be the co rrect, because only possible, way o f d o in g philosophy. A ssum ing, th a t is, th a t th e a priori is characteristic o f philosophy. In o n e ’s first co n fro n tatio n w ith th e specifically philosophical, a priori subject-m atter o n e is easily m isled in to tra n sfe rrin g to it th e stru ctu res w hich a re fam iliar fro m scientific o r even pre-scientific know ledge. T h is is why one points away fro m w ords to th in g s w ith o u t co n sid erin g th a t p hilosophy does n o t relate to things in th e way th e sciences do. A nd even w hen this is ad m itte d th e re is a tem p ta tio n to distinguish th e things o f philosophy a n d th e ir m ode o f availability fro m em pirical things b u t n o netheless to conceive o f th e m by analogy with em pirical things. T h e philosophical su b ject-m atter is n ot s u r re n ­ d e re d in th e language-analytical conception; it is m erely fre e d fro m a naive m isu n d ersta n d in g . F or philosophy th e d em an d th a t we sh o u ld tu rn o u r atten tio n to th e things can only m ean : th a t we should conceive o f th e a priori su b ­ je c t-m a tte r in connection with experience. T h e d a n g e r o f losing c o n ­ tact with th e things (an d th a t m eans: with experien ce) arises precisely w hen a philosophy constructs in th e a priori sp h e re its ow n fictitious w orld o f things with its ow n non-em p irical m o d e o f access. Precisely if ex p erien ce is th e only subject-m atter fo r p h ilosop h y th e n w hat is sp e­ cifically philosophical can only be linguistic analysis. T h e last reflection serves to draw o u r atte n tio n to a questio n ab le assum ption which th e line o f th o u g h t p u rsu e d so fa r sh ares with th e trad itio n al conception o f philosophy. Even if th e existence o f an a priori a n d its distinction fro m th e em pirical seem s u n d en iab le , it does n ot follow th a t it is m e an in g fu l to set th e sp h e re o f th e a priori o ver against th e sp h e re o f th e em pirical as a self-contained sp h e re o f know ledge. N o r does it follow th a t it is m e an in g fu l to distinguish fro m th e em pirical sciences an exclusively a priori en q u iry an d subjectm a tte r called philosophy. T h is how ever is to touch o n a question which po in ts ah ead an d which o n e is unlikely to m ake p ro g ress with in th e co n fro n tatio n with

A question of method

11,

e a rlie r philosophical positions. A nd at th e p re se n t stage o f o u r a rg u ­ m e n t it ca n n o t be tackled at all, fo r we do n o t yet possess a u n ita ry co n c ep tio n o f philosophy. O nly o n th e basis o f such a co n cep tio n co u ld it be d ec id e d in w h at way a priori an d em p irical e n q u iry are to be com bined. W e m u st n o t d isre g a rd this q u estio n , th o u g h it m u st b e b o rn e in m in d as a q u estio n th a t has yet to be decid ed . T h e p rim a ry aim o f th e line o f th o u g h t p u rsu e d so fa r has b een to m a k e us realize th a t we h av e n o t yet arriv ed at a definite co n cep tio n o f ph ilo so p h y (even if we d o n o t q u estio n th e p re su p p o sitio n o f a p u re ly a priori co n cep tio n o f p h ilosophy). F or even if we exclude, in th e way previously in d icated , th e sp h e re o f logic a n d m athem atics, th e re m a in in g s p h e re o f th e a priori does n o t a m o u n t to a unified su b ject-m atter. We clearly do n o t w an t to re g a rd all analytic statem ents which re st o n som e d efin itio n o r o th e r (e.g. ‘A b ach elo r is u n m a rrie d ’) as b e lo n g in g to p h ilo so p h y . So a p rio rity is at best a g eneric fe a tu re o f ph ilo so p h y ; it does n o t suffice fo r its specific definition. N o r did e a rlie r co n cep tio n s o f p h ilo s­ o p h y consist sim ply o f th e idea th a t p hilosophical k n o w led g e is a prion. Sim ilarly, th e notions o f m eaning-analysis a n d analyticity d o n o t su f­ fice to p ro v id e th e language-analytical co n c ep tio n with a u n ita ry co n ­ cep t o f philosophy. I f o n e looks at th e lan g uage-an aly tical lite ra tu re o n e notices th a t it is n o t ju s t any w ords w hose m e an in g is in v estig ated . B u t fro m w h e re does language-analytical p h ilo so p h y get its criteria fo r d ec id in g w hich w ords, types o f w o rd , an d linguistic stru c tu re s a re to be analysed? O bviously to a large e x te n t fro m its o rie n ta tio n to w ard s tra d itio n a l philosophical disciplines an d prob lem s. In so fa r as this is so th e objection th a t th e language-analytical p ositio n is only a m e th o d a n d does n o t possess a unified ce n tral q u estio n o f its ow n a p p e a rs ju stified . H ow ever, th e objection only applies to th e ex istin g lan g u ag eanalytical lite ra tu re . W e have yet to see w h e th e r in th e very idea o f a language-analytical p hilosophy th e re m ay n o t be co n tain e d a u n ita ry fu n d a m e n ta l question.

LECTURE 2

A philosopher in search of a conception of philosophy

T h e co n fro n ta tio n with ea rlier conceptions of philosophy with which I am b eg in n in g th e in tro d u c tio n to language-analytical philosophy not only has th e aim o f justify in g this way o f doing philosophy; it is also in te n d e d as a way o f finding its own central question. T h e first th ru st re m a in e d on th e p erip h e ry . We m erely in fe rre d w hat lan g u ag e-an aly t­ ical philosophy is from th e definition o f the nam e. A nd th e idea th at philosophy is a p n o n was sim ply taken over fro m th e trad itio n . N o n e­ theless we did succeed in taking a first step tow ards justification: the ap p a re n tly superficial idea th a t the m e th o d o f philosophy consists in an analysis o f o u r linguistic u n d e rsta n d in g was show n to be the defensible core o f the trad itio n al conception of th e a priori ch aracter o f philoso­ phy. W ith this first step we have rea ch ed th e c u rre n t self-u n d e rstan d in g o f language-analytical philosophers. H ow ever, this self-u n d e rstan d in g is n o t ad e q u ate, for, as we have seen, it provides no criterio n fo r d istin­ g u ish in g the philosophically relevant w ords, o r w hat is philosophically rele v an t in language, fro m w hat is philosophically irrelevant. F o r this we clearly n ee d a definition o f the su b ject-m atter o f philosophy, som e­ th in g which is n o t given sim ply by saying th a t th e su b ject-m atter of ph ilosophy is a priori. H ow should o n e proceed? O ne could try to m ake distinctions within the sp h e re o f th e a priori, to distinguish d iffe re n t species o f th e analytic. O n e could, fo r exam ple, exclude em pirical expressions which can be d efin e d in term s o f a com bination o f p ro p erties. F or exam ple, th e sen­ tence ‘B achelors are u n m a rrie d ’ is analytic because ‘b ach elo r’ is defined as ‘u n m a rrie d m a n ’. O ne could try to delim it a class o f expressions which one feels a re n o t em pirical in this sense an d which may be th o u g h t to be som ehow (I am deliberately expressin g m yself in this v ague way) philosophically relevant: w ords such as ‘g o o d ’, ‘tru e ’, ‘actio n ’, ‘b e lie f’, ‘e x p e rie n c e ’, ‘tim e’, ‘object’, ‘m e an in g ’.

In search of a conception of philosophy

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I shall no t take this path, th o u g h it seem s to m e prom ising an d has yet to be developed. Even if by follow ing this p ath one succeeded in arriving at useful distinctions o ne w ould still lack o rien tatio n with respect to the q uestion of which linguistic sph ere is philosophically rel­ evant. For to be able to decide this one m ust start fro m a conception of the subject-m atter o f philosophy. W e m u st th e re fo re en q u ire directly as to th e them e, o r fu n d am e n tal question, o f philosophy; an d , specifically, about th e them e, o r fu n d a ­ m ental question, o f language-analytical philosophy. T o this en d I shall again choose the m eth o d o f co n fro n tatio n with th e philosophical tra ­ dition. T h is tim e we cannot sta rt out fro m a prelim in ary conception of language-analytical philosophy, fo r as far as th e substantive fu n d a m e n ­ tal question is co n c ern ed we do no t have such a conception at o u r disr posal. W e m ust, th e re fo re , take as o u r sta rtin g -p o in t one o r m o re fu n ­ d am en tal questions o f the philosophical trad itio n an d see w h eth er, w hen in te rp re te d language-analytically, they yield a fu n d am e n tal q u es­ tion o f language-analytical philosophy. I shall consider in tu rn th re e concepts th a t are ce n tral to traditional philosophy, an d in this way we shall gradually in tro d u c e ourselves into th e fu n d am e n tal qu estio n o f language-analysis. T h e se are (1) the concept o f being which was c h a r­ acteristic o f the ancient conception o f philosophy (2) the concepts o f consciousness and experience tow ards which m o d e rn philosophy has been o rien tate d an d (3) th e concept o f reason w hich - in th e Socratic question - stands at the b eg in n in g of o u r philosophical trad itio n . O f course we cannot with these th re e points o f o rien tatio n exhau st w hat trad itio n can teach us about the fu n d am e n tal philosophical question. T h e o rien tatio n tow ards o th e r perspectives o f philosophical th o u g h t could also have o th e r consequences fo r the sketch of a language-analytical position. So to this e x te n t the follow ing a tte m p t rem ains consciously incom plete an d one-sided. You m ig h t also ask: can one in the en d really be satisfied with a his­ torical o rien tatio n tow ards existing conceptions of philosophy? Even if it can be show n th a t these traditional conceptions a re only genuinely realized in linguistic analysis this w ould only justify th e lan g u ag e-an a­ lytical m ode of en q u iry relative to these positions. B u t how are these positions them selves to be justified? T his leads to th e question: how does o ne justify a certain conception o f philosophy in an d fo r itself ra th e r th a n sim ply relative to o th e r conceptions? T h is question we should keep in m in d in the discussion o f th e particu lar conceptions. A lready the discussion o f th e first conception will lead to im p o rta n t hints how to answ er this question.

Introduction

14

It was P arm enid es who first posed the question ab o u t being as th e fu n d a m e n ta l question o f philosophy. B ut it is in A ristotle, at th e b eg in ­ ning o f his Metaphysics, that we first find an a tte m p t at an in tro d u c tio n to this question as th e fu n d am e n tal question o f philosophy. T h e r e is m uch th a t is im p o rta n t fo r o u r u n d e rta k in g (in d ep e n d en tly o f th e o ri­ en tation tow ards being) to be le arn ed from it; I shall th e re fo re p re se n t it in r a th e r m ore detail. A ristotle first develops a prelim inary idea o f philosophy, i.e. a fo rm al indication o f w hat is to be u n d ersto o d by philosophy. O nly a f u rth e r reflection on how this idea can be concretely realized will lead to a d e f­ inite conception o f philosophy. T his prelim in ary idea is th a t o f know ledge o f th e h ig h est an d m ost g en eral gro u n d s. T h is prelim inary conception o f p hilosophy as a m ost g eneral a n d ultim ately justifying form of know ledge rem a in ed , d esp ite variations in in te rp re ta tio n , largely d o m in a n t in the trad itio n th a t fol­ lowed. H usserl, fo r exam ple, still characterizes his p relim in ary co n c ep ­ tion o f philosophy as th e ‘idea o f a science a n d ultim ately a universal science with an absolute fo u n d a tio n .’1 A ristotle arrives a t this prelim inary conception o f philosophy in tw o ways. O n e 2 consists in an investigation o f w hat in g en eral is u n d e rsto o d by th e w ord ‘p hilosophy’ - in A ristotle it is th e w ord ‘w isdom ’, sophia. T h e o th e r starts fro m the fact th a t we m ean by ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ a p re-em i­ n en t, highest m ode o f know ledge o r enquiry. It w ould th u s seem r e a ­ sonable to call th a t know ledge ‘philosophy’ w hich possesses those p r o p ­ erties constitutive o f know ledge to th e h ig h est d eg ree. Now it is constitutive o f know ledge th at it is general a n d th a t o n e can give r e a ­ sons fo r w hat is know n. It follows from this th a t th e h ig h est know ledge is know ledge based on ultim ate an d the m ost general g ro u n d s. In this line of a rg u m e n t the assertion th a t know ledge is g en eral m ay, in p articu la r, seem im plausible. Usually know ledge is d istin g u ish ed fro m belief o r opinion: we say o f som eone th a t he know s so m eth in g , an d does n o t m erely believe it, if his belief is tru e an d if h e can ju stify it.3 T h e aspect o f justification figures in this definition b u t n ot th a t o f generality. A nd we w ould certainly say th at th e re can also be know ledge o f sin g u lar item s.4 T o u n d e rsta n d A ristotle’s account one m u st bear in m in d th a t h e is n o t speaking o f know ledge in co n tra st to belief o r o pinion. In term s o f th e distinction A ristotle h e re has in m ind, believing, know ing an d q u es­ tio ning all belong to th e sam e level and are as a w hole co n trasted with a low er cognitive capacity h e calls ‘e x p e rien c e’ (empeiria). In his in tro ­ d u ction A ristotle n o t only contrasts philosophy with ‘lo w er’ m odes o f

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know ledge; h e re g a rd s it as the h ig h e st possibility o f cognitive b eh av ­ iour. In a q u ite m o d e rn -so u n d in g discussion he distinguishes th re e levels o f cognitive b e h a v io u r5 (or of th e cognitive c o m p o n e n t o f b ehaviour). T h e lowest level is th a t o f p erc ep tio n . By m eans o f p ercep tio n a h u m a n b ein g o r anim al resp o n d s to en v iro n m en ta l stim uli in acco rd an ce with a given b eh a v io u ral schem a. A h ig h e r cognitive level is th a t which A ris­ totle calls ex perience-capacity a n d which m o d e rn psychology calls learning-capacity: th ro u g h association one learns from ex p erien ce. T h e re p e a te d p e rc e p tio n o f a p h e n o m e n o n A to g e th e r with a p h e n o m e n o n B has th e re su lt th a t w hen A h a p p e n s we ex p ect B; o r we learn th a t if we d o B we achieve A a n d in this way fo rm a new b eh av io u ral schem a. W e have th e th ird cognitive level, acco rd in g to A ristotle, w hen th e re is fo rm e d betw een A a n d B n o t a m erely u n a rtic u la te d association w hich m anifests itself m erely in b eh av io u r, b u t w hen this co nnection is m ad e explicit in th e belief (or know ledge) th a t ‘w h e n e v e r ^ , th e n B ’ o r th a t ‘all A are B \ W e do n o t find this capacity in th e o th e r anim als, says A ristotle, only in m an; a n d we can su p p le m e n t this by saying th at only m an possesses a system o f signs in w hich it is possible to fo rm u n iv ersal ‘if - th e n ’ sentences o r ‘all’ sentences. W e can also fo rm u late this m o re precisely as follows. O nly m an possesses a la n g u ag e in w hich th e re are sin g u lar (‘this . . .’) an d hen ce also p a rtic u la r (‘som e . . .’) a n d universal (‘all . . .’) sentences; a n d only w hen an org an ism possesses such a system o f signs can it distinguish betw een singular, p articu la r a n d universal states o f affairs. T h e associative state o f affairs - th e co n n ectio n betw een A a n d B - is already g en e ral; b u t this is a quasi-g en erality w hich does n o t yet sta n d in any d efin ite relatio n to singularity an d in w hich, th e re fo re , th e re is as yet no distinction betw een ‘all . . .’ a n d ‘m any . . .’ C o n n ected w ith this is th e fact th a t th e g en eral in ‘e x p e ri­ en c e ’ is n o t yet an object. T h e o rg an ism m erely behaves in th e a p p r o ­ p ria te way a n d w hat it has in m ind is th e indiv id u al th in g given in p e r ­ ception. F or this reason it is only th e cognitive level o f k n ow ledge w hich A ristotle characterizes as general. O nly w hen th e g en eral becom es an object an d stan d s in a d e te rm in a te rela tio n sh ip to th e in dividual is th e re a rela tio n sh ip to th e g en eral. A f u rth e r characteristic o f know ledge in co n trast to ex p erien ce, acco rd in g to A ristotle, is justification. T h e universality o f an ‘all’-senten ce clearly belongs to a justification-context. W h o ev er asserts ‘all . . .’ can be asked fo r a justification o r hav e his a tte n tio n d raw n to c o u n te r­ reasons. T h e relation to justificatio n is in fact a fe a tu re n o t ju s t o f ‘all’sentences b u t o f all asserto ric sentences, all assertions in so fa r as they

Introduction

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m ake a truth-claim . I shall exam ine this connection later. W hat A ris­ totle calls ‘e x p e rie n c e ’, on th e o th e r h a n d , the cognitive faculty w hich is not articu la ted in sentences, does not involve reasons an d co u n ter-reasons. So w hen A ristotle refers to justification as a characteristic o f know l­ ed g e h e re too th e co n tra st is n o t with b elief b u t with ex p erien ce. K now l­ edge, it is tru e, is distin g u ish ed fro m belief by th e fact th at som eo n e w ho know s so m e th in g can ju stify w hat h e knows. B u t the p erso n who only believes or d o u b ts ab o u t w hat th e o th e r person knows also stands in a possible justification-context, som ething which is n ot tru e o f the p erso n who disposes o f a co rresp o n d in g state of affairs in the m a n n e r o f association on th e basis o f ‘ex p e rien c e’. T h e distinction o f the th re e levels o f cognitive capacity th at A ristotle m akes at th e b e g in n in g of his Metaphysics is still not obsolete. N e v e rth e ­ less we may not find com pelling th e construction o f th e idea o f a h ig h est science o n the basis o f th e two characteristics which resu lt fro m this distinction. O ne can, how ever, reach th e sam e resu lt m o re directly, sim ­ ply by conceding th a t by a h ig h est science one can at any ra te n o t u n d e rs ta n d a restric ted science. It follows fro m this th a t no science can be re g a rd e d as th e h ighest science which is restricted in its scope an d in its justification. We shall now p au se a m o m e n t an d con sid er w hat we can learn fro m this in tro d u c tio n o f a p relim in ary conception re g a rd in g the q u estio n o f how it is possible to in tro d u c e a conception of philosophy. A ristotle arriv ed at his p relim in ary conception o f philosophy by reflecting on (a) w hat o n e u n d e rsta n d s by th e w ord ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ (or ‘w isdom ’) an d (b) a p a rtic u la r aspect o f this u n d e rsta n d in g , nam ely, th a t by ‘p h ilo so p h y ’, in co n trast to the p a rtic u la r sciences, is m e an t a highest science, a p r e ­ e m in en t fo rm o f know ledge. My appeal to traditio n is simply a v arian t (b ro a d e n e d by th e historical dim ension) o f such an ap p e al to a p re lim ­ inary u n d e rsta n d in g . B ut is such an ap p e al to th e p relim in ary u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f th e w ord com pelling? Can we n o t free ourselves from it an d sketch a n o th e r, p e rh a p s m o re ad eq u ate, conception o f philosophy? C ertainly we can sketch o th e r conceptions o f ‘p h ilo so p h y ’. B u t w hat does it m ean to say th a t they could be m o re ad eq u ate? M ore a d e q u ate to w hat? We see th a t it w ould only be a m a tte r o f a d isp u te ab o u t w ords. T h e re is no such th in g as the co rrec t m ean in g o f a w ord. It is n a tu ra l w hen talking ab o u t ‘philo so p h y ’ to m ean w hat co rresp o n d s to th e o rd i­ n ary p relim in ary u n d e rsta n d in g o f this w ord. B ut th e re is n o th in g sacred ab o u t this. A nyone is at liberty to in tro d u c e a n o th e r m ean in g , p ro v id ed h e can d istinguish it clearly fro m th e usual m eaning.

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Now this may a p p e a r unsatisfactory. In this question o f w hat is to be u n d ersto o d by philosophy, thus at the crucial startin g -p o in t o f o u r enquiry, a re we to rem a in subject to arbitrarin ess and a boundless re l­ ativism? Does not this a p p e a r wholly incredible? In philosophy if o ne gets into a situation like the p re se n t one, one should ask oneself w h eth e r one does no t in reality m ean som ething d iffe re n t fro m w hat o n e thinks o n e m eans. W e thin k we know th a t the m eaning o f ‘philo so p h y ’ cannot be anything arbitrary . B ut on the o th e r h a n d it is plainly ab su rd to arg u e ab o u t the correct m ean in g o f a w ord. I f th e re fo re th e re is som ething co rrect about o u r feeling th a t the m e a n ­ ing of ‘p hilosophy’ ca n n o t be an y th in g arb itrary , th en we m u st in reality m ean som ething else. It is possible th a t som eone will now say: ‘Precisely. T h e e rro r lies in yo u r language-analytical p ro ce d u re . T h e m ean in g o f th e word ‘philosophy’ may be arb itra ry ; b u t n o t w hat philosophy is.3 W hoever talks like this does n o t know w hat he is saying. For so long as th e m eaning o f th e w ord is n o t settled th e question: w hat is philoso­ phy? can only m ean: w hat does th e w ord m ean? Probably th en we m ean so m ething else w hen we assum e th at th e m eaning o f ‘philo so p h y ’ cannot be arbitrary. Let us co n sid er w hat it w ould be like to ask a sim ilar q uestion o f a n o th e r science, botany fo r exam ple. We would say: o f course it is a verbal question w h eth er a p a r ­ ticular scientific subject-m atter is so called; b u t this subject-m atter - th e study o f plants - exists, irrespective o f which te rm we use to describe it. H e re we are dealing with som eth in g th at is th e re , a specific sp h ere o f objects. B u t one could h ardly say th a t philosophy deals with a specific sp h e re o f objects. H ow ever, ju st as in th e case o f th e p articu la r sciences we say ‘th e re exists a sp h e re of objects M ’ in th e case o f philosophy we can say ‘th e re exists such-and-such a specific m ode o f know ledge’, e.g. ‘th e re exists - in idea at least - a h ig h est form o f know ledge, reg ard less o f w h eth e r we call it philosophy, o r so m ething else’. A nd we could th e n p erh a p s go on to say: ‘th e re exists —in idea at least - a m ost g eneral a n d ultim ately justify in g fo rm o f know ledge, reg ardless o f w h eth e r we call it philosophy o r som ething else’. H ow ever, this way o f avoiding m eaning-relativism clearly leads to a fo rm o f dogm atism an d h en ce basically back to relativism . If we concede th e w ord ‘philoso p h y ’ to an o p p o n e n t w ho declares th a t he w ould like to m ean som ethin g d iffe re n t by ‘p h i­ losophy’ an d rem ain co n ten t m erely to say ‘b u t th e re exists th e m ode o f enquiry X ’, th e n oth ers a re free to say: ‘th e re is also th e m ode o f en q u iry Y .’ B ut in th a t case w hich m ode o f enquiry o ne engages in w ould be a m a tte r o f arb itra ry choice. T h e re thus em erges a difficulty w hich has no parallel in th e o th e r

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sciences: fo r th e re we are n o t co n c ern ed to show th a t it is n o t arb itra ry to en g a g e in th e m o d e o f enquiry in question. W h at is given in the case o f a science is sim ply th e sp h e re o f objects. In th e case o f philosophy, on th e o th e r h a n d , we a re no t th in k in g o f a p a rtic u la r sp h e re o f objects b u t o f a m o d e o f know ledge or en q u iry , thus a p articu la r activity. T h e n o n -a rb itra rin e ss (and th a t m eans: legitim acy) o f an activity, how ever, can only resid e in th e n o n -arb itrarin e ss o f th e motivation fo r engag in g in this activity. I f we are relu c tan t to accept th a t th e w ord ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ stan d s fo r so m e th in g a rb itra ry th e n it w ould a p p e a r th at w h at we m ean is th a t it ca n n o t stand fo r so m eth in g fo r w hich th e re is an arb itra ry m otivation. In this case w hat ‘exists’ is no t a s p h e re o f objects. N o r is it a n activity. It is a m otivation. A co nception o f philo so p h y is to be re g a rd e d as a suggestion to which o th e r suggestions can be o pposed. T h e se suggestions a re to be u n d e rsto o d , firstly (and incidentally), as suggestions as to how th e w ord ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ is to be u n d e rsto o d , an d , secondly (and essentially), as suggestions re g a rd in g th e en g ag in g in a p a rtic u la r fo rm o f enquiry. T h is provides us with an an sw er to th e q u estion: w hat is it to legitim ate a conception o f philosophy, not ju s t historically, relative to a given p relim in ary u n d e rsta n d in g , b ut abso­ lutely? T o in tro d u c e som eone to philosophy, an d to a p a rtic u la r co n ­ ception o f philosophy, is to show th e m otivation to en g ag e in this activ­ ity to be p re -e m in e n t vis-a-vis o th e r motives. A ristotle already saw it like this in his in tro d u c tio n . F ro m th e outset his co nceptual in tro d u c tio n goes h a n d in h a n d with an in tro d u c tio n o f m otivation. W e delight, h e says, in th e cognitive as such, alread y in p e r ­ ception a n d especially in seeing; a n d the h ig h e r th e cognitive level th e m o re estim able it is.6 T o show th a t it is th e cognitive as such to w hich we are m otivated A ristotle believes h e has to isolate th e cognitive fro m th e co n tex t o f b e h a v io u r.7 T h e re fo re th e h ig h e st m otivation w ithin th e cognitive sp h e re belongs to know ledge w ithout practical p u rp o se , p u re th e o ry .8 In this text A ristotle is co n ten t to r e f e r to ex istin g opinions; besides h e m erely show s th a t th e re is a m otivation to th e cognitive a n d th a t w ithin th e cognitive sp h e re th e highest m otivation belongs to th e ­ oretical science and, ultim ately, to philosophy. B u t A ristotle th o u g h t he could show th a t p u re th eo ry is th e activity m ost w orth striving afte r, th e h ig hest possibility o f h ap p in ess.9 T h is thesis is based o n th e follow ing two prem ises: (1) th a t activity is th e o n e m ost w orth striving afte r w hich is self-sufficient an d im m utable (2) th eo ry is th e activity w hich possesses th ese p ro p ertie s. N e ith e r o f th ese prem ises can seem ev id en t to us today. N o r do I know o f any o th e r a rg u m e n t th a t can ju stify th e m o ti­

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vation to p u r e th eo ry as a way o f life w orth striving a fte r fo r its ow n sake, let alo n e th e o n e m ost w orth striving a fte r, as valid fo r everybody. L et m e sum m arise. (1) T h e u ltim ately decisive in tro d u c tio n o f a c o n ­ ception o f philo so p h y w hich p ro v id es m o re th a n a historical leg itim a­ tion and w hich is n o t relative to a given p relim in ary u n d e rs ta n d in g is an in tro d u c tio n in te rm s o f m otivation. (2) T h e A ristotelian in tro d u c ­ tion in term s o f m otivation is n o t convincing. W h e th e r this invalidates th e A ristotelian p relim in ary co n cep tio n , o r w h e th e r it is still possible to p ro v id e a convincing in tro d u c tio n o f this p relim in ary co n cep tio n in term s o f m otivation, a re questions to which I shall be r e tu r n in g in co n ­ n ection w ith th e th ird tra d itio n a l g u id in g n o tio n , th a t o f reaso n (Lec­ tu re 7). W e m u st now ex a m in e how A risto tle gets fro m the p relim in ary co n ­ cep tion o f philo so p h y as a science which (1) is univ ersal a n d (2) ra d ic a l­ izes th e asp ect o f ju stificatio n , to his p a rtic u la r co n cep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y as e n q u irin g into b ein g o r ‘b ein g as b ein g ’. In Metaphysics 1 , 2 , w here A ristotle in tro d u c es th e p relim in ary co n ­ cep tion, he indicates a specific co n crete e la b o ra tio n 10 o f it w hich is clearly P lato n ic:11 every p a rtic u la r science is being conceived - on th e m odel o f geom etry - as a d ed u c tiv e th eo ry w hich justifies th e p ro p o si­ tions possible in this sp h e re by d ed u c in g th e m fro m th e h ig h est an d most general prem ises in this sp h e re : th e axiom s o f this science. B oth th e ju stificatio n an d th e gen erality possible w ithin th e p a rtic u la r science are lim ited. T h e ju stificatio n is lim ited because th e axiom s a re assu m ed as h y p otheses; they a re n o t them selves ju stified . T h e g en erality is lim ited to th e p a rtic u la r sp h e re . T h is p ersp ectiv e leads to th e id ea o f a h ig h e st science th e task o f w hich w ould be to d eriv e th e p rem ises o f th e p a rtic ­ u la r sciences fro m o n e o r m o re s u p re m e princip les, fro m w hich th e p rem ises o f all o th e r p a rtic u la r sciences a re to be d eriv ed . T h is w ould p ro v id e a co n crete co n cep tio n o f philo so p h y an d its tasks vis-a-vis th e p a rtic u la r sciences th a t co rre sp o n d s exactly to th e p relim in ary co n c ep ­ tion d ev e lo p e d by A ristotle: th e aspects o f h ig h est g en erality a n d u lti­ m ate ju stificatio n coincide in th e idea o f a science w hich d eriv es all know ledge fro m su p re m e prin cip les (= m ost g en e ral g ro u n d s). T h e P latonic idea o f philo so p h y as a d ed u c tiv e system based o n a su p re m e p rin cip le, o r s u p re m e p rinciples, reta in ed a stro n g attra c tio n in th e su b se q u e n t h istory o f philo so p h y rig h t u p to G erm a n Id ealism with its dialectical system s. H ow ever, this id ea o f a su b stan tiv e un iv ersal science was rejected as u n rea liza b le by A ristotle, on th e g ro u n d s th a t it p resu p p o se s a m istak en th e o ry o f science. T h e u ltim ate su b stan tiv e

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prem ises o f the p articu la r sciences, according to A ristotle, are ir re d u ­ cible, not fu rth e r d eriv ab le.12 T h is criticism can be m ad e even m o re strin g en t from a m o d e rn perspective. A ristotle still accepted th e Pla­ tonic conception o f th e p articu lar science as a deductive theory on the m odel o f g eo m etry .13 T h is contradicts the concep t o f an em pirical sci­ ence which g ro u n d s its propositions so to speak fro m below, by ex p e­ rience, a n d not fro m above by referen c e to given prem ises. If already w ithin th e p articu la r science th e m ovem ent o f justification is fro m below upw ard s r a th e r than fro m above dow nw ards th e n th e idea o f a radicalization o f substantive justification by derivation from even h ig h e r u p is ru led o u t in advance. F or A ristode the Platonic conception o f philosophy was th e m ost n a t­ u ral possibility o f giving a concrete sense to his prelim in ary conception. I f he nevertheless cam e to recognize that this conception is incapable o f realization an d yet w ished to hold fast to his p relim in ary conception, th e n a new ap p ro ach was req u ired which w ould d eterm in e , within the fram ew ork o f this prelim inary conception, th e relation o f philosophy to th e sciences in a fu n d am en tally d iffe re n t way. T his new conception is th a t o f ontology.

LECTURE 3

Ontology and semantics

It is at the b eginning o f B ook IV o f his Metaphysics that A ristotle first in troduces his new conception of philosophy. ‘T h e r e is a science which studies being as being.’ In d e e d the special ch aracter of this science visa-vis the o th e r sciences is supposed to consist in the fact th a t w hereas th e latter investigate a p articu lar sp h e re o f being philosophy investi­ gates being as b eing.1 W hat distinguishes the concept o f being, fo r A ristotle, is th a t it is th e m ost general concept.2 F o r o f everything an d an ything one can say th a t it is. E verything and anything, th e re fo re , can be called being. Clearly A ristotle arrives at his new conception o f philosophy by d ro p ­ p in g the aspect o f justification from the prelim inary conception devel­ o p ed at the beginn ing an d settling exclusively fo r th e aspect o f highest generality. T h e highest, p re-em in en t science, called philosophy, is u n i­ versal, but does not have a justificatory role in relatio n to th e particu lar sciences. T his conception, since it is orien tated tow ards the concept o f being {on), leads to the conception o f philosophy as ontology. T o enable us to u n d e rsta n d the specific ch aracter o f this conception o f philosophy as ontology (and this m eans: a conception th a t is based on th e concept o f being) we can think o f an analogous reflection using a concept o f m o d e rn philosophy, th a t o f an object. Each science has to do with a specific sph ere o f objects, objects o f a specific k ind, an d with a specific m ode o f accessibility. Can one say that it is also th e task o f the p articu la r science to them atize this object-sphere as such and th e pecul­ iar m ode o f givenness which distinguishes it from o th e r object-spheres? O n e could a rg u e about this. Since th e concepts which characterize an object-sphere as such are n o t o f m erely gradually h ig h er generality th a n the concepts within the object-sphere, one can say th at th e objectsp h e re as such, e.g. th at o f physics, th e arts, m athem atics, is th e subjectm a tte r o f the philosophy o f physics, philosophy o f art, philosophy o f

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m athem atics. H usserl called such a them atization o f an o b ject-sp h ere a ‘reg io n al ontology’.3 W hat is discussed in such an ontology is w hat it is to be an object o f th e relev an t sphere. B ut one can go fu rth e r a n d ask: w hat is m eant by an object as such, in abstraction fro m a p articu la r s p h e re o f objects? In this way one arrives at the q u estion ab o u t objects as objects, ju s t as previously o n e arrived at the questio n ab o u t beings as beings. A re we h ere d ealin g with two analogous questions o r do b oth ques­ tions have th e sam e m eaning? Obviously this d e p e n d s on w h e th e r or n o t th e two expressions ‘b e in g ’ and ‘object’ have rou g h ly th e sam e m eaning. W hereas fo r us th e expression ‘bein g ’ (‘Seiendes1) is a p h ilo ­ sophical term o f art, th e G reek p hilosophers w ere able to take the ex pression ‘on fro m o rd in a ry lan g u ag e.4 As ‘b ein g ’ (on) is th e participle o f th e verb ‘to b e ’ (einai), a n d th e w ord ‘is’ is notoriously am biguous, difficulties arise h e re , ab o u t which I shall speak later. At p rese n t, how ­ ever, we can confin e ourselves to the characterizatio n ju s t given: every­ th in g a n d a n y th in g is a being, because o f everythin g it is significant to say th a t it is. O n e could d o u b t this, p o in tin g o u t th a t th e re exist objects th a t a re not, e.g., objects o f phantasy. B ut to this o n e could rep ly th at by saying ‘they ex ist’ one says o f them th a t they are. T h u s it seem s th at even those objects which in a certain sense are n o t in a n o th e r sense som ehow are. N ow w hat is m e a n t by th e w ord ‘object’? T his w o rd too, in th e com ­ p reh e n siv e sense in which it is used in philosophy, is a term o f art. In o rd in a ry la n g u ag e we are inclined to call only m aterial objects - an d th e n only those which are n o t persons - objects, a n d n o t e.g. events or n u m b e rs and o th e r abstract objects; alth o u g h th e n again o n e does speak o f the object o f a discussion. W hat is m eant by ‘objects’ in philos­ ophy has its basis n o t in w hat we call objects in o rd in ary lan g u ag e b ut in w hat we m ean by the w ord ‘so m e th in g ’ in o rd in ary language. O ne could say: by ‘object’ is m e a n t everything th a t is som ething. H ow ever, this form ulation is linguistically faulty, because th e w ord ‘so m e th in g ’ is n o t a predicate, b u t an indefinite p ro n o u n . T h e e r r o r o f sp eak in g in such a way w ould becom e even m ore strikingly evid en t w ere o n e to say: an object is a som ething. N onetheless philo so p h ers have freq u en tly talked like this in th e trad itio n . T h u s A ristotle, e.g., coined th e e x p re s­ sion ‘a this’ (tode ti) fo r ‘object’. W e m u st try to avoid such u n g ra m m a ti­ cal expressions, an d to this en d th e re is no altern ativ e b u t to go back even fu rth e r to th e linguistic b ack g ro u n d . T h e re is a class o f linguistic expressions w hich are used to stand fo r an object; a n d h ere we can also say: to stand fo r som ething. T h e se are th e expressions which can fu n c­

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tion as th e sentence-subject in so-called sin g u lar pred icativ e statem en ts a n d w hich in logic have also b een called singular terms. T h e elu cid atio n o f th e concept o f an object by rec o u rse to sin g u lar term s is certainly also to be fo u n d p rio r to lan g uage-analytical philo so p h y . T h u s H usserl d eterm in e s th e b re a d th in w hich he w ishes th e co n c ep t ‘object’ to be u n d e rsto o d by defin in g it as follows: ‘any subject o f possible tru e p red ic atio n s’.5 A nd A ristotle too d efin e d his co n c ep t of an object by m eans o f the co n cep t of the hypokeimenon, th e subject o f p red ic atio n s.6 B u t w hat is m e a n t by this rem a in s u n c le a r so long as it is n ot specified w hat is to be u n d e rsto o d by a sin g u lar p red icativ e sta te m en t a n d by its subject. Now it w ould seem n a tu ra l to d istinguish sin g u lar p redicative statem en ts fro m o th e r pred icativ e sta te m en ts by saying th at they are those w hich have a sin g u lar te rm as th e ir subject. W e are thus m oving in a circle and re q u ire an in d e p e n d e n t c riterio n fo r recognizing sin g u ­ lar term s. T h e follow ing c rite rio n suggests itself: an expression X is a sin g u lar term if, w hen it is s u p p le m e n te d by a n o th e r ex p ressio n to fo rm a w hole assertoric sentence, o n e can d e d u c e fro m this sentence a n o th e r sen tence in w hich X is rep laced by ‘so m e th in g ’ (or ‘so m eb o d y ’).7 By this criterio n ‘the n u m b e r 3’, e.g., is a sin g u lar term , fo r fro m the sen ten ce ‘T h e n u m b e r 3 is sm aller th a n th e n u m b e r 4 ’ th e re follows th e sentence ‘S o m eth in g is sm aller th an th e n u m b e r 4 ’; a n d we can now ad d by way o f elucidation: som eth in g , nam ely th a t fo r which th e ex p ressio n ‘th e n u m b e r 3’ stands. O bviously th e m ode o f e m p lo y m e n t o f sin g u lar term s is co n n ected with a system o f p ro n o m in a l ex pressio n s which can take th e ir place (pro-nom ina!): ‘so m e th in g ’, ‘w hich?’, V h ic h ’, ‘th e sam e’. A nd each o f these p ro n o u n s we can, trivially, su p p le m e n t by th e w ord ‘object’, by saying, instead o f ‘w hich’, ‘w hich ob ject’, instead o f ‘the sam e’, ‘th e sam e object’, an d , instead o f ‘so m e th in g ’, ‘som e o b ject’. If the w ord ‘object’ is used so bro ad ly , th u s if its m e an in g is yielded by th e use o f these p ro n o u n s, or th e sin g u lar te rm s w hich replace th e m , th e n it has th e b ro ad sense in te n d e d in philosophy. O nly la ter will I ex am in e th e in tim ate connection betw een th e w ords ‘so m e th in g ’ an d ‘th e sam e’. B ut even now I can p o in t o u t that, in stea d o f th e criterio n ju s t m e n ­ tio ned, o n e could also use th e id entity-sign as a criterio n o f sin g u lar term s: an expression is a sin g u lar te rm if it can stan d on e ith e r side o f ‘is the sam e as’ (or ‘= ’).8 T h e notion o f ‘objects’, as th u s d e te rm in e d , is clearly directly co n ­ nected with th at o f ‘b ein g ’. T h e thesis th a t o f ev e ry th in g a n d a n y th in g we can say ‘it is’ m e an s-so m e th in g like: w hatever so m eth in g m ay be at any rate it is. H ence, alread y ac co rd in g to A ristotle th e con cep t o f being was intim ately co n n ected n o t only with th a t o f unity b u t also w ith th a t

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o f so m eth in g (ti)\ a n d this connection - th a t every b eing is also som e­ th ing an d o ne and vice versa - was also reta in ed in Scholasticism u n d e r th e titles ens, unum, aliquid. B ut how can o ne th em atize such a th in g as being as being, objects as objects? W here an d in w hat way do we find such a thing? Clearly n o t in ex perience, fo r alth o u g h we find objects in experien ce we do n o t find the object as object, objecthood, being as being, Being (Sein). B ut n o r do we reach it by abstraction. W e can see this if we reflect on th e p e c u ­ liar certainty o f th e statem en t ‘E v erything is a bein g ’ o r ‘E verything is an object.’ Clearly th e certainty o f this statem en t is no m ere inductive o r hypothetical certainty; we have no t arrived at it by co m p arin g m any objects an d progressive abstraction. For if th at w ere so, th e n it w ould be conceivable th a t th e re m ight still be som ething which we h ad not so far co nsidered th a t could no t be te rm e d an object. B ut this possibility is excluded a priori, because if it is som ething th e n it is eo ipso an object. So we do not arrive at w hat we m ean by ‘an object’, o r by the e x p re s­ sion ‘so m e th in g ’, by abstraction. H usserl drew atten tio n , in this co n n ec­ tion, to th e distinction betw een ‘g en eralizatio n ’ an d ‘fo rm alizatio n ’9 an d called th e them atizatio n of th e object as object, in co n trast to th e ‘regional ontologies’, ‘form al o n to lo g y ’. T h u s with th e conception o f philosophy as ontology th e rela tio n o f the highest science to the p a rtic ­ u la r sciences is d e te rm in e d in a new way vis-a-vis the Platonic co n cep ­ tion: philosophy no lo n g e r em braces the p articu la r sciences as reg a rd s th e ir co n ten t, but form ally; as ontology it them atizes th a t which all sci­ ences form ally p resu p p o se , ra th e r than principles fro m which th e ir p ropositions could be derived. W ith this A ristotle explicitly m ark ed o u t fo r the first tim e a them atic field which was already in Plato, th o u g h only im plicitly. Clearly this field o f th e form al is a field o f a priori, a n a ­ lytic know ledge (we have ju st seen th a t we can n o t arrive at the concepts in question inductively, em pirically). A nd equally it is clear th a t h e re th e d em arcatio n o f a narrower field w ithin th e analytic, w hich we m issed w hen discussing th e analytic c h a ra c te r of philosophy, begins to take shape. B ut now w hat is m e a n t by ‘fo rm alizatio n ’ in co n trast to ‘g en eraliza­ tio n ’? H usserl did not elab o rate this an d A ristotle did n o t even explicitly m ake th e distinction. O n e could provisionally describe it by saying th a t it p resu p p o se s a m ove o f reflection. W hereas th e p articu la r sciences are co ncerned with the objects o f a dom ain an d th e ir p ro p erties, the su bject-m atter o f ontology is not to be sought in a tra n sc e n d e n t dom ain (for w here should this be?). B ut th e n the only altern ativ e is th at on e arrives at this subject-m atter by reflecting on th e m a n n e r o f o u r r e f e r ­

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ence to objects. Such a m ode of en q u iry was only developed in th e m od­ e rn period an d that explains why it was not possible fo r A ristotle to use a concept such as that o f form alization. T h e question now arises: in w hat way do we re fe r, or can we refer, to objects? W e becam e acquainted with one possibility in th e attem p t to fix the philosophical co ncept o f an object, viz. referen c e to objects by m eans o f linguistic expressions. T h e re is a specific class o f linguistic expressions - singular term s - w hose m ode o f em ploym ent is such th a t by m eans o f th em we are able to re fe r to som ething, to an object. A nd if we can only specify w hat is m e an t by the philosophical concept o f an object by recourse to sin gular term s, the w ord ‘so m eth in g ’ and o th e r p ro n o u n s, th en to the question ‘how can one them atize som ething like th e objecthood o f objects (or being qua being)?’ it w ould seem plausible to answ er: only by reflecting on the use o f th e co rresp o n d in g linguistic expressions. F rom th e linguistic perspective we can at any rate give a definite m eaning to th e distinction betw een generalization an d form alization. W hat I have called, in explaining generalization, progressive abstrac­ tion clearly rests on the fact th at we can subsum e concepts u n d e r o th er, m o re general, concepts. C oncepts a re principles o f classification an d to th e m th e re co rresp o n d , in language, the so-called general terms o r pred­ icates, which, accordingly, can be called classification-expressions.10 An ex am ple o f a progressive abstraction would be th e series o f predicates: ‘native o f th e P alatinate’, ‘G e rm a n ’, ‘h u m a n ’, ‘living th in g ’, ‘spatiotem p o ral object’. H ere th e next p red icate is m o re g eneral th a n the p re ­ ceding one, because it is applicable to all objects to which th e p reced in g o n e is applicable, w hereas the converse is not th e case. Now one can say o f each of these predicates, or the c o rresp o n d in g concepts, th a t it is a classification-expression, or classification-principle. T his is clearly to say so m ething com pletely general, fo r it applies to all predicates, o r co n ­ cepts. B ut it is clearly n o t simply gradually m ore general th a n any o f th e predicates o r concepts them selves, an d , th e re fo re , does n o t belong to a series o f th e kind I have ju st p rese n ted . F o r it is the concepts o r predicates them selves a n d n o t the objects which fall u n d e r th e concepts, o r to which th e predicates are applicable, which fall u n d e r th e descrip­ tion ‘classification-principle’ or ‘classification-expression’. In contrast to the previously n am ed predicates, which a re applicable to objects, we arrive at the pred icate ‘classification-expression’, o r th e p red icate ‘p re d ic a te ’, by reflecting on th e m ode o f em p lo y m en t o f those o r o f any predicates; a n d th at m eans: by reflecting on th e m ode o f em ploym ent o f a species o f linguistic expression. B ut now this is a p ro ­ c e d u re o f basically the sam e kind as th a t by which we a rriv ed at th e

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p red ic ate ‘singular te rm ’ o r ‘expression which stands fo r an object’. Now the specifically language-analytical position w ould be th a t o n e can only explain w hat is m e an t by ‘concepts’ by referen c e to the use o f p re d ­ icates, and th at o n e can only explain w hat is m e an t by ‘objects’ by re f­ e re n ce to th e use of singular term s. B u t in w hat sense is this reflection on the m od e o f em plo y m en t o f expressions to be u n d e rsto o d as form alization? A b rie f indication o f linguistic distinctions is h e re req u ired . T h e concept o f fo rm is clearly closely connected with th a t o f stru ctu re. O u r linguistic expressions are structurally com posite at two levels: (a) that o f the com bination of p h o n em es to fo rm the sm allest m ean in g -b earin g units, i.e. w ords or m o rp h em es an d (b) th a t o f th e com bination o f m o rp h em es to form sentences. ‘S tru c tu ral com position’ m eans that th e com position is ruleg overned: the sm aller units cannot be com bined with others arbitrarily b u t only in so fa r as they are elem ents o f certain classes. Now at th e level o f the com bination o f m eaning-bearing units to fo rm sentences th e re are two possible m odes of analysis: on th e o n e h an d , th e syntac­ tical which investigates th e ex tern al o r ‘su rface’ com position o f sen­ tences and has re g a rd n e ith e r to the m ean in g o f the sentences n o r to th a t o f the sentence-com ponents. T h e classes o f sen ten ce-co m p o n en t a re n o t defined sem antically; ra th e r they are d eterm in e d exclusively by th e so-called principle o f ‘d istrib u tio n ’, i.e. th e substitutability o f their elem ents for o n e an o th er, th e only condition bein g th at th e resu lt m ust also be a sentence. By con trast o ne calls ‘sem antic’ any m ode o f analysis w hich concerns the meaning o f linguistic expressions. H ere it can be a m a tte r eith er o f the m ean in g o f th e individual w ords o r o f how th e m eaning o f sentences d e p e n d s on th e m eanings o f th eir p arts. In lin­ guistics it was only a few years ago th a t atten tio n began to be paid to this second m o d e o f enquiry, w hereas w ithin philosophical sem antics it has been, since Frege, th e d o m in a n t one. T h e classes o f sentence-parts to which one m u st re fe r in this m ode o f enquiry are not th e classes o f syntactic sentence-parts, fo r th e fo rm e r can n o t be defined in d e p e n ­ d ently o f m eaning; ra th e r they a re sem antic classes which a re defined in term s o f th e sort o f co n trib u tio n the m e an in g o f th e ir elem ents m akes to the m eaning o f a la rg e r u n it, ultim ately a sentence; o r in term s o f th e elem ents o f o th e r sem antic classes with w hich they can be com ­ b ined. As exam ples o f such sem antic classes on e can m ention both sin­ g u la r and general term s. T h e reason why th e definition o f singular term s is so involved is because o n e is dealing n o t with a syntactically definable class b u t with a sem antic class which is defined by th e m ode o f em ploym ent o f the expressions, o r by the so rt o f co n trib u tio n they

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m ake to th e m e an in g o f a sentence. T h e se two sem antic classes also p ro v id e a sim ple exam ple o f th e com bination o f th e elem en ts o f two sem antic classes; fo r the com bination o f an expressio n which stan d s fo r an object with a classification-expression yields a (singular) p redicative assertoric sentence. H ow precisely this is to be u n d e rsto o d will occupy us at length later on. Now o ne can call any stru ctu ra l them atizatio n o f lan g u ag e - th e p h o ­ netic, th e syntactic and th e sem antic - form al. It seem s n a tu ra l, th e re ­ fore, to distinguish betw een m aterial {inhaltlich) a n d fo rm al sem antics. F orm al sem antics arrives at its subject-m atter th ro u g h a process o f fo r­ m alization which is linguistically sym bolized by rep la cin g th e m aterial exp ressions by variables, with th e u n d e rsta n d in g th a t these stan d fo r an a rb itra ry expression o f a sem antic class. In this way th e sem antic form o f a com posite expression can be exhibited, e.g. o n e can use th e letters ‘a , ‘b’, V for sin g u lar term s, F \ £G’ fo r g en e ral term s an d can then ex h ibit th e form o f a predicative senten ce with o n e sin g u lar te rm (e.g. ‘P ete r is crying’) by ‘F a, an d that o f a p redicativ e sentence with two sin g u lar term s (e.g. ‘P eter hits P aul’) by ‘Fab’. T h u s if it sh o u ld be tru e th a t we can only arriv e at, a n d can only th em atize, th e category o f object by reflecting on th e c o rre sp o n d in g linguistic expressions, th e n it w ould be clear w hat is m ean t by ‘fo rm ali­ zatio n ’. F or th e th em atization in question w ould n o t be ju s t any th e ­ m atization o f linguistic expressions; it w ould be a th em atizatio n o f th eir sem antic form . You could point o u t th a t I have now only d escrib ed w hat is m ean t by ‘fo rm al’ a n d ‘fo rm alizatio n ’ w ithin sem antics in term s o f th e contrast with m aterial sem antic questions, a n d th at it is n o t clear w h e th e r this distinction co rresp o n d s to th e distinction betw een fo rm a l­ ization and generalization, thus betw een a fo rm a l an d a m aterial ap p ro a ch to objects. T h ese two things m ust in d e e d be d istin g u ish ed ; they are, how ever, connected. O n e can show this by m eans o f th e sym ­ bolization I have ju s t illustrated. T h e scientist w ho is d ea lin g w ith objects o f a certain sph ere, an d th e ir p ro p e rtie s, uses, am o n g o th e r sen ­ tences, sentences o f th e fo rm ‘F a. W ith th e sin g u lar term s w hich h e uses in place o f ‘a h e re fe rs to certain objects, e.g. with th e expression ‘th e m o o n ’ he refers to th e m oon. T h e m aterial sem anticist can en q u ire ab o u t th e meaning o f this a n d o th e r expressions. B u t w hen o n e fo rm a l­ izes w hat th e scientist (or any o th e r la n g u ag e-u ser) is d o in g w hen h e re fers with this singular te rm to this object, th u s if one asks w hat in g en e ral it m eans to re fe r to an object a n d w hat in g en eral it m eans to speak o f an object (‘w hat an object qua object “is” ’), th en o n e does so precisely by form alizing th e m aterial su b ject-m atter o f th e sem anticist

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an d asking ab o u t th e form al m ean in g o f singular term s. O bjectual fo r­ m alization finds its sense in sem antic form alization. I f this should be th e only possible way o f u n d e rsta n d in g th e form alization-step by w hich ontology is constituted, th e n o n e w ould have already show n th a t ontology is only realizable in a language-analytical p h ilosophy u n d e rsto o d as form al sem antics.11 A t this stage o f o u r reflections I can n o t yet assert so m uch. In discussing th e m o d ern , socalled tra n sc e n d e n ta l concept of philosophy we shall b ecom e ac q u ain ted with a n o th e r kind o f reflection in which re fe re n c e to objects is not u n d e rsto o d linguistically; an d only m uch later will I really attack this trad itio n al m o d e rn conception (Lectures 20 an d 27). So fa r only this m uch has b een said: (I) fo r A ristotle, an d with h im th e w hole p r e ­ m o d e rn ontology, th e re was no possibility o f exp lain in g w hat d istin ­ guishes th e form al concepts investigated in ontology fro m o th e r co n ­ cepts. (2) T h e rec o u rse to form al sem antics offers at least one possibility o f ex p lain in g this distinction. You will have felt it to be problem atic th a t fo r the A ristotelian co n ­ cept o f being I su b stitu ted th e concept o f an object, an d th a t I o rie n ta te d m yself exclusively tow ards th e latter. My reason for p ro ce ed in g in this way is th a t th e con cep t o f an object is less am biguous an d that, conse­ quently, certain aspects o f w hat is m ean t by ‘b ein g ’ can be b ro u g h t o u t by it m o re clearly. B u t w hen o n e p roceeds in this way essential p e rsp e c ­ tives o f th e trad itio n al ontology rem ain u n h e e d e d . W h at m akes th e ex pression ‘b ein g ’ so difficult is its connection with th e am biguous v e r­ bal ex p ressio n ‘is’. F o r th e tim e being it will suffice to a tte n d to two o f this w o rd ’s various m odes o f em ploym ent. W e som etim es use th e w ord ‘is’, th o u g h ad m itte d ly ra th e r seldom , with a sing u lar te rm o r a p ro ­ n o u n a n d w ithout a su p p le m e n tin g p red ic ate ex p ressio n (e.g. in th e sen tence ‘G od is’). H e re it m eans ‘exists’. A second m o d e o f em p lo y ­ m ent, an d th e on e w hich is m ost fre q u e n t in o u r lan g u ag e, is as th e socalled cop u la in a predicative sentence (e.g. ‘T h e sky is b lu e’). N ow it w ould seem th a t w hen o ne speaks o f ‘a b ein g ’ only th e use o f ‘is’ in th e sense o f ‘exists’ is involved, fo r ‘a b ein g ’ m eans ‘so m eth in g which is’, th u s th e w ord ‘is’ is h e re used w ithout a su p p le m e n tin g p redicateex pression. So w hereas th e ex pression ‘is’ is used am biguously, th e su b ­ stantival expression ‘b ein g ’ seem s to be univocal an d have th e sense ‘ex iste n t’. W e m ust be all the m o re su rp rised th e n w hen we find th a t in his ontology A ristotle is p rim arily o rien tate d tow ards th e copulative ‘is’. A nd it m u st seem even m o re su rp risin g th a t h e u n d e rsta n d s this ‘is’ as th e ‘is’ o f a ‘b ein g ’12 a n d th at he takes the ‘b ein g ’ to b e th a t for which

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the predicate stands, hence the being-thus-and-so {das So-seiend-Sein) o f th e object. O ne could try to in te rp re t this in a harm less way: why sh o u ld not th e predicate in a sentence like ‘T h e sky is blue’ also stand fo r som ething, in this case th e blueness o f the sky? T his conception w ould be co m p ar­ atively harm less because som ething like blueness is in d e ed an object (som ething) an d thus could also be designated as a being. O u r criterion o f objects fits: th e expression ‘th e blueness’ is a singular term . B u t in m oving from ‘T h e sky is b lue’ to ‘th e blueness o f the sky’ we have to ch ange th e fo rm o f th e expression; the p red icate ‘is b lu e ’ has b een ch an g ed by a so-called nom inalization into th e singular te rm ‘the b lu e­ ness’. A nd since singular term s an d predicates are sem antic classes, we m u st also u n d e rsta n d this gram m atical change as on e o f sem antic form . L ater I will show th a t th e nom inalized form is sem antically secondary relative to th e predicative form . I ca n n o t assum e this h ere. B u t th en I do no t need to, for A ristotle him self, in his d eb ate with Plato, does n o t m erely re g a rd objects like blueness, hence abstract objects, as sec­ on dary; he rejects th em altogether. W hatever o n e ’s attitu d e may be to th e Platonic p roblem o f th e relation o f th e blueness o f an individual object to th e blueness as such, A ristotle rejects no t only th e latter b u t also the fo rm e r.13 For him such abstract objects do not exist, only co n ­ crete objects with th e ir predicative determ in atio n s. A ristotle was ce r­ tainly too casual in his ap p ro ach to th e com plicated pro b lem o f abstract objects. H e was, how ever, u n d o u b te d ly right to reject the red u c tio n o f p redicative d eterm in a tio n s to abstract objects. Even if o n e accepts ab stract objects, they in th e ir tu rn have predicative d eterm in atio n s. B ut how should on e positively u n d e rsta n d predicative d e te rm in a ­ tions if they are no t objects? If one appro ach es th e problem im partially th e n I th in k one has to say: if we divide a singular predicative sentence into its sem antic com ponents both o f them - th e singular te rm an d th e pred icate - have a m eaning, i.e. we u n d e rsta n d both o f th em ; b u t only o n e of them - th e singular term - stands for an object. If only singular term s stand fo r objects th e n it seems to follow th a t form alization o f th e linguistic expressions reaches fu rth e r th a n th e form alization o f objects. A n explicitly sem antic enquiry was, how ever, u nknow n to A ristotle. T h is is why h e called predicative d eterm in atio n s both onta (beings) an d legomena (som ething said ).14 In th e M iddle Ages this u n d ecid ed n ess becam e the sta rtin g -p o in t o f th e nom inalism controversy. A ristotle re fu se d to follow Plato in trea tin g th e m eaning o f predicates as an in d e ­ p e n d e n t object. H ow ever, because h e failed to perceive th e sem antic

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dim ension he inevitably objectified th e ir m eaning. T h e result is a pecu­ liar extension o f th e concept o f being (on). It is — to g e th er with the concepts o f th e o n e an d o f som ething - m ore com p reh en siv e th an th at o f an object (tode ti). T h e title ‘o ntology’ now begins to iridesce. It would have an unequivocal sense if one w ere to define it, as I initially did, an d as is usual in analytical philosophy, in term s o f the con cep t o f an object, or, which am ounts to th e sam e thing, in term s o f th e concept o f being in th e sense o f existence; ‘ontology’ would then m ean ‘theory o f objects’. In contrast to this the introduction o f ontology by A ristotle, which becam e sta n d ard in the tradition, contains a tension which was not resolved in th e tradition. T his tension is a consequence o f A ristotle’s d u al orien tatio n : on the one h and, to th e - objectual - fo rm u la ‘being as b ein g ’; on th e o th e r h an d , to the verbal form ‘is’. H e lets him self be g u id ed by this verbal form even w here it does n o t co nnote bein g in the sense o f existence, i.e. w here th e ‘is’ is not the ‘is’ o f a being; an d since the fo rm u la ‘bein g as being’ nonetheless rem ains th e gu id in g principle, th e form alizing ap p ro ach , which in itself would have led away from the restriction to th e problem o f objects, is again being cast into an objectual term inology. A ristotelian ontology transcends th e form al th eo ry of objects in th e d irection o f a form al sem antics, b u t in such a way that w hat em erges is m isin te rp rete d in term s o f an object-o rien ted p ersp ec­ tive, ow ing to th e lack o f aw areness o f the sem antic dim ension. T h u s if one views the traditional elaboration, essentially d eterm in e d by A ristotle, o f th e idea o f a philosophical fu n d am e n tal discipline as ontology fro m a language-analytical perspective (one o f reflection on th e m eaning o f words) it tu rn s out to be unsatisfactory in re g a rd to both o f th e aspects in A ristotle’s p relim inary conception o f philosophy. Firstly, in re g a rd to its justification: the object-orientated A ristotelian fo r­ m al discipline lacks a fo u n d atio n in a m ethod o f reflection; such a fo u n ­ d atio n w ould be p rovided by a form al sem antics (though w h eth e r this is th e only possible fo u n d atio n we do n o t yet know). Secondly, in reg ard to its scope: its claim to universality could only seem convincing so long as o n e rem a in ed o rien tate d to objects. B ut the o rien tatio n to everything (and that m eans: to all objects) ap p e ars itself restricted as soon as on e focusses on th e realm o f th e form al itself. T h e perspective on objects th e n co rresp o n d s to ju s t one sem antic form am o n g others. T h e r e are two aspects o f this critique o f ontology from a languageanalytical p o in t o f view w hich I m ust particularly em phasize. Firstly, th e critique is not an external one. Both defects re p re s e n t im m an e n t diffi­ culties. T h e language-analytical perspective was n o t necessary to show

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th em u p , b u t only to rem ove them . Secondly, this critique has positive consequences fo r th e question o f linguistic analysis as reg a rd s its own co n ception o f philosophy. W e d id n o t u n d e rta k e th e c o n fro n tatio n with th e trad itio n al basic conceptions m erely in o rd e r to be able to co n trast the language-analytical conception o f philosophy with them . R a th e r we did so in o rd e r to arriv e at such a conception in th e first place, a fte r it e m erg ed th a t th e o rien tatio n tow ards m eaning-analysis does n o t suffice fo r this p u rp o se. In this re g a rd the follow ing possibility seem s so far to em erge. We can follow A ristotle in his sketch o f a p relim in ary co n cep ­ tion o f philosophy (with th e reserv atio n s about m otivation m e n tio n e d in th e last lecture). W e can also follow him in th e d ev e lo p m e n t o f his p relim in ary co nception into th e conception of a philosophical fu n d a ­ m ental discipline which does n o t deductively g ro u n d th e know ledge o f the o th e r sciences b u t ra th e r them atizes w hat they all form ally p re s u p ­ pose. A nd now we only n eed to follow u p th e two weak points o f his co nception o f ontology with an a ttitu d e th a t is p re p a re d to reflect on th e m ean in g o f linguistic expressions a n d we find th a t th e trad itio n al ontology itself points beyond itself to a new conception o f th e form al science, which, in th e shape o f a form al sem antics, u n d erlies all sciences. F orm al sem antics is, on th e o n e h a n d , a language-analytical u n d e rta k ­ ing: it is sem antics, it analyses th e m e an in g o f linguistic expressions. O n th e o th e r h a n d , it is form al, in th e sam e sense th a t ontology was form al; an d because it rem oves w eaknesses o f ontology, which are in capable o f im m an e n t reso lu tio n , it can lay claim to being onto lo g y ’s legitim ate suc­ cessor. T h e r e is also a n o th e r way in which we can com e to see th e su p erio rity which form al sem antics possesses over form al ontology fro m th e p e r­ spective of A risto tle’s own idea o f philosophy. T h is is by sta rtin g o u t no t fro m th e unclarities o f ontology b u t fro m th e step which A ristotle took fro m th e reg io n al sciences to fo rm al science. I f one co n stru es p h i­ losophy qua h ig h e st science as th e tran sitio n fro m th e p a rtic u la r sci­ ences to th e fo rm a l elem en t com m on to th em all, th e n it is by n o m eans obvious th a t th e only such elem ent is objecthood. In science, as also elsew here, we n e v e r sim ply re fe r to objects, b u t always in such a way th at we m ake p redicative statem ents a b o u t them . B u t m ost o f th e state­ m ents o f science, e.g. those in which laws are fo rm u late d , do n o t co n ­ tain singular te rm s an d only re fe r indirectly to objects. It is surely co n ­ sistent th e n n o t to restrict th e form alization to sin g u lar term s, b u t to ex ten d it to w hole sentences and all sentence-form s. N ote m o reo v er th a t ontology is com pletely p rese rv e d w ithin form al sem antics. T h is is tru e n o t only o f th e parts o f trad itio n al ontology in

Introduction

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which so m ething was illegitim ately objectified - th e predicative d e te r­ m inations - bu t also o f th e th eo ry o f objects which now proves to be a p a rt o f form al sem antics. W hat still rem ains u nclear, how ever, is w hether this new conception o f a fo rm al fu n d a m e n ta l discipline has a unitary fu n d a m e n ta l question as ontology did in th e question co n cern in g ‘being as b ein g ’. So fo r the tim e being we have simply an ex ten d e d subject-m atter; w h eth er this can be org an ized a ro u n d a ce n tral question is still u n clear. I shall take u p this difficulty in th e nex t lecture. T o d ay I w ould sim ply like to lighten the shock you may have felt w hen I stated th a t ontology is p reserv ed w ithin sem antics. Even if you ag ree with m e th a t th e o rien tatio n tow ards the fo rm o f linguistic expressions opens u p a subject-m atter th a t is b ro a d e r th a n ontology, you will probably w ant to qualify this to th e effect th a t th e new subjectm a tte r is a linguistic one and thus no lon g er belongs to th e dim ension of ontology, th e d im ension o f ‘reality’. T h e r e is re p e a te d h ere the sam e resistance to the language-analytical position th a t has already show n itself, in a n o th e r connection, in th e first lecture. L anguage, o n e thinks, is som eth in g m erely subjective. If o n e co nverts ontology, w hich has to d o w ith reality, into linguistic analysis, th e n th e m ost im p o rta n t thing is lost, even if som eth in g else is ad d ed . Now it seems to m e th a t in objections o f this kind, even w hen raised by philosophers, a pre-philosophical m otive is p rese n t, a reserv atio n sim ilar to th a t w hich is en te rta in e d against philosophy in g en eral by th ose w ho are n o t fam iliar with philosophy. In w hat way, I would reto rt, does ontology have to do with reality? C ertainly n o t in th e way th e sci­ ences do. It does n o t have to do with objects. O b jecthood is n o t itself so m eth in g real like an object. B ut is n o t - you could now ask - objecthood, even if n o t itself som e­ th in g real, th e reality o f th e real? A nd is n o t this lost in the reflection on th e m erely linguistic? It is only in th e f u rth e r course o f these lectures th a t we will gradually w ork o u t th e categories which m ake it possible ad eq u ately to discuss such questions. So fa r I have barely tou ch ed on th e essence o f th e lin­ guistic. W e are, th e re fo re , no t yet in a position to see th a t it is a m istake to speak o f th e ‘m erely linguistic’, of la nguage as a m ere m ed iu m betw een us and reality. At th e p re se n t stage of o u r en q u iry it m ust suffice to say th a t th e opinion ju s t expressed, th a t th e reality o f th e real can n o t be a p p re h e n d e d in reflection on th e use o f language, arises fro m a m e re feeling; fo r if it w ere to be m o re th an this o n e w ould have to be able to say how som eth in g like ‘reality’ can be given to us, if n o t in

Ontology and semantics

33

linguistic usage. We will soon have an opportunity critically to examine such a positive alternative (p. 61 ff). But it would in any event be false to think that the distinction between object and m eaning is levelled out by the semantic turn. T h e opposite is the case. It was the old ontology in which this distinction was levelled out; for want of other categories the m eaning of a linguistic expression was interpreted as an object. By contrast, there is no reason, from the semantic perspective, for neglecting the object for which an expression stands in favour of its meaning. All linguistic expressions which we understand have, in so far as we understand them , a m eaning. Some of these expressions, singular terms, stand for objects. An expression can presumably only have this function of standing for an object in virtue of how we understand it, thus in virtue of its meaning. If this is correct - and it is only later that we will precisely investigate these connections - then the objecthood of objects cannot be thematized independently of the meaning of singular terms. However, that does not mean that the object for which the expression stands and its m eaning coincide. T he dimension of objects does not lose anything as a result of the semantic approach; rath er som ething is added to it and only thus does it become intelligible. If we now proceed from singular terms to whole sentences (or to other component-expressions) then, although they have a meaning, it is not clear that we can say that they stand for objects. H ere then the dimension o f objects does indeed fall away; and the impression th ere ­ fore arises that we are dealing with the ‘merely linguistic’. But the lin­ guistic is not the m ere sign; it is that which one understands and which many can understand in the same way. It is, therefore, nothing subjec­ tive. At present I am only concerned that you should dwell on this understanding in its puzzling familiarity and resist the tem ptation to force it into traditional categories. A nother reason why I have exam ined objections I assume you to have towards a formal semantics as extended ontology is that they seem to me to be the same objections that have hindered traditional ontology itself from developing into formal semantics. All the decisive steps o f Greek ontology resulted from semantic reflection. However, every step led to an objectifying reinterpretation which concealed the linguistic dimension of the reflection. Thus the problem of being (Sein) and notbeing (Nichtsein) was twisted by Parmenides into a problem o f what is and what is not (von Seiendem und Nichtseiendem ), with the grotesque but con­ sistent result that there is ju st a single unm oved being (Seiendes), because with what is not (dem Nichtseienden) not-being (das Nichtsein) was also

Introduction

34

excluded.15 Plato discovered for the first time, in reflection on questions of definition, the meanings of predicates - and immediately objectified them, in his doctrine of ideas, into supersensible entities. Finally, Aris­ totle started out from the form of the singular predicative sentence and nonetheless developed on this basis an objectual ontology. But what is it then that hindered traditional ontology from dealing with the semantic dimension as such, and which also makes it so diffi­ cult for us? Why is it that we too unconsciously interpret the nonobjectual understanding of linguistic expressions in an objectual way? Clearly it is due to the fact that when we speak o f something this is, by definition, an object. We can thus thematically direct ourselves only to objects; u n d e r­ standing is essentially unthem atic. So if we wish to investigate the m ean­ ing o f o u r expressions we find ourselves faced with peculiar difficulties. T he m eaning is not what we are naturally directed towards; we must, therefore, carry out a reflection which inhibits our natural directedness. And then we m ust also be careful not to objectify that with which we are dealing in this reflection. My saying ‘with which . . . we are dealing’ already contains, in the pronom inal ‘with which’, an objectification. And is there not an objectification already contained in speaking of ‘the m eaning’ of an expression? Indeed, and we shall see later that, and to what extent, this is an im proper way of speaking.

LECTURE 4

Has formal semantics a fundamental question?

Because Aristotle orientated him self not only towards the expression ‘being’ (Seiendes) but also towards the expression ‘is/to be’, traditional ontology reaches beyond a m ere theory of objects or theory of sub­ stance. This surplus really already belongs to the broader field of a formal semantics. If one asks why Aristotle included predicative d eter­ minations as well as objects in his form al them atic the answer m ust be: because predicative determ inations, although not objects, are at least determ inations of objects. So the orientation towards the category of an object, which is definitive of the whole o f traditional philosophy, also determ ined which non-objectual semantic form Aristotle dealt with. If we now envisage a form al semantics as the form al universal science in place o f ontology we m ust consider w hether the form al thematic, as thus extended, still has some sort of unified structure and a centre, so that h ere too a unitary fundam ental question can be form ulated. T h e fundam ental question o f ontology is: what is being as being? It is obvious that this form ulation of the question is a makeshift solution, for it is fram ed as though one were asking about the what-being (WasSein) of an object. I have therefore reform ulated it so that what is being asked is what it m eans to speak of an object (or being). This is already to give the question a semantic form ulation. But its real semantic coun­ terp art is the question: ‘How can one refer to objects with linguistic expressions?’ and this question, it would seem (cf. p. 33), leads back to the question: ‘In what does the m eaning of a singular term consist?’ And if we wish to avoid speaking of a m eaning as an object, this ques­ tion can be form ulated as follows: ‘W hat is it to understand a singular term ?’ Analogously, if we extend the sphere of the formal thematic beyond that of singular term s, we can ask with respect to any semantic class: ‘W hat is it to u n derstand an expression of this form ?’ T h e for­ mulation ‘W hat is it to u n derstand . . . ?’ is not completely clear. But at

Introduction

36

the present stage of our deliberations it is appropriate to content o u r­ selves with a question-form ula which contains only a vague indication of what we are looking for. As yet we do not know with what categorial means we can adequately thematize som ething like the understanding of linguistic expressions. T o explain how such questions about the understanding o f expressions of a certain form, or about the u n d e r­ standing of this form, are adequately to be form ulated is, therefore, a task which already belongs to the elaboration of formal semantics. We can call the question: what is it to u nderstand an expression of a certain semantic form , or the form o f this expression? the formalized question o f m eaning. Its relation to questions about the m eaning or understanding of a particular expression of this form is analogous to the relation o f the study of being as being to the reference to an indi­ vidual being. T hus it seems that we can call this question the fundam en­ tal semantic question which corresponds to the fundam ental ontological question. M oreover, with this question concerning the structure of our linguistic u nderstanding we have an answer to the question concerning a narrow er and m ore fundam ental reflection on our understanding, som ething we still lacked when attem pting, in the first lecture, to char­ acterize a language-analytical conception of philosophy. In contrast with the broad sphere of the a priori, o f the clarification of meaning, we have here a narrow er sphere of reflection in which the understandingstructures already presupposed and understood in all understanding of particular linguistic expressions are to be analysed. If we define the subject-m atter of philosophy in term s o f this formal-semantic sphere of reflection, this implies the thesis that all specifically philosophical con­ cepts are concepts connected with the analysis of the semantic struc­ tures. But if we construe the enquiry into semantic form as reflection on the presuppositions of all linguistic understanding, then we cannot be con­ tent to see this question break down into as many questions as there are sem antic forms. In this respect then the question about semantic form, as hitherto form ulated, does not yet correspond to the fundam ental question of ontology; for to speak of the question about semantic form obscures the fact that one is really dealing with several questions. How are they connected? A first step suggests itself immediately: the form of the expressions of a semantic class is determ ined by which expressions of other classes they can be com bined with and by the way in which the m eaning of the expressions contributes to the m eaning of the composite expressions which thereby arise (p. 26). T he semantic form o f a class o f com po­

H as form al semantics a fundam ental question?

37

nent-expressions is thus always an abstract m om ent of the structure of the corresponding complex expressions. Now it belongs to the essence of a structural composition that it m ust term inate in units which are no longer essentially parts o f wholes, but essentially wholes of parts. In the linguistic sphere these independent units are sentences - or, to put it better, we can define sentences as follows (though this is not unproble­ matic): they are those linguistic expressions which can still enter as parts into larger linguistic units, but no longer in such a way that they are essentially components of a m ore com prehensive syntactic or semantic structure (which does not rule out that some com ponents of sentences, e.g. personal pronouns may involve a reference to com ponents of other sentences).1 T h e sentence thus seems to be the primary unit of m ean­ ing. T ru e, one can also understand parts of sentences, but one then understands them as parts of sentences; and one can only say some­ thing (etwas zu verstehen geben) with a sentence, not with a word or other sentence-part (save where these function as elliptical sentences). It follows from this that the question concerning the semantic form of a class of non-independent expressions (such as, e.g., singular terms) is always to be understood as a com ponent-question of the question concerning the semantic form o f the corresponding sentence (in this case of the predicative sentence). T h e questions concerning the seman­ tic forms of the various classes of com ponent-expressions thus enter as parts into the questions concerning the semantic forms of sentences. B ut now, because there are different sentences, the problem again arises, at the present level, o f w hether there are not just many similar questions in form al semantics, but a unitary question. Does o u r u n d er­ standing of linguistic expressions break down into the understanding of different sentence-forms or are these sentence-forms internally con­ nected? Is there such a thing as a general form o f all sentences, of which all particular sentence-form s can in some way be regarded as specifica­ tions? It would seem clear that this question cannot be decided in advance, but only in the actual elaboration of the formal-semantic anal­ yses. But it seems equally clear that the analyses must be directed towards this question if one does not wish to have different forms of understanding merely juxtaposed to one another. Accordingly, formal semantics has at least a hypothetical fundam ental question, viz. the question concerning the form of all sentences, or the connection of all sentence-form s, a question we can also form ulate thus: ‘W hat is it to understand a sentence?’ It is this question which corresponds to the question about being as being in ontology.2 All we can do at the present stage of our deliberations by way of

Introduction

38

preparation for answering this fundam ental question is to ask whether traditional ontology does not already contain a perspective on some­ thing which is common to all sentences. You may feel that it is a mistake even to surmise the presence of such a perspective, given that sentences did not even belong to the thematic of ontology. However, we have seen that ontology is an ambivalent discipline, one of whose tendencies points towards a formal semantics (though this tendency is blocked by an object-orientated counter-tendency). We may then surmise that ontology already contains a perspective on the form of sentences, par­ ticularly when one considers that Aristotle, in his ontology, was orien­ tated towards the concept o f logos - m ore precisely the logos apophantikos, the assertoric sentence. This orientation towards the assertoric sentence was connected with the thematization of the copulative ‘is’. Aristotle’s interpretation of all (singular) predicative sentences with a verbal predicate (e.g. ‘Peter swims’) as sentences with a copula and a participle (e.g. ‘Peter is swimming’)3 implies that the copula had for him the significance of the indicative verbal form as such, or the form of the composition of predicative sentences. However, this perspective on the sentence-form came to nothing, because the interest was immediately directed towards ‘beings’, the predicative contents. But most im portant o f all, because of the orientation towards ‘beings’, the singular predica­ tive sentence-form rem ained the only one considered in ontology. And this sentence itself, partly on account o f the orientation towards ‘is’ and partly on account of the interpretation of the predicates as standing for determ inations o f objects, was interpreted one-sidedly as a com pound of singular term and predicate. T h e possibility, which became so crucial for the m odern logic of relations, that sentences like ‘Peter hits Paul’ can just as well be interpreted as the combination of a so-called twoplace predicate (= classification-expression) (‘. . . hits . . .’) with an ordered pair of singular terms (‘P eter’, ‘Paul’), was not seen. T he rem aining forms of assertoric sentence were partly not perceived by Aristotle at all (such as those of complex sentences) and partly (as in the case of general sentences) regarded as ontologically irrelevant because they do not express statem ents about an object. T hus one cannot derive a perspective for the question concerning something common to all forms o f sentence from these beginnings of a theory of the predicative sentence-form; for they only deal with a single sentence-form. In certain places, however, Aristotle encountered aspects of form which, though presented by him as formal aspects of the predicative sentence, can immediately be seen to apply also to other sentences. O ne such place is his treatm ent of the Principle of Contra­

Has form al semantics a fundam ental question?

39

diction and the Law of Excluded Middle. In the context of our discus­ sion there are two respects in which Aristotle’s mode of treatm ent of these ‘most general principles’ is worthy of attention. Firstly, Aristotle finds it difficult to bring the discussion of these prin­ ciples into a systematic connection with the them atic of ontology - the doctrine of substance. T h e discussion of these principles does indeed not belong to a theory of objects. Aristotle, however, justifies his inten­ tion to deal with them in ontology on the grounds that they underlie all sciences.4 H ere then Aristotle him self encountered formal foundations of the sciences which cannot be understood objectually. N owhere does the tension between theory of objects and form al semantics, which p er­ vades the Aristotelian ontology, becom e m ore evident than here. On the one hand, Aristotle was undogm atic enough to place treatm ent of these principles, on account of their form al-universal character, in the context of the question concerning being as being. On the other hand, the discussion o f them, in Book 4, does not stand in any systematic connection with the rest of the problem atic of the Metaphysics. Secondly, it is worth noting that Aristotle presents both principles only with reference to the form of singular predicative statements. T hu s the Principle of C ontradiction takes the form : ‘the same attribute cannot at the same time and in the same respect belong and not belong to the same object’.5 In o th er places, however, Aristotle also formulates it thus: ‘it is impossible that (something) at the same time is and is not’.6 If the ‘is’ of this form ulation is understood as the copula, then this fo r­ mulation is identical with the previous one. However, this ‘is’ can also be interpreted as having the sense of th at ‘is’ which can be placed before any assertoric sentence. Instead of saying, e.g., ‘It is raining’ one can say ‘It is the case that it is raining’, and instead of saying ‘It is not rain ­ ing’ one can say ‘It is not the case th at it is raining.’ If we orientate ourselves towards this use of ‘is’, the form ulation of the Principle of Contradiction ju st m entioned would have the m eaning: ‘It is impossible for som ething at the same time to be the case and not be the case.’ We can perhaps say, provisionally, that this prefixed ‘is’ expresses the affirmative form of an assertoric sentence and the ‘is not’ expresses the negative form . T he following re-form ulation o f the last-mentioned fo r­ mulation o f the Principle o f C ontradiction would correspond to this explanation: ‘It is impossible at the same time to affirm and deny some­ thing.’ Why is it impossible? T o this we also find an answer in Aristotle. It is clearly not impossible to u tter such a sentence; it is only impossible for one to say som ething thereby, to signify som ething (etwas zu verstehen

Introduction

40

geben).1 I can elucidate this as follows: if one affirms and denies some­

thing, this is like making a move in chess and then withdrawing it, or giving som ething away and then taking it back.8 In the relevant actionrespect one has not done anything. Aristotle points out that one can only justify the Principle of C ontradiction indirectly, namely by show­ ing that whoever denies it makes speech senseless. Since this justifica­ tion no longer rests on the special form of the predicative statement, but on the m ore universal aspect of affirm ation and negation, inter­ preting the Principle of Contradiction in this m ore general way is sug­ gested by Aristotle himself. But how general is it? If the m ore general interpretation holds for all sentences whose affirmative or negative form is expressed by that prefixed ‘is’ or ‘is not’, then clearly it holds for all assertoric sentences. We find a criterion for distinguishing so-called assertoric sentences or statements from other sentences in Aristotle (though not in th e Metaphysics)', and this criterion has been accepted ever since. It is: w hether one can call what is said with the sentence true or false.9 By means of this criterion assertoric sentences are distinguished from sentences in other so-called modes, such as im perative sentences, optative sentences, interrogative sen­ tences. In contrast to this semantic criterion it m ight seem plausible to characterize assertoric sentences by reference to the syntactic criterion of the indicative verbal form . But the two criteria do not correspond. T h ere are various types, or modes of em ploym ent, of indicative sen­ tences in which one does not say som ething which can be called true or false and which, therefore, cannot be called assertoric sentences, e.g. many sentences in the 1st Person F u tu re Indicative - such as ‘1 will come’ - express not a prediction, which can turn out to be true or false, but an intention. If it makes sense to speak o f the general form of assertoric sentences, then we m ust also be able to symbolize these sentences in a general way. And if the Principle of Contradiction holds for all assertoric sentences, then it m ust be capable of being form ulated by means of this form ali­ zation. From now on I shall use, as is usual in logic, the letters ‘p \ ‘q\ Y as symbols for arbitrary assertoric sentences. In this way we arrive at the standard m odern form ulation of the Principle of Contradiction: a statem ent of the form ‘p and not^?’ is impossible (necessarily false). If we characterize what is said with a sentence (e.g ‘It is raining’) as true or false, we express this by means o f the form ulation ‘that/?’, e.g. ‘T h at it is raining is tru e’. B ut this ‘th at’ already occurred in the for­ m ulation with the prefixed ‘is’ and one can now easily see that, in the case of any sentence which one can equivalently transform into ‘It is

Has form al semantics a fundam ental question?

41

the case that/?’, one can equally well say ‘It is true that/?’. Consequently, the use of that prefixed ‘is’ extends ju st as far as, and no fu rth e r than, the use of assertoric sentences. If it is correct that the prefixed ‘is’ and ‘is not’ express the affirmative or negative form of assertoric sentences, then we can now say that the Principle of Contradiction is grounded in this general form of assertoric sentences. T he real result for our ques­ tion concerning a unitary sentence-form would of course be that here a general form, if not of all sentences then at least of all assertoric sen­ tences, seems to emerge. But does not the distinction between affirma­ tion and negation extend beyond the use of that prefixed ‘is’ and ‘is not’? Does it not apply to imperative sentences and optative sentences as well as to assertoric sentences? And would we not then have to expect a m ore general form of the Principle of Contradiction, which extends beyond the sphere of assertoric sentences? O f course m ore im portant for us than this question would be the question w hether perhaps there emerges here a general form of all sentences. Before I investigate this question (and I will not do so until the next lecture) we m ust consolidate what has so far been achieved. I wanted to pursue the question concerning a general sentence-form today only to the extent that clues to it can be derived from traditional ontology. If the reflections so far can only be supported by reference to Aristotle’s treatm ent of the Principle of Contradiction, then they have a rather slender basis in his ontology. Since ontology is orientated towards the word ‘is’, a clearer basis would be given if that prefixed ‘is’, on which I based the reflections, occurs in Aristotle himself. Now this is in fact the case. In his discussion of the various meanings of the word ‘is’ Aristotle distinguished this prefixed ‘is.’10 H e p u t forward the thesis, which a m om ent ago I merely hinted at, that with this ‘is’ it is said that some­ thing is true and with the corresponding ‘is not’ that something is false. This thesis he justifies by referring to the equivalence of ‘It is the case that/?’ to ‘It is tru e th a t/?’. Aristotle calls this meaning of being einai hos to alethes.11 We can accordingly speak of veritative being. T h e situation with regard to Aristotle’s treatm ent of veritative being resembles that with regard to his treatm ent of the Principle of C ontra­ diction. H ere too Aristotle considers only predicative sentences, although again it is clear that what he says can be applied to all asser­ toric sentences. And here too Aristotle is unsure about the systematic place of this subject in ontology. At first he states that it does not belong to metaphysics at all,12 but later on there is a short discussion of this m eaning of being.13 This discussion is directed so strongly towards the predicative sentence form that it yields little for our problematic. Only

Introduction

42

one thing is of interest: Aristotle arrives here at a differentiation within veritative being which relates to the so-called modalities of being (pos­ sibility, actuality, necessity). In his detailed discussion of possibility and actuality in th e Metaphysics, on the other hand, Aristotle treats them as modalities of copulative being; and this means: in an objectual m anner. T he word ‘possible’, e.g., is not understood in such a way that, like the veritative ‘is’, it is prefixed to the assertoric sentence (and we must add: to an arbitrary assertoric sentence) (‘It is possible that/?’), but in such a way that one must say a is possibly F \ thus in such a way that it is the objects that are possibly or actually such-and-such. In the ontological tradition possibility, actuality and necessity have been called ‘modalities of being’; but because of the orientation towards objects one could not see that the being of which they are modalities is veritative being. But what, you will ask, is this veritative being? From Aristotle we get no fu rth er inform ation on this question. However, we must not over­ look the fact that in this connection too Aristotle speaks not only of ‘to be’, but also o f ‘being’. Is the veritative ‘is’ the ‘is’ of an object? This con­ ception may not seem mistaken, inasmuch as the grammatical trans­ form ation o f (p ’ into ‘that /?’ m ust be conceived as nominalization. Although the expression ‘that it is raining’ still seems to have the same content as the assertoric sentence ‘It is raining’, ‘that it is raining’ is not a sentence; it is a singular term . We can tell this from the fact that ‘that/?’ requires supplem entation by a (higher-level) predicate in order to become once m ore a whole sentence, e.g. ‘T h at it is raining/is tru e ’, ‘T h at it is raining/is pleasant.’ We must also include here such rela­ tional supplem entations as ‘he /hopes/that p ’, ‘he/believes/that/?’. Now if ‘that/?’ is a singular term , then we will have to say that every such expression stands for an object. Clearly, from any sentence ‘that p/F y we can infer ‘som ething/F’. Now what sort of objects are they for which the nominalized form of an assertoric sentence stands? Instead of saying ‘It is the case that/?’ we can also say ‘It is a fact that/?.’ This circumstance might suggest the view that the objects in question are facts. However, this would be a mistake. For in the negative case we say ‘It is not a fact that/?.’ H ere we still have to do with the object in ques­ tion, but deny that it is a fact. T h a t it snowed yesterday is a fact only if it is true that yesterday it snowed. We obviously use the predicate ‘is a fact’ as equivalent in m eaning to the predicate ‘is true’. We must, th ere­ fore, ask: what are these objects that are designated by an expression of the form ‘that/?’ (and which are only facts if they are true) in and for themselves? T h at which can be true or false and which, if it is true, is a fact, is what is asserted when we u tter an assertoric sentence. So it seems

H as form al semantics a fundam erital question ?

43

that we can characterize the objects in question as what is said or asserted. This also seems to correspond to our ordinary use of lan­ guage. We ask, e.g., ‘Is what he asserted (said) true? Is it a fact?’ In English philosophy the term of art ‘proposition’ has been adopted for what I here designate as what is said (das Gesagte). Frege called these objects ‘thoughts’. As this word is used by Frege ‘thought’ is not to be understood in the sense of thinking, but ra th e r in the sense of what is thought. Perhaps this designation ‘what is th o u g h t’ or ‘the thought’ is m ore attractive to you than my linguistic talk of ‘what is said’. But p e r­ haps you will also be unhappy with Frege’s designation and say: ‘All these designations of the object in question, w hether as “what is said” or “what is thou g h t”, characterize it merely subjectively as “what is m eant by us”; but we would like to know what it is in itself.’ Although I doubt w hether this dem and is justified, I shall for the present accede to it. As a m atter of fact, there is also a term inology for the objects in question which is free of all subjective connotations: they are referred to by Husserl, and in W ittgenstein’s Tractatus, as ‘states of affairs’ (Sach­ verhalte). Thus, according to this conception, every nominalized asser­ toric sentence ‘that /?’ stands for a state of affairs. W ittgenstein then proceeded to define a fact as the ‘obtaining’ (Bestehen) of a state of affairs.14 With this we would have reached a conception which suggests that the veritative ‘is’ is to be construed as the being (Sein) of an object, as a mode of existence (Existenz), namely as the obtaining (Bestehen) of a state of affairs. O f course this obtaining would be a strange kind of existence. For one will have to say even of states of affairs which we do not obtain, hence states of affairs that are not facts, that, as states of affairs, they somehow exist; for otherwise we could not talk about them . One could try (and it has been tried) to dispose of this difficulty by attributing to states of affairs ano th er sort of being which they have in themselves whether or not they also obtain. B ut the real difficulty sets in earlier, namely, in the question: what then is a state of affairs? O ne can see nicely from this exam ple how the allegedly thing-orientated thinking and language-analytical thinking com pare. T h e re are people who breathe a sigh of relief when offered the term ‘state of affairs’ for the objects for which expressions of the form ‘th at/?’ stand. But the alleg­ edly language-independent object is then som ething merely suggested by the word. It is the linguistic analyst who first establishes the relation to the thing (Sachbezug) by not being content with the word and asking what is m eant by it. W hat then is m eant by it? Just try to answer this question w ithout referrin g to sentences and their meanings! I cannot

Introduction

44

yet deal with this question adequately. As yet we lack the categorial means for tackling a question concerning a kind of objects. Also I shall only later (Lecture 10) show in what way the attem pts by Husserl and W ittgenstein to construe the object-character of states o f affairs without reference to language must be regarded as having failed. In these pre­ liminary reflections we are not yet trying to solve the problems, but simply to arrive at a correct way of posing the problems. At certain points then I will have to be satisfied if an idea seems sufficiently plau­ sible for you to be p rep ared to follow me further. In the case of the present4question it m ust suffice if I say: the concep­ tion of veritative being as the obtaining o f states of affairs at any rate does not correspond to our ordinary ways of talking, and seems merely to arise from a traditional tendency to assimilate this being to the exis­ tence o f perceptible objects. O ne can, if one insists, speak of the obtain­ ing of a state o f affairs. But if one asks for the criterion for deciding whether a state o f affairs obtains or not, one will have to say: the state of affairs that (e.g.) it snowed yesterday obtains if and only if it is true that it snowed yesterday. And it is true that it snowed yesterday if and only if it snowed yesterday. T h u s talk of the obtaining of a state of affairs points back to the u n derstanding of the unm odified, not yet nom inalized, sentence. We had the following series o f equivalences: (1) the state of affairs that/? obtains = (2) that/? is a fact = (3) it is the case that/? = (4) that/? is true = (5) /?. Now if the m eaning of (2) is not explicated by (1), but the m eaning of (2), and hence that of (1), by (4) and (5), then clearly we also cannot explicate the m eaning of (3), hence the m eaning of verita­ tive being, in term s o f its equivalence with (2) and (1), but only in terms of its equivalence with (4) and (5). Let us begin with (4) and (5). However unclear the m eaning of ‘that /?’ still is to us, this m uch seems clear: that the nominalized sentence ‘that/?’ contains not m ore than the original sentence *p\ but less. W hat was rem oved from the sentence ‘/?’ in the transform ation into the sin­ gular term ‘that/?’ is what we can call its assertion-m om ent. If instead of saying ‘Yesterday it snowed’ one simply says ‘that it snowed yester­ day’, one refers to what was asserted in the preceding utterance; but in such a way that one no longer asserts it. If one only says ‘that it snowed yesterday’ then, in contrast to when one says ‘It snowed yesterday’ one does not yet signify (zu verstehen geben) anything; rather, by rem oving the assertion-m om ent, one creates, so to speak, an empty-place for other supplem entations, in which other position-takings vis-a-vis the same state of affairs, which was previously asserted, can be expressed,

Has formal semantics a fundam ental question ?

45

e.g. ‘that p - is doubtful’, ‘that/? - I regard as im probable’, etc. Now there is one such predicative supplem entation the significance of which appears to be that it gives back to the expression precisely what was taken away by its nominalization. This is the supplem entation by the predicate ‘is tru e’. For if one supplem ents ‘that/?’ with ‘- is tru e’, one says again precisely the same as one said with ‘/?’. From this it seems to follow that the predicate ‘is tru e ’ expresses the assertion-moment. In the original expression ‘/?’ there is no sign for expressing the assertionm om ent. But because the equivalence ‘/? = that/? is tru e ’ holds, we can now say that the m eaning of ‘/?’ is composed of a propositional content and the assertion-m om ent, and that the propositional content corre­ sponds to what is expressed in the nominalized form by ‘that/?’. You will ask: how is this assertion-m om ent to be understood? I can­ not yet answer this question here; the answer again belongs to the elab­ oration rath er than to the exposition of the problematic (cf. Lectures 15 and 28). Provisionally, I think I can assume that you have a vague understanding of what is m eant by the assertion of something, as opposed to o ther position-takings, such as supposition, doubt, etc. of the same state of affairs. But one thing it would seem can be inferred from the reflections ju st carried out, and this is that the assertionmom ent, because it can be expressed in the predicate ‘is tru e’, contains a truth-claim . W hoever utters an assertoric sentence asserts something (e.g. that it is raining) and always also thereby asserts that what he asserts (e.g. that it is raining) is true. Now if the veritative ‘is’ is used as equivalent to the predicate ‘is tru e ’, then it follows that this ‘is’ also expresses the assertion-m om ent of the statem ent, and that this assertion-m om ent is to be understood as a truth-claim. This result can now be directly linked with the explication of this ‘is’ I gave in the discussion of the Principle of Contradiction, viz. that it expresses the affirmative form of the statement. T h e difficulty which arose there: that this description is too general, because it also applies to non-assertoric sentences, would now be removed. For we can now say: the affirmative form of the sentence, in the special case of the assertoric sentence, has the significance of an assertion; and this is a definition of the class of assertoric sentences by a characterization of their form . This definition, of course, is very closely connected with the criterion that we have previously found, viz. that a sentence is an asser­ toric sentence if one can call what is said with it true or false. T he p re ­ sent definition, on the other hand, says that a sentence is an assertoric sentence if it is used in such a way that a truth-claim is thereby m ade. We can of course easily bring out the connection between the two cri­

Introduction

46

teria by saying: only in so far as the use of a sentence already contains a truth-claim can what is said with it be called true or false. But now the following difficulty suggests itself. I had previously dis­ tinguished the affirmative sentence-form from the negative. But the truth-claim , or the assertion-character, is supposed to belong to all assertoric sentences and hence also to negative assertoric sentences. Does this not show that the subordination of the assertion-form to the affirmative form is mistaken? W here does the mistake lie? Have I, p er­ haps, in the introduction of the truth-claim , based myself one-sidedly on the affirmative assertoric sentences and lost sight of veritative notbeing? But what would this mean? Should we say that negative sen­ tences, or sentences o f the form ‘It is not the case that/?’, make a falsityclaim? ‘It is not the case that/?’ is clearly equivalent to ‘T h a t p is false’; so one can indeed say that with a sentence of this form it is asserted that what is said with *p* is false. But ‘It is not the case that/?’ is, of course, equivalent, not to ‘p \ but to ‘not-/?’. With ‘It is not the case that/?’, th ere­ fore, the falsity of the opposite statem ent is asserted; and this is only possible because here too the statem ent asserts its own truth. T hus the use of any assertoric sentence, w hether or not a ‘not’ occurs in it, involves a truth-claim . And that in the use o f any assertoric sentence something is asserted is clear anyway. A lthough one can assert the opposite, one cannot do som ething that is the opposite of asserting. We thus find ourselves forced to look for the e rro r on the o ther side. T he assumption that there is an affirmative and a negative sentence-form, or that affirm ation and negation are on a level, cannot be correct. Firstly, it is not possible to divide sentences into affirmative and neg­ ative. T ru e, for every assertoric sentence there is an opposite sentence. But there is no general criterion by which we could tell which of the two is the negative one; for the criterion that that sentence is negative in which a negation-sign occurs is of only limited application. Frege gives as an example the sentence ‘Christ is im m ortal.’15 It is, of course, the negation of the sentence ‘Christ is m ortal’; but it appears not to be meaningful to say that it is intrinsically negative, or, as I incautiously said, that it has a ‘negative form ’. T h e predicate ‘is im m ortal’ is as ‘pos­ itive’ as the predicate ‘is.m ortal’. It may seem negative because it is equivalent to ‘is not m ortal’; but the predicate ‘is m ortal’ can equally well seem negative because it is equivalent to ‘does not live forever’.16 Thus we cannot regard negation as a property which belongs to a sentence; rather we m ust construe it as an operation which, when applied to a sentence, generates the opposite sentence. But what is it that is negated, or to what is the operation o f negation applied? As both

Has formal semantics a fundam ental question?

47

assertoric sentences - e.g. ‘It is rain in g ’ and ‘It is'n o t raining’ - are assertoric, one cannot construe the second sentence as though what is negated is the assertion o f the first; rath er w hat is negated is what the first asserts, its propositional content. If we symbolize the assertionm om ent o f ‘p ’ with Frege’s assertion-sign V , and the non-nom inalized propositional content of with */?*, then our two sentences have the form V*/?*’ and V *not-/?*’ rather than the form V */?*’ and ‘not h *p*\ T h at the negation-sign pertains only to the propositional content can also be reinforced, following Frege, by considering the role of negation in com ponent-sentences of complex sentences.17 W hen sentences enter as com ponent-sentences into a com plex sentence then, even if they are not nom inalized, they lose their assertion-m om ent; only the whole sen­ tence is asserted. Let us take e.g. the sentence-form ‘p or q\ It is obvious that here only the complex sentence as a whole is asserted, and that it would contradict the sense of such an ‘o r’-sentence if the two com po­ nent-sentences were also asserted. T hus the two com ponent-sentences lack the assertion-m om ent when they occur in this form of sentence, though th ere is no symbol for this lack in natural language. But this is only possible if (since the assertion-m om ent is absent) the ‘not’ belongs to the propositional content. This arg u m en t can only be evaded by the outlandish thesis that the word ‘n o t’ has a different m eaning when it occurs in an in d ep en d en t sentence and when the same sentence func­ tions as a com ponent-sentence. But is it not then misleading, you will ask, to continue to refer to assertion as affirmation? T he notion of an affirm ation seems essentially related to a denial. However, one can acknowledge such a correlation without contradicting the results ju st achieved. We simply have to rem ove an ambiguity in speaking of denial and negation. For every propositional content *p* there is always one opposed to it (*not-/?*), which we get by negating the first. T o avoid ambiguities we can reserve the word ‘negation’ for this. If one asserts (assertorically affirms) this second propositional content (*not-/?*) one can call this the denial of the affirm ation of the first propositional content (*/?*) and, again to avoid ambiguity, one can reserve the word ‘denial’ for this. Denial, as thus understood, is, therefore, the assertoric affirm ation of a negated propositional content; and this m eans: of a propositional content which is negative relative to another. T h u s the denial, which is itself an affir­ mation, is opposed to another affirm ation. It is in this way that we must also u n d erstan d the words ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (for the time being I shall disregard their non-assertoric use). We use these words in conversation when the propositional content which is

Introduction

48

affirm ed or denied has already been expressed by a preceding assertion or question, so that the reply does not need to repeat the propositional content and can restrict itself to the mere affirm ation or denial. Again it is easily overlooked that with the ‘no’ too som ething is affirm ed, viz. the opposite propositional content. If we use the symbol ’ to indicate that the propositional content which is at issue is the one that had been m entioned in the conversation, then the assertoric ‘yes’ has the form ’ and the assertoric ‘no’ the form V not Now if every denial is an affirm ation which is opposed to another affirm ation, then it also follows that every affirmation is opposed to another affirm ation - namely, its denial, the affirm ation of the opposite propositional content. Every ‘n o ’ expresses a position-taking against a ‘yes’. Does every ‘yes’ also express a position-taking against a ‘no’? If it is correct that one cannot divide sentences into intrinsically positive and intrinsically negative then this is clearly how we must view it. Thus, understanding the assertion-m om ent as affirm ation turns out to be cor­ rect. Every assertion is a position-taking against the one opposed to it; only this position-taking is not m ade explicit as it is in denial. Later I shall try to show that without consideration of this property - being a position-taking against - one cannot understand the m ode of employ­ m ent o f assertoric sentences and their various forms (Lectures 15, 17, 27). T hus from the fact that what is negated is always only the proposi­ tional content and not the assertion, it in no way follows that the assertion-m om ent is untouched by the negation. On the contrary. T hat the utterance o f an assertoric sentence has the character of an assertion, and hence o f an affirm ative position-taking, would be meaningless if the propositional content were not opposed to one that negated it. Now w here do we stand with respect to our question concerning a unitary form of all sentences? We have arrived at a form which is common to at least all assertoric sentences: (1) they have the structure ‘t- */?*’ and con­ nected with this structure is the fact that (2) for every *p* there is a *not-/?*. W hereas the first part of this symbolization represents som e­ thing that rem ains the same for every assertoric sentence, behind the second part, the symbol */?*, is concealed the entire multiplicity of struc­ tures of the propositional content. A unitary understanding of the form of assertoric sentences would only be achieved if a connection of the various structures of the propositional content were also to become vis­ ible. But so far it is n o t even clear how one is to enquire into the p ro p ­ ositional structures. I do not intend to pursue this aspect of the problem

Has form al semantics a fundam ental question?

49

any fu rth er in the introductory reflections; it will be our central concern in the main part of the lectures. But I would also not wish to give the impression that with the re fer­ ence to the assertion-m om ent and the negateability o f propositional content this structure that is comm on to all forms of assertoric sen­ tences is already explained. T he aim of this lecture was not to find an answer to the question concerning the form of assertoric sentences (and perhaps of all sentences), but simply to investigate w hether there is a unitary form at all which would be amenable to such a question. At present we only know that the question: what is it to understand an assertoric sentence? aims at three structural m oments and their inner connection: (1) what is it to understand an assertoric affirmation? (2) what is it to understand a propositional content? (3) what is it to u n d e r­ stand the word ‘not’?

LECTURE 5

Consciousness and speech

If Aristotle or the tradition which followed him had taken veritative being as the guiding thread of their investigation, then there would have developed, within the fram ew ork of ontology, a semantics of the assertoric sentence-form . Instead o f this, however, the problematic, which Aristotle had at least touched upon, becam e unrecognizable in the shape of the inadequate doctrine of th everum as another ‘transcen­ dental’ determ ination o f ens, together with unum and aliquid, a doctrine in which the veritative m eaning of ‘is’ was assimilated to the others and thereby finally objectified. M oreover for mediaeval ontology the start­ ing-point for the dem onstration of the universality of being was no longer the usage of ‘is’ but the thesis that the determ ination ens is the first determ ination that is given to the m ind.1 How this proposition, which, to the im partial observer, must appear far from evident, indeed unintelligible, could be regarded as suprem ely evident by an entire tra ­ dition, can be explained only by reference to the concept of represen­ tation (Vorstellen) which I shall exam ine at the end of this lecture. W here the Aristotelian ontology, and indeed the entire traditional ontology from Parm enides to Hegel, came closest to veritative being was in the assum ption th at the question of being is always connected with the question of not-being. How far from obvious this is can be seen immediately one considers that a theory which started out from objects or from that mediaeval conception of ens would have no occasion to them atize the ‘not’. T h e opposition o f being and not-being is (as we could already see in connection with the Principle of Contradiction) an opposition that belongs to veritative being ju st as much as the so-called modalities of being; and other meanings of ‘is’ (such as that of the cop­ ula or existence) only participate in this opposition because they are species of veritative being.2 O n the oth er hand, our traditional orien­ tation towards the opposition being - not-being contributes to our ten­

Consciousness and speech

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dency to place denial on a level with affirm ation and to overlook the peculiar status3 of the ‘n o t’ m the sentence-form . W hat we were able to achieve in the previous lecture in connection with veritative being was a form al characterization of all assertoric sen­ tences. T his provided us with a fundam ental question for the semantics of assertoric sentence-form s. If in the question concerning a form al universal science we orientate ourselves tow ards the Aristotelian startingpoint, nam ely towards the question concerning the form al p resu p p o ­ sitions o f all sciences, then with the form al semantics of assertoric sen­ tences we have already achieved our aim, for in the sciences only assertoric sentences occur (at m ost-one would have to add in terro g a­ tive sentences). On the oth er hand, once one has en tered the sphere of form al semantics it would be artificial to restrict the thematic field to asserto­ ric sentences, since such a restriction would be incompatible with this form al science’s claim to universality. It thus seems plausible no longer to sketch the form al them atic o f the sought-for universal science by reference to the sciences but by taking as o n e ’s point of dep artu re, as I did in the previous lecture (p. 36), o u r u n d erstan d in g o f linguistic expressions in general. But then we are faced with the question: how can we extend the unified perspective we have achieved for the inves­ tigation o f assertoric sentences in such a way that it can be understood as the unified perspective for the investigation of all forms of sen­ tences? Assertoric sentences are contrasted with im peratives, optative sen­ tences and interrogative sentences. I leave undecided w hether this list of other sentence-form s is com plete and systematically significant. And I shall not now give a semantic criterion for these classifications.4 It is usual to rely on gram m atical criteria such as m ode o f verb, word-position and intonation. T his is an indication o f how little attention has hitherto been given in philosophical semantics to non-assertoric sen­ tences. O ne can see in this an effect o f the traditional ontology. W hereas Aristotle had with veritative being ju st en tered the dim ension of assertoric semantics, non-assertoric semantics seem to lie completely outside the scope o f an ontology - unless one understands the o rien ­ tation towards ‘is’ as an orientation not ju s t towards the indicative form of this verb, but towards all its modes. Such an orientation has never been developed in the traditional elaboration o f the question of being; b u t it would be conceivable.5 Ju st as we can transform an asser­ toric sentence into a prefixed ‘it is the case’ followed by the nominalization of the sentence, so we can clearly also transform an im perative

Introduction

52

sentence (e.g. ‘Let him come!’) into a prefixed ‘let it be the case’ fol­ lowed by the nom inalized form ‘that he comes!’, or, e.g., the interro­ gative sentence ‘Is he coming?’ into ‘Is it the case that he is coming?’ This gives us a fundam ental insight into the structure of non-asser­ toric sentences: ju st like assertoric sentences they can be divided into an affirm ation-m om ent and a propositional content; and in their case too the propositional content without the affirm ation-m om ent can be expressed by m eans o f the nominalized locution ‘that p ’. But not only do non-assertoric sentences also have a propositional content; one can also see immediately that one and the same propositional content can occur in an assertoric sentence and in the various non-assertoric modes o f sentence; e.g. ‘He is com ing’, ‘Let him come!’ ‘If only he would com e’, ‘Is he coming?’ all clearly have the same propositional content and only differ with respect to mode. T h ere is thus confirmed what initially did not seem to follow necessarily, namely, that we must regard the sem antic form o f non-nom inalized assertoric sentences as also com posed o f an affirm ation-m om ent and a propositional content; although the propositional content is not grammatically isolable. Only this structure makes intelligible the connection between ‘He is com ing’, ‘Let him come!’ etc. It thus em erges that the sentence-forms of the various sentence-m odes only differ with respect to their mode, whereas the other element, the propositional content (thus that ele­ m ent which is the bearer of all fu rth er formal-semantic sub-struc­ tures), is com mon to all sentence-form s (with of course certain quali­ fications, such as, th at im peratives can only refer to something in the fu tu re).6 In this way then one arrives at a unitary structure of all sentences, which one can symbolize by ‘M */?*’, where ‘M ’ is a variable which is to be replaced by the symbols for the various modes e.g. by V for the assertion-m om ent, which gives us the already familiar Similarly one can e.g. write ‘!*p*’ for the im perative and for the inter­ rogative sentence. B ringing in non-assertoric sentences also provides additional confir­ mation for the view that the ‘n o t’ belongs to the propositional content. T he im perative ‘Do not come!’ dem ands the realization of the same state of affairs whose truth is asserted by the assertoric sentence ‘You will not com e.’ T h e im perative denial also has the form ‘!*not -/>*’ and is thus the im perative affirm ation of a negated propositional content. Only in passing shall I m ention the problem of so-called ‘external’ negation, i.e. negation in such sentences as ‘I do not order that p .’1 Such so-called ‘perform ative’ sentence-form s, though they have the

Consciousness and speech

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grammatical form of assertoric sentences, are not assertoric sentences. For in u ttering them one is not only asserting something; one is at the same time doing what they assert (e.g. when I say ‘I o rder . . .’ I am not (only) asserting that I am ordering; I am ordering).8 Now if one could assimilate ‘I assert th at/?’ and ‘I o rd er th at/?’ to ‘p y and ‘!*/?*’ then ‘I do not assert that /?’ and ‘I do not o rd e r that /?’ would clearly have the form ‘not h */?*’and ‘not ! */?*’. O ne may doubt w hether this assimilation is correct and w hether the semantics of performatives is not ultimately to be understood in term s of the semantics of assertoric sentences, so that one would again arrive at a unitary conception of negation. In any case external negation does not occur in the case of the non-nominalized sentences ‘/?’, *!*/?*’, etc. However, by reference to perform atives one can see what meaning a sentence of the form ‘not-M*/?*’ would have and in this way convince oneself again that negative assertoric sentences, imperatives, etc., do not have this form. Must we also regard the non-assertoric modes as a form of affir­ mation? Do they too have the character of a position-taking against an opposing affirmation? For this view speaks the fact that the Principle of Contradiction clearly also holds for non-assertoric sentences and that one can justify it h ere in exactly the same way as in the case of assertoric sentences. If one says ‘Come here and do not come h ere’ one has said nothing. With the second step one has cancelled the first. A nd of course there is also an im perative use of ‘yes’ and ‘no’. How­ ever, even in the case of the explicitly negative sentence (‘Do not come!’) it seems less clear that it is to be construed as position-takingagainst; for such an utterance seems directed not against another utterance but against an action. Only if it could be shown that the negative im perative is really directed against an opposite imperative by which the action is being directed would it be clear that it is to be construed as the denial of an affirm ation. And then of course it would be plausible also to construe the im perative which does not contain a ‘not’, precisely as in the case of the assertoric sentence, as affirmation; and that means as position-taking against the imperatival affirmation of the opposite propositional content. T he question of w hether the various non-assertoric modes can be construed as modes of affirma­ tion can, therefore, ju st as in the case of the assertoric mode, in the end only be decided by actually carrying out the semantics of these form s of sentence. Only in the case of interrogative sentences can one see in advance that they do not conform to this schema. A lthough they too have a negatable propositional content, it seems not to be m eaningful to

Introduction

54

describe the two interrogative sentences which have an opposed prop­ ositional content as being themselves opposed. It would be m ore cor­ rect to say that in both questions ‘Is he coming?’, ‘Is he not coming?’ one and the same thing is being asked. But it is also easy to see why interrogative sentences occupy this special position. A question is a dem and that a sentence be uttered, within a range specified by the interrogative sentence,9 normally an assertoric sentence or, if there are specifically practical questions (cf. Lecture 7), an imperative. Thus the only reason why interrogative sentences are not affirmative is that they contain the dem and for an affirm ation, a position-taking. Con­ sequently these non-affirm ative sentences do not constitute a counter­ example, to the result that is now em erging, viz. that yes/no positiontaking is fundam ental to the use of all sentences with a propositional content. Do all our sentences have this form? Clearly there are also independent units of com m unication which have no propositional content, e.g. ‘ow’, ‘h u rra h ’, ‘thanks’, ‘hello’. But such expressions do not exhibit any semantic structures (or only very rudim entary ones). We shall see later that the analysis of the m eaning of such situationrelated expressions presents far fewer difficulties than the analysis of propositional sentences. O ne can therefore say that the question con­ cerning the understan d in g of our linguistic expressions, though not completely reducible, is in essence reducible to the question of the understanding of sign-form ations of the form 'M *p*\ And so the fun­ dam ental question of form al semantics as a whole can be directly join ed to the fundam ental question o f the semantics of assertoric sen­ tences presented at the end of the previous lecture; only in place of the question about the u n derstanding of V’ one has the question about the u nderstanding of the various modes and their interconnection. T he fundam ental question is: how is it that our entire linguistic understanding has the structure of yes/no-position-takings of various modes vis-a-vis propositional contents? O f course, w hether one can speak of a unitary structure and not simply of common structural mom ents is still an open question. B ut at least we now know in what answering it positively would consist: firstly, in the dem onstration o f a systematic connection o f the structures o f the propositional content (p. 48) and, secondly, in the dem onstration o f a systematic connection between the different modes. With this I can conclude this prelim inary sketch of a form al sem an­ tics as the language-analytical successor-discipline to ontology in its capacity as form al universal science. We do not yet know anything

Consciousness and speech

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about the conceptuality and m ethods with which such an enquiry can be tackled; in the m ain part of these lectures I shall likewise attem pt to p u rsu e this enquiry by way of a step-by-step destruction of the con­ ceptuality available from the tradition. At present I am only trying to m ark out a them atic field that can be claimed as the field of a science which is somehow pre-em inent and for this reason merits the title ‘philosophy’. In o rd e r to restore the connection with this o ur principal question and to p rep are the next step I can now sum m arize the criticism that can be brought against the Aristotelian conception of a pre-em inent science as ontology in the following way. Firstly, one can call this con­ ception in question absolutely, i.e. with respect to m otivation (p. 18). It will be in the context of the guiding idea of ‘reason’ that I shall first attem pt to introduce a conception of philosophy absolutely, that is to say by reference to a pre-em inent m otivation and not on the basis of a prelim inary u n d erstan d in g o f the w ord ‘philosophy’ (Lecture 7). Secondly, one can criticize the conception of philosophy as ontology relative to the prelim inary u n d erstan d in g which Aristotle takes as his starting-point. O ne could then question the idea of form alization. If this is to be m easured against A ristotle’s own prelim inary conception, then the question arises: with what right is one of the two aspects of the prelim inary conception, viz. the radicalization o f the justificatory character of science, left out? I shall likewise be taking up this aspect u n d e r the heading ‘reason’. T hirdly, one can also criticize the ontolog­ ical conception from the point o f view of the o th er aspect of A ristotle’s prelim inary conception, viz. th at of universality. It was this third aspect which led us to envisage the b ro ader disci­ pline of a form al semantics in place of ontology. So far then the only thing to recom m end the idea of a form al semantics as a pre-em inent science is essentially the fact th at it is m ore com prehensive than ontol­ ogy. If we continue to orientate ourselves prim arily towards this aspect of universality one could ask: if it has now been shown that ontology is surpassed in its universality-claim by form al semantics, what gu ar­ antee have we that form al semantics will not in tu rn be surpassed in its universality-claim by an o th er discipline? O ne could argue that the sense of form alization which em erged from the analysis o f the concept of an object is only significant with reference to sentences and that, consequently, the idea of an extension of the form al discipline beyond the sphere of sentences does not make sense. I adm it that I am inclined to this view. However, we m ust be on our guard against dogm atism here. In the linguistic interpretation of

Introduction

56

A ristotle’s form al reflection-step I stressed that I must initially leave open the question of w hether this is the only possible way of u n d er­ standing this step. M oreover, it seems undeniable that linguistic understanding is not reducible to the understanding of isolated sen­ tences. Sentences are the smallest units of communication; but these belong - both in science and elsewhere - to larger contexts of com­ m unication and understanding. T hese contexts rem ain unexam ined if we confine ourselves to the form of sentences. A thematic orientated towards sentences, ju st like one orientated towards objects, favours an atomistic approach. It is for this reason that there has recently arisen, un d er the title ‘pragm atics’, a discipline which seeks to transcend this lim itation.10 Also, the question arises of w hether we should leave out of account all modes of consciousness and experience which are not expressed in sentences. This question opens up a new perspective. It subsumes the u nderstanding of linguistic expressions under the con­ cept of consciousness and thus holds out the prospect of a broadening of the field of form alization, although off-hand it is not clear w hether a formalization of non-linguistic experience makes sense, or what should take the place of formalization. In consciousness we encounter the second traditional guiding-idea with which I wanted to confront the language-analytical conception of philosophy (p. 13). T he orientation towards consciousness character­ istic o f classical m odern philosophy has - like the language-analytical conception - been understood as a critical extension of ontology. T he relationship to ontology of philosophy of consciousness and linguistic analysis is in a certain way analogous. In both cases, and in contrast to the theory of objects, the new philosophical approach arises out of reflection. In the philosophy of consciousness this is represented as. reflection on the experience or consciousness of objects; in semantics as reflection on the sentences in which objects are spoken about. Phi­ losophy of consciousness and language-analytical philosophy thus app ear as com peting undertakings, each of which can claim to out­ reach the other. All consciousness of an object is always a com ponent of the u nderstanding of a sentence. On the other hand, the philoso­ phy of consciousness can argue that all sentence-understanding is merely one m ode of consciousness am ong others. An introduction to language-analytical philosophy will therefore have to include a confrontation with the philosophy of consciousness. As in the debate with ontology the concern is just as much with addi­ tional insights into the n atu re of language-analytical philosophy as with the justification of the language-analytical conception of philoso­

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phy. T h e link between the debate with ontology and the debate with the philosophy of consciousness is this: reflection on consciousness opens up a perspective which appears to outbid the universality-claim of the language-analytical conception. In o rd er to be able to carry through this debate with the philosophy of consciousness we m ust first get an idea - obviously a very simplified and schematic one - of the positions of the philosophy of conscious­ ness relevant to our problematic. This we shall do by examining how ontology was m ade into a problem, and its point of departure extended, by reflection on consciousness. I shall present this develop­ ment of the philosophy of consciousness, in contrast to ontology, in the form of three successive and increasingly radical steps. Having done this we shall then have to ask what the consequences are of each of these three steps for the language-analytical conception, or what the consequences are of a language-analytical conception for these three steps. T he first step is that which we can call the Cartesian step. Historically it was with this step that the turn from ontology to consciousness began. It resulted from a re tu rn to that aspect of the Aristotelian preliminary conception of philosophy which Aristotle him self had neglected in his ontological interpretation of this prelim inary conception, viz. the aspect of grounding and justification. T h e question o f justification in the sci­ ences concerns their assertions in so far as they make a claim to knowl­ edge. B ut knowledge is ultimately always knowledge of an individual. It always concerns som ething which someone believes. We say that he not only believes it, but knows it, if he can justify it. We also say then that he is certain of what he believes, that it is indubitable for him. Justification consists in an explicit elimination of possible doubts. In the question of doubt and certainty everyone finds himself thrown back upon him self: one can have one’s attention draw n to possible doubts by others, but the doubting itself and the corresponding certainty is a state of the individual. Now Descartes pointed out that this state of doubt or certainty itself cannot be doubted by the person whose state it is at the time he is in that state. It then tu rn ed out that there is a whole class of states - believing, wishing, intending, feeling, etc. - which are indubit­ able for the person who is in them . If one asks by what this class is defined perhaps the only criterion is precisely this: that the person whose states they are has, at the time in which he is in them , an in d u ­ bitable knowledge that he is in them . This criterion gives us a first broad concept of consciousness (we shall later become acquainted with a sec­ ond, m ore narrow concept). It now seemed plausible to interpret this

Introduction

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sphere of consciousness as som ething inner which is somehow im m e­ diately given to the individual, thus to ‘m e’ (to the ‘ego’, as was now said). A nd fu rth er it seemed plausible to assume that I know everything outer and dubitable somehow by means of what is inwardly given and indubitable. T he radicalization of the question of justification thus leads to (1) the conception of the inner as som ething indubitable and (2) the question of how som ething outer is given to me, how it can be known by me. This question was called the epistemological question. This first step in the philosophy of consciousness - the Cartesian, epistemological one - does not yet imply any extension of ontology. It signifies vis-a-vis ontology only a new centre of gravity of enquiry: before the question concerning being as such there is placed the ques­ tion concerning its accessibility. T he ontological structures can rem ain untouched. However, the question of accessibility can affect the ontological ques­ tions themselves. W here this happens there results the second step, the so-called transcendental-philosophical turn. This step consists in this: the question of the mode of givenness of objects is no longer regarded merely as a question about certainty but as constitutive for the object­ hood of objects. We can clarify this thesis o f transcendental philosophy most easily by reference to H usserl’s conception of regional ontologies, a conception I have already touched on in the introduction of the ontological posi­ tion. At the time I pointed out that the fundam ental concepts which characterize a sphere of objects as such - concepts such as ‘material thing’, ‘state of consciousness’, ‘num ber’ - are not merely of gradually higher generality than the concepts which belong to the object-sphere; they are fundam entally different from them. If there are fundam en­ tally distinct object-spheres which are not simply sub-divisions of one universal realm o f being, this m ust be because there are not only objects of different kinds in the distinct object-spheres, but objects whose mode of objecthood is different. Now for a philosophy which does not yet reflect on language there is only one possible interpretation of this state of affairs. T he distinctions in question are not distinctions of the objects and their contents; they can therefore only concern the m ode of giv­ enness of objects. For Husserl the form o f objecthood is constituted in the form of m ode of givenness of these objects (Ideen hi §7). C orre­ spondingly one can also, according to H usserl, only clarify the sense of objecthood as such in a transcendental study of givenness. We find a basically similar position in Kant, only with the difference that Kant does not thematize objecthood as such. N or does he distin­

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guish different spheres of object; he is concerned only with the object­ hood of the objects of experience in space and time. As with Husserl the possibility of experience is, for Kant, constitutive of the objecthood of objects. T h a t is the sense of the celebrated statement: ‘T h e conditions o f the possibility of experience as such are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects o f experience.’11 With this second step, then, the reflection on consciousness has an effect on ontology itself. Ontological analysis is now conceived as the analysis o f the possibility of experience or of what makes it possible that objects as such and the objects o f the various regions can be given. But as I have presented the transcendental-philosophical position so far it still rem ains d ep endent on ontology in that it allows the latter to furnish it with its fundam ental concept, that of an object. T h e transcendental turn merely brings it about th at what was already the theme, object­ hood, is now analysed in a new way; but the them atic field is not thereby extended. This extension of the them atic field by reflection on consciousness is the third step. T h e latter consists in this, that by reflecting on conscious­ ness the orientation towards objects is transcended, for it emerges that there are modes o f consciousness which cannot be understood as con­ sciousness of an object. Historically this step is only hinted at in the m odern philosophies of consciousness, in particular in Kant. Reflection on the experience o f objects m ade Kant aware that objects are given to us in space and time. Space and time, however, are not themselves objects. But how we should positively in terpret the con­ sciousness of space and time, which is not itself an objectual conscious­ ness, rem ains unclear. On the basis of form al analogies (Critique o f Pure Reason, B39, B47) K ant calls it an ‘intuition’ (Anschauung) but that is clearly a m akeshift solution. Intim ately connected with the conscious­ ness of space and time (cf. B 39 f.) is the consciousness o f the world, the (definite or indefinite) totality of experienceable things (B 446 f.). This totality o f objects is clearly not itself an object. Unlike Husserl, K ant arrived at the necessity of a transcendental enquiry precisely through the recognition th at all experience of objects is essentially always spatial and tem poral and contains a world-relation (Weltbezug). T he subjective tu rn was m ade necessary by som ething which does not becom e accessible in an objectual approach. On the other hand, Kant only them atized that non-objectual consciousness which belongs to the context of objectual experience. Kant recognized th at concepts like totality and infinity can only be understood on the basis of the concept of a repeated (‘successive’) act . 12

Introduction

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M oreover, the concept o f a synthetic act - the synthesis of the manifold according to rules - was, for Kant, fundam ental to the understanding of consciousness as such, or at any rate of that consciousness which Kant called experience: the knowledge o f objects (B103, 195 f.). Now the consciousness that som eone has o f his action (and that means: of the rule which he follows in his action) is again not the consciousness of an object. So not only did K ant also take account of modes of consciousness that are non-objectual; he thought that a certain non-objectual con­ sciousness - an act-consciousness - was essential to the consciousness o f objects.13 T his, o f course, shows that Kant nonetheless rem ained orien­ tated towards the consciousness of objects: for this reason he consid­ ered only that act-consciousness which, in his view, is essential to the consciousness o f objects and their connection in space and time. He did not develop a general theory of the consciousness of acts; hence the question of what it is to be conscious o f one’s action and what it is to be conscious o f an action-rule rem ained unclarified. It is in H eidegger’s Sein und Zeit that we first find an attem pt explicitly to carry thro u g h the third step an d free the understanding of con­ sciousness from the orientation towards objects. In doing so Heidegger abandoned the term ‘consciousness’. This was because this term had, on account o f its descent from ontology, been so tied to the concept of an object that it seemed that consciousness means eo ipso consciousness of objects. For the term ‘consciousness’ H eidegger substituted a term of art ‘disclosedness’ (Erschlossenheit),14 In particular H eidegger tried to show that the disclosedness which the person has of himself, of his own being (thus speaking traditionally: his self-consciousness) is not to be u n d e r­ stood objectually. This problem atic was, for him, connected with the non-objectual ‘disclosedness’ o f ‘w orld’, where ‘w orld’ stands not for the totality of objects but for the totality o f significance in which a person understands him self (Sein und Zeit §§ 18, 32). A fter this crude survey of the relationship o f the philosophy of con­ sciousness to ontology we m ust ask: what implications does this have for the language-analytical conception? For the presen t I shall pass over the problem which we encountered in the first, Cartesian, step, for this problem had to do not with an extension of ontology, b u t with a completely different conception of philosophy which results from a radicalization of the aspect of justifi­ cation. We shall retu rn to this problem later u n d e r the heading ‘reason’. T h e second, transcendental step is an expression of the insight that one can only them atize that which constitutes an object as object and

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the objecthood of the various spheres of object by at the same time reflecting on our relationship to objects. In the discussion of the Aris­ totelian formalization-step I pointed out that one can only thematize the objecthood of objects by reflecting on our relationship to them (p. 24). We then saw how one can achieve and thematize the concept of an object if one understands our relationship to objects in such a way that it rests on the use o f certain linguistic expressions. At the time I left open the question of w hether one can also conceive of this relation­ ship, and the reflection on it, in non-linguistic terms. It is this concep­ tion which we now find ourselves confronted with in the transcenden­ tal-philosophical position. In so far as our present guiding question is the universality of the m ode o f enquiry this much at least is clear: so long as it restricts itself to objects the transcendental mode of enquiry is not m ore comprehensive than the language-analytical, for the relationship to objects which tran­ scendental philosophy of course regards as primarily non-linguistic, is, even from its perspective, not linguistically inaccessible. On the other hand, however, the language-analytical reflection on our relationship to objects places this in the m ore com prehensive context of predication and veritative being. W hat is to be understood by the ‘givenness’ of objects in this context is som ething we shall have to consider later. But it will perhaps already make sense if I say, by way of anticipation, that from the point of view of linguistic analysis the problem of the ‘acces­ sibility’ of objects becomes a part of the problem of the verifiability of the predicative statements which can be m ade about objects. T h e prob­ lem o f regional ontologies thereby acquires a new and more com pre­ hensive sense than it has in Husserl. If the difference between different spheres of object concerns the objecthood of objects, this means that it concerns the form of the corresponding predicative statements. T hat two objects differ not only with respect to certain predicates but with respect to their objecthood means, as H usserl says, that they are acces­ sible in essentially different ways. But that would now also have to mean: that the applying of predicates to them is verified in fundam entally different ways. A nd that means: the difference in m ode of givenness is grounded in the difference of veritative being. B ut the transcendental-philosophical reflection on our relationship to objects is not ju st m ore narrowly conceived than the language-analyti­ cal. T h e question arises: is not the idea o f a pre-linguistic relationship to objects which one can reflect on an illusion? I can today merely indi­ cate this language-analytical criticism of the transcendental-philosophical approach in o rd er to provide at least a preliminary orientation;

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only later (Lectures 21 and 27) will we be in a position to elaborate this criticism. T h e idea of a pre-linguistic relationship to objects implies that one thinks of this relationship as a having before oneself (ein Vorsichhaben). T h e fundam ental m odern concept for this having before oneself is the concept of ‘representation’ (Vorstellung). Consciousness has a rela­ tionship to objects by ‘representing’ them. This term is the principal point o f attack for a language-analytical critique of the transcendental-philosophical position. It is not the fact that transcendental philosophy orientates itself towards objects that lin­ guistic philosophy objects to. R ather it is that transcendental philosophy conceives o f the consciousness of objects in too simple a fashion; it fails to take account of the fact that we refer linguistically to objects by means o f expressions which - as singular term s - belong to a certain logical (formal-semantic) sentence-structure. How then is one to conceive of a pre-linguistic relationship to objects? As representation. W hat is m eant by this? H ere I m ust become somewhat m ore precise. In ordinary linguistic usage the expression ‘sich etwas vorstellen’ (lit. to represent som ething to oneself) is used in two different senses. In one sense ‘er stellt sich vor . . .’ is com pleted by a noun clause, e.g. ‘Er stellt sich vor, dass es jetzt in Berlin regnen könnte’ (‘He imagines that it could now be raining in B erlin’). This is representing som ething to oneself in the sense of im ag­ ining that som ething is so and so. In the second sense ‘er stellt sich vor . . .’ is com pleted by an expression which stands for an object, e.g. ‘Er stellt sich den Kölner Dom vor’ (‘H e pictures Cologne C athedral to him ­ self’), ‘Ich kann mir m einen Grossvater nicht m ehr vorstellen’ (‘I can no longer picture my g ran d fath er’). Used in this way ‘sich etwas vor­ stellen’ means som ething like ‘make som ething present to oneself’ (‘sich etwas vergegenw ärtigen’) in the sense o f : form an inner picture, a phantasy-im age of, bring it before one sensuously (anschaulich). It is this second m ode of em ploym ent from which the philosophical terminology derives. It came to be used in early m odern philosophy in the context of an epistemological ‘theory o f representation’ (Repräsentation ): inner representations (Vorstellungen) as representatives (Vertreter) [repraesentationes] of outer objects. However, transcendental philosophy still retained the term ‘representation’ (Vorstellung) even when it rejected this theory o f representation (Repräsentation) and m ade it clear that con­ sciousness relates to objects directly and not via inner representatives. This is true, as indeed Husserl him self show ed,15 even of phantasyrepresentations (when I imagine Cologne C athedral I mean it itself directly; I do not see a picture which ‘stands fo r’ it). But it is also true of

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all o th er form s of being conscious o f an object. H ence the rep resen ta­ tion (Repräsentation) aspect in the concept o f rep resen tin g (Vorstellen) drop s out. A nd as this concept is also not restricted to m aking present sensuously (anschauliches Vergegenwärtigen) it becomes so refined that it stands for any, even non-sensuous, conscious having before oneself. A nd thus ‘rep resen tatio n ’ became the general concept for o u r conscious relationship to objects. B ut in reality this concept is vacuous. With it som ething which belongs to a sensuous relationship (Anschauungsbezie­ hung) is transferred to a relationship th at is logical. T h e consciousness of an object is like the sensuous having before o neself of a picture, only this having before oneself is not sensuous. From the beginnings of G reek philosophy up to Husserl philosophers, through the neglect o f language-analytical reflection, have o perated with a sensuous and even optical m odel. T h e philosopher sits at his desk and thinks about the world and nothing is m ore natural than to look at the objects he has before him: things on the desk an d , outside the window, trees and houses. O f all these things he has a sensuous im age. A nd it is ju st so, he thinks, only not sensuously, when one refers to objects. B ut what does ‘j u st so - only not sensuously’ mean? We can now also u n d erstan d the mediaeval idea that being is the prim ary object of the intellect (ens primum objectum intellectus nostri).16 A lthough the term ‘rep resen tatio n ’ is not yet used here the conception of an intellect which has som ething before it (objectum) is basically the same. It was then thought: if from this content which the intellect has before it, as im agination its image, one rem oves all determ inateness, w hat results is the concept o f b ein g .17 And it was this conception o f ‘being’, which no longer has anything to do with the actual use of ‘is’, which Hegel took as his point of d e p a rtu re in his Logic . 18 We shall later have to see w hether this conclusion, that transcenden­ tal philosophy in its attem p t to construe the relationship to objects1nonlinguistically falls back on an em pty concept, can also w ithstand a m ore precise exam ination. You could think: even w hen we refer to an object linguistically we m ust still also rep resen t it to ourselves. But if someone uses a singular term , e.g. ‘P eter’, we do not ask him: ‘Who do you re p ­ resent to yourself with “P eter”?’ but ‘W ho do you m ean with “Peter”?’ We do not represent objects to ourselves, we mean objects. B ut what, you will ask, is it to m ean an object? Now that is precisely the question th at will have to be investigated. It is a question which can be investigated - the language-analytically purified question of tra n ­ scendental philosophy - whereas the question o f what it is to represent an object is a pseudo-question. Even the o rd in ary language ‘V orstellen’

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which of course, unlike the philosophical term , is m eaningful (making som ething present in the imagination) is only possible in the context of m eaning som ething: if someone, e.g., tries to sensuously represent to him self an object, this means that he tries sensuously to represent to him self the object which he means. But has the whole of transcendental philosophy been so exclusively orientated towards representation? You will point out that I myself have draw n attention to the fact that Kant conceives of the conscious­ ness of objects as a synthetic act. However, if we ask what it is that this act synthesizes the answer is: representations. It is of secondary im por­ tance that Kant actually uses this term .19 W hat is decisive is that the manifold which consciousness synthesizes consists of simple data (‘sense-data’). And ju st as little as the consciousness of objects can be thought o f as representation can it be thought of as a combination of representations. In general one can say: so long as one failed to con­ sider logical structure it was not possible to think of the relationship of consciousness to objects in any oth er way than by analogy with a sen­ suous having before oneself, arid that means - w hether this expression is used or not - as ‘representation’. T hough other perspectives were always being added to it, it was the orientation towards ‘representation’ that rem ained decisive. Particularly questionable is the developm ent of this conception in G erm an Idealism (though this would require a criti­ cal in terpretation on its own). H ere representation was fu rth er form al­ ized into a ‘subject-object relation’ and this one sought to grasp with general logical-ontological concepts such as those of identity and oppo­ sition. T hese concepts, for their part, were taken over naively without considering the way they function in sentences. And then, since con­ sciousness allegedly cannot be grasped with the understanding, by means of logic, these concepts were combined in paradoxical fashion in a so-called dialectical logic. Once one has started with a problem in a wrong way, and there are prejudices which prevent things from being put right, then all that seems to rem ain is the escape into the apparent profundity of the paradoxical.

LECTURE 6

The argument with the philosophy of consciousness continued

T h e debate with the second step of the philosophy of consciousness the transcendental approach - went in favour of the language-analyti­ cal position. How is it with the third step, in which the transcendental question concerning the conditions of the possibility of the experience o f objects led to modes o f consciousness which are no longer objectual? In this extension of the enquiry beyond objects transcendental phi­ losophy failed to take account of sentences. It thereby passed over a whole dim ension of non-objectual consciousness without which there is also no objectual consciousness. T h u s in extending the thematic it started out from an unclear basis.1 On the other hand, with the worldproblem there is opened up, in both the Kantian and the H eideggerian version (connection of objects in space and time; connection of signifi­ cance), a dimension of consciousness which goes beyond the u n d er­ standing of sentences ju st as much as beyond the relationship to objects. Also the other non-objectual modes o f consciousness, such as the con­ sciousness of action-rules (the same is true of the experience of a sen­ sible manifold such as the view of a landscape or the hearing of a mel­ ody) are not ‘logical’ modes of consciousness, are not articulated in sentences. H ere then we encounter a limitation of the language-analyt­ ical approach, if this is understood as formal semantics. But if we recognize such a limitation from whence do we get ou r criterion of universality? Clearly we orientate ourselves towards a broad concept of consciousness in the sense of what H eidegger m eant by ‘dis­ closedness’. But what is to be understood by consciousness in general? Plainly we have no clear concept of this. N or do we have a clear concept of the various non-logical modes of consciousness; what is actually m eant by a consciousness of spatial and tem poral connections, by an action-consciousness and so on? Until we can see more clearly here we

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can have no idea how we should concretely conceive an extension of the universal approach beyond the sphere of sentences. In particular it must rem ain unclear whether, and if so how, a formal analysis of a nonlinguistically articulated consciousness is possible, what formalization would mean here, or what would have to take the place of formaliza­ tion. O ne can clearly only make progress here by clarifying our u n d e r­ standing of the various modes of consciousness and of the notion of consciousness in general. How can modes of consciousness be analysed? One m ight think: by introspection, by inner perception. But is con­ sciousness something we can inwardly look at? Is there such a thing as inner perception, inner observation? I ask you to seriously try to p er­ ceive what is inside you. Is it not immediately evident that this is a non­ sensical idea? We can observe with our senses, and if we speak of observing something inwardly this can mean: attending to one’s bodily sensations. But this is not what one means when one speaks of what is inner. What is inner - that is consciousness, and here there can be no question of anything like observation or perception. Perhaps you will say: ‘But I know indubitably that I am conscious of this and that; this consciousness m ust therefore be somehow inwardly given to m e.’ Must it? It would be over hasty to argue: what we do not know by means of outer observation we know by means of inner observation. Perhaps the so-called inner differs much m ore fundam entally from the so-called outer.2 Instead of philosophizing in this way by postulation we would do bet­ ter to look at how things actually stand. But where should we look if not by inner perception? What is to be done if we do not even know where and how we have to look, if we do not know how something about which we speak is to be m ade evident? If all that is given to us of something is our speaking about it then we can only elucidate it by examining how we can speak about it. It seems then we can only clarify even that the­ matic which extends beyond the understanding of sentence-forms by means of linguistic analysis. T o be sure, I am speaking now o f ‘linguistic analysis’ in the broad sense of an analysis of m eaning, not in the narrow sense of an analysis of sentence-forms. Linguistic analysis in this broad sense takes the place of descriptive phenom enology, if one rejects as fictions the peculiar forms of intuition - inner intuition and intuition of essences - presupposed in phenomenology. I would like to try to dem onstrate to you the methodological superi­ ority of linguistic analysis to phenom enology by reference to that way o f speaking of consciousness which has become decisive for phenom e­ nology itself (in Husserl).

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Husserl distinguishes two concepts of consciousness.3 T he one derives from our speaking of som eone having a consciousness of some­ thing or a conscious relation to something. Husserl calls this conscious­ ness of som ething ‘intentionality’ or ‘intentional experience’ (intention­ ales Erlebnis). It is for Husserl the decisive concept of consciousness. However, ‘intentional experiences’, according to Husserl, fall un d er the more com prehensive genus of experiences in general. In each person experiences belong to the unity of a ‘stream of experiences’. We also call this ‘stream of experiences’ ‘consciousness’. In this sense we say, e.g., this and that is contained in my consciousness - that is, it is a part of the whole of my consciousness in the sense of my stream of experi­ ences. Consciousness in this sense - H usserl’s second concept of con­ sciousness - is clearly founded upon the concept of ‘experience’ (Erleb­ nis). T h e two term s which are fundam ental to H usserl’s concept of consciousness, and which stand in need of clarification, are, therefore, ‘experience’ and ‘intentionality’. Husserl seemingly carries out the explication and clarification of both concepts phenomenologically, using the m ethod of inner intuition. I would like to show that in neither case is there really any question of an inner intuition and that the deci­ sive criteria are exclusively linguistic. By ‘experiences’ Husserl understands anything which can be inwardly perceived by the person whose experiences they are. Husserl claims that the possibility of such an inn er perception is evident. How can Husserl claim som ething to be evident which we have just seen can­ not even be found? From H usserl’s reference to the Cartesian sphere of inner certainty we can immediately see what he has in mind. I have already draw n attention, in the previous lecture, to the fact that one can define a first concept of consciousness in such a way that it embraces all states in which the person whose states they are has, at the time at which he has them , an indubitable knowledge th at he has them . These states are what Descartes called cogitationes and what Husserl calls experi­ ences. W hen I say: I am in such-and-such.a mood, have such and such phantasies, feelings, intend, believe, wish this or that, it is clearly inap­ propriate to ask: ‘How do you know that, are you sure of that?’ (one can only ask: ‘A re you telling the truth?’) - as opposed to when, e.g., I say: ‘I weigh 70 kg’ or ‘My u p p e r right wisdom-tooth is hurting.’ This is the fact to which Descartes drew attention and which Husserl too starts out from . Husserl, however, immediately placed the following in terp re­ tation on it: if I cannot doubt a state of myself then it is directly given to me, I directly perceive it. Husserl believed that he had an evident perception of this perception. However, m ust one not say: this allegedly

Introduction

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evident perception is as fictitious as w hat it is supposed to be a percep­ tion of? W ittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations,4 has pointed out that an approach such as H usserl’s illegitimately assimilates statements about what is in n er to statem ents about what is outer. If we make a statem ent in which an ‘experience’ is expressed it is clearly not based on an external observation. From this philosophers like Husserl conclude that it is based on internal observation. But must a statem ent always be based on something? I have ju st pointed out that in the case of a state­ m ent about an experience it does not make sense to ask: ‘How do you know that?’ H usserl presupposes that such a question always makes sense and that one can reply: ‘I know it by inner perception.’ T hat a statem ent is not based on anything appears strange to us. But this is only because we automatically assimilate all statements to one another and construe them on the model o f observation-statements. If we exam ine how things actually stand we see that in this case the statem ent itself is som ething ultimate. T h e characteristic feature o f experience-words, for Wittgenstein, is ‘that the third person present is to be verified by observation, the first person not’ (Zettel §472). T h e statem ent ‘I am w orried’ is not based on the worry in the sense that it rests on the observation that I am worried but in the sense that in it the being w orried is expressed, as in a cry (Phil. Inv. §244). On the oth er h an d - and this distinguishes it from the cry - the statem ent is uttered by me as one which can be repeated as this same statem ent by others and can then be verified by observation. Both these things - that the word in the 1st Person Present is not to be veri­ fied and that in the 3rd Person it is to be verified by observation belong essentially to the m ode of em ploym ent o f such a word. ‘I do not say it on the basis o f the observation of my behaviour. But it only makes sense because I so behave’ (§357). (And that means: because another can say it on the basis of the observation of my behaviour and my utter­ ances.) If it were not so then we could not learn and understand such a word. By dem onstrating this two-sidedness in the use of experience-words W ittgenstein m ade possible an understanding of the so-called inner which is distinct from both behaviourism and introspectionism. In the context of our discussion we need not pursue this problem any further. O ur sole concern here is to show that, contrary to H usserl’s view, the certainty-criterion which Descartes used to define cogitationes does not rest on an inner perception. T h e certainty is not som ething positive, but simply the negative fact th at here ‘the expression of uncertainty is

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senseless’ (Phil. Inv. §247) because the request for a justification is sim­ ply not applicable and a ‘doubt is logically excluded’ (Phil. Inv. p. 221). T he criterion of an experience-sentence in the 1st Person Present such as ‘I am in pain’ is, therefore, that it can be automatically converted into ‘I know that I am in pain.’ Because this conversion, though always possible, contains no addi­ tional inform ation it hardly occurs in ordinary language. W here, how­ ever, philosophy orientated itself towards this sentence ‘I know that I am in pain’ without noticing that its m eaning is precisely that of the sentence ‘I am in pain’, the illusion arose that the person who utters such a sentence observes him self and perceives the experience-state with absolute certainty. T he orientation towards this form of sentence in which the word ‘I’ occurs twice resulted in self-consciousness being characterized as a relation o f ‘the self’ to itself (so-called reflection). T he real peculiarity of sentences in which som eone says som ething about his experience-states is not the double occurrence of the word T , but rather that they - and indeed precisely in the simple form - are not statements about the state, but its expression, and hence exclude doubt. And it is precisely this last-m entioned fact which is expressed by the sentence with the double ‘I ’ (‘I know that I . . .’). With this the language-analytical basis for H eidegger’s analysis o f the disclosedness of o n e’s own being is reached. H eidegger rejected the theory o f reflection ju st as much as W ittgenstein;5 his m istrust of sen­ tences, however, h indered a clear destruction of the theory of reflec­ tion. But H eidegger started precisely where W ittgenstein finished. T he obsession with reflection had prevented philosophers from seeing what one is actually conscious o f in self-consciousness. This can only be appreh en d ed by attending to the simple sentences (without a double ‘I ’) in which someone says som ething about himself by saying e.g.: I am in such-and-such a mood, I intend to do this and this. I am not directed towards myself in the utterance of such sentences, but express my being-thus-and-so (being-in-a-mood, being-bent-on). It is the analysis of this being which, according to Heidegger, is the task of a properly understood theory of self-consciousness.6 I come now to the other, and for Husserl decisive, concept of con­ sciousness: that o f ‘intentional experience’. This is intended to desig­ nate that class of experiences the peculiar character o f which is to be directed towards an object. Consciousness in this sense, then, is essen­ tially consciousness of something. Now we must ask ourselves: how does H usserl establish the existence of this object-relation, and in what does it consist? What is m eant ‘strikes

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us unmistakably in any illustration we choose. In perception something is perceived, in im agination som ething imagined, in a statem ent some­ thing stated, in love som ething loved, in hate something hated, in desire som ething desired, etc. It is the common feature that can be ap p re­ hended in such examples that B rentano has in mind when he says: “Every m ental phenom enon is characterized by what the scholastics of the m iddle ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object and what we . . . would call the direction to an object.” ’7 How does Husserl establish the directedness to an object by means of these examples? H ere too Husserl appealed to the evidence of the intu­ ition of essences (Wesensanschauung ). However, the examples show that again the criterion is simply a linguistic one. He notices that verbs such as ‘perceive’ ‘state’ ‘h ate’, etc., are transitive, that they have a gram m at­ ical object. Intentionality is thus a relation. Since intentionality is sup­ posed to constitute what is to be understood by ‘consciousness in the strict sense’,8 everything depends on making clear what it is that distin­ guishes these transitive verbs from non-intentional transitive verbs. Husserl gives no fu rth er explanation. I will now try to work out what is specific to the intentional relation by asking: of what kind are the objects referred to by the grammatical object of these verbs? We find that the majority of these verbs are not completed by singular terms which stand for concrete (perceptual, spatio-temporal) objects but by nominalized sentences, thus by linguistic expressions of the form ‘that p ’ which stand for ‘states of affairs’. W hen Husserl, in his series of examples, says that in a statem ent som ething is stated, the word ‘some­ thing’ clearly stands not for a concrete object, but for a state of affairs. T he same is true of most intentional verbs or modes of consciousness e.g. knowing, believing, doubting, wishing, questioning. T he sentence ‘I know . . .’ can only be completed by an expression of the form ‘that p’. Som ething corresponding is true of asking a question and intending, except that the completing sentence has a different grammatical struc­ ture. We can therefore say that the characteristic feature of these inten­ tional verbs is that they stand for a relation which holds not between two concrete objects but between a concrete object (a person) and a state of affairs. In English philosophy, in which the term ‘proposition’ has been adopted for ‘Sachverhalt’, these modes of consciousness are called propositional attitudes. We can speak of propositional modes of conscious­ ness. Now clearly not all the examples Husserl gives of intentional experi­ ences belong to the class of propositional modes of consciousness. In the case of some of them , e.g. loving, pitying, adm iring, only a singular

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term which stands for a concrete object can ap p ear as transitive object. Moreover, th ere is a group of intentional verbs which can be used in both ways. T o this mixed group belong perceiving, seeing, rem em ber­ ing, desiring. O ne can say ‘I see that the sun is rising’, but also ‘I see the sun’, ‘I desire to eat a piece of b re a d ’ but also ‘I desire a piece of bread.’ We can distribute this mixed g roup according to their two modes of em ploym ent am ong the two other groups, and we would then have two fundam ental classes of intentional modes of consciousness: propositional and non-propositional, those which relate to states of affairs and those which relate to concrete objects. Now the question is: what do these two classes have in common that distinguishes them from all o th er relations? We cannot appeal to the fact that both are modes of consciousness o f som ething; for what this means is supposed to be explained by the characterization of intention­ ality. H usserl says that common to all modes o f consciousness is a directedness to something. But what does this m ean? ‘D irectedness’ is clearly a m etaphor. Sign posts and guns are directed towards something; how­ ever they are not intentional. Again the appeal to inner evidence may appear tem pting. But if someone were to say to me: ‘You see when you are conscious of an object, perceive it, rem em ber it, fear it, that you are directed towards it; and you see how this relation differs from other relations’, then I would say: I see nothing at all. I sense a difference of course, but here it is a question of m aking clear what is unclearly sensed; and for this I have no intuition at my disposal - only linguistic usage. If there was only the one class o f intentional modes of consciousness, viz. the propositional, then we would have a clear distinguishing crite­ rion. For we do not find relations between a concrete object and p ro p ­ ositions outside intentionality. O pposed to this criterion, however, stands the o th er class of experiences designated as intentional. W hat is to be done in such a case? T h ree possibilities are conceivable, (a) the modes of consciousness of the two classes have nothing in common, in which case the concept of intentionality tu rn s out to be a pseudo­ concept o r (b) we succeed in finding a completely different common characteristic; the supposition that the orientation towards the p ro p o ­ sitional could be a way of achieving a general criterion of intentionality would then be shown to be m istaken, or (c) it would have to be shown that the non-propositional modes o f consciousness are only apparently non-propositional, that in reality they imply propositional conscious­ ness. It is this last possibility which, in my opinion, can be realized. I assert then: all non-propositional intentional modes of conscious­

Introduction

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ness imply propositional modes of consciousness. We can take as our point of d e p a rtu re a thesis of B rentano according to which what distin­ guishes intentional relations from o ther relations is the fact that the second term of such a relation need not exist.9 We shall see in a m om ent that this characterization does not apply to all non-propositional inten­ tional relations. It is, however, clearly correct for most cases. X can fear, love, desire, etc.,7V, even though TV does not exist. Non-intentional rela­ tions, by contrast, are not possible unless both terms of the relation exist. If N does not exist, then I cannot hit N , eat him, or sit on him. But how is this peculiarity of intentional relations to be explained? Shall we say that in the case of an intentional relation the object is, so to speak, in the m ind of the person concerned and, hence, that the rela­ tion is also possible when the object does not exist in reality? But this way of speaking is again clearly metaphorical. How can we give it a clear m eaning? Probably by saying that X m ust at least believe that N exists. I can fear the devil w ithout him existing but not without believing that he exists. T o believe that N exists - or, to put it m ore precisely, that there is exactly one object to which the properties implied in ‘AT belong - is a propositional m ode of consciousness. W hat B rentano drew attention to, viz. that the object o f an intentional mode of consciousness need not exist, is th erefo re simply a consequence of the fact that one can only relate intentionally (consciously) to an object in such a way that one believes it to exist. T h a t it is really this th at is characteristic of the non-propositional intentional relation is shown by those cases to which B rentano’s thesis does not apply. If I say ‘X sees, hears, recognizes N ’, then that N does not exist is ruled out. T h a t would only be possible if I had said: ‘X believes that he sees, hears N .’ However, even here the consciousness that there exists an object that = N is implied. W hen we say of X that he sees N this m eans: he knows on the basis of his optical perception (1) that there is som ething which = N (2) that here (in his optical su rro u n d ­ ings) there is som ething, (3) that this = N. T h at the apparently simple sentence ‘He sees N ’ contains such a complex assertion can be seen from the fact that if som eone says ‘I see N ’ one can dispute this assertion in three ways: (1) there is nothing which = N (N does not exist) (2) there is nothing here or (3) this (what you see) is not = N . Thus seeing, etc., also implies a propositional consciousness that N exists. At the same time the account ju st given makes it clear why B rentano’s thesis does not apply to these cases. If one says of som eone that he sees, hears, recog­ nizes N, this means that he does not ju st believe the implied state of affairs; he knows it.10 Now if one says of som eone ‘He knows that/?’

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(and not: ‘He believes he knows th a tp ’), then one asserts (among other things) that it is true that p. Thus, whoever says ‘X sees N ’ (and not just ‘X believes he sees AT) at the same time endorses the truth of the state­ ments implied by X’s statem ent ‘I s e e N ’, hence the truth of the implied existential statements; and fo r this reason it is implied in these cases that N exists. T o reinforce my thesis that all non-propositional intentional con­ sciousness implies a propositional consciousness —or, more precisely, a belief that that to which it refers exists - I would like to deal with another apparent counter-exam ple. How is it when we represent some­ thing to ourselves in the imagination? T he specific character of this m ode of consciousness seems to be precisely that that to which it refers is m eant as non-existent. But how is this non-existence to be under­ stood? For example, one is telling a story, a joke or the like and one begins ‘A man . . .’ Im plied is: ‘Im agine that there existed a man . . T he man is thus m eant as non-existent. But that can only be done by thinking of him as existing. It would be incorrect to think that when we m ean something in the imagination the existence is taken away and the m ere object is left over. T h e phantasy-modification has the character ‘it is not so, but I imagine that it were so’. T h e phantasy-modification is a modification of veritative being. It therefore concerns not ju st objects but, e.g., a whole story. Everything which is told there or thought up is not m eant as really being so, but only thought of as being so. It is, however, thought of as being so. And for the objects this means that they are not m eant as really existing, but are merely thought of as exist­ ing. They are, however, thought of as existing. T hus phantasy-consciousness too is implicitly propositional. In the previous lecture I drew attention to the fact that to have a consciousness of an object is not to have a representation of it but to m ean it, and to mean an object by means of a singular term is a nonindependent com ponent in the understanding of predicative sentences. T he reflections which have now been carried through take us a step further: to mean an object is not only a non-independent com ponent of a propositional consciousness; it in turn rests on a propositional con­ sciousness, which consists in holding to be true an existential sentence.11 And thus the general proposition would be proved that all so-called intentional consciousness is explicitly or implicitly propositional con­ sciousness. T h e essence of the intentional relation consists in this: it is a relation between a concrete object and a state of affairs. And that means: that it is grounded in the understanding of a sentence. Thus the attem pt to recover in a language-analytical way H usserl’s ‘strict’ con­

Introduction

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cept of consciousness has led us to an unexpected discovery: we find that a consciousness of som ething that is not founded in a holding-tobe-true of an existential sentence does not exist. T h e peculiar ‘quality’ of consciousness which Husserl called ‘intentionality’ and which in sup­ posedly intuitive description he characterized as a directedness to an object turns out to be sentence-understanding. Let me rem ark, incidentally, that the description of consciousness as a subject-object relation, of which the transcendental philosopher is so fond, is also thereby ren d ered untenable. T h ere is no such relation. W here a subject has a conscious relationship to an object this is never a simple relation but is always founded in the understanding of a sen­ tence. A particularly u n fortunate consequence o f the idea o f the ‘sub­ ject-object relation’ was that the attem pt was also made, in German Idealism, to interp ret self-consciousness in accordance with this schema. In the case of self-consciousness the subject is conscious of him ­ self. This consciousness was, therefore, interpreted as a subject-object relation in which subject and object are identical; thus as a relation of som ething to itself. This idea, which was simply a result of the underinterpretation of the actual facts as m anifested in the sentences in which someone speaks about himself led the already inadequate conception of self-conscious­ ness as reflection into absurdity. Instead of simply orientating oneself towards sentences with the double T (‘I know that I . . .’) one took these two occurrences of T out of their sentence-context and constructed an abstract self-relation of ‘the’ self to itself. Insoluble problems were obviously bound to result from such an ap p ro ach.12 T h e dem onstration th at all intentional consciousness is propositional gives an additional historical significance to the language-analytical pro ­ gram m e of a theory of sentences: the question about consciousness, like the ontological question about being as being, turns out to be a question about the understanding o f sentences. O f course this only applies to consciousness in the sense of intentionality, not to the non-objectual modes of consciousness. A language-analytical clarification o f the non-objectual modes of con­ sciousness, unlike that o f experiences and intentionality, would not be able to base itself on work that has already been done. M ore extensive preparation would therefore be necessary here. I thus leave open the question of w hether, and, if so, how, the question concerning the understanding of sentences can be surpassed by invoking either a m ore com prehensive concept o f understanding such as that aimed at by ‘pragm atics’, or a more com prehensive concept o f consciousness of the

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kind to which the transcendental-philosophical attem pts point. A nd so the question also rem ains open as to how the'universality-claim of the language-analytical conception of philosophy I have developed is to be ju d g e d and w hether, and if so how, this conception could be extended. B ut does this m ean then that the decisive question rem ains u n an ­ swered? T h e decisive questions never find an answer in philosophy. This is not to say that they are unansw erable, but only that, w hen the questions left open by a philosophy (e.g. ontology) are answ ered by a new philosophical approach, this new approach, so long as it is philo­ sophically alive, itself reaches into the dark, inasm uch as it encounters questions which, for the tim e being at least, it cannot answer. In the case o f such questions, which concern the limits of a philosophical posi­ tion, it is already a gain if one at least perceives these limits. You could ask: if I see the limits of a sentence-orientated theory of understanding why do I not go beyond them? My answer is: because I do not know how the concept of form alization can be extended beyond these limits or w hat would th ere take the place of form alization. Perhaps you will draw my attention to the fact that I m yself expressed doubts, in Lecture 1, about an a priori conception o f philosophy. Should one not be even m ore dubious about a purely formalistic conception? Certainly. From such doubts, however, there would not im m ediately result a new posi­ tive conception o f philosophical m ethod, but only a syncretism. You will see th at it will not be at all easy for us even to find an adequate concep­ tuality for the new semantic thematic. For in the main the categorial means available to us still stem from an object-orientated tradition; and it seems to me d oubtful w hether it is possible to develop a new concep­ tuality other than by debating with the inadequacies of previous ones (cf. Lecture 8). Only somebody who does not see these specifically philosophical difficulties of conceptual clarification and the form ation of categorial m eans adequate to a m ode of enquiry can wish to take two or m ore steps at a time.

LECTURE 7

A practical conception of philosophy

Today I come to a new and final attem pt at an introduction of the language-analytical conception of philosophy. It is orientated towards the idea of reason. T h e word ‘reason’ (Vernunft ) is not used univocally. In the G erm an Enlightenm ent vernünfteln was used to translate the Latin ratiocinari, just as today raisonner in French and to reason in English are still in use. T he faculty of reason would accordingly consist in the capacity to argue. It is this that K ant has in m ind when he defines rea­ son in its logical sense as the faculty of making inferences (Critique of Pure Reason, B355). But from this there follows a second ‘transcenden­ tal’ definition, according to which reason is designated as ‘the faculty of principles’ (B356). ‘Principles’ are the first and, hence, unconditional propositions of a deductive system. From this there resulted for Kant a concept of reason according to which reason stands for the conscious­ ness of unconditioned totality (B378 ff.). On this basis G erm an Idealism then came to oppose reason, wholeness, dialectic, to the ‘m ere’ u n d er­ standing, and there began that disdain for the logical that is character­ istic of the G erm an developm ent of the last century and a half. Despite this peculiar developm ent of G erm an philosophy the words Vernunft and vernünftig retained, in ordinary language, their original Enlight­ enm ent sense, whereas vernünfteln and räsonnieren are now only used in a pejorative sense. In ordinary language vernünftig means something like ‘well g ro u n d ed ’. A nd the dem and to use one’s reason means: one should not take over opinions unexam ined, but enquire as to their grounds and counter-grounds. T h e capacity to argue is not only a capacity to make deductive inferences but, m ore generally, the capacity to justify statements. Ratio, raison, reason can mean both ‘gro u n d ’ (Grund) and ‘reason’ (Vernunft). T h e faculty of reason is the capacity of being able to answer for one’s beliefs and actions (Latin: rationem reddere. Greek: logon didonai).

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A conception of philosophy which is orientated towards the idea of reason thus takes up that aspect of the Aristotelian preliminary concep­ tion of philosophy which had been neglected in its ontological realiza­ tion. T h ere have been many attem pts in the history of philosophy to develop a conception of philosophy as the science which radicalizes the aspect of justification which is present in all sciences; for example, in Plato, in Descartes, in Germ an Idealism, in Husserl. However, I shall not undertake the introduction of a language-analytical conception of philosophy which is orientated towards the idea of reason in connection with these historical positions. For now, at the end of the introductory reflections, I would like to make an attem pt to justify the languageanalytical conception of philosophy - and with it an idea of philosophy as such - absolutely, rath er than relatively to given historical concep­ tions or a given understanding o f ‘philosophy’. With this I link up with the reflections of Lecture 2: to justify a par­ ticular conception of philosophy can mean: to show that it corresponds to our prelim inary understanding of philosophy or that in it the inten­ tions of earlier conceptions of philosophy can be realised or better real­ ised. T he previous p art of my introduction moved within this fram e­ work. One can, secondly, try to justify a particular conception of philosophy directly. But, as I tried to show in the second lecture, this can only mean: to justify the motivation for this activity. By this I mean: to dem onstrate that it is advisable (ratsam) to engage in this activity. A justification of a conception of philosophy which is not merely relative to a presupposed prelim inary understanding of the word ‘philosophy’ can, therefore, only have the sense of a practical justification. If such a practical introduction is not itself to presuppose a particular understanding of a word then we cannot start from a particular concep­ tion of philosophy and only subsequently attem pt to justify it practi­ cally. Rather we must ask: is there a theoretical activity - for we can assume that this is what is at issue - which it can be shown to be advis­ able to engage in? A nd whatever the answer will be, it will be this theo­ retical activity which - being practically pre-em inent - we shall call phi­ losophy. O r we can drop the assumption ju st m ade and simply ask: is there any activity which it is advisable to engage in? O r better: what is it advisable to do? This is clearly the most comprehensive practical question that it is possible to ask, and we can now say: if it motivates or requires a particular theoretical activity then we will call this theoretical activity ‘philosophy’. Let us first try to get clear in a prelim inary way about the meaning of such practical questions in general and about the meaning of the most

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comprehensive practical question. What are practical questions and to what context do they belong? There is a class o f actions which are characterized by being inten­ tional.1 Some authors even define ‘action’ in terms of intentionality, for of an unintentional movement and its consequences one does not say ‘He did it* but ‘It happened to him.’ What criterion do we have for recognizing an intentional action? The distinguishing criterion o f intentional action seems to be that the action can be characterized by reference to its intention. Someone is making movements at a window. What is he doing? He is letting fresh air in. That is his intention. But the opening of the window - as means to an end - is also intended. So to the question ‘What is he doing?’ we can also reply: ‘He is opening the window.’ How do we tell that the action is really intentional and has precisely this intention? Ultimately only from the fact that the person concerned is himself prepared to express his intention. If one accepts this criterion, then one can only speak of intentional acting, and hence o f doing or acting in a narrow sense, with respect to beings who can speak. In our context we can ignore the problem of unconscious inten­ tions,2 for what concerns us is that our entire conscious life, that which can express itself linguistically, is always characterized by intentions and intentional activity. We can always ask someone who can speak and who is not asleep or unconscious: ‘What are you doing?’ We achieve an additional understanding o f the relation o f intention and action if we consider that we can also intend future actions. If someone has the intention o f doing something in the future he can also simply say: ‘I will do this*, e.g. ‘I will come.* It is to be noted that such sentences in the 1st Person Future which look like assertoric sentences are not assertoric sentences (cf. above p. 49). The sentence ‘I will come’ is not a prediction but a sentence in which an intention is expressed. I shall call such sentences intention-sentences. If the person said ‘I will come* and he does not come we do not say ‘He made a mistake’, but ‘He did not stick to his declaration.’ When I say to someone ‘I will certainly come* this ‘certainly’ expresses, not the theoretical certainty of a predic­ tion, but the resolution to stick to my word. Just as the denial o f the negation, considered as a possibility, under­ lies theoretical certainty (I am sure that p when I am convinced that it is excluded that not-p) so too the practical certainty of resolution is grounded in a denial o f the negation, considered as a possibility, o f the intention (the intention-sentence): ‘I will certainly come’, that is: for me there is no question of my not coming. Now we encounter here a pecu-

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liar feature of intentional activity that is conscious (capable of linguistic articulation): because the act is determined by an intention and this is articulable in a sentence, but the sentence is negateable, with the con­ sciousness of the act there is always given the consciousness of the pos­ sibility of refraining from the act. Conscious intentional action is there­ fore always situated in a range (Spielraum) o f possibilities against which one can of course close oneself but for which one can also open oneself in deliberation. With this we have reached the phenomenon of so-called human free­ dom.3 It is better if we speak of a free action than of a free will. All conscious intentional action is free. However, the mere consciousness o f alternative possibilities does not amount to freedom; freedom requires that the consciousness o f alternative possibilities can be actiondetermining. Where this is not the case we speak of compulsive acts; and we do not say of compulsive acts that they are intentional. The compulsive act happens to the person concerned. How can one estab­ lish whether the consciousness of alternative possibilities is action-deter­ mining? By connecting with the act which someone claims not to be able to avoid a disproportionate punishment. If he still cannot refrain from the action then he is acting unfreely. You will now perhaps ask: how can one know that action, in which the consciousness of alternative possibilities can be action-determining, is really free, that it is not itself determined? This question is, however, no longer permissible if a free act is defined as one in which the con­ sciousness o f alternative possibilities is action-determining. The ques­ tion just posed presupposes a concept of ‘real* freedom which would be opposed to determinism. I hold this metaphysical concept of freedom to be fictitious; I would therefore say that in this sense of freedom intentional action is not free. By contrast, freedom as I have just defined it is a phenomenon, for which there are empirical criteria. And it seems to me that it fulfils what we mean when we, e.g., say ‘I am free to do it’ or ‘It depends on me whether I will do it/ Now just as there is deliberation with reference to the range of free­ dom, so too there is questioning, for all deliberation is guided by a ques­ tion. This question must be understood as the question-counterpart of the intention-sentence, just as the theoretical question is the questioncounterpart of the statement. When we deliberate and ask what is to be done we take counsel with ourselves. We can therefore say that the question-counterpart of the intention-sentence is the question: what is it advisable to do? - thus what I have called a practical question.4

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H ow ever, it is stili u n clear w hat is really being asked ab o u t w hen one asks: w hat is advisable? Is th e re a typical q uestion-fo rm u la fo r this q u es­ tion which brings o u t the logical character o f this question? If the practical question is the q u estio n -co u n te rp a rt o f th e intentional-sentence, th e n its g eneral form w ould have to be th a t which results fro m “the question-m odification o f such a sentence, thus, e.g., ‘Will I com e?’ an d , as the com prehensive question, ‘W hat will I do?’ Now if in an intention-sentence an in ten tio n is expressed an d ‘I will com e’ m eans som ething like ‘I in ten d to com e’, th en th e question m ust also be able to take th e form ‘Do I in ten d to com e?’ an d , as co m p re h e n ­ sive question: ‘W hat do I in te n d to do?’ T h is question, how ever, unless fu rth e r qualified is at least am biguous, in th a t it gives th e im pression o f being a theoretical question (‘which intentions, motives are p re se n t in m e?’). O nly at a pinch can it be u n d ersto o d as a practical question, i.e. as a question w hich initiates a deliberation an d is d irected to a decision, n o t a statem ent. T h e previously m entioned form ‘W hat will I do ?’, on the o th e r han d , is am biguous in a n o th e r way: it can have the sense o f a request for a theoretical prognosis. N onetheless a deliberation can be expressed in this question an d also in th e question ‘W hat do 1 in te n d to do?’ You see, it is not th e g ram ­ m atical form which is decisive, b u t th e m ode of em ploym ent. T h e r e is, how ever, still a n o th e r gram m atical fo rm for th e practical question in which th e possibility o f m isin te rp retin g it as a theoretical q uestion seems to be excluded. W hen we deliberate on w hat is to be d o n e we are m ost likely to say ‘W hat ought I to do?’ A nd yet this form too is am biguous, for such a question can equally well be u sed as a req u e st for an o rd e r: it is at th e sam e tim e th e q u estio n -co u n te rp a rt of th e im perative. T his is connected with the fact th a t sem antically intention-sentences a n d im peratives are closely related; intention-sentences are th e equivalent in the 1st Person o f im peratives in the 2n d (or 3rd) P erson. In th e case of a statem ent (‘H e will com e') the relationship betw een sentence and event is such th a t the sentence is su p p o sed to co rresp o n d to th e event, to be correct (or incorrect) relative to it. In the case o f th e im perative an d th e intention-sentence, o n th e o th e r h an d , th e relationship is such th a t th e event - nam ely th e action - is supposed to co rresp o n d to th e sentence, to be correct (or incorrect) relative to it. (C om pare: ‘H e presents th e m atter as it is’; ‘H e acts as h e was o rd e re d to do/as he h ad resolved to d o ’.) C onnected with this affinity betw een im perative and in ten tion-sentence is th e fact th a t ‘O u g h t I to com e?’ is used both as a q u estio n -co u n te rp a rt o f ‘C om e!’ an d as a q u estio n -co u n ­ te rp a rt o f ‘I will com e.’ T h e question ‘W h at o u g h t I to do?’ is, th e re fo re,

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also am biguous; it can be used as a re q u e st fo r an o rd e r as well as fo r advice. T h u s to reach an u n d e rsta n d in g o f practical qu estio n s we ca n n o t confine o u r atten tio n to any o ne o f th e gram m atical fo rm s ‘W hat will I do?, ‘W hat d o I in te n d to do?’, ‘W hat o u g h t I to d o ?’ In th e case o f each o f the form s we m ust add: i f it is u n d e rsto o d as a req u e st fo r advice. A nd so we find ourselves again h aving to fall back on th e fo rm u latio n we started o u t from : ‘W hat is it advisable to d o ?’ We m u st th e re fo re ask ourselves: w hat are we asking fo r w hen we ask fo r advice, w hat d o we expect fro m advice? S uppose we ask som eone: ‘W hat o u g h t I to d o (in this situation)?’ an d suppose h e u n d e rsta n d s th a t we a re no t asking fo r an o rd e r b u t fo r advice, an d sup p o se h e replies: ‘D o w hat is best (in this situ atio n ).’ Surely we w ould say: ‘W hat is best, clearly, b u t what is th e best (in this situation)?’ W hat seem s ridiculous in th e co n tex t o f a co n crete question, because it is trivial, can be philosophically significant. T h e trivial answ er to a practical question is ‘T h e b est’. T h is gives us a sim ple linguistic criterion fo r telling w h eth e r th e question ‘O u g h t I . . .?’ is m e an t as a practical question, as a req u est fo r advice, a n d n o t fo r an o rd er: nam ely, w h enever it occurs in explicit o r im plicit connectio n w ith the e x p re s­ sions ‘th e best’ or ‘g o o d ’. W hat d o we m ean by th e w ord ‘g o o d ’? W hen d o we call so m eth in g ‘b e tte r’ th a n so m eth in g else?5 T o this th e follow ing g en e ral answ er can, I believe, be given: w hen the o ne is to he preferred to th e o th e rfo r objective reasons. T h e definition I am suggesting th u s has two co m p o n en ts: (1) the w ord ‘b e tte r’ is used to exp ress a p re fe re n c e , a n d ‘to p re fe r’ m eans: with re fe re n c e to a plurality o f possibilities, to decid e fo r one, to choose it. T h e w ord ‘g o o d ’ th u s belongs, as a p re fe re n c e -w o rd , to th e co n tex t o f choice an d freed o m . O nly a bein g w hich is free in th e sense p rev i­ ously described can u n d e rsta n d th e w ord ‘g o o d ’. (2) In co n trast to o th e r p referen ce-w o rd s like ‘m o re p le a sa n t’ o r ‘like m o re ’, w hich express th a t som ething is m erely subjectively p re fe rre d by som eo n e, th e w ord ‘b e t­ te r’ expresses th a t th e p re fe re n c e is an objectively ju stified one. T h e p re fe re n c e —both th e subjective o n e an d th e objective o n e —can relate to things, states o f affairs o r actions. F o r ex am p le, we say o f a th ing o f a certain k in d , a car fo r instance, th a t it is good o r is b etter th a n an o th er. T h is m eans: if o ne need s a th in g o f this k in d , this is to be p re fe rre d to the o th e r fo r objective reaso n s (which does n o t ru le o ut th a t som eone m ig h t consciously choose th e w orse because he n e v e rth e ­ less likes it m ore. A lth o u g h he ought to p re fe r the o n e, he chooses th e other).

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T alk o f good things is d e p e n d e n t on talk o f good actions. A th in g is good if one can p e rfo rm well with it the action fo r which it is servicea­ ble. H ow ever, this is n o t to say th a t ‘goo d ’ m u st ultim ately re fe r to actions. For, th a t an action is to be p re fe rre d to an o th e r fo r objective reaso n s may in tu rn be g ro u n d e d in this, th a t th e condition - th e state o f affairs - th a t is b ro u g h t ab o u t by it is to be p re fe rre d , fo r objective reasons, to th a t w hich w ould be b ro u g h t about by th e o th e r action. T h e an sw er ‘W hat is best’ is th u s the trivial answ er to th e q uestion ‘W hat o u g h t I to d o ?’; b u t n o t only to this question. T h e question ‘W hat o u g h t I to d o?’ is itself a special fo rm o f th e com pletely g en eral question ‘W hat o u g h t I to choose?’ ‘W hat is to be p re fe rre d for objective reasons?’ T h e scope o f th e trivial answ er ‘th e best’ extends as fa r as this question. It is n o t only in q u estions co n c ern in g o u r own actions th a t we find ourselves faced with a choice. ‘G o o d ’ m eans com pletely generally som ething like ‘w orthy o f b ein g d esire d ’. W hat we re g a rd as w orthy o f being desired, i.e. w h at we believe is to be d esire d (p referred ) fo r objective reasons, d e term in e s w hat we believe we o u g h t to do. We can leave o p en the q u estio n o f w h eth e r w hat is ultim ately (i.e. n o t relative to so m eth in g else) w orthy o f being d esire d can itself only be th o u g h t o f as activity. Practical q uestions th e n a re questions concernin g the good, the b et­ te r, th e best. In th e practical question the q u estio n er is n o t asking ab o u t w hat is (veritative being) b u t ab o u t w hat it is good (better, best) fo r him to do. Now w hat does it m e an to say th a t som eth in g is to be p re fe rre d fo r objective reasons? T o g ro u n d so m eth in g objectively m eans to ju stify it. T h is c o rre­ sp onds to the con cep t o f reaso n which I in tro d u c ed at the b eg in n in g o f to d a y ’s lecture. So instead o f saying o f th at which is good th a t it is th at which is to be p re fe rre d fo r objective reasons we can equally well say th a t it is th a t w hich is rationally to be p re fe rre d . A n d now we can also say: w hen we ask som eo n e fo r advice, o r take counsel with ourselves re g a rd in g w hat we o u g h t to do, we a re asking w hat it is ratio n al to do, i.e. which course o f action we can g ro u n d , justify. B u t w hat does th a t m ean? Justification (Ausweisen) is a species o f leg­ itim ation (Rechtfertigung). W hen we legitim ate an action we are saying th a t it is correct; an d by this we m ean th at it conform s to a rule. All conscious action is ru le -g u id e d an d th e re fo re th e w o rd -p air ‘c o rre c tin c o rre c t’ belongs essentially to all conscious actions. An action can, e.g., be co rrec t relative to a ru le o f w riting, a rule o f a gam e, a social conven­ tion, a technical ru le, a legal norm . O ne can speak o f a relative legiti­ m ation here. O n e legitim ates o n e ’s action, re n d e rs an account o f it, rel­ ative to a certain n o rm ; a n d this th en also m eans: vis-ä-vis th e p articu la r

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p artn e rs who ad h e re to this rule. T h is relative legitim ation can already be called a gro u n d in g : one g ro u n d s o n e ’s action, ren d e rs an account of it by referen c e to th e ru le which it follows. Justification differs fro m this relative legitim ation in b eing an absolute legitim ation, absolute in the sense th a t (a) it is n o t accom plished relative to a given ru le and hence also (b) n o t vis-a-vis p articu lar p artn e rs but vis-a-vis arb itrary p a rtn e rs (and is in this sense ‘objective’). It is precisely th e capacity fo r this absolute legitim ation th a t we call ‘reaso n ’. W hat one is dealin g with h e re th e n is a possibility o f answ ering for, re n d e rin g an account of, an action in a way th a t is n o t relative to a given rule. Such an absolute legitim ation exists, in a p rim ary sense, only in re la ­ tion to linguistic acts, statem ents. T h e correctness o f statem ents does n o t hold relative to a rule, b u t absolutely; this correctness one calls tru th . I f we can also ask (in a secondary sense) o f o th e r actions w h eth er they can be legitim ated (in th e absolute sense), this is because in te n ­ tional acts im ply intention-sentences which can be g ro u n d e d by state­ m ents o f th e form ‘It is good (better) th at . . (including th e form ‘It is good to do x.’) Such statem ents, which are possible replies to practical questions, we can call practical statem ents. T o every in ten tio n -sen ten ce ‘I will do x*, bu t also to every action-sentence ‘I am d o in g x \ th e re can be attached a w hy-question ab o u t th e reason fo r the action, o r fo r the in tention. H ere reason m eans som eth in g like m otive. If I am asked why I am d oing som ething I can reply by giving eith er a subjective o r an objective reason. In th e fo rm e r case I say ‘B ecause I like d o in g it’, in th e latter ‘B ecause it is good (better) to d o this.’ N ow w hen I d o x because I believe th at th e best th in g (in this situation) is to d o x , th e n the ju stifi­ cation o f this practical statem en t carries over to th e action which im plies this statem ent. O n e can th e re fo re also legitim ate non-linguistic acts in an absolute sense, show them to be rational, by justify in g th e statem ents ab o u t what is good th a t are im plicit in them (and th a t o f course m eans: ju stifying th em as true). T h e good is thus a species o f the tru e , which is sim ply to say th at practical statem ents are a k ind o f statem ent. A nd th e tru e in tu rn is a species o f th e correct, th at species, nam ely, in reg a rd to which we can speak o f absolute legitim ation, justification. O n e can also oppose the tru e to the good; it th e n stands fo r those statem ents in which the w ord ‘g o o d ’, o r a c o rresp o n d in g w ord like ‘advisable’ or ‘o u g h t’, does not occur. It th e n stands only fo r those statem ents which, in co n ­ trast to practical statem ents, one can call theoretical statem ents. B ut now how are statem ents o f th e form ‘It is good th a t/? ’, ‘T h a t p is b e tte r th a n th a t q to be justified? O nly w hen th at is exp lain ed w ould the com plicated path we have follow ed in to d ay ’s lecture - a path which

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sta rted with practical questions and led, via th e p h e n o m e n a o f fre ed o m , choice, d elib eratio n , advice, th e good as w hat is objectively to be p r e ­ fe rre d , to reaso n as the faculty o f justification - lead beyond an appeal to ev er new w ords to a g e n u in e result. L et us first m ake clear to ourselves th a t sentences o f this fo rm are used in such a way th a t they at any ra te make a claim to objectivity an d justifiability. T h e characteristic fe a tu re o f the justification-claim of statem en ts is th e possibility o f b rack etin g it by th e use o f expressions like ‘it seem s (to m e, to us) th a t’, ‘I believe t h a t . . T h e m ean in g o f th e ju stification-w ord ‘is tr u e ’ (ju st like th a t o f any sim ple use o f an asserto ric sentence) lies in this co n tra st with ‘it seem s th a t . . Now this co n ­ trast is also p re s e n t in sentences in w hich th e w ord ‘g o o d ’ is u sed. We can say: ‘It seems to th em to be good, they believe th a t it is good. B ut is it g o o d ?’ T h is does n o t apply to subjective p referen ce-w o rd s: we can n o t (except u n d e r special circum stances) say ‘I believe th a t I like it’ 'That p seem s to m e to be m o re p le san t th a n that q.’ T h e w hole co n tex t o f qu es­ tio ning, d o u b tin g , disp u tin g , ju stify in g is absent h ere ; b u t n o t in th e case o f those sentences in w hich it is asserted th a t so m eth in g is good. T h e se sentences th e re fo re also have no subjectivity-indicator; th eir validity claim is objective, fo r all ratio n al beings (e.g. fo r all w ho can ask ab o u t th e justification o f sentences). T h is seem s to be co n trad icted by th e fact th a t we can say ‘T h a t is good fo r him , fo r m e.’ B u t th e re is an am biguity in th e w ord ‘fo r’. ‘It is good fo r h im ’ m eans: it is conducive to his well-being; if his w ell-being is to be p ro m o te d th e re are objective reasons fo r p re fe rrin g this. B u t these reasons fo r this being b e tte r fo r him are valid n o t ju s t fo r him b u t fo r an y o n e an d , h ence, so m eo n e else can advise him with re fe re n c e to his well-being. T h u s it is clear th a t practical questions are actually ratio n al questions, ju stification-questions. B u t now how is a justificatio n o f practical state­ m ents conceivable? T his q u estio n can easily be answ ered fo r all cases in w hich we ask w hat we o u g h t to do (w hat it is good to do) in order to achieve a certain end. T h e q uestion o f w hat a re th e best m eans to p r e ­ su p p o sed ends can be answ ered by rec o u rse to th eo retical reaso n in g , p articularly a b o u t th e rele v an t causal connections. B ut w hat ab o u t w hen we do n o t ask ‘W hat o u g h t I to do in o r d e r to achieve A V b u t sim ply ‘W hat o u g h t I to do (in this situation), w h at is th e best to wish an d to do (in it)?’, e.g. ‘Is a capitalistic o r a socialistic econom ic system b e tte r? ’ Also in th e answ ering o f such a q uestion th eo retical co n sid era­ tions take u p th e g reatest space; we c a n n o t significantly an sw er such a q u estion w ithout know ing th e situation an d theoretically p e n e tra tin g

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th e altern ativ es envisaged in th e questio n . B u t m e re k n o w led g e is n o t ad e q u a te fo r an sw e rin g th e questio n : w hat is it best to do? T h e leg iti­ m ation o f o u r u ltim a te aims is n o t a m a tte r o f th e o re tic al reaso n . K n ow ledge o f w hat o u g h t to be c a n n o t be re d u c e d to k n o w led g e o f w hat is. So th e re arises th e q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e possibility o f th e ju stificatio n o f th e irred u cib ly practical c o m p o n e n ts o f practical ju s tifi­ cation. It is th e q u estio n c o n c ern in g th e possibility o f p ractical reaso n . So w hen we ask practical q u estio n s w hich a re n o t m erely relativ e to p re su p p o se d ends, w h en we u ltim ately call in q u estio n o u r actions a n d desires, we a re re f e r re d back to th e p rio r q u estio n o f th e possibility o f practical reason. B u t m u st we ultim ately call in q u estio n o u r action? W h at in d u c es us to d o so? W e have previously seen th a t practical q u estio n s arise fo r us to th e e x te n t th a t we are conscious o f ourselves as faced w ith a ra n g e o f p o s­ sibilities. M ostly we a re n o t conscious o f a r a n g e o f possibilities fo r o u r action; a n d w hen we are , this usually only co n c ern s th e q u estio n o f th e co rrect choice o f m eans. S eldom d o we also call in q u estio n o u r aim s an d o u r way o f life as a w hole. B u t o n w hat th e n does th e e x te n t o f o u r consciousness o f o u r r a n g e o f possibilities d e p e n d ? T h e qu estio n : w hat induces us to ask p ractical q u estio n s? th u s re fe rs us back to th e q uestion: w hat in d u ces us to b eco m e conscious o f a ra n g e o f possibilities? W e can now say th a t it is th e in te re s t o f rea so n in ju s ti­ fication. F o r th e rea d in ess to ju stify th e th e o re tic a l a n d practical beliefs im plicit in o n e ’s ow n action p re su p p o se s th a t o n e co n sid ers altern ativ e possibilities. R eason p resu p p o se s fre e d o m a n d ex te n d s only as f a r as freed o m . If, th e re fo re , o n e w ants to act rationally , o n e has an in te re st in beco m in g conscious o f o n e ’s ra n g e o f possibilities a n d in e x te n d in g it. A im ing a t rea so n in o n e ’s actions c a n n o t sim ple m ean : ask in g w h eth e r w h at o n e is actually d o in g is good. R a th e r it m ean s asking w hat it w ould be best to do. It is th e re fo re n o t as th o u g h o u r actio n m oved in a fixed r a n g e o f possibilities w hich is th e re in d e p e n d e n tly o f o u r co n ­ sciousness a n d to w hich we only have to a tte n d . H ow f a r th e ra n g e o f possibilities ex ten d s d e p e n d s on o u r in te re st in actin g reflectively, a n d th a t m eans: rationally. T h is ratio n al in te re st can be re stric te d to th e m eans to given ends, b u t it can also rela te to th e en d s them selves an d , ultim ately, to o u r life as a w hole. T h e q u estio n : w h at is w o rth y o f b ein g d esired in g e n e ra l (an d n o t ju s t fo r me)? a n d th e q u estio n c o n n e cted with it: w h at o u g h t I to do? (u n d e rsto o d as a q u estio n re la tin g to my w hole life), I w ould like to call th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical q u estio n . W hat in d u c es us to ask this q u estio n is th u s th e in te re st in reaso n , a n d

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th a t m eans: the in te rest in existing responsibly in an absolute sense, i.e. in such a way th a t we can be answ erable for o u r actions n o t only with re fe re n c e to given n o rm s and n o t only with referen c e to given aims. O ne could go a step fu rth e r an d ask: but why should on e w ant to be rational? T h is w hy-question is am biguous. It can eith er be u n d e rsto o d as being itself a q u estion o f rea so n , in which case it has th e sense: is it rational to w ant to be rational? O r it can be u n d ersto o d as a question o f m otivation: w hat as a m a tte r of fact induces us to be rational? Is it ratio n al to w ant to be rational? We cannot, so it seem s, legitim ate reaso n th ro u g h itself; this w ould be to p resu p p o se the very th in g we wish to justify. M ust we n o t th en say that the rational in te rest is itself irratio n al, c a n n o t itself be rationally justified? In o rd e r to be able correctly to assess the logical situation in which we h e re find ourselves it will be best if we think o f it in th e form o f a dialogue. T h e r e are th e n two possibilities; e ith e r the p erso n who re p ­ resents the in te re st o f reaso n (A) is challenged by an o th e r p erso n (B) to ju stify it; o r A tries to c o n v in c e d o f his standpoin t. In th e first case A can reply th a t in asking him for a justification B is already p resu p p o sin g th e in terest o f reason; an d in this sense - as th e p resu p p o sitio n o f all ratio n al questions - th e in terest o f reason is itself rational. T his legiti­ m ation o f th e in te rest o f reason co rresp o n d s to the way in which, since A ristotle, o ne justifies th e Principle o f C ontradiction. T h e Principle o f C o n trad ictio n can also n o t be ju stified directly, because it m ust itself be p re su p p o se d in any justification. B u t for this very reason it can n o t be called in question; if o ne speaks at all - in sentences - th e n one has p re su p p o se d th e P rinciple o f C ontradiction. A ristotle th e re fo re says th a t, to be consistent, th e o p p o n e n t (of the principle) w ould have to give u p sp e ak in g .6 In th e case of th e in terest o f reason we are n ot in so fav ourable a position: h e re we can only say th a t to be consistent th e o p p o n e n t m ay n o t ask fo r a legitim ation. (O ne could still allow him to ask relative ratio n al questions concern in g m eans to ends; b u t the ques­ tio n asked by B, nam ely, how the in te rest o f reaso n is to be legitim ated, was n o t in te n d e d in this relative sense.) But, conversely, if he does n ot ask a ratio n al question B also ca n n o t be convinced by A o f the sta n d ­ p o in t o f reason, fo r som eone who does not e n te r in to ratio n al arg u m e n t can clearly also no t be rationally convinced. T h u s we arriv e at th e follow ing result. T h e in terest o f reaso n is itself ratio n al in th e special sense th a t it is the presu p p o sitio n o f all rational questions. B u t th e re is no absolute sta n d p o in t outside reaso n from w hich one could p e rsu a d e an in te rlo cu to r - p erh a p s the one in o n e ’s

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own soul - who lives according to the principle o f im m ediacy (n o n ­ deliberation) to accept the in te rest of reason. O ne can only aw aken an d stren g th en the in te rest o f reason th ro u g h p ro p er education. T his also answ ers the second question, which co n cern ed not th e leg­ itim ation o f the in terest o f reason but its factual genesis. B ut does this m ean th a t everything is relativized again by the question: in w hat does the p ro p e r education consist? No, for th e correct ed ucation is defined by this line o f th o u g h t as th a t which cultivates the in terest o f reason. A nd alth o u g h such an education is only one of m any conceivable e d u ­ cations, it follows from w hat has previously been said th a t it is th e only one th a t is correct in the absolute sense, th e only o n e which can be legitim ated as rational. I can now re tu rn to my real p urpose, a practical in tro d u ctio n o f a conception of philosophy. T his was supposed to arise fro m th e context o f practical questions and for this reason we h ad first to get clear ab o u t the n a tu re o f practical questions. My suggestion at th e b eg inning o f th e lecture was: if th e practical question ‘W hat is it advisable to do?’ d em ands a certain theoretical activity then we can call this activity - as a practically p re-em in en t activity - ‘philosophy’. Now th e question ju st re fe rre d to is th e question w hich in the m eantim e I have called th e fu n d am e n tal practical question and which has em erg ed as th e m ost com prehensive ratio n al question. A nd the fu n d am en tal practical q u es­ tion, we saw, points in tu rn to th e p rio r question co n cern in g th e possi­ bility o f practical reason. Now one could designate as philosophy both the co ncrete process of answ ering the fu n d am e n tal practical question with all its th e o re tic a lveritative and p ractical-veritative im plications and also th e p rio r q u es­ tion co ncerning th e possibility o f practical reason. T h e two belo n g to gether; and from w hat has gone before it is clear th a t th e re is fo r b o th o f them not ju st som e m otivation b u t the highest rational m otivation. If we com pare this in tro d u ctio n of philosophy with th a t of A ristotle then it already differs from it in th e prelim inary stage which in A ristotle was characterized by the concept of science. T o this p relim in ary stage th e re co rresp o n d s in the p rese n t intro d u ctio n the co n cep t o f reaso n so far as this is not yet specifically related to th e fu n d am e n tal practical question. It co m p reh en d s both practical an d theoretical reason an d is thus m o re com prehensive th an the concept of (theoretical) science. In the concept o f reason there is taken up the aspect o f justification w hich was em phasized by A ristotle h im self but neglected in th e second stage of his intro d u ctio n . But, secondly, th e p rese n t in tro d u ctio n is prim arily distin g u ish ed

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from th e A ristotelian by th a t aspect by w hich p h ilo so p h y is d istin ­ g uished as a p re -e m in e n t science, or rational question, fro m th e o th ers. F or in th e p re se n t in tro d u c tio n this p re-em in en ce is a practical p r e ­ em inence. T h e re is a practically p re -e m in e n t rational q u estio n . I f we call it philosophy th e n co m ponents in th e usual p relim in ary u n d e r ­ stan d in g o f th e w ord sophia becom e im p o rta n t which A ristotle neglected: ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ an d ‘w isdom ’ as th e question ab o u t th e h ig h est good, as th e question ab o u t th e m eaning o f life an d as a g en eral p ra c ­ tic al-th eo retical w o rld-orientation. We call him a wise m an who can advise us well with resp ect to ultim ate aims an d life as a whole. In th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical question we also find again th e aspect o f universality w hich A ristotle em phasized; only now th e universality is n o t u n d e rsto o d in term s o f spheres o f objects b u t in term s o f th e p ra c ­ tical q u estion which ideally d ep e n d s on a theoretical p e n e tra tio n o f th e total co n c rete w orld-situation. Em pirical sciences w ould have to e n te r into ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ as th u s u n d ersto o d ; the o rd e r in which they w ould do so w ould be d e te rm in e d by th e practical aim . I am b eg in n in g to speak in th e subjunctive because as yet a m ethodologically clarified co nception o f such a ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ does n o t exist, n o r am I in a position to p rese n t such a conception. My practical in tro d u c tio n th e re fo re break s o ff at th e crucial p o in t w here th e p relim in ary conception o f philosophy o b tain ed fro m th e practical fu n d a m e n ta l question sh o u ld acq u ire definite m e th ­ odological contours. O nly at th e h ig h est point o f th e fu n d am e n tal practical q u estion, in the p relim in ary q u estion co n c ern in g the possibility o f practical reaso n , do we reach m ethodologically fam iliar g ro u n d . W ith th e question a b o u t th e possibility of-practical an d theoretical reason, i.e. with the questio n o f how statem ents can be ju stified , the th eo ry o f veritative being, o r the assertoric senten ce-fo rm , is taken u p again with p articu la r re fe re n c e to the aspect o f justification. T h e aspect o f justification which was neglected by A ristotle in th e form alization-step is in tu rn accessible to a form al th em atization a n d th e resu ltin g them atic coincides with th e th e ­ m atic o f ontology ex ten d e d to veritative being in th e w idest sense (which also em braces statem ents in which w ords like ‘g o o d ’ occur). We shall see later th a t o n e u n d e rsta n d s an assertoric sen ten ce if an d only if one know s its tru th -co n d itio n s; a n d th at m eans: know s how it is to be justified. A nticipating this later result I can say th a t th e ex p lan atio n o f th e m e an in g o f a sta te m en t-fo rm is identical with th e ex p lan atio n o f how statem ents o f this form are to be justified . T h u s th e question co n ­ cerning the possibility o f reason finds its answ er in a sem antics o f a sser­ toric sentences. T o be sure, th e question co n c ern in g th e possibility o f

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reaso n does n o t directly lead beyond veritative bein g to a g e n e ra l fo r­ mal sem antics. N o n -asserto ric sentences have no relatio n to reason. H ow ever, th e ju stificatio n a n d necessity o f such an ex ten sio n does n o t sim ply follow fro m th e fact th a t o n e can only elu cid ate so m e th in g by th em atizin g th e w hole g en u s to w hich it belongs an d by co n tra stin g it with o th e r species o f th e sam e genus. R a th e r it has alread y b ecom e clear th a t we c a n n o t h o p e to analyse p ractical sta te m en ts w ith o u t analysing in te n tio n -se n ten c es, im peratives a n d optative sentences. T h e w ord ‘g o o d ’ can only be e x p lain e d in this way; th u s th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th o se assertoric sentences in which th e w ord ‘g o o d ’ occurs is g ro u n d e d on th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th ese n o n -asserto ric se n ten ce-fo rm s. T h u s my practical in tro d u c tio n o f p h ilosophy leads, at least at its h ig h e st point, back to th e language-analytical co n c ep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y as this em e rg e d in co n n ectio n w ith th e ontological realizatio n o f th e A risto te­ lian p relim in ary co n cep tio n o f philosophy. By analo g y with th e A risto ­ telian fo rm u latio n ‘th e re is a science w hich stu d ies b ein g as b ein g ’ (above p. 21) we can now say: th e re is a fo rm a l q u estio n w h ich we have a p re -e m in e n t ratio n al m otivation fo r asking: th e qu estio n c o n c ern in g th e possibility o f practical reason. T h is questio n belongs to th e m o re gen eral q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e possibility o f rea so n as such, a q u e s­ tion which is identical w ith th e q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f assertoric sentences. T h is la tte r q u estio n is po sed w ithin th e fra m e ­ w ork o f a g e n e ra l fo rm a l sem antics, w hose fu n d a m e n ta l q u estio n is: w h at is it to u n d e rs ta n d a sentence? A n d this q u estio n (cf. above p. 36) coincides with th e elu cid atio n o f th e questio n o f w h at it is to u n d e rs ta n d th e m e an in g o f a linguistic exp ressio n . T h e p re -e m in e n t m otivation we h av e fo r th e q u estio n co n c ern in g th e possibility o f practical re a so n thus leads us in to th e sam e sem antic th e ­ m atic th a t resu lted w hen we took ontology as o u r sta rtin g -p o in t. H ow ­ ever, it leads in to it via a p a rtic u la r sem antic s tru c tu re - th a t o f practical statem ents - w hich fo r a g en e ral analysis o f th e sem an tic sp h e re ca n n o t sta n d at th e b eg in n in g . T h e practical h ie ra rc h y based on th e p r e ­ e m in e n t m otivation does n o t c o rre sp o n d to th e th e o re tic al sequ en ce which results fro m th e in n e r co nnections o f th e th em atic field. T h is is also th e rea so n why it is so difficult to w ork o u t in m ethodologically clarified fo rm th a t co n c ep tio n o f ph ilo so p h y w hich re p re s e n ts th e co n ­ crete ca rry in g th ro u g h o f th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical q u estio n . A n d yet fro m th e p o in t o f view o f this p ractical in tro d u c tio n th a t w ould be th e m ost im p o rta n t philosophical task.

P art Two A first step: analysis of the predicative sentence

LECTURE

8

Prelim inary reflections on m ethod and preview of the course of the investigation

My aim in th e in tro d u c to ry p a rt o f th e se lectures was to w o rk o u t a q u estio n w hich can be r e g a rd e d as a fu n d a m e n ta l q u estio n o f lan g u ag eanalytical philosophy. At th e sam e tim e th e languag e-an aly tical co n cep ­ tion o f p h ilo so p h y was to be c o n fro n te d with o th e r p h ilo so p h ical posi­ tions an d we w ere to ex a m in e w h eth e r, a n d if so how , it can be ju stified vis-ä-vis these o th e r positions. A nd this involved also discussing th e idea o f p hilo so p h y in general. T h e fact th a t this has n o t yielded a u n ita ry co n c ep tio n o f p h ilo so p h y is no disad v an tag e. T h e object o f such reflections is to g et clear about th e d iffe re n t possibilities o f u n d e rs ta n d in g so m e th in g (in o u r case th e idea o f a ‘p re -e m in e n t science’) a n d a b o u t how th e se d iffe re n t possibil­ ities are re la te d to o n e a n o th e r. W hich o f these o n e th en calls ‘p hiloso­ p h y ’ is a se co n d a ry m a tte r. Essentially we have b eco m e ac q u ain ted with th re e ways in w hich ‘p h ilo so p h y ’ co u ld be u n d e rsto o d . Firstly, o n th e basis o f th e discussions o f th e first lectu re, o n e could d e sig n a te ‘p h i­ lo so p h y ’ all elu cid a tio n o f p rio r u n d e rs ta n d in g , all clarification o f co n ­ cepts o r m eanings. Such en q u iry w ould be a ‘p re -e m in e n t’ en q u iry in asm uch as it con cern s th e u n d e rsta n d in g -p re su p p o sitio n s o f d irect, non-reflective k n o w ledge a n d en q u iry . Secondly, fro m o u r e x a m in a tio n o f th e A risto telian in tro d u c tio n th e re em erg ed a co n c ep tio n o f ph ilo so p h y as a u n iv ersal fo rm a l science, w hich is to be u n d e rs to o d as form al sem antics. T h e first o f th ese two co nceptions o f p h ilo so p h y re p re se n ts a vague, b u t indispensable, m etho d o lo g ical co n c ep tio n o f lan g u ag e-an aly tical philosophy. By co n tra st th e second co n c ep tio n has clear th e m atic co n ­ to u rs an d a d efin ite fu n d a m e n ta l q uestion. It re p re se n ts, if o n e holds on to the first, b ro a d co n cep tio n o f language-analy tical p h ilo so p h y , th e g ro u n d -d iscip lin e o f language-analytical p hilosoph y . It co n tain s a q u es­ tion w hich, vis-ä-vis questio n s in ac co rd an ce with th e first co n cep tio n , is

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‘p re -e m in e n t’; fo r it concerns th e universal presu p p o sitio n s o f all u n d e rsta n d in g . T h e co nceptions o f p hilosophy as ontology an d as tran sc en d e n ta l p h ilosophy have show n them selves to be in a d eq u a te ap p ro x im atio n s to th e second con cep tio n o f philosophy. In so far as tran scen d en tal p h i­ losophy contains elem ents which p o in t beyond this co n cep tio n these elem ents can them selves only be clarified by linguistic analysis (L ecture 6), thus by m eans o f a p ro c e d u re in accordance with th e first conception o f philosophy. Finally, a third con cep tio n o f philosophy re p rese n ts th e question I have called th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical question. H istorically, since Soc­ rates an d Plato, this questio n c o n c ern in g the good - W hat is to be done? H ow should we live? - has in flu en ced th e conceptio n o f philosophy. It is possible to see th e w hole history o f E u ro p e a n philosophy as a d eb ate betw een this practical con cep tio n o f philosophy an d th e A ristotelian th e o re tic a l-fo rm a l conception. T h is practical fu n d a m e n ta l question is also a ‘p re -e m in e n t’ question. B u t it is p re -e m in e n t in a n o th e r sense, nam ely, in th e sense th a t it is th e only question fo r w hich th e re is an im m ed ia te a n d absolute ratio n al m otivation. N ow which sense o f ‘p r e ­ e m in e n t’ sh o u ld we settle for: th a t w hich leads to th e second conception o f philo so p h y o r th a t w hich leads to the th ird conception? If by this q u estio n o n e m eans: w hich so rt o f enq u iry sh o u ld be called ‘philoso­ p h y ’? th e n it is u n d ec id a b le an d also u n im p o rta n t. It is a m atter o f in d iffe re n c e to which so rt o f e n q u iry one attaches the label ‘philoso­ p h y ’. B u t if th e questio n m eans: fo r w hat so rt o f en q u iry should on e rationally decid e, which q uestion o u g h t one to ask? th en it follows a n a ­ lytically th a t it can only be th e th ird conception o f philosophy. I was n o t in a position to give clear co n to u rs to this kind o f philoso­ phy. O f course, it does n o t re q u ire m uch reflection to see th a t the q u es­ tion: w hat o u g h t to be d one? is n o t a sem antic question. T h e h ig h est co n cep tio n o f p hilosophy, hig h est in th e sense th a t it is th e only o n e th a t is p re -e m in e n t in te rm s o f its m otivation, is th u s n o t a languageanalytical co n cep tio n o f philosophy. N ow we have seen th a t this th ird conception o f philo so p h y also refers back to o u r second concep tio n , in as m uch as o ne can only clarify th e p relim in ary q uestion c o n c ern in g th e possibility o f practical reason - th e possibility o f th e justificatio n o f p ractical statem en ts - by m eans o f an analysis o f th e fo rm o f these sentences (p. 8 8 - 9 ).1 H ow ever, it w ould be sophistical - th o u g h very attractive as a way o f easing th e theoretical p h ilo s o p h e r’s conscience - to in fe r fro m this connectio n th a t the u n c o n ­ d itio n al ratio n al m otivation th e re is fo r th e th ird co n cep tio n o f philos­

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o p h y carries over to the second conception. It is tru e th at th e question o f th e possibility o f asking th e practical question is m ethodologically p rio r to the practical question; bu t it does not follow from this th at it sh o u ld p reced e it practically. F or th e fu n d a m e n ta l practical question does n o t ad m it o f p o stp o n em en t. O n e w ould be simply ev ad in g the practical question w ere one to try to p e rsu a d e o n eself th at o n e cannot ask it w ithout having first clarified th e m ethodologically necessary p re ­ lim inary questions. M oreover, w hat g u a ra n te e is th e re th at o n e will not rem a in stuck in th e form al prelim in ary questions? In these lectures at any ra te I will n o t even get as far as a sem antics o f practical statem ents; I will thus rem ain stuck in a question w hich is prelim in ary to th e p relim ­ inary question. A fte r this w arn in g I can begin th e m ain p a rt o f th e lectures. In the first lecture I a n n o u n c e d th a t I w ould n o t be p rov id in g any results or surveys. In stea d 1 would like to p u rsu e with you a fu n d a m e n ta l ques­ tion o f linguistic analysis. W e now have a ro u g h id ea o f th e outlines o f the fu n d a m e n ta l discipline o f linguistic analysis. H ow can we begin to w ork this them atic field? T h e follow ing p ro c e d u re m ight suggest itself. Since it has becom e clear th a t w hat is unsatisfactory about ontology is th e restrictio n to one or at best two sem antic form s - sin g u lar term s a n d predicates - a g en ­ u in e reflection on th e sentence-form s w ould have to m ake su re th a t the totality o f the rele v an t fo rm al distinctions w ere inclu d ed . It w ould th en be possible to carry o u t th e enq u iry into th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f sentences at th e re q u ire d level o f system atic generality. Such a system atic p ro c e d u re is how ever not possible if o n e does n o t yet possess the categorial m eans o f analysis. W e d o n o t yet know how o n e can en q u ire into the m e an in g o f a linguistic expression, let alone into w hat it is to u n d e rsta n d a sem antic class o f ex pressions, or the co m bination o f expressions o f d iffe re n t classes. As yet we d o n o t even have a clear conception o f sem antic fo rm , hence we do n o t yet have a p ro c e d u re for sem antically classifying sentences, a n d thus fo r arriv in g at th e totality o f form al distinctions ju s t d em an d e d . T h e few distinc­ tions I have m a d e in th e in tro d u c to ry reflections w ere p u rely provi­ sional ones which could sim ply claim a certain plausibility; they m erely served to give us a view o f th e field o f investigation. I only d istin g u ish ed the sem antic class o f sin g u lar term s, w hich was m a rk e d out by th e tr a ­ ditional concept o f an object, an d the co m p lem en tary class o f pred icates (g eneral term s). A nd even in th e p rese n tatio n o f these classes I h ad to an ticip ate unclarified notions such as th a t o f a m o d e o f em p lo y m en t. Equally tentative w ere th e distinctions betw een p ro p o sitio n al co n ten t

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a n d m ode a n d , in p articu la r, th e distinction o f d iffe re n t m odes. T h e d e m a n d to e x te n d th e analysis fro m objects to th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f sentences can th e re fo re n o t be taken to m ean th a t in sentences we have a field o f investigation w hich we sim ply have to e n te r. If we wish to r e g a rd form al sem antics as th e successor discipline to ontology th e n we m u st first w ork o u t a conceptuality, as fu n d a m e n ta l as th e ontological, w ith which this field o f investigation can be m a d e accessible. O f course a co nceptuality which is ad e q u a te to a su b ject-m atter can only be achieved in th e analysis o f this su b ject-m atter itself. H ow ever, th e re results a com pletely d iffe re n t kin d o f p ro c e d u re , d e p e n d in g on w h e th e r (as in a p a rtic u la r science, in o u r case linguistic science) o n e em b ark s directly on th e theo retical w orking o f a field, usin g an existing con ceptuality a n d leaving th e d ev e lo p m e n t o f a m o re a d e q u a te co n cep ­ tuality to scientific p ro g re ss, o r (as in philosophical research into fo u n ­ d ations) o n e a p p ro a c h e s th e field o f investigation with th e p rim a ry in te n tio n o f w o rk in g o u t an ad e q u ate conceptuality. In th e first case th e investigations o f th e co n c rete m aterial a re ca rrie d o u t in such a way th a t th e available trad itio n al conceptuality (which is know n to be in a d e ­ q u ate), an d h en c e any conceptuality, is as little in evidence as possible. In th e second case we m u st carry o u t such analyses as a re aim ed at p u ttin g th e adequacy o f th e trad itio n al conceptuality to th e test an d , if it proves to be in a d eq u a te, dev elo p in g a new conceptuality. In co n crete term s th a t m eans: th e fu n d a m e n ta l co n cep t o f previous philosophy is th a t o f beings o r objects. T h e fu n d a m e n ta l co n cep t o f m o d e rn p h ilo so p h y - th a t o f consciousness - is also u n d e rsto o d in th e sense o f a consciousness o f objects. T h is leads to every new p h ilo so p h i­ cal o r scientific them atic bein g c o n stru e d in term s o f this concept. T h e co n seq u en ce fo r sem antics is th a t th e answ er given to th e q u estio n : w h at is it to u n d e rs ta n d a linguistic ex pression? is th a t w hat o n e u n d e r ­ stan d s w hen o n e u n d e rsta n d s an ex p ressio n is th e meaning o f th e ex p ressio n , this bein g conceived as follows: th e exp ressio n stands fo r th e m e an in g w hich th e p e rso n w ho u n d e rsta n d s th e ex p ressio n represents to him self, an d w hat on e re p re se n ts to o n eself is an object. T h u s alth o u g h sta n d in g fo r objects is p ec u lia r to o n e specific class o f ex p ressio n s (sin­ g u la r term s), an d alth o u g h even in th e ir case m e an in g an d object sh o u ld be d istin g u ish ed , th e fact th a t th e re is no o th e r concep tu ality available in th e trad itio n leads o n e to co n stru e even th e m e an in g o f th ese ex pressions an d th a t o f every ex p ressio n as an object. W h e re th e in a p p ro p ria te n e ss o f this m o d e o f conception is felt in linguistic rese arch , b u t a fu n d am e n tally new o n e is not available, such an objec­ tionable co n c ep t as th a t o f an ‘object’ is avoided by u sing a m o re n e u tra l

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term in o lo g y : o n e speaks, fo r ex am p le, o f ‘c o n te n ts’, o r on e sim ply co n ­ fines o n e s e lf to saying th a t every e x p re ssio n stands fo r so m eth in g , leav­ ing it com pletely o p e n how this ‘so m e th in g ’ is to be u n d e rsto o d . W e shall have to a d o p t precisely th e o p p o site p ro c e d u re . W e m u st avoid concepts w hose only a d v a n ta g e is in d e te rm in a te n e ss. I f in stead o f saying th a t th e ex p re ssio n stan d s fo r an object o n e says th a t it stan d s fo r a co n te n t, o r sim ply fo r so m e th in g , th e n o n e has m erely lost clarity an d g ain ed n o th in g . C rucial fo r us m u st be th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r o n e can say th a t th e ex p re ssio n stands jo r so m e th in g a t all. I f this tu rn s o u t to be false th e n we m u st try to w ork o u t a new c o n c ep tio n w hich is as fu n d a m e n ta l as th e objectual co n c ep tio n . T h e first, critical—d estru c tiv e step - th e te stin g o f th e ad eq u acy o f th e tra d itio n a l o b je ct-o rien ted a p p ro a c h in its ap p lica tio n to th e u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f linguistic ex p ressio n s - seem s relatively easy to u n d e rs ta n d . It is p erfectly intelligible th a t a co n c ep tu ality th a t was d ev e lo p e d fo r a specific an d m o re n a rro w th e m atic sh o u ld pro v e in a d e q u a te w hen a p p lied to a n o th e r a n d b ro a d e r them atic. B u t how sh o u ld o n e conceive th e se co n d , co n stru ctiv e step? I f we p u t th e tra d itio n a l p ersp ectiv e o u t o f action an d e n te r o u r th e m atic field as it w ere w ith o u t any p e rsp e c ­ tive, th e n far fro m a p p e a rin g in a new lig h t it will a p p e a r in n o lig h t at all. A new co n cep tu ality can n ev e r be a tta in e d d irectly fro m an u n c o n ­ cep tu alized th e m atic field, b u t only in reflection o n th e w eaknesses o r limits o f a prev io u s conceptuality. T h u s th e critiq u e o f th e objecto rie n ta te d position in its ap p licatio n to th e q u estio n o f m e a n in g is by no m eans in te n d e d to have th e m erely neg ativ e significance o f clearin g away an in a d e q u a te conceptuality; r a th e r it co n stitu tes th e in d isp e n s­ able first step in th e positive task o f w o rk in g o u t a m o re a d e q u a te co n ­ ceptuality. O f c o u rse n o t every kind o f critiq u e o f a given co n cep tu ality is co n structive; h o w ever, th e re is no p ro g re ss in th e field o f fo u n d a ­ tional rese arch w hich does n o t arise fro m a c ritiq u e o f th e p rev io u s co nceptuality. T h is co n n e ctio n b etw een d estru c tiv e an d co n stru ctiv e c o n c ep tu al w ork is exem p lified by a s tru c tu re w hich in th e co u rse o f these lectu res will re p e a te d ly p ro v e to be fu n d a m e n ta l to a new step: if an ex istin g co n cep tu ality tu rn s o u t to be in a d e q u a te w hen a p p lie d to a w ider th em atic field, o n e is obliged to reflect on p re su p p o sitio n s o f this co n ceptuality w hich did n o t have to be reflected u p o n w ithin th e p r e ­ vious co n cep tio n . O n e th u s arriv es at a m o re g e n e ra l co n c ep tu ality , on e w hich u n d e rlie s th e p rev io u s co n c ep tu ality b u t w hich also p e rm its other c o n cep tu al in te rp re ta tio n s. Such new co n c ep tu al in te rp re ta tio n s o f co u rse n ev e r arise in a m erely ab stra ct reflectio n on fo u n d a tio n s, b u t only u n d e r th e p re s s u re o f new d a ta o f th e th e m atic field w hich ca n n o t

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be ex p lain e d in te rm s o f th e previous conceptuality. W e shall see th at this critica l-co n stru ctiv e s tru c tu re is n o t only im p o rta n t fo r th e w orking o u t o f a specifically language-analytical conceptuality, as o p p o sed to the trad itio n al o b je ct-o rien tate d conceptuality, b u t th at it also rep eats itself w ithin th e language-analytical position. T h e d e b a te with trad itio n al philosophical conceptions o f trad itio n al ph ilosophy was th u s by no m eans m erely a m a tte r o f in tro d u c in g you to th e th em atic o f lan guage-analytical philosophy. In so fa r as languageanalytical p hilosophy, like all previous form s o f fu n d a m e n ta l p h ilo so ­ phy, is co n cep tu al rese arch in to fo u n d atio n s an d is n o t m erely co n ­ ce rn ed with p a rtic u la r problem s (m any analytical p h ilo so p h ers o f co urse a re only co n c e rn e d with p articu la r problem s; fo r us how ever this is irre lev an t), it is ca rrie d o u t by m eans o f a critiq u e o f trad itio n al philosophy. In th e in tro d u c to ry p a rt o f these lectures the d eb ate with trad itio n al con cep tio n s co n c ern ed only the d em arca tio n o f th e th em atic field. Now , how ever, th e d eb a te will concern th e conceptuality. T h e aim s o f this m ain p a rt o f th e lectures are, (1) to d e m o n stra te th a t th e m e an in g o f sentences ca n n o t be co n stru e d objectually (L ectures 9 10), (2) to w ork o u t a new conceptuality, in term s o f w hich we can ex­ plain, if n o t th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f all sentences, th e n at least th e u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f all asserto ric sen ten ces (L ectures 11-19, 27) an d (3) to show th a t th e tra d itio n a l fu n d a m e n ta l concept o f an object can itself only be u n d e rsto o d on th e basis o f this new conceptuality (L ectures 2 0 -2 7 ). I f it is co rrec t th a t we can only achieve a new conceptuality with which th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f linguistic expressions can be ex p lain e d by ex plic­ itly taking leave o f th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d conceptio n , th e n as re g a rd s th e m e th o d o f o u r en q u iry it w ould be advisable, firstly, initially to restrict th e in v estigation to those sem antic stru ctu re s which fall w ithin th e purview o f tra d itio n a l p h ilo so p h y an d , secondly, to sta rt w ith th e criticism o f a th eo ry o f m e an in g w hich th o u g h m o d e rn is still tra d itio n ­ ally o rie n ta te d a n d w hich a ttem p ts to m ake as m uch as possible o f the o b je ct-o rien tate d concep tu ality in sem antics. R e g ard in g th e first p oint, it w ould seem reaso n ab le to ig n o re co m ­ pletely fo r th e tim e b ein g n o n -asse rto ric sentences; fo r these sentences d o n o t fall w ithin the scope o f th e trad itio n al conceptuality at all. M o re­ o ver it w ould a p p e a r sensible to co n c en tra te above all on th e pred icativ e sen ten c e-fo rm . A lth o u g h th e tra d itio n was also fam iliar with o th e r fo rm s o f assertoric sen ten ce, th e trad itio n al sem antic co n cep tio n m akes sense, if at all, only in co n n ectio n with predicative sentences (for o th e r fo rm s cf. L ectures 17 a n d 18); a n d th e stru c tu re o f th e predicative se n ­

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ten ce was widely re g a rd e d as the universal stru c tu re o f th e assertoric sentence, o r ju d g m e n t, as such.2 It is n o accident th at in th e d eb ate with ontology th e two sem antic classes o f singular an d general term s, thus th e two constituen ts o f th e predicative sentence, e m erg ed relatively easily. I f o n e ’s o rien tatio n is tow ards objects th e n th e predicative sen­ tence seems th e one m ost easy to u n d e rsta n d , fo r besides an objectd esignation it contains only one o th e r com p o n en t. M oreover it also seem s reaso n ab le to assum e th at th e predicative statem en t in which an individual is classified is th e m ost elem en tary fo rm o f assertoric speech a n d the o ne which u n d erlies all o th e r sem antic stru ctu res. H usserl is a good rep rese n tativ e o f a trad itio n al position with which to begin. O n th e one h a n d , H usserl was already aw are o f th e p roblem o f th e m e an in g o f linguistic expressions an d , u n d e r th e influence o f Frege, trie d to avoid co n stru in g th e m ean in g o f an ex p ressio n as its object. O n th e o th e r h a n d , he, u nlike Frege, ap p ro a c h e d th e p ro b lem fro m a philosophical position w hich did no t exclude th e subjective (psychological-epistem ological) aspect; an d it was a d ecidedly objecto rien tate d position. F u rth e rm o re , in his th e o ry o f categ o rial synthesis H u sserl m a d e an effo rt, u n iq u e in th e pre-analytical trad itio n , to solve by m eans o f th e trad itio n al conceptuality th e p ro b lem o f how th e m e a n ­ ing o f a com plex expression (in p articu la r th a t o f a sentence) arises o u t o f th e m ean in g o f its com ponents. H ence, in ex am in in g th e possibility o f explaining th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f linguistic expressions an d , in p artic­ u lar, th eir com bination, in term s o f an o b ject-orien tated conceptuality, th e difficulties an d blind alleys o f H u sserl’s sem antics can be re g a rd e d as exem plary. T h e collapse o f the trad itio n al conception, acco rd in g to which lin ­ guistic expressions a re always used to stand fo r so m eth in g , will lead us to them atize th e p h e n o m e n o n , p re su p p o se d b u t n o t reflected u p o n in th e trad itio n al conception, o f mode o f employment, an d to look o u t for a new conception. In analytical philosophy th e re are two ap p ro ach es to th e ex p lan atio n of th e u n d e rs ta n d in g of linguistic expressions an d , in p articu lar, th a t o f assertoric sentences. T h e o ne ap p ro a ch , which stem s fro m the later W ittgenstein, says: to u n d e rsta n d a sen ten ce is to know how it is to be used. T h e o th e r ap p ro a ch , which ex ten d s fro m F rege via th e early W ittgenstein, C a rn a p an d T arsk i to D avidson an d o th ers, says: to u n d e rsta n d an assertoric sentence is to know u n d e r w hat conditions it is tru e o r false. We shall see th a t a satisfactory analysis o f th e m ean in g o f assertoric an d , in p articu la r, o f predicative sentences a n d th e ir com ­ p o n en ts, can only be achieved by com bining these ap p ro a ch es in a c e r­

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tain way. Even now it may a p p e a r plausible th a t th e con cep t o f tru th occupies a place in th e conceptuality o f a th eo ry o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f assertoric sentences which is com parably fu n d a m e n ta l to th a t occu­ pied by th e co n cep t o f an object in th e conceptuality o f ontology an d tran sc en d e n ta l philosophy. O f course th e concept o f tru th also occurs in trad itio n al philosophy. M oreover th e concept o f an object is also reta in ed in analytical philosophy. H ow ever, w hereas in th e trad itio n th e tru th -re la tio n was u n d e rsto o d in term s o f refe re n c e to objects, I shall try to show th a t refe re n c e to objects is essentially an elem en t in the tru th -re la tio n , ju s t as th e fu n ctio n o f sin g u lar term s is only to be u n d e r ­ stood in term s o f th e ir role in a sentence. B ut we ca n n o t be c o n te n t to trea t th e concept o f tru th as som eth in g sim ply given. O f co u rse th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ is n o t definable. It will be o n e o f o u r first tasks a fte r the d em o n stratio n o f th e collapse o f th e o b je ct-o rien tated ap p ro a ch to ex p lain how th e m ean in g o f expressions a n d sem antic classes o f e x p re s­ sions can be investigated philosophically. It will th e n em erg e th a t the ex p lan a tio n o f th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ coincides with th e ex p lan a tio n o f the assertoric, an d , ultim ately, th e predicative se n ten ce-fo rm (L ectures 18, 27). In these lectures I shall n o t get beyond this first step in th e w orking o u t o f a basic analytical conceptuality. W ith the d e m o n stra tio n th a t the refe re n c e to objects is an elem e n t in th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a species o f sentences th e step in th e co n cep tu al research into fo u n d atio n s to w hich th e d eb a te with th e pre-analytical, object-orientated trad itio n is essen ­ tial is concluded. T h e n ex t fu n d a m e n ta l step, w hich co n cern s the ex ten sio n o f th e problem atic fro m assertoric to n o n -asserto ric sen ­ tences, I shall m erely indicate in th e last lecture. T h is step is re g a rd e d by m any analytical p h ilo so p h ers today as th e n ex t to be tak en , th eir a tte n tio n having h ith e rto b een largely confined to assertoric sentences. It seem s clear th a t o n e ca n n o t tra n sfe r th e notion o f tru th -co n d itio n s o r at least n o t autom atically - to sentences which do n o t ch aracteristi­ cally contain a truth-claim . So again we a re faced with an in a d e q u a te concept, this tim e th a t o f th e tru th -re la tio n . A nd o n e can ask w h eth er, by reflecting on its fo u n d atio n s, o n e can so ex ten d this co n cep t as to yield a concept w hich achieves fo r all sentences w hat th e co n cep t o f tru th achieved fo r assertoric sentences. So again th e n ext step in the q u estion o f fo u n d atio n s w ould not consist sim ply in a tte n d in g to h ith ­ e rto neglected sem antic form s. It w ould also involve a sim u ltan eo u s d eb ate with th e previously available fu n d a m e n ta l conceptuality; except th a t this w ould n o lo n g e r be a trad itio n al conceptuality, b u t alread y an analytical one.

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O n e m u st o f co u rse leave o p e n th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r th e co n cep t o f tru th (always assu m in g th a t it does p ro v e to be fu n d a m e n ta l to the analysis o f asserto ric sentences) is really su ite d to serve as th e basis fo r th e so u g h t-a fte r b ro a d e r conceptuality. B u t if this a p p ro a c h fails th e n th e q u estio n arises: fro m w hat o th e r co n c ep tu ality can o n e start? T h e idea th a t th e re is no n e e d to start fro m a p rev io u s, m o re restric ted co n ­ cep tuality, an d th a t a new co n cep tu ality will auto m atically arise fro m th e c o n fro n ta tio n w ith th e new d a ta , is naive. T h is is th e reaso n why, if we a re seeking n o t so m e kind o f in v e n to ry b u t ra th e r co n c ep tu al clari­ fication, we c a n n o t begin im m ediately a c o m p le te fo rm a l sem antics, b u t m u st p e n e tra te th e th e m atic field step by step. T h e seq u en ce o f steps h e re is p re sc rib e d n o t by factors o f th e th e m a tic field b u t by th e avail­ able conceptuality. T h e s tru c tu re o f all sentences w hich I b r o u g h t o u t in th e in tro d u c tio n - M * p * - could o f co u rse give rise to d o u b ts a b o u t this p ro c e d u re . I h ad p o in te d o u t th a t all f u rth e r fo rm a l su b s tru c tu rin g belo n g s to th e p r o p ­ ositional co n ten t. W e m u st th e re fo re ex p e ct th a t th e re is also a p r e d i­ cative fo rm , etc., in th e case o f n o n -a sse rto ric sentences. W ould it n o t th e n be m uch m o re satisfactory fro m a system atic p o in t o f view if in stead o f first restric tin g ourselves to asserto ric sen ten ces we w ere to p ro ce ed like J o h n S earle in his book Speech Acts, i.e. m a first section investigate th e sem antics o f th e d iffe re n t m o d e s a n d , in a second sec­ tion, th e sem antics o f p ro p o sitio n a l stru c tu re s in ab stractio n fro m th e m odes? T h is w ould in d e e d be m o re satisfactory fro m a system atic p o in t o f view, b u t I do n o t see th e co n c ep tu al m e an s with w hich we can carry o u t such a n u n d e rta k in g . In p a rtic u la r I m u st p o in t to two difficulties: firstly, b o th m o d e a n d p ro p o sitio n a l c o n te n t a re ab stra ct elem en ts o f sen tences th e significance o f w hich we c a n n o t h o p e to clearly g rasp rig h t at th e b eg in n in g o f o u r u n d e rta k in g ; a n d co n n e c te d with this is th e fact th a t in d ev e lo p in g th e co n c ep tu ality necessary fo r th e analysis o f th ese co m p o n en ts th e re is, in n e ith e r case, a tra d itio n a l co n cep tu ality w hich we can sta rt o u t fro m . S econdly, as o ne is d ea lin g with two m o m en ts, n o t with tw o c o n stitu e n ts, o n e c a n n o t so conceive th e stru c ­ tu re M*^>* th a t th e con cep tu ality re q u ire d fo r th e analysis o f th e on e elem e n t could be in d e p e n d e n t o f th e co n cep tu ality re q u ire d fo r th e analysis o f th e o th e r elem ent. B u t in th a t case it w ould seem m ost unlikely th a t an analysis first o f th e m odes a n d th e n o f th e p ro p o sitio n a l co n te n t could lead to a satisfactory resu lt. Since o n e c a n n o t d o ev ery ­ th in g at o n ce th e re is no a ltern ativ e b u t to p r e p a re th e g en e ral se m an ­ tics o f th e form s o f p ro p o sitio n a l c o n te n t by first an alysing som e o f th ese fo rm s in co n n e ctio n with one m o d e. A n d th e m o d e m ost suitable

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fo r this p u rp o se is clearly th e traditionally m ost fam iliar one, viz. the assertoric m ode. O nly th a t su b se q u en t ab straction -step to which I have already re fe rre d w hich w ould have to lead beyond th e conceptuality th a t p ro v ed successful fo r th e analysis o f assertoric sentences w ould m ake possible both an u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e o th e r m odes an d a co n cep ­ tuality in which we can u n d e rs ta n d th e form s o f p ro p o sitio n al co n ten t in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e individual m odes. W e thus find ourselves once m o re r e fe rre d to a step-by-step p ro c e d u re . H ow ever convincing S earle’s p ro g ra m m e may be it is a p ro g ra m m e fo r th e fu tu re - as can be seen fro m the co n c ep tu al u n fru itfu ln e ss o f S earle’s own carry in g o u t o f this p ro g ra m m e (w hich I will only be ex am in in g later. See p. 398). O n e m u st recognize th at, as in any rese arch , so too in philosophical research into fo u n d a tio n s, th e seq u en ce o f steps in the analysis does n ot c o rre sp o n d to th e sequence in th e su b se q u en t system atic exposition. B efo re we begin o u r u n d e rta k in g with th e ex am in atio n o f H u sse rl’s analysis o f the predicative sen ten c e-fo rm I would like to specify the q u estions w hich m u st g u id e us. W e will be dealing fo r th e first tim e with q u estions o f m e an in g an d we sho u ld fra m e such questions in a way w hich involves th e few est possible assum ptions. I f one asks: ‘W hat is the m e an in g o f th e ex p re ssio n “r e d ”?’ o ne clearly m eans the sam e as w hen on e asks: ‘H ow is th e expression “r e d ” to be u n d e rsto o d ? ’ We ca n n o t speak o f th e m e a n in g o f an ex p re ssio n w ith o u t re fe rrin g to an u n d e r ­ stan d in g ; b u t we can p erfectly well speak o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f an ex p ression w ithout re fe rrin g to a m eaning. It w ould th e re fo re seem to involve few er p resu p p o sitio n s if one w ere to fo rm u late a m eaningq u estion as follows: ‘H ow is th e expression “A ” to be u n d e rsto o d ? ’ r a th e r th a n as follows: ‘W hat is th e m e an in g o f th e ex p ressio n “A ”?’ A n o b je ct-o rien tated th e o ry o f m e a n in g will o f course p re fe r th e second version because it is analogously fo rm u la te d to th e q u estio n : ‘W h at is th e object fo r w hich th e n am e ‘W ” stan d s?’ B u t th e o b ject-o rien tated p h ilo so p h er can also have no objection to th e first version. In fo rm u la t­ ing the q u estio n we sh o u ld n o t already p re d e te rm in e a p articu la r answ er. So alth o u g h we should n o t puristically avoid sp eak in g o f the m e an in g o f an ex p re ssio n (which is a perfectly n a tu ra l way o f speaking), we sho u ld n o t be m isled into asking questions w hich a re only suggested by this m o d e o f speech. H ow ever we are n o t dealin g with so sim ple a sem antic q u estion as th a t co n c ern in g th e m e an in g o f th e w ord ‘r e d ’. T h e q u estio n c o n c e rn ­ ing the u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e pred icativ e sen ten c e-fo rm d iffers fro m such a q u estio n in two respects. Firstly, it co ncern s th e m ean in g o f an ex p ressio n (such as ‘T h e ball is r e d ’) which is com posed o f two elem ents

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each of w hich already has a m ean in g b u t w hich w hen co m b in ed yield a u n ita ry m eaning. As we are in te reste d in th e q uestion o f how the u n d e rsta n d in g o f the sentence-w hole d e p e n d s on the u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e two sen ten ce-p arts we m ust now, secondly, abstract fro m the p artic­ u la r m e an in g o f this sentence o r its com ponents an d ask ab o u t th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e sentence-form ‘Fa o r ‘Fab’ (cf. p. 26). I f one asks how a w hole is m ade u p of p arts, th e re is clearly a relatio n o f in te rd e p e n d e n c e betw een a co rrect u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e p arts (as p arts o f this whole) o f the w hole a n d o f th e com bination. We m ust th e re fo re exp ect an analysis o f th e predicative sen ten ce-fo rm to p ro ­ vide an answ er to the follow ing fo u r questions: (1) how is a singular te rm u n d ersto o d ? (2) how is a p red ic ate u n d ersto o d ? (3) how is th e com bination of a singular te rm with a p red ic ate u n d e r ­ stood? (4) how is a (predicative) assertoric sentence u n d ersto o d ? It is n o t so easy to fo rm u late these fo rm a l-sem an tic questions in term s o f th e w ord ‘m e a n in g ’. It may seem plausible to use th e ‘as’ fo r­ m u la o f ontology and ask, e.g., ‘In w hat does th e m ean in g o f a p red icate as such consist?’ B ut th e question ‘In w hat does th e m e an in g consist?’ has no clear m eaning; it could tu rn o u t to be a p seu d o -q u estio n . In question (3), finally, th e referen c e to a m eaning no lo n g er seem s a p p ro ­ p riate, unless th a t is o n e assum es th a t to th e co m bination too th e re som ehow c o rresp o n d s ‘a m e an in g ’. B ecause o f these difficulties I have im m ediately fo rm u la te d th e fo u r questions w ithout using a w ord like ‘m e an in g ’ o r ‘sense’ (like H usserl I re g a rd these two expressions as synonym s). B u t even if we confine o u r ­ selves to th e w ord ‘u n d e rs ta n d in g ’ it is far fro m clear how such fo rm a lsem antic questions a re to be fo rm u late d . O n an ea rlier occasion I u sed th e fo rm u latio n ‘W hat is it to u n d e rsta n d a p red ic ate ?’ B u t already at th e tim e I re m a rk e d th a t this fo rm u latio n can only be re g a rd e d as p r o ­ visional (p. 35 f). W e co u ld only arrive at a clear fo rm u latio n o f o u r questions if we w ere clear ab o u t th e type o f answ er we expect. We th u s find ourselves in the aw kw ard, b u t in philosophy n o t u n u su a l, position o f n o t know ing clearly w hat it is we a re really asking ab o u t. It is im p o r­ ta n t in such cases th a t o n e at least knows th a t o n e does n o t know. W e will th u s have to b e a r in m in d th a t th e questions them selves also becom e c lea re r in the co u rse o f bein g answ ered. In p articu la r we m u st see to it th a t th e fo rm al sem antic questions (e.g. co n c ern in g th e u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f predicates) reta in th e necessary connections w ith th e c o n ­ cre te sem antic questions (e.g. ab o u t th e m e an in g o f ‘r e d ’) fro m w hich

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they re su lt th ro u g h form alization. We m u st th e re fo re find a fo rm fo r co n crete sem antic q uestions w hich can be tra n s fe rre d to the fo rm alized questions. O n e such possibility (which I m e n tio n by way o f anticip atio n ) is th e follow ing. O n e can also d e-substantify the q u estio n co n c ern in g ‘the u n d e rs ta n d in g ’ of, e.g., th e expression ‘r e d ’ an d ask: ‘U n d e r w hat co nditions d o we say o f som eo n e th at h e u n d e rsta n d s th e ex p ressio n “r e d ”?’ B u t to speak o f conditions (or th e ‘conditions o f th e possibility’) also involves substantivization. Clearly we ca n n o t ex p ress w hat is m e an t by m eans o f a substantive, b u t only by m eans o f a sen ten ce, nam ely, by saying: th e answ er we are aim ing at to th e questio n co n c ern in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e expression ‘r e d ’ m u st have th e form : ‘so m eo n e u n d e rsta n d s the expression “r e d ” if an d only if . . .’ T h is fo rm u latio n can now easily be tra n s fe rre d to th e form alized sem antic q u estio n . W hen we ask ab o u t th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f p redicates we are looking fo r an answ er o f th e form : ‘S om eone u n d e rsta n d s a p red ic ate “F” if an d only if . . .’ Now it seem s plausible to conceive th e co m p letio n o f this ifsen tence in such a way th a t both in th e co ncrete q u estio n an d in the fo rm alized sem antic question th e m ode o f em p lo y m e n t o f the e x p re s­ sion is bein g r e fe rre d to. As this seem s to involve a distinct p reju d ice against th e o b ject-o rien tated position I w anted at p rese n t sim ply to m en tio n this perspective, n o t to ad o p t it. I shall com e back to this q u es­ tion o f th e fo rm in w hich fo rm a l-se m a n tic questions a re to be p o sed at th e b eg in n in g o f th e positive analytical reflections, in conn ectio n with a p rin cip le o f W ittgenstein (L ectures 11 a n d 12). L et us now r e tu r n to th e fo u r questions re fe rre d to above. C learly q u estion (3) (how is th e com bination o f th e sin g u lar te rm with th e p r e d ­ icate u n d ersto o d ? ) is th e key-question. F rom its clarification th e re w ould im m ediately have to follow th e answ er to th e fo u rth q u estio n : how is th e predicative sentence u n d e rsto o d ? We can also expect th a t an ad e q u a te answ er to th e first two questions is only possible if th e th ird q u estion is alread y included; fo r only if it can be show n th a t in the u n d e rsta n d in g o f each o f th e two se n ten ce-co m p o n en ts the u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f its com bination with th e o th e r c o m p o n e n t is alread y in clu d ed can o n e expect a u n ita ry m e an in g o f the w hole sen ten ce an d n o t a m e re ag g lo m erate o f two m eanings to result. It w ould seem th e re fo re th a t we sho u ld begin with questio n (3), o r at least include it fro m th e very b eginning. H ow ever, if we w ant to tak e as o u r sta rtin g -p o in t the object-o rien tated , a n d specifically th e H u sserlian , th eory th e n we m u st first observe th e sequen ce which th e basic ap p ro a ch o f this th e o ry dictates. It is characteristic o f th e o b ject-o rien ­

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ta te d ap p ro a c h th a t it does n o t tak e as its sta rtin g -p o in t th e com p o sitio n o f th e se n ten ce, b u t is prim arily o rie n ta te d tow ard s th a t sen ten cec o m p o n e n t w hich stan d s fo r an object, viz. th e sin g u lar term . It th e n c o n stru e s th e w hole se n ten c e as also sta n d in g fo r an object. In th e in te r ­ p re ta tio n o f H usserl we will th e re fo re have to sta rt w ith qu estio n (1), a n d fro m th e re m ove tow ards a p re lim in a ry decision a b o u t q u estio n (4). O nly a fte r this will we be able to deal w ith q u estio n s (2) an d (3) to g e th e r. H u sse rl’s a p p ro a c h , a n d th e o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a ch in g en e ral, fo u n d e rs on th e q u estio n o f how p red ic ate s a re u n d e rsto o d . In p red ic ate s th e re fo re we will find a sta rtin g -p o in t fo r th e d ev e lo p ­ m e n t o f a new , specifically lan guage-analytical, co n cep tio n . T h u s in w o rking o u t th e language-analytical co n c ep tio n I will p ro ce ed in rev e rse o rd e r. I shall begin with q u estio n (2) - p red ic ate s - (L ectures 11 and 12) a n d th e n p ro ce ed to a p re lim in a ry inv estig atio n o f q u estio n (4) - th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f asserto ric sentences as such - (L ectu res 1 3 16). O nly at the en d (L ectures 2 0 -2 7 ) will I d ev elo p th e lan g u ag eanalytical con cep tio n o f sin g u lar term s. It will em e rg e th a t sin g u lar term s in fact p re se n t sem antic analysis with m uch g re a te r difficulties th a n do p red icates, a n d th a t th e o b je ct-o rien tate d analysis ex p lain s th e sem antic categ o ry o f sin g u lar term s, fo r w hose e x p la n a tio n it was se em ­ ingly p re d e stin e d , in a wholly in a d e q u a te way. In th e lan g u ag eanalytical analysis sin g u la r te rm a n d p re d ic a te are essentially u n d e r ­ stood as se n ten c e-p arts; th e an sw er to q u estio n s (3) a n d (4) will th e r e ­ fo re follow autom atically fro m th e clarification o f th e first two q u e s­ tions. In conclusion I w ant to deal w ith an objection th a t has p ro b ab ly o c c u rre d to som e o f you d u rin g th ese last reflections. I am b eg in n in g with th e q u estio n o f th e m e an in g o f a com posite ex p ressio n . B u t w ould it n o t be m o re a p p ro p ria te fro m a system atic p o in t o f view to first ex p lain how a n o n -co m p o site ex p re ssio n is to be u n d e rs to o d ? F or only th en w ould we have a basis fo r th e q u estio n o f how a co m p o site e x p re s ­ sion arises o u t o f th e m eanings o f its c o m p o n e n t ex p ressio n s. H ow ever, if it is co rrec t th a t th e p rim a ry sem an tic u n its a re sen ten ces (an d h en c e com posite expressions) th e n th e q u estio n c o n c e rn in g the sem antics o f elem e n ta ry com posite ex p ressio n s is th e fu n d a m e n ta l sem antic q uestion. B u t in th a t case o n e c a n n o t h o p e to be able to clarify th e essence o f th e m e a n in g o f ex p ressio n s in g en e ral in d e p e n d e n tly of an sw erin g this q uestion. We m ust th e re fo re also ex p e ct th a t all n o n ­ co m posite ex p ressio n s a re essentially c o m p o n e n t-e x p re ssio n s a n d th a t th e ir m e a n in g can only be u n d e rsto o d in te rm s o f th e sentence-w hole.

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If this is co rrec t th e n any sem antic theory is m istaken which believes it can first say so m e th in g ab o u t th e m eaning o f sim ple expressions an d only th e n m ove on to th e q u estio n o f how th e m e an in g o f a com posite ex p ressio n arises o u t o f the m e a n in g of its c o m p o n e n t expressions.

LECTURE

9

Husserl’s theory of m eaning1

H u sserl develops the fo u n d atio n s o f his theory o f m ean in g in his Logical Investigations, p articularly in Investigation I, w hich is en title d ‘E x p res­ sion and M e an in g ’. T h e in tro d u c to ry p a ra g ra p h s are d ev o ted to d istin ­ g u ishing ‘m e a n in g fu l’ signs - linguistic expressions - fro m indicative signs. T h e concepts essential to his th eo ry o f th e m ean in g o f linguistic exp ressions a re in tro d u c e d by H u sserl in §§9-14. T h e first, fu n d a m e n ­ tal step is ta k en in §9: if an expression is n o t ju s t ‘a m e re w o rd -so u n d ’ b u t a sign an d , m oreo v er, a sign o f a specific kin d , th e n th is is d u e to th e fact th a t it can be ‘in te rp re te d ’ as so m ething w hich has a m eaning. T h e m ere p a tte rn o f so u n d s or m ark s o n p a p e r d o es n o t have a m e a n ­ ing in its e lf; r a th e r the m ean in g is ‘c o n fe rre d ’ u p o n it by its b ein g in te r­ p re te d in a p a rtic u la r way. T h is first step in H u sse rl’s investigation seem s to m e to be u n o b jec­ tionable, th o u g h no t obvious. By taking it H u sserl placed his analyses o n a d e e p e r th o u g h m o re h azard o u s basis th a n Frege: a satisfactory th e o ry o f m e an in g ca n n o t confine itself to talking abstractly a b o u t m eanings; it m u st also take into account the psychological o r a n th ro ­ pological fac to r o f the sign-user. M eanings do n o t exist in a Platonic h eaven; they a re m eanings o f signs. A nd they a re m ean in g s o f signs only in virtue o f the fact th a t certain sensible fo rm s are u sed (‘in te r­ p r e te d ’) as signs. I f this is so, th e n it is fu n d a m e n ta l to a satisfactory th eo ry o f m e an in g th a t one correctly characterize the m ode o f b ehav io u r, o r conscious­ ness, in w hich an expression is in te rp re te d as m ean in g fu l. In th e p r e ­ vious lecture I drew atte n tio n to th e fact th at o ne only speaks o f m e a n ­ ings o f expressions in connection with an u n d e rsta n d in g o f these expressions. O n e w ould th e re fo re have expected H u sserl to re fe r to th a t which ‘c o n fe rs’ m e an in g on th e expression as understanding, so th a t

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the further question would then have to be: What is it to understand an ex p ression? F rom th e ou tset, how ever, H usserl speaks, as th o u g h this w ere obvious, o f m e a n in g -c o n fe rrin g acts. A nd in H usserl ‘act’ is a technical te rm fo r ‘in te n tio n a l e x p e rie n c e ’. As in d icated in L ec tu re 6, by an in te n ­ tional ex p e rien c e H usserl m eans a m ode o f consciousness o f an object. T h e co n c ep t o f intentionality, which is n o t explicitly d ev elo p ed u n til In v estigation V - in an analysis w hich, significantly, is no lo n g e r o rie n ta te d tow ards th e m eanings o f linguistic exp ressio n s - is alread y p re su p p o se d as th e only possible basic concept o f th e th e o ry o f co n ­ sciousness in th e sem antic Investig atio n I. ‘In virtu e o f these acts [the m e a n in g -c o n fe rrin g acts] th e expression is m o re th a n m erely a w ordso u n d . It m eans som eth in g , a n d by m e an in g it it re fe rs to an o b ject’

(§9). Y ou will notice how , in an alm ost p ara d ig m atic m a n n e r, th e p ro b lem o f m e a n in g is h e re overlain w ith a trad itio n al, o b ject-o rien tated co n cep ­ tuality. W h at it m ean s to u n d e rs ta n d a linguistic exp ressio n is a q u estio n w hich is n o t asked. It is ta k en fo r g ra n te d th a t it is a m a tte r o f in te n ­ tional consciousness, consciousness d ire c te d to an object. F rom th e o u t­ set H u sserl ap p ro a c h e s th e p ro b lem o f m e an in g w ith this co n c ep t o f consciousness. O n e m ight have ex p ected , as th e logical co n seq u en ce o f this a p p ro a c h , th a t th e m e an in g o f an expression w ould be sim ply id e n ­ tified w ith th e object to w hich th e m e a n in g -c o n fe rrin g act is d irected . H ow ever, H usserl does n o t m ake such an identification. H u sse rl is so re w a rd in g as a critical p o in t o f d e p a r tu re because, on th e o n e h a n d , his a p p ro a c h is, explicitly a n d as a resu lt o f philosophical reflectio n , an o b je ct-o rien tate d one, a n d because, on th e o th e r h a n d , he n o n eth eless reco g n ized th a t th e m ean in g s o f expressions ca n n o t sim ply be co n ­ s tru e d as objects. So by ex a m in in g H u sse rl’s theory o f m e an in g o n e can investigate th e questio n o f how far a consistently o b ject-o rien tated a p p ro a c h can as it w ere be stretch e d bey o n d itse lf; th u s how far, if on e starts o u t fro m th e assu m p tio n th a t linguistic expressions a re u sed to re p re s e n t objects, o ne can n o netheless take accoun t o f th e fact th a t the u n d e rs ta n d in g o f expressions is n o t identical with th e re p re se n ta tio n o f objects. H u sse rl took account o f this fact in two respects, a n d in so doing in d ic ated d iffe re n t possible ways in w hich th e m ean in g s o f linguistic expressions can be in c o rp o ra te d into a consciousness o f objects w ith o u t them selves having to be re g a rd e d as objects. Firstly, he acknow ledged th a t th e re a re expressio n s w hich, th o u g h they have a m e an in g , d o n o t in any way stand fo r an object: th e so-

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called sy n ca te g o rem a tic expressions. T h is c o n c ep t ste m s fr o m th e sem antics o f tra d itio n a l logic.2 C a te g o re m a tic ex p re ssio n s w ere th o se w hich can o ccu r as terms, i.e. in th e position o f su b ject o r p re d ic a te in th e p ro p o sitio n s o f a syllogism. T h e n o tio n o f sin g u la r an d g e n e ra l te rm s is o f th e sam e o rig in . E xp ressio n s w hich c a n n o t fu n c tio n as te rm s w ere re g a rd e d as m e re aux iliary w ords. T h e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h also lies b e h in d this division o f ex p re ssio n s in to cate g o re m atic a n d syncateg o rem atic. In th e A risto telian o n tolo g y , ev ery ex p re ssio n w hich falls u n d e r o n e o f th e ‘ca te g o rie s’ (every kategorema), i.e. every ex p re ssio n w hich can fu n ctio n as a sin g u la r o r g e n e ra l te rm , stan d s fo r so m eth in g . T h e se ex pressions w hich stan d fo r so m e th in g have an in d e ­ p e n d e n t m e an in g . In c lu d e d a m o n g th e m w ere also w hole asserto ric sen tences. A cc o rd in g to this co n c ep tio n , o th e r e x p re ssio n s h ave a m e a n in g only in co n n e ctio n w ith ca te g o re m a tic ex p re ssio n s a n d w ere, fo r this re a so n , called ‘sy n c ate g o re m a tic’. H u sse rl takes over th e division in to c a te g o re m atic a n d sy n c a te g o re ­ m atic ex p ressio n s (In v estig atio n IV §4 ff.). W e will see la te r how h e fits sy n c ateg o rem atic ex p ressio n s into his o b je c t-o rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h . I n i­ tially, in In v estig atio n I, th e d istin ctio n is ig n o re d . H e re H u sserl seem s, w hen sp e a k in g o f ex p ressio n s in a com pletely g en e ral way, to be th in k ­ in g only o f c a te g o re m atic expressions. B u t even in th e case o f c a te g o ­ rem atic ex p ressio n s, in o th e r w ords, ex p re ssio n s w hich sta n d fo r so m e­ th in g , H u sse rl does n o t th in k th a t th e object fo r w hich an ex p ressio n stan ds is th e m e an in g o f th a t ex p re ssio n : ‘E very [!] e x p re ssio n . . . has n o t only its m e an in g , b u t also re fe rs to c e rta in objects . . . B u t th e object n ev e r coincides with th e m e a n in g ’ (In v estig atio n I §12). In th e n o tio n th a t, in th e case o f all (categorem atic) ex p ressio n s, o n e m u st d istin g u ish betw een th e object a n d th e m e a n in g o f th e ex p ressio n , H u sserl is in v o k in g a distinction m a d e som e years e a rlie r by F re g e, in his essay ‘O n Sense a n d R e fe re n c e ’.3 In this essay F re g e sta rte d o u t fro m th o se ex p ressio n s he called p r o p e r n a m e s a n d w hich m o re o r less c o rre sp o n d to th e sin g u la r term s o f th e o ld e r tra d itio n . A n d H u sse rl too states: ‘N am es o ffe r th e clea re st ex a m p le s o f th e s e p a ra tio n o f m e an in g a n d re fe re n c e to an o b je ct’ (In v e stig a tio n I 12). A lth o u g h H u sse rl’s te rm in o lo g y is n o t w holly u n a m b ig u o u s, h e m e an s by n am es p rin cipally ex p ressio n s w hich ‘can p e rfo rm th e sim ple su b je ct-fu n ctio n in a sta te m e n t’ (Investig atio n V §34). W hat we have h e r e th e n is H u s ­ se rl’s sem antics o f sin g u la r term s. W e a re th e re fo r e fac ed with th e first o f th e fo u r questio n s w hich I sin g led o u t a t th e e n d o f th e p rev io u s lectu re as b ein g im p o rta n t fo r th e clarification o f th e p red ic ativ e se n ­ tence.

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H ow does H u sserl answ er th e questio n ab o u t the m ean in g o f sin g u lar term s? Every such ex p ressio n , he says, designates an object. A n d if one defines ‘object’ as I suggested in L ec tu re 3 an d as it is also d efin ed by H u sse rl,4 th e n o n e will take no excep tio n to this sta te m en t (th o u g h one may p e rh a p s fo rm u la te it m o re carefully as: ‘Every sin g u lar te rm claims to d e sig n ate an o b ject’5 in o r d e r to allow fo r th e fact th a t w hat is d esig­ n ated m ay n o t exist). B ut, h e con tin u es, every such ex p ressio n also has a m e a n in g , an d this is to be d istin g u ish ed fro m th e object. In s u p p o rt o f this claim , H u sserl, like F rege, points to th e fact th a t two sin g u lar term s can d esig n ate th e sam e object a n d yet n o t have the sam e m e a n ­ ing, e.g. ‘th e victor o f J e n a ’ an d ‘the v anquished o f W aterlo o ’, or, to q u o te F re g e ’s c e le b ra ted ex am p le, ‘th e E vening S tar’ an d ‘the M o rn in g S ta r’. O n e can u n d e rs ta n d both expressions, a n d thus know w hat m e a n ­ ing they have, a n d yet n o t know th a t they stand fo r th e sam e object. F re g e an d H u sse rl a re h e re re fe rrin g in p articu la r to a specific class o f sin g u lar term s know n as ‘d efin ite d escrip tio n s’. So as to be able so m e­ how to classify th e se ex pressions we should first get clear ab o u t the various sem antic types o f tho se sin g u lar term s with which co n crete (p erceptible) objects can be d esig n ated . I will r e tu rn to these d istin c­ tions w hen, follow ing th e discussion o f predicates, I give my ow n an a l­ ysis o f sin g u lar term s. A first possible way in w hich expressions can d esig n ate co n crete objects is th e deictic, by m eans o f d em o n strativ e p ro n o u n s such as ‘th is’ o r ‘th a t’ a n d p e rso n a l p ro n o u n s such as ‘I ’, ‘you’, ‘it’. It is characteristic o f this m o d e o f d esig n atio n th a t it d e p e n d s on th e co n tex t o f speech w hich object th e ex p ressio n stan d s for. In th e case o f such a w ord, one ca n n o t ask fo r w hich object does it stand, only for w hich object does it stan d in this o r th a t context. T h e ob ject-referen ce d e p e n d s on th e p a r ­ ticu lar use. I f o n e takes this p ro p e rty as th e criterio n o f an ex p re ssio n ’s m e m b e rsh ip o f this class, th e n we will also have to in clu d e in th e class o f deictic subject-expressions tho se expressions which consist in th e co m b in atio n o f a d e m o n stra tiv e p ro n o u n o r a possessive adjective with a su bstantive, e.g. ‘this h o rse ’, ‘o u r h o rse ’, likewise th e com b in atio n with th e d efin ite article (‘th e h o rse ’) w h ere the expressio n is n o t used to d es­ ig n ate a species (‘th e h o rse is a dom estic an im al’) b u t in such a way th a t an in d iv id u al object o f this k in d is m ean t, w here it is again given by the co n text w hich object it is. A second class is co n stitu ted by definite descriptions: expressions such as ‘th e victor o f J e n a ’, ‘th e E vening S ta r’. E xpressions o f this kind d esig n ate an object by specifying a certain characteristic (e.g. th a t o f b eing th e victor o f J e n a ) w hich, it is su p p o sed , belongs only to a single

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object, this being expressed by th e definite article. Russell th e re fo re aptly called these expressions ‘defin ite d escrip tio n s’.6 A th ird class consists o f p ro p e r nam es, such as ‘N ap o le o n ’, ‘V en u s’, ‘B o n n ’. It is characteristic o f these expressions that, alth o u g h they des­ ignate an object, they do no t do so by m eans o f a co n te x t-d e p e n d e n t or c o n te x t-in d e p e n d e n t description. It th e re fo re seems co rrect to say o f th ese w ords th a t they have no m eaning. For it m akes no sense to ask for th e m ean in g o f such a w ord o r to ask how it is to be u n d e rsto o d : one can only ask which object does it designate. In th e trad itio n d e term in e d by ontology the fact th a t these w ords d esignate objects b u t th at one can n o t in ad d itio n ask fo r th eir m e an in g m ade th em seem th e linguistic expressions par excellence. From a naive p o in t o f view p r o p e r nam es seem also to be the sin g u lar term s w hich it is m ost easy to u n d e rsta n d . In contrast to a definite d escription a p ro p e r n am e seem s to desig n ate th e object as such, im m ediately an d d irectly.7 W e will see later th a t this is a m istake an d th a t th e m ode o f em p lo y m en t o f p ro p e r nam es belongs to a h ig h e r level th a n th a t o f th e o th e r two classes o f referrin g ex pression an d indeed presu p p o ses them . At p re se n t all th a t needs to be m a d e clear is that the thesis o f F reg e an d H usserl, th a t every ‘n am e’ bo th designates an object an d has a m eaning, is valid for only one class o f co ncrete sin g u lar term s: definite descriptions. Deictic sin g u lar term s do no t in them selves stan d for an object; and p ro p e r nam es have no m eaning. F or us th e im p o rta n t q u es­ tion is w h eth er, an d if so how, o n e can m ake sense o f th e n o tio n o f a m ean in g o f an expression which is distinct fro m th e object fro m an ob ject-o rien tated p oint o f view. W h at is to be u n d e rsto o d by th e m e a n ­ ing o f a ‘n a m e ’? F rege h ad alread y given a plausible answ er to this question. O f course o n e m ust take note o f his d iffe re n t term inology. F rege, u n lik e H usserl, does no t use ‘sense’ (Sinn) and ‘m e a n in g ’ (Bedeutung) as synonym s; ra th e r for th a t which H usserl p rim arily calls ‘m e an in g ’ F reg e exclu­ sively uses th e w ord ‘sen se’ an d , d e p a rtin g fro m o rd in a ry linguistic usage, calls th e object th e m eaning (Bedeutung) o f the expression. T h is term inological d iffe ren ce does n o t involve any ad d itio n al substantive problem s; it is ju s t th a t w hen speaking ab o u t F re g e ’s views o n e m ust be clear w h eth e r o ne is using th e w ord ‘m e an in g ’ in his o r th e u su al sense. N ow acco rd in g to F rege th e sense o f th e ex pressio n contains th e ‘m o d e o f p re se n ta tio n ’ o f the object.8 It is clearly constitutive o f m aterial objects th a t they can a p p e a r in an u n lim ite d n u m b e r o f perspectives o r m odes o f p rese n tatio n . F re g e ’s thesis is th a t every definite d escription designates an object as th e object w hich is given in such-and-such a way.

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T h e expression ‘th e Evening S ta r’, fo r exam ple, stands for th e object which a p p e ars at a p articu la r tim e in a p a rtic u la r p a rt o f th e sky. T h e sam e object a p p e a rs at a n o th e r tim e in a n o th e r p a rt o f the sky an d if on e designates it as th e object w hich a p p e a rs thus o n e calls it ‘th e M o rn ­ ing S ta r’. Now th a t is an account w hich H usserl was well able to ad o p t. In In v estigation I th o u g h he gives yet a n o th e r account. H e starts fro m the assu m p tio n th a t expressions w hich d esig n ate th e sam e object b u t have d iffe re n t m eanings a re distin g u ish ed fro m o ne a n o th e r by ‘th e specific m a n n e r in which th e object is m e a n t’ (Investigation I §13). It th e re fo re seem ed plausible to co n stru e th e m ean in g as a ch aracteristic o f th e act. H ow ever, an expression has o n e identical m eaning , w hereas any n u m ­ b er o f acts can in te rp re t it in th e sam e way. H usserl th e re fo re cam e to th e view th a t th e m ean in g consists in th e essence (th e ‘ideal species’) of th e rele v an t act (‘o f m ean in g th e p a rtic u la r object’). ‘T h e m e an in g (.Bedeutung), th e re fo re stands to th e various acts o f m ean in g (Meinen) . . . as red n ess in specie stands to th e strips o f p a p e r lying h e re w hich all “h av e” this sam e re d n e ss’ (Investigation I §31). T h is at any ra te is a possible way in w hich H usserl can acco m m o d ate m eanings w ithin th e fram ew o rk o f his o b ject-o rien tated ap p ro a ch . B ut it is by no m eans obvious th a t w hen we m ean an object with a d efin ite d escrip tio n w hat we u n d e rsta n d is th e essence o f this (act of) m eaning. T h is acco u n t is also u n ab le to answ er the question o f how it is th a t th e re are d iffe re n t m odes in which o n e an d th e sam e object can be m eant. Does n o t a p articu la r m ode o f p re se n ta tio n o f th e object co rre sp o n d to each such act-essence? L ater, in his Ideas. (§94), H u sserl m odified his co n ception in this direction, which h ad already b een an ticip ated by F re g e’s account: th e ‘sense’ is th e ‘object in its specific m ode o f p re se n ­ ta tio n ’ (§131). T h is is a second possible way o f in te g ra tin g m ean in g s which a re dis­ tinct fro m th e object into th e object-o rien tated ap p ro a ch : th e m ean in g is n o t th e object b u t th e m o d e o f p rese n tatio n o f th e object. A n d it is, m o reover, quite a plausible view. R eflection on th e m ode o f p re se n ta tio n of objects is characteristic o f th e so-called tra n sc e n d e n ta l tu rn in ontology. In its tran sc en d e n ta l fo rm th e theory o f objects th u s h ad a perspective in which it could m ake intelligible th e m eanings o f at least those expressions which also desig­ n ate objects. In th e th eo ry th a t the m e an in g of an ex p ressio n is th e m ode o f p rese n tatio n o f th e object, th e concept o f m e an in g rem ains d e p e n d e n t on th e concept o f an object. In d e e d fro m th e o u tset we m ust expect th a t it is sim ply n o t possible fo r th e object-o rien tated ap p ro a ch

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to develop a co n c ep t o f m e an in g w hich w ould be in d e p e n d e n t o f th e co n c ep t o f an object. H u sse rl’s first ex p la n a tio n o f th e m e an in g of a ‘n a m e ’ - th e m e an in g is th e essence o f th e act o f m e an in g - is an e x p la ­ n a tio n in w hich th e m e a n in g is u n d e rs to o d in term s o f th e object-reference; fo r it rests on th e assu m p tio n th a t th e re is an act, a n d an act is th e consciousness o f an object. T h e co n c ep t o f m e a n in g which is d e p e n d e n t on re fe re n c e to objects is o f course u n p ro b le m a tic so long as we a re d ealin g with sin g u lar te rm s, in o th e r w ords, w ith expressio n s w hich d esig n ate objects. B u t now w hat is th e position as re g a rd s th e m e an in g o f th e re m a in in g ca te­ go rem atic ex p ressio n s, viz. (a) g en e ral term s a n d (b) w hole assertoric sentences? T h e s e q u estio n s c o rre sp o n d to th e second a n d th e fo u rth o f th e fo u r questio n s to w hich I r e f e r re d at th e e n d o f th e p rev io u s lec­ tu re. L et us first co n sid er q u estio n 4, th a t o f th e m e an in g o f th e w hole assertoric senten ce. H u sse rl gives an answ er to this q u estio n in In v esti­ g ation I, b e fo re an sw e rin g th e th ird q uestion - th e q u estio n ab o u t p r e ­ dicative s tru c tu re - in In v estig ato n V I. T ac k lin g th in g s in this o r d e r also m akes sense in te rm s o f th e su b je ct-m a tte r. F or o n e can certainly say so m e th in g ab o u t how in g e n e ra l o ne sh o u ld in te r p re t th e m e a n in g o f w hole asserto ric se n ten ces - w h e th e r they be p red icativ e o r n o t even b e fo re o n e has investigated th e ir stru c tu re . We shall see th a t th e a cco u n t w hich H usserl gives o f th e m e an in g o f th e w hole asserto ric se n ten ce p re d e te rm in e s a p a rtic u la r answ er to th e th ird a n d crucial q u estio n a b o u t p red ic ativ e stru c tu re . H usserl does n o t wish to restric t his thesis th a t every ex p ressio n b o th re fe rs to an object a n d has a m e a n in g to sin g u la r term s. It holds fo r all (categorem atic) ex p ressio n s an d , in p a rtic u la r, fo r w hole asserto ric se n ­ tences (§12). B u t now w h at a re we to u n d e rs ta n d by th e m e an in g an d th e object o f a w hole asserto ric sentence? H u sse rl p ro v id es n o u n e q u iv ­ ocal answ er to this questio n . O n th e o n e h a n d , h e says, o n e can re g a rd th e object o f th e su b ject-term o f th e sen ten ce, in o th e r w ords, th a t ‘ “ab o u t” w hich th e sta te m e n t is m a d e ’, as th e object o f th e sentence. O n this view, th e object o f th e sta te m e n t ‘a is la rg e r th an b’ w ould be a o r p e rh a p s a a n d b. ‘B u t th e re is also possible,’ h e th e n says, ‘a n o th e r c o n ­ cep tion w hich views th e w hole state o f affairs c o rre sp o n d in g to th e sta te m e n t as th e a n a lo g u e o f th e object n a m e d by a n a m e an d w hich d istinguishes it fro m th e m e an in g o f th e asserto ric sen ten ce. If o n e does this th e n o n e will give as exam ples sen ten c e-p airs such as “a is la rg e r th a n b” a n d is sm aller th a n a ”. T h e two sentences clearly assert so m e­ th in g d if fe r e n t . . . B u t they ex p ress th e sam e state o f affairs . . . N ow

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w h e th e r we d efin e the object o f th e sta te m en t in this o r the o th e r sense . . . statem en ts a re always possible w hich d iffe r in m ean in g b u t which rela te to the sam e “object” ’ (§12). T h is gives th e im pressio n th a t it is m o re im p o rta n t to distinguish object an d m e a n in g at any price th a n to specify w h at is to be u n d e rsto o d by th e m e an in g a n d th e object o f a statem en t. H u sserl’s w avering b etw een two possible ways o f c o n stru in g th e m e an in g -o b je ct distinction as ap p lie d to w hole asserto ric sentences reveals a fu n d a m e n ta l u n c e r­ tain ty as to how talk o f objects in re g a rd to linguistic expressions is to be d efin e d . O n th e o n e h a n d , H usserl too d efin e d an ‘o b ject’ as th at w hich is the subject o f possible p red ic atio n s.9 O n the o th e r h a n d , his o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a ch - th e assu m p tio n th a t all ‘m e an in g -co n fe r­ rin g consciousness’ is consciousness o f an object - obliged h im to hold th a t every linguistic ex p ressio n , o r at least every categ o rem atic ex p re s­ sion, stands fo r an object. It follows fro m th e first co n cep tio n th a t the only th in g th a t can be re g a rd e d as th e object o f an assertoric sentence is th e object (or objects) fo r w hich th e su bject-term (or subject-term s) o f th e se n ten ce stan d s (and o n e can only speak o f an object o f th e sentence in th e case o f sin g u lar p red icativ e sentences). In this way m e a n in g an d object o f th e se n ten c e are in d e e d sh arp ly d istin g u ish ed , fo r th e re is now n o object c o rre sp o n d in g to th e m e an in g o f the w hole sentence. H ow ­ ever, fo r the o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a c h this is an u n accep tab le result, fo r fro m such a p o in t o f view a m e an in g not s u p p o rte d by conscious­ ness o f an object hangs as it w ere in a void and is sim ply inconceivable. So H usserl fo u n d h im self com pelled by his ob ject-o rien tated a p p ro a c h to d raw the distinction betw een object a n d m e an in g in reg a rd to w hole sentences in a d iffe re n t way. T h e o b je ct-o rien tated ap p ro a ch d e m a n d e d a co n cep tio n w hich assigns to th e sen ten ce an object c o rre ­ s p o n d in g to th e w hole m e an in g . A n d as we have already seen we can in d e e d speak o f an object fo r which a w hole senten ce ‘p ’ stan d s, viz. the state o f affairs that p. M o reo v er such a conception is com patible with the d efin itio n o f an object as the subject o f possible p red icatio n s, fo r, even if th e assertoric senten ce itself is n o t a subject-expression (a sin g u lar te rm ), its nom inalized fo rm ‘th a t p ’ certainly is. B u t now if th e object o f an assertoric sentence is u n d e rsto o d in this way can we in ad d itio n distinguish a m ean in g o f th e sentence? T h is is w hat H usserl tries to do in th e discussion to which I have ju s t re fe rre d . T h e two sentences ‘a is big g er th a n b ’ an d lb is sm aller th an a ’ re p re se n t th e sam e state o f affairs b u t have d iffe re n t m eanings. H u sserl clearly w ants to assim ilate the m e a n in g -o b je c t distinction as ap p lied to state­ m ents as closely as possible to th e distinction as ap p lied to sin g u lar

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term s: th e m eanings o f th e two sentences are so to speak two m odes o f p rese n tatio n o f o n e an d the sam e state o f affairs. B ut h ere talk o f d iffe re n t m odes o f p rese n tatio n o f o n e a n d the sam e th in g has only a m etap h o rical sense. W hat lies beh in d it? W h at are the criteria fo r d eciding (a) w hen two sentences have th e sam e o r d iffe re n t m eanings a n d (b) w hen they stan d fo r the sam e o r d iffe re n t states o f affairs? As reg a rd s (a) n o th in g specific can be in fe rre d fro m H u sse rl’s exam ple. It may be d o u b te d w h e th e r he had definite criteria, an d h en c e a d efinite concept of m eaning, in m ind. As fo r (b) H u sserl probably u sed the sta n d a rd criterio n , viz. tw o sentences stand fo r th e sam e state o f affairs if they have th e sam e tru th -co n d itio n s, i.e. if we can assert a priori (analytically), sim ply on the basis o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e se n ­ tences, th a t if the o n e (e.g. ‘a is b ig g er th an b’) is tru e th e n th e o th e r (e.g. (b is sm aller th a n a ’) is also tru e , and if th e one is false th e n th e o th e r is also false. T h e c o rre sp o n d in g criterio n in th e case o f descrip tio n s w ould be: two d escriptions stan d fo r th e sam e object if we can assert a priori (analyti­ cally), sim ply on the basis o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e expressions, th a t they d esignate th e sam e object. H ow ever this is not the criterio n w hich h olds fo r all d escriptions which desig n ate th e sam e object, fo r norm ally we can n o t establish w h eth e r they d esignate th e sam e object sim ply on th e basis o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e expressions. We ca n n o t in fer th a t ‘th e victor o f J e n a ’ stands fo r th e sam e object as ‘th e v an q u ish ed o f W aterlo o ’ m erely fro m o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f these expressions; we can only establish this by ex perience. A n exam ple o f d escrip tio n s analogous to ‘a is big g er th a n b’ a n d ‘b is sm aller th an a in this resp e ct w ould be, p erh a p s, ‘th e victor o f J e n a ’ an d ‘th e c o m m a n d e r o f th e victorious arm y at J e n a ’. T h u s we see th a t the criterio n by re fe re n c e to w hich H u sserl d eterm in e s w hich statem en ts stan d fo r th e sam e state o f affairs is in fact d iffe re n t fro m , an d n a rro w e r th a n , th e criterio n fo r d escrip tio n s’ h a v ­ ing the sam e object. In th e case o f statem ents a classification-criterion as wide as th a t which connects all descriptions which d esig n ate the sam e object w ould have to be: statem ents have th e sam e object if they h av e n o t only th e sam e tru th -co n d itio n s, b u t th e sam e tru th -v a lu e .10 B ut o n e w ould th e n have to say th a t all tru e statem ents designate o n e an d th e sam e object; an d likewise all false statem ents. T h is intuitively u n n a tu ra l b u t form ally consistent thesis was p r o ­ p o u n d e d by F re g e .11 H e too th o u g h t th a t o n e m ust also d istin g u ish b etw een ‘sen se’ (Sinn) a n d ‘object’ (Bedeutung) in th e case o f statem en ts. H ow ever h e in te rp re te d th e object o f the assertoric sen ten ce n o t as th e state o f affairs fo r w hich it stands b u t as its truth-v alu e, i.e. as ‘the cir­

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cu m stance th a t it is tru e o r th a t it is false’. T his co n cep tio n , in co n trast to H u sse rl’s, at least allow ed a clear distinction to be d raw n betw een m e an in g an d object. T h e two sentences ‘B e rn e is th e capital o f Switz­ e rla n d ’ and ‘B o n n is situated on th e R h in e ’ have d iffe re n t m eanings, b u t they stand fo r th e sam e ‘object’, nam ely, th e sam e tru th -v alu e , fo r they a re both tru e . O n e can reach a b e tte r intuitiv e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f this id ea by th in k in g o f th e ‘object’ fo r w hich all tr u e statem en ts stand as ‘reality ’ o r th e ‘w orld’; th e m eanings (senses) o f tru e statem en ts w ould th e n be th e d iffe re n t m odes o f p re se n ta tio n in w hich reality m anifests itself (false statem en ts w ould th e n n o t have th e ir ow n object; r a th e r th e ir m e an in g s w ould re p re se n t th e aspects in w hich reality does n o t m anifest its e lf).12 B ut this idea o f reality as an object as sug g ested by th e substantival expression m ust itself a p p e a r su sp ect to us. T h e real sub stance o f th e analogy w hich F rege exhibited b etw een th e m e an in g a n d object o f descrip tio n s an d th e m e an in g an d tru th -v a lu e o f state­ m ents lies in a n o th e r d irectio n an d alread y points b ey o n d th e objecto rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h . I ca n n o t go in to this h e r e 13 b u t w ould m erely p o in t o u t th a t F re g e was clearly using the w ord ‘o b ject’ in a n o n -sta n ­ d a rd se n se.14 I f it is taken in its usual sense - as ‘subject o f possible p red ic atio n s’ - th e n F re g e’s theo ry , w hatever its positive co n te n t may be, p rovides no possible answ er to th e q uestion co n c ern in g th e object o f assertoric sentences. H u sserl on th e o th e r h a n d probably d id not u n d e rs ta n d th e fo rm al co nnections F reg e h ad in m in d , an d in any case h e was b o u n d to be p u t o ff by th e intuitive u n n a tu ra ln e ss o f F re g e ’s result; h e thus m a d e his ow n suggestion in which th e analogy with the c o rre sp o n d in g distinction in re g a rd to descriptio n s is no lo n g e r p re ­ sent. A n d he d id n o t develop it fu rth e r. H ow ever we sh o u ld n o t over-estim ate this negative result. It sim ply consists in this: th a t th e distinction betw een m e an in g an d object which is m a d e in re g a rd to descrip tio n s can scarcely be tra n s fe rre d to asser­ toric sentences in th e m a n n e r suggested by H usserl. B u t H u sserl was able to d ispense w ith th e very vague idea o f th e m e an in g o f asserto ric sentences w hich h e in tro d u c e d on this occasion; h e was nev erth eless able to ho ld on to th e view th a t every assertoric sen ten ce ‘p ’ stan d s for an object, viz. th e state o f affairs that p. O nly th e co n cep t o f m e an in g h ad to be newly d efin ed a n d its rela tio n sh ip to th e object newly d e te r­ m ined. It now o c c u rre d to H usserl to com bine th e two possible ways, co n sid ered as alternatives in §12, o f d istin g u ish in g betw een th e object an d th e m e an in g o f a statem en t. You will recall th a t, acco rd in g to th e first o f these, th e object o f a predicative sentence is th e object o f its su bject-term ; th e w hole sen ten ce as such only has a m e an in g a n d not,

Hass er Vs theory of meaning

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in a d d itio n , an object. T h e r e was no real a r g u m e n t w hich told ag ain st this co n c ep tio n , only th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h , ac co rd in g to w hich th e re also h ad to be an object c o r re s p o n d in g to th e w hole e x p re s­ sion. B ut now this re q u ire m e n t is fulfilled by sim ply in c o rp o ra tin g in to th e first possibility th e o n e u n p ro b le m a tic idea o f th e seco n d possibility, viz. th e idea th a t every n o m in a liz ed asserto ric se n ten ce ‘th a t p' sta n d s fo r a state o f affairs. T h u s in §34 o f In v estig atio n I th e re e m e rg e s th e follow ing c o n c e p ­ tion (the o n e which is finally a c ce p te d by H usserl). T h e object o f th e se n ten c e ‘J u liu s is w e e p in g ’ is th a t o f w hich it asserts so m eth in g , viz. Ju liu s. B u t o n e can also speak a b o u t th e m e a n in g o f th e sen ten ce. In this case th e m e an in g o f th e se n te n c e becom es itself th e ob ject-ab o u tw hich o f a f u r th e r sta te m en t. T h is new object w hich is d esig n ated by th e nom in alized ex p re ssio n ‘th a t J u liu s is w e e p in g ’ is th e state o f affairs. C o rre sp o n d in g to th e g ram m atical m odificatio n o f n o m in alizatio n is th e sem antic m odification o f th e o bjectification o f m e an in g . T h e q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e re la tio n sh ip b etw een th e m e an in g a n d object o f th e asserto ric se n ten c e is th u s m a d e m o re co m p licated by th e fact th a t now two objects are involved. T h e object-ab o u t-w h ich o f th e sta te m en t is th e object o f th e su b je ct-te rm o f th e se n ten ce; it is d istin ­ g u ish ed fro m th e m e a n in g in th e way d e sc rib e d by H u sse rl in th e first altern ativ e o f § 12. T h e state o f affairs, on th e o th e r h a n d , th e object fo r w hich th e ex p ressio n ‘th a t/? ’ sta n d s, is th e —objectified - m ean in g . T h e q u estio n I left o p e n w hen I in tro d u c e d objects o f th e ty p e that p in L ec tu re 3, viz. how th e se objects - states o f affairs o r p ro p o sitio n s sh o u ld be conceived, w ould th u s b e an sw e re d in a specific way: th e object that p is th e m e a n in g o f th e se n te n c e ‘p ’. T h is id e a could a p p e a r p lausible, fo r it is n a tu ra l to say th a t tw o states o f affairs that p a n d that q a re iden tical if th e tw o sentences a n d ‘q h av e th e sam e m e a n in g (it is o f co u rse assu m ed th a t th e se n ten c es a n d ‘q c o n tain no deictic expressions). B u t even if we d isre g a rd deictic ex p re ssio n s th e id en tificatio n o f th e state o f affairs that p w ith th e m e a n in g o f ‘p ’ is n o t ten ab le. W e can alread y see this fro m linguistic usage: we c a n n o t tra n s la te sta te m en ts a b o u t states o f affairs w ith sta te m en ts a b o u t m ean in g s. F o r ex am p le, o n e ca n n o t say instead o f ‘th e state o f aff airs th a t it was snow ing y ester­ d ay is p le asin g ’ ‘th e m e a n in g o f th e se n ten c e “it was sn o w in g y esterd ay ” is p leasin g ’. T h is fact w hich is o fte n re m a rk e d u p o n 15 does n o t itself p ro v e an y th in g . W hat o n e m u st go o n to ask is w hat th e g r o u n d o f this d iscrep an cy in linguistic usage is. It is usefu l to look ag a in a t th e c o rre s p o n d in g th e o ry o f F rege. T o

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th e superficial r e a d e r F re g e seems to hold th e sam e view as H usserl. I w ould re m in d you th a t F re g e ’s te rm for w hat H usserl calls a ‘state o f a ffa irs’ is ‘th o u g h t’. N ow F rege also says that th e sense o f an assertoric sen tence is a th o u g h t.16 Also acco rd in g to F reg e th e object o f the n o m ­ inalized e x p re ssio n ‘th a t p ’ is the sense o f ‘p ’. 17 H ow ever, it is easy to o verlook th e fact th a t w h at F rege calls ‘sense’ is a technical term an d does not c o rre sp o n d at all to w hat o n e ordinarily u n d e rsta n d s an d w hat H u sserl u n d e rs ta n d s by ‘m e a n in g ’ (or ‘sense’). In p articu lar the c o rre ­ lation betw een sense a n d u n d e rsta n d in g fro m which I sta rted in th e p revious le ctu re does n o t hold fo r Frege. T h e r e seems to be no com ­ p reh e n siv e te rm in F reg e fo r w hat we u n d e rsta n d w hen we u n d e rsta n d a linguistic exp ressio n . I f we co n tin u e to call th a t which we u n d e rsta n d ‘m e a n in g ’ (B edeutung) - an d thus use the w ord quite d ifferen tly fro m F re g e - we will have to say that fo r F rege th e sense o f an assertoric sen ten ce constitu tes only a p a rt o f its m eaning. B ecause, fo r F rege, th e sense is th e th o u g h t a n d th e th o u g h t is th at which can be tru e o r false,18 only w hat is re le v a n t to th e question o f tru th o r falsity belongs to th e se n se .19 H e re , as D u m m e tt has show n, F rege anticip ated th e m o d ern view th a t th e m e a n in g o f a sentence consists in its tru th -co n d itio n s. It is only later th a t I shall r e tu r n to this really crucial aspect o f F re g e’s th e ­ ory. I shall also at p re s e n t d isre g a rd those o th e r con stitu en ts o f m e a n ­ in g 20 in w hich acco rd in g to F rege a feeling is ex p ressed o r a ‘h in t’ is given to th e h e a r e r .21 W h a t is im p o rta n t from the p oint o f view o f o u r discussion is th a t, fo r F rege, an assertoric sentence an d th e c o rre sp o n d ­ ing in te rro g a tiv e sen ten ce have th e sam e sense; this m ean s th a t th e assertio n -m o d e o r q u estio n -m o d e (F rege speaks of ‘assertoric fo rce’) do es n o t b elo n g to th e sense b u t is an additional elem en t o f m e an in g .22 Now this view co rre sp o n d s in th e m ost precise fashion to actual linguis­ tic usage, w hen we co n sid er th a t th e sense is th a t for which th e e x p re s­ sion ‘t h a t// stands. ‘T h a t/? ’ d iffers fro m (p ’ in th a t it lacks th e assertionm o m e n t (cf. above p. 64). W e can now r e tu r n to H u sse rl’s thesis th a t th e state o f affairs that p is th e (‘objectified’) m e an in g o f ‘p \ It is now clear why this thesis is false. T h e m e an in g o f ep ’ always contains m ore th a n th a t fo r w hich the ex p ressio n ‘th a t/? ’ stands. H ow ever justified a n d how ever n atu ra l it is to say th a t an ex p re ssio n ‘th a t p* stan d s for so m eth in g - w h eth e r o ne calls it a state o f affairs, a p ro p o sitio n o r a th o u g h t - it is false to say this o f th e u n m o d ifie d ex p re ssio n ‘p ’. Som eone w ho says ‘p ’ is n o t simply d esig n atin g a state o f affairs, b u t at the same tim e asserting th a t it is tru e o r ‘o b ta in s’; a n d this ad d itio n a l factor w hich is in c lu d ed in the m e an in g o f ‘p ’ can no lo n g e r be c o n stru e d objectually.

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H usserl did n o t overlook this factor o f the sentence-m ode; o n the co ntrary he held th a t a ‘positional q uality’ belongs to th e essence o f in ten tio n al acts as such, including all ‘nom in al’ acts.23 H e th u s trie d to neutralize the th re a t to his fu n d a m e n ta l position, w hich is o rien tate d tow ards nam es a n d re p rese n tatio n , posed by the n a tu re o f sentences by sim ply in c o rp o ratin g this aspect o f sentences into th e object-reference. Now this w ould m ean: every singular term not only stands for an object; with such a term so m ething is implicitly asserted. B u t w h at is it th a t is im plicitly asserted w ith a sin g u lar term ? A ccording to H usserl it is the existence o f the object.24 A pplied to singular term s th a t stan d for (m ate­ rial) objects this thesis is no t im plausible an d I shall be re tu rn in g to it later (Lect. 26). B u t even now we can anticipate th a t if this thesis tu rn s o u t to be co rrect the conclusion it suggests is th e o p p o site o f th a t d raw n by H usserl: it w ould follow th a t these nam es re fe r back to statem en ts (those w hich they implicitly assert) (cf. above p. 73). H ow ever, ap p lied to the nom in al expressions with w hich we are now co n cern ed , e x p re s­ sions o f the form ‘th a t/? ’, th e thesis w ould seem to be false. T h e idea th a t w hen we say ‘th a t p ’ the obtaining o f th e state o f affairs (or the tru th o f the th o u g h t) is im plicitly asserted contrad icts th e fact th a t we can ju s t as well com plete ‘that/? . . with ‘is false’, ‘is d o u b tfu l’, etc., as with ‘is tr u e ’. S om eone who is ju s t begin n in g to say ‘th a t p . . .’ has n o t yet im plicitly p re ju d g e d how he will com plete it. So we have no alternative b u t to reject H u sse rl’s identification o f the state o f affairs thatp with the m eaning of ‘p ’. H ow ever, H u sserl’s objecto rien tate d ap p ro a ch gives rise to a n o th e r a n d even m o re serious p ro b ­ lem. W h e th e r one identifies th e state o f affairs that p with th e m ean in g o f *p’ or in te rp re ts th e ir relationship in a d iffe re n t way th e re still arises th e f u rth e r and crucial question o f w h eth e r o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f the m ean in g o f ‘/?’ is g ro u n d e d in o u r know ing for w hich object ‘th a t p ’ stands o r w h eth e r it is the o th e r way ro u n d . H usserl him self, in Investigation I, characterizes th e connection betw een m e an in g an d state o f affairs thus: th e state o f affairs is the objectified m eaning. T h is w ould seem to im ply that th e identification o f th e state o f affairs that p already p resu p p o ses th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e m eaning o f ‘p \ B ut th e n this w ould m ean th a t the m e an in g w ould fo r its p a rt have to be in te rp re te d non-objectually. But, as we have alread y seen, fo r H u sse rl’s object-orientated ap p ro a ch a m e an in g which is n o t p ro p p e d u p by an object-consciousness is impossible. So H usserl draw s th e conclusion which, given his sta rtin g -p o in t, is the only possible one: as the state o f affairs thatp is in any case su p p o sed to be identical with th e m eaning o f *p’ it is easy to pro ject th e conscious­

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ness o f th e state o f affairs back in to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f m ean in g . C onsistently with this H u sserl no lo n g e r speaks, in Inv estig atio n s V a n d V I, o f th e m ean in g , b u t only o f th e state o f affairs. T h e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e n o t yet nom in alized sta te m e n t is also in te rp re te d as ‘conscious­ ness o f th e state o f a ffa irs’; only in this case th e state o f affairs is n o t yet ‘objectual in th e strict sen se’ (Investigation V §§36, 38). W e m u st th e re fo re re g a rd H u sse rl’s a tte m p t to apply th e m e a n in g object d istinction to statem en ts as well as to n am es as a failu re. In itself this w ould be no d isaster, n o r is this resu lt th e essential one. W h at is essential is th a t H u sserl co n stru es th e m e a n in g o f th e se n ten c e as an object. H ow can th e so u n d n e ss o f this co n cep tio n be tested? By asking: if th e state o f affairs is n o t fo u n d e d in th e m e a n in g th e n how , acco rd in g to this co n cep tio n , is it positively u n d e rsto o d ? I f o n e ca n n o t have rec o u rse to th e m e a n in g o f the sta te m e n t th e only way o f ex p lain in g th e ontological status o f th e state o f affairs is to re g a rd it as a composite object. T h e idea th a t th e m ean in g o f an asserto ric sen ten ce is an object inevitably results in th e view th a t th e m a n n e r in which th e m e an in g o f th e w hole sta te m e n t arises o u t o f th e m eanings o f its p a rts can only be th o u g h t o f as com position. O n e can leave o p e n th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r o n e speaks o f m ean in g s o r objects in re g a rd to th e sen ten ce-p arts. W h a t is crucial is th a t it is a m a tte r o f com position. C om p o sitio n im plies objects both as its elem en ts an d as its results. E ven if o n e avoids sp e ak ­ in g o f objects a n d thin k s o f th e meaning o f th e com posite ex p ressio n as com posed o f th e meanings o f th e c o m p o n e n t ex pressio n s, in th e co n cep t o f com position o n e is m ak in g u se o f an objectual categ o ry a n d h en c e co n stru in g m eanings as objects. W e are thus faced w ith the crucial th ird q u estio n o f th e fo u r q u e s­ tions em p h asized by m e at th e e n d o f th e last lectu re viz. how is th e co m bination o f th e two sen ten c e-p arts, th e sin g u lar te rm a n d th e p r e d ­ icate, to be u n d e rsto o d ? H u sse rl’s answ er to th e fo u rth q u estio n (how is th e w hole assertoric se n ten c e u n d ersto o d ? ), viz. its m e an in g is an object (a state o f affairs), largely p re d e te rm in e s th e answ er to th e th ird q u e s­ tion: to th e com position o f th e expression th e re m u st co rre sp o n d a co m position in th e object, o r m ean in g . T h is m ay at first a p p e a r harm less, an d p e rh a p s you will even ask in asto n ish m e n t: how else is th e m e an in g o f th e w hole ex p ressio n to be u n d e rsto o d , if n o t as com posed o f th e m e an in g s o f its co m p o n en texpressions? In th e n e x t le ctu re we shall h av e to ex a m in e how fa r th e objectual co n ception o f th e m e a n in g o f a pred icativ e sen ten ce can be p rese rv e d by m eans o f an acceptable co n c ep t o f com position.

LECTURE

10

Collapse of the traditional theory of m eaning

T h e g u id in g q u e stio n o f o u r in v estigation is: W h a t is it to u n d e r s ta n d a se n ten c e? T h is q u estio n I re g a rd as th e fu n d a m e n ta l q u estio n o f p h i­ lo sophy, w hich sh o u ld ta k e th e place o f th e tra d itio n a l fu n d a m e n ta l q u estio n - w h at is b ein g as being? o r w h at is it to r e p r e s e n t a n object? W e a re th u s n o t asking this q u estio n fo r th e sake o f ask in g it b u t r a th e r with th e aim o f re a c h in g a new philo so p h ical a p p ro a c h . T h e conviction ex p re sse d in th e first p a r t o f these le c tu re s th a t th e q u estio n - W h at is it to u n d e r s ta n d a sentence? - has th e fo rm a l un iv ersality o f th e q u es­ tio n c o n c e rn in g objects as objects a n d in fact is m o re c o m p re h e n siv e th a n th e la tte r, d oes n o t a m o u n t to a new a p p ro a c h vis-ä-vis th e objecto rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h ; it m e re ly points in th e d ire c tio n o f su ch a new a p p ro a c h . O n e can only d ev e lo p it by w o rk in g o u t a new basic co n c ep ­ tu ality a p p r o p r ia te to th e new su b je ct-m a tte r. T o achieve this we shall first look at w h at h a p p e n s w hen th e tra d itio n a l basic co n c ep tu ality is a p p lie d to th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f a se n ten c e, in th e e x p e c ta tio n th a t th e re su ltin g te n sio n will yield a basis fo r th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f a new h o rizo n o f e x p la n a tio n . I n th e last le c tu re we w ere able to see how th e o b je ct-o rien tate d a p p ro a c h d id n o t p re v e n t H u sse rl fro m giving a p lau sib le a c co u n t o f th e d istin ctio n betw een th e m e a n in g a n d th e ob ject o f n am es b u t th a t in th e case o f th e m e a n in g o f w hole sen ten ces it lan d s h im in grav e difficulties. T h e state o f affairs that p, w hich H u sse rl h im s e lf initially in te r p re ts as a su b se q u e n t m odification, m u st, given th e o b je c t-o rie n ­ ta te d a p p ro a c h , be p ro je c te d back in to th e o rig in a l con scio u sn ess o f th e m e a n in g o f A ccordingly, if th e co n sciousness o f a sta te o f affairs c a n n o t be e lu c id a te d by re fe re n c e to th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f a se n ten ce, b u t th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f th e e x p re ssio n co m p o sed o f sin g u la r te rm a n d p re d ic a te is an originally objectual consciousn ess, th e n th e m a n n e r in w hich th e m e a n in g o f th e p red ic ativ e se n ten c e d e p e n d s o n th e m e a n ­

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in g o f its te rm s can only be ex p lain ed by m eans o f th e only o b ject-o rien ­ ta te d conceptuality available fo r this p u rp o se, i.e. it m ust be co n stru e d as composition, as synthesis. So we are faced with th e fu n d a m e n ta l q uestion o f sem antics, h ere in co n n e ctio n w ith th e special case o f th e predicative sentence: how does th e m e an in g o f a com posite ex p ressio n result fro m th e m ean in g s o f its c o m p o n e n t expressions? P roving itself a d e q u ate in this fu n d a m e n ta l sem an tic q u estio n is th e decisive criterio n for th e applicability o f a p h il­ o sophical concep tu ality to the q uestions of sem antics. I t was clear to H usserl th a t the com position constitutive o f a state o f affairs c a n n o t be w hat o n e o rd in arily u n d e rsta n d s w hen o n e speaks o f co m posite objects. O rd in arily w hen one com bines objects to form a co m posite object - e.g. w h en on e com bines pearls to fo rm a pearl-necklace o r build in g -sto n es to fo rm a b u ild in g - th e com posite object is ju s t as m u ch a c o n c re te sp a tio -tem p o ra l object as its parts. A state o f affairs o r fact, on th e o th e r h a n d , is n o t a concrete sp atio -tem p o ral object. W h e n we sp eak o f th e fact th a t C aesar was m u rd e re d in R om e in 44 B.C. C aesar is a co n crete sp atio -tem p o ral object. Equally th e event o f his m u r d e r is sp atio -tem p o rally locatable. It h a p p e n e d in th a t place an d at th a t tim e. T h e fact th a t C aesar was m u rd e re d in th a t place at th a t tim e, on th e o th e r h a n d , is n o t locatable and datable. T h u s th e object fo r w hich a nom in alized sentence stands, like th a t for w hich a n o m i­ n alized p re d ic a te stands, is no t a co n c rete spatio -tem p o ral object: states o f affairs are , like a ttrib u te s, so-called ‘ab stract’ objects. H u sserl calls co n c rete objects ‘re a l’ objects an d ab stra ct objects ‘ideal’ objects. For him th e c riterio n o f a ‘re a l’ object is th a t it can be sensibly perceiv ed (Inves­ tig atio n VI §46). T h u s a lth o u g h his o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a ch obliged H u sserl to c o n s tru e states o f affairs as com posite objects they are non eth eless objects o f a n o th e r o rd e r th a n the objects of w hich they a re com posed. B u t now this m ean s th a t th e com position in questio n m ust be o f a sp e­ cial kind. H u sse rl a tte m p te d to o vercom e this difficulty by m eans o f his th e o ry o f categ o rial synthesis. T h is re p re se n ts th e m ost far-rea ch in g a tte m p t so f a r m a d e to ex p lain states o f affairs an d th e m ean in g o f sen tences fro m an o b je ct-o rien tate d position. B e fo re e x p o u n d in g th e basic fe a tu re s o f this th eo ry I w ould like briefly to d raw y o u r a tte n tio n to a n o th e r object-o rien tated position in w hich th e n o tio n o f com position is ap p lied naively to states o f affairs, viz. th e position re p re s e n te d by W ittg e n stein ’s Tractatus. In asm u ch as W ittg en stein in th e Tractatus is, u n lik e H usserl, o rien tate d prim arily to w ard s sentences r a th e r th a n nam es his position is alread y a decidedly

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language-analytical one: ‘O nly propositions have sense; only in the n exus o f a p ro p o sitio n does a nam e have m e an in g ’ (3.3). H ow ever this idea is still in te rp re te d ontologically. T h e Tractatus g ro u n d s th e sem an ­ tic prim acy o f se n ten ce over n am e in an ontological prim acy o f facts o v er things: ‘T h e w orld is th e totality o f facts, n o t o f th in g s’ (1.1). Now th e question arises: w hat are we to u n d e rsta n d by a ‘fact’? W ittgenstein answ ers: ‘W hat is th e case - a fact - is th e o btainin g o f states o f affairs’ (2.). A nd w hat is a state o f affairs? T o this W ittgenstein answ ers: ‘A state o f affairs is a com bination o f objects’ (2.01). T h is view is o p e n to th e criticism at w hich I have already h in te d , viz. th at it depicts th e state of affairs as a com posite co n crete object. T h e Tractatus invites this criticism by explicitly stating: ‘In a state o f affairs objects fit into o n e a n o th e r like th e links o f a ch ain ’ (2.03). W ittgenstein rejected this view h im self w hen h e ab a n d o n ed the ob ject-orientated position o f th e Tractatus. F rom this p erio d stem som e notes w hich, u n d e r th e title ‘C om plex a n d F act’ have been p u b lish ed as an a p p e n d ix to Philosophical Remarks. 1 H e re W ittgenstein writes: ‘C om ­ plex is n o t like fact. F or I can e.g. say o f a com plex th a t it moves fro m one place to a n o th e r, b u t n o t o f a fact . . . A nd a com plex is a spatial object, com posed o f spatial objects . . . B u t that this com plex is now situated h e re is a fact . . . T o say th a t a re d circle is composed o f red n ess an d circularity, o r is a com plex with these c o m p o n en t p arts is a m isuse o f these w ords an d is m isleading (Frege was aw are o f this an d told me). It is ju s t as m isleading to say th e fact th a t this circle is re d (that I am tired) is a com plex w hose c o m p o n en t p arts are a circle an d red n ess (m yself an d tiredness) . . . O f course we also say: “to p o in t o u t a fact”; bu t th a t always m eans; “to p o in t o u t th e fact th a t T o p o in t o u t a fact m eans to assert som ething, to state som ething. “T o p o in t o u t a flow er” d o esn ’t m ean this . . . T h e ro o t o f this m u d d le is th e co n fu sin g use o f th e w ord “object”.’ W hat W ittgenstein h e re calls a com plex is a com posite co n crete object. In now g oing so far as to say th a t th e fact does not consist o f so m eth in g he is rejecting th e object-orientated ap p ro a ch alto g eth er. H usserl, how ever, has show n th a t on th e basis o f an ob ject-o rien tated a p p ro a ch one can still perfectly well distinguish betw een a com plex an d a fact. T h is brings m e to his theory o f categorial synthesis. T h e task H u sse rl set h im self was to distinguish fro m th e real com position o f an object a special n o n -re al com position w hich is constitutive o f a fact. L et m e try to m ake th e distinction clear by m eans o f an exam ple. A h a m m e r is a real object which is com posed o f two p arts: a shaft an d a head. I f we

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ascertain this a n d say ‘this h a m m e r is com posed o f a sh aft a n d a h e a d ’ th e re c o rre sp o n d s to this sta te m en t th e state o f affairs th a t th is h a m m e r is co m posed o f a sh aft a n d a head. T h e state o f affairs, it is assu m ed , is itself an (ideal) com posite object. Now w hat a re its co n stitu en ts? S h o u ld we say: th e (real) com position is (ideally) co m b in ed , o n th e o n e h a n d , w ith th e h a m m e r, on th e o th e r h a n d , with th e sh a ft a n d th e head? T h e state o f affairs in questio n w ould th e n be co m p o sed o f tw o co n stitu en ts: (1) th e real com position a n d (2) th e o rd e re d object-trio [h am m er, sh aft, h ead]. H u sse rl p r e fe rre d a n o th e r way o f looking at it (In v estig atio n VI §48) ac co rd in g to w hich only th e real objects, th u s h a m m e r, sh aft a n d h e a d , fu n ctio n as co n stitu e n ts o f th e state o f affairs a n d th e real co m ­ po sition (the p a rt-w h o le relation) re p re se n ts th e way in w hich th ese objects a re (ideally) co m b in ed in th e state o f affairs. N ow w hichever way th e m o d e o f com position o f th e state o f affairs is to be u n d e rsto o d (I shall com e back to this) it is clearly fu n d a m e n ta lly d iffe re n t fro m th e m o d e o f co m position o f th e h am m er. T h e h a m m e r itself e n te rs into th e state o f affairs as a p a rt, an d , alth o u g h a real co m p o site object can always be itself a real p a r t o f a la rg e r w hole, it can n ev er be so in such a way th a t its ow n p arts can be th e c o m p le m e n ta ry co n stitu e n ts o f th e new whole. T h e state o f affairs th a t th e h a m m e r consists o f h ea d a n d sh aft, is, in co n tra st to th e h a m m e r, n o t a p erc ep tib le object. A n d equally we c a n n o t p erceiv e its com position as we can p erceiv e th e co m ­ p osition o f th e h a m m e r o u t o f h e a d an d shaft. It is th e re fo re te m p tin g to say: ideal com position is n o t ascertain ab le by p e rc e p tio n b u t only in thought. H u sserl can h e re a p p e a l to a lo n g tra d itio n ac co rd in g to w hich th in k ­ in g , th e ‘u n d e rs ta n d in g ’, is a faculty o f synthesis an d a synthesis w hich is n o t a species o f real co m p o sitio n .2 L et m e illu strate this by m ean s o f a n o th e r ex am p le. W h e n we a p p r e h e n d th e fact th a t A is se p a ra te fro m B th e n A a n d B a re certainly n o t really co m b in ed , they a re sep arate . A n d yet in th e state o f affairs th a t they are se p a ra te , they a r e co n n ected . T h ey a re b ro u g h t in to this co nnection, w hich is n o t a real co n n ectio n , by th o u g h t. T h is does n o t m e an th a t th e co n n e ctio n do es n o t actually (wirklich) exist (A a n d B a re actually separate). T h a t facts are n o t real objects (con crete objects in space an d tim e), th a t they a re only co n sti­ tu te d in th o u g h t, does n o t m ean th a t they a re n o t actual. T h in k in g too, like all consciousness, is u n d e rsto o d by H u sserl as objectual consciousness an d h en c e as an ‘act’.3 Acts o f th in k in g h e calls ‘categ o rial’ acts in co n tra st to ‘sensory’ acts in w hich c o n c rete objects a re re p re se n te d . It is ch aracteristic o f a categ o rial act th a t it re p re se n ts an object w hich is co m p o sed in such a n d such a way as co m p o sed in such

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a n d such a way - w hich it can only d o by sim u ltan eo u sly r e p re s e n tin g its c o m p o n e n t objects. N ow th e r e p re s e n tin g o f each co m p o n e n t-o b je c t is (by d efinition) itself an act. A ca te g o ria l act is th e re fo re a sy n th etic act w hich is fo u n d e d o n o th e r acts, ultim ately o n sen so ry acts w hich r e p ­ re se n t th e real objects w hich e n te r in to th e synthetic object. T h e sy n th e ­ sis o f th e objects o f th e f o u n d in g acts is ac co m p lish e d by th e fo u n d e d categ o rial act; a n d in this synthesis th e new synth etic object is consti­ tu te d . T h u s th e la tte r c a n n o t, even in p rin cip le, be re p re s e n te d in a sim ple (sensory) act. So H u sserl tries to ex p lain th e d istin ctio n b etw e en ideal a n d real objects a n d th e p e c u lia r co m p o sitio n o f ideal objects by d istin g u ish in g b etw een th e c o rre s p o n d in g acts, th u s by d istin g u ish in g th e ways in w hich th e re le v a n t objects a re given (th u s by giving a ‘tra n s c e n d e n ta l’ ex p lan a tio n ). T h e o r d e r o f types o f object is g r o u n d e d in th e o r d e r o f acts. T h e e x p la n a tio n h e gives is s u p p o se d to h o ld fo r all ideal objects, also fo r species (w hich a re c o n stitu te d in acts o f ‘id eativ e ab stra c tio n ’), a ttrib u te s a n d equally fo r sets. H o w ev er, I shall co n fin e m yself to states o f affairs. T h e co m p o sitio n o f a state o f affairs, w hich is fu n d a m e n ta lly d if fe r e n t fro m all real co m p o sitio n , is ex p la in e d by saying th a t this syn­ thesis is th e synthesis ac co m p lish e d by a categorial act. It th u s becom es clear ‘th a t categ o rial fu n ctio n s, in “fo rm in g ” sensible objects, leave th e ir real essence u n to u c h e d . . . C a te g o ria l fo rm s d o n o t glue, tie o r p u t p a rts to g e th e r so th a t a real, sensibly p e rc e p tib le w hole resu lts. T h e y d o n o t fo rm in th e sense in w hich th e p o tte r fo rm s. F o r th e n th a t w hich was originally given to se n se -p e rc e p tio n w ould be m o d ified in its ow n o b jecth o o d : re la tin g a n d c o n n e c tin g th o u g h t a n d k n o w led g e w ould n o t be th o u g h t a n d k n o w led g e o f w hat is, b u t r a th e r falsifying tra n s fo r­ m a tio n into so m e th in g else’ (In v e stig a tio n V I §61). P e rh a p s you will ask: to w h at e x te n t th e n can o n e say th a t p a rtic u la r states o f affairs actually {wirklich) o b ta in (and th a t th e c o rre sp o n d in g sta te m en ts a re tru e ), if th e se objects a re n o t ‘re a l’ (real) a n d a re only c o n stitu te d in th e sy n th etic acts o f th in k in g ? T o th is H u sse rl can reply: a state o f affa irs is o n e th a t actually obtains (an d th e c o rre sp o n d in g sta te m e n t is tru e ) if th e re le v a n t ca te g o ria l synthesis o n th e fo u n d a tio n o f th e real objects th a t e n te r into it can be p e rfo rm e d (is possible) (e.g. th e state o f affa irs th a t sh a ft a n d h e a d a re co m b in ed , actually o btains if th e c o rre s p o n d in g synthesis o f th e se rea l p a rts can be p e rfo rm e d ).4 N ow b e fo re I com e to th e a p p lica tio n o f this th e o ry o f c ateg o rial sy n ­ thesis to o u r c o n c re te q u estio n c o n c e rn in g th e sem an tic stru c tu re o f p red ic ativ e sta te m e n ts I w ould like to d raw y o u r a tte n tio n to a p a rtic u ­ lar sem an tic p ro b le m w hich H u sse rl th o u g h t this th eo ry co uld solve:

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th e p ro b lem o f th e sem antics o f syncategorem atic expressions. As I re m a rk e d in the last lectu re (p. 109) such expressio n s co n stitu te, even fo r H u sserl, a class o f ex pressions w hich have m ean in g b u t do n o t stan d fo r an object. T h is co nception can be in te g ra te d with th e o b ject-o rien ­ ta ted co n cep tio n , with which p rim a facie it seem s in co m p atib le (In v es­ tigation V §§4 ff.), by m eans o f th e th e o ry o f categorial synthesis. A ccording to H usserl, syncategorem atic expressions a re com binationw ords; they have no ‘in d e p e n d e n t’ m eaning. O nly exp ressio n s w hich stand fo r an object (categorem atic expressions) have an ‘in d e p e n d e n t’ m ean in g . N ow categ o rem atic ex pressions can only be co m b in ed w ith o th e r categ o rem atic ex pressions to form a com plex ex p ressio n w ith a new u n ita ry m e an in g if this com bination is m ed iated by one o r m o re sy n categ o rem atic expressions. T h is sem antic-syntactic con cep tio n c o r­ resp o n d s directly to th e o n to lo g ic a l-tra n sc e n d e n ta l co n cep tio n o f cate­ gorial synthesis. T h e synthesis o f a categorial act is ex p re ssed in th e n o n -in d e p e n d e n t m ean in g s o f th e syncategorem atic te rm s (e.g. ‘a n d ’, th e p red icativ e ‘is’, ‘= ’). T h ey a re objectually in te rp re te d by these acts n o t in th e sense th a t th ey them selves stand fo r objects, b u t ra th e r in th e sense th a t they re p re s e n t the fo rm o f unity in which th e synthetic object is c o n stitu ted on th e basis o f th e fo u n d in g objects. Since it is again an act w hich con fers m e a n in g on th e syncategorem atic ex p ressio n , an d since th e to ta l-m ea n in g o f this synthetic act is again an object, th e o b je ct-o rien tate d ap p ro a c h can be u p h e ld in im pressive fashion even fo r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f these expressions. B u t in th e e n d we have to ask w h e th e r th e theo ry o f categorial acts is really cap ab le o f m a k in g th e consciousness o f states o f affairs, o r the u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e m e an in g o f com posite expressions, intelligible. In p a rtic u la r, how do th in g s sta n d as re g a rd s th e m e an in g o f th e p re d ic a ­ tive sentence? I have d elib erately p rese n ted H u sse rl’s th eo ry o f nonreal com position as abstractly as H u sserl h im self p rese n ts it, because th e su b su m p tio n u n d e r this th e o ry o f th e predicativ e sen ten ce gives rise to an ad d itio n a l difficulty. I f we tak e a sim ple p red icativ e sentence, e.g. ‘H e id e lb e rg C astle is r e d ’, th e n if th e th eo ry o f categ o rial synthesis is to be a p p lie d we m u st assum e th a t n o t only th e sin g u lar te rm ‘H e id e l­ b e rg C astle’ b u t also th e p red ic ate -ex p ressio n ‘r e d ’ stands fo r an object; fo r if we d o n o t have at least tw o objects th e n we ca n n o t speak o f a co m position, a synthesis. We th u s com e up again st th e second o f my fo u r q u estions, viz. th a t co n c ern in g th e m e a n in g o f th e predicate. A n objectifying co n cep tio n o f p red icates o f th e kind o n e could have in fe rre d fro m th e g e n e ra l s tru c tu re o f the th e o ry o f categorial acts is in fact to be fo u n d in H u sserl. T h e analysis o f th e p red icativ e sentence-

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fo rm in Investigation VI §48 is ca rrie d out to g e th e r with an analysis o f sentences in w hich it is said o f som eth in g th at it contains so m e th in g else as a p art. As a un itary schem a fo r both predicative sen ten ces and w h o le -p a rt sentences H usserl suggests: A is (has) a A is a ’ is th e fo r­ m alization o f a predicative sentence w ith a copula such as: ‘T h e castle is re d .’ H usserl attaches g re a t im p o rta n ce to se p aratin g the co p u la, as a sy n categorem atic com bination-w ord which is sup p o sed to re p re se n t (repräsentieren) th e synthesis, from th e predicate. A has a , o n th e o th e r h a n d , is a (not very happy) attem p t to form alize a w h o le -p a rt sentence, e.g. ‘T h e castle has the b an q u e t-h all.’ T h e converse fo rm w hich H usserl gives both fo r A is a’ an d fo r A has a , viz. ‘a is in A ’ (e.g. ‘T h e b an q u ethall is in the castle’) is clearer. If we also apply this converse fo rm to th e predicative sen ten ce we get: ‘(the) red n e ss is in th e castle’. O bviously we can now convert this fo rm itself into th e converse fo rm ‘T h e castle has re d n e ss’, w hich, in co n tra st to ‘T h e castle is re d ’, H u sserl re g a rd s as th e fo rm o f expression in w hich the synthetic s tru c tu re becom es explicit. W e also find this assim ilation o f th e su b je ct-p red ic ate sen ten ce to th e w h o le -p a rt sen ten ce elsew here in H usserl. In Investigation I II , which is h e a d e d ‘O n th e theory o f wholes an d p a rts’, h e says th a t p red icates sta n d fo r ‘n o n -in d e p e n d e n t p a rts’. ‘W e in te rp re t th e con cep t part in th e widest sense w hich allows o n e to call an y th in g a “p a r t” th a t can be d istin ­ g u ish ed “in ” an object or, speaking objectively, th a t is “p re s e n t” in it . . . T h u s every non-relative “rea l” p red ic ate points to a p a r t o f th e object o f th e subject-term . T h u s e.g. “r e d ” an d “r o u n d ” . . .’ (§2) O n e m ight question w h eth e r th e w h o le -p a rt relatio n is th e m ost su it­ able relation to which to assim ilate th e su b je ct-p red ic ate stru ctu re . In ste a d o f ‘th e red n ess is in th e castle’ one could suggest ‘th e red n ess is o n th e castle’, a n d instead o f ‘th e castle has red n e ss’, ‘th e castle is com ­ b in e d with re d n e ss’. T h e real question, how ever, is n o t which relatio n is to be p re fe rre d b u t whether a predicative sentence can be in te rp re te d as a relatio n al sta te m en t at all. T h a t it m u st be thus in te rp re te d how ever follows necessarily from th e idea th a t th e p red ic ate stands fo r so m e­ th in g ; an d this idea is itself inevitable if o ne starts fro m th e assu m p tio n th a t th e state o f affairs is co n stitu ted in a categorial synthesis. In d e e d th e idea th a t th e p red icate stands fo r som ething does n o t even d e p e n d o n th e peculiarities o f H u sse rl’s th e o ry o f categorial synthesis; ra th e r it rests on th e fu n d a m e n ta l p resu p p o sitio n , which we also fo u n d in th e Tractatus, th a t th e state o f affairs is som ething com posite; fo r this p r e ­ su p poses th a t it is com posed o f at least two constituents. So you see, th e specific way in w hich H usserl has answ ered th e fo u rth q u estio n (the m e an in g of th e w hole sentence is th e state o f affairs) p r e ­

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d eterm in e s a specific answ er to th e th ird question, how the m e an in g of th e w hole senten ce arises o u t o f th e m e an in g of th e co m p o n en t-ex p ressions (nam ely, as a resu lt o f com position, o r m ore precisely: as a resu lt o f categorial synthesis). A nd this answ er to th e th ird question in tu rn p resu p p o se s a specific answ er to th e second question, th a t co n c ern in g th e m ean in g o f th e pred icate, nam ely, th a t the m e an in g o f th e p re d i­ cate (e.g. ‘r e d ’) is th e object fo r w hich its nom inalized m odification (‘re d n e ss’) stands. It is to be noted th a t every step in this th o u g h tseq uence (if o n e d isreg ard s th e peculiarities o f th e th eo ry o f categorial synthesis) is a necessary consequence o f th e o bject-o rien tated ap p ro a ch as such an d n o t som eth in g p eculiar to H u sse rl’s philosophy. In H usserl th e in te rp re ta tio n o f predicates as objects does n o t only arise in this way as a necessary consequence from th e system atic con­ text, b u t also sim ply from th e conception o f a p red ic ate as a ca te g o re­ m atic expression, or, m o re fu n d am en tally , because an altern ativ e con­ cep tio n o f m e an in g which d id no t re q u ire to be p ro p p e d u p by objects was sim ply n o t available w ithin the fra m ew o rk o f th e o b ject-o rien tated ap p ro a ch . It is tr u e that in Investigation I. §12, with w hich I began, H u sserl also claim ed th a t th e distinction betw een object a n d m ean in g w hich h ad been show n to obtain in re g a rd to nam es m ust also be m ade with re g a rd to predicates; in d e ed he even assum ed th e re th a t a p re d i­ cate does not d esig n ate an object at all an d that, th e re fo re , o n e can n o t speak o f th e object o f a p re d ic a te b u t sim ply of a ‘relatio n to objects’, th ese being th e objects to w hich a p red ic ate can be applied. T h u s he can explain th e distinction betw een object and m e an in g as ap p lied to p red icates in a way fam iliar to us fro m m o d e rn sem antics: two p re d i­ cates - e.g. ‘an equ ilateral tria n g le’ an d ‘an eq u ia n g u la r tria n g le ’- can h ave ‘th e sam e relatio n to objects, th e sam e ra n g e o f possible applica­ tio n ’ an d yet n o t have th e sam e m eaning. B ut if we ask how this m ean ­ ing w hich is d istinct fro m th e relation to objects is itself to be u n d e r ­ sto od th e answ er is exactly analogous to th a t in th e case o f th e m ean in g o f th e w hole sentence: (a) in speaking o f ‘red n e ss’ o n e is sp eak in g objectually o f the m e an in g o f th e p red ic ate ‘r e d ’ (b) in th e absence o f any o th e r conception o f m e an in g th e objectual consciousness (of redness) is p ro jected back in to th e o rig in al m eaning-consciousness o f th e p red icate ‘r e d ’. A lthough in u n d e rsta n d in g th e p red ic ate o f a sentence th e act of consciousness is n o t objectually d irected to th e m ean in g o f th e p re d i­ cate, b u t only to th e object o f th e subject-term o f th e sen ten ce, th e m e an in g o f th e p red ic ate is n o netheless an object, nam ely, th e c o rre ­ sp o n d in g attrib u te. T h u s th e objectual conception o f predicates ca n n o t be sh ak en by sim ­

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ply p o in tin g to th e fact th a t H u sse rl h im self defin ed an ‘o b ject’ as th e subject o f possible p red ic atio n s (cf. p. 418 n. 4). T h is d efin itio n do es n o t c o n tra d ic t th e idea th a t p red ic ate s too sta n d fo r objects. F o r every p r e d ­ icate can be nom in alized an d o n e ca n th e n say: ju s t as, th o u g h th e state o f affairs that p is n o t the o b ject-about-w hich o f the sen ten ce ‘p ’ th e sen ten ce neverth eless stan d s fo r this state o f affairs, so, in th e sam e way, a lth o u g h in using the p red ic ate ‘r e d ’ o n e is n o t d ire c te d to the a ttrib u te o f red n e ss as an object, n ev erth eless th e p re d ic a te stan d s fo r this object, an d this object is its m ean in g . A re we b e tte r e q u ip p e d in th e case o f p red ic ate s th a n we w ere in th e case o f assertoric sentences to show th a t this p ro c e d u re o f H u sse rl’s involves a hysteron-proteron? I believe we are . F or in th e m e an tim e we have in c o rp o ra te d in to o u r en q u iry th e q u e stio n o f th e c o n stru c tio n o f th e w hole ex p ressio n fro m th e m e an in g s o f th e co m p o n en t-ex p re ssions; a n d it is in rela tio n to this p ro b lem , th e p ro b lem u p o n w hich ev ery th in g else h in g e s, th a t we can show th a t th e o b je ct-o rien tated ap p ro a ch fo u n d e rs. T h e o b je ct-o rien tate d a p p ro a c h re q u ire d th a t th e way in w hich th e m e an in g o f th e w hole ex p re ssio n arises o u t o f th e m ean in g s o f its co m ­ p o n e n t expressions be in te rp re te d as composition. T h a t this co n cep tio n is u n te n a b le if com position is th o u g h t o f in th e usual sense as real co m ­ position we saw by re fe re n c e to W ittg e n ste in ’s Tractatus. T h e p u rp o se o f th e th e o ry o f categorial synthesis was to o vercom e this difficulty. Was it successful? Yes, to th e e x te n t th a t th e co m po sitio n o f th e state o f affairs ca n n o t be in te rp re te d as-real com position. B u t this only tells us how th e com position may not be in te rp re te d . W hat is still lacking is a positive ch aracteriza tio n o f this com position. In th e case o f real com ­ position we have d efin ite c riteria fo r d e c id in g w h e th e r o r n o t an object A is co m b in ed with an object B (e.g. th e sh a ft a n d h e a d o f th e h am m er); an d this is equally so in th e case o f a real p a rt-w h o le rela tio n sh ip . Now if th e talk o f com position is n o t to be com pletely em p ty we m u st also have a criterio n fo r d ec id in g w h e th e r o r n o t an ideal com position obtains. We ca n n o t establish, e.g., w h e th e r red n e ss is in th e castle o r co m bined with th e castle in th e way th a t we can establish th a t th e d ra w e r is in th e table o r is co m b in ed with it. R edn ess fo r its p a r t is n ot a real object, b u t an a ttrib u te a n d this c a n n o t be a tta c h e d in a real way to th e castle o r o ccu r in it as a real, se p a ra te p a rt. In d e e d this was stressed by H usserl him self. B ut th e n w hat sort o f positive criteria do we have? It seem s to m e we only h av e one: th a t red n e ss is in (o r on) th e castle is th e case if an d only if th e castle is re d . In o th e r w ords, if we a re asked

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which relatio n we m e an w hen we speak o f th e relatio n betw een th e a ttrib u te a n d th e object we can only reply: th a t relatio n which o btains w hen th e c o rre sp o n d in g p re d ic a te applies to th e object. I f this is c o rrec t - an d so lo n g as no a ltern ativ e way o f u n d e rs ta n d in g this rela tio n is o ffe re d we m u st accep t it - th e n th e hysteron-proteron o f th e o b ject-o rien ­ tated co n c ep tio n o f p red ic ate s is established. W hat a sen ten ce such as ‘R edness is in th e castle’ o r ‘R ed n ess is com bined with th e castle’ m eans can only be ex p la in e d by re c o u rse to the sentence ‘T h e castle is r e d ’ an d n o t th e o th e r way ro u n d . It is im m aterial w hich p rep o sitio n we use in th e objectual r e n d e rin g - w h e th e r we say th e red n ess is in o r o n o r u p o n th e castle o r co m b in ed w ith it; fo r w hat we m ean by all such aw k­ w ard fo rm u la tio n s (aw kw ard because they are p arasitic on d iffe re n t real relations) can be m a d e precise (and can only be m a d e precise) by re fe re n c e to th e stra ig h tfo rw a rd pred icativ e senten ce in which n o re la ­ tion is ex p re ssed . We a re th u s at th e tu rn in g p o in t o f th e w hole discussion. For if it is tru e th a t we can only d efin e th e rela tio n betw een a ttrib u te an d object by m eans o f th e o rig in a l p red ic ativ e sen ten ce th e n we can n o t seek to ex p lain th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e predicative sen ten ce itself by m eans o f th a t rela tio n . B u t th e n this m ean s th a t we re q u ire a com pletely new ex p lan a tio n o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a pred icate, an ex p lan a tio n w hich does n o t have re c o u rse to th e n o m inalized fo rm o f th e p red ic ate an d w hich d oes n o t take th e fo rm o f saying th a t th e p red ic ate stands fo r so m eth in g . F or any such e x p la n a tio n w ould again have to speak o f a co m b in atio n o f th e object o f th e subject-term with th e object (or m e a n ­ ing) o f th e p red ic ate , a n d w hen asked fo r th e criterio n o f th e ex istence o f this co m b in atio n w ould ag a in have to have rec o u rse to an u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f th e p red ic ativ e se n te n c e which o n e alread y possesses. W e m u st th e re fo re com pletely a b a n d o n the o b je ct-o rien tated ex p lan a to ry m odel o f a com po sitio n o r synthesis. T his m odel w hich consisted in th e assim ilation o f a logical stru c tu re to a real relatio n (an d com p o sitio n unless specially d efin ed is a real re la ­ tion) o ffers only tw o altern ativ es: either o ne does n o t d istinguish th e co m position o f a state o f affairs fro m th a t o f a real th in g a t all (Tracta­ tus), or o n e does d istin g u ish th e m b u t is th e n unab le positively to c h a r­ acterize th e m (H usserl). I f we now look back at th e th e o ry o f categ o rial synthesis it becom es clear th a t w hat gave it plausibility was m erely th e negative a d v a n ta g e o f avoiding th e absu rd ities o f a real com position. T h e vagueness o f th e co n c ep t o f ideal com position by w hich this a d v a n ta g e is p u rc h a se d is n o t rem o v e d by p ro p p in g it u p with categorial acts, fo r such acts can them selves n o t be directly exhibited . O u r only evid en ce

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th a t a categorial act o f a p articu la r type is involved is th e fact th a t an ex p ression o f a p articu la r sem antic fo rm is bein g used. So far o f cou rse I have only d e m o n stra te d th e failu re o f th e theory o f categorial synthesis in re g a rd to one-place predicative sentences. T h e in adequacy o f th e th e o ry is particularly obvious in th e ir case because such a sentence has only o n e object-about-w hich an d it was necessary th e re fo re first to tra n sfo rm them b efo re one could speak o f a synthesis o f tw o objects at all. O n e m ight th in k th at th e th eo ry can at least be su stained in th e case o f relational statem ents, th u s in th e case o f manyplace predicative sentences. W hen I first in tro d u c e d th e th eo ry in a g en e ral way 1 also gave relational sentences as exam ples. H ow ever let us now look at th e m a tte r m ore closely. L et us take th e exam ple 1 have alread y used, th e sentence ‘T h is h am ­ m e r is com posed o f sh a ft a n d h e a d .’ In my discussion o f this exam ple I p o in ted o u t th a t the com position o f this state of affairs can be th o u g h t o f in two d iffe re n t ways. T h e one th a t seem s to m e to be logically co r­ rect is as follows: in th e state o f affairs th e relatio n o f real com position is ideally com bined with, on the o n e h an d , th e h a m m e r a n d , on th e o th e r h an d , with th e object-pair sh a ft an d h ea d . In this co n cep tio n a relational sta te m en t is tre a te d as a m any-place pred icativ e statem en t. T h e relation (in this case th e real com position) is th e object fo r which th e nom inalization o f th e m any-place p red ic ate (‘com posed o f ’) stands a n d thus co rresp o n d s to th e a ttrib u te in th e case o f a o n e-p lace p re d i­ cative sentence. T h e ideal com bination of th e relatio n with th e real objects (the h a m m e r on th e one h a n d , th e object-p air sh a ft an d h ead o n th e o th e r h an d ) thus co rresp o n d s exactly to th e co m b in atio n o f th e a ttrib u te with th e one real object in th e case o f a o n e-place p redicative sentence. B u t th e n this conception is o p en to precisely th e sam e objec­ tion as the previous one: asked to give a criterio n fo r th e p resen ce o f this ideal com position o ne can only reply th a t it obtains betw een th e real com position and th e objects if th e original sentence is tru e , in o u r ex am ple: if th e h a m m e r is com posed o f sh aft an d head. As I have alread y p o in te d out, H u sserl p re fe rre d a n o th e r co n cep ­ tion, according to which in a relational sta te m en t it is only th e real objects which are synthesized in th e categorial act; th e real relatio n on th e o th e r h a n d is so to speak in c o rp o ra te d into th e categorial synthesis. T h u s th e categorial act will be a d iffe re n t one d e p e n d in g o n th e type o f rela tio n co n c ern ed . T h is view seem s to m e to be u n te n ab le . T h e r e is no rea so n to re g a rd any relatio n betw een two real objects as n o t a real relation. H usserl how ever th o u g h t th a t to the d iffe re n t real relations th e re co rre sp o n d d iffe re n t ideal relations. C onsistently ap p lie d this

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idea w ould re su lt in a d u p licatio n o f all types o f relatio n . ‘In th e fo r­ m ation o f ex te rn a l relations a sensuous fo rm m ay serve as th e fo u n d a ­ tion fo r th e constitution o f a c o rre sp o n d in g [!] categorial form ; as w hen we a p p re h e n d , a n d p e rh a p s express, th e sensible ad jo in in g o f con ten ts A a n d B given in th e p e rc e p tio n o f a co m p re h en siv e w hole G in the synthetic form s “A adjoins B ” o r “B adjoins v4” W ith th e co n stitu tio n o f th e la tte r form s, how ever, th e re arise new objects b elo n g in g to th e class “states o f affairs” ’ (Investigation VI § 48). F rom th e fact th a t th e state o f affairs th a t A adjoins B is an ideal object H u sserl m istakenly infers th a t th e relation o f ad jo in in g ex p ressed in th e two sentences is itself an ideal relation. T h e only ideal relation involved is th e relatio n betw een th e real relation o f ad jo in in g an d th e object pair {A, B }; we w ould thus be back with my original conception w hich leads to th e sam e difficulty as aro se in th e case o f o ne-place p redicative sentences. L ater on I will ex am in e a n o th e r aspect o f H u sse rl’s th eo ry o f cate­ gorial synthesis which co ncerns th e m e a n in g o f th e w ords ‘a n d ’ a n d ‘o r ’. B u t o u r first task m u st be to w ork o u t a new con cep tio n o f p red icates which does n o t tre a t th em as sta n d in g fo r objects.

LECTURE

11

Predicates: the first step in the development of an analytical conception of the m eaning of sentences. T h e dispute between nominalists and conceptualists

T h e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d con cep tio n o f th e m e a n in g o f p red icativ e se n ­ tences f o u n d e r e d on th e questio n o f how th e m e a n in g o f th e w hole se n ten c e results fro m th e m ean in g s o f th e sen ten c e-co m p o n en ts. T h e only an sw er th e o b je ct-o rien tate d position co u ld give was: th e m e a n in g o f th e w hole se n ten c e is co m p o sed o f th a t fo r w hich th e sin g u lar te rm sta n d s a n d th a t fo r w hich the p red ic ate stan d s. T h is an sw e r led to th e dilem m a: e ith e r th e com position m u st be c o n s tru e d as th e real c o m p o ­ sition o f a co m p lex object o r o n e c a n n o t say w hat is to be u n d e rsto o d by com po sitio n h e re w ith o u t p re su p p o sin g precisely th a t u n d e r s ta n d ­ in g o f th e se n ten ce w hich was to be ex p lain e d . T h is re su lt is n o t p u re ly negative, inasm uch as it p rescrib es a specific d irec tio n o f e n q u iry fo r a new , n o lo n g e r o b je c t-o rie n ta te d a tte m p t at an ex p la n a tio n . Firstly, u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e p re d ic a te has e m e rg e d as th e - fro m an o b je ct-o rien tate d p o in t o f view - critical e le m e n t in th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a p red icativ e sentence. W e will th u s first h ave to try to achieve a new a n d no lo n g e r o b je ct-o rien tate d c o n c ep tio n o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a p red icate. S econdly, it has a t th e sam e tim e b eco m e clear th a t th e p ro b lem o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a p re d ic a te - th e seco n d o f my f o u r qu estio n s (see p. 103) - is directly c o n n e c te d w ith o u r th ird q u estio n , viz. how we u n d e rs ta n d th e co m b in atio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm with th e p red ic ate . It w ould th e re fo re seem plausible th a t th ese two q u estio n s sh o u ld now be co m bined. T h is gives a c o n c re te clue to th e en q u iry in to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a p red ic ate . W ere we sim ply to f o r ­ m u late th e questio n c o n c ern in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e p re d ic a te th u s: w h at is it to u n d e rs ta n d a p re d ic a te if this u n d e rs ta n d in g c a n n o t consist in th e consciousness o f an object? we w ould h av e n o positive clue as to how we sh o u ld p ro ce ed . If, on th e o th e r h a n d , we co m b in e th e second q u estio n with th e th ird a n d h o ld fast to th e id ea th a t at any ra te th e sin g u lar te rm sta n d s fo r an object, we can ask: if th e su p p le m e n ta ­

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tion o f th e sin g u la r te rm by a p red ic ate does n o t have th e fu n ctio n o f co m b in in g th e object o f th e sin g u lar te rm with a n o th e r object (th at o f th e p red icate) how th e n is it to be u n d e rsto o d ? C learly we ca n n o t now look fo r so m e th in g o th e r th a n an object with w hich th e object o f the sin g u la r te rm w ould be co m b in ed , fo r w hatever is com b in ed with som e­ th in g is so m e th in g an d , h en c e, an object. W hat we have to a b a n d o n is precisely this id e a o f a co m b in atio n o r synthesis. So we have to ask: if th e su p p le m e n ta tio n o f a sin g u lar te rm by a p re d ic a te does n o t have th e fu n c tio n o f com b in in g th e object fo r w hich th e sin g u lar te rm stands with so m e th in g else th en w hat is its function? W e can h e re link o u r discussion to a co n cep t which was already p re s e n t in th e tra d itio n a l th e o ry o f th e p red ic ate . T h e only aspect o f th e tra d itio n a l th e o ry I have so far co n sid ered is th e id ea th a t th e p r e d ­ icate sta n d s fo r an object. I have n o t g o n e into th e q u estio n o f w hat th at o bject was conceived to be. It is only in passing th a t I have called these objects d e sig n a te d by nom in alized p red ic ate s ‘a ttrib u te s’: we find in th e tra d itio n , in a d d itio n to ‘a ttrib u te ’, a series o f o th e r d esig n atio n s such as ‘sp ecies’, ‘u n iv e rsa ls’, ‘co n c ep ts’, ‘p ro p e rtie s ’. T h e d esig n atio n ‘universals’ expresses th e idea o f ‘g en e ral objects’ w hich can b elo n g to any n u m b e r o f in d iv id u al objects. It is this ‘b elo n g in g ’ w hich is ex p ressed in th e d esig n atio n ‘a ttrib u te ’. ‘S pecies’, th e desig n atio n p re fe rre d by H u s­ serl, is th e L atin tra n sla tio n o f th e G reek eidos (‘loo k ’, ‘a p p e a ra n c e ’); this w o rd c o n trib u te s little to th e ch aracteriza tio n o f th e objects in questio n e x c ep t p e rh a p s this: th a t they a re objects o f an intellectual in tu itio n . T h e w ord ‘c o n c e p t’ occupies a special position, fo r one hesitates to r e g a rd concepts as objects. So already in trad itio n al p h ilo so p h y th e re seem s to exist, in th e id e a th a t p red icates sta n d fo r co ncepts, an a p p ro a c h w hich leads aw ay fro m th e o b je ct-o rien tate d co n cep tio n ; th e te rm ‘c o n c e p t’ sh o u ld th e re fo r e be specially in v e stig a ted .1 Finally, th e d esig n atio n o f universals as ‘p ro p e rtie s ’ can be u n d e rsto o d as a fu rth e r specification o f th e ir d e sig n atio n as attrib u tes: it is ch aracteristic o f u n i­ versals th a t w h en they a re ascribed (‘a ttrib u te d ’) to a real object it a p p e a rs as c h a racterize d by th ese attrib u tes; th e a ttrib u te is its ‘q uality’ o r ‘p r o p e r ty ’. H ow ever, this d esig n atio n is insufficiently c o m p re h e n ­ sive. A n a ttrib u te such as redness is a p ro p e rty o f th e castle b u t we w ould n o t call th e a ttrib u te o f b ein g a castle a quality o f this b u ilding. ‘T h is is a castle’ answ ers th e q u estio n ‘W hat is this?’ w hereas o n e only calls q u al­ ities th o se characteristics o f objects w hich r e p re s e n t answ ers to th e q u estio n : ‘H ow is this q u alified ?’ W hat is m e an t th e n by calling u n iv e r­ sals ‘p ro p e rtie s ’ is sim ply th a t th e object is som ehow ch a racterize d by

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th em , in w hatever resp e ct this m ay be. F o r this reaso n it w ould seem b e tte r to call an a ttrib u te a ‘ch a racteristic’ r a th e r th a n a ‘p ro p e rty ’. I f th e object fo r w hich a p re d ic a te stands is conceived as a c h a ra c te r­ istic th e n th e o b ject-o rien tated con cep tio n com es closest to th e p re se n ­ tatio n o f th e pro b lem I have ju s t elaborated. F or as a ch aracteristic th a t fo r w hich th e p re d ic a te stands is viewed in its relation to th e object o f th e sin g u lar term . I h a d asked: w hat fu n ctio n has th e su p p le m e n ta tio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm by a pred icate? U sing th e concept o f a c h a ra c te r­ istic it is possible to give an answ er to this q uestion th a t still co n fo rm s to th e object-o rien tated ap p ro a ch . Such an an sw er w ould be: th e s u p p le ­ m e n tatio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm by th e p red ic ate has th e fu n ctio n o f ch aracterizin g the object o f th e sin g u lar te rm an d it does this by co m ­ bin in g this object with a characteristic. Now we w ere su p p o se d to d ro p th e idea o f a com bination with som ething. It was fo r this reaso n th a t I fo rm u la te d th e q u estio n thus: if th e su p p le m e n tatio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm by a p red ic ate does not have th e fun ctio n o f co m b in in g th e object o f th e sin g u lar te rm w ith so m e th in g th en w hat fu n ctio n does it have? W e can d eriv e an answ er to this q u estio n directly fro m th e o b ject-o rien ­ tated ac co u n t ju s t given by d r o p p in g the specifically o b je ct-o rien tate d ad d itio n . In ste a d o f saying: th e su p p le m e n ta tio n o f th e sin g u lar te rm by a p re d ic a te has th e fu n ctio n o f co m bining th e object w ith so m eth in g a n d th e re b y ch aracterizin g it we can say: th e su p p le m e n tatio n by th e p re d ic a te does not have th e fu n ctio n o f co m binin g th e object o f th e sin g u lar te rm with som eth in g , but instead th a t o f ch aracterizin g it. W ith this we e n c o u n te r a new a n d no lo n g e r ob ject-o rien tated thesis ab o u t w hat it is to u n d e rs ta n d a pred icate. A ccording to this new c o n ­ cep tion th e fu n ctio n o f th e p re d ic a te is n o t to stand fo r so m eth in g , b u t r a th e r to characterize so m e th in g (th e object o f th e sin g u lar term ) a n d h en c e to u n d e rs ta n d th e p red ic ate is to u n d e rsta n d its ch aracterizatio n fu n ction. A sen ten ce such as ‘T h e castle is r e d ’ is n o lo n g er to be ex p lain e d by saying th a t th e p re d ic a te stands fo r a ch aracteristic (re d ­ ness) w hich is synthesized with th e object, b u t ra th e r by saying th a t th e object - th e castle - is ch a racterize d in a specific m a n n e r by th e p r e d i­ cate ‘is r e d ’. I can see th a t you will raise a w hole series o f fu n d a m e n ta l objections an d q ueries. Firstly, you m ight ask, with w hat rig h t do I su d d en ly sta rt sp eak in g o f a fu n ctio n o f a linguistic expression. Secondly, you will w ant to know w hat precisely is m e a n t by a ‘ch a racteriza tio n -fu n ctio n ’. T h ird ly , you w ould be ju stified in asking how far my suggestion is an altern ativ e to th e o b je ct-o rien tate d acco u n t at all. T h a t th e object o f th e

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sin g u lar te rm is ch a racterized by th e p re d ic a te is, you will say, obvious a n d alm ost trivial. B u t d o esn ’t this sim ply say less th a n th e object-orienta ted conception? T h e la tte r also allows o n e to speak o f a c h a racteriza­ tion o f th e object o f th e sin g u lar te rm by th e p red ic ate , b u t in stead o f sim ply leaving it a t th a t it also provides an ex p lan a tio n o f how this c h a r­ acterization is achieved, viz. by th e com bination with a ch aracteristic fo r w hich th e p red ic ate stands. O nly if it becam e clear how th e new e x p la ­ n atio n com pen sates fo r this a p p a re n t lack could it really claim to be re g a rd e d as an altern ativ e to th e object-o rien tated ex p lan atio n . In this le ctu re I w ant to deal in tu rn with these th re e question-com plexes. So, firstly, with w h at rig h t d o I ask fo r th e fu n ctio n o f a linguistic expression? In so d o in g I seem to be sm u g g lin g in a new id ea w hich has n o t arisen fro m my critical in te rp re ta tio n o f th e o b je ct-o rien tate d a p p ro a c h . H ow ever, I w ould ask you to co n sid er th a t o u r task m u st now be th a t o f fin d in g an alternative, in th e specific case o f p red icates, to th e o b je ct-o rien tate d in te rp re ta tio n o f linguistic exp ressio n s. W e th u s find ourselves throw n back to th e sta rtin g -p o in t o f H u sse rl’s sem antics an d m u st so to speak take a n o th e r step b e h in d this startin g p o in t so th a t th e a ltern ativ e possibilities can reveal them selves. H u sse rl’s sta rtin g -p o in t was th e ‘c o n fe rrin g o f m e a n in g ’ by th e u se o f signs (above p. 107). W e saw how H usserl im m ediately in te rp re ts this ‘c o n fe rrin g o f m e a n in g ’ as an ‘act’ a n d thus as consciousness o f an object. I f we go b eh in d this first m ove o f H u sse rl we arriv e at th e m o re g en eral p e r ­ spective o f th e use o f signs. B ecause fro m th e o u tset H u sserl so co n ­ ceived th e use o f a sign th a t a sign can only be used to stan d fo r an object, th e u n d e rly in g con cep t o f th e use o f a sign could n ot as such becom e salient fo r him . Now this concept o f sig n -em p lo y m en t has, as a basic concept, th e a d v a n ta g e th a t it still encom passes th e o b ject-o rien ­ tated a p p ro a c h b u t a t th e sam e tim e o p en s u p altern ativ es to it. It p e r ­ mits th e view th a t all o r som e signs a re u se d to stan d fo r an object. O n th e o th e r h a n d , how ever, we can now ask: fo r w hat o th e r p u rp o ses a re signs used? A nd o n e possible answ er w ould be: to ch aracterize. Now th a t fo r w hich so m e th in g is used is w hat we call its fu n ctio n . N otice th a t in this new way o f looking at thin g s signs assum e an im p o rta n c e w hich th ey did n o t have in th e o b ject-o rien tated c o n c ep ­ tion. F o r th e la tte r th e sign is a m e re in te rm e d ia ry b etw een conscious­ ness a n d object. It has th e fu n ctio n o f m ak in g p re se n t to consciousness th e object fo r w hich it stands. B u t consciousness can also be conscious o f th e sam e object th a t is m ad e p re se n t to it by th e sign w ith o u t th e sign. T h u s th e w hole th e o ry o f categorial acts can be c a rrie d th ro u g h p u rely as a th e o ry o f th in k in g w ith o u t having to r e f e r to signs. T h e situ atio n is

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co m pletely d if fe r e n t as so o n as o n e co n sid ers o th e r fu n ctio n s o f signs. For exam ple, if th e fu n c tio n o f a sign consists in ch aracterizin g , th e n this fu n ctio n o f ch a ra c te riz in g is d e p e n d e n t o n a sign. H e re th e sign d oes n o t serve as a m e re in s tru m e n t fo r so m e th in g w hich co u ld also be ach ieved w ith o u t it. N ow if th e fu n c tio n o f a th in g is w h at th a t th in g is used fo r th e n th e n o tio n o f th e fu n ctio n o f a sign is closely co n n e cted with th a t o f th e employment o r use o f a sign. W h en we ask w hat th e fu n ctio n o f so m e th in g is we p re s u p p o s e th a t it belo n g s to a c o n te x t o f p u rp o siv e actio n . I f we e n q u ire as to th e fu n ctio n o f so m e th in g , e.g. a h a m m e r, we a re asking: fo r w hat p u r p o s e is it n o rm ally used ? A n d this q u estio n re fe rs to a p a rtic u la r h u m a n activity (e.g. th e k n o ck in g in o f nails). So th e q u e s­ tion: w hat is th e fu n c tio n o f a sign? is directly co n n e cted w ith th e q u e s­ tion: w hat is th e n o rm a l u se o f this sign? an d th e la tte r q u e stio n re fe rs to th e q uestion: w hat is th e action o f w hich this u se o f a sign is th e (or a possible) co n d itio n ? F o r ex am p le, if a p a rtic u la r class o f signs has th e fu n ctio n o f c h a ra c te riz in g so m e th in g this m e an s th a t th e se signs a re n o rm ally u se d to c h a ra c te riz e so m e th in g a n d th a t th e action w hich so m e o n e p e rfo rm s w h en h e uses a p re d ic a te is th a t o f ch a ra c te riz in g so m e th in g as th u s o r th u s. All o f this is clearly also tr u e in th e p a rtic u la r case w hich th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d c o n c ep tio n re g a rd s as th e o nly case. A sign with th e fu n c tio n o f sta n d in g fo r so m e th in g is u sed to in d icate w hich object o n e m eans. A n d th e a n sw e r to th e q u estio n : w h at is a p e r ­ son d o in g w ho uses a sign in this way? is th a t h e is in d ic atin g w hich ob ject h e m eans. W h en I discussed H u s s e rl’s ta k in g th e ‘c o n fe rrin g o f m e a n in g ’ as his s ta rtin g -p o in t I p o in te d o u t th a t th e in te rp re ta tio n (Auffassung) o f a sign w hich co n fers m e a n in g o n it sh o u ld really be called ‘u n d e r s ta n d in g ’ fo r we h a d e a rlie r seen th a t to ask fo r th e m e a n in g o f a sign is to ask how th a t sign is to be u n d e rs to o d . W e saw th a t H u sse rl im m ed iately by­ p assed u n d e rs ta n d in g in fav o u r o f th e in te n tio n a l act. C o n sid eratio n o f an u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e sign was fo r him as su p e rflu o u s as c o n sid e ra ­ tion o f th e u se o f th e sign, alth o u g h th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d co n c ep tio n can equally well be b ased on u n d e rs ta n d in g as on use: to u n d e rs ta n d a sign is to know fo r w hich object it stands. N ow how is th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f a sign c o n n e c te d w ith its use? C learly in this way: to u n d e rs ta n d a sign is to know w h at fu n c tio n it has o r how it is u sed . N ow if we know o f so m e th in g how it is u se d th e n this m ean s th a t we know its em p lo y m e n t-ru le s. If this is so th e n u n d e r s ta n d ­ in g th e fu n c tio n o f a sign m u st consist in k n o w in g th e ru les o f its em p lo y m e n t.

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It thus em erg es th a t by going back to th e fu nction o f linguistic ex p ressions we arrive at a new co m prehensive ex p lan a to ry perspective o f which th e follow ing concepts a re characteristic: fu n ctio n , use o f so m eth in g , ru le o f this use, ac tio n -ru le and an u n d e rsta n d in g th a t is an u n d e rs ta n d in g o f a rule. A fte r th e discussion o f pred icates we will have to a tte m p t to apply the sam e set o f concepts to sin g u lar term s. O n the basis o f the th u s re -fo rm u la te d questions ab o u t singular term s an d p red icates we will be able to re tu r n , with m o re pro sp ect o f success (th o u g h only a t the en d o f th e w hole lecture-series [L ecture 27]), to o u r th ird q uestion - viz. w hat is it to u n d e rs ta n d th e co m bination o f a sin­ g u la r te rm w ith a pred icate? F or we no longer feel com pelled to en q u ire in to a com bination o f w hat th e sin g u lar term stands fo r with w hat th e p re d ic a te stands for. R a th e r th e q uestion now acquires th e sense: how is th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f th e o n e so rt o f expressio n co n n ected with th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f th e o th e r so rt o f expression? T h e aim o f th e w hole investigation is an answ er to th e question: w hat is it to u n d e r ­ sta n d a w hole predicative sentence? It should now be possible to p u t this question th u s: w hat is th e fu n ctio n o f such a sentence? o r w hat are we d o in g w hen we em ploy a p redicative sentence? H u sse rl’s answ er was: w hat we a re d o in g w h en we u se a predicativ e sentence is r e p r e ­ sen tin g , by m ean s o f it, a state of affairs. O f course on th e p re se n t basis it is to be ex p ected th a t we will arriv e at quite a d iffe re n t so rt o f answ er. B u t now let us re tu r n to p redicates. T h e second question 1 exp ected fro m you was: w hat does it m ean to speak o f ‘ch aracteriza tio n ’? As I th in k this is a basic d a tu m o f o u r u n d e rsta n d in g in so far as we u n d e r­ sta n d how to use p red icates, I ca n n o t d efine this w ord, m erely elucidate it. A p red ic ate fulfils its ch a racteriza tio n -fu n ctio n by acting as a crite­ rion. A criterio n (from th e G reek krinein, to separate) is so m eth in g w hich serves to d istinguish. In ap p ly in g a p red ic ate to som e objects b u t n o t to o th ers we classify all those objects to which we apply it an d at th e sam e tim e distinguish th e m fro m th o se to which we do n o t apply it. W h en we apply a p red ic ate to an object we declare it to be an object w hich is like th e o th e r objects to w hich we app ly th e p red ic ate an d u n lik e those to w hich we d o n o t apply it; and th a t m eans: we c h a ra c te r­ ize it as such an object. T h e ch aracteriza tio n -fu n ctio n consists in this classifying-and-distinguishing. T h e th ird q u estio n I ex p e cted fro m you can be directly linked to this elu cidation. F or you could now a rg u e against m e as follows. I f ch arac­ te rizin g is a fo rm o f classifying th en fo r precisely this reason th e objects ch a racterize d by a p re d ic a te m ust h av e som ething in com m on. A nd do we n o t th en h av e to say th a t it is really this com m o n so m eth in g th a t

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characterizes th e object and are we not th u s led back to th e objectual characteristic? T h e p redicate, you will say, can n o t itself fu n ctio n as a criterion, fo r the application o f th e p red ic ate to ju s t th ese objects an d n o t o th ers requires a fo u n d atio n in the objects, o r ‘m a rk o f d istin ctio n ’; a n d in d e ed th e characteristic was also so called in trad itio n al philosophy. S hould this a rg u m e n t prove com pelling, th e n the o b ject-o rien tated co nception w ould be resto red . I t w ould th e n have been show n th a t the fu n ctional conception does not o ffe r a g en u in e alternative, fo r it is itself obliged to have reco u rse to th e object-o rien tated co nception: th e p r e d ­ icate only characterizes th e object by sta n d in g fo r a characteristic which itself characterizes th e object in a prim ary sense. It is only now th a t th e real w eight o f th e object-o rien tated conception shows itself. It does n o t sim ply arise from th e philosophical p reju d ice th a t every linguistic expression stands fo r som ething; ra th e r it seem s to be th e only in telli­ gible epistem ological explan atio n o f th e use o f predicates. Vis-ä-vis my earlier re fe re n c e to th e priority o f th e predicative fo rm (‘r e d ’) over its nom inalized m odification (‘re d n e ss’), th e object-orien tated p h ilo so p h er could now a rg u e th a t this priority tu rn s o u t to be a m erely g ram m atical one; epistem ologically th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e p red ic ate is fo u n d e d in the re p re se n ta tio n o f the c o rre sp o n d in g characteristic. My accusa­ tion of a hysteron-proteron w ould th u s re b o u n d against m y own e x p la n a ­ tion. So if this fu nctional ex p lan atio n is to re p re se n t a g e n u in e altern ativ e to the object-o rien tated one th e n its real co n ten t m ust be d e e p e r th a n an y th in g suggested by my account so far; a n d it m ust be in term s o f this d e e p e r c o n te n t th a t th e fu nctional ex p lan atio n is able to answ er th e ob ject-orientated counter-criticism ju s t p re se n te d . F ro m th e p o in t o f view o f m e th o d it w ould seem reasonable to start th e p rese n tatio n o f th e new ap p ro a ch by arg u in g with this criticism , fo r such a c o n fro n ta ­ tion should disclose th e real substance o f th e fu nctio n al ex p lan atio n . I will co n d u ct this c o n fro n tatio n in th e fo rm o f a dialo g u e betw een th e two positions. Such a dialogue sh o u ld b rin g us step by step to th e rea l kernel o f th e problem . T h e functional ex p lan atio n fits into th e so-called n o m in alist trad itio n acco rd in g to which th e re are no gen eral essences fo r w hich p red icates stand; an d th e only objects given to us in u n d e rsta n d in g these signs a re th e signs them selves, th e nomina. T h e co n tra ry position has som etim es been called realism , som etim es conceptualism ; the fo rm e r w hen th e th e o ry has been u n d e rsto o d in a m o re ontological sense (p red icates stand fo r real objects), th e latter w hen it has b een u n d e rsto o d in a m o re

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psychological o r epistem ological sense. T h e traditional ontological cri­ tiq u e o f realism by nom inalism is n o t th e o n e I p re se n te d in my last lecture, w hich c o n c e rn e d the p ro b le m o f how th e object o f the p r e d i­ cate is co n n e cted w ith th a t o f th e subject; r a th e r it re la te d to th e o th e r p ro blem o f how o n e a n d th e sam e g en e ral object can sim u ltan eo u sly be in m any co n crete objects. T h e d e b a te into w hich we m u st e n te r (in view o f th e counter-criticism ju s t raised), on th e o th e r h an d , is n o t p rim arily an ontological d eb a te b u t a psychological-epistem ological one. A ccording to th e con cep tu alist thesis o n e can only u n d e rsta n d th e ch aracteriza tio n -fu n ctio n o f a p re d ic a te if th e em p lo y m e n t o f th e p r e d ­ icate is co n n e cted w ith th e re p re se n ta tio n o f so m eth in g fo r w hich th e p red icate stands. F or if this w ere n o t so th e p red ic ate w ould h ave no objective fo u n d a tio n ; it w ould be arb itrary . L et us first allow th e nom inalist to m o u n t his co u n ter-attack . H e will d en y th a t we in fact always r e p re s e n t so m e th in g w hen we significantly em ploy a p red icate. T a k e , e.g., th e sentence ‘H eid e lb e rg Castle is r e d .’ I f we m ake this sta te m e n t in th e p e rc e p tu a l situatio n , th u s in a situ atio n in w hich we perceive th e castle a n d perceive th a t it is re d , th e n clearly we do so on th e basis o f a p articu la r co lo u r-rep rese n tatio n . B u t su p p o se we u tte r such a sen ten ce h e re in th e lectu re-ro o m , fo r ex am p le, w h ere we ca n n o t see th e castle; we can have a c o rre sp o n d in g c o lo u r-re p re s e n ­ tation in o u r im ag in atio n , b u t clearly we can also u n d e rs ta n d th e sen ­ tence w ith o u t h aving any such re p re se n ta tio n co rre sp o n d in g to th e w ord ‘r e d ’. T his first attack by th e nom inalist can easily be b e a te n o ff by his o p p o n e n t. It tu rn s o u t to be a m is u n d e rsta n d in g , fo r it th o u g h t o f th e re p re se n ta tio n o f so m e th in g fo r which th e p red ic ate is su p p o se d to stan d as a sensuous re p re se n ta tio n . T h a t we can use a p red ic ate with u n d e rs ta n d in g w ith o u t having sensuous im ages is so m e th in g th e c o n ­ ceptualist will im m ediately concede. H u sserl h im self show ed this in im pressive fashion, in C h a p te r 2 o f Investigation I. B u t it is n o t a q u es­ tion o f sensuous re p re se n ta tio n s, th e conceptualist will say; th e c h a ra c ­ teristic o f red n e ss is so m e th in g w hich is co m m o n to m an y things, it is red ness in general. So this was a m is u n d e rsta n d in g . H ow ever, it was n o t an u n p ro d u c tiv e m isu n d ersta n d in g . F o r it is now clear th a t th e only k in d o f re p re s e n ta ­ tions in question a re non-sen su o u s re p re se n ta tio n s. Previously th e n om inalist h a d asserte d th at u n d e rs ta n d in g a p re d ic a te is not always acco m p an ied by a sensuous re p re se n ta tio n ; h e will now claim th a t th e re sim ply a re no re p re se n ta tio n s o f th e kind claim ed by th e conceptualist. T h e suspicion arises th a t, a lth o u g h th e co m m o n ch aracteristic is n o t an

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o b ject o f se n se-p erc ep tio n , this re p re se n ta tio n is still b e in g th o u g h t o f on th e m odel o f sen se-p erce p tio n . T h e com m on characteristic, because it is so m e th in g g en e ral, ca n n o t be se n su o u sly re p re s e n te d ; b u t it can n o n eth ele ss be re p re s e n te d . B ut how ? T h a t se n se-p erce p tio n h e re serves as th e m o d el seem s p articu la rly clear in H u sse rl’s case, fo r h e says: th e g en e ral object is given to us in an in tu itio n o f essence (Wesen­ sanschauung). A c o rre sp o n d in g tra d itio n , a c c o rd in g to w hich we r e p r e ­ se n t th e se g e n e ra l essences in an intellectu al in tu itio n (nous), has existed since Plato. T h e no m in alist can leave u n d e c id e d how far his o p p o n e n t th in k s o f th e g en e ral ch aracteristic o n th e m o d el o f se n se-p erce p tio n (th o u g h one m ay well th in k th a t u ltim ately h e has to th in k o f it in this way). His a rg u m e n t will now be th a t in any e v e n t we do n o t e n c o u n te r such a re p re se n ta tio n o f so m e th in g g en e ral th a t we reco g n ize in an object. L et us assum e, w hen we say o f th e castle th a t it is r e d , th e m ost fav o u rab le case, viz. th a t o f p e rc e p tio n ; we h av e a p a rtic u la r sen su o u s c o lo u r-re p re se n ta tio n , b u t d o we h av e , in a d d itio n to this r e p r e s e n ta ­ tio n (or fo u n d e d in it), a f u r th e r n o n -se n su o u s re p re s e n ta tio n th ro u g h w hich we a p p r e h e n d th a t co m m o n c h a racteristic - th e re d n e s s - in th e object? T h is q u estio n is m e a n t to hit th e o p p o n e n t a t precisely th a t p o in t w hich h e h im se lf em p h asized as th e decisive one. W e ca n n o t, h e h a d claim ed , reco g n ize an object as o ne c h a ra c te riz e d by a p re d ic a te unless we can d iscern in it a ch a racteristic fo r w hich th e p re d ic a te stan d s. A n d now it is objected to him th a t we sim ply c a n n o t fin d such a re p re s e n ta ­ tio n o f a ch aracteristic. T h is b rin g s o u t a p ec u lia rity o f his a rg u m e n t w hich sh o u ld be n o ted : his insistence on th e a p p re h e n s io n o f a c h a rac­ teristic w hich m u st u n d e rlie th e c h a ra c te riz a tio n -fu n c tio n o f th e p r e d i­ cate was n o t a discovery b u t a p o stu late . It was n o t show n th a t it is so; r a th e r it was a rg u e d th a t it m u st be so. T h is aro u se s th e suspicion th a t ag ain it is only th e o b je ct-o rien tate d p re ju d ic e th a t is at w o rk h e re , n o t, ad m itte d ly , in th e sim ple fo rm o f sta tin g in ad v a n ce th a t every sign m u st stan d fo r so m e th in g , b u t r a th e r in th e fo rm o f an inability to th in k o f th e c h a ra c te riz a tio n -fu n c tio n o f p re d ic a te s in any o th e r way. O n e c a n n o t th in k o f it d iffe ren tly ; th e re fo r e it m u st be so. B u t if o n e ca n n o t ascertain th a t it is so th e n th e re w ould seem to be so m e th in g w ro n g wich o n e ’s p re su p p o sitio n s. B u t at th e stage th e d e b a te has now re a c h e d , th e stre n g th o f th e co n ­ ce p tu a list vis-ä-vis th e n o m in alist consists in th e fact th a t a lth o u g h th e co n c ep tu alist ca n n o t ex h ib it th e n o n -se n su o u s re p re s e n ta tio n h e p o s­ tu lates, th e no m in alist f o r his p a rt h as n o t yet given a positive ac co u n t o f how th e c h a ra c te riz a tio n -fu n c tio n o f p re d ic a te s is to be u n d e rsto o d .

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So long as n o altern ativ e acco u n t is available th e co n cep tu alist account, h o w ev er hy p o th etical it m ay be, reta in s the advan tag e. T h e n o m in alist m ust th e re fo re now be pressed into giving his ow n positive account. T h e w eakness o f trad itio n al nom inalism was th a t its stre n g th lay only in its critiq u e o f th e o p posing position. O nly since W ittg e n stein ’s Philosophical Investigations has th e re been a positive ex p la­ n a tio n o f how o n e can u n d e rs ta n d th e ch a racterizatio n -fu n ctio n o f p red icates th a t does n o t involve p r o p p in g up this fu n ctio n with objects.2 1 shall take as my p o in t o f d e p a r tu re a g e n e ra l re m a rk ab o u t th e m e a n in g o f linguistic expressions w hich is fo u n d in §560 o f th e Investi­ gations: ‘-“T h e m e an in g o f a w ord is w hat is ex p lain e d by th e e x p lan a­ tio n o f th e m e a n in g ” i.e. if you w ant to u n d e rsta n d th e use o f th e w ord “m e a n in g ”, look fo r w hat a re called “explan atio n s o f m e a n in g ” ’. A t th e b e g in n in g o f th e Blue Book, w here a sim ilar re m a rk occurs, W ittgenstein explains its significance by saying th a t it is in te n d e d to b rin g th e q u estio n ‘W h at is m e an in g ?’ ‘dow n to e a r th ’. It is in te n d e d to fre e us fro m th e com pulsive idea th a t m ean in g m u st be an object. T h e sense o f this re m a rk is th e re fo re o n a level w ith m y ea rlier suggestion th a t in stead o f asking fo r th e m e a n in g o f an expressio n we sh o u ld ask how we u n d e rs ta n d it. H ow is th e understanding o f m e a n in g of w hich I h ad sp o k en co n ­ n ec te d with th e explanation o f m e a n in g re fe rre d to in th e q u o tatio n fro m W ittgenstein? U n d e rsta n d in g a n d explain in g a re fre q u en tly used as o p p o sin g concepts, as fo r ex am p le in the fam iliar co n tra st betw een in te rp re ta tiv e (verstehend) a n d e x p la n a to ry psychology. H ow ever, th e w o rd ‘e x p la in ’ is used in tw o d iffe re n t senses. O n e can say ‘E xplain to m e why th at is th u s a n d so’: ex p la n a tio n in th e sense o f th e giving o f reasons. It is only this k in d o f ex p lan a tio n th a t can be o p p o sed to u n d e rs ta n d in g o r describing. E xplaining-w hat o r -how differs fro m this ex p laining-w hy: ‘E xplain to m e how th a t w orks’, ‘explain to m e w hat th a t m e an s’, ‘ex p lain to m e th e m e a n in g o f th e ex p re ssio n ’. It is ex p la­ n a tio n in this second sense th a t W ittgenstein is re fe rrin g to. T h e re la ­ tio n sh ip o f this kind o f ex p la n a tio n to u n d e rsta n d in g is as follows: so m e o n e w ho explains so m e th in g show s w hat h e u n d e rsta n d s o r how h e u n d e rs ta n d s so m e th in g . I f I ask som eone to ex p lain to m e how a m a ch in e w orks I assum e th a t he u n d e rsta n d s how it works a n d how o ne o p e ra te s it; a n d th e e x p la n a tio n is successful if it results in my u n d e r ­ sta n d in g how it is o p e ra te d . C o rresp o n d in g ly , if I ask so m eo n e to ex p lain th e m e a n in g o f a linguistic expression to m e I assum e th a t h e u n d e rsta n d s th e ex p ressio n ; a n d th e ex p lan a tio n is successful if it

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results in my u n d e rsta n d in g th e expression. T h u s we can say: to explain (in this sense) m eans to show w hat o ne u n d e rsta n d s, to com m unicate an u n d e rsta n d in g , to m ake so m eth in g u n d e rsto o d . If now we apply W ittg en stein ’s rem a rk to predicates we m ust say: the m ean in g o f a p re d ic a te is w hat we explain w hen we ex p lain its m eaning. A nd how do we ex p lain th e m e an in g o f a predicate? If to u n d e rsta n d a p red ic ate is to know how it is u sed to characterize, i.e. to classify an d d istinguish, th e n th e ex p lan atio n o f th e m ean in g o f a p red icate m ust consist in explainin g how it is u sed to classify an d distinguish. H ow can this be d o n e, e.g. in th e case o f th e p red ic ate ‘re d ’? C learly n o t by p o in t­ ing to th e g en eral characteristic o f red n ess, for, as th e conceptualist rightly em phasized, this is su p p o sed to be a g en eral essence an d h ence n o th in g which can be sim ply p o in te d to. T h is g en e ral essence sim ply plays no p a rt in th e ex p lan atio n o f the m e an in g of a p redicate. In real­ ity we explain th e m ean in g o f a p red ic ate - if we ca n n o t explain it by m eans o f o th e r w ords, by a definition - by m eans o f exam ples. We p rese n t th e p erso n to w hom we wish to explain th e m ean in g o f the w ord ‘r e d ’ with objects which we characterize as re d (‘th a t is r e d ’) an d o th ers o f which we den y the p red ic ate (‘th a t is n o t r e d ’). T h e positive exam ples show how th e p red ic ate classifies an d the n egative ones show fro m w hat it distinguishes th a t which it classifies. W h at we show in this way is how th e p re d ic a te is used. W e can th e n ascertain w h eth e r th e p erso n to w hom we have ex p lain ed th e use o f th e p re d ic a te has u n d e r ­ stood th e ex p lan a tio n by g etting him to use th e p red ic ate him self. A n d if h e th e n uses it d iffe ren tly fro m w hat we in te n d e d we co rrect him by m eans o f such expressions as ‘c o rre c t’ a n d ‘n o t c o rre c t’ until h e has u n d e rsto o d us. W h at we explain to him by m eans o f th e exam ples is th u s th e employment-rule o f th e p redicate. F o r an activity which in all its stages is re g u la te d by ‘co rrec t’ a n d ‘in c o rrec t’ is an activity which follows a rule, even if th e ru le ca n n o t be fo rm u late d in w ords. T h e ru le shows itself only in its c o rre c t use, an d in o u r case this m eans: in th e co rrec t ap plication o f th e p red ic ate to exam ples. We th u s arrive at th e follow ing result: if th e m ean in g o f a p red ic ate is sim ply w hat we explain w hen we explain th e m ean in g o f th e p r e d i­ cate, th e n th e m e a n in g o f th e p red ic ate ca n n o t be id en tified with th e com m on featu re; r a th e r the la tte r does n o t figure in th e ex p lan atio n of m ean in g at all. T h e factor w hich conceptualism held to be essential p roves to be su p e rflu o u s in th e ex p lan atio n o f m eaning. T h e rejection o f th e re p re se n ta tio n o f a g en e ral essence is now no lo n g e r m erely n eg ­ ative. R a th e r a new positive conception has tak en its place. I f h e is

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asked: how can a m ode o f em p lo y m en t o f a p re d ic a te avoid b ein g a rb i­ tra ry if it is w ithout a fo u n d a tio n in objects? th e nom inalist can now p o in t to th e ru le obtain ed by applying the p re d ic a te to exam ples. T h e conceptualist could try to relativize this re su lt by calling in q u es­ tion th e p resu p p o sitio n , tak en over fro m W ittgenstein, th a t th e m e a n ­ in g o f a linguistic expression is sim ply w hat we ex p lain w hen we explain its m eaning. E xplanation, he could say, is sim ply an in tersubjective co m m u n icatio n o f u n d e rsta n d in g . It does n o t follow fro m this th a t w hat we u n d e rs ta n d can be identified with w hat we can explain. A n d in d e ed this does n o t necessarily follow. H ow ever, th e nom inalist will now give th e conceptualist the follow ing points to consider: (1) L in ­ guistic signs do as a m a tte r o f fact belong to intersu b jectiv e co m m u n i­ cation. As a m a tte r o f fact the in dividual only acquires a lan g u ag e in this way. Is it n o t th en superfluous to posit, in ad d itio n to this u n d e r ­ sta n d in g th a t o n e can explain, make understood, a n o th e r special in n ersubjective u n d e rsta n d in g ? (2) T h e p o in t previously rea ch ed in th e d eb a te was th a t th e conceptualist was n o t able to d e m o n stra te th e exis­ te n ce o f his postu lated re p re se n ta tio n o f a g en eral essence an d d e m a n d e d fro m the nom inalist an alternative positive ex p lan atio n . T h is has now b een p ro v id ed , at least fo r that m e an in g which is in tersu b jectively com m u n icated . T h is ex p lan a tio n w hich is actually valid fo r intersubjectively com m unicable m e an in g is, th e n , a possible ex p lan atio n o f th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f m ean in g in general. A nd as th e co n cep tu alist h a d no d em o n strab le alternative to o ffe r fo r inner-subjective u n d e r ­ sta n d in g he o u g h t now to accept this explanation-possibility exhibited in intersubjective ex p lan atio n as hold in g also for in ner-subjective u n d e rsta n d in g . A nd this, the nom inalist w ould say, seem s all th e m o re plausible if we consider th a t each individual, if h e wishes to becom e clear ab o u t his u n d e rsta n d in g o f a predicate, m u st em ploy the sam e m e th o d h e uses w hen exp lain in g th e em p lo y m en t-ru le o f th e p red icate to som eone else. I f o n e wishes to get clear a b o u t th e m e an in g with w hich one is using th e w ord ‘re d ’, even if th e re w ere such a th in g as th a t gen eral re p re se n ta tio n o f red n ess, it w ould be useless to ap p eal to it: even to o n eself o n e can only ex p lain (m ake clear) o n e ’s own u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f a p red ic ate by elucidating to o n eself by m eans o f exam ples how one uses it. We c a n n o t say th a t we only u n d e rsta n d w hat we are able to explain; we can, how ever, say th at we only u n d e rsta n d clearly w hat we a re able to explain, an d th a t we can only becom e clear ab o u t w h at we u n d e rsta n d by exp lain in g it. W e will n o t be able to leave th e d eb a te betw een nom inalism an d co n ­ ceptualism in this state. T h e conceptualist can still get r o u n d this last

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a rg u m e n t o f th e n om inalist. B u t b efo re p assing final ju d g m e n t in the co n tro v ersy we will first have to get cle a re r a b o u t th e m eth o d o lo g ical significance o f th e new perspectives in tro d u c e d by th e n om inalist.

Appendix on speaking of concepts W h en listing th e v a rio u s tra d itio n a l d e sig n atio n s o f w hat p re d ic a te s sta n d fo r p. 134) I also m en tio n ed a term inology which o n e m ight th in k could p o in t b e yond th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d fram e w o rk : th e term in o lo g y a cc o rd in g to w hich p re d ic ate s sta n d f o r concepts. T h is way o f sp e a k in g seem s to avoid two difficulties to which H u sse rl’s c o n ce p tio n gave rise. Firstly, it is n o t c le ar th a t a c o n c e p t is a n object. Secondly, if o n e speaks o f c o n cep ts this n o lo n g e r suggests th e idea o f a c o m p o ­ sition. W e d o n o t say th a t th e ob ject fo r w hich th e sin g u la r te rm sta n d s is com­ bined w ith a c o n cep t; r a th e r we say th a t it is subsumed u n d e r it, th a t th e object falb under th e concept. So it m ig h t seem th a t H u sse rl’s c o n ce p tio n o f p re d ic a te s is n o t a t all re p re s e n ­ tative o f th e tra d itio n , in d e e d th a t in c h o o sin g H u sse rl I h a d picked a p a rtic u ­ larly w eak re p re se n ta tiv e o f th e tra d itio n . A n d o f c o u rse if this w ere so th e n m erely d e m o n s tra tin g th a t H u s se rl’s c o n ce p tio n c a n n o t w ith sta n d critical analy­ sis w ould be no cause fo r a b a n d o n in g th e e n tire tra d itio n a l position a n d a d o p t­ ing a specifically lan g u ag e-an aly tical co n cep tio n . W h at th e n is th e significance o f sp e a k in g o f concepts? K a n t’s c o n ce p tio n can p e rh a p s be re g a rd e d as e x em p lify in g th e tra d itio n a l u n d e r s ta n d in g o f concepts. In his Lectures on Logic § 1 K a n t d e fin e s ‘c o n c e p t’ as ‘g e n e ra l re p re s e n ta tio n ’ a n d in b ra ck e ts adds: repraesentatio per notas communes. C o rre sp o n d in g ly , in th e Cri­ tique of Pure Reason, h e says a c o n ce p t is a ‘re p re s e n ta tio n ’ w hich in c o n tra st to in tu itio n rela te s to a n object n o t im m ediately b u t ‘m e d ia te ly ’ ‘by m ean s o f a fea­ tu re w hich several th in g s m ay hav e in c o m m o n ’ (B377 cf. also B93 f.). T h u s a co n ce p t is u n d e rs to o d by K a n t a n d in early m o d e m p h ilo so p h y g e n era lly as a species o f re p re s e n ta tio n (G e rm a n : Vorstellung. L atin: repraesentatio. English: ‘id ea ’). In early m o d e m p h ilo so p h y th e re is a d d e d to th e fu n d a m e n ta l d ifficul­ ties involved in sp e a k in g o f ‘re p re s e n ta tio n s ’ th e a m b ig u ity o f th e te rm as b etw een re p re s e n tin g a n d r e p re s e n te d , i.e. b etw een th e sta te o f consciousness and th e object a p p re h e n d e d by it, its objective c o rre la te . T h is a m b ig u ity also m akes it u n c le a r w h a t is m e a n t by sp e a k in g o f a ‘c o n c e p t’ (conceptus). T h e d efi­ nitions o f K a n t w hich have ju s t b e en given, ho w ev er, a re relatively u n a m b ig u ­ ous. T h e y d e cid e th e am biguity in fa v o u r o f th e subjective m e a n in g (concipere, conceive) fo r, in th e d e fin itio n th e objective m e a n in g is a g ain expressly e m p h a ­ sized as so m e th in g to w hich th e co n cep t relates: nota communis. B u t now this objective c o rre la te o f th e subjectively in te r p re te d c o n c e p t - th e c o m m o n m ark - is sim ply H u s se rl’s ‘species’, th e ‘a ttrib u te ’ o f th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d co n cep tio n . Now th e subjective c o rre la te o f th e a ttrib u te - th e re p re s e n tin g o r m e a n in g (Mei­ nen) o f th e a ttrib u te —is clearly n o t a possible th eo re tic al su b stitu te fo r th e a ttri­ bute. I t w ould a p p e a r to m ak e n o p a rtic u la r sen se to say th a t th e p re d ic a te stands

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fo r th e re p re s e n tin g o f th e a ttrib u te ; a n d even if it d id m ake sense one w ould still be left with the u n c la rifie d n o tio n o f an a ttrib u te . In te r p r e te d in this way th e n th e c o n ce p t-te rm in o lo g y does n o t re p re se n t an a lte rn a tiv e to th e o b jec t-o rie n ta ted co nception; th e im pression o f a non-objectual c o n ce p tio n results sim ply fro m th e am biguity o f this term inology. In F reg e, how ever, we find, in c o n tra st to this e a rlie r m o d e rn trad itio n , a th eo ry o f p re d ic ate s a cc o rd in g to w hich (1) p re d ic ate s stand fo r concepts (2) con cep ts a re explicitly u n d e rsto o d objectively (objektiv) a n d (3) concepts a re n o n e th e less sh arp ly d istin g u ish e d fro m objects (Gegenstände). A b rie f d escrip tio n o f th e essential fe atu res o f his th eo ry will have to suffice h e re .3 F o r F re g e th e re are - a p a r t fro m syn categ o rem atic expressions - two kinds o f linguistic ex p ressio n : ‘c o m p le te ’ a n d ‘in co m p lete ’. C o m p lete expressions a re (1) n am es (sin g u lar term s) a n d (2) w hole (assertoric) sentences. O f b o th we can say th a t they sta n d fo r an object. I can h e re ig n o re the peculiarity in F re g e ’s co n ce p ­ tion th a t a w hole se n ten c e .also stands fo r an object (a tru th -v a lu e ).4 In c o m p lete ex p ressio n s a re e x p ressio n s with o n e o r m o re gaps; they a re th u s ‘in n e e d o f su p p le m e n ta tio n ’. E xam ples are: ‘T h e b ro th e r o f . . . is a h o rse ’. I f an in co m p lete e x p ressio n is su p p le m e n te d by a co m p lete ex p ressio n (by a nam e) th e re resu lts a n o th e r c o m p le te e x p ressio n , w h e th er it be a n a m e o r a sentence, e.g. ‘the b r o th e r o f C h a rle s’, ‘C atalina is a h o rse ’. All exp ressio n s which n e ed su p p le m e n tin g in this way F reg e calls ‘fun ctio n al e x p ressio n s’. P redicates - e.g. ‘. . . is a h o rs e ’ - thus c o n stitu te a species o f fu n c tio n al expression; they are those ex p ressio n s w hose su p p le m e n ta tio n results n o t in a nam e b u t in a sentence. A c co rd in g to F reg e fu n c tio n a l e x p ressio n s also d e sig n ate som ething; how ever this is n o t a n object, fo r ‘o bject’ is d e fin e d as w hat is d e sig n ated by a com plete e x p ressio n . F re g e calls w hat is d e sig n ated by a fu n ctio n al e xpression a ‘fu n c tio n ’; a n d if the fu n c tio n a l e x p ressio n is a p re d ic a te he calls the fu n c tio n a ‘c o n cep t’. F u n ctio n s in th e w id er sense I can h e re d isre g a rd . T h e im p o rta n t aspect o f F re g e ’s th e o ry in this c o n te x t is th e id ea th a t a p re d ic a te too stands fo r so m e­ th in g , b u t th a t this is n o t an object b u t a concept. F reg e em phasizes that this h olds fo r th e p re d ic ate precisely in its c h ara cte r as predicate. T h e con cep t is ‘essentially p re d ic ativ e ’.5 If, o n the o th e r h a n d , o n e w ants to say som ething about a co n cep t th e n one m u st d e sig n ate th e concept by m eans o f a ‘n a m e ’ which resu lts fro m th e n o m in a liz atio n o f th e p red icate. B u t now a n a m e can only d e s­ ig n a te a n object. If, th e re fo re , o n e speaks of a co n cep t, if on e says so m eth in g about it, it m u st ‘first be tra n s fo rm e d in to an object’.6 T h is object into which th a t which th e p re d ic ate stan d s fo r is tra n s fo rm e d is ro u g h ly th e sam e as H u s s e rl’s ‘species’, th e tra d itio n a l a ttrib u te . F rege th ereb y gets h im self in to th e follow ing aw kw ard position: w hen sp eak in g o f such an object in dividually he calls it a ‘c o n ce p t’ even th o u g h b eing a n object it c an n o t be a concept. T h is leads to th e p a ra d o x ‘th a t in my term in o lo g y expressions such as “th e c o n ce p t F” d o n o t d e sig n ate con cep ts b u t o bjects’; ‘the c o n ce p t horse is not a c o n c e p t’.7 In assessing F re g e ’s th e o ry o f p re d ic ate s we can distin g u ish two co m p o n en ts,

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a syntactical on e a n d a sem antic one. T h e syntactical fo u n d a tio n o f F re g e ’s th e ­ ory is his id ea th a t a p re d ic ate is an essentially incom plete expression, th a t it is to be u n d e rsto o d as essentially a se n ten c e-p a rt, a sta te m en t-frag m en t. W ith this p io n e e rin g step F re g e p re p a re d th e way fo r th e language-analytical conception. H e b re ak s with th e trad itio n a l idea, w hich H u sserl took over, th a t a sin g u lar pred icativ e sen ten ce is com posed o f subject, copula a n d p red icate, th a t b oth p re d ic a te a n d subject a re in d e p e n d e n t un its, th a t each stan d s fo r an object a n d th a t b etw een the two objects fo r w hich they sta n d th e re m u st be a com binationelem ent, the sem antic c o u n te rp a rt o f the c opula, a synthesis betw een th e two objects. F o r F reg e th e cop u la n o longer exists; w hat was called th e c o p u la is a p a rt o f th e pred icate. T h is c onception o f th e syntax o f predicative sentences also enables F re g e to b re ak with th e trad itio n a l idea th a t the p re d ic ate stands fo r a n object. T h e p ecu ­ liarity o f F re g e ’s c onception finds expression in th e fact th a t h e applies to w hat the p re d ic ate stan d s fo r a n d w hat h e calls a concept, th e sam e term s as h e applies to th e predicate: ‘n e e d in g su p p le m e n ta tio n ’, ‘u n s a tu ra te d ’. T h a t th e co n ce p t is ‘essentially p re d ic ativ e ’ m eans th a t it is so m e th in g in com plete, u n sa tu ra te d a n d fo r precisely this re aso n c an n o t be an object. F rege th u s rem ain s tie d to th e tra d itio n in so fa r as h e holds fast to th e idea th a t th e p re d ic ate too stan d s for som ething; w hat it stan d s for, how ever, is n o t an object. T h e q uestion is w h e th er this re p re se n ts a g e n u in e th ird possibility b etw een th e o b jec t-o rie n ta ted concep­ tion a n d th e language-analytical conception. I f the p re d ic ate does n o t sta n d fo r an object th e n o n e w ould be rid o f th e difficulties o f th e o b jec t-o rie n ta ted con­ ception a n d yet w ould n o t sim ply be left with th e view th a t it is all a m a tte r o f the sign a n d its em p lo y m en t-ru le . Does such a th ird possibility really exist? T h e r e is, to b egin with, th e basic difficulty th a t a sign is su p p o sed to stand fo r so m e th in g th a t is n ev erth eless n o t an object. T h e c o n tra d ic tio n w hich seem s to be involved h e re is show n by the fact th a t F reg e finds h im self h a ving to m ake such statem en ts as ‘T h e concept horse is n o t a co n ce p t.’ H ow ever I d o not wish to p u rsu e this p ro b lem fu rth e r; I re fe r you instead to th e instructive in te rp re ta tio n a n d criticism in S e a rle .8 F reg e him self says: ‘L an g u ag e h e re is in an aw kw ard situ atio n w hich justifies d e p a rtin g fro m w hat is u su al.’9 A ssum ing o n e is p re p a re d to accept this, it still rem ain s to ask (1) w h at positive in te rp re ta tio n a re we to give to this so m e th in g which is n o t an object? a n d (2) how a re we to u n d e rs ta n d th e relation in a p re ­ dicative sentence betw een this so m eth in g a n d w hat th e subject o f th e sen ten ce stands for? T h ese two questions a re directly connected. F re g e calls th a t w hich a p re d ic ate stands fo r, like th a t w hich a sin g u lar term stan d s fo r, its ‘re fe re n c e ’ (Bedeutung).10 It is n o t necessary fo r m e h e re to go fu r th e r in to th e p ro b lem s co n n ec te d with this term in o lo g y .11 Suffice it to say th at w ith re g a rd to b o th p red icates a n d nam es F rege distinguishes th e ir re fe r­ ence fro m th e ir sense, a n d th a t in each case th e re fe re n c e is w hat th e exp ressio n desig n ates, stands f o r .12 F reg e is th e re fo re able to call the c o n cep t the re fe re n c e o f a p re d ic ate . T h e question: w hat is o n e to u n d e rs ta n d by a concept? can th e re ­

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fore also be construed thus: what is it for a predicate to have a reference? Frege’s answer to this question can be inferred from his account of what it is for a pred­ icate (concept-word) to have no reference: ‘Concept-words . . . which have no reference . . . are not such as combine contradictory elements - for a concept can very well be empty - rather they are such as have vague boundaries. In regard to every object it must be determinate whether it falls under the concept or not; a concept-word that does not satisfy this requirem ent in its reference has no reference.’13 This definition shows that for Frege a concept is a criterion by which objects are distinguished into those which fall u nder it and those which do not. T hat the question of what a concept is is so closely connected with the ques­ tion of how we are to understand its relation to what a name stands for is the consequence of Frege’s idea that the concept is something essentially in need of supplementation. The relation o f ‘an object’s falling under a concept’ Frege calls ‘the fundamental logical relation’.14 O f course these answers to the two questions just referred to which can be inferred from Frege immediately give rise to counter-questions: (1) to speak of an object falling under a concept is to speak metaphorically. How are we to conceive this falling of something under a concept? (2) Even though we may understand in general what it means to speak of a criterion there still remains the question of how in a given case one can recognize a concept or how one can decide whether an object falls under a particular concept. One can find no answer to these questions in Frege. For him they are epistemological questions and as such no concern of logic. In the context of a funda­ mental philosophical enquiry, however, we cannot rest content with this. State­ ments about what is to be understood by the sense or the reference of an expression which do not tell us how we can know what sense or reference an individual expression has remain empty. In contrast to Frege, both Husserl and linguistic analysis give an answer to this question. According to Husserl one rec­ ognizes the attribute in an act of intuition of essence; and against this the language-analytical position argued that one explains the application-rule of a predicate by means of examples. Frege’s theory of concepts does not offer a third possibility; it provides no answer at all. One can, however, try to get clear about what Frege calls the ‘fundamental logical relation’. What does it mean to say that an object ‘falls u nder’ a concept? What does the corresponding notion of ‘subsumption’ mean? T he metaphor of ‘falling under’ goes back to the terminology Aristotle used for the subject-predicate relation. The term for ‘to predicate’ - kategorein - means something like ‘say down upon’; correspondingly the correlative term ‘subject’ (,hypokeimenon) means ‘that which lies under’. There is a peculiar ambiguity in the way Aristotle uses this terminology: it is not clear whether he is referring to the linguistic expression or to something for which the expression stands. It was this ambigu­ ity which concealed from Aristotle the later alternatives of nominalism and con­ ceptualism. However, the expression being said down upon’ stems from the orientation towards the use of the expression. Just as in Greek one could use the

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e x p re ssio n ‘saying d o w n u p o n ’ we speak o f th e application - o f th e p re d ic ate ! - to (.Anwenden auf). T h a t th e n o tio n o f ‘s u b s u m p tio n ’ a n d th e falling o f objects ‘u n d e r ’ concepts seem s m o re plau sib le th a n th e o b jec t-o rie n ta ted n o tio n o f a combination o f th e object w ith a n a ttrib u te is d u e sim ply to th e fact th a t th e fo rm e r re fe rs back directly to th e lan g u ag e-an aly tical e x p la n atio n . W e can now try to fo rm a m o re precise id e a o f how th e n o tio n o f an object falling u n d e r a c o n c e p t re fe rs back to th a t o f th e applicability o f a p re d ic a te to th e object. In this I follow P. L o r e n z e n .15 O n e can first m ak e clear to o n e se lf that in stea d o f a p a rtic u la r p re d ic a te -e x p re ssio n w hich o n e u ses in a c c o rd an c e with a ru le (w hich o n e h as e x p la in e d by m ea n s o f a d e fin itio n o r by sam ples) o n e can always use o th e r e x p ressio n s in a c c o rd an c e with th e sam e rule. Sem antically w hat m a tte rs is n o t th e e x p ressio n b u t th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le , th e c h a ra c te riz a ­ tio n -fu n c tio n . N ow o n e can a b strac t fro m all p e cu liaritie s o f th e sign a n d re fe r to tw o d iffe re n t predicate-expressions - e.g. ‘r e d ’ a n d ‘r o u g e ’ - as the sa m e predicate if th ey a re a p p lie d in acc o rd an c e with th e sam e ru le. H o w ev er, to avoid a m b i­ guities o n e can as b e fo re re serv e th e w o rd ‘p re d ic a te ’ f o r th e p re d ic ate -ex p re ssion a n d use th e w o rd ‘c o n c e p t’ fo r th e a b stra c tio n ju s t in tro d u c e d . T h is w ord w ould th e n be so d e fin e d th a t all p re d ic a te s th a t a re u se d in a cc o rd an c e with th e sam e ru le re p re s e n t th e sam e co n cep t. A n d F re g e ’s fu n d a m e n ta l logical relatio n o f ‘fa llin g u n d e r ’ w ould th e n be d e fin e d th u s: a n object falls u n d e r a c o n ce p t if a p re d ic a te w hich re p re se n ts this co n ce p t a p p lies to it (auf ihn zutrifft). T h u s th e q u e stio n s to w hich n o a n sw er c o u ld be fo u n d in F reg e w o u ld now be a n sw e re d by g ro u n d in g th e talk o f co n ce p ts o n th a t o f p re d ic ate s. T h e r e is o f co u rse a d iffe re n c e b etw een this d e fin itio n o f ‘c o n ce p t’ a n d F re g e ’s co n ce p tio n . T h e d e fin itio n ju s t given is a so-called ‘in te n sio n a l’ defin itio n : a c c o rd in g to it tw o p re d ic ate s r e p re s e n t th e sam e c o n c e p t if a n d only if they have th e sam e m e a n in g , a re u se d in a c c o rd a n c e with th e sam e a p p lic atio n -ru le . F reg e o n the o th e r h a n d has a so-called ‘e x te n sio n a l’ c o n c e p tio n o f ‘c o n c e p t’. F or him tw o co n ce p t-w o rd s sta n d fo r th e sam e c o n ce p t if a n d only if ‘th e c o rre ­ s p o n d in g c o n ce p t-e x ten sio n s co in cid e’. 16 T h u s fo r in sta n c e th e tw o p re d ic ate s ‘an im al with a h e a r t ’ a n d ‘a n im al with k id n e y s’ re p re se n t, a cc o rd in g to th e defi­ n itio n we have ju s t given, two d if fe r e n t c o n ce p ts, w h ereas, o n the basis o f F re g e ’s d e fin itio n , they sta n d fo r o n e a n d th e sam e c o n cep t. T h is d iffe re n c e h o w e v er is n o t a fu n d a m e n ta l o n e; o n e can o p e ra te w ith a n e x te n sio n al d e fin itio n o f ‘c o n ­ c e p t’ in m uch th e sam e way as o n e does w ith th e in te n sio n a l d e fin itio n . T h e id en tity -c rite ria o f th e c o n ce p t w ould still re la te to th e a p p lic atio n o f p re d ic ate s; only o n e w ould now have to say: two p re d ic a te s r e p re s e n t th e sam e c o n ce p t if they a p p ly to th e sam e object.

LECTURE

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T he basic principle of analytical philosophy. T he dispute continued. Predicates and quasi-predicates

B e fo re I b rin g to an e n d th e in te r ru p te d d eb a te betw een th e nom inalist a n d th e co n c ep tu alist we should try to get a c le a re r g rasp o f the m e th ­ odological significance a n d scope o f th e two decisive p erspectives on w hich th e n o m in a list’s a rg u m e n t rested . T h e se perspectives co n stitu te o u r first steps in th e d irec tio n o f a new , no lo n g e r ontologically-orienta te d sem an tic con ceptuality. T h e first o f th e se perspectives was co n ­ ta in e d in th e q u estio n co n c e rn in g th e fu n ctio n o f a lingustic expression th a t was in tro d u c e d at th e b e g in n in g o f the prev io u s lectu re, th e second in W ittg e n stein ’s d ic tu m , which was only b ro u g h t in in th e co u rse o f th e d isp u te b u t is in fact fu n d a m e n ta l: T h e m e an in g o f a w o rd is w hat th e ex p lan a tio n o f its m e a n in g ex p lain s.’ In both cases it is a m a tte r o f p e r ­ spectives w hich I h a d a p p lie d specifically to o u r q u estion co n cern in g th e m e an in g o f p red ic ate s b u t w hich are in fact o f u n iv ersal scope; fo r th ey co n c ern th e q u estio n o f th e m e a n in g o f all linguistic ex p ressio n s a n d th u s rea ch b ey o n d th e special controversy betw een nom in alism an d co n ceptualism . H ow fa r am I en title d to claim th a t these perspectives h av e so m eth in g intrinsically co m p ellin g a b o u t th e m an d are n o t a rb itra ry altern ativ es to th e o b je ct-o rien tate d co nception? O n e can n o t d e m a n d o f a new way o f loo king at th in g s th a t it be intrinsically com pelling, m erely th a t it be m o re fu n d a m e n ta l th a n th e p rev io u s o n e an d h en ce can at least n o t be called in q u estio n by th e latter. I have a lre ad y show n in th e last le ctu re th a t this is th e case with th e fu n ctio n al co n c ep tio n vis-ä-vis th e o b je ct-o rien tate d co nception. T h a t signs are used an d u sed to p e rfo rm a p a rtic u la r fu n ctio n is n o t d e n ie d by th e o b je ct-o rien tate d co n cep tio n , b u t p re su p p o se d as obvious; an d th e only re a so n why this fe a tu re is n o t m a d e them atic is because th e o b je ct-o rien tate d p h ilo s o p h e r sim ply takes it fo r g ra n te d th a t the fu n c ­ tio n o f th e sign is to sta n d fo r an object. B ut as soon as o n e explicitly

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retrac es th a t step th e p a rtic u la r fu n ctio n o f sta n d in g fo r an object tu rn s o u t to be m erely one possibility a m o n g others. O f course th e objecto rie n ta te d p h ilo so p h e r m ay say th a t we can n o t conceive o f any o th e r fu n ctio n fo r a sign th a n th a t o f sta n d in g fo r an object. B u t we have alread y seen th a t, in th e special case o f p redicates at least, it is n o t d if­ ficult to get him to ad m it th a t a p re d ic a te has th e fu n ctio n o f c h a racter­ izing the object fo r w hich a singular te rm stands. O f co u rse h e h ad to qualify this adm ission by saying th a t this is m erely a fu n ctio n th a t the p red ic ate also has a n d th a t it can only fulfil it by p e rfo rm in g its alleged basic fun ctio n o f sta n d in g fo r an object: it characterizes th e object o f th e subject-term o f th e sen ten ce by sta n d in g fo r an object - th e attrib u te - w hich itself ch aracterizes th e object in a p rim a ry sense. W ith w hat w o n d erfu l capacities th e trad itio n al p h ilo so p h er finds it necessary to en d ow his objects! A re we n o t in d u lg in g in m ythology if we say o f objects th a t they characterize o th e r objects? A n d this th ey are su p p o sed to accom plish by a d h e rin g to th e o th e r objects, by b eing co m b in ed with th em . It alread y em erg ed in th e H usserl-critique th a t the co n cep tio n o f th e m ean in g o f a pred icativ e sentence as com posite o r - this always so u nds b e tte r - as a ‘synthesis’ o f two objects - ca n n o t be carried th ro u g h . It now em erges th a t even if it could, it could n o t m ake th e fu n ctio n o f ch a racterizin g intelligible. In reality th e o b ject-o rien tated co nception has h e re p ro jec ted a fu n ctio n w hich is only intelligible as a fu n ctio n o f signs back in to th a t s tru c tu re which was th e only o n e avail­ able to it. T h e m ethodological significance o f th e second persp ectiv e which is co n tain ed in W ittg e n stein ’s re m a rk - ‘T h e m e an in g o f a w ord is w hat th e ex p lan atio n o f its m e a n in g ex p lain s’ - rem a in ed less clear in th e last lecture. W hat is m e an t by this re m a rk is sim ply this: w hen p h ilo so p h i­ cally we ask ab o u t th e m e an in g o f linguistic expressio n s we a re asking w hat th a t is in gen eral (‘as su ch ’) ab o u t which we ask w hen pre-p h ilo sophically we ask ab o u t th e m e an in g o f an in divid u al expression. T h u s W ittg en stein ’s re m a rk has fo r analytical philosoph y a significance co r­ re sp o n d in g to th a t w hich th e q uestion ab o u t ‘b ein g as b ein g ’ has fo r ontology. J u s t as ontology did not m e an by ‘b ein g ’ a m etaphysical co n ­ stru ctio n b u t was asking w hat th e beings with w hich we h ave to d o p rephilosophically a re as beings, so too fo r analytical philo so p h y w hat is m e a n t by ‘m e a n in g ’ ca n n o t be a m etaphysical o r scientific co n stru ct: w hen philosophically we ask how we use linguistic exp ressio n s we a re asking ab o u t th e sam e th in g we ask a b o u t w hen pre-p h ilo so p h ically we ask how an in dividual ex p ressio n is used; only now it is a qu estio n o f m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t as such, in fo rm a l generality. O n e co uld th e re ­

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fo re call W ittgenstein’s d ic tu m the fu n d a m e n ta l p rin cip le o f analytical philosophy, i.e. th e fu n d a m e n ta l p rin cip le o f th a t philosophy w hich conceives itself as a question ab o u t th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f o u r linguistic ex p ressions an d w hich seeks to win th e conceptuality in w hich it poses this questio n fro m this q u estio n itself. N ow how is this second p erspective co nnected w ith th e first, viz. th at o f th e function o f linguistic expressions? T h e first p ersp ectiv e yielded th e m axim : if you w ant to clarify th e m e an in g o f a fo rm o f linguistic expressions th e n ask: w hat a re expressions o f this fo rm used f o r ? T h e second perspective yields th e m axim : if you w ant to clarify th e m e an in g o f a fo rm o f linguistic expressions th e n ask: how a re exp ressio n s o f this fo rm used? T h u s both perspectives em phasize th e m o d e o f e m p lo y m en t o f an expression, b u t th e second proves to be m o re fu n d a m e n ta l an d g en eral; as o p p o se d to the first p erspective it does n o t p re su p p o se th a t th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f a linguistic exp ressio n belongs to a teleological co n tex t, th e co n tex t o f an in ten tio n al action. I do n o t know w hat a rg u m e n t o ne could use to cast d o u b t on W itt­ g en stein ’s p rin cip le so long as it is u n d e rsto o d in this fu n d a m e n ta l g e n ­ erality; fo r o n e w ould th e n have to d etach the m e an in g which th e w ords ‘m e a n in g ’, ‘u n d e rs ta n d in g ’, etc., have in linguistic th eo ry fro m the m e an in g they have in th e ir p re-th eo retica l em ploym en t. T h e re are con­ ceptions of linguistic th eo ry fo r which this is a possibility. A p h ilo so p h ­ ical sem antics how ever w ould lose its p u rp o se if this h a p p e n e d , fo r p h i­ losophy only seeks to m ake explicit w hat we alread y u n d e rsta n d prephilosophically. W ittg en stein ’s p rin cip le th e re fo re also lays dow n th e limits o f a possible philosophical sem antics; and this also co n tain s a first clue to th e answ er to th e question I left o p en , viz. how philosophical sem antics could be d istinguished fro m linguistic sem antics. So th e ob ject-o rien tated p h ilo so p h er could n o t evade W ittg en stein ’s p rin cip le eith er. H ow ever, h e w ould im m ediately - an d rightly ex p lain th a t w hen h e says th a t every expression (or at least every ‘categ o rem a tic’ expression) stands fo r an object he also m eans th a t in each ind ividual case w hen o n e is asked a b o u t th e m e an in g or th e use or the ex p lan atio n o f an expression o ne is to indicate th e object fo r w hich th e ex p ressio n stands. So fro m th e p o in t o f view o f m e th o d we have th e sam e situation as we h ad in th e case o f th e first perspective: a question is posed which h a d no t b ee n m ad e explicit in th e o b ject-o rien tated tr a ­ d itio n but which th e object-o rien tated p h ilo so p h e r im m ediately accepts an d m o reo v er im m ediately answ ers in an o b je ct-o rien tated way, as th o u g h this w ere th e only possible answ er. W e h o w ev er can ask: are th e re no t o th e r possible ways o f ex p lain in g an e x p re ssio n ’s m ode o f

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em plo y m en t? In th e p a rtic u la r case o f p red ic ate s it seem s obvious th a t we c a n n o t ex p lain th e use o f a n ex p re ssio n in th e way th e objectth e o rist claim s we can (cf. p. 143). N ow o n e could object th at in to d a y ’s elu cid atio n s I have unjustifiably sim plified W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le. D id we n o t alre ad y see in th e p r e ­ vious le c tu re th a t this p rin cip le by no m ean s m erely ties th e p h ilo s o p h ­ ical analysis o f m e a n in g to th e an sw e rin g o f in d iv id u al qu estio n s o f m e an in g but, in its stress on th e explanation o f m e an in g , red u ces m e a n ­ ing to th e intersubjectively available m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t o f th e ex p ression? A nd if th e p rin cip le is u n d e rs to o d in this way it clearly c a n n o t be ac know ledged by th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d p h ilo so p h e r as being m erely trivial. W ittgenstein did in fact u n d e rs ta n d his p rin cip le in this n a rro w e r sense a n d d isp u te d th e possibility o f an in tro sp ectiv e fixing o f m eanings. H ow ever W ittg e n stein ’s d en ial o f th e possibility o f a so-called p riv ate la n g u a g e 1 rests on a rg u m e n ts th a t a re d isp u te d in analytical p h ilo so p h y .2 I f we a re to re g a rd W ittg e n ste in ’s p rin c ip le as th e fu n d a ­ m ental p rin cip le o f analytical p h ilo so p h y th e n a t th e p re se n t stage o f o u r reflections w h ere we a re only g ettin g a fo o tin g in analytical p h ilo s­ op h y we sho u ld n o t b u rd e n it with this n a rro w in te rp re ta tio n . W e m ust take it in a fo rm in w hich it is ad m itte d by everyon e. W e o b tain such an u n d o g m a tic in te rp re ta tio n o f th e p rin cip le if we allow n o t only th e p o s­ sibility o f som eone e x p lain in g an e x p re ssio n ’s m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t to h im self in th e sam e way th a t h e w ould ex p lain it to so m eo n e else b ut also, as a lim iting case, th e possibility o f th e re b ein g m ean in g s o r m eanin g -co m p o n en ts o f ex pressions th a t so m e o n e can only ex p lain to h im ­ self. T h e la tte r w ould clearly be th e case if so m e th in g th a t is only inw ardly accessible, a sensation o r re p re se n ta tio n , co n stitu tes o r partly co n stitutes th e m e a n in g o f an ex p ressio n . W e can now take u p ag ain th e co n tro v ersy betw een th e no m in alist an d th e conceptualist. In re sp o n se to th e challeng e to p ro d u c e his own positive con cep tio n o f the m e a n in g o f a p re d ic a te th e n om inalist, invok­ ing W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le, h ad r e f e r re d us to th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le w hich is ex p lain e d a n d can only be ex p la in e d by m ean s o f positive an d n eg ative exam ples. T a k in g acco u n t o f th e distinctions I hav e ju s t m a d e th e co n cep tu alist co uld now reply th a t h e has n o objection to W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le, b u t th a t one m u st d istinguish b etw een th e g e n u in e ex p lan a tio n an d g ra sp in g o f m e a n in g an d th e in te rsu b jec tiv e e x p lan a tio n . ‘It is p erfectly tr u e ’, h e w ould say, ‘th a t a p re d ic a te can only be e x p lain e d in te rsu b jec­ tively in th e way d escrib ed by th e n om inalist. H o w ev er all this p roves is th a t th e intersu b jectiv e e x p la n a tio n is n e v e r a d e q u a te to th e g rasp in g

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o f a m eaning; it can only m e d iate it. For such an ex p lan atio n o f the em p lo y m e n t-ru le by exam ples still leaves o p en w hat it really is th at d e term in e s the ru le. T h e ind iv id u al exam ples do n o t suffice for this for we only say o f so m e o n e th a t h e has u n d e rsto o d th e ex p lan atio n if he is able to apply th e p red ic ate correctly to new exam ples. B ut this can only m ean th a t th e p e rso n to w hom we explain th e p red ic ate by m eans o f ex am ples form s a m ental co rrela tio n betw een the p red ic ate an d som e­ th in g th a t is com m on to th e positive exam ples b u t ab sen t fro m th e n eg ­ ative ones; an d it is only because he can also p erceive this com m on fe a tu re in new objects th a t h e can apply th e p red icate correctly beyond th e exam ples given to new cases. T h u s th e positive ex p lan atio n given by th e nom inalist c a n n o t p re se n t itself as a g en u in e altern ativ e to the o b je ct-o rien tated e x p lan a tio n b u t m ust itself ultim ately fall back on the la tte r.’ T h e r e a re analytical p h ilo so p h ers w ho are sim ply closed to this a rg u ­ m ent. T h u s it fre q u e n tly looks as th o u g h in th e en d th e re is again ju s t o n e view co n fro n tin g a n o th e r. W e ca n n o t leave it like this. W e m ust settle th e co ntroversy in a convincing m a n n e r. T h e re are two do g m atic a rg u m e n ts with w hich th e conceptualistic line o f a rg u m e n t ju s t p re ­ sen ted is som etim es p a rrie d . Firstly, o n e occasionally h ea rs it said th a t such an a rg u m e n t refers to psychological co n d itio n s with w hich sem antics has n o th in g to do. As we shall see th e re is an elem e n t o f tru th in this statem en t. In this vague fo rm , how ever, it is unaccep tab le; fo r it is not clear in advance w hat the b o u n d arie s betw een sem antics a n d psychology are. O n e m ust first take seriously th e co n c ep tu alist’s a rg u m e n t in o rd e r to establish precisely w hich aspect no lo n g e r belongs to sem antics an d why it does not d o so. Secondly, it is som etim es stated th a t it is only th ro u g h lan g u ag e - an d m o re precisely p red ic ate s - th a t o u r e x p e rien c e is stru c tu re d into types. T h e co n c ep tu alist’s rep ly thus violates th e prin cip le o f th e ‘impossibility o f going b e h in d la n g u a g e ’ (‘U nhint ergehbarkeit. der Sprache’)* H ow ever, this is an im plausible thesis w hich can be show n to be ab su rd by th e fact th a t we perceive linguistic signs them selves (w h eth er acoustically or optically) as typical. I f fo r ex a m p le we h e a r th e so u n d ‘r e d ’ we resp o n d to it in so fa r as it exhibits a p a rtic u la r stru c tu re ; we react to th e in d iv id ­ ual sou n d in so fa r as it is a re p re se n ta tiv e o f a type o f so u n d . B u t now th e sam e is tru e o f all p e rc e p tio n , n o t ju s t h u m a n p erc ep tio n . Every stim u lu s-re sp o n se schem a, w h e th e r co n d itio n e d o r u n co n d itio n e d is such th a t th e sam e so rt o f re sp o n se follows th e sam e so rt o f stim ulus, o r a d e te rm in a te r a n g e o f sim ilar stim uli. A nd to th e ex ten t th a t p e r ­

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ceptual p h e n o m e n a a re introspectively accessible we can likewise ascer­ tain th a t o u r sensation- an d rep rese n tatio n -co n te n ts are, w ith o u t ex cep ­ tion, typical. A co lo u r-p ercep tio n , fo r exam ple, is as reg a rd s its con ten ts n ev er u n iq u e; ra th e r a specific sh a d e o f red is perceived as o ne th at can be perceived as the sam e on any n u m b e r o f occasions. O ne m ust h e re note a rem a rk a b le confusion which th ro u g h o u t th e centuries has b u rd e n e d th e en tire discussion o f nom inalism . T ra d i­ tional philosophy, since A ristotle,4 carried with it a d o g m a acco rd in g to which p erc ep tio n - ‘sensibility’ - relates to individuals. T h is p rem ise was p re su p p o se d by both sides in th e nom inalism controversy. T h a t th e re a re rep rese n tatio n s o f individuals a p p e a re d u n p ro b lem atic to both sides in th e dispute; th u s if th e re a re also re p rese n tatio n s o f universals o r types this m ust be a n o n -sensuous m ode o f cognition. In reality how ­ ever p e rc ep tio n relates n e ith e r to individuals n o r to universals; r a th e r it is typical. T h u s th e con trast is n o t betw een th e in dividual and th e universal an d typical b u t betw een th e typical on th e o n e h a n d an d th e individual an d the universal on th e o th er. W hat distinguishes the u n i­ versal fro m th e typical is th a t we only call universal w hat is com m on to m any individuals (an attrib u te) o r can be ap p lied to m any individuals (a predicate). T h e con cep t o f a universal is correlative to th a t o f an in dividual, ju s t as p redicates are essentially expressions w hich su p p le ­ m e n t sin g u lar term s. F ro m the p o in t o f view o f linguistic analysis th e consciousness o f w hat is individual is no m ore a sensuous p h e n o m e n o n th a n consciousness o f a universal; it is a logical p h e n o m e n o n . A n d as we shall see th e logical - o r linguistic - co nstitu tio n o f re fe re n c e to individuals poses m uch g re a te r p roblem s o f analysis th an does th e co n ­ sciousness o f universals which in consciousness o f types h as a sensuous p rec u rso ry fo rm . A nd on th e o th e r h a n d we can now u n d e rsta n d how trad itio n al philosophy could fail to notice th e evident fact, n ev e r d o u b te d in psychology, th a t p erc ep tio n relates to th e typical.5 It h ad to acco m m o d ate th e category o f the individual som ew here an d as it d id n o t reflect on th e fo rm o f sentences all th a t rem a in ed was to assign th e in d ividual to sensibility. W hat follows from all this re g a rd in g the evaluation o f th e a rg u m e n t b ro u g h t by th e conceptualist against the nom inalist? T h e co rrec t a p p li­ cation o f th e p red ic ate to exam ples according to th e co n cep tu alist’s th e ­ sis is only possible on th e basis o f a m ental-correlatio n o f th e p red icate w ith so m eth in g th a t is com m on to all exam ples. Does this n o t m ean: with so m eth in g typical given in consciousness? A n d w ould n o t th e co n ­ cep tu alist’s view be vindicated by th e typicality o f p ercep tio n s ju s t described? B u t in th a t case the p u rp o se fo r w hich th e co n cep tu alist

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fo u n d it necessary to po stu late an ab stract object w ould alread y be achieved by sensuous re p rese n tatio n s them selves. In o r d e r to attain clarity h e re we m ust d istinguish b etw een th e behaviouristic an d introspective conceptions o f th e psychological p h e n o m e ­ no n o f th e typicality o f perceptions. T h e typical sensation o r th e typical m ental im age th a t we en c o u n te r in in tro sp ectio n (a specific sh a d e o f red , a specific triangle-shape) does n o t c o rre sp o n d to th e em p lo y m en tra n g e o f o u r o rd in a ry p redicates (‘r e d ’, ‘tria n g le ’). F o r precisely this reason th e conceptualist fo u n d it necessary to p ostu late a n o n -sen su o u s re p re se n ta tio n o f so m eth in g th a t is com m on to all sh ad es o f re d , every­ th in g th a t is called ‘r e d ’, o r all form s o f triangle. T h e situation is d iffe r­ e n t fo r th e behaviouristic conception. T h a t an org an ism perceives ty p ­ ically is d e te rm in e d by its re sp o n d in g to stim uli o f a certain kind in th e sam e way. T h e ra n g e o f sim ilarity o f th e stim uli to w hich the o rg an ism re sp o n d s in th e sam e way can be w idened o r n arro w e d . For ex am p le th e o rg an ism can le arn to re sp o n d in th e sam e way to all colo u r-sh ad es o n e calls ‘r e d ’. W hereas in th e introspective concep tio n th e re is no sen ­ suous re p re se n ta tio n co rresp o n d in g to all colour-sh ad es th a t a re n o t m erely th e sam e b u t sim ilar, in th e behaviouristic co nception this dis­ tinction no lo n g er applies. W h e th e r we call th e various stim uli, fro m an in trospective sta n d p o in t, th e sam e o r m erely sim ilar - if th e .o rg an ism is a p p ro p ria te ly co n d itio n ed th e n it re sp o n d s to th em in th e sam e way. In this sam eness o f reaction to sim ilar stim uli behaviouristic psychology o f p e rc e p tio n has a p rese n tab le d atu m with which th e in tro sp ectio n ist co n ception has n o th in g com parable. T h e pro b lem o f sim ilarity played a larg e role in th e trad itio n al, introspectively c o n d u c te d discussion o f nom inalism . For nom inalism , H u m e a rg u e d th a t one does n o t need th e re p re se n ta tio n o f so m e th in g identical th a t is com m on to all sensuous re p re se n ta tio n s w hich c o rre ­ sp o n d to th e em p lo y m e n t o f a p redicate; it suffices th a t th e re p re s e n ­ tations g ro u p them selves in to circles o f sim ilarity.6 B u t in th a t case, it was a rg u e d ag ainst H u m e ,7 th e re m ust be a re p re se n ta tio n o f th e sim i­ larity o f th e sensuous rep rese n tatio n s, fo r w hat m a tte rs from an in tro ­ spectionist sta n d p o in t is th a t consciousness recognizes th a t th e sim ilar rep rese n tatio n s are sim ilar; th e nom inalist th ereb y finds h im self com ­ pelled to again ad m it at least the re p re se n ta tio n o f one ab stract object. B u t if o n e adm its th e re p re se n ta tio n o f sim ilarity th e n why n o t r e p r e ­ sentations o f any relations a n d attributes? T his difficulty does n o t arise in th e behaviouristic conception which is n o t co n c ern ed with re p re s e n ­ tations an d is able to p o in t to th e physical p h e n o m e n o n o f th e sam e

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resp o n se w h ereas th e in tro sp ectiv e co n cep tio n is u n ab le to p o in t to any c o rre sp o n d in g psychic p h e n o m e n o n . B u t w hat follows fro m this? A t p re s e n t only this: o n e can only a p p e al to th e typicality o f p e rc e p tio n as th e psychological fo u n d a tio n o f th e u n ifo rm ity in th e em p lo y m e n t o f a p re d ic a te if o n e takes as o n e ’s basis th e behav io u ristic co n c ep t o f p e rc e p tio n . T h e co n c ep tu alist may a g re e w ith this; fo r a fte r all h e is claim ing th a t th e psychological fo u n d a tio n o f th e u n ifo rm ity in th e em p lo y m e n t o f a p re d ic a te is n o t a p e rc e p tio n , is n o t a m erely sen su o u s re p re se n ta tio n . B u t if th e b ehaviouristicallyin te rp re te d p e rc e p tu a l m echanism can even be c o n s id e re d as th e psy­ chological fo u n d a tio n o f th e u n ifo rm em p lo y m e n t o f p red ic ate s, th e n m u st n o t th e re c o u rse to ab stract objects, w hich only b eco m es necessary fro m th e in tro sp ectiv e perspective, a p p e a r su sp ect (especially w hen we recall th a t th ese re p re se n ta tio n s a re no t fo u n d in in tro sp e c tio n b u t m erely postu lated )? T h e co n c ep tu alist m ay rep ly th a t n o th in g is ex p lain e d by th e re fe re n c e to th e s tim u lu s-re sp o n s e sch em a a n d its co n ditionability; th at, o n th e c o n tra ry , th e le arn in g -ca p acity o f in telli­ g e n t org an ism s is itself ju s t as p u zz lin g a n d in n ee d o f e x p la n a tio n as th e special capacity fo r le arn in g p red icates. T h is is co rrec t. B ut, firstly, this is to sh ift th e p ro b le m to a n o th e r level, th a t o f causal e x p lan a tio n ; a n d , secondly, o n e m u st p o in t o u t to th e co n c ep tu alist th a t if th e le a r n ­ in g o f p red ic ate s is only o n e case o f such a u n iv ersal b eh a v io u ral p h e ­ n o m e n o n as th e learnin g -cap acity o f in te llig en t o rg an ism s th e n th e re q u ire d e x p la n a tio n can only be conceived as a physiological o ne; u nless o n e also w ants to a ttrib u te th e capacity fo r re p re s e n tin g ab stra ct objects to m ice an d fish (always assu m in g th a t th e re p re s e n tin g o f ab stract objects could in any way explain th e capacity fo r a u n ifo rm resp o n se to sim ilar stim uli).8 W e arriv e at a definitive clarification o f th e situ atio n if we now re tu r n to W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le, w hich I assu m ed w ould be accep ted , in its m o st g e n e ra l in te rp re ta tio n , by th e o b je ct-o rien tate d p h ilo so p h e r. I h ad co n c ed e d to th e la tte r th e possibility th a t a linguistic ex p re ssio n is u sed (and h en c e also ex p lain ed ) in such a way th a t it is assig n ed to a r e p r e ­ sen tatio n o r stands fo r so m e th in g th a t is only inw ard ly accessible. W e can now use W ittg e n stein ’s p rin c ip le as a c rite rio n fo r d e c id in g w h e th e r th e co n c ep tu alist was r e fe rrin g to th e m e a n in g o f an ex p ressio n a t all w h en he asserte d th a t ex p lan a tio n by ex am p les is n o t e n o u g h , th a t th e ex p re ssio n m u st sta n d fo r so m e th in g id entical th a t we in w ard ly r e p r e ­ sent. C learly he was n o t if th e m e a n in g is w h at we ex p lain w hen we ex p lain th e m e an in g o f th e ex p ressio n . F o r even if we d isre g a rd in te r-

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subjective e x p la n a tio n an d assu m e th a t a p erso n exp lain s th e w o rd ‘r e d ’ to h im self in trospectively he can clearly only do so by placing b e fo re his in n er-ey e, n o t th a t a ttrib u te o f which th e re is no sensuous re p re s e n ta ­ tion, b u t exam ples. So it now becom es clear th a t w hat th e co n cep tu alist m issed in e x p la n a tio n by exam ples was n o t so m eth in g th a t b elo n g s to th e q u estio n o f m e a n in g b u t so m e th in g th a t co ncern s th e causal ex p la­ natio n o f u n d e rs ta n d in g . I f o n e accepts W ittg en stein ’s p rin cip le (in its w idest in te rp re ta tio n ) th e n h y p o th eses co n c ern in g th e causal e x p la n a ­ tion o f u n d e rs ta n d in g no m o re b elo n g to th e philosophical ex p lan atio n o f u n d e rs ta n d in g th a n they b elo n g in th e individual case to ex p lain in g how a p a rtic u la r ex p re ssio n is used. By o rie n ta tin g ourselves tow ards W ittg e n stein ’s p rin c ip le we can also see th a t o ne does n o t over-step the limits o f a specifically sem antic en q u iry sim ply by b rin g in g in psycho­ logical p h e n o m e n a ; o n e only does so if th e en q u iry assum es th e c h a r­ acter o f an e x p la n a tio n why. O f co u rse th e re is no law th a t o n e m u st accept W ittg en stein ’s p rin ci­ ple. B u t if o n e does n o t accept it one m u st be clear w hat it is o n e is really asking ab o u t. A n d we have ju s t seen th a t if w hat interests us is causal e x p la n a tio n th e n physiological hypo th eses a re p referab le to th e in tro sp e ctio n ist hypothesis. I f th e con cep tu alist n o n eth eless holds on to the in tro sp e c tio n ist s ta n d p o in t this is because he was originally m oving w ithin th e limits o f W ittg e n stein ’s d ictu m an d was n o t th in k in g o f a causal e x p la n a tio n at all. H e h a d sta rte d o u t from th e assu m p tio n th a t o n e exp lain s an in d iv id u al p re d ic ate -ex p ressio n to o n eself by assigning it to th e c o rre sp o n d in g a ttrib u te . B u t this thesis h a d to be ab a n d o n e d rig h t at th e b eg in n in g o f th e d e b a te with th e nom inalist, fo r in tro sp e c ­ tion fails to reveal such an object. O nly w hen th e co n cep tu alist asserted , in his critiq u e o f th e n o m inalist, th a t th e re must be such an object did he slip u n n o tic e d in to tre a tin g th e q u estio n as o n e o f hy p o th etical causal e x p lan a tio n . So we can now finally re g a rd th e o b je ct-o rien tated co n cep tio n o f p red ic ate s as h av in g b een disp o sed of. B u t have we alread y achieved a new co n c ep tio n o f th e m e a n in g o f pred icates th a t is fu n d a m e n ta l e n o u g h a n d precise en o u g h to replace th e object-o rien tated co n c ep ­ tion? W h a t we have so fa r re a c h e d are two definitions: (1) to ex p lain (or u n d e rsta n d ) a p re d ic a te is to ex p lain (or u n d e rsta n d ) w hat ch aracteriza tio n -fu n ctio n it has, (2) we ex p lain a p red ic ate o r th e m e an in g o f a p re d ic a te w hen we show (or know ) th e use o f th e p re d ic a te by m ean s of positive a n d n egative exam ples. I t is easy to see how th ese two d efin i­ tions a re co n n e cted : we ex p lain w hich ch aracterizatio n - (distinction-, classification-) fu n c tio n a p re d ic a te has by d e m o n stra tin g , by m ean s o f

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positive a n d negative exam ples, its m ode o f em p lo y m en t, o r we u n d e r ­ stand w h at ch a racteriza tio n -fu n ctio n the p red ic ate has i f we can u se it correctly, positively a n d negatively. F or this concep tio n o f th e m e an in g o f predicates th e use o f th e linguistic sign fo r characterizatio n is essen ­ tial an d does not m erely m ed iate this characterizatio n ; o n e can th e re ­ fo re call it a specifically language-analytical conception. T h a t th e p r e d ­ icate stands fo r an a ttrib u te is n o t d isp u ted by the new co nception; it m erely asserts th a t th e existence, o r know ledge, o f the attrib u te c a n n o t g ro u n d th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e p red icate, b u t is itself g ro u n d e d on this u n d e rsta n d in g . As re g a rd s fu n d am e n tality this ex p lan atio n o f th e m e an in g o f p r e d ­ icates can co m p are w ith th e o b ject-o rien tated ex p lan atio n , b u t n o t yet as reg a rd s clarity a n d distinctness. F or it is n o t yet clear w h at precisely is m ean t by ‘m ode o f em p lo y m e n t’, o r ‘co rrec t app licatio n to ex am p les’, notions th a t a re fu n d a m e n ta l to th e new ex p lan atio n . T h is can be show n by th e follow ing consid eratio n . T h e ex p lan a tio n o f a p red ic ate is su p p o sed to consist in th e d em o n stratio n by m eans o f exam ples o f its co rrect a n d in co rrect em p lo y m en t. T h a t th e p erso n to w hom a p r e d i­ cate has been ex p lain ed has u n d e rsto o d th e ex p lan atio n is show n by th e fact th a t h e uses it a n d only uses it as it was ex p lain ed to him . W ere h e to use it d iffe ren tly a n d w ere we still to say th a t he is u sin g it correctly this w ould m ean th a t th e ex p lan a tio n was incom p lete; we could n o lo n g er claim th a t w h at was being exp lain ed was th e m e an in g o f th e expression. B ut th e n it w ould seem th a t a m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t o f p redicates w ould resu lt th a t does n o t at all co rre sp o n d to th e ir actual m o de o f em ploym ent. T h e p red ic ate ‘re d ’, fo r exam ple, is ex p lain ed by ap p lying it to a p p ro p ria te objects given in p erc ep tio n . W ould it n o t th e n follow th a t he a n d only he has correctly u n d e rsto o d th e w ord ‘r e d ’ w ho uses it if an d only if so m e th in g red is p re se n t in th e p erc ep tu a l situation; a n d th a t h e a n d only h e correctly u n d e rsta n d s th e w ord ‘ra in ’ w ho uses it if an d only if it is rain in g ? W e can o f course imagine a p rim itive la n g u ag e in w hich expressions a re used in this way. I shall call expressions u se d in this way quasi-pred­ icates. O n e can p robably say th a t th e characterizatio n -ex p ressio n s chil­ d re n learn in th e first stage o f lan guage-acquisition are u sed in this way. A child learn s to say ‘bow-w ow ’ w hen it sees a dog, ‘m a m a ’ w hen th e p e rc e p tu a l p a tte rn o f th e m o th e r shows itself. W e a re n o t now co n ­ c e rn e d w ith w h eth e r it is a c o rre c t hypothesis o f d ev elo p m en tal psy­ chology to say th a t th e ch aracterizatio n -ex p ressio n s w hich ch ild ren first le arn are q u asi-predicates. I am u sin g th e q u asi-p red icate m erely as a th o u g h t-m o d e l o f an expressio n co m p arab le to a p red ic ate b u t se m an ­

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tically very m uch sim pler an d re fe r to child-langu ag e sim ply by way o f illustration. T h e characteristic fe a tu re o f q u asi-predicates is th a t in th e ir case em ploym ent-situation a n d ex p lan atio n -situ atio n are o f th e sam e kind. T h e ex p lan a tio n shows in w hat situation th e expressio n is to be used. In th e case o f predicates, by co n trast, it is clearly ch aracteristic th at th e ir n o rm al em p lo y m en t-situ atio n is n o t o f th e sam e kind as th e ir e x p la n a ­ tion-situation. I f th e n we wish to hold on to th e view th at w hat is ex plained w hen an expression is ex p lain ed is its m o d e o f em p lo y m en t (and we m u st hold on to it fo r this connection is analytically co n tain ed in th e m e an in g o f th e w ord ‘ex p lan a tio n ’) th e n it follows th a t the ex p la­ n ation o f a p red ic ate , a n d hence too its m o d e o f em p lo y m en t, is m o re com plicated th a n could have been g a th e re d fro m th e acco u n t given so far. As I have so fa r described th e m e an in g o f p red icates it rem ain s in d e te rm in a te w h e th e r we a re speaking o f predicates o r q u asi-p re d i­ cates, o r m o re correctly: so far w hat has b een exp lain ed has n o t b ee n th e m e an in g o f p redicates, b u t th a t o f quasi-predicates. T h e difficulty we h e re com e u p against is no m ere q u estio n o f detail. It can n o t be dealt w ith by m erely su p p le m e n tin g w hat has been said so far, for it concerns th e fo u n d a tio n o f th e sem antic th e o ry th at is to be w orked out. It concerns the questio n o f how th e m o d e o f em p lo y m en t o f p redicates, an d h en c e th a t o f th e o th e r expressio n s o f o u r lan g u ag e, is to be u n d e rsto o d . T h e n otion o f th e use (or em ploym ent) an d o f th e rules o f use is, as we have seen, still extrem ely vague. It still also fits th e objectual conception. T h e questio n which now arises is: if the use o f linguistic expressions is no t re g u la te d by re fe re n c e to objects th e n by re fe re n c e to w hat is it reg u lated ? T h e answ er th a t m ost readily suggests itself is: by refe re n c e to th e circum stances o f use. It looks as th o u g h if o n e does n o t assign linguistic expressions to re p re se n ta tio n s o f objects - fro m th e in n e r-p ersp e ctiv e so to speak - th e n th e only altern ativ e is to assign th e m to the circum stances o f use - in the o u te r-p ersp e ctiv e so to speak. T h u s we re a d in W ittgenstein th a t w hen o n e asks fo r th e m ean in g o f a linguistic expressio n one sho u ld ask o n eself in w hat so rt o f circum stances it is u se d .9 N ow it is precisely this con cep tio n w hich breaks dow n w hen ap p lied to predicates, fo r it results in th e ir b eing ex plained as quasi-predicates. O f q u asi-predicates we can in d e ed say th a t to ex p lain th e m is to explain in w hat circum stan ces - in w hat situ ­ ation - they are to be used; a n d th at a sp e ak e r o f th e q u asi-p red icate lan g u ag e u n d e rsta n d s such an expression is show n by his using it in th e co rrect circum stances. I f predicates ca n n o t be u n d e rsto o d in this way an d if it sho u ld e m erg e th a t th e o th e r expressio n s ca n n o t be u n d e r ­

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sto o d in this way e ith e r th e n th e q u estio n arises: w hat o th e r possible way is th e re o f u n d e rs ta n d in g th e ir m o d e o f e m p lo y m e n t if it is to be n e ith e r by re fe re n c e to re p re se n ta tio n s o f objects n o r by re fe re n c e to circu m stan ces o f use? O u r f u r th e r analyses o f th e sem antics o f p red ic ativ e sentences m u st b e o rie n ta te d tow ards this question. W h at is at issue is th e fo rm a tio n o f a co n c ep tu ality a d e q u a te to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f o u r lin g u istic e x p re s ­ sions, initially in th e p a rtia l are a o f th e p red ic ativ e asserto ric sentence. A new concep tu ality d o es no t sim ply fall fro m h eav en . W e can only w ork it o u t ste p by step, taking as o u r sta rtin g -p o in t p rev io u s c o n c ep ­ tualities an d th e ir d efects revealed in th e a tte m p t to ap p ly them . By way o f p re p a ra tio n fo r the n e x t steps I w ould to d ay ju s t like to d ra w y o u r a tte n tio n to a f u rth e r d istinction betw een p red ic ate s a n d q u asi-p red icates. T h e q u asi-p re d ica te ‘r e d ’ also d iffe rs fro m th e p r e d i­ cate ‘r e d ’ in th a t it is used as an in d e p e n d e n t linguistic ex p ressio n ; it is a o n e-w o rd se n te n c e ,10 w hereas th e p re d ic a te req u ires s u p p le m e n ta ­ tio n , in the sim plest case su p p le m e n ta tio n by a sin g u lar te rm . T h is d if ­ fe re n c e b etw een p re d ic a te an d q u a si-p re d ic a te is so ch aracteristic th a t w e can ex p e ct th a t w h e re v e r a w o rd fu n ctio n s an alo g o u sly to a p r e d i­ cate (nam ely as a ch a racteriza tio n -ex p ressio n ) b u t is u se d in d e p e n ­ d en tly it is a q u asi-p re d ica te, i.e. a ch a racteriza tio n -ex p ressio n w hose e m p lo y m e n t is situ atio n -rela te d . W h a t follows fro m this fo r th e m e a n ­ in g o f p red icates? T h a t it will only be possible to u n d e rs ta n d th e m in th e co n tex t o f th e su p p le m e n tab ility by sin g u la r term s, certainly. B ut h e r e two o p p o sin g h y p o th e ses a re conceivable. Firstly o n e could s u p ­ p o se th a t it is only becau se p red ic ate s ca n n o t be em p lo y ed in d e p e n ­ d en tly th a t they ca n n o t b e u n d e rs to o d by re fe re n c e to th e situ atio n o f th e ir em p lo y m e n t; to this su p p o sitio n w ould c o rre s p o n d th e h y p o th esis th a t th e m e a n in g o f whole sen ten ces, p red ic ativ e sen ten ces, an d th e n o th e rs, can be u n d e rs to o d com pletely by re fe re n c e to th e circu m stan ces o f th e ir em p lo y m e n t. T h e second possibility w ould be th a t it is precisely th e su p p le m e n ta tio n o f p red ic ate s by sin g u lar term s w hich m akes th e e m p lo y m e n t o f p red ic ate s, a n d h e n c e th a t o f w hole p red ic ativ e se n ­ tences, situation-independent. If th a t is so th e n only if we ap p ro a c h th e q u estio n co n c e rn in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f sin g u la r te rm s in th e sam e specifically language-analytical m a n n e r in w hich, in th e last two lec­ tu res, we h av e a p p ro a c h e d th e q u estio n co n c e rn in g th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f p red ic ate s can we a rriv e at a new u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e m e an in g o f p red ic ate s w hich relates n e ith e r in trospectively to th e re p re s e n ta tio n o f objects n o r b eh aviouristically to th e circum stances o f em p lo y m en t. Y ou will alre ad y h av e g a th e re d fro m th e way in w hich I have c h a r ­

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acterized these two h y p o th e ses th a t I h o ld th e second to be th e co rrect on e. I in te n d , how ever, to ex a m in e th e first hypoth esis first a n d will n ot ex a m in e th e second till m uch later. F o r it will e m e rg e th a t fo r a p ro m ­ ising clarification o f th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f th e two co m p o n en ts o f a p red ic ativ e se n ten c e we re q u ire a te n ab le p relim in ary co n cep tio n o f the e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f the w hole sentence. Such a co n cep tio n ca n n o t be ach ieved at a stroke.

LECTURE

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T he meaning of an expression and the circumstances of its use. Dispute with a behaviouristic conception

I f th e m e an in g o f a linguistic sign can n o t be u n d e rsto o d in term s o f th e sign’s sta n d in g fo r an object th e n th e view w hich m ost readily suggests itself is th a t to u n d e rs ta n d a sign is to know in which circum stances it is to be used. A t th e e n d o f th e last lectu re I trie d to show th a t as re g a rd s th e use o f p red icates at any ra te this con cep tio n will n o t do; how ever I also raised th e question o f w h e th e r this conceptio n m ig h t nev erth eless be c o rre c t in the case o f all in d e p e n d e n t u tte ran ce s a n d h en ce in th e case o f w hole assertoric sentences. B efore we reject th e thesis th a t th e m ean in g o f an ex p ressio n consists in th e circum stances o f its u se we m ust subject it to a m o re fu n d a m e n ta l ex am inatio n . In §117 o f his Philosophical Investigations W ittgenstein writes: ‘If, fo r ex am ple, som eone says th a t th e sentence . . . has m e an in g fo r him , th e n he should ask h im self in w hat p articu la r circum stances this sen ten ce is actually u se d .’ A n d as W ittgenstein says in a n o th e r place the use is th ereby co n n e cted with o u r o th e r activities. By way o f ex p lan atio n h e presen ts, at th e b e g in n in g o f th e Investigations, som e exam ples o f ‘la n ­ guages m o re p rim itive th a n o u r ow n’ (§2). A n exam ple, w hich is f u r th e r elab o rate d in th e follow ing p a ra g ra p h s, is d escribed in §2: ‘Let us im a g ­ in e a la n g u ag e . . . w hich is m e a n t to serve fo r com m u n icatio n b etw een a b u i l d e r a n d an a s sista n t# . A is building with b u ilding-stones: th e re a re blocks, pillars, slabs an d beam s. B has to pass h im th e stones, a n d th a t in th e o rd e r in w hich A n ee d s them . F o r this p u rp o se they u se a lan g u ag e consisting o f the w ords “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “b e a m ”. A calls th e m out; - B b rin g s th e sto n e which h e has le a rn t to b rin g at suchan d -such a call.’ W ittgenstein adds: ‘conceive this as a co m p lete p rim i­ tive la n g u a g e ’. S om ew hat later we read : ‘W e can also th in k o f th e w hole process o f using w ords in §2 as o n e o f tho se gam es by m ean s o f w hich ch ild ren le arn th e ir native language. I will call these gam es “lan g u ag e-

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g am es” . . . I shall also call the w hole, consisting o f la n g u ag e an d th e actions into w hich it is w oven, th e “lan g u ag e -g a m e” ’ (§7). T h e lan g u ag e o f §2 is a m ore realistic m odel o f a situ atio n -rela te d lan guage th a n th e quasi-p red icate lan g u ag e I p rese n ted in th e last lec­ tu re , m ore realistic because this lan g u ag e-g am e fulfils an intelligible com m unicative p u rp o se. I f the e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f ex p ressio n s sim ply consisted in all m em bers o f th e linguistic com m unity u tte rin g such-andsuch an expressio n in such-and-such circum stances this w ould have no obvious com m unicative significance a n d o ne could n o t explain how such a la n g u ag e dev elo p ed in a biological species, unless it rep rese n ts (as we can assum e in th e case o f child-language) a ru d im e n ta ry stage o f a h igher-level language. O f course this in no way affects th e usefulness o f th e q u asi-p red icate lan g u ag e as a th o u g h t-m o d e l. H ow ever, even fo r th e child -lan g u ag e it is m o re realistic to conceive o f its sem antics as b ein g en ric h e d in th e follow ing way: the child does n o t only u tte r a p a rtic u la r so u n d w hen a p articu la r p erc ep tu a l situation is given b u t also w hen it w ishes it to be given; it le arn s to say ‘m a m a’ n o t only w hen its m o th e r is th e re b u t also w hen it w ould like h e r to com e. T h u s th e q u asi­ p red ic ate is used both quasi-indicatively a n d q u asi-im p erativ ely -o p tatively; an d th e im p e rativ e -o p tativ e m ode o f em p lo y m en t is clearly p u r ­ poseful. T h e p a tte rn o f ex p lan atio n o f such expressions rem ains in p rin cip le th e sam e a n d we can th e re fo re also speak o f q u asi-p red icates th a t are u se d both indicatively a n d im peratively. In b o th cases th e ex p lan atio n has th e fo rm : ‘if such-and-such circum stances o btain, suchand -such an ex pression is u se d ’; th e only d iffe ren ce w ould be th a t in o n e case th e circum stances consist o f th e p erc ep tu a l situ atio n an d in th e o th e r case o f th e need-situ atio n ; in th e one case they are ex tern al stim ­ uli in th e o th e r in te rn a l stim uli which, how ever, are d irec ted to th e p ro d u c tio n o f ex tern al stim uli. H ow ever, as W ittgenstein him self em phasized o n e can h ard ly speak o f ‘ex p la n a tio n ’ in th e case o f child-language in the first stage o f its d ev elo p m en t; it is m o re a p p ro p ria te to speak o f ‘tra in in g ’ (§5). T o speak o f ‘ex p lain in g ’ p resu p p o se s th a t th e o n e to w hom an ex p ressio n is ex p lain ed already u n d e rsta n d s th e w ords ‘co rrec t’ a n d ‘in c o rre c t’. T h u s h e learn s a ru le to which h e conforms; h e learns th e m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t th a t is co rrec t relative to an actio n -n o rm . (For th e exis­ ten ce o f an actio n -n o rm it is n o t necessary th a t it be cap ab le o f bein g fo rm u late d . Its existence am o u n ts sim ply to this: th a t certain actions can be called ‘co rrec t’ a n d o th e rs ‘in c o rrec t’.) I f th e m o d e o f em p lo y ­ m e n t is n o t being explained th e n we are d ea lin g sim ply with a causal co nnection th e m echanism o f w hich can be u n d e rsto o d p u rely in term s

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o f th e b ehaviouristic th e o ry o f le a rn in g . T h e child learns, th ro u g h socalled ‘in stru m e n ta l co n d itio n in g ’, th a t in su c h -an d -su ch ex te rn a l o r in te rn a l circum stances (in th e e n v iro n m e n t o r th e o rg an ism ) it can th ro u g h such-an d -su ch an activity - th e u tte rin g o f a p a rtic u la r so u n d - p ro d u c e a positive stim u lu s o r p re v e n t a n eg a tiv e one. T h e positive stim u lu s fu n ctio n s as a so-called ‘re w a rd ’ o r ‘re in fo rc e m e n t’ which causally m otivates the co n d itio n e d resp o n se . In th e case o f th e im p e ra ­ tively em plo y ed q u asi-p re d ica te th e re w a rd consists in th e p ro d u c tio n o f th e stim ulus associated w ith th e ex p re ssio n ; in th e case o f its in d ica­ tive em p lo y m e n t it consists in th e p leased re a c tio n o f th e adults. F or o u r p u rp o ses, how ever, we can d isre g a rd th e q u estio n o f w hat m oti­ vates th e association betw een circum stances (in te rn a l o r ex tern al) an d th e use o f th e sign; in d e e d we can ig n o re a lto g e th e r th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r this association is explained o r causally p ro d u c e d by co n d itio n ­ ing. We can th e re fo re also ig n o re th e q u estio n o f w h e th e r o n e can sp e ak o f th e meaning o f a sign an d understanding a t all w h e re th e use o f th e sign is le a rn e d by c o n d itio n in g (clearly n o t if o n e can only speak o f ‘m e a n in g ’ a n d ‘u n d e r s ta n d in g ’ w h ere o n e can also speak o f ‘e x p lan a­ tio n ’; on th e o th e r h a n d o n e sh o u ld n ev e r g et b o g g ed d o w n in such v erbal questions: r a th e r o n e sh o u ld leave o p e n th e possibility o f th e re b ein g , e.g., a w id er a n d a n a rro w e r c o n c ep t o f m ean in g ). W e can d is­ re g a rd this distinction - which in o th e r co n tex ts is fu n d a m e n ta l b ecause th e im p o rta n t p o in t in o u r co n te x t is u n a ffe c te d by it. W h e th e r th e ru le in q u estio n is a normative ru le , i.e. a ru le w hich th e sign-user follows, o r a causal ru le , i.e. a m e re objective re g u la rity w hich can be n o te d by an o b serv er - th u s w h e th e r th e ru le is o f th e fo rm ‘if such an d such conditions obtain this ex p re ssio n is to be u s e d ’ o r ‘if such an d such co n d itio n s o b ta in this ex p re ssio n is u s e d ’ - m b o th cases it is a m atter o f th e association o f th e use o f a sign w ith a p a rtic u la r p e rc e p tu a l situation, w ith p a rtic u la r perceived circu m stan ces o r conditio n s. In so far as such a ru le , w h e th e r it be c o n stru e d as a causal ru le o r a n o rm ativ e ru le, assigns th e use o f th e sign to c e rta in circum stances (conditions) I shall call it a ‘co n d itio n al r u le ’. T h e q u e stio n o f w h e th e r th e m e a n in g o f o u r linguistic expressio n s consists in th e circu m stan ces o f th e ir use can th e re fo re also be fo rm u la te d th u s: a re th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f o u r linguistic expressio n s to be c o n s tru e d as in this sense co n d itio n al rules? T h e lan g u ag e -g a m e w hich W ittg e n stein p re se n ts in §2 is also d istin ­ g u ish e d fro m th e q u asi-p re d ica te la n g u ag e e n ric h e d by th e q u asi­ im p e rativ e e m p lo y m e n t-fo rm in th a t it takes a c co u n t o f th e communica­ tive aspect o f all n a tu ra l - w h e th e r h u m a n o r an im al - languages. A sign is n o t only used by som eone; it is also d irec ted to so m eo n e (or

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several persons). W e m u st th e re fo re distinguish betw een sp e ak e r a n d h e a r e r or, m o re g enerally, betw een th e em itte r an d th e receiver(s) o f th e sign. In W ittg e n ste in ’s ex a m p le it is only in resp ect to th e sp e ak e r th a t o n e can say th a t th e sign is associated with th e circum stances o f its use. In re g a rd to th e h e a r e r - in th e exam p le th e assistant - on th e o th e r h a n d , w h e th e r o r n o t h e u n d e rsta n d s th e sign is show n by w h e th e r w hen h e perceives th e sign h e p e rfo rm s a p a rtic u la r act. H o w ­ ever, th e h e a re r-ru le is also a co n d itio n a l rule; th e only d iffe ren ce is th a t now th e co n d itio n is th e sig n -ev e n t its e lf: if th e sign is h e a rd such a n d such an activity is c a rrie d out. T h is ru le can also be c o n s tru e d b oth no rm ativ ely a n d causally. I t is only in this m o d el th a t we h av e a realistic m odel o f a prim itive la n g u ag e, fo r it is only in this m o d e l th a t an in tersu b jectiv e p u rp o se o f sig n -em p lo y m e n t becom es evident. In fact o n e can say th a t all actual p rim itiv e la n g u ag e s w hich in c o n tra st to child-lang u ag e are n o t p re lim ­ in a ry stages b u t alre ad y fu n c tio n purp o siv ely in th e ir ow n rig h t, h en ce all an im al-la n g u ag e s, c o n fo rm to this schem a. H en ce th e e n tire b eh av ­ io u ristic th e o ry o f la n g u a g e takes its d e p a r tu re fro m th is schem a. A cco rd in g to this c o n c e p tio n th e fu n ctio n o f th e sign is to m ed iate b etw een stim u lu s a n d re sp o n se a n d in this way to m ake it possible th a t th e one c o m m u n ic a tio n -p a rtn e r has o r receives th e stim u lu s an d th e other exhibits th e a p p r o p r ia te re s p o n s e .1 T h u s in W ittg en stein ’s ex a m ­ ple A n eeds a p a rtic u la r b u ild in g -sto n e an d in stead o f p e rfo rm in g th e a p p ro p ria te actio n h im se lf h e p e rfo rm s a substitute-action w hich fo r its p a rt ex erts a stim ulus o n B w hich b rin g s it a b o u t t h a t # p e rfo rm s th e action. T h u s th e sign m akes it possible fo r th e o n e to act fo r th e o th e r, b u t also fo r th e o n e to p erc eiv e fo r th e o th e r. T h e latter is th e case, fo r ex a m p le , w ith w arn in g o r feeding-signals: o n e p a rtn e r perceives th e situ atio n a n d does n o t h im se lf re s p o n d (or is n o t th e only o n e to re sp o n d ) b u t r a th e r p e rfo rm s an actio n w hich serves as a su b stitu te stim ulus fo r th e o th e r p a r tn e rs such th a t they can re sp o n d a p p r o p r i­ ately to th e situ atio n w ith o u t p erc eiv in g it them selves. W e can call signs w ith this so rt o f com m unicativ e fu n ctio n ‘signals’. T h is te rm in o lo g y is n o t u n d is p u te d . T h e r e are a u th o rs 2 w ho only call signs o f this k in d ‘signals’ if th e ir e m p lo y m e n t bo th by th e em itte r a n d th e receiver is n o t le a rn e d b u t in n a te , as in the la n g u ag e o f bees. H o w ­ ev er, in th e c o n te x t o f o u r in v estig atio n the distinction betw een th e le a rn e d a n d in n a te e m p lo y m e n t o f such signs is n o t im p o rta n t, p a rtic ­ u larly as I shall also be ig n o rin g th e (m uch m o re fu n d a m e n ta l) d istin c­ tio n b etw een th o se signs o f this k in d w hose ru les a re causal an d those w hose ru les a re n o rm a tiv e a n d w hich we m ust u n d e rs ta n d as co n v en ­

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tio n al signals. A lth o u g h W ittgenstein says th a t th e la n g u ag e-g am e that h e describes is le a rn t th ro u g h ‘tra in in g ’ it em erges clearly fro m later p arts o f th e Investigations th a t he u n d e rs ta n d s th e rules as n o rm ativ e a n d th e signs as conventional. A m o re serious u n ce rtain ty co n cern in g th e in te rp re ta tio n o f W ittgenstein’s lan g u ag e-g am es has to d o with the qu estio n o f w h e th e r he in te n d s to c o n tra st th em as ‘prim itive lan g u ag es’ with th e lan g u ag e we actually speak o r w h eth e r h e in ten d s th e m to be u n d e rsto o d as a sim ple m o d el o f how even o u r la n g u ag e fu nctions. T h e thesis th a t o u r lan g u ag e is a signal-language a n d th at it is to be u n d e r ­ stood o n the m o d e l o f co n d itio n e d responses (only in a m o re com pli­ cated way) is p ro p o u n d e d by th e b eh a v io u rist th e o ry o f lan g u ag e; w h e th e r W ittgenstein h eld a c o rre sp o n d in g view, th o u g h with a n o r­ m ative ra th e r th a n a causal in te rp re ta tio n o f rules, is a q u estio n we can leave o pen. A nyw ay it is this thesis - th a t o u r linguistic ex p ressio n s fu n c tio n as signals o r th a t th e ir rules a re conditio n al rules - th a t we have to exam ine. It is th e m o re g en e ral a n d m o re fu n d a m e n ta l fo rm o f th e thesis th a t th e m e an in g o f an ex p re ssio n consists in th e circu m ­ stances o f its em ploym ent. I w ould first like to p o in t o u t tw o fu n d a m e n ta l difficulties which im m ediately becom e a p p a r e n t if on e a ttem p ts to co n stru e th e sentences o f o u r la n g u ag e as signal-signs. T h e first is th a t the m e an in g o f a signalsign is not th e sam e fo r sp e ak e r an d h e a re r. T h u s th e b eh av io u rist lang u ag e -th eo rist L eo n a rd B loom field w rites th a t th e ‘m e a n in g ’ o f an ex p re ssio n is ‘th e situation in w hich th e sp eak er u tte rs it and th e reac­ tion w hich it calls fo rth in th e h e a r e r ’.3 A ttem pts have b een m a d e to gloss o ver this fact, p o in tin g o u t th a t every m e m b er o f a linguistic com ­ m u n ity can, d e p e n d in g on th e situation, assum e b o th th e ro le o f th e sp e a k e r an d th a t o f th e h e a re r an d o n e can th e re fo re say th a t so m eo n e only u n d e rsta n d s th e ex p ressio n if he know s both co n d itio n al rules. B u t even so this co nception does n o t fit th e sentences o f o u r lan g u ag e. O r p u ttin g it m o re cautiously: it at least does not c o rre sp o n d w ith o u r o rd in a ry u n d e rs ta n d in g to say th a t a sen ten ce does n o t have o n e an d th e sam e m e an in g fo r sp e ak e r an d h e a re r. T h e r e is h e re revealed a pecu liar co n tra st betw een th e two th eo ries o f m e an in g th a t I have so fa r discussed. T h e o b ject-o rien tated th e o ry o f m e an in g h ad sim ply ig n o re d th e com m unicativ e fu n ctio n o f la n ­ g u age; as it did n o t expressly reflect on the fact th a t an ex p ressio n is used it was also able to overlook the s p e a k e r- h e a re r relatio n . F ro m this p o sition th e fact th at an ex p ressio n has only one m ean in g fo r sp e ak e r a n d h e a re r a p p e a rs entirely u n p ro b lem atic . T h e b eh av io u rist co n c ep ­ tio n on th e o th e r h a n d rig h tly took th e com m unicativ e situ atio n as its

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startin g -p o in t. H ow ever, its o rien tatio n tow ards sig n al-lan g u ag es led to sp e ak e r-m ea n in g a n d h e a re r-m e a n in g bein g se p a ra te d . A satisfactory analysis o f th e m e an in g o f o u r linguistic ex pression s can ig n o re n e ith e r th e com m unicative aspect o f la nguage n o r th e id e n tity o f m e an in g fo r sp e a k e r an d h e a re r; an d we will th e re fo re have to ask how this identity o f m e an in g is co n stitu ted fro m w ithin th e s p e a k e r- h e a re r situation. T h is is a way o f fo rm u la tin g th e q u estio n which is sim ilar to th e way in w hich it h ad alre ad y been fo rm u la te d in the first th ird o f this ce n tu ry by th e A m erican social-psychologist G eo rg e H . M e ad .4 In stea d o f sim ­ ply taking th e iden tity o f m e an in g fo r g ra n te d as in th e o b ject-o rien ­ ta ted conception one sh o u ld , ac co rd in g to M ead, tak e as o n e ’s startin g p o in t th e biologically m o re prim itive an d th eoretically u n p ro b le m a tic signal-languages an d ask w hat in th e way o f b e h a v io u r m u st be ad d e d fo r sp e ak e r a n d h e a re r to be able to re fe r to so m eth in g identical. A ccording to M ead this is only possible if th e sp e ak e r im plicitly cop e rfo rm s th e resp o n se o f th e p a rtn e r a n d likewise th e h e a re r th e action o f th e speaker. I f th a t is correct, th e n an identical m e an in g which is in d e p e n d e n t o f th e specific com m unicatio n -ro les o f sp e ak e r a n d h e a re r w ould only be co n stitu ted by th e division o f th e co m m u n icatio n -ev en t in to speaker- a n d h e a re r-ro le s beco m in g explicit fo r sp e ak e r an d h e a re r them selves, in th a t each o n e in th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f his role cop e rfo rm s th a t o f th e o th e r. T h is th e o ry , th a t each o f th e p a rtn e rs in te r­ nalizes th e ro le o f th e o th e r, also explains, acco rd in g to M ead, how it is th a t som eone can talk to him self. H ow ever, M e ad ’s th eo ry rem a in ed p ro g ra m m a tic . H e did n o t show how th e im plicit co -p e rfo rm an ce o f th e p a r tn e r ’s resp o n se in o n e ’s ow n action is concretely to be conceived. B u t we can re ta in his co n cep tio n as a h y pothetical p ersp ectiv e fo r o u r f u r th e r analysis. I f d espite this obvious d iffe ren ce betw een senten ces an d signals viz. th a t sentences have only one m e an in g , we ex a m in e th e thesis o f th e sig n al-ch aracter o f o u r la n g u ag e in relatio n to th o se sen ten ces which a re o u r im m ed ia te co n cern - pred icativ e assertoric sentences - th en we find ourselves im m ediately facing a second difficulty. F o r a signallan g u ag e clearly o ffers n o ro o m fo r assertoric sentences. I f o n e seeks to ap p ly th e distinction b etw een indicative a n d im p erativ e sentences, w hich is essential to o u r lan g u ag e, to a signal-sign o n e can in te rp re t th e signal b oth as a sta te m en t th a t so m e th in g is th e case an d as an im p e ra ­ tive th a t so m eth in g is to be do n e; b u t precisely because b o th in te r p re ­ tations are possible both a re o u t o f place. Is a b ee-d an ce to be co n stru e d as in fo rm in g th a t th e re is h o n ey in a p a rtic u la r place o r as a co m m an d to fly there? Is a w arning-cry to be co n stru e d as in fo rm a tio n th a t th e re

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is d a n g e r o r as a c o m m an d to ru n away? Such a d istin ctio n w ould clearly only be m e a n in g fu l if it b e lo n g ed to th e ru le s o f th e lan g u ag e g am e th a t th e re c ip ie n t does n o t m erely re sp o n d w ith th e resp o n se a p p r o p r ia te to th e e m itte r’s stim ulus b u t also has th e possibility o f re s p o n d in g to th e e m itte r’s giving o f a sign as su ch . A lth o u g h we are n o t yet able to say w hat th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s a r e w hich d e te rm in e w h e th e r a se n ten c e is asserto ric o r im p e rativ e this m u c h at least is clear: a sign can only be u se d assertorically o r im p e rativ e ly if th e re c ip ie n t has th e possibility o f re sp o n d in g to th e giving o f th e sign as an a sserto ric o r im p e ra tiv e giving o f a sign. T h e possibility o f re sp o n s e to th e giving o f th e sign itself is in o u r se n ten c e-la n g u ag e co n ta in e d in th e p h e n o m e n o n o f p o sitio n -tak in g (Stellungnahme). T a k e a situ atio n in w hich a signal co u ld also be given (e.g. th e alarm -cry ‘fire ’). T h e re c ip ie n t can re sp o n d to th e se n ten c e in th e sam e way th a t h e can re s p o n d to th e signal. B u t it is also possible fo r him , instead o f re sp o n d in g , to re p ly to th e sen ten ce, to ta k e u p a p o sitio n to w ard s it. T h e sim plest fo rm o f p o sitio n -tak in g is d en ial a n d d e p e n d in g on how th e w o rd ‘n o ’ is used a n d w h at it is to w ard s w hich a positio n is ta k en th e se n ten c e is rev e ale d as an im p e r­ ative o r an indicative. It m ay be su rm ise d th a t th e two fe a tu re s w hich alre a d y a t first glance seem to d istin g u ish th e sen ten ces o f o u r la n g u a g e fro m signals b elo n g to g e th e r. It w ould now seem plausible to look u p o n th e position-taking o f th e re c ip ie n t as th a t re sp o n se o f th e p a r tn e r w hich, ac co rd in g to M ead, is im plicitly co -p e rfo rm e d by th e em itte r. F o r th e n eg ativ e o r affirm ativ e p o sitio n -tak in g o f th e re c ip ie n t is a re sp o n se o f th e kind b ein g looked fo r; o n e w hich is a lre ad y a n tic ip a te d in th e e m itte r ’s u se o f th e sign. W h e n we u tte r a sentence w h e th e r asserto rically o r im p e r­ atively, we m e an it as o n e th a t can be d e n ie d . T h e a p p r o p r ia te re sp o n se o f th e p a r tn e r to a sen ten ce, in c o n tra st to th a t to a signal, is n o t th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f a n action b u t th e a ffirm atio n o r d en ial o f th e sen ten ce. In th e case o f th e im p e rativ e th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f th e actio n is also a possible resp o n se . B u t this p e rfo rm a n c e o f th e actio n is to b e u n d e r ­ sto o d as a ffirm a tio n , so m e th in g essentially d if fe r e n t fro m th e m e re r e s p o n s e ;5 fo r in stea d o f p e rfo rm in g th e action o n e can re p ly w ith a ‘n o ’. In yes/no p o sitio n -tak in g , as in th e o th e r p o sitio n -tak in g s such as q u estio n in g , d o u b tin g a n d so on w hich a re g ro u n d e d in th e possibility o f yes/no p o sitio n -tak in g , th e re c ip ie n t is clearly re f e r rin g to the same thing as th e e m itte r, albeit in a d iffe re n t way. A n d if th e ru le s fo r th e e m p lo y m e n t o f th e se n ten c e by th e e m itte r can be show n to be such as re la te its e m p lo y m e n t to th e possible p o sitio n -tak in g s o f th e recip ien t, th e n th e e m itte r is alread y re fe rrin g to th e sam e th in g as th e possible

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recipients. In this way M e a d ’s p ro g ra m m a tic hypoth esis w ould be given d efin ite c o n ten t. O f co u rse these reflections a re them selves still p r o ­ g ram m atic, fo r o n e w ould first have to show th a t an d how yes/no p o si­ tio n -ta k in g belongs to th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f sentences. Initially we a re only co n c ern ed w ith assertoric sentences an d in p a r ­ tic u la r with pred icativ e assertoric sentences. A fte r th ese very g en e ral a n d an ticip ato ry reflections I com e now to th e p ro m ised ex am in atio n o f th e thesis th a t th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f pred icativ e sentences can be u n d e rs to o d as co n d itio n al rules a n d , specifically, in acco rd an ce with th e sch em a o f a signal-language. T h e g en e ral difficulties ju s t re fe rre d to d o n o t r e n d e r a d etailed ex a m in a tio n su p erflu o u s. F o r it is only by m eans o f th e p recise critical e x a m in a tio n o f existing theo ries th a t we can h o p e to m ake new positive ap p ro a ch es. I w ant to co n d u c t th e discussion w ith re fe re n c e to an ex am ple. I shall choose an ex a m p le w hich because it is a p p ro p ria te to a co n tex t o f action is as acco m m o d atin g as possible to th e theory to be criticized: th e se n ­ te n ce ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire.’ O n e can easily im ag in e situations in w hich it w ould be ju s t as a p p ro p ria te to use this sen ten ce as th e signalex p re ssio n ‘F ire !’ N ow ac co rd in g to th e th e o ry to be ex am in ed th e m e a n in g o f th e se n ten c e consists o f two conditio n al ru les: the co rrec t u n d e r s ta n d in g o f th e h e a re r is show n by th e fact th at h e resp o n d s to th e se n ten c e in a specific way; a n d th e co rrec t use by th e sp e ak e r is sh o w n by th e fact th a t h e uses th e sen ten ce in specific circum stances. So if th e th eo ry is c o rrec t it m u st be possible to specify th e p articu la r re a c ­ tion o f th e h e a r e r an d th e p a rtic u la r situation o f th e sp e ak e r w hich to g e th e r a re su p p o se d to co n stitu te th e m e an in g o f this sentence. I shall b eg in with th e h e a re r. S u p p o se so m eo n e com es h e re into th e le c tu re -ro o m a n d u tte rs th e se n ten c e ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire.’ H ow w ould we react? P robably m any o f us w ould n o t react at all, o th e rs w o uld ask th e m an to leave us in peace, o th e rs w ould ask him how h e know s this, o th e rs w ould p e rh a p s lau g h a n d o th e rs m ig h t ru n o u t with v arious aim s; in sh o rt th e re is no q u estio n o f a ru le-g o v ern ed co n n ex io n b etw een th e h e a rin g o f th e sen ten ce an d p a rtic u la r actions. T o avoid this m anifest n o n se n se to which th e theo ry seem s to lead b eh av io u rist th e o rists in tro d u c e d th e concept o f an actio n -d isp o sitio n .6 A sen ten ce ca n only have a practical m e an in g , o ne m ig h t say, in c e rta in situations. F o r ex am p le, th e se n ten c e ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire’ does n o t have a p ractical m e a n in g if so m e o n e u tte rs it h e re in th e le ctu re-ro o m b u t it d o es if so m e o n e is rin g in g th e fire-b rig ad e. T o escape th e objection th a t we n ev e rth ele ss u n d e rs ta n d th e se n ten c e w hen it is u tte re d h e re in th e le c tu re -ro o m a n d we do n o t b elo n g to th e fire -b rig a d e it is ex p lain ed

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th a t th e m e an in g consists n o t in an action b u t in an action-disposition; th a t we h e re a n d now u n d e rsta n d th e sentence ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire’ m eans th at it aw akens a disposition in us such th a t if we w ere th e fireb rig a d e we w ould rush o u t to extinguish the fire. B u t o n e could ju s t as well say th e m e an in g consists in th e disposition to ru n o u t in to th e street if o n e w ere an o cc u p an t o f th e tow n-hall. T h e r e are any n u m b e r o f d iffe re n t situations in w hich this se n ten ce can be practically relevant. A m o n g arsonists, fo r exam ple, it can be used as an a n n o u n c e m e n t o f success. T h e a tte m p t to co n stru e an assertoric sen ten ce as a signal th u s leads to th e re su lt th a t n o t ju s t two m eanings m u st be a ttrib u te d to it b u t in n u m e ra b le m eanings. T h is disqualifies th e th e o ry at least as re g a rd s th e h earer-sid e; fo r if th e re are indefinitely m any m eanings o f a linguistic ex p ressio n th en th e m e an in g o f th e expressio n cannot be som eth in g th a t o n e can learn acco rd in g to a ru le (or several rules). I w ould also like to p o in t o u t once ag ain th a t 1 have chosen an exam ple w hich is specially fav o u rab le to th e th eory. In th e case o f m ost assertoric sentences it is difficult to th in k o f any kind o f a p p ro p ria te reactions. W hat, fo r exam ple, w ould be th e a p p ro p ria te reactions to th e senten ce ‘T h e tow n-hall is r e d ’ o r ‘T h e tow n-hall dates fro m th e eig h tee n th c e n tu ry ? W e will th e re fo re have to su p p o se th a t th a t with w hich the h e a r e r connects th e sen ten ce acco rd ­ ing to a ru le is so m eth in g o th e r th a n an action, action-disposition o r b u n d le o f action-dispositions, an d re tu r n to th e m uch m o re n a tu ra l co nception th a t th e action o r action-disposition w hich th e h e a rin g o f an ex pression effects is a re su lt re q u irin g th e com bin ed o p e ra tio n o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e expression and o f th e action-m otivations o f th e p erso n co n c ern ed . B u t in w hat th e n does th e m e an in g fo r th e h e a re r consist? O n e could p e rh a p s th in k th a t the ru le w hich in signal-languages is th e h e a re r-ru le fits im peratives ra th e r th a n assertoric sentences, a n d th at th e ru le we have to follow in using assertoric sentences is th e ru le w hich in th e sig nal-language is th e sp e ak e r-ru le. T h is is certainly an attractiv e su g ­ gestion, p articu larly w hen o n e considers th a t in this w eaker fo rm th e behaviouristic th e o ry w ould also be able to cope with both o f th e diffi­ culties to w hich I r e fe rre d a t th e b eg in n in g . In co n trast to signals, sen ­ tences w ould be e ith e r indicative o r im perative. T h e m e an in g o f th e indicative se n ten c e w ould be d e te rm in e d even fo r th e h e a r e r by th e sp e ak e r-ru le a n d th e m e an in g o f th e im perative sen ten ce w ould be d e te rm in e d even fo r th e sp e a k e r by th e h e a re r-ru le . In both cases th e n th e m ean in g fo r sp e ak e r a n d h e a re r w ould be th e sam e. So in th e case o f th e sentences w ith which we a re at p re se n t con­

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c e rn ed (i.e. asserto ric sentences) ev e ry th in g d e p e n d s on w h e th e r at least th e sp eak er-sid e o f th e signal-schem a fits. C an o n e say th a t th e m e an in g o f an asserto ric se n ten ce consists in th e circu m stan ces in w hich it is used? T h is thesis fo r its p a rt allows o f two in te rp re ta tio n s. Firstly o n e could try to co n stru e th e circum stances practically. T h e m e an in g o f th e se n ­ ten ce ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire ’ w ould th e n be d efin e d by th e circ u m ­ stances which give p o in t to th e u tte ra n c e o f th e sen ten ce, e.g. th a t h elp is n e e d e d to p u t o u t th e fire. T h is ex p lan a tio n how ever am o u n ts to a rep e titio n o f th e ex p lan a tio n th a t was previously given fo r th e h e a re r a n d it w ould be subject to th e sam e w eaknesses. B esides we w an ted to assim ilate th e h e a re r-ru le to th e sp e ak e r-ru le an d n o t vice versa. T h is in te rp re ta tio n is th e re fo re elim inated. T h e second a n d m o re plausible in te rp re ta tio n o f th e re fe re n c e to circum stances o r em p lo y m en t-situ atio n is th a t w hich c o rre sp o n d s to th e re fe re n c e to th e stim ulus in th e b eh av io u rist m odel: th e circum stances to w hich the m e a n in g -ru le ties th e use o f th e se n ten c e a re d efin e d by th e p e rc e p tu a l situ atio n o f th e speaker. T h is view can be h eld in a sim ­ ple a n d a revised version. A pp lied to o u r exam ple th e sim ple version w ould be: always (or in m ost cases) w hen it is p erceiv ed th a t th e tow nhall is on fire o n e says ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire’, o r in its n o rm ativ e fo rm u latio n : w h en ev er it is p erceived th a t th e tow n-hall is on fire o n e is to say ‘T h e tow n-hall is on fire.’ O n e could also re g a rd this ru le fo r th e use o f th e p redicative sen ten ce as a specification o f a ru le fo r th e use o f th e predicate, w hich w ould th e n be: w h en ev er it is p erceiv ed th a t so m e th in g is o n fire o ne is to say th a t it is on fire. T h is ex p lan a tio n w ould be an e x p lan a tio n o f th e p re d ic a te as a q u asi-p red icate. It is obvious th a t this ex p lan a tio n is in a d eq u a te, fo r n o rm ally we use n e ith e r p red ic ate s n o r pred icativ e sentences in th e c o rre s p o n d in g p e rc e p tu a l situ ation. O f course, signals too a re som etim es sto red a n d tra n sm itte d n o t in th e p e rc e p tu a l situation, b u t only w hen they can be rele v an t to a p a r t­ n e r. Bees, fo r ex am ple, p e rfo rm th e ir la n g u ag e -d a n ce n o t in th e p re se n c e b u t in th e im m ed ia te a fte rm a th o f certain p ercep tu ally receiv ed factors; it is th e in fo rm a tio n -re q u irin g p a rtn e rs th a t first trig ­ g e r o ff th e la n g u ag e -d a n ce . T h is com plication can be easily in c o rp o ­ ra te d in to th e b eh a v io u rist th e o ry by m eans o f th e follow ing ad d itio n s: (1) th e no tio n o f p e rc e p tu a l circum stances can be e x te n d e d to in clu d e p erc ep tio n s w hich co n tin u e to exercise an influ en ce th ro u g h m em ory. (2) H e re too o n e can in tro d u c e th e co n c ep t o f a d isposition an d say: fro m th e m o m e n t o f th e rele v an t p e rc e p tio n th e sp e ak e r is in a c o rre ­

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sp o n d in g d isp o sitio n w hich is only ac tu a liz ed if he en c o u n te rs a p a r tn e r n e e d in g in fo rm a tio n ; th e p a r tn e r is th e n h im se lf a fa c to r th a t b elongs to th e circum stances. T h e co n d itio n a l ru le is now an e x te n d e d situ atio n ru le a n d can be fo rm u la te d so m e th in g like this: if xy was p erceiv ed an d a p a r tn e r P is p erc eiv e d , S is (or in th e n o rm a tiv e fo rm u la tio n : ‘is to b e ’) u tte re d . T h is revised v ersion o f th e b e h a v io u ristic ex p la n a to ry sch em a can easily lead o n e to su p p o se th a t th e lack o f situ a tio n -re la te d n e ss w hich is c h a racteristic o f th e use o f a p red ic ativ e se n te n c e is in p rin cip le n o th in g b u t th e e x te n d e d situ a tio n -re la tio n th a t a lre a d y h o ld s fo r b ee -lan g u a g e, only m u ch m o re com p licated . T h e sp e a k e r n e e d n o t have p erceiv ed th a t th e tow n-hall is on fire; h e m ay h av e in fe rre d it o r le a rn t it fro m so m eo n e else. All th e se possibilities w ould have to be in c o rp o ra te d in th e e x te n d e d situ a tio n -ru le . As in th e case o f th e h e a re r-ru le th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le th re a te n s to b eco m e so co m p licated th a t it ceases to be d e te rm in a te - a n d this in th e case o f so sim ple a sen ten ce as ‘T h e to w n-hall is on fire ’! B ut, you m ay ask, why s h o u ld n ’t a se n ten ce w hich is easy fo r us to u n d e r s ta n d re st u p o n a co m p licated m ech an ism ? H o w ­ ever, we a re n o t e n q u irin g a b o u t a m e ch a n ism u n d e rly in g th e u se o f th e se n ten c e b u t a b o u t th e ru le s o f its u se w hich o n e m u st be able to ex p lain to som eo n e; o th e rw ise we a re n o t e n q u irin g a b o u t m e an in g . B u t we d o n o t n e e d to dw ell on this in d e te rm in a c y a rg u m e n t. T h e thesis th a t th e m e a n in g o f a p re d ic a tiv e se n ten c e can be d efin e d in te rm s o f th e situ atio n o f its use, h o w ev er e x te n d e d , fo u n d e rs fo r r e a ­ sons o f p rin cip le. In o r d e r to show this I w ould like to d raw a tte n tio n to two aspects o f th e use o f p red ic ativ e se n ten ces w hich co n tra d ict th e ac co u n t w hich rela tes use to circu m stan ces. I can b rin g th e se two aspects in to re lie f by se ttin g th e m a g a in st th e tw o ad d itio n s in th e revised v ersion o f th e b eh a v io u ristic th e o ry . T h e se w ere (a) to th e p r e ­ sen t circu m stan ces w ere a d d e d th e p ast circ u m sta n ce s w hich co n tin u e to e x e rt an in flu e n ce th ro u g h th e m e d iu m o f m e m o ry (b) th e p re s e n t circ u m sta n ce w hich calls fo rth th e actu al use o f th e se n ten c e is th e p re s ­ ence o f a p a r tn e r n e e d in g in fo rm a tio n . _ 1. I shall begin w ith th e seco n d o f th e se tw o p o in ts. I t is essen tial to th e view th a t use is d e te rm in e d by circu m stan ces fo r if th e re is no p r e ­ sen t fa c to r w hich calls fo rth th e actual use, th e actu al u se at a p a rtic u la r tim e a n d a p a rtic u la r place w o u ld n o t be g o v e rn e d by th e circu m stan ces at all. B u t now an asserto ric se n te n c e is n o t g o v e rn e d by a ru le w hich ties its use to a specified p a rtn e r-s itu a tio n . E ven if o n e ig n o res th e fact th a t o n e can also significantly u tte r a se n te n c e w ith o u t an a d d re sse e b ein g p re s e n t it is n o n e th e le ss tr u e th a t o n e can u tte r it to any p a r tn e r j

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at any tim e in any place w ith o u t its m e a n in g chan g in g . (T his o f co u rse does n o t apply to sentences w ith deictic ex pression s; it is only la te r th a t 1 shall sp eak a b o u t th ese ex p re ssio n s, w hich in th e co n tex t o f o u r dis­ cussion possess a special significance.) B u t this m eans th e n th a t th e use o f th e se n ten c e is n o t ju s t less situ a tio n -re la te d th a n a signal b u t p o si­ tively situ a tio n -in d e p e n d e n t. It can be re p o r te d on th e rad io , fo r ex a m ­ ple, th a t H e id e lb e rg tow n-hall is on fire, an d som eb o d y so m ew h ere in A laska o r in A fg h a n ista n can tell som e p eo p le, who m ay o r m ay n o t be in te re ste d to h e a r it, ‘H e id e lb e rg tow n-hall is on fire .’ O f co u rse if th e m an in A laska d oes u se this se n te n c e th e re will be ce rtain circum stances in his situ atio n w hich occasion his re p e a tin g of-this sen ten ce; b u t th ese circum stances a re c e rta in m otives a n d in te rests a n d h av e n o th in g to do with th e m e a n in g o f th e se n ten ce. So th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le w hich d e te r ­ m ines th e m e a n in g o f a p red ic ativ e se n ten c e ca n n o t be a co n d itio n al ru le o f w h atev er co n te n t; it c a n n o t be a ru le o f th e fo rm ‘if . . . use se n ten c e “p ” H o w ev er to rec o g n ize th e situ a tio n -in d e p e n d e n c e o f a p red ic ativ e se n ten c e is n o t yet to u n d e rs ta n d it. T h e elu cid atio n o f this p ecu liarity o f p red ic ativ e se n ten c es is in my o p in io n o f decisive im p o r­ tan ce fo r th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e u se o f predicativ e sentences an d o f asserto ric la n g u a g e generally; I will la te r go into this p ro b lem th o r ­ oughly. F o r th e tim e b ein g h o w ev e r I can at m ost claim plausibility for th e thesis th a t it is th e sin g u la r te rm s in pred icativ e sentences w hich m ake possible this situ a tio n -in d e p e n d e n c e . W hat d istin g u ish es th e sen ­ ten ce ‘H e id e lb e rg tow n-hall is o n fire’ fro m th e q u asi-p re d ica te ‘fire’ is th e fact th a t th e sin g u la r te rm h o ld s on to th e p e rc e p tu a l situ atio n , or so m e th in g in it, as iden tical a n d in this way m akes it possible to r e f e r to th e p e rc e p tu a l situ atio n fro m any o th e r situation. T h is re fe re n c e to th e situ atio n fro m a n o th e r situ atio n is so m e th in g fu n d a m e n ta lly d iffe re n t fro m a n e x te n d e d situ a tio n -re la tio n in th e sense o f situ atio n -d e p en d ence. 2. In th e case o f th e e m p lo y m e n t o f a p red icativ e sen ten ce th e re a re n o t only n o p re s e n t circu m stan ces w hich b elong to its m ean in g , th e re a re no past circu m stan ces e ith e r. It m ig h t at first seem th a t alth o u g h th e significant use o f th e se n te n c e ‘H e id e lb e rg tow n-hall is on fire ’ by th e m a n in A laska d id n o t re q u ir e a ca llin g -fo rth fa c to r th a t b elongs to th e m e a n in g it d id re q u ire th e circ u m sta n ce th a t h e h e a rd this se n ten c e on th e rad io . S om e e x p e rie n tia l fo u n d a tio n , even if n o t a p e rc e p tu a l one, seem s to be re q u ire d fo r th e significant use o f th e sentence. H o w ­ ever it is easy to see th a t this assu m p tio n is m istaken. T h e m a n may fro m w h ate v er m o tiv e have g o t it in to his h e a d to sta rt a false ru m o u r. T h is ex a m p le m ay at first a p p e a r so m ew h at artificial. Y ou m ig h t even

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be inclined to say th a t if som eone uses the sen ten ce in this way th e n he is using it in a way th a t is co n tra ry to th e ru le an d th a t uses w hich are co n tra ry to th e ru le do n o t n ee d to be, in d e e d may n o t be, in c lu d ed in th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le . B u t th in k once m o re o f the m an w ho com es in h e re an d cries: ‘T h e tow n-hall is o n fire.’ W e u n d e rs ta n d this sta te m en t im m ediately alth o u g h we do n o t know w hat ex p e rien tial basis th e m an has fo r it; in d e e d we d o n o t know w h e th e r h e has any ex p e rien tial basis at all. N atu rally we will only take his sta te m e n t seriously to the e x te n t th a t we su p p o se it to be w ell-founded. B u t o u r u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e sta te m e n t is in d e p e n d e n t o f w h e th e r we take it seriously o r not. I f we ask ourselves o r ask him w hat a re th e circum stances w hich have occa­ sio ned his u tte ra n c e o f this se n ten ce o r w h at g ro u n d s h e has fo r it we a re p re su p p o sin g th a t fo r him a n d fo r us in d e p e n d e n tly o f these c ir­ cum stances o r g ro u n d s th e m e an in g o f th e sen ten ce is alread y fixed. T h e conclusion is th u s un av o id ab le th a t n o t only th e p re se n t circ u m ­ stances b u t also th e p ast circum stances o f a se n ten c e’s em p lo y m e n t a re com pletely irre le v a n t to th e m e an in g o f th e sentence. In re g a rd to th e first point, th e situ a tio n -in d e p e n d e n c e o f th e em p lo y m e n t o f a p r e ­ dicative sentence, o n e could still su p p o se th a t a co n d itio n al ru le w hich fixes its m e an in g is m erely not sufficient fo r th e actual use o f a p re d ic a ­ tive sentence. It was still conceivable th a t th e re sho u ld be a co n d itio n al ru le w hich fixes th e m e an in g w hich concerns th e sp e a k e r’s p ast circu m ­ stances a n d re p re se n ts at least a necessary co n d itio n o f th e use o f th e p redicative sentence. It has now b ee n show n th a t the m e an in g c a n n o t ' be c o n tain e d in a conditional ru le at all. T h is n egative resu lt raises once m o re th e questio n : w h at sh o u ld be th e d irectio n o f o u r en q u iry into th e m e an in g o f a p red icativ e sentence? I f we ca n n o t c o n stru e th e m e an in g as an object a n d if it does n o t consist in th e circum stances o f use w hat th e n rem ains? In p a rtic u la r you m ay ask: if th e circum stances o f use a re irre le v an t to th e m e an in g th e n m u st we n o t also a b a n d o n th e p resu p p o sitio n th a t to u n d e rsta n d a linguistic ex p ressio n is to know its em p lo y m en t-ru le? B u t to arg u e th u s w ould be to assum e th a t it is only to th e circum stances o f its em p lo y m e n t th a t so m e th in g can be re la te d by its em p lo y m e n t-ru le ; an d th is w ould be a m istake. W h e n I first in tro d u c e d th e question a b o u t use it e m e rg e d th a t w hen we sp eak o f th e use o f so m eth in g it is norm ally so m e th in g th a t has a fu n ctio n (p. 136f). A nd w h en we ask fo r th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f so m e th in g th a t has a fu n ctio n we a re n o t asking u n d e r w h at circ u m ­ stances it is to be u sed b u t how it is to be u se d if o n e wishes to achieve th e p u rp o se fo r w hich it exists. P redicates, it b ecam e clear, have a fu n c ­ tio n , th e fu n c tio n o f characterizin g ; so it is plausible to su p p o se th a t

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on e can also speak o f a fu n ctio n in th e case o f th e w hole sentence. B u t in w hat sh o u ld th e fu n ctio n o f a sentence consist? D oes th e use o f a sen tence have a p u rp o se ? Do we use a se n ten c e with th e in te n tio n o f b rin g in g so m e th in g about? T h is w ould be th e sim plest way o f in te r ­ p re tin g th e idea th a t th e use o f a sentence has a fu n ctio n . T h e em ploym e n t-ru le s o f th e se n ten c e w ould on this view be ru les co n c ern in g how th e sentence is to be used to achieve th e in te n d e d effect; on e can call ru les o f this kind instrumental rules. W e shall th e re fo re have to ex a m in e th e h y pothesis th a t th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f asserto ric sentences a re n o t to be co n stru ed as conditional rules b u t r a th e r as in stru m en tal rules.

LE CTURE

14

T he employment-rule of an assertoric sentence. A rgum ent with Grice and Searle

‘T h e m e a n in g o f a w o rd is w h at th e e x p la n a tio n o f th e m e a n in g e x p lain s.’ I hav e called this d ic tu m o f W ittg e n ste in ’s th e fu n d a m e n ta l p rin cip le o f analytical philo so p h y ; a n d we h av e so fa r seen n o re a so n fo r n o t c o n tin u in g to a d h e r e to it. (In th e last le c tu re it re c e d e d in to th e b a c k g ro u n d inasm u ch as it could n o t fo rm th e basis o f th e b e h a v io u r­ istic version o f th e thesis th a t th e m e a n in g o f an e x p re ssio n is d e te r ­ m in e d by a co n d itio n a l rule. F o r precisely this re a so n how ever I stressed th a t o n e can u n d e r s ta n d th e c o n d itio n a l ru le n o t only as a causal ru le b u t also as a ru le w hich th e p e rso n w ho uses th e sign follow s a n d w hich o n e can th e re fo r e ex p lain . My c ritiq u e o f th e co n d itio n alru le th e o ry was n o t specially d ire c te d a g a in st its causal v ersio n a n d can th e re fo re also be u n d e rs to o d as a c ritiq u e o f a th e o ry w hich takes W itt­ g e n ste in ’s p rin c ip le as its basis.) F u rth e rm o re it still seem s trivial to say th a t to ex p lain th e m e a n in g of an e x p re ssio n can only b e to ex p lain th e r u le o f its em p lo y m e n t. I b eg an th e analysis ö f th e m e an in g o f p re d ic a tiv e se n ten c es with th e e n q u iry in to th e m e a n in g o f p red ic ate s. T h e se q u en c e was as follows: in analysing th e p red ic ativ e se n te n c e it se e m e d n a tu ra l to sta rt w ith p red ic ate s b ecause it was this p a r t o f th e p re d ic a tiv e se n te n c e on w hich th e o b je c t-o rie n ta te d co n cep tio n o f th e m e a n in g o f p red ic ativ e se n ­ tences fo u n d e re d . In th e m e a n tim e a se co n d rea so n fo r this o r d e r o f p ro c e e d in g , a n d on e m o re closely re la te d to th e m a tte r in h a n d , has beco m e a p p a re n t. I f u n lik e the o b je c t-o rie n ta te d p h ilo s o p h e r o n e starts n o t with re p re s e n ta tio n s b u t w ith m o d es o f b e h a v io u r a n d if f u r th e r ­ m o re o n e takes into ac co u n t la n g u ag e s m o re p rim itiv e th a n sen ten cela n g u ag e , th e n it becom es clear th a t c h a ra c te riz a tio n -e x p re ssio n s a re th e linguistic ex p ressio n s which a r e th e easiest to u n d e rs ta n d . P re d i­ cates have a p re -fo rm w hich I h av e called q u a si-p re d ic a te s an d w hich a lre ad y fu n c tio n as in d e p e n d e n t e x p re ssio n s, h en c e d o n o t re q u ire to

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be s u p p le m e n te d by sin g u la r term s. T h e ir ex p lan a tio n is u n p r o b ­ lem atic fo r it is achieved by m eans o f exam ples by sim ple assig n m en t to p a rtic u la r circu m stan ces (perceived by the sign-u ser o r to be b ro u g h t a b o u t by th e recipient). In the last lecture I d id n ot d irectly re fe r to signals as q u asi-p re d ica tes, fo r I w ished to avoid con fu sio n in th e ex a m ­ in a tio n o f th e q u estio n o f w h eth e r predicative sentences can be co n ­ s tru e d as signals. B u t su b seq u en tly th e re is no reaso n fo r n o t also calling signals qu asi-p red icates. O n e can th u s th in k o f p red ic ativ e sentences as arising o u t o f quasi­ p red ic ate s th r o u g h th e a d d itio n o f sin g u lar term s. T h e analysis o f sin ­ g u la r term s w hich to th e o b je ct-o rien tated p h ilo so p h e r a p p e a re d so u n p ro b le m a tic co n stitu tes fo r th e b e h a v io u r-o rie n ta te d a p p ro a c h th e ; rea l cru x in th e analysis o f th e sem antics o f pred icativ e sentences. It is th e sin g u lar te rm s by m ean s o f w hich - as I have so far only b ee n able to su ggest - th e use o f pred icativ e sentences becom es situ atio n -in d e­ p e n d e n t. N ow it is becau se p red ic ate s, th o u g h close to quasi-p red icates, are n o t q u asi-p re d ica tes (for th ey a re essentially incom p lete ex p ressio n s an d this is so m e th in g th a t w ould also have to be em b o d ied in th e ir em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le ) th a t my first account« o f th e way in which p red icates a re e x p la in e d f o u n d e re d (p. 160). T h is account p ro ce ed ed in accordance w ith th e m o d el a p p r o p r ia te to quasi-predicates: to ex p lain an ex p re s­ sion is to show in w hich circu m stan ces it is to be used. T h is m odel, h o w ever, h a d to be fu n d a m e n ta lly criticized. It h a d to be show n th a t it is useless n o t only fo r th e ex p la n a tio n o f predicates b u t also fo r th a t o f w hole sentences. Since this has b een d o n e in th e last le ctu re we could r e tu r n to th e discussion o f p red icates. A nd ac co rd in g to w h at has ju s t b e e n said a satisfactory ac co u n t o f th e ex p lan a tio n o f p red icates w ould now at th e sam e tim e have to in clu d e th e ex p lan a tio n o f sin g u lar term s. N ow th e c o m b in ed analysis o f th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f p red icates an d sin g u la r te rm s is sim ply th e analysis o f th e pred icativ e sen ten ce in its p red ic ativ e s tru c tu re . I f p red icates a n d singular term s a re expressions w hich essentially co m p lete each o th e r th e n th e ir m e an in g can only co n ­ sist in th e c o n trib u tio n w hich each o f these types o f ex p ressio n m akes to th e m e a n in g o f th e w hole sentence. B u t if this is so th e n it w ould be advisable b e fo re sta rtin g th e discussion o f the tw o se n ten ce-co m p o n en ts to achieve a t least a p r e lim in a ry ‘co n cep tio n (Vorbegriff) o f th e em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le o f th e w hole sentence. Since th e objectual a p p ro a c h (which a ro se fro m a o n e-sid e d co n c ern with sin g u lar term s) an d now th e thesis th a t m e a n in g consists in th e circu m stan ces o f em p lo y m e n t (which arose fro m a o n e-sid e d co n c ern w ith signal-signs fu n ctio n in g like p red icates

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m ade in d e p e n d e n t) a re to be re g a rd e d as having fo u n d e re d we at p re ­ sen t lack a positive perspective th a t could guide an analysis o f p re d i­ cates a n d sin g u lar term s. A n d since o u r aim in th e co u n ter-m o v e to those one-sided ap p ro a ch es is to u n d e rs ta n d both p red icates a n d sin­ g u la r term s in th e ir m utually su p p le m e n tin g fu n ctio n we can only ex p ect to find such a g u id in g -p e rsp e ctiv e in th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le of th e w hole sentence. O f cou rse if we sh o u ld be able to discover som e­ th in g a b o u t its use as a senten ce before th e elucidatio n o f th e sentenceco m p o n en ts a n d hen ce o f th e stru c tu re o f th e p red icativ e sentence, th e n obviously this can only co n cern th e sentence as an asserto ric sen­ tence in gen eral, n o t as a predicative sentence. A n d if th e pred icativ e se n ten ce-fo rm is th e m ost elem en tary se n ten c e-fo rm , to w hich all o th e r form s, as h igher-level form s, re fe r back, th e n w hat we can find o u t ab o u t th e use o f th e assertoric sentence in gen eral b efo re th e analysis o f th e p redicative stru c tu re can only be re g a rd e d as a provisional account which can itself only becom e fully intelligible later th ro u g h the analysis o f th e p red icative stru c tu re . In an investigation such as th e p re ­ sent o n e an are a has first to be o p en e d u p ; o n e is n o t sim ply d escrib in g o n e th a t is already know n. C onsequently such going to a n d fro is h ard ly to be avoided. T h e question o f how th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an assertoric sen ten ce is positively to be u n d e rsto o d was raised at the e n d o f th e last lectu re, a fte r we h a d a rriv e d at th e negative resu lt th a t it ca n n o t be u n d e rsto o d as a conditional rule. O u r only reliable g u id e in this q u est is th e p rin ci­ ple th a t we can only c o u n t as th e m e an in g o f a sen ten ce th at o f w hich o ne can significantly say th a t we explain it w hen we ex p lain to so m eo n e how th e sentence is to be used. T h e ex p lan atio n , we saw, is n o t achieved by giving exam ples o f th e em p lo y m e n t o f th e sen ten ce in p a rtic u la r circum stances. N ow if th e p re se n t circum stances h av e n o th in g to do with th e m e an in g o f th e asserto ric senten ce th en th e ad d re ssee o f th e in fo rm a tio n is th e only elem e n t p re se n t in th e situ atio n th a t could have so m eth in g to do with the m e an in g o f th e sentence. C o u ld it be th a t th e em p lo y m en t-ru les we are seeking are ru les which som ehow rela te th e em p lo y m en t o f th e sentence to th e ad d ressee? I f so th e n this clearly ca n n o t be in such a way th a t th e ad d re ssee is u n d e rsto o d sim ply as a trig g e rin g -fac to r, for, as we have seen, if this w ere hisTuncti'on, th e n he w ould m erely be a n o th e r item in the circum stances. B ut how else is th e rela tio n o f th e use o f th e senten ce to th e ad d re ssee to be u n d e rsto o d ? I f th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le in which th e m e an in g is su p ­ posed to reside does no t rela te th e em p lo y m en t o f an asserto ric sen ­ tence to so m eth in g given (the p re se n t a n d past circum stances) a n d if

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m o reo v er we wish to avoid relatin g it to so m eth in g in w ard ly r e p r e ­ sen ted , th e n th e only th in g left is to relate it to certain consequences o f th e se n ten c e’s em ploym ent. A nd th e sim plest way to co n stru e this w ould be as follows: th e em p lo y m en t-ru le o f th e sen ten ce relates to a purpose, to an intended effect. T h e relatio n betw een th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le an d th e p a r tn e r w ould th e n be this: w hen we say so m e th in g to so m eo n e we th ereby in te n d to b rin g so m eth in g about in him . I am th u s taking u p the suggestion m a d e at th e en d o f the last lectu re th a t o n e sh o u ld tak e as o n e ’s sta rtin g -p o in t th e fact th a t linguistic expressions have a fu n ctio n an d en q u ire w h eth e r th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le w hich we explain w h en we ex p lain th e m e an in g co u ld be co n stru e d as an instrumental rule. B ut first we m ust dispose o f a m isu n d ersta n d in g . T h e qu estio n o f w h eth e r th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an assertoric senten ce relates to a p u r ­ pose sho u ld n o t be co n fu se d with th e trivial q u estio n o f w h e th e r we use sentences to achieve p u rp o ses. T h a t by u tte rin g a sen ten ce we n o rm ally in te n d to b rin g so m e th in g ab o u t is trivially tr u e - b u t we can in te n d to b rin g a b o u t all sorts o f things so it ca n n o t be this which d e te rm in e s th e m eaning o f th e sentence. As well as using a h a m m e r fo r th e p u rp o se fo r w hich it exists we can also use it for various o th e r p u rp o ses; an d even w hen we use it f o r t h e p u rp o se fo r w hich it ex ists,,in its ow n p r o p e r fu n ctio n , we d o so in o rd e r to achieve various o th e r p u rp o ses. A n d we can also use a sto n e for all sorts o f p u rp o ses, a lth o u g h in itself it has no function. So w hen we ask w h eth e r th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le o f sentences relates to a p u rp o se we a re not asking w h eth er we use th e m fo r p u rposes: R ather we a re asking w h eth e r a sen ten ce has a s ta n d a rd p u rp o se, in th e way th a t a h a m m e r has an d a sto n e has n o t an d w h eth e r this sta n d a rd p u rp o se is w hat we explain w hen we ex p lain its m eaning. O ne possible way o f rela tin g th e m eaning o f a sen ten ce to an effect in the ad d re ssee w hich th e sen ten ce-u ser in te n d s w ould be this: th e sentence is used to b rin g ab o u t a p articu la r action o r action-disposition o f th e p a rtn e r. T his conception w ould be very close to th e con cep tio n , re fu te d in th e last le ctu re, th a t th e h e a re r u n d e rsta n d s th e sen ten ce if h e resp o n d s to it by acting in a p articu la r way. T h e p re se n t suggestion is - at least as re g a rd s assertoric sentences - like th e p rev io u s o n e a n d , fo r th e sam e reasons, u n ten ab le. T h e actions we; can in te n d to p ro d u c e in a p a rtn e r with an assertoric sentence a re so m u ltifario u s th a t they can n o t d e te rm in e its m eaning. So this possibility is excluded. I f th e re is any q u estio n at all o f an in te n d e d effect on th e p a rtn e r d e te rm in in g th e m e an in g th e n it can only be a disposition w hich co rresp o n d s to th e indicative sense o f th e

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asserto ric se n ten ce. O n e could say: th e use o f an asserto ric se n ten ce th a t is to say th e sta te m e n t - has th e fun ctio n o f in fo rm in g th a t so m e­ th in g is th e case. A n d o n e could r e n d e r this m o re precisely by saying: if so m eo n e, vis-ä-vis a p a r tn e r, uses an asserto ric sen ten ce *p’, h e in te n d s to b rin g it a b o u t th a t th e p a r tn e r hold s ‘p ’ to be tru e , o r, in a n o th e r fo rm u la tio n , th a t h e believes th a t p. B u ild in g o n this thesis, a n d a c o r­ re s p o n d in g o n e fo r im peratives, H . P. G rice, in an in flu en tial p a p e r ,1 d ev e lo p e d a th e o ry a b o u t w hat it is to mean so m e th in g w ith a sign. W e m u st sharp ly d istin g u ish th e two m e an in g s o f th e G erm a n w o rd 'meinen’ w hich play a ro le in G rice’s th eo ry a n d fo r w hich in E nglish th e re are tw o d iffe re n t w ord s: (1) to m ean so m e th in g w ith a sign: E nglish: ‘m e a n ’, F re n ch : ‘vouloir dire’ (in G e rm a n too in stead o f £was meinst du ' damit?’ we can equally well ask ‘was willst du damit sagen?’) (2) to believe th a t so m e th in g is th e case, hold so m e th in g to be tru e . T h e fu n d a m e n ta l im p o rta n c e fo r sem antics o f ‘m e a n in g ’ in th e sense o f vouloir dire becom es clear w hen o n e realizes th a t th e action w hich so m e o n e p e r ­ fo rm s w hen he uses a se n ten c e consists in m e a n in g som ething-w ith th e sen ten ce; a n d o n e can now also u n d e rs ta n d th e ‘u n d e r s ta n d in g ’ o f th e h e a r e r as a c o n c ep t co rrelativ e to this m e a n in g (Meinen): th e h e a re r u n d e rs ta n d s w h at th e sp e a k e r m eans. A ccordingly w hat is u n d e rsto o d is n o t th e sign b u t th e actio n o f th e sp e a k e r or, b e tte r, w hat is d o n e w ith th e sign. G rice’s p ro g ra m m e consists in a tte m p tin g to c o n stru c t th e co n ­ c e p t o f th e m e a n in g (sense) or u n d e rs ta n d in g o f linguistic ex p ressio n s o n th e basis o f th e c o n c e p t o f m e a n in g (vouloir dire). P reviously I said th a t th e fu n ctio n o f th e asserto ric se n ten c e can be u n d e rs to o d as in fo rm in g (Mitteilen). O n e could now b u ild th e co n c ep t o f in fo rm in g in to th e G ricean co n cep tu ality by saying: in fo rm in g is a special case o f m e a n in g (Meinen) nam ely th a t w hich consists in th e e m p lo y m e n t o f an asserto ric senten ce. N ow G rice shows t h a t w hen o n e d o es so m e th in g with th e in te n tio n o f b rin g in g it ab o u t th a t o n e ’s p a r t­ n e r believes so m e th in g this ca n n o t always be u n d e rs to o d as in fo rm in g o r as m e a n in g (in th e sense o f vouloir dire). F o r ex am p le, in o r d e r to b rin g it a b o u t th a t a p e rso n believes so m e th in g o n e can g et th e p e rso n in to th e a p p ro p ria te p e rc e p tu a l situ atio n o r o n e can see to it th a t h e perceives a sy m p to m (Anzeichen) o f its being th e case. A sym p to m is a so-called n a tu ra l sign, a state o f affairs w hose existence enables o n e to in fe r th e existen ce o f a n o th e r state o f affairs. W h e n I p o in t o u t to so m e ­ o n e th e p a w -p rin t o f a b e a r this can have th e significance th a t I in te n d to b rin g it a b o u t th a t h e believes th a t a b e a r is in th e vicinity; b u t such an act is n o t in fo rm in g . G rice show s th a t we can only sp eak o f in fo rm ­ in g or, m o re generally, o f m e a n in g (vouloir dire) if o n e in te n d s, in a

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particular way, to b rin g it a b o u t th a t o n e ’s p a rtn e r believes that/?, nam ely in such a way th a t th e p a r tn e r (1) recognizes th e in te n tio n an d (2) th e recognizing o f th e in te n tio n is fo r him th e g ro u n d fo r th e fo rm atio n o f th e belief. F o r o u r p u rp o se s how ever we can ig n o re th ese refin em en ts, fo r w hat has first got to be d ec id e d is w h eth e r it is at all co rrect to say th a t so m eo n e who, vis-a-vis a p a rtn e r, uses an assertoric sen ten ce ‘p ’ always th e re b y in ten d s - in w hatever m o re precisely d efinable way - to b rin g it a b o u t th a t th e p a rtn e r believes that/?. A lth o u g h this is certainly m ost o fte n th e case, it is n o t always th e case. A pupil, fo r exam ple, w ho answ ers th e te a c h e r’s q u estio n does n o t in te n d to in fo rm th e teach er. O r if A u tte rs, vis-ä-vis B, an assertoric sen ten ce ‘p \ know ing th a t # is convinced o f th e opposite, h e clearly does n o t d o so in o r d e r to b rin g it a b o u t t h a t # believes that/?. G rice him self, in a later p a p e r ,2 a b a n d o n e d his th e o ry fo r ju s t such reasons; how ever h e c o n tin u e d to h old th a t th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an assertoric se n ­ te n ce consists in its b ein g used to b rin g it a b o u t th a t a p a r tn e r believes so m ething. A ccording to th e new theo ry : w hen A uses, vis-ä-vis B, an assertoric se n ten c e *p\ th e n he in te n d s (in th e m o re precisely d efin ed way) to b rin g it ab o u t t h a t # believes th a t A believes th a t/? .3 T h is sta te m e n t seem s to m e to be correct. W h en I u tte r, vis-ä-vis so m eone, an assertoric sentence ‘p ’ I d o n o t necessarily in te n d to b rin g it a b o u t th a t he believes th a t p; b u t I d o necessarily in te n d to b rin g it ab o u t th a t he believes th a t I believe th a t p (even if I’m lying I in te n d to b rin g it a b o u t th a t he believes th a t I believe that/?). H ow ever, it does n o t follow fro m th e correctn ess o f this statem en t th a t th e in te n tio n to w hich it refers is th e p rim a ry in te n tio n co n n ected w ith th e use o f an assertoric sentence, o r th a t this is th e fu n ctio n o f th e sentence. It is conceivable th a t this in te n tio n is m erely a conseq u en ce o f th e p rim a ry in te n tio n w ith which an assertoric sentence is used an d by re fe re n c e to w hich its fu n c tio n is to be u n d e rsto o d . B ut above all it does n o t follow fro m th e co rrectn ess o f th a t sta te m en t th a t th e m ean in g o f th e sen ten ce is co n tain e d in th e fu n ctio n o f an assertoric sen ten ce as this is h e re d efin ed . I shall deal only with this last p o in t w hich fo r us is th e m ain one. I f we ap p ly W ittg e n stein ’s p rin cip le to G rice’s suggestion th en we w ould explain to so m eo n e th e m e a n in g o f an asserto ric sen ten ce ‘/?’ by telling him th a t it is used to b rin g it ab o u t th a t a h e a re r believes th at th e sp e a k e r believes th a t p. O n e w ould th u s explain th e m e an in g o f th e se n ten c e ‘p ’ by m eans o f a lo n g e r se n ten c e ‘q’ w hich contains th e e x p re s­ sion ‘th a t/? ’ as a p art. T o this it can be objected, firstly, th a t *q’ is clearly n o t synonym ous with ’/?’; an d , secondly, th a t o n e c a n n o t u n d e rsta n d

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such an ex p lan a tio n unless one already u n d e rsta n d s th e m ean in g o f ‘th a t p ’ an d h en ce the m e an in g o f B ut even if we w ould o r could explain, in a p articu la r case, th e m ean ­ ing o f a sen ten ce in this way this w ould not be a possible basis for a th e o ry o f m ean in g , at least not if th e latter re g a rd s itself as fu n d a m e n ­ tal, thus in explaining th e m ean in g o f sentences is n o t co n te n t to p re ­ su p p o se th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f c o rresp o n d in g sentences in an o th e r lan­ gu age, a so-called m eta-language. T h e re a re various types o f such circu lar m eta-linguistic theories o f m eaning. W h at distinguishes the G ricean th eo ry fro m th e o thers is th a t it n o t only p resu p p o ses th a t th e m e an in g -th e o rist u n d e rsta n d s m eta-linguistic sentences b u t also th at he alread y know s w hat it is to believe that p. B ut this is to p re su p p o se every­ th in g th a t is to be explained. G rice’s th e o ry does n o t o ffe r an alternative to th e a p p ro a c h which has reco u rse to ideas a n d the behaviouristic ap p ro a ch ; it sim ply leaves th e p ro b lem open. I do not wish to suggest th a t G rice’s p roposal is w orthless. H ow ever, th e im p o rta n ce o f his co n trib u tio n lies elsew here. G rice attem p ts p r e ­ cisely to defin e a com prehensive con cep t o f m e an in g (in th e sense o f vouloir dire) w hich goes b eyond m e an in g in sentences an d also em braces signals, those nam ely w hich are n o t to be u n d e rsto o d causally, b u t o f w hich o ne can say th a t so m eth in g is signified by them . I believe th a t such a use o f signals only occurs w h ere the basic lan g u ag e o f those who u se th e signals is already a sentence-language. In th e case o f signals o f this kind it is in d e e d tru e th a t they a re ex plained in th e way envisaged by Grice. T o ap p eal to a sentence ‘q’ which p resu p p o ses th e u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f a sentence in exp lain in g a signal x is n o t circular. B u t precisely because G rice’s concept o f m ean in g {vouloir dire) is so co m p re­ hensive, h e can n o t, as we shall see, c a p tu re w hat is specific to assertoric speech. Finally, 1 w ould like to m ention o n e m o re difficulty. Even if we re g a rd th e intersubjective em p lo y m en t o f sentences as basic, n o th eo ry o f m e an in g can be satisfactory which does n o t allow fo r th e fact th at we can also use assertoric sentences, an d with no chan g e o f m e an in g , w hen talking to oneself. So if my suggestion th a t the em p lo y m e n t-ru le is to be u n d e rsto o d as som ehow related to th e ad d re ssee is to w ork th en this can only be if th e role o f th e ad d re ssee can also be in tern alized . B u t in G rice’s th eo ry this is no t so. It w ould be ab su rd to suppose th a t w hen I say som eth in g to m yself I in te n d to b rin g it ab o u t th a t I believe th a t I believe th at so m eth in g is th e case. W h en one speaks to o n eself one is clearly no t try in g to b rin g som ething about. N onetheless it does seem th a t one uses th e linguistic sign to som e end, th a t it has a fu nction.

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T h is w ould su ggest th a t we should c o n tin u e to be g u id e d by th e id ea th a t th e se n ten c e has a sta n d a rd p u rp o se , i.e. a fu n ctio n , b u t th a t th e fu n ctio n does n o t relate to th e p ro d u c tio n o f an effect. Is this conceiv­ able? In any ev e n t ev e ry th in g seem s to fav o u r a b a n d o n in g th e sugges­ tion th a t we sh o u ld rela te th e m e a n in g o f asserto ric sen ten ces to an in te n d e d effect a n d in te r p re t th e ir em p lo y m e n t-ru le s as in stru m e n ta l ru les. P e rh a p s th e re is a n o th e r way o f u n d e rs ta n d in g th e fu n ctio n o f a sen tence; an d p e rh a p s th e re is a way o f rela tin g th e em p lo y m en t-ru les to th e ad d re sse e which does n o t involve re g a rd in g th e la tte r as th e object o f an in te n d e d effect. A bove all we m u st sta rt at a m uch low er level a n d n o t o p e ra te fro m th e o u tse t with such high-level w ords as ‘believe’ a n d suchlike. T h a t th e p rim a ry effect o f an asserto ric sen ten ce o n an a d d re sse e is n o t an action b u t a belief is so m e th in g w hich, if correct, itself re q u ire s to be ex p lain e d . I f in seeking to u n d e rs ta n d th e w ord ‘believe’ we d o n o t wish to re s o rt once m o re to in te rn a l re p re se n ta tio n s th e n we m u st be clear th a t outsid e th e use o f sentences th e re a re no actions o r action-dispositions th a t o ne can sim ply d escribe as th e ex p ressio n o f a belief. I t is tru e th a t we speak o f th e actions o f in tellig en t anim als as being d e te rm in e d by beliefs a n d in te n tio n s. F o r exam ple, th e cat ru n s tow ards th e sp o t b ecause it believes th a t th e re is so m e th in g th e re th a t has th e p ro p e rtie s x y w hich it can perceive and because it desires th in g s which h av e these p ro p e rtie s. T h e in te n tio n a l action is th e exp ressio n o f a b elief and a d esire; b u t th e re a re no actions o u tsid e th e use o f asserto ric sentences in w hich a belief-disposition could m an ifest itself in d e p e n d e n tly a n d n o t as a m e re co m p o n en t. T h a t th e cognitive a n d th e v o lu n tativ e factors are co n tra ste d w ith one a n o th e r at all in behaviour seem s th u s to be a co n sequence o f th e use of, on th e o n e h an d , assertoric, an d , on th e o th e r h a n d , im p e rativ e a n d in te n tio n a l sentences; b u t, if this is so, th e n we c a n n o t m ak e use o f th e con cep t o f belief in ex p lain in g th e m o d e o f em p lo y m e n t o f an asserto ric sentence. In ste a d o f p re su p p o sin g th a t only a belief can c o rre sp o n d - in w h at­ ev er m o re precisely d efin ab le way - to an assertoric sentence, we sh o u ld sta rt with th e actual m odes o f b e h a v io u r with w hich an ad d re ssee re sp o n d s to th e u tte ra n c e o f an assertoric sentence. W hat d istin g u ish es th e p a r tn e r ’s re sp o n se to an assertoric sentence fro m th e resp o n se to a signal is not th a t th e p a r tn e r does n o t re sp o n d - b u t only believes so m e­ th in g - b u t r a th e r th a t th e only actions o f th e h e a r e r w hich a re rela ted in a ru le -g o v e rn e d way to th e sta te m e n t o f th e sp e a k e r a re them selves speech-acts a n d consist in th e use o f a linguistic ex p ressio n . T w o lin ­ guistic resp o n ses to a sta te m e n t th a t a re always possible a re th e u tte r ­

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ances ‘yes’ an d ‘n o ’. E q u iv a len t to th e se a re th e re p e titio n o r d en ial o f th e sta te m e n t, likew ise th e u tte ra n c e s ‘t h a t p is t r u e ’ a n d ‘t h a t p is false’. C learly ‘n o ’ a n d ‘yes’ a re n o t ju s t two possible resp o n se s, r a th e r they b elo n g to g e th e r: th e h e a r e r can an sw e r w ith ‘yes’ or ‘n o ’. In this ‘ca n ’ is g r o u n d e d every o th e r linguistic re sp o n se to th e u tte ra n c e o f th e sp e a k e r (a) in th e sense th a t th e re a re o th e r p o sitio n -tak in g s a n d equally th e possibility o f ab stain in g fro m ta k in g a p o sitio n a n d th ese possible re sp o n se s a re all g r o u n d e d in th e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f th e yes/no a lte rn a ­ tive (b) in th e sen se th a t every o th e r linguistic re sp o n se w hich can be r e g a rd e d as a re p ly to th e s p e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e p re su p p o se s explicitly o r im plicitly o n e o f th e p osition-takings. B u t if you th in k th a t in saying this I am alread y a sse rtin g to o m u ch it d o e s n ’t m a tte r; it is e n o u g h if you a d m it th a t th e h e a r e r can always rep ly w ith ‘n o ’ o r ‘yes’. H ow can a th e o ry such as th a t o f G rice a c co m m o d ate such facts? T h e ‘yes’ reactio n co u ld be a c c o m m o d a te d relatively easily: th e h e a re r th e re b y m akes it know n, o n e m ig h t say, th a t h e accep ts th e b elief o f th e sp e ak e r. B u t w h at ab o u t ‘n o ’? C learly o n e c a n n o t say th a t th e h e a r e r is th e re b y m ak in g it know n th a t h e d o es n o t a c ce p t th e b elief o f th e sp e ak e r. I f h e says ‘n o ’ this d oes n o t m e a n th a t h e do es n o t believe th a t so m e th in g is th e case b u t th a t h e positively believes th a t so m e th in g is n o t th e case. S hall we th e n say th a t so m e o n e w ho rep lies with ‘n o ’ th e re b y m akes it know n th a t h e believes th e o p p o site o f w h at th e sp e a k e r believes? B u t th e n h e a r e r a n d sp e a k e r w ould n o t be c o n tra ­ d ic tin g o n e a n o th e r. T h e tw o se n ten c es ‘A believes th a t p ’ a n d ‘B believes th a t n o t-p’ d o n o t c o n tra d ic t each o th e r; a n d o f c o u rse this is eq u ally tr u e o f th e sen ten ces A in te n d s to b rin g it a b o u t t h a t # believes th a t A believes that/> ’ an d *B in te n d s to b rin g it a b o u t th a t A believes th a t B believes th a t not-^>.’ W e have now a first im p o rta n t clue to th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f an a sserto ric se n ten ce. W e m u st first clarify w h at it is th a t so m e o n e is d o in g w ho uses an asserto ric se n te n c e if th e p e rso n to w hom he speaks can re s p o n d to it w ith ‘n o ’ a n d this u tte ra n c e is to be u n d e rs to o d in such a way th a t th e h e a r e r is c o n tra d ic tin g th e sp e ak e r. I f w hat th e sp e a k e r is d o in g is to be in te r p re te d as try in g to b rin g so m e th in g a b o u t th e n it re m a in s u n in te llig ib le w hat it is th a t th e h e a r e r is co n tra d ic tin g o r w hat it is th a t is d e n ie d o r affirm e d by th e h e a re r. I f we ask ourselves w ith o u t p re c o n c e p tio n s w h at is it th a t is d e n ie d by th e h e a r e r th e an sw e r is th a t clearly it is th a t w hich th e sp e a k e r a sserte d . W e w ould now have a new h y p o th e sis as to w h at th e actio n o f th e sp e a k e r a n d th e fu n ctio n o f th e se n te n c e consist in; w h at th e sp e a k e r is d o in g w hen h e uses an asserto ric se n te n c e is asserting so m e th in g an d

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th e fu n c tio n o f th e sen ten ce consists in its being u sed to assert so m e­ th in g o r to m ake an assertion. B ut o f course this im m ediately raises th e question: w hat does it m ean to assert so m ething? W e have alread y seen in th e provisional c h a ra c te r­ ization o f assertoric sentences in th e in tro d u c tio n th a t th e assertio n of a sen ten ce ‘p ’ contains a tru th -claim ; th a t it is asserted th a t it is tr u e th a t p. B ut we ca n n o t be co n te n t with such explanations. T h e q u estion is: if th e fu n ctio n of th e se n ten c e is so d efin ed th e n how a re the em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le s o f th e se n ten c e to be u n d ersto o d ? N egatively we can say: w hen^f asserts th a t p this is an act, so m eth in g he does, b u t co n tra ry to G rice’s way o f d efin in g th e speech-act - th e em p lo y m en t o f th e sign this is n o t an act th a t can be d efin e d as b ringing , o r try in g to b rin g , so m eth in g about. A ccordingly we can also say o f th e sign, the assertoric sen tence, th a t th e p u rp o se fo r w hich it is used is sim ply th e act itself, th e assertion. In th e case o f an action th a t is d irec ted tow ards an effect on e first d eterm in e s th e in te n d e d effect; a n d th e n by m eans o f this one defines th e action. O n e can th e n ask fo r th e ru le which th e action - o r th e em p lo y m e n t o f m ean s - m u st follow in o rd e r to achieve th e p u rp o se. In th e case o f an action w hich contains its p u rp o se in itself this division in to two stages does n o t apply. As th e assertion-act is n o t d efin ed by re fe re n c e to an in te n d e d effect it can only be defined by th e actio n -ru le itself (which o f co u rse is always to be u n d e rsto o d as th e em ploym entru le o f th e sign) a n d again this m eans th a t th e em p lo y m en t-ru les are n o t to be co n stru e d as in stru m e n ta l rules. As Searle has show n,4 th e rules m u st b e rules th a t are co nstitutive o f an action. B u t now w hat so rt o f rules a re they? T h e thesis th a t th e g e n u in e speech-act, th e act w hich Grice called m e an in g (in th e sense o f vouloir dire), is n o t to be defin ed in term s o f th e in te n tio n o f p ro d u c in g an effect o rig in ates fro m J. L. A ustin. A ustin d istinguishes th re e acts w hich a re p e rfo rm e d in u sing a se n ten ce.5 T o speak o f d iffe re n t acts w hich a re fo u n d e d in o n e a n o th e r is sta n d a rd in ac tio n -th eo ry an d co rre sp o n d s to o u r o rd in a ry way o f speaking. It derives fro m th e fact th a t an act is d efin ed by th e in te n tio n which gov­ ern s it, by its p u rp o se , a n d th a t bodily acts are p e rfo rm e d in o r d e r to achieve so m eth in g , in o r d e r to achieve so m e th in g f u rth e r , etc. T h u s en d s a re p u rs u e d w hich in tu rn a re in te n d e d as m eans to f u rth e r ends. F o r ex am p le I p e rfo rm a ce rtain h a n d -m o v e m e n t on th e w indow catch in o r d e r to o p en th e w indow , in o rd e r to let fresh air in. A nd this m eans: I let fresh air in (act C) by o p e n in g th e window (a c t# ) an d I do this by m oving my h a n d in a p a rtic u la r way (act A). O f co u rse w h eth e r

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it is correct to speak h e re o f several acts ra th e r th an several ways of d escribing o ne an d th e sam e act is d isp u ted in actio n -th eo ry :6 b u t we do n o t n ee d to b o th e r ab o u t this here. Back now to speech-acts. A ccording to A ustin we are to distinguish (1) th elocutionary act, th e u tte ra n c e o f certain stru c tu re d sounds (2) th e illocutionary act, th e m e an in g (in th e sense o f vouloir dire), th u s in o u r case the asserting; th e relation betw een these two acts is such th at on e can say: h e u tte rs th e sentence ‘p y in o rd e r to assert th a t p o r a lte rn a ­ tively: he asserts that/? by u tte rin g o r em ploying th e sen ten ce ‘p ’ an d (3) th e perlocutionary act, th a t act o r those acts which in te n d effects an d w hich one seeks to achieve by m eans o f th e illocutionary act e.g. ‘he asserts th a t p in o rd e r to convince th e p a r tn e r ’ (in o rd e r to b rin g it a b o u t th a t th e p a rtn e r believes th a t p)\ o r p u ttin g it th e o th e r way ro u n d : ‘he seeks to convince the p a rtn e r by assertin g th a t p ’.7 A ustin ’s co n trib u tio n consists in having h ig h lig h ted th e illocutionary act as a distinct act o r act-description, an d th e sem antically relev an t o n e, as against th e perlocutionary act tow ards which G rice’s th e o ry is o rie n ­ tated. A u stin ’s line o f th o u g h t, th e central concern o f w hich lay else­ w h ere (tho u g h I n ee d n o t go into this here), has subsequently b ee n d eveloped as a th eo ry o f m eaning by A lston an d S earle;8 b u t in n e ith e r o f these a u th o rs do we find a satisfactory characterizatio n o f th e em ploym ent-rules o f this act.9 S earle, it is tru e , has co n stru cted a w hole system o f rules in g ra n d style an d in th e process has p ro d u c e d a n u m ­ b er o f ideas which can serve as guidelines; these how ever have rem a in ed u n d ev e lo p e d . T h u s h e gives the follow ing rules fo r th e illo­ cu tionary act o f assertion, and h en c e for th e em p lo y m en t o f an asser­ to ric sentence: (1) th a t an assertoric sentence fp* is only to be used w hen th e sp eaker believes th a tp an d (2) th a t th e em p lo y m en t o f this sentence ‘counts as an u n d e rta k in g to the effect that/? rep rese n ts an actual state o f affairs’.10 H ow ever, it is n o t clear, n o r does S earle ex p lain , w hat h e m eans by ‘u n d e rta k in g to th e effect th a t’. F u rth e rm o re it is n o w h ere show n w hat th e connection is betw een these two rules - w hich S earle calls the ‘sincerity ru le ’ an d th e ‘essential ru le ’.11 So it rem ain s u n clea r w h eth e r these a re two in d e p e n d e n t conditions which m u st b o th be fu l­ filled or w h e th e r th e o n e is th e consequence o f th e o th er. I shall re tu r n to this difficulty later (p. 214ff) a n d fo r th e p re se n t confine my a tte n ­ tio n to the ru le w hich S earle obviously reg ard s as th e fu n d a m e n ta l o n e: th e ‘essential r u le ’. I shall deal w ith th e first p a r t o f S earle’s fo rm u latio n o f this rule - ‘an u n d e rta k in g to th e effect th a t . . .’ - la ter (p. 199); it m u st som ehow co n cern th e ac t-ch aracter o f assertion. It is th e second p a rt o f th e fo rm u latio n (‘th a t p rep rese n ts an actual

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state o f a ffairs’) th a t is crucial. T h is ex p lan a tio n , you will perceive, rem ains com pletely em pty, fo r in it ev e ry th in g th a t sh o u ld be ex p lain ed is sim ply p re su p p o se d ; m o reo v e r with its re fe re n c e to actual a n d n o n ­ actual states o f affairs it w ould lead stra ig h t back to th e o b ject-o rien ­ tated a p p ro a c h . It is obvious th a t o ne ca n n o t explain th e use o f a se n ­ ten ce to som eo n e by saying th a t som eone w ho uses p ’ wishes th e re b y to say th a t ‘p ’ re p re se n ts an actual state o f affairs. T h e inevitable c o u n te r­ q uestion is: w hat a re states o f affairs a n d how does o n e tell w h e th e r they a re ‘actu al’? N ow because S earle uses *p' to re fe r n o t to th e asser­ toric se n ten c e b u t to th e p ro p o sitio n al c o n te n t - th u s as I have used ‘*p*’ _ We m u st re fo rm u la te S earle’s ex p lan a tio n in th e follow ing way: so m eone w ho uses ‘p ’ wishes th e re b y to say th a t th e state o f affairs th a t p actually obtains. B u t th e state o f affairs that/? actually obtains w h en it is tru e th at/? (above p. 44). A n d as we also*have to o m it th e ex p ressio n ‘wishes to say’ (‘m e a n s’) in exp lain in g th e use we can say even m o re sim ply: w hen a sp e a k e r uses an assertoric senten ce ‘/?’ h e asserts th at/? an d w h en h e asserts th at/? h e asserts th a t it is tru e that/?. You will p e rh a p s find this a tte m p t to sim plify S earle’s ‘essential ru le ’ rid iculous a n d say th a t all it achieves is th a t this ru le loses all e x p la n a ­ tory force. W hat is th e use, you may ask, o f know ing th a t so m eo n e w ho asserts th a t/? asserts th a t it is tr u e th at/?? In th e first place, th e w ord ‘asserts’ occurs again in th e ex p lan atio n . In th e second place, I can now be accused o f w h at I always accused th e o th e rs o f d o in g : n am ely o f sm uggling into th e ex p lan a tio n a w ord w hich itself has first to be ex p lain ed : th e w ord ‘tr u e ’. T o this I sho u ld reply: (1) S earle’s sta te m en t do es in d e ed lose its a p p a re n t e x p lan a to ry value as a resu lt o f this sim plification; how ever we m u st dem olish p se u d o -e x p lan a tio n s to clear th e way fo r real ex p la ­ nations; (2) th a t th e w ord ‘a ssert’ occurs ag ain in th e ex p lan a tio n shows th a t this sta te m en t can at m ost re p re se n t a first step tow ards an ex p la ­ n ation; (3) - an d this is th e crucial p o in t - I have n o t sm u g g led in th e w ord ‘tr u e ’; r a th e r this w ord belongs to assertoric speech itself. N e ith e r S earle’s com plicated sta te m en t n o r its sim plified fo rm have any v alue in them selves; its sim plified fo rm how ever is in te re stin g fo r us b ecause it b elongs directly to th e co n tex t o f m odes o f b eh a v io u r reflection on w hich has led us to conclude th a t th e use o f an asserto ric sen ten ce is to be co n stru e d as assertion. It is these m odes o f b eh a v io u r them selves to w hich we m ust tu r n if we w an t to know w hat an assertio n is, fo r th e q u estio n o f w hat an assertion is can be n o th in g b u t th e q u estio n : in ac cordance with w h at rules is this act p erfo rm e d ? L et m e recall: th a t th e use o f an assertoric sen ten ce is to be c o n s tru e d

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as assertio n re su lte d fro m th e fact th a t th e h e a r e r can rep ly to th e sp e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e w ith ‘yes’ (or ‘th a t is tr u e ’) o r ‘n o ’ (o r ‘th a t is false’) a n d th a t th e u tte ra n c e ‘n o ’ is to be u n d e rs to o d as m e a n in g th a t th e h e a r e r is co n tra d ic tin g th e sp e ak er. In th e m o st im p o rta n t tra d itio n o f m o d e rn ph ilo so p h ical sem antics (a tra d itio n w hich ex te n d s fro m F re g e th ro u g h W ittg e n ste in ’s Tractatus to T arsk i, C a rn a p a n d D avidson a n d to w hich I shall be re f e r rin g again) th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ o ccupies a c e n tra l place, b u t only as a w ord w hich th e sem an tic th e o rist uses; a n d in sem an tic th e o ry th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ can also be u se fu l w h e re a la n g u a g e is th e m a tiz e d in w hich th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ does n o t o cc u r (e.g. a signalla n g u a g e ).12 O n th e o th e r h a n d th e fact th a t asserto ric sp eech is a fo rm o f speech in w hich th e u se o f th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ itself has a co n stitu tiv e ro le has so fa r b e e n m o re o r less ig n o re d w ith th e re m a rk a b le ex c ep tio n o f M ichael D u m m e tt’s re c e n t book o n F rege. H ow th e fact th a t th e use o f th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ belo n g s to asserto ric sp eech is to be in te r p re te d is so m e th in g th a t will c o n tin u e to occupy us fo r a lo n g tim e; in d e e d we shall see th a t th e analysis o f th e use o f th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ coincides w ith th e analysis o f th e u se o f asserto ric sentences. W h a t can b e said h e r e a n d now is: (1) th e rep lies by m e an s o f (a) ‘n o ’, (b) th e d en ial o f w h at is asserte d , (c) ‘th a t is false’, a re clearly eq u iv ale n t in m e an in g . Likew ise th e rep lies by m eans o f (a) ‘yes’ (b) th e re p e titio n o f th e assertio n (c) ‘th a t is tr u e ’. O n e can th e re fo r e say th a t a lth o u g h th e yes/no reply has a w id er field o f ap p lica tio n th a n asserto ric se n ten ces th e analysis o f ‘yes’ an d ‘n o ’ as u sed in th e co n tex t o f assertoric speech is id e n tic al w ith th e analysis o f th e w ords ‘tr u e ’ a n d ‘false’. (2) It is n o t only th e h e a r e r w ho can say ‘th a t is tr u e ’; th e sp e a k e r too in stea d o f sim ply a sse rtin g th at/? can assert th a t it is tr u e th at/? (it was precisely this th a t m y sim plified v ersion o f S e a rle ’s sta te m e n t b ro u g h t out). B u t in so d o in g h e h im self is d e n y in g th e possible n eg ativ e rep ly o f th e h e a re r. A n d as ‘it is tr u e th a t/? ’ is eq u iv ale n t in m e a n in g to the o rig in a l sta te m e n t ‘p ’ th e sp e a k e r’s s ta te m e n t alre ad y im plicitly co n tain s a d en ial o f th e possible d en ial o f th e h e a re r (cf. p. 4 7 f). N ow this does n o t yet enab le us to give an analysis o f th e em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le s o f an assertio n ; it d o es, h o w ever, enab le us to take a first step to w ard s such a n analysis. F o r now we can at least say: (1) N o t only a re th e speech-acts w ith w hich th e h e a r e r re sp o n d s to th e sp e a k e r a n d , above all o th e r speech-acts, th e yes- o r n o -re sp o n se - re la te d in a ru le -g o v e rn e d way to th e s p e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e ; th e o rig in a l use o f th e asserto ric se n ten c e by th e sp e a k e r is also re la te d in a ru le -g o v e rn e d way to th e y es/n o -reactio n o f th e h e a re r. B u t this m ean s th a t since th e

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e m p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f th e asserto ric sen ten ce re la te n e ith e r to th e cir­ cu m stances o f u se n o r to an in te n d e d effect it can now be ex p ected th a t th e em p lo y m e n t rules w hich we a re seeking a re som ehow m ed iated th ro u g h th e possible co n tra d ic tio n o f th e h e a re r. (2) T h e h e a r e r ’s re sp o n se , at any ra te in its basic fo rm s o f ‘yes’ a n d ‘n o ’, is itself an asser­ tion. B u t th e re is an essential d iffe re n c e betw een this k ind o f h e a r e r ’s re sp o n se a n d th e o th e r th in g s o n e w ould describe as responses. It is n o t ju s t th a t th e h e a re r, as re g a rd s th e ru le -g o v e rn e d relatio n to th e u tte r ­ an ce o f th e sp e a k e r, can equally well re sp o n d w ith ‘yes’ o r ‘n o ’ o r an a b ste n tio n a n d th a t h en c e th e re is a specific a re a o f fre e d o m h ere; r a th e r th e ch a racteristic f e a tu re at an y rate o f d en ial is th a t it refers back to th e u tte ra n c e o f th e speak er. A n d in d e ed this co u n te r-u tte ra n c e o f th e h e a re r is re la te d to th e sp e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e in precisely th e sam e way th a t th e s p e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e is re la te d to th e h e a r e r ’s u tte ra n c e ; this is b ecause, as w e saw e a rlie r, (p. 46 f) th e re is n o absolute distinction b etw een affirm ativ e a n d n egative statem ents. W e can only say th a t th e la tte r is th e d e n ia l o f th e fo rm e r. B u t th e n th e fo rm e r is equally th e d en ial o f th e la tte r. T h is resu lts in a fa r-re a c h in g relativization o f th e d istin ctio n b etw e en sp e a k e r a n d h e a re r. If th e h e a r e r resp o n d s with ‘n o ’ th e d istin ctio n red u c es to this: th a t th e o riginal sp e ak e r m akes so to sp eak th e first ‘m o v e’. T h u s in so fa r as th e rela tio n betw een sp eak er a n d a d d re sse e is n o t a one-w ay stree t it c o rre sp o n d s n e ith e r to th e stimu lu s -re s p o n s e sch em a n o r to th e G ricean co n cep tio n o f a p u rp o sere la te d act. It is n o t ju s t th a t th e act o f th e h e a r e r reacts u p o n th e sp e a k e r o r his act; r a th e r b o th acts clearly relate - th o u g h o f co u rse in a way th a t has yet to be e x p la in e d - to th e sam e th in g : th e o n e denies what th e o th e r affirm s. M o reo v er, th e affirm ing, a n d likewise th e q u es­ tio n in g , d o u b tin g , etc., resp o n se s o f th e h e a r e r re fe r back to th e s p e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e in fu n d a m e n ta lly th e sam e way as denial, nam ely as d iffe re n t position-takings to th e sam e th in g w hose n eg atio n is asserte d in th e d en ial. F o r all these resp o n se s tak e place ag a in st th e b a c k g ro u n d o f th e possibility o f d en ial, h e n c e p re s u p p o s e d en ial as a possibility. A nd becau se all o th e r possible resp o n ses by m eans o f speech-acts also p re ­ su p p o se one o f th e se p o sitio n -tak in g s they too a re n o t m e re resp o n ses to th e sp e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e . O n e can call all th e se speech -resp o n ses w hich p re s u p p o s e th e possibility o f denial, in c lu d in g d en ial itself, answers in stead o f resp o n ses. W h a t have we th e re b y achieved? Still very little. I f we co n fin e o u r ­ selves to th e possibility o f an sw e rin g ‘yes’ or ‘n o ’ as th e basic possibility th e n th e only ch a racteristic o f th e use o f an asserto ric sen ten ce so fa r to e m e rg e is th a t it - as an a ssertio n - anticipates a d en ial o r is itself th e

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denial o f an o th e r assertion. I have already p o in te d th a t o u t in th e in tro ­ d u ctio n (p. 47); a n d this o f course does n o t a m o u n t to an em p lo y m en trule. I t is conceivable how ever th a t this c o n fro n ta tio n o f two o p p o sed assertions p rovides an initial basis on w hich to co n d u c t o u r search for th e ru les which d e te rm in e th e em p lo y m e n t o f an assertio n . As th e two assertions are re la te d to o ne a n o th e r in such a way th a t the o n e calls ‘false’ w hat th e o th e r designates ‘tr u e ’ th e c o n fro n ta tio n clearly con­ cerns th e tru th o f th e statem ent. B ut w hat is ‘tr u th ’ an d how can the relatio n to it be reflected in em ploym ent-rules?

LECTURE

15

Positive account of the employment-rule of assertoric sentences in terms of the truth-relation

In th e last le ctu re I s ta rte d o u t fro m th e assu m p tio n th a t b efo re we can d eterm in e th e em ploym ent-rules o f predicates, an d o f the singular term s w hich s u p p le m e n t p red ic ate s so as to fo rm elem e n ta ry asserto ric se n ­ tences, we m u st first possess a p relim in ary con cep tio n o f th e em p lo y ­ m e n t-ru le s, a n d th a t m ean s o f th e m eaning, o f w hole asserto ric se n ­ tences. W e n e e d a reasonably solid conceptual basis fo r th e en q u iry in to th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e co m p o n en ts o f an elem en tary assertoric s e n ­ ten ce, even if this basis can itself only be subsequen tly con so lid ated by th e analysis o f th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e co m p o n en ts o f th e p red icativ e sentence. Even this q uestion o f a m erely provisional u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f assertoric sentences tu rn s o u t to be exceedingly difficult. I will su m m arize th e results achieved so far: (1) A lready in th e le ctu re b e fo re last we w ere able to exclu d e th e behaviouristic o r quasi-behaviouristic conception according to which th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le rela tes to circum stances, th e em p lo y m en t-situ atio n . (2) Likewise excluded is the object-orientated conception which relates th e em p lo y m e n t o f th e sentence to a re p re se n ta tio n o r idea (how ever this is to be in te rp re te d ) o f a state o f affairs o r actual state o f affairs; such an ex p lan a tio n w ould be a hysteron-proteron because th e state of affairs can itself only be identified by m eans o f sentences. (3) It n e x t seem ed plausible to in te rp re t th e em p lo y m en t-ru les as fu n ctio n al ru les a n d to rela te th em , on th e o n e h a n d , to th e a d d re ssee a n d , on the o th e r h a n d , to th e consequences o f th e speech-act. B u t th e q u estion was: How? T h e m ost n a tu ra l th in g seem ed to be to view th e act as b ein g d efin e d by an in te n d e d effect an d th e rules as in stru m e n ta l rules; this con cep tio n led to th e speech-act b ein g d efin ed as an act o f in fo rm in g . H ow ever, th e co rrect sta te m en t th a t so m eo n e who, vis-ä-vis a p a rtn e r, u tte rs an assertoric se n ten c e *py th e re b y in fo rm s him th a t h e

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believes th at/?, a n d th a t this m eans th a t in a specific way h e in te n d s to b rin g it ab o u t th a t th e p a r tn e r believes th a t he believes that/?, also p roved to b e an u n su ita b le basis fo r a rriv in g at th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le o f th e sen tence. (4) I th e n su g g ested , ap p e a lin g to th e illocutio n ary -act th e o ry , th a t we sh o u ld u n d e r s ta n d th e sem antically re le v a n t act o f em p lo y in g an asserto ric se n te n c e n o t as an act o f c o m m u n ic atio n b u t as an act o f assertion. H o w ev er, we co u ld find n o satisfactory answ er in S earle to th e q u estio n co n c e rn in g th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f an assertio n . (5) I f th e e m p lo y m e n t-ru le s can only be re la te d to th e p a r tn e r an d to th e consequences o f th e act then th e only a d e q u a te p ro c e d u re seem ed to b e to ask: w h at a re th e possible resp o n se s o f th e a d d re sse e th a t a re re la te d by a ru le to th e sp e a k e r’s u tte ra n c e ? It e m e rg e d th a t th ese resp o n se s a r e them selves speech-acts a n d th a t u n d e rly in g th e m all a re th e answ ers by m ean s o f ‘n o ’ o r ‘yes’ o r an in te rm e d ia te p o sitio n -tak in g , o r an ab sten tio n fro m ta k in g a p o sitio n , a n d th a t th e possibility o f ‘n o ’ possesses a fu n d a m e n ta l significance fo r all o th e r p o sitio n -tak in g s, a ‘n o ’ w hich is clearly u se d as e q u iv ale n t in m e a n in g to th e ex p ressio n ‘th a t is false’. It is only this circ u m sta n ce w hich p erm its o n e to call th e u se o f an asserto ric se n te n c e ‘a sse rtio n ’. A n d it also b ecam e clear th a t th e ‘n o ’ itself expresses an assertion. It belongs to th e sense o f an assertion th a t it con tain s a re fe re n c e to an assertio n co n tra d ic tin g it. T h is is how f a r we h a d got. T h e q u estio n we m u st now ask is w h e th e r this is a possible basis fo r fin d in g th e em p lo y m e n t-ru le s o f asserto ric sen ten ces th e e x p la n a tio n o f w hich co u ld claim to be th e ex p lan a tio n o f th e ir m e an in g . It is only th e sense o f th ese em p lo y m e n t-ru le s th a t co u ld d e te rm in e ju s t w hat is m e a n t by calling a speech -act ‘a sse rtio n ’ - a d e s­ ig n a tio n w hich so far I have m erely taken as a fact fro m o rd in a ry usage. B u t first I w ould like to deal w ith two d o u b ts th a t m ig h t be raised a b o u t my p ro c e d u re at th e en d o f th e last le c tu re , a p ro c e d u re w hich co n c e n tra te d en tirely on one reply, viz. th a t w ith th e w o rd ‘n o ’. (1) Since I have m yself em p h asized th e im p o rta n c e o f th e fact th a t in asserto ric speech th e w o rd ‘tr u e ’ occurs, it w ould seem necessary th a t th e f u r th e r analysis sh o u ld n o t only be o rie n ta te d to w ard s th e ‘n o ’ b u t sh o u ld also ta k e ac co u n t o f th e fact th a t th e ‘n o ’ o f asserto ric speech has th e specific sen se o f ‘th a t is false’. A n d do we n o t th e re fo re have to p ro v id e a t least a provisional e x p la n a tio n o f th e w ords ‘tr u e ’ an d ‘false’? (2) H ow fa r is o n e ju stifie d in a c c o rd in g such a special p o sitio n to th e n eg ativ e reply? Even if it is clear th a t all o th e r p o sitio n -tak in g s tak e p lace ag ain st th e b a c k g ro u n d o f th e possibility o f d en ial it co u ld n o n e ­

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theless be argued that, for the addressee, prior to any position-taking, prior also to the withholding from any position-taking, is the under­ standing o f the speech-act. We must o f course accept that this under­ standing o f the assertion already belongs to the context o f possible position-takings towards the assertion; however it is not identical with any position-taking, though it does seem to be the primary hearer-correlate o f the speech-act. If we free the notion, introduced by Grice, o f m eaning in the sense o f vouloir dire from Grice’s own interpretation o f it as communication and apply it to the present view that it is an assertion, then we can now also say: the hearer understands what the speaker means, he understands what he wishes to say, he understands the asser­ tion. And this understanding is not just a theoretical assumption that we can make in order to explain the transition from the hearing o f an assertion to the hearer’s taking up his own position; rather there are also responses belonging to the hearer’s behaviour in which the pure understanding o f the assertion is expressed. T h e hearer says, for exam ­ ple: ‘(I understand what he is saying:) He is asserting that/?.’ T h e analysis o f the em ployment-rules o f an assertoric sentence will have to pay par­ ticular attention to this understanding on the part o f the hearer, for when we ask about the m eaning o f a linguistic expression we are asking what it is to understand it; and indeed we can now say: what the hearer understands when he understands the speaker’s assertion is, precisely, the employment-rules o f the assertoric sentence. True, one must distin­ guish between the understanding o f the linguistic expression and the understanding o f the speech-act, but if what is understood when the linguistic expression is understood is its function, then the two things belong together: to understand an assertoric sentence is to understand what assertion it can be used to make; and one can then say o f this assertion itself that it is understood. However, the reference to the pos­ sible denial o f the hearer is not relativized by this inclusion o f the hearer’s understanding; it is merely supplem ented. Som eone who understands an assertion understands it precisely as one to which an assertion denying it can be opposed. A nd as we have seen this means: the assertion is so understood that another assertion can say that what it asserts is false or that it is true. But this means: whoever understands the assertion understands it as one which can be true or false. But what do we mean by these words ‘true’ and ‘false’? I thus com e to the other point. Before attempting, on the basis o f what has now been achieved, to look for the employment-rule o f an assertoric sentence must we not first explain the use o f the words ‘true’ and ‘false’? Now one could say that this has already been done, for I pointed out that

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‘that p is false* is used equivalently with the denial o f the sentence and ‘that/? is true’ equivalently with the denial o f this denial, hence with the original sentence. T h e m eaning o f the word ‘true’ would then be given by the equivalence: that p is true = p. It is customary to refer to the theory that the meaning o f the word ‘true’ is defined by this equivalence as the Redundancy Theory,* for it appears to make the word ‘true’ superfluous: instead o f saying ‘that/? is true’ we can always simply use the original statement 7?’ itself. Almost everyone who is confronted with this theory for the first time has the feeling that it suppresses som ething essential, som ething one could perhaps call the statement’s relation to reality. We must try to form a clearer idea o f what underlies this feeling. T o this end the best thing to do would be to start with the way in which this relation to reality was dealt with in the truth-definition o f the philosophical tradition. T h e traditional definition o f truth goes back to a definition o f Aristotle: ‘For to say that what is the case is not the case or that what is not the case is the case is false; but to say that what is the case is the case and that what is not the case is not the case is true.’2 Since Aristotle thought that there are negative and positive statements, in an absolute sense, he defined their truth and falsity separately. I f we ignore this peculiarity o f his definition it turns out to be identical with the Redundancy Theory: a statement that som ething is the case is true if it is the case. However, Aristotle also explained his definition by saying that truth consists in a correspondence between statement and thing3 and this in turn led to the traditional formula o f the adequatio intellectus et rei,4 the agreem ent (Übereinstimmung) o f the thought with the thing. T h e inde­ terminateness o f the expressions em ployed in this formula led in the philosophical tradition (which for the most part simply took this formula, rather than the actual use o f the word ‘true’, as its point o f departure), to the most phantastic theories such as, e.g., that truth is the coincidence (Zusammentreffen) o f thinking and reality, the unity o f subject and object;5 and that things becom e true by being thought; and it would then also seem plausible to suppose that a statement only becomes true by being verified, for only then would thinking com e into contact with the thing itself. Unbridled speculations o f this kind, which merely spin out an uncom prehended traditional formula and have lost contact with the matter itself (die Sache selbst) - the actual understanding o f words - are clearly not worth debating with. I f the traditional formula permits a m eaningful interpretation at all then it can only be this: since that with which the thought is supposed to agree is construed as an object (as ‘thing’) ‘the thought’ too is to be

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co n stru ed as an object an d n o t in the sense o f ‘th in k in g ’. T h e only version o f th e fo rm u la w orth discussing is th a t which con stru es th e ag re em e n t as o n e betw een w hat is believed (or w hat is asserted) an d w hat is real, such that w hat is believed is th e objective correlate o f the actual statem ent a n d w hat is real is the objective co rre la te o f th e tru e statem en t. Since th e objective co rrela te o f a sta te m e n t is a state o f affairs th e re w ould re su lt the follow ing d efinition: (1) the asserted state of affairs, that p, is true if and only if it agrees with the corresponding real state of affairs, the corresponding fact. T h is con cep tio n o f two states o f affairs, a believed o r asserted state o f affairs on th e o n e h a n d , a real state o f affairs on th e o th e r h a n d , which in any event som ehow ‘c o rre s p o n d ’ (entsprechen) a n d in th e case o f tru th also ‘a g re e ’ (übereinstimmen) fo u n d e rs on the im possibility o f cashing th e im ages o f c o rre sp o n d e n c e an d ag re em e n t. In p articu la r it can n o t be specified w hat th e real state o f affairs ‘c o rre sp o n d in g ’ to th e asserted state o f affairs is su p p o se d to be w hen th e assertion in qu estio n is false, n o r w herein th e relatio n o f a g re e m e n t is su p p o sed to consist. W e can h o w ever re -fo rm u la te (1) in such a way that th e referen c e to a co rre ­ sp o n d e n c e o r an a g re e m e n t is d ro p p e d b u t w hat was in te n d e d by th e fo rm u la tio n is p rese rv e d : (2) the asserted state of affairs, that p, is true if and only if it is a real state of affairs (a fact). T h e r e is now no lo n g e r any talk o f tw o states o f affairs; it is th e sam e state o f affairs th a t is b ein g asserted th a t in th e case o f tru th is real an d w hich we th e n call a fact. O n e can still call (2) a fo rm u latio n o f th e a g re e m e n t-th e o ry o f tr u th alth o u g h th e w ord ‘a g re e m e n t’ n o lo n g er o ccurs in th e d efinition. H ow ever, th e question now arises w h eth e r we sh o u ld so to sp eak rea d this equivalence from left to rig h t o r fro m rig h t to left. W hat is d efin ed by w hat? T h e claim o f th e object-o rien tated a g re e m e n t-th e o ry is th a t th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ is ex p lain e d by re fe re n c e to th e reality o f th e state o f affairs. B ut this presupposes (1) th at we already u n d e rs ta n d w hat is m e an t by a state o f affairs th at/? b efo re we u n d e r ­ sta n d th e se n ten c e an d (2) th a t th e re is a p ro p erty o f states o f affairs W th a t e ith e r is reality or is th e criterio n o f reality, a n d th at we have to e x a m in e states o f affairs w ith resp ect to this p ro p e rty in o rd e r to decide w h e th e r th e assertio n th a t/? is tru e. H ow ever, thin g s are obviously the o th e r way ro u n d : if we a re to explain to som eone w hat th e p ro p e rty in q u estio n is all we can say is: th e state o f affairs asserted by m eans o f a se n ten c e ‘/?’ is real (a fact) if an d only if it is tru e th a t p. I f we now d ro p the object-orientated com ponents o f (2) we can attem p t to c o n s tru e th e rela tio n to reality to w hich the w ord ‘tr u e ’ is su p p o sed

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to re fe r not as the p ro p e rty o f an object b u t adverbially an d in this way arrive at th e form ulation: (3) that p is true = really p, fo r exam ple: ‘(the assertion) th a t it is rain in g is tru e if an d only if it really is ra in in g ’. B u t now it is obvious th a t we can say ‘it really is rain in g ’ if and only if we can also simply say ‘it is ra in in g ’. T his how ever red u ces th e last-m entioned fo rm u latio n o f the ag reem ent-theory to th e form ula o f the R edundancy T h eo ry . T h e w ord ‘really’ m erely u n d erlin es a co n tra st which clearly alread y belongs to the use o f th e assertoric sentence itself. W hat is this contrast? T h e o th e r fe a tu re which I b ro u g h t in today by way o f su p p le m e n ta­ tion, viz. th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e h e a re r which preced es any positiontaking tow ards the assertion o f th e speaker, is o f help h ere too. W hen S says ‘th e tow n-hall is on fire’ th e resp o n se o f the h e a re r in which his u n d e rsta n d in g w hich p recedes his own position-taking is ex p ressed is th e sentence ‘it is asserted th a t th e tow n-hall is on fire’. A n d he can add: ‘is it really on fire?’ o r ‘is it tru e th a t it is on fire?’ T h u s in an assertoric co m m unication-situation we always have th ese two things: th e sp e a k e r’s sentence ‘p ’ an d the h e a re r’s sentence (which does not have to be u tte red b u t always could be u ttered ): ‘it is asserted th a t /?’. In asm u ch as w hat th e sp e ak e r is doing, viz. asserting som eth in g by m eans o f th e assertoric expression p \ is u n d e rsto o d a n d possibly stated by th e h e a re r (‘it is asserted . . .’) th e now m odified expression ‘th a t /?’ loses its assertionm o m e n t an d can th u s serve th e h e a re r as th e basis fo r a position-taking o f his own; fo r ‘that/? . . .’ can now be su p p le m e n ted by ‘is tr u e ’, ‘is false’, ‘is d oubted by m e’, etc. T h e w ord ‘tru e ’, like th e word ‘rea l’, is a contrastword. L ea rn in g to u n d e rsta n d it is le arn in g to u n d e rsta n d the co n trast betw een '/?’ and ‘it is asserted th a t /?’ o r m o re generally: the co n trast betw een ‘p ’ an d ‘th at/?’. C o m p ared with th e incom plete expression ‘th a t p ’ the expression ‘p ’ contains a plus and it is this plus th a t is ex p ressed in th e su p p le m e n tatio n by ‘is tr u e ’: th e expression ‘is tr u e ’ is th a t ex pression by m eans o f which we are able to so su p p le m e n t th e re d u c e d ex pression ‘that/?’ as to obtain an expression which is again equivalent to the original assertoric expression ‘/?\ It is precisely this th a t the fo rm u la o f the red u n d a n cy -th eo ry states. It only ap p e a rs trivial if o n e overlooks how essential th e d iffe ren ce betw een '/?’ a n d ‘that/* ’ is. T o explain th e m ean in g o f the w ord ‘tr u e ’ is to explain th e differen ce in the m e an in g o f ‘/?’ an d ‘th at /?’ which is essential to th e use o f assertoric sentences. W hoever moves fro m ‘(it is asserted) th at /?’ to (p ’ m oves from m erely u n d e rsta n d in g ‘p ’ to asserting that/?. H ence th e ex p lan atio n o f th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ is identical with th e ex p lan atio n o f th e act o f asserting. For this reason th e u n d e rsta n d in g of th e w ord ‘tr u e ’ as this is specified in th e

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fo rm u la o f th e re d u n d a n c y theory is only trivial if o n e assum es th a t o n e already u n d e rsta n d s th e em p lo y m e n t o f asserto ric sentences. W hat have we achieved with all this? We h a d alread y seen earlier th a t th e ‘tru e ’/‘false’-response c o rresp o n d s to the ‘yes7‘n o ’-resp o n se, o r a ffir­ m ation a n d denial. In ad d itio n it has now e m e rg e d th a t to th e sense o f ‘tru e T fa lse ’ th e re belongs no t only th e o p p o sitio n betw een these w ords them selves w hich can be re p ro d u c e d in th e affirm atio n an d denial o f th e relev an t senten ce b u t also w hat distinguishes th e se n ten c e ‘p ’ fro m th e red u ced expression ‘th at p ’. T his co ntrast-m om en t which is expressly m an ifested in th e w o rd -p air ‘tr u e ’/Talse’ th e re fo re also alread y belongs to th e assertorically used Y es/No a n d m ust be ta k en into acco u n t in th e analysis o f th e act o f assertion. L et us now r e tu rn to th e p o in t rea ch ed at th e e n d o f th e last lecture. I f assertion essentially anticipates th e possibility o f a d en ial - a c o u n te r­ assertion - th e n it can be u n d e rsto o d as a challenge, in th e sense in w hich o n e challenges som eo n e to take u p th e co u n ter-p o sitio n in a gam e, e.g. in a bet. T h a t th e em p lo y m en t-ru les of assertoric sen ten ces can be u n d e rsto o d as rules o f a game is an idea w hich stem s fro m W ittgenstein, w hich S earle too has ta k en up b u t n o t really explo ited , a n d which has b een d ev elo p ed above all by D u m m e tt.6 F ro m D u m m e tt com es th e f u r ­ th e r suggestion th a t assertoric speech can be c o m p ared w ith th e type o f g am e in w hich two p a rtn e rs play against each o th e r a n d th e rules a re such th a t follow ing th e m leads to a final-position which consists in th e o n e having won and th e o th e r h av in g lost. L et us first be clear th a t the m oves in a g am e a re acts o f th e kind we a re looking for, nam ely, acts th e rules o f w hich relate n o t to th e circ u m ­ stances in w hich they a re p e rfo rm e d b u t to th e ir consequences. B ut now th ese a re consequences n o t in th e sense o f in te n d e d effects, b u t in th e sense o f consequen ces re g a rd in g th e outco m e o f th e g am e which re su lt fro m follow ing th e ru les o f th e gam e. T h e ru les also re la te th e acts to a p a rtn e r; b u t they do so in such a way th a t th e p a rtn e r is n o t th e object o f an in te n d e d effect, b u t th e o p p o n e n t w ho is essential to th e gam e. T h e gam e is defined by th e way in which th e moves o f th e two p a rtn e rs a re rela ted by th e ru les o f th e g am e to th e o u tco m e o f th e gam e. Now w h at is th e g am e o f asserto ric speech like? T h e assertio n -act th a t consists in th e em p lo y m e n t o f an assertoric sen ten ce ‘p ’ is th e o p e n in g move. T h e rules o f th e gam e a re such th a t th e p a r tn e r ’s co u n ter-m o v e is already fixed by th e open in g -m o v e; it consists in th e u tte ra n c e o f ‘n o t p .’ By way o f analogy th in k o f bets (th o u g h in fact it is m isleading to speak o f ‘analogy’ h e re fo r a b et can itself only be u n d e rsto o d as a m o d ­ ification o f th e assertoric gam e; how ever, th e re fe re n c e to a b et m ay

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serve to illustrate what I have in m ind). Now how is the opening move to be understood? I can now com e back to th at p art o f Searle’s rule whose discussion I had postponed. As the essential rule for the em ploym ent of an assertoric sentence he o ffered: its em ploym ent ‘counts as an u n d ertak in g to the effect that/? rep resen ts an actual state o f affairs’ (above p. 187). I have already shown th at the second p a rt o f this form ulation presupposes w hat has first to be explained and is th erefo re useless. B ut how is the first p art to be in terp reted ? W hat does ‘counts as an u n d ertaking to the effect that . . mean? T his rem ained unclear. H owever, it becomes sig­ nificant if we in te rp re t it as: ‘stands fo r a g u aran tee t h a t . . .’ T h at some­ one who uses an assertoric sentence ‘p ’asserts som ething m eans, we m ight say, th at he offers a g u aran tee th at it is tru e that p. His o p p o n en t on the other hand guarantees that it is tru e that not -p. W hat does this mean? Well, whoever guarantees som ething guarantees th at certain conditions specified by him are fulfilled. W hat would these conditions be in the case o f the em ploym ent o f an assertoric sentence? Can we say: whoever uses an assertoric sentence guarantees th at the truth-conditions o f his assertion are fulfilled? B ut what, you will ask, is m eant by this talk of truth-conditions? A condition is expressed in an if-sentence. So if that which som eone asserts is to have a truth -co n d itio n we would have to envisage a form ulation of the following kind: ‘that/? is true, if . . .’ And th e thesis ju st m entioned would th erefo re m ean: if som eone uses an assertoric sentence ‘p ’ (if he guarantees th at it is tru e that p) th en he guarantees that th e condition re fe rre d to in th e protasis o f the above form ula is fulfilled. T o be able properly to u n d erstan d th e significance o f this suggestion one should com pare it with the idea - which was rejected - th at the em ploym entrule relates the em ploym ent to the circumstances of employment. T here we were dealing with a conditional rule. It had the form : ‘if . . . the em ploym ent o f the expression* is co rrect’. Now th e ‘if . . .’ appears on the o th er side: ‘the em ploym ent o f th e exp ressio n* is correct (true), if . . T h e re it was said u n d e r what conditions it is correct to use the expression. Now one is saying: if (for w hatever reasons) the expression is used what th en are the conditions u n d e r which it is correct. This reversed relation to conditions presupposes ( 1 ) th at those conditions in which the expression is used (the em ploym ent-situation) are irrelevant to th e correctness o f its use - this is the situation-independence of em ploym ent th at I m entioned earlier (but which will only be explained later) - and (2 ) th at those conditions on which the correctness of the use o f the expression depends are those whose fulfilm ent is g u aranteed by

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the use of the expression itself. W hat the expression guarantees is that the conditions o f its correctness (truth) are fulfilled. It is this, then, that is m eant by speaking o f truth-conditions. T h e speech-act of assertion consists in g u aran teein g its own truth-conditions. We can now also begin to u n d erstan d how it is that som eone who uses an assertoric sentence ‘/?’ can equally well say ‘that/? is tru e ’. T he equivalence ‘p = that/? is tru e ’ is g ro u n d ed in the fact that someone who asserts som ething is always asserting the correctness (truth) of his asser­ tion; that this is so is g ro u n d ed in the essence o f assertion as an act of guaranteeing. In the preceding prelim inary discussion of the word ‘tru e ’ I pointed out that this w ord expresses the contrast between '/?’ and ‘it is asserted that/?’ and th at it is in the h e a re r’s u n d erstan d in g that this contrast first becomes prom inent. We can now see why this is so. Someone who gives a guarantee m ust always do two things: ( 1 ) he specifies the conditions whose fulfilm ent he is guaranteeing; (2 ) he guarantees their fulfilment. W hoever gives a g u aran tee does both these things; but th ere would be no act o f g u aranteeing if he did not do both things at once. Now the person to whom the g u aran tee is given can only be said to understand the g uarantee if he also u n d erstan d s both these things. But he would not u n d erstan d the g u aran tee as a g uarantee if these two things - what is gu aranteed and that it is g u aran teed - were not kept apart in his understan d in g . A pplied to the u n d erstan d in g o f an assertion this means: someone understan d s the assertion m ade by m eans of an assertoric sentence if, firstly, he knows the truth-conditions of the assertion and, secondly, if he knows th at the speaker is g u aranteeing th at these conditions are fulfilled. W hat he does not know, w hat is open for him, is w hether the conditions are actually fulfilled, in o th e r words, w hether the assertion is true. Its being open for the p erson who understands the assertion w hether it is tru e is as essential to his u n d erstan d ing as his knowing that the person who makes the assertion asserts that it is true. T h e insight that one u n d erstan d s an assertoric sentence if and only if one knows its truth-conditions was first form ulated in W ittgenstein’s Tractatus: ‘T o u n d e rsta n d a proposition (Satz) m eans to know what is the case if it is tru e ’ (4.024). This definition is, however, incomplete, for the u n d erstan d in g of an assertion is also characterized by the second of the above-m entioned features: it is also understood that the person em ploying the sentence is g u aran teein g that it is tru e . 7 B ut now this second feature rem ains the same for every assertoric sentence. So if it is simply a m atter of explaining to som eone the m eaning of a particular

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sentence and it can be assum ed that he knows that it is an assertoric sentence, one can also simply say: the m eaning of the sentence is explained by giving its truth-conditions. T h e result so far achieved seems unsatisfactory, for two reasons: firstly, nothing has so far been said about how one can explain what the truthconditions of an assertion or sentence are. One possibility would be (as the reference to an if-sentence suggests) that the truth-condition of a sentence is itself given by means of a sentence. T he tradition of semantic theories that was inaugurated by T arski 8 is grounded in this possibility. It presupposes, o f course, th at in explaining a sentence one always has at o n e’s disposal another sentence which is already understood or, if it is a question of the m eaning of a whole system of sentences, another language, a so-called m eta-language. I pointed out in the debate with Grice th at such a meta-linguistic theory is not sufficient for our fu n d a­ m ental question of how linguistic expressions are understood. I would also rem ind you that so far we have seen no reason to abandon the idea that to explain a linguistic expression is to explain its em ploym ent-rule, and that means: its m ode o f em ploym ent. If we specify the truth-con­ dition of a sentence by m eans of another sentence, this can only mean that the first sentence is used in the same way as the second; it does not mean that the m ode of em ploym ent itself is shown. Besides, by the thesis that the m eaning is given in a conditional rule we did not m ean that the conditional rule is form ulated in words, but, rather, that it is shown under what conditions the sentence is used. A nd clearly we must now hold on to the same theoretical claim. Secondly, the purpose of speaking of a ‘guarantee’ and a ‘bet’ can only be to point in the right direction; such term s must now be put aside, for the following two reasons. Firstly, every act of guaranteeing som ething itself presupposes the use of an assertoric sentence. T h e explanation by m eans of the term ‘g u arantee’ would thus be a pseudo­ explanation. We would again be committing a hysteron-proteron. Secondly, the notion of a guarantee involves something more than the anticipation contained in an assertion, for it is essential to the concept of guaranteeing that in the event o f the anticipated condition not being fulfilled the g uaran to r must reckon with certain negative consequences from the side o f the partners. T h e same is true of the notion of a bet. Even some­ one who bets ‘m erely for the h o n o u r’ loses the honour that would be due to him were he to win the bet. T hese two defects belong together. I used the word ‘g u arantee’ in order to describe the act of assertion as the opening-m ove in a game. But if we want not merely to nam e the opening-m ove of a gam e but to

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define it, this can clearly only be done by specifying the consequences it has in the gam e, and th at means: how it is related by the rule of the gam e to the outcom e of the game. A nd only by defining an assertion in term s of the rules of the game-moves that follow it can we expect to be able to explain the truth-conditions guaranteed by the assertion by ref­ erence to em ploym ent-rules. It is only now that the crucial defect of Searle’s system of rules becomes clear. This system of rules ended precisely where it should have begun, namely with the m ere nam ing of the opening-m ove of the game. This is no merely external criticism, for in his general prelim inary reflections Searle him self com pared speech-acts with game-acts and pointed out that a game-act is regulated by its consequences in the gam e . 9 By what rules then is the game of assertoric speech defined? Although I want to d ro p the notion o f a guarantee we can still be guided by it. It is essential to a guarantee that there are decision-criteria for its fulfilment. Som eone who understands a guarantee knows the criteria by reference to which it is decided w hether it is fulfilled o r not. Likewise som eone who u nderstands an assertion, though he does not know w hether it is tru e does know how it can be established w hether it, or the opposite assertion, is true; in o th e r words he knows how it would be decided w hether the asserted truth-conditions are fulfilled or not. T h e estab­ lishing of w hether an assertion is tru e is called its justification or verifi­ cation. T hus from a completely differen t starting-point we arrive at a thesis m ade fam ous by Logical Positivism, viz. th at one understands an assertion if and only if one knows how it is to be verified, and that means: if one knows its verification-rule. Now if the person who u n d er­ stands the assertion knows how one establishes whether it is true, then the assertion m ust consist in the g u arantee that, if it is tested as to its tru th , it will be established that it is tru e, and that means: that following its verification-rule will lead to success. This state of affairs could be expressed in the com plicated form ulation: the person who asserts that p in guaranteeing that its truth-conditions are fulfilled guarantees that the fulfilm ent of the truth-conditions, and hence the tru th of the asser­ tion, is verifiable. But the interm ediate clause now becomes superfluous and there is no reason fo r not regard in g the verifiability itself as the tru th condition of the assertion. This step is crucial for it removes the unclarity that has so far su rro u n d ed the question of what one is to und erstan d by the truth-conditions of an assertion and how one can explain them to som eone. If the truth-condition consists in the fact that following the verification-rule will lead to success, then giving the truth-

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condition o f an assertion will consist in d em o n stratin g its verificationrule or, to p u t it m ore simply, in show ing how it is verified. So instead of speaking o f a ‘g u a ra n te e ’ we can now specify the rules of the gam e whose opening-m ove is the use of an assertoric sentence. T h e gam e is like this: a speaker utters an assertoric sentence ‘p \ T h e h e are r is free to re g a rd him self as a m ere spectator o r as a p a rtn e r in the gam e. In the latter case he assumes th e role of o p p o n en t by u ttering the negation of ‘p*. However, it is also en o u g h if speaker and h earer know th at the h e a re r (or som eone o r other) could assum e the role of oppo n en t. T h e rule of the game consists in th e verification-rule. T h e verification-rule is such th at following it leads to a positive result either for the speak er o r fo r his oppo n en t. T h e gam e-outcom e is defined by the consequence that an agreem en t is reached betw een speaker and opp o ­ nent such that eith er the speaker assents to the o p p o n e n t’s original assertion or vice versa. T h e act o f assertion can now be defined. R em em ber I only appealed to the notion o f assertion for the p u rp o se o f defining anew the use of an assertoric sentence, after it h ad becom e clear th at the use of such a sentence can be defined n eith er by the circum stances of its use n o r by an in ten d ed effect. From th e outset o u r p u rp ose was to find the em ploym ent-rules which we explain (or u n d erstan d ) w hen we explain (or u n d erstan d ) th e m eaning o f an assertoric sentence. A nd now we can say: one u n d erstan d s an assertoric sentence if one knows what function it has, viz. the function of being used to p e rfo rm a particular assertion-act. T his act or the use o f the sentence is defined as the open­ ing-m ove of the gam e ju st described. A nd that means: following a certain rule - the verification-rule - leads to a resu lt the consequence o f which is that th e o p p o n en t agrees with the speak er or vice versa. T h e specifi­ cation o f the com plex of rules and actions (the ‘g am e’) to which the use of an assertoric sentence belongs spells o u t what was m erely h inted at by describing som eone who uses an assertoric sentence as guaranteeing that its truth-conditions are fulfilled an d , subsequently, as guaranteeing that his assertion is verifiable, o r that th e application of the verificationrule will have a positive outcom e for him . W hat it m eans to guarantee a positive outcom e shows itself in the way in which the consequence of the gam e-outcom e is connected with the opening-m ove by the verification-rule. T h e consequence o f the gam e-outcom e does not have the character o f an effect. R ather it is a consequence which is draw n by the players in accordance with th e rule of th e gam e, such that if som eone refused to draw the consequence which results from following the ver­

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ification-rule we would say that he did not u n d erstand what an assertion is, or th a t it showed that although he u ttered a sentence he did not u n d e rsta n d its m eaning. It could be objected to my analysis that I have defined an assertion as the opening-m ove o f a gam e at the end o f which there are again asser­ tions, nam ely the agreeing statem ents of the two opponents. Isn’t this circular? We m ust first try to get a clearer picture than so far achieved o f the connection betw een the result of following the verification-rule and the gam e-outcom e. Following the verification-rule obviously leads to a situation in which no one who understands the assertion is any longer free to affirm it or to deny it. I say obviously it leads to such a situation, for th ere is no o th er way o f interpreting the fact that even the person who denied it m ust now affirm it. T h a t there actually are such rules the following o f which has a result that one can characterize by saying th at the assertion turns out to be true (or false) could o f course only be show n by the actual explanation of these rules and so far I have not done this. So far all we can say is: that following the verificationrule leads to such a situation is shown by the fact that playing through the verification-rule has the consequence that one of the two opponents sees him self compelled to accept the assertion of the other. T h e assertion at the en d o f the gam e thus has a pre-em inent character: one cannot contradict it in this situation - at th e end o f the game - without laying oneself open to the charge o f n o t u n d erstan d in g it. But is it possible to treat the use of an assertoric sentence which occurs at the end o f the gam e as itself an assertion if I define assertion as an act o f guaranteeing, or as the opening-m ove in the game? I think it is. We m ust allow the limiting-case of a trivial act o f guaranteeing, o r the trivial case in which opening-m ove and concluding-m ove coincide. T o fu rth e r characterize the gam e-outcom e by saying that the speaker has won if the o p p o n e n t has to agree with him and otherwise has lost seems at p resen t to be superfluous; it is only in a later connection that we will see how far this description is necessary. For the present we can say that th e rules o f this gam e are not such as lead to an outcom e which consists in a player having won o r lost but ra th e r in an assertion proving to be true o r false. T h is is exactly how the outcom e of the game is described by the opp o n en ts in the gam e itself. T h e assent of the o p p o ­ n en t forced u p o n him by the rules of the gam e is expressed in the sentence ‘Y our assertion has tu rn e d out to be true, m ine false.’ V erification-rules are distinguished from o th e r gam e-rules - and this constitutes th eir u n iq u e character - by being rules of justification, i.e. rules the following o f which decides w hether the assertion of the speaker

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or th at of his opponent is correct - where the word ‘correct’ has the sense of ‘tru e ’. In contrast to all the rules so far re ferred to - conditional rules, instrum ental rules and o ther kinds of gam e-rules - the character­ istic feature of justification-rules is th at the correctness of an act does not simply consist in its following the rule; ra th e r it is only the correct following of the rules that decides w hether the original act is correct in the absolute, no longer rule-relative, sense of ‘tru e ’. W hen I provisionally characterized the em ploym ent of an assertoric sentence as guaranteeing that its own truth-conditions are fulfilled (a characterization which of course continues to be valid; it was merely insufficient) I pointed out that when it is simply a m atter of explaining the m eaning of a particular sentence to som eone and it can be assumed that he knows that it is an assertoric sentence one can also simply say: the m eaning of the sentence is explained by giving its truth-conditions. Similarly I can now say: as all other features o f the verification-game are the same for all assertoric sentences then, w hen it is only a m atter of explaining the m eaning o f a particular sentence and one can assume that it is known that it is an assertoric sentence, one can simply say: the m eaning of the sentence is explained by showing how it is verified; to und erstan d an assertoric sentence is to know its verification-rule. B ut precisely this aspect o f the p resent theory, which is clearly central and of decisive im portance for particular explanations, has so far rem ained undeveloped. I have not yet shown how a verification-rule is explained. But nothing can be said about this in general. How an asser­ toric sentence is verified is som ething th at must be shown separately for each form of assertoric sentence. O ne cannot get fu rth er than the result so far achieved so long as one speaks about assertoric sentences in gen­ eral. My im m ediate aim was simply to arrive at a - necessarily hypo­ thetical - prelim inary conception of the em ploym ent-rules of assertoric sentences as a foundation for the enquiry into the em ploym ent-rules of the com ponents of a predicative sentence, the most elem entary form of assertoric sentence (p. 179). So the next step would seem to be to set about the task of clarifying the employment-rules of predicates and singular terms. If the conception now arrived at is correct then the em ploym ent-rule of the singular term and the em ploym ent-rule of the predicate together constitute the veri­ fication-rule of the predicative sentence. From this fact alone, viz. that the verification-rule of the predicative sentence is founded in two other rules, it is clear that the elucidation o f the verification-rule of the p re­ dicative sentence-form will present peculiar difficulties. Consider also the following point. In the refutation o f the thesis that the employment-

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rule of assertoric sentences relates to the circum stances of em ploym ent we encountered the peculiar situation-independence of the employmentrule of assertoric sentences. It is this situation-independence of em ploy­ m ent which makes it possible for the em ploym ent to be determ ined by rules o f an o th er kind (with which we have now becom e acquainted). In particular this situation-independence is clearly essential to the fact that one can use not only the w ord ‘correct’ b u t the w ord ‘tru e ’: an assertion is once and for all true or false. So far I have p resupposed this aspect of the em ploym ent of the word ‘tru e ’, not explained it. How this situa­ tion-independence is constituted is som ething that the analysis o f the most elem entary sentence-form would have to show. I have already hinted that it is the function o f singular term s to make possible this situation-independence (p. 161). T h e analysis o f the verification-rule o f predicative sentences is thus m ade even m ore difficult. I will therefore postpone once again the treatm en t o f predicates and singular term s in o rd e r first to show by reference to simple cases how the m eaning of a sentence can be explained by giving its truth-conditions and how these can be explained by dem onstrating the sentence’s m ode of verification. T hese simple cases are those in which th e truth or falsity of an assertion depends simply on the tru th or falsity o f o th er assertions. Sentences em ployed in this way are the com plex sentences form ed by means of ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’, and so-called general sentences. T h e discussion of these sentence-form s will also provide an o p portunity to dem onstrate, from an o th er angle, the inadequacies of object-orientated semantics.

L E C T U R E 16

Supplements

T h e m ultiplicity of sem antic theories I have touched on in the last two lectures in the process o f trying to achieve w hat seems to me to be a tenable prelim inary concept o f th e m eaning o f an assertoric sentence may have left b ehind a certain confusion. So before taking up the p ro b ­ lem to which the line o f th o u g h t o f the last lecture led it seems to m e to be necessary to in se rt a lecture devoted to surveying what has been achieved. T his will enable me to say som ething about the connections betw een the various positions an d to add a su pplem ent th at will be im p o rtan t fo r w hat will follow.

/.

T h e various theses ab o u t the m eaning of assertoric sentences (a.s.) are as follows. (1) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows fo r which state of affairs it stands. (2) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows in which circum stances it is to be used. (3) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows w hat its truth-conditions are. (4) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows w hat its verification-rules are. (5) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows w hat belief the person who uses it com m unicates to a hearer. (6 ) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if one knows which assertion-act a speaker can p e rfo rm with it (illocutionary act theory). (7) O ne u n d e rsta n d s an a.s. if o ne knows the verification-gam e whose opening-m ove is p e rfo rm e d with it. T h e m ost striking thing both about the line o f thought as it has turned out and abo u t virtually all im p o rtan t m o d ern theories is the central position which the concept o f tru th suddenly acquires. You could say:

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that statem ents can be tru e or false is som ething one has always known. Before Frege, however, no one had hit upon the idea o f defining the m eaning - the sense - of a sentence by means of its truth-conditions. T h e ‘reality-relation’ of statem ents was also understood as tru th in the philosophical tradition, but this relation always rem ained pre-defined as a relation to things (res), to beings. It is only when one is prim arily orientated towards sentences ra th e r than towards nam es that it seems natural to start with the possible tru th of a sentence and by reference to this u n d erstan d even its m eaning. B ut how is this tru th that is no longer gro u n d ed in an orientation tow ards objects to be understood? T h e re is a great tem ptation simply to presuppose the concept of tru th as an unanalysed basic concept, as was done with the concept of an object in traditional philosophy. And in fact this is precisely what most analytical philosophers do, both those who have regarded the form ula of the Redundancy T heory as an answ er to the question of the m eaning of ‘tru e ’ ra th e r than m erely a starting-point, and also those who, in the question o f the m eaning o f an assertoric sentence, have been content with thesis (3). T hese two views, which are often held simultaneously, contradict one anoth er. For th e idea that the word ‘tru e ’ is eliminable, as the R edundancy T h eo ry claims, is incom patible with the idea that it is indispensable to the determ ination o f the m eaning o f a sentence. If one is w ondering w hether th ere is an alternative to the objectorientated approach - thesis ( 1 ) - and the orientation towards the con­ cept o f tru th , th en it is clear th at this is not provided by the actiontheoretical account given in (5) or (6 ), for this m ust either itself have recourse to the concept o f tru th or revert to the object-orientated approach. T h e only alternative seems to be the conception represented by (2 ) which relates the sentence to the circumstances of its employment. T h e th ree great conceptual alternatives for understanding the realityrelation o f a sign thus seem to be ( 1 ) the relation to an object (2 ) the relation to circum stances of use (3) the relation to truth. It is of course a cru d e simplification to speak o f alternatives here. We shall see that ju st as the object-orientated approach took some account o f the truthrelation, so too the tru th -o rien tated approach includes the relation to objects as a necessary com ponent. Thesis (2), we have seen, is hopelessly inadequate. Now that we have arrived at the tru th -o rien tated conception we can also see why it is. Despite a ra th e r dangerous ambiguity which the w ord ‘circum stances’ thereby acquires we can contrast theses (2) and (3) by saying that according to (2 ) to understand a sentence is to know in which circumstances it is to be used, whereas, according to (3), to u n d erstan d a sentence is to

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know in which circumstances it is true. T h e p ro p o n ent of thesis (2) found it necessary to re-in terp ret what we can now recognize as the grounds o f the truth o f a statem ent as the conditions u n d er which the statem ent is used. Why this was hopeless can now easily be seen. Employmentgrounds and tru th -g ro u n d s are two entirely different things. T h e con­ dition of o ur significantly using a statem ent is not that we have grounds for its truth but only that we know what they are; and this is precisely what is m eant by saying that we know what its truth-conditions are. From a methodological point of view, however, thesis (2), which is false, has an advantage over (3), which is correct. It meets the require­ m ent, which thesis (3) does not meet, that the m eaning of an expression m ust be explained by explaining how it is used. Admittedly Wittgenstein’s principle, which I called the fundam ental principle of analytical philos­ ophy, does not go quite as far as this. It says only that the m eaning is what the explanation of the m eaning explains. A nd one can say that we explain the m eaning of a sentence by giving its truth-conditions. But such an explanation is bound to be circular so long as one is unable to explain the truth-conditions themselves. A nd this can only be done by showing what one has to do to justify the statem ent or, putting it another way, by showing how one verifies the statem ent. T herein lies the supe­ riority of thesis (4) over thesis (3), a superiority one can also describe by saying that to speak o f tru th , both in general and in reference to a particular statem ent, rem ains empty so long as one does not explain the word ‘true’ itself; and this one can only do by showing how one recognizes that a statem ent is true. Thesis (4) is superior to (3) inasm uch as it explains truth-conditions by reference to a rule o f action, but it does not show in what sense this rule o f action is the em ploym ent-rule of the sentence itself. Besides, the explanation it gives would apply ju st as much to the reduced expression ‘th a t// as to th e assertoric sentence itself, *p\ T h e same truth-conditions, or the same verification-rule, hold for both expressions. B ut whereas if one only says ‘that p ’ one leaves it open w hether the truth-conditions are fulfilled, w hether following the verification-rule will lead to success, if one uses the sentence ‘p ’ one asserts that the truth-conditions are fulfilled or that following the verification-rule will lead to success. It is only thesis (7) which does justice to this aspect of the m eaning of a sentence. In this thesis I have given a precise m eaning to thesis (6 ) which as it stands is vague - that an assertoric sentence is used to make an assertion, by combining it with (4) and hence also with (3). It is only on the basis o f (7) that it becomes intelligible how by explain­ ing the verification-rule one explains the em ploym ent-rule o f the sen­

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tence. T h e em ploym ent-rule is not identical with the verification-rule the em ploym ent-rule is the rule which relates the em ploym ent via the verification-rule to the game-outcome - the verification-rule is, however, that com ponent o f the em ploym ent-rule o f an assertoric sentence that distinguishes it from the em ploym ent-rule of another assertoric sentence. Perhaps it still strikes you as strange th at the rule which concerns the verification o f a sentence should be its em ploym ent-rule. It is not the verification-rule, you m ight say, which determines the use of a sentence. C ertainly not. B ut the em ploym ent-rule o f som ething which has a func­ tion is not w hat ‘determ ines’ its use, if this means: what motivates or somehow causes its use, o r what determ ines in which circumstances it is used. W hat we are looking fo r u n d e r the heading ‘em ploym ent-rule’ is what we explain to som eone when we explain to him the use o f a lin­ guistic expression. A nd w hen we explain to som eone the use of an assertoric sentence we are not explaining what the occasions, circum ­ stances or motives o f its use are. R ather we are showing him w hat som e­ one who uses it is guaranteeing and how he does this. Sum m arizing we can say: thesis (1) commits a hysteron-proteron. (2) is false but contains an im p o rtan t methodological principle. (3) and (4) are correct b ut insufficient. (6 ) is correct but indeterm inate and all three are in corporated in my thesis (7). T h e re rem ains (5), the thesis which agrees with (7) inasm uch as it too starts out from the assum ption that the em ploym ent-rule of an assertoric sentence relates to its function but which interprets this function as com m unication. II We have already seen th at thesis (5) is incorrect because it founders on W ittgenstein’s fundam ental principle (p. 182). O n the o ther hand, the statem ent th a t / 2 when, vis-ä-visB, he u tters *p\ intends to bring it about that B believes th at A believes that/?, is correct. Accordingly if (7) is a correct analysis o f the em ploym ent-rule o f ‘p ’ th en this statem ent must follow from (7). I m ust th erefo re supplem ent the critique o f (5) from the standpoint o f my own conception by placing the two conceptions into a positive relationship to one another. B ut first a rem ark about term inology. C oncerning Grice’s ‘m eaning’ (vouloir dire) th e re are two possibilities: Either the notion of m eaning is understood as being correlative to that o f un d erstan d in g (such that one can say: the h e a re r u n derstands, or does not u n d erstand, w hat the speaker ‘m eans’) - and this appears to be the m eaning which ‘m ean’ or vouloir dire (and the G erm an meinen) actually has in ordinary linguistic

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usage. B ut in that case it is false th a t w hat a sp eaker m eans by ‘p ’ is that he wants to bring it about, etc.; r a th e r this is w hat he would m ean if, he said ‘I want to bring it about, etc.’ W hat he m eans by u tterin g ‘p ’ is to assert that p. It is this th at the o th e r perso n un derstands. Or I g ra n t Grice his terminology. I then have to say that th e function o f an assertoric sentence, o r the intention with which such a sentence is used, is not that o f m eaning som ething with it b u t ra th e r th a t o f asserting som ething with it. A nd now to business. Both in Grice and in my in terp retatio n the use o f a sentence is u n d e rsto o d intersubjectively. A ccording to Grice, how ­ ever, the addressee is th e object o f an in te n d e d effect; whereas in my account he is a p a rtn e r in a game. T his m eans (1) that in G rice’s account the com m unication-act is one-sided, w hereas in my account it is in trin ­ sically reciprocal: the speaker addresses th e h e a re r as som eone who can take up a position tow ards what h e says. T his anticipation of positiontaking belongs to the m eaning o f an assertoric sentence (cf. p. 189f). From this, however, it follows th at (2) in my in te rp re ta tio n the speaker can assum e the role o f the addressee in the capacity o f ‘N o ’-utterer. T h e ph en o m en o n o f speaking to o n eself presents no difficulty for this co n ­ ception; even if we are speaking to ourselves the use o f an assertoric sentence consists in an assertion in the sense described. It is only this conception which m akes it possible, on the o n e hand, to take account o f the intersubjective ch aracter o f speech and, o n the o th e r hand, to avoid the absurd consequence th at a sentence does n o t have the same m ean ­ ing in soliloquy as it has in conversation with a n o th e r . 1 O n the o th e r h an d I m ust now ad m it th at in my account an essential function o f intersubjective assertoric speech, viz. its com m unicationfunction, has so far been om itted. W hen I u tte r a sentence ‘p ’ I do not norm ally do so with the in tention o f challenging the h e a re r to a verification-gam e, but ra th e r with the inten tio n o f informing him (bringing it about in a specific way th at he believes), by m eans o f my assertion, that p or at least that I believe that p. Even if my thesis th at the com m unication-function does not belong to the m eaning of the sentence is correct I m ust still be able to explain this function. As the notion of believing th a tp is clearly essential in the form u latio n o f the com m unication-function we m ust first ask: w hat is m ean t by belief, an d in w hat relation does it stand to assertion? I am n o t in a position to give a definition o f ‘belief’; n o r do I know w hether th e re is a satisfactory explanation o f this word. O ne of the chief difficulties is this: we also speak o f belief in reg ard to beings which do not speak and in re g a rd to ourselves in contexts in which we do not

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speak and hence do not use an expression such as ‘p ’ or ‘that p \ ‘B elief’ - as Peirce was the first to em phasize 2 - refers to an act-disposition. We say o f a being that it believes that p if in its actions it takes account of the fact that p. A lternatively one can say that it relies on o r banks on that p, that in its actions it presupposes that p. Belief is the cognitive disposition which, to g eth er with th e voluntative or instinctual disposi­ tions, d eterm ines intentional action; and, as I have already pointed out (p. 184), p rio r to the use o f sentences there is no action in which this disposition is m anifested by itself (so it can only be an external description w hen we speak o f a belief o f an anim al by means o f the expression ‘that p ’ which refers to a sentence). In contrast to this b ro ad concept o f belief (Glauben) we can define a n arro w er concept, using for purposes of term inological contrast the term opine (Meinen):3 A opines that p = def. if A is presented with the question ‘p o r n o t-p?’, an d if he has no intentions which go beyond the gam e-outcom e, he will assert that p. This concept thus refers to the tendency or readiness o f a person to guarantee the truth of the assertion that/? in so fa r as he has no intentions which go beyond the outcom e o f the game. T his qualifying clause can also be expressed thus: ‘in so far as the p erso n ’s speech-act is d eterm in ed only by the intention that the gam e should have a positive outcom e for him ’. So here we do find it necessary to speak o f losing and w inning the game, for the reason that h e re it is a question o f th e m otivation for taking one side or the other o r for abstaining. In describing the verification-game in the last lecture I ignored this question. I was able to do so because one can explain the gam e to som eone w ithout reference to the question of the m otivation for playing on one side o r the other. I said in the last lecture that the outcom e o f the gam e does not consist in a player winning or losing but rather in an assertion p roving to be tru e or false (p. 204). But this means that if we now consider the game from the point o f view of the intentions o f the players, o r th eir readiness to take one side or the other, the inten­ tion o f w inning the gam e can equally well be described as a truth-intention: the speaker intends to assent to an assertion that is tru e . 4 One can call this in tention in the em ploym ent o f an assertoric sentence, which is concerned only with the positive outcom e of the verification-game, a purely theoretical intention. It is this purely theoretical intention which enters into the definition o f ‘opining’ through the qualifying clause ‘if he has no intentions going beyond th e gam e-outcom e’. O pining, like belief, is defined as a specific act-disposition. B ut here the act consists only in the em ploym ent o f an assertoric sentence with the purely theo­ retical intention ju st described. O ne can therefo re call this act a purely

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theoretical act. O f course it is n o t these labels which m atter; what m at­ ters is that in opining, as thus defined, we have a belief-disposition which represents an isolable cognitive disposition. W hereas the broad concept o f belief refers to a cognitive disposition which can only be extrapolated as an item co-existing with voluntative dispositions to explain in ten ­ tional acts, in the case of the disposition o f opining one can speak o f a purely cognitive disposition, inasm uch as the acts in which it is m ani­ fested are determ ined solely by the intention o f truth. However, opining as thus defined - in oth er words assertoric belief can now be subsum ed u n d er the broad concept of b elie f: som eone who without reg ard to fu rth e r intentions has a tendency to assert that/? will also take account o f thatp in his actions. O n the other hand one cannot say that, whenever A believes that/?, he also opines that/?. T he contra­ position o f the previous sentence, however, clearly does hold: if he does not believe that p then neither does he opine that p; hence one can convict som eone on the basis of his actions of the untruthfulness o f his assertorically expressed opinions. It would, however, be a mistake not to differentiate actions and lin­ guistic utterances, but simply regard them as manifestations of one beliefdisposition. T h e purely cognitive disposition o f opining outlined by the definition ju st attem pted is an in d ep en d en t disposition whose definition contains the concept o f assertion; through the connection thereby given with the verification-game it acquires certain differentiating and con­ trastive features which do not belong to non-assertoric belief. (1) W hereas in the case of any belief one can speak o f its causes, opinions also have grounds. O ne m ight even be tem pted to substitute the following defi­ nition fo r the one I have given: A opines that/? = def. A expects that the assertion that/? can be shown to be true. T h e definition I have given would then be the consequence o f the definiens that has now been given. However, as a definition this suggestion would be circular, for ‘expects’ is simply an o th er w ord for ‘opines’. (2) T h e readiness to assert that/? is grou n d ed in an explicit or implicit decision between the assertion that p and the assertion th at not-p; thus to opinion, unlike non-assertoric belief, th e re belongs the contrast with the possibility of undecidedness, or of d o u b t w hether the assertion that p is tru e or false. Doubt too concerns the justifiability of the assertion. (3) At the other end o f the scale, if the opinion is com bined with consciousness of the indubitability (and that means: the com plete verification) of what is believed then the person concerned says not only th at he opines that/?, but that he knows that p. We also make a distinction between belief and knowledge in the case of non-assertoric belief (e.g. o f animals). But that is another concept

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of knowledge according to which knowledge is correct belief; the classical definition of knowledge as a belief that is not ju st true but also adequately g ro u n d e d 5 clearly fits only assertoric belief. I f we now retu rn to the question o f the relation between assertion, belief, com m unication and the m eaning of an assertoric sentence, th en clearly as regards belief we can restrict ourselves to the n arrow er concept o f assertoric belief, i.e. to opining. I shall begin with the connection between opining and assertion. T h e definition o f opining I have given defines this connection in a specific way. We can now test the adequacy of this definition by reference to the way in which assertoric speech itself expresses itself. Clearly, the h ea rer can receive the sp eaker’s assertion in such a way that he says: ‘H e asserts th a tp; but he does n o t opine th at/?.’ T h e speaker himself, on the o ther hand, cannot say ‘p; b u t I do not opine that /?’. Searle has attem pted to in terp ret this featu re - that it is not possible to assert that p and at the same time openly adm it that one does not opine that/? - as one of the rules o f assertion, or o f the em ploym ent of an assertoric sentence. H ow ­ ever, the connection o f this rule —which he calls the ‘sincerity ru le’ with the in any case inadequately developed main rule (‘essential ru le ’), in place o f which I have p u t thesis (7), rem ains unclear. A nd, of course, this connection is bound to rem ain unclear so long as one has not decided w hether opining is to be defined by reference to assertion or vice versa. T he syncretism o f Searle’s theory here reaches its high-point. O n the one hand, the speech-act which consists in th e em ploym ent of an asser­ toric sentence is characterized as assertion and determ ined by the ‘essential ru le’. O n the other han d , the em ploym ent o f a sentence ‘p ’ is supposed to consist in the speaker’s taking the ‘responsibility’ for opining that p; b u t we are not told anything about th e m eaning of ‘opine’. In fact th ere is a clear alternative here. Either one defines assertion the em ploym ent o f an assertoric sentence - by reference to opinion, thus for instance: ‘a sentence “p ” is used to express the opinion that /?’ - a definition that would be unobjectionable if only it were possible to give an explanation o f the w ord ‘opine’ and o f the m eaning of the expression ‘that/?’ which did not have to appeal to the em ploym ent-rule o f the sentence ‘/?’ defined by the verification-game. Or one assumes that this is not possible and defines opinion as I have done, by reference to assertion. T h en the fact that when one uses the sentence ‘/?’ one expresses that one opines that p - or in o th e r words: cannot openly adm it that one does not believe that/? - cannot be a com ponent of the employmentrule of *p\ R ather it would have to follow from the m eaning of ‘opine’

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as I have ju st defined this word. T h a t it does in d eed follow from this definition is easy to see. F or if som eone asserts th a t p, and hence gu ar­ antees th at it is tru e th at p, then he cannot at the same tim e openly adm it that it is not his intention to assert som ething that is true. Someone who asserts th a t p w ithout opining th a t p p erfo rm s the opening-m ove o f th e verification-gam e w ithout the intention o f w inning the game; his opening-m ove is the opening-m ove o f one who w ould have chosen this opening-m ove with the intention of w inning the gam e. O n the basis o f the definition o f opinion we can also fo rm u late this as follows: he expresses by his assertion an opinion which is not his but that of a person who asserts the same with the inten tio n o f asserting som ething true, and this m eans: he deceives his p a rtn e r about his gam e-intention, and th at m eans: ab o u t his opinion. B u t now w hat does this m ean for the act o f assertion? L et us look at the m atter fro m the perspective of th e hearer. If th e latter notices that the speaker does not opine what he asserts th e n for the h ea rer this m eans th at th e player has m ade his m ove w ithout the intention of win­ ning. N onetheless he has m ade a m ove which has its significance with referen ce to the gam e-outcom e in d ep en d en tly o f the player’s intention o f winning. O therw ise expressed, it m eans fo r the h e a re r that the speaker does n o t stand beh in d his assertion, nonetheless h e has m ade the assertion. T h e h e a re r will not now take th e speaker seriously; he can, how ever, take the assertion seriously. W h eth er or not th e speaker stands behind his assertion is im p o rtan t to the h e a re r as regards the question of w hat weight he gives to th e sp eak er’s utterance. But this circum stance does not belong to the sentence’s em ploym ent-rule, which is defined by referen ce to the gam e-outcom e. T h e re is m anifested h e re a peculiar in d ep en d en ce o f the gam e from the players, which in the previous lecture I described by saying that the outcom e of th e gam e does not consist in a play er’s having won or lost, b ut ra th e r in an assertion’s proving to be tru e o r false. T h e sam e is tru e of th e opening-m ove. In this gam e o n e and th e sam e move can be p er­ fo rm ed by several persons, one an d th e same g u aran tee can be given by several persons. If o n e of you says to m e ‘T h e re ’s a m an waiting outside for you’, and im m ediately afterw ards a n o th e r p erson uses the sam e sentence, I will say ‘I ’ve already h eard . W hy do you say it again?’ O n th e o th er h a n d , they would clearly not both be com m unicating the sam e thing to me if one w ere to say ‘I believe th at a m an is waiting o u tsid e’ and th e oth er w ere to add ‘I believe so too.’ T h e one assertion w ould thereby acquire g re a te r w eight for me. W hat is cancelled out if

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som eone openly adm its that he does not opine what he asserts is not the assertion, the guarantee, but the dispositional participation of this individual in the guarantee. Now th at the connection between assertion and opinion has been explained an d it has been m ade clear that the recourse to opinion is not necessary to explain the m eaning of an assertoric sentence, but that ra th e r the dependence is the o th er way ro u n d , we must ask: given that this is so, how are we to u n d erstan d the com m unication-function em phasized by Grice? W hat I have so far said about the connection between assertion and opinion also applies to speaking to oneself, though o f course in this case - trivially - th e possibility of asserting som ething one does not opine no longer applies. In every monological employment o f an assertoric sentence there is expressed an opinion of the person; an d in the fact that all opinion is always also a belief, in the broad sense of this word, is g rounded the practical significance of assertoric speaking to oneself. It may seem strange th at although it started o u t from the intersubjec­ tive em ploym ent-situation, my description of the em ploym ent-rules of sentences does not so far contain the aspect of communication. It is im p o rtan t to be clear what the reason for this is. W hen one explains to som eone how an assertoric sentence is used it is presupposed that the p artn er is an arbitrary person, so long as he knows the same employmentrules. In the same way, when the rules of chess are explained to someone it is assum ed th at o n e’s p artn er is an arbitrary person who knows the sam e gam e-rules. This arbitrariness of p artn er is a reason (though not the only one) why one can also play the verification-game with oneself (one cannot play chess with oneself). T o u n d erstand how a sentence is used to com m unicate involves m ore than knowledge of the employmentrules, inasm uch as th e com m unication is always a com m unication to specific persons, not arbitrary persons. If I wish to be understood by a particular person, th en , in addition to intending to assert that/?, I m ust also in ten d to bring it about that this person notices that I am asserting that/?. In precisely the same way, if I am playing chess with someone and make a certain move, then, in addition to having the intention which governs th e move and is related to the outcom e of the game, I m ust also intend to bring it about that my p artn er notices that I have m ade this particular move. This ancillary intention is realized - in the assertoric gam e as in chess - by the player (a) seeing to it that his p artn er perceives which sign he is using and (b) - on the assum ption that th ere are several signs or sign-systems for the same game-act - choosing a sign or signsystem (a language) which (i.e. the rules of which) is fam iliar to his part-

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ner. However, these presuppositions of communication (viz. that the partners reciprocally know o f one an o th er that they are using the same signs in accordance with the same rules, and that they use the signs in such a way that each notices which sign the other is using), no more belong to the em ploym ent-rules of linguistic signs than they do to the em ploym ent-rules of other game-signs. If, in som eone’s perceptual range, I use an assertoric sentence *p' the rules o f which he knows, then he knows that I am asserting that/?. Now, if I have occasion to intend that the o th er knows that I am asserting that p, then I also have occasion to intend that he opines that I am seriously asserting that/?, and this means that I opine that/?. O f course I cannot bring it about that he knows that I opine that/?. But, since, for the most part, som eone who asserts that/? also opines that/?, my partner, if he knows that I am asserting that p, also has a reason (even if not a sufficient reason) to opine that I opine that/?. And since, for the most part, when som eone opines th at /?, his opinion is m ore or less wellfounded, my p artn er, if he knows that I am asserting that/?, also has reason him self to opine that/?. T hus by seeing to it that someone notices that one is asserting that/? one can inform (mitteilen) him that/?. For what is here called communication (Mitteilung), however, it is not only essential that one intends to bring it about, by means of conventional rules, that the h earer believes som ething (which is what Grice’s theory essentially comes down to), but that one intends to bring it about, by means of an assertion, that he opines som ething. This m eans that the communication is essentially exposed to the possibility of denial, and hence doubt, and belongs, therefore, to a potential dialogue; the effect is only achieved to the extent that the p artn er regards the o th e r’s assertion as justified. Ill With this I conclude the debate with thesis (5) and would now like to indicate a difficulty which has probably been troubling you for some time and which will give me the opportunity to make a few supplem en­ tary rem arks. W hen I drew attention to the Yes/No response of the hearer there seem ed no way o f avoiding having to say: there is something that is affirm ed or denied. A nd this was even clearer when the same response was expressed in the utterance ‘that is true/false’. It is to this same thing that the other position-takings relate and it was this too of whose truth-conditions I afterw ards spoke. Is there not revealed here, you will have asked yourselves, an objectual com ponent in my own conception? No doubt this is so. W hat we have to ask ourselves is (1)

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how should we in terp ret this objectual element? (2 ) how far can I none­ theless claim that the recourse to it does not rep resent a reversion to the object-orientated approach? Following ordinary linguistic usage I have called that which is true or false ‘the assertion’. O ne m ight th erefore be inclined to think that the objectual elem ent that we have h ere encountered - that which is true or false - is the speech-act, the use o f an assertoric sentence. For it was this that I have called assertion. However, it is easy to see that the expression ‘the assertion’ is am biguous and th at I have also in fact used it am biguously : 6 ( 1 ) we can call an individual assertion-act one assertion (2 ) in ordinary speech we say that som eone repeated one assertion or that several people m ade the same assertion. In both (1) and (2) it is t h e a ^ r tion-act that is referred to, but obviously we m ust distinguish between the act-event and the act-type. To this distinction there corresponds an analogous distinction on the part of the sign. W hen an assertoric sign ‘p ’ - or any o th er sign - occurs m ore than once, or is used m ore than once, we can say that th ere are several signs (sentences), that is, several physical occurrences o f the same structure. B ut we can also say (and this is the m ore usual way of speaking) that it is o n e sign that occurs or is used several times. Following Peirce, the sign-event is referred to as the sign-token, and the one sign that occurs several times as the sign-type. It is clear that when we enquire about the rule o f the em ploym ent of a sign we m ean the sign in the sense o f the sign-type. T h e ambiguity in speaking o f the assertion-act corresponds m ore o r less exactly to this ambiguity in speaking o f a sign. B ut we m ust distinguish a fu rth e r am biguity in the expression ‘the assertion’. We have seen that one can automatically supplem ent the sen­ tence ‘This assertion is tru e ’ as follows: ‘This assertion that/? is tru e .’ Can we still say that what ‘the assertion that/?’ refers to is the assertionact (in the sense of the act-type)? Clearly we have to distinguish the assertion in the sense o f the asserting (the assertion-act w hether as acttype or act-event) and the assertion in the sense of what is asserted. It is only the assertion in this third sense - in the sense of what is asserted which is th at which we call true or false. T h e distinction ju st indicated corresponds not only to linguistic usage (we do not say of the speechact that it is tru e or false) but also to a distinction we encountered in describing assertion as an act of guaranteeing: someone who uses a sen­ tence ‘p ’ (1) indicates what he is guaranteeing and (2) guarantees it. This distinction is a necessary one, for it is possible to take up a position towards that which the sign-user asserts - thus towards th at which he guarantees - which is o th er than that of guaranteeing. O ne can assert

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that it - the same thing that had been asserted - is false or doubtful, etc. T h e assertion-act which som eone p erform s when he employs the sentence thus consists in this: it asserts something; and that means: takes u p a position towards the same thing towards which a differen t position can also be taken u p , but to which, equally, the same position can be taken. This implies that, because th e Yes/No relates to tru th , there belongs to assertoric speech a basic relation to som ething identifiable, and this means: a relation to an object. If one considers assertoric speech, in contrast to a m ore prim itive, circum stances-related language, its char­ acteristic feature is th at it relates to tru th and by virtue of this to objects. O ne m ust th erefo re say that the prim ary objects o f assertoric speech those to which it relates qua assertoric speech - are those of which it can be predicated th at they are tru e or false. T h e objects which we h ere enco u n ter u n d e r the title ‘that which is asserted’ are of course the same as those we m et earlier u n d e r the description ‘states o f affairs’ or ‘th o u g h ts’ o r ‘propositions’ (p. 43). T he problem o f these objects which can be tru e or false is usually treated by contrasting them with spatio-tem poral objects, which are taken for gran ted and reg a rd e d as unproblem atic. W ithin a limited enquiry such a pro ced u re is justified, inasm uch as spatio-tem poral objects are iden­ tifiable in space and time, w hereas a state o f affairs that/? can only be identified by saying: it is th at which is asserted w hen one uses the sen­ tence . So although talk o f objects th at can be tru e or false is as fu n ­ dam ental as the use o f assertoric sentences (as became clear in the analysis o f the em ploym ent-rule of assertoric sentences in the last lecture) the identification o f such an object that p presupposes the understanding of the em ploym ent-rule of th e co rresponding sentence ‘p ’. H erein lies the difference from the object-orientated position (the explanation of the em ploym ent-rule of the sentence does not have to refer to the object that p. cf. above p. 2 0 2 ). T h e explanation o f the ontological status of a state o f affairs we have ju st given - that an object th at p is identified as th at which is asserted when the sentence *p* is used - is, of course, not satisfactory as it stands; it can merely serve to indicate the direction in which we have to enquire. For the explanation as it stands is peculiarly elusive and invites the fu r­ ther question: w hat is that which is asserted when the sentence *p* is used? With this I take up a question which I left open in the introductory reflections on form al sem antics (p. 44). T h e simplest answ er to this question would be: it is the sentence itself, clearly in the sense o f sentence-type. In that case, that which is called

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true or false, and to which position-takings relate, would be the sentence. This view would n o t only be sim ple, but seems also to be presupposed by a widely-held thesis to which I too have appealed. I am referring to thesis (3) (above p. 207). I f we can only explain the m eaning o f a sentence by giving its truth-conditions, th en this m eans that it is sentences that have truth-conditions, hence th at it is sentences which can be tru e or false. T his idea, th at the so-called tru th -b earer is the sentence, would, of course, be subject to at least the following qualification: it is the sen­ tence-type in so fa r as it is em ployed in a particular way. If the same sentence were em ployed differently (e.g. as a sentence o f another lan­ guage) then it would have d ifferent truth-conditions. T h e state of affairs would thus be the sentence-in-a-particular-m ode-of-employment. Hence, what I ju st asserted in general would also hold for this conception: the identification o f the state of affairs presupposes the u n d erstanding of the em ploym ent-rule an d is thus g ro u n d ed in the u n d erstanding of m eaning. However, even with this qualification the view that the state of affairs is the sentence is not tenable. O n the surface even linguistic usage speaks against this identification o f sentence and state of affairs. It is tru e that in G erm an, in contrast to o th e r languages, the word ‘Satz is used in both m eanings - both for the sentence-type and for what is asserted by means o f a sentence-type. T h a t th ere are two m eanings here is shown by the fact th at the term is com pleted differently. O n the one h and, we speak o f the Satz ‘p \ on the o th e r hand o f the Satz that p. W hat lies behind this surface difference? In the first place it is easy to see that (as I have previously pointed out) not only can the sam e sentence stand for different states of affairs when, nam ely, it is used according to d ifferen t rules, but also that dif­ feren t sentences stand for the same state o f affairs if they are used according to the sam e rule, thus have the same m eaning. If we say ‘C opernicus asserted th at the earth revolves aro u n d the sun’, we do not m ean th a t he used th e English sentence ‘T h e earth revolves around the sun’, b u t ra th e r som e sentence o r o th er th at has the same m eaning as this sentence. T h u s the identity-criteria for the state of affairs that p and for the sentence *p* overlap. H ow ever, if that were all, one could still hold that the state of affairs that/? - like the sentence-type ‘/ / - is som ething by reference to which we identify many sentence-events as one Satz. In the case of the sentencetype the unifying-principle is th e form of th e sound- o r script-structure; in the case of the proposition th at p it is th e em ploym ent-rule. So this conception am ounts to equating the identity-criteria for states of affairs

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with those for em ploym ent-rules, and this m eans, for the m eanings of sentences. A nd this means that the state of affairs that/? would be the m eaning o f ‘p \ Now we have already seen (p. 118f) that this conception cannot be correct, for the state o f affairs that/? lacks the assertion-m ode that belongs to the m eaning of'/?’ and which, in the case o f the expres­ sion ‘th a tp ’, is only added by the supplem entation ‘is tru e ’. Besides, the view that the state of affairs that/? is the m eaning of the sentence ‘/?’ collapses when applied to those sentences that contain deictic expressions. H ere we can no longer say that all sentence-occurrences with the same m eaning stand for a proposition that p. For sentenceoccurrences with one and the same m eaning can have different truthconditions, d ep en d in g on the situation in which they are used (by which speaker, at what time); and sentence-occurrences with d ifferen t m ean­ ings can have the same truth-conditions, depending on the employmentsituation. T h e two sentence-occurrences ‘I am h ungry now’ and ‘You were hungry yesterday’ do not have the same m eaning; but they do have the same truth-conditions, or stand for the same state o f affairs that I am hun g ry now, if the first sentence is used by me now and the second by you tom orrow . T h e consideration of deictic expressions calls in question not only the attem p t to construe the tru th -b earer as in some way the sentence or as a classification-principle of sentence-occurrences. I f one cannot speak of the truth-conditions of a sentence at all, then, clearly, the definition of the m eaning o f a sentence as given by me in the last lecture by spec­ ification of truth-conditions or the dem onstration o f its verification-rule is also untenable. However, both difficulties can be rem oved by an app ro p riate supple­ m entation. It is not the sentence-occurrence, but the speech-event, that we m ust regard as the elem entary unit which provides the basis for the truth -b earer. In this way we retu rn to the beginning of the present reflection where I started from the idea that the object th at p is the assertion - in a particular sense of this word - and represents an abstract elem ent of the assertion in the sense o f the speech-act. A nd the speechact, we can now say, is not identified simply by the m eaning of the sen­ tence which it uses, but by the m eaning of the sentence together with the situation in which it uses it. If a sentence contains deictic expressions, then it is only th ro u g h the com bination o f a sentence used according to a certain rule with a certain em ploym ent-situation that th ere arises som ething that can be tru e or false. T h e consequence of this for the m eaning of the sentence is that to understand a sentence ‘/?’ that contains deictic expressions cannot be to know its truth-conditions, but rather

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what the truth-conditions o f the speech-act are which uses it in situation x, where ‘x’ is a variable. This can also be expressed in somewhat technical language as follows: the m eaning o f the sentence is a function whose argum ents are the em ploym ent-situations of the sentence and whose values are assertions, i.e. objects which have determ inate truth-values (or have determ inate truth-conditions for the person who has identified them on the basis of the m eaning o f the sentence employed and the em ploym ent-situation). However, we m ust go a step furth er. N ot only does the em ploym ent of a sentence with one and the same m eaning have different truthconditions, d ep ending on the em ploym ent-situation. It is also true, con­ versely (as was shown by the exam ples ‘I am h u n g ry ’ and ‘You were h u n g ry ’), that sentences with different m eanings, employed in different situations, stand for one and the same assertion with the same truthconditions. Consequently what I ju st said, viz. that it is only through the combination o f a sentence em ployed according to a particular rule with a particular em ploym ent-situation that th ere results som ething that can be tru e or false, m ust be correspondingly supplem ented. T h e combi­ nation just described would characterize only an individual speech-event, and such a fleeting event is not the identifiable situation-independent som ething that can be tru e or false. The assertion —both in the sense of the speech-act-type and in the sense o f what is asserted (the state of affairs that/?) - is rath er the identical som ething whereby all speechevents which, th ro u g h the use of differen t sentences in different situa­ tions, have the same truth-conditions are united into one class. T h e one assertion is thus the unifying principle relative to the many speech-events determ ined by the m eanings of the employed sentences and the situa­ tions, in the same way that the sentence-type and the proposition that/? were, in their different ways, the unifying principles relative to the many sentence-occurrences. W hat is m eant by ‘unifying principle’ is that we count the many occurrences or events as one sentence-type, or as one Satz that/?, if they fulfil a certain condition. In the case of the sentencetype this condition was the form o f the sound- o r script-structure; in the case of the Satz that/? it was the em ploym ent-rule. In the case of the assertion, on the oth er han d , it is not im m ediately clear what it is in virtue o f which the many speech-events, which have neither the meaning of the em ployed sentence n o r the situation in com m on, are counted as one assertion. T o say that they have the same truth-conditions would be correct. But this would be to invoke as the g round of explanation the very thing that has to be explained. For the question is precisely: how

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is it that we can a p p re h e n d differenr. speech-events as having the same truth-conditions? T h e following conjecture, which we m ust later examine, suggests itself: if the m eanings of sentences are functions whose argum ents are the em ploym ent-situations, and whose values are truth-conditions, this can only m ean th at the em ploym ent-rules o f the various sentences which, in their respective situations, rep resen t the sam e truth-conditions recip­ rocally re fe r to one another; this system atic relation between the expressions m ust belong to th eir em ploym ent-rule. T his systematic reciprocal relation, whereby the identical elem ent required for assertoric speech is constituted, m ust be the specific achievem ent of the em ploy­ m ent-rule o f those sentence-com ponents which relate the use of sen­ tences to the situation: the deictic expressions. You may perhaps find strange this conjecture th at it is o f all things the function of situationrelated expressions to m ake the use o f linguistic expressions situationin d ep en d en t. But it can really only a p p e a r strange if one takes for gran ted th e situation-independence of assertoric speech, as som ething obvious. I f we view assertoric speech against the background of m ore prim itive, situation-dependent languages th en we m ust ask: what are the linguistic means w hereby the em ploym ent o f expressions is m ade in d e p e n d e n t o f situation in the m an n er p resu p posed in speaking of ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’. A nd what is th en m ore n atu ral than to suppose that this situation-independence is m ade possible by those expressions which expressly relate to the situation? T h a t this positive function o f deictic expressions in the constitution o f identifiability has h ith erto not been seen is connected with the fact that, in the context o f the usual m eta-linguistic sem antic theories, one did not have to worry about how the expressions which refer to situa­ tions, and which, as everyone adm its, m ust figure in the specification of the truth-conditions o f sentences with deictic expressions, are themselves explained. In the m eta-language the em ploym ent-situation can be re fe rred to by m eans o f expressions which locate the situation in an already p resupposed objective system o f objects in space and time. T h e n atu re o f o u r enquiry clearly rules out p resu p p o sing the un d erstan d in g o f any meta-linguistic expressions. We shall have to ask how the use of expressions which locate the situation in an objective system of objects is itself to be explained. It will em erge - this too I can now merely anticipate as a thesis - that far from it being the case th at the use of situation-related deictic expressions can be explained by means of such objective expressions, the use o f these objective expressions, and with it

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the use of all singular term s which refer to spatio-temporal objects, can only be explained by recourse to the deictic expressions. This suggests a whole new perspective for the problem of propositional objects and spatio-tem poral objects. H itherto in analytical philosophy this problem has been regarded simply as one of identifiability and the two kinds of object have been discussed only in contrast to one another. In the course of a fundam ental discussion of the m eaning of assertoric sentences, however, the basic question is: to what extent is som ething like a relation to objects essential to assertoric speech (in contrast to m ore prim itive, situation-dependent languages)? A nd the prim ary object-relation, w ithout which there could not be assertoric speech, con­ cerns those objects which can be true or false. Now if the identifiability of these objects is g rounded in the use o f deictic expressions, and if the deictic expressions make possible the situation-independence essential to this identifiability by producing through their reciprocal relation a prim ary level o f identifiability in space and time, then one must conclude that a reference to objects in space and time is the condition of the possibility of the use o f the expressions ‘tru e’ and ‘false’. So you see, my opposition to the object-orientated tradition should not be in terp reted as implying that a relation to objects is no longer essential. On the contrary, it emerges that a relation to objects is as basic as the u n d erstan d in g o f assertoric sentences. T h e difference between my position and what I call the object-orientated position consists simply in this: the latter presupposes the object-relation as som ething self-evi­ dent, o r it views objects as correlates o f the pseudo-concept of represen­ tation (Vorstellen) and then puts them in place of the meanings of lin­ guistic expressions; whereas what we really have to do is to show how som ething like an object-relation is only constituted in the rule-governed use of linguistic expressions, and this means: in the understanding of their m eaning. If the hypothesis regarding the positive function of deictic expressions for th e identifiability of states of affairs, and hence for the possibility of using the words ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’, is correct, then clearly we can no longer regard sentences with deictic expressions, as is usual in metalinguistic semantics, as a special case or as an unavoidable complication of socalled natural languages. In the case of sentences which contain no deictic expressions one can speak o f the truth-conditions of the sentence and say th at to u n d erstan d the m eaning of the sentence is to know its truthconditions or its verification-rule. And correspondingly, in the case of these sentences, we can also regard the state of affairs th a tp as a classification-principle of sentence-occurrences (as the ‘Satz that/?’).

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B ut, firstly, it now seems desirable to regard this case as the special case and view the state of affairs that/? in all cases as a classificationprinciple of speech-events. In the special case in which there are no situation-com ponents of the truth-condition the speech events can be identified by the rule of the sentence that is used, and the truth-condi­ tions of the speech-events are therefore, trivially, reducible to the truthconditions of the sentence-occurrences. Secondly, if the thesis referred to is correct, we can clearly no longer assume that the two cases, deictic sentences and other sentences, are of equivalent status. If it is only through deictic expressions that the identity required for the use o f the word ‘tru e ’ is constituted, then the use of an assertoric sentence - a sentence with a truth-claim - that does not refer back in one way or the o ther to deictic sentences is simply inconceivable. If we disregard more complicated sentences - those for instance which refer to abstract objects - then we must envisage two form s of such a reference-back: If it is correct that the use of all singular term s refers back to deictic expressions, then this means that in the case o f all elem entary sentences - all predicative sentences in which concrete (perceptible) objects are referred to - the truth-condition, and hence the verification-rule of the sentence, can itself not be explained without the use of deictic expres­ sions. In other words, the use of an elem entary sentence is a speech-act which, even if it employs a sentence without deictic expressions, only stands for a particular assertion that p if it belongs to a class of speechacts which all have the same truth-conditions, and of which some use sentences with deictic expressions. T hus in the case of such sentences it is a m ere illusion that one, can specify their truth-conditions without deictic expressions, an illusion that can persist only as long as one spec­ ifies the truth-conditions by means of a m eta-language, and which, as we shall see, disappears as soon as one attem pts to explain the employ­ ment-rule. It is much simpler in the case of a second form of reference-back. T h ere are sentences which are such that the tru th or falsity of the asser­ tion depends simply on the truth o r falsity of o th er assertions. Thus no situation-com ponents enter into the truth-conditions of these so-called truth-functional sentences or assertions. But this is only because they already have a situation-independent stratum of assertions that can be true or false as their foundation. So because it is essentially simpler to explain the verification-rules of these higher-level, truth-functional sentences I will begin the concrete presentation of the employmentrules of assertoric sentences with this most simple case and only then

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come back to predicative sentences. At the sam e time it has now become clearer why, prior to the discussion of predicative sentences, we could only achieve a prelim inary concept of the general essence of assertoric sentences (cf. p. 179). T h e situation-independence and identity fu n d a ­ m ental to the use o f all assertoric sentences, and thus an essential aspect o f the m eaning of the words ‘tru e ’ and ‘false’, is constituted at the level of elem entary sentences.

LECTURE 17

A nd’ and ‘o r’

In the lecture b efore last we arrived at a first, prelim inary result in the enquiry into th e m eaning o f assertoric sentences. In the last lecture I related this result to o th er possible conceptions and then supplem ented it in an essential respect. I had started from the assum ption that to understan d a linguistic expression is to u n d erstan d its em ploym ent-rule. It becam e clear th at the u n d erstan d in g of its em ploym ent-rule consists not in know ing in what circum stances it is used, but ra th e r in know ing what its function is; and th at this function consists in asserting something. So far we have only been able to d eterm in e in a general way what this m eans. T o assert som ething is to p erfo rm the opening-m ove in a veri­ fication-game. Such a gam e has the following defining features. T h e re are two m utually negating opening-positions. T h e rules of the gam e are verification-rules. T h e outcom e o f th e gam e is characterized thus: on the basis o f following th e verification-rule the one assertion turns out to be tru e the o th e r false o r one assertion m ust be w ithdraw n in favour of the other. It followed from this general characterization of the em ploym ent-rules o f assertoric sentences that the explanation of the use o f such a sentence m ust consist in the explanation of its verificationrule. It was this question th at rem ained open an d to which we m ust now tu rn . It had to rem ain open, because in g eneral nothing can be said abou t the verification-rules o f assertoric sentences. T hey m ust be shown separately fo r th e d ifferent sentence-form s or, better: different sentenceform s are distinguished precisely by having different sorts o f verificationrule. (Should th at prove to be correct then we would have a basis for re n d e rin g precise the concept o f sem antic form that has h itherto rem ain ed vague.) T h e account given so fa r is thus not only abstract; it is also incom plete so long as it has not been shown how the verification-rules of specific sentence-form s can be explained. O nly by doing this will we be able to

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see how far this conception really provides a basis for the explanation o f the m eaning of individual sentences and sentence-parts. Now we saw at the end of the last lecture that the view that the em ploym ent-rule (m eaning) o f a sentence is its verification-rule must be corrected. T h a t which can be said to have truth-conditions or a ver­ ification-rule is in general not the sentence but what is asserted. T he sentence as such has in general no specific truth-condition or verificationrule. T o know its em ploym ent-rule is not to know its verification-rule, but ra th e r the verification-rule of the assertion which uses the sentence in situation*. At this point, however, we can disregard this complication, for I w anted to begin with sim pler, though higher-level, forms of sen­ tences which do not necessarily contain deictic expressions, thus sen­ tences whose em ploym ent-rule does not contain a situation-reference. In the case of these sentences, th erefore, one can say that the truthcondition, or verification-rule, of the assertion is also the truth-condition or verification-rule of the sentence. H ence, the explanation of the m eaning o f the sentence is reducible to the explanation of this verifi­ cation-rule. T h e simplest type o f such sentence-form s are the so-called truthfunctional sentences, i.e. sentences whose tru th or falsity depends on the tru th or falsity o f oth er sentences. Sentences of this kind are (a) certain form s of com plex sentences, in particular sentences of the form ‘p or q an d (b) the sentences, traditionally known as general sentences, in which words like ‘all’ and ‘som e’ occur. In both cases one has to do with expressions or sentence-form s which had also been taken account of in the tradition, though of course they were interpreted there in an object-oriented way. T hese form s, together with that o f the simple pre­ dicative statem ent, played an essential role not only in m odern logic but also in traditional logic (the en tire A ristotelian syllogistic is exclusively concerned with general sentences), and, as a result, the traditional idea of thinking included these forms as well as the predicative form. It would th erefo re seem to me worthwhile not to begin immediately with the truth -o rien ted analysis of these sentence-form s, but again take as our starting-point the traditional object-orientated conception. In this way we can give the confrontation o f the language-analytical approach with the traditional position a b ro ad er basis. How could the m eaning of the word ‘an d ’ be explained from an objectorientated position? It would clearly be absurd to claim that this word stands for an object. B ut it is not necessary for traditional semantics to do so. F or it had at its disposal the concept of a syncategorematic expression (p. 109). R ather it is characteristic of the traditional view

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to regard the ‘an d ’ as standing for an ‘aggregate’ (Zusammen) of objects. However, this can hardly be a m atter of real composition (Zusammenset­ zung). W hen we say ‘Peter and Paul and Sim on’ we do not mean that the three are joined together or in some way really (real) connected. But what then do we mean? If it is a m atter of composition at all it can only be a composition in ‘th o u g h t’ of the kind contained in H usserl’s concept of categorial synthesis. So if there is any possibility at all of interpreting the meaning o f the word ‘and’ in an object-orientated way, then Husserl’s theory of categorial synthesis seems tailor-m ade for this purpose; and in fact in constructing his theory of categorial synthesis Husserl from the outset had also this case in mind. T h e them atic discussion o f ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’ takes place in §51 of Inves­ tigation VI of Logical Investigations u n d er the heading ‘Collectiva and Disjunctiva’. However, the analysis is only carried out for ‘an d ’. This is probably no accident, for it is difficult to im agine what an object-orien­ tated in terpretation o f ‘o r’ could look like. Now in the case of ‘a n d ’ Husserl speaks o f the ‘conjunctive combination of names or statem ents’. In other words, he treats the case in which the word ‘and’ occurs between names and that in which it occurs between statem ents as analogous. This is a logical consequence of his view that assertoric sentences also stand for objects, namely, states o f affairs (above p. 119). From this it follows that the ‘and’ that occurs between assertoric sentences represents a combination of states o f affairs in the same way that the ‘a n d ’ between names represents a com bination o f objects. This led to Husserl only explaining ‘conjunctive com bination’ with reference to names, for on his view the transference of this explanation to the other case follows automatically. H e gives the following explanation: ‘T h at which corresponds to the words “a n d ” and “o r” . . . cannot be grasped with one’s hands or a p p re ­ hended with some sense; just as it cannot be represented pictorially, e.g. in a painting . . . T h e re is h ere only the one possibility which is always open to us: that we perform a new act o f conjunction (collection) on the basis of the two individual acts o f perception and thereby mean the aggregate o f the objects^ and B .’ In the first sentence H usserl rejects a conception o f ‘an d ’ as the representative of a real combination. In the second he gives his positive explanation which grounds the synthesis in a ‘new’ (categorial) act o f a special kind, an act of conjunction. To this act there corresponds ‘a unitary object which can only be constituted in this act-com bination’. H usserl calls this object a ‘collectivum’ or a lter­ natively an ‘aggregate’ (Inbegriff); by this he would appear to mean the same abstract object which in logic is usually called a ‘set’.

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Is it an intelligible explanation of the word ‘and’, at least as far as it occurs between nam es, to say that the objects that are designated by the names connected by the word ‘a n d ’ together constitute a set? We should not let ourselves be im pressed by the scientific respectability of the word ‘set’. T he explanation that thro u g h the w ord ‘an d’ several objects are combined to form a set explains nothing so long as we do not know what a set is. Now H usserl by no means m erely presupposes this. On the contrary, he tries to explain w hat a set - au aggregate - is by re fe r­ ring to the synthetic act in which, as he thinks, the word ‘a n d ’ is expressed. Now how is this act described? As one which ‘m eans’ ‘the aggregate o f the objects’. This description is H usserl’s explanation of the m eaning o f the w ord ‘a n d ’. Now the question is: is this description intelligible? Do we understand what it really means to mean the ‘aggregate’ of several objects? W hat is m eant by this ‘aggregate’? T h e first thing we think of when we hear this word is some kind o f spatial proximity. B ut H usserl has rightly ruled this out in rejecting the idea of a ‘real’ combination. W hen we say ‘Peter and Paul’ no spatial proxim ity is implied. T h e one may be in Australia, the other in Costa Rica or no longer be alive. B ut what then is positively m eant by the ‘aggregate’? H usserl would no doubt reply: we are here dealing with something entirely sui generis which can only be understood by p erform ing the relevant act. ‘If we want to make clear to ourselves the m eaning of the word “an d ” then we m ust actually perform an act of collection and in the thus genuinely presented aggregate bring to fulfilm ent a m eaning of the form “a and b” ’ (Investigation IV §9 (b)). But now the question once m ore arises: how is an act o f collection char­ acterized? How do I tell that I am perform ing such an act and not some other synthetic act? H usserl is clearly moving round in circles: an act of collection is one which means the aggregate of objects and this aggregate is precisely what is constituted in such an act. Perhaps you will say: what enables one to tell that one is dealing with an act of collection is the fact that it is expressed in the word ‘an d ’. But th at would m ean that what we are to u n d erstan d by ‘aggregate’ is explained by means of ‘a n d ’; whereas H usserl wanted to explain the m eaning of ‘a n d ’ by reference to the ‘aggregate’. B ut if we can only explain the ‘aggregate’ by means of ‘an d ’ we must be able somehow to understan d the latter. But how do we u n d erstan d it? Since the object-orientated in te rp re­ tation has turn ed out to be a gam e with em pty words, we shall have to try to find the step back which we took in the case o f predicates. We must in terp ret the question about the m eaning of the word ‘an d ’ as a question about the explanation o f its use. B ut then the prior question

A n d ’ and ‘or ’

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immediately arises of w hether the use of the word ‘and’ can be explained at all in the way proposed by the object-orientated conception, namely by having it simply stand between nam es - ‘Peter and Paul’ —w ithout this w ord-sequence being supplem ented by a predicate. I believe it can be shown th at such an explanation o f the w ord ‘an d ’ is simply incon­ ceivable. For how could we explain the use o f such a part-expression ‘a and b and c’ by means o f examples? Suppose we try to do so by somehow placing the objects together, or by draw ing a circle and placing them in it. W hat we would then have explained would already include a certain predicate, e.g. ‘a and b an d c are in this circle’. And we would thereby have included a real relation, som ething which H usserl has already rightly ruled out. P erhaps you th in k one could keep rearran g in g the three objects until it is understood th at one is to abstract from the specific m an n er in which they are placed together. B ut it is an illusion to think th at we could in this way bring som eone to u n d ersta n d that we m ean ‘a n d ’; we will rather be understood to m ean that the objects are somehow together. B ut there is no reference to such a being together or spatial proxim ity in ‘a and b\ T h u s the expectation th at one could explain the use o f the word ‘a n d ’ purely in connection with names turns out to be an illusion. A nd it would be a corresp o n d in g illusion to suppose that one could explain what is to be u nderstood by a set w ithout m aking use of predicates. Sets can only be determ in ed with the aid of predicates; we say of all objects to which a predicate is applicable th a t they are elem ents of a set. I f we introduce the concept o f a set in this way th en it should also be noted that, contrary to H usserl’s opinion, an expression of th e form ‘a and V does not rep resen t a set at all. So long as we only use the expression ‘a and b\ then although we can say th at a and b are elem ents of a set, we cannot say th at together they constitute a set; for the expression ‘a and b’ leaves open the possibility that the set also contains o th er elements. You m ight ask: why sh o u ld n ’t one also be able to form a set consisting only of the elem ents a an d b? Clearly one can do this - b u t not by m eans o f the m ere expression ‘a and b\ I f we wish to speak o f the set consisting only of a an d b then o u r form ulation m ust express the exclusion from this set of all oth er objects. So we would have to say: the elem ents of this set are a and b an d no object that is not identical with a or b; and this can be expressed by means o f a m ore com plex predicate by saying: all objects to which th e predicate ‘identical with a or W is applicable constitute the intended set. Notice th at to introduce a set consisting only o f a and b one has to use, not the word ‘and\ but the word ‘or\ You could m ake th e following objection: from the fact that ‘a and b’

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does not stand for a set in the sense of set-theory it does not follow that H usserl’s idea o f an ‘aggregate’, for which the expression ‘a and b* is supposed to stand, is not m eaningful. T h a t is correct. However, perhaps it is precisely on the basis o f this excursus into set-theory th at we can now have a better idea of w hat possible m eaning can be connected with this ‘aggregate’. We have seen that one cannot understand the expression (a and b’ to m ean that a an d b constitute a set, but merely that they are elem ents of a set. B ut elem ents of which set? For this set is not already defined by these two elem ents. Obviously, precisely that set that is defined by the predicate that follows the sentence-part a and b\ I believe this to be the only rem aining sense for H usserl’s idea of an ‘aggregate’. What ‘connects’ a and b is that they are both elem ents of a set which has been left open and has yet to be specified. B ut if this is correct then we can spare ourselves the whole d e to u r into set-theory and say m uch more simply: the sense o f that ‘ag g reg ate’ consists in this, that a predicate that has yet to be specified applies to both a and b. T h e expression ‘Peter and Paul’ should be understood as merely a sentence-fragment. It points forw ard to a predicate F and the thus com pleted sentence - ‘Peter and Paul are F ’ - clearly has the same m eaning as the complex sentence ‘Peter isF and Paul is F.’ With this we would have reached an im portant interm ediate result: not only do expressions of the form ‘a and b’ involve a reference Verweisen) to sentences, in the sense that they are to be understood as sentence-fragm ents; th eir completion to form a whole sentence shows th at ‘an d ’ as it occurs between nam es refers back to ‘a n d ’ as it occurs betw een whole sentences. T his sheds new light on the pos­ sibility o f explaining the use o f the expression ‘a n d ’ by means of exam ­ ples. However, this result requires qualification. Not every sentence of the form ‘a and b are F ’ has the same m eaning as ‘a is F and b is F\ We cannot convert a sentence such as ‘Peter and Paul are standing next to each o th e r’ into ‘Peter is standing next to each other and Paul is standing next to each o th e r.’ We m ust reg ard this sentence-form as a special case. In such a case one is dealing with symmetrical relations. A relation is term ed ‘sym m etrical’ if w henever it holds between a and b it also holds between b and a. If the sentence ‘P eter is next to Paul’ is true, then the sentence ‘Paul is next to P e te r’ is also true. Only in the case of nonsymmetrical relations (e.g. ‘P eter hits Paul’) is it necessary for there to be a syntactical indication which shows the o rd er of the two term s of the relation. N atural languages do this in two ways: by inflection and by w ord-order. In the case o f symmetrical relations this requirem ent no longer applies. H ence in English we have the sentence-form in which

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the o rd e r of the nam es of the two terms of the relation before the pred­ icate is optional. T h a t the word ‘an d ’ also occurs between the two names has no additional semantic significance. ‘Peter Paul stand next to each o th e r’ would have the same m eaning. T h e m ode of em ploym ent of this ‘and’ therefore requires no special explanation. We can thus ignore this special case and tu rn our attention to the em ploym ent of the word ‘an d ’ as it occurs between sentences. We can now also include the word ‘o r’ in the discussion. It is in any case obvious that when ‘o r’ occurs between names (e.g. ‘Peter or Paul’) the expression requires to be supplem ented by a predicate and that the sense of the ‘or that occurs between names is reducible to the ‘o r’ that occurs between sentences. I do not know how Husserl may have conceived, in the case o f ‘o r’, the relation between objects analogous to the ‘aggregate’ o f ‘and’. A disjunction between objects? W hat could that be? Suppose H usserl had followed me up to this point and would adm it that the words ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’ m ust be understood prim arily in their role of com bining sentences to form complex sentences. From his objectorientated position he would have to say that the ‘an d ’ and the ‘o r’ stand for certain syntheses between states o f affairs. But this would be simply to tran sfer the interpretation-schem a which Husserl applied to the ‘an d ’ of names to the new level; and this would result in the same difficulties as before. If it were really a m atter of a synthesis between states of affairs then we should expect, not the expression ‘p and q\ but rather ‘th a tp and th at^’. Such expressions do actually occur and they are indeed analogous to ‘a and b\ for they too require to be supplem ented by a predicate, e.g. ‘T h a t it is raining and that it is warm is pleasant.’ But with regard to this expression we would now have to say that it is equiv­ alent to the higher-level complex sentence ‘T h a t it is raining is pleasant and that it is warm is pleasant.’ We would thus find ourselves in an infinite regress. So H usserl could not even have accepted the interm ediate result reached so far. T o accept it is to have already given up the object-orien­ tated interpretation of ‘an d ’ and ‘o r’. W hat o th er interpretation is conceivable? Someone coming from the object-orientated tradition will now be inclined to pose the question like this: if the word ‘a n d ’ combines neither objects nor states of affairs what then does it combine? However, as we saw in our treatm ent of predicates, what is mistaken in the object-orientated conception is not its view of what is connected by the predicate with the object of the subject-term of the sentence. T h e erro r was m ore deep-seated. It consisted in the assum ption that som ething is com bined with som ething at all. T h e same

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holds for ‘a n d ’ and ‘o r’. We m ust free ourselves completely from the presupposition that the m eaning o f these w ords consists in their com ­ bining in some way som ething with som ething. T h e e rro r in the objectorientated conception of ‘an d ’ is not that it speaks of states of affairs (clearly th ere corresponds to the complex sentence ‘p and q a state of affairs that p and q, likewise to the constituent sentences *p' and ‘q the states of affairs that p and that q)\ ra th e r its e rro r consists in thinking th at the state o f affairs that p and, q is somehow composed of the other two states o f affairs similar to the way in which the sentence ‘p and q is com posed o f the sentence ‘p \ the w ord ‘a n d ’ and the sentence ‘q. As in the case of predicates we again req u ire a m ore general concept which, though em bracing the possibility of composition, also leaves open oth er possibilities. W hen dealing with predicates I introduced the con­ cept of function and then that of m ode of em ploym ent: if the predicate does not have the function of com bining, if that is not its m ode of em ploym ent, then w hat function does it have, how then is it used? Sim­ ilarly we could now ask: what o th er function or m ode of em ploym ent does the w ord ‘an d ’ have? However, we will m ake m ore progress from a theoretical point o f view if we ask this question not of the sentencep art but of th e sentence-whole or the corresponding state of affairs. In th at case the question would have to be: if the state of affairs that p and q does not d ep en d on the states of affairs that p and that q in the sense th at it is com posed of them , in what sense does it depend on them? T h e move from the concept o f composition to the m ore general one of depen­ dence, like th at to the m ore general concepts of function and mode of employment, is still entirely uncontroversial and the object-orientated philosopher would have no reason to resist it. It is uncontroversial that what som eone asserts when he employs the sentence ‘p and q m ust somehow d ep en d on w hat he asserts when he uses the sentence ‘p ’ and on what he asserts when he uses the sentence ‘applies to the object for which the singular term ‘a stands if and only if the assertion ‘Fa is true. Clearly we cannot say analogously: the singular term ‘a stands for that object which, if the predicate ‘F' applies to it, makes the assertion ‘Fa* true. For then the object a would not be distinct fro m all o th er objects to which the predicate ‘F’ applies. T h u s we here en co u n ter an asym m etry reg ard in g the roles o f the predicate and the singular term in the predicative sentence.1 O ne can, it is tru e, say that th e tru th o f the assertion d ep en d s both on which object th e singular term stands for an d on w hether the predicate applies to this object. B ut then one m ust be clear that, w hereas the first

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of these conditions can be form ulated independently of the second, the second cannot be form ulated independently of the first: the question of w hether the predicate applies to the object presupposes that we know to which object, thus which object it is for which the singular term stands. T h o u g h one does not have to, one can describe this state of affairs as follows (this is Straw son’s view):2 the tru th of the assertion does n o t d ep en d o n which object the singular term stands for and on w hether the predicate applies to it; ra th e r the question of the tru th or falsity o f the assertion presupposes that we know for which object the singular term stands. T h e tru th o f the assertion depends (then only) on w hether the predicate applies to this object. W hether the state of affairs should be thus described is disputed. I f one describes it thus this has the consequence th at if th ere is no object, o r m ore than one, for which the singular term stands, the assertion does not count as false. We m ust then say either th at it is n eith er tru e n o r false or th a t the person who uttered such a sentence did n o t assert anything. A lthough Strawson and others have m ade m uch of this question of w hether one should in ter­ pret it in this way o r that it is o f only limited im portance. W hether the assertion is called false or n eith er true n o r false in such cases is a m atter o f convention an d may vary from language to language. I shall be re tu rn in g to this question (Lecture 22). T h e asymmetry between p re d ­ icate an d singular term , how ever, from which this question starts out, represents a non-conventional, substantive difference. W hereas the question o f w heth er the predicate ‘F' applies to the object a depends on o u r knowing for which object the singular term ‘a’ stands, the reverse is not the case: the question of which object the singular term ‘a’ stands for m ust be settled independently of, and is the condition of, being able to establish w hether the predicate ‘F’ applies to it. H ow ever, we should not read too m uch into this result. All th at fol­ lows from it is th at in the question of the tru th of a particular assertion Fa the question o f which object the singular term ‘a’ stands for must already be decided independently of the question of the tru th of this assertion (or of w hether this predicate applies to this object). O n the other h an d it does not follow from this th at what in general it means for a singular term to ‘stand fo r’ an object can be explained in d ep en ­ dently o f the fact th at it is som ething to which predicates can apply, or not apply. T h u s from the tru th-definition of predicative assertions we can arrive at n eith er a positive n o r a negative decision regarding the question of w hether what it is for a singular term to stand for an object can be u n d ersto o d in dependently of the context of predication. Q ur line o f th o u g h t so far suggests th at the object-relation cannot be u n d e r­

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stood independently of the truth-relation. O n the other hand the asym­ metry th at has ju st been described should m ake us cautious. We cannot expect that what has been shown for predicates can simply be trans­ ferred to singular terms. T h e question can only be decided by applying to singular terms the same basic question which guided us in the case of predicates, viz. the question regarding the mode of em ploym ent of these expressions, and this means: the question of how we can explain the em ploym ent of expressions of this type.

L E C T U R E 20

W h a t is it for a sign to stand for an object? T h e traditional account

In the enquiry into the semantics o f singular term s there is no reason why we should not follow the traditional philosopher in describing the relation betw een the singular term and the object by saying that the singular term stands fo r the object. B ut at p resent we should regard this expression ‘stands for’ as a cipher, as an expression whose sense has yet to be specified. I earlier (p. 15If) called W ittgenstein’s dictum ‘T he m eaning o f a word is w hat the explanation of its m eaning explains’ the fundam ental principle o f analytical philosophy, because it instructs one to fram e the philosophical question about the m eaning of linguistic expressions in a way that exactly corresponds to the pre-philosophical question and in fact merely formalizes the latter. According to this principle the philo­ sophical question concerning the understan d in g o f a form o f expres­ sion should be construed as the question o f how pre-philosophically we explain expressions o f this form. In the case o f singular term s we have to do with expressions which not only have a m eaning but also stand for an object. In whatever way these two aspects may be connected, if the expression stands for an object at all then the question about the expression’s m ode o f em ploym ent m ust em brace, together with the question o f how its m eaning is explained, that o f how one explains for which object it stands. A nd we can only answer the philosophical ques­ tion of what it is for an expression to stand for an object by explaining how pre-philosophically one explains in a particular case which object an expression stands for. T o explain what it is for a predicate to apply to an object we asked how we would explain how we establish that a predicate applies to an arbitrary object. Likewise we can only explain what it is for a singular term to stand fo r an object by asking how we establish for which object a singular term stands. T h e question ‘How do we establish it?’ is quite indispensable. W ithout

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it any explanation of an expression would rem ain in the air. W ithin semantics this recourse to establishing corresponds to the move we m ade in th e enquiry into the semantics o f whole assertoric sentences from truth-conditions to verification-rules. In precisely the same way we were able to see in the case o f predicates th at the m eaning of ‘applies’ can only be explained by asking how it is established th at a predicate applies to an object. W ithin ontology this move corresponds to the epistemological (‘tran scen d en tal’) tu rn which ontology took in m odern times; so if the question concerning the m eaning of ‘stands fo r’ assumes this form th ere is n o th in g to p rev en t even the traditional m odern philosopher from going along with us. W hoever refuses to pose the question in this form thereby refuses to enquire into the m eaning of the relation betw een nam e and object at all, how ever this relation is designated. Such an attitu d e is not characteristic of the traditional position but of certain m o d ern sem antic theories, those, nam ely, which in the specifi­ cation of the m eaning o f assertoric sentences rem ain at the level of truth-conditions and specify the latter in a m eta-language. In these the­ ories the n am e-object relation is so construed th at each singular term is ‘assigned’ to an object. This expression ‘assignm ent’ is ju st another w ord for ‘standing fo r’; and like the latter it rem ains vacuous so long as one does not show how it can be established to which object a singular term is assigned. W hat actually h ap p en s in theories of this kind is th at the singular term is simply assigned to an o th er name, a nam e in the m eta-language. T hese theories are m erely logical or linguistic tech­ niques and do not am o u n t to a philosophical position at all. By merely presupposing, ra th e r th an explaining, how we are able to assign a sin­ gular term to an object these techniques m erely presuppose, ra th e r than explain, how we are able to re fe r to objects and what it means to speak of an ‘object’. By contrast it is characteristic of both the epistemologically based m o d ern theory o f objects - transcendental philoso­ phy - and the language-analytical theory of objects that they seek to clarify the object-relation and w hat it means to speak o f ‘objects by recourse to the question o f how objects can be given to us. T h e d iffer­ ence is that w hereas the traditional theory posed this question in d ep e n ­ dently of the question o f the function of the corresponding signs, the language-analytical theory u n d erstan d s the object-relation as a re fe r­ ence (Bezugnahme) which can essentially only be achieved by means of a sign. B u t if we do not wish to com m it a petitio principii vis-a-vis the trad i­ tional p hilosopher we cannot ju st assum e th at we can only refer to objects by m eans of linguistic expressions. O nce again w hat m atters is

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that we should so fram e the question that the traditional philosopher has no difficulty in accepting it. A nd h e can and m ust agree to clarify the question o f what it is fo r a sign to ‘stand fo r’ an object by asking how we would explain, o r establish, in an individual case, for which object a singular term stands. H e must agree to it for one cannot see in what o th er way the m eaning of ‘standing fo r’ could be explained. He can agree to it because th at th ere are signs which stand for objects is not a m atter of controversy. W hat the traditional philosopher wishes to stress is simply th at referrin g by m eans of linguistic expressions is not our only and n o t our prim ary way of referrin g to objects. T h e tradi­ tional philosopher would thus not app ro ach the question of the objectrelation as such from the sign-relation. Nevertheless he too must be capable of explaining this sign-relation. A nd we can expect that it will be precisely in th e question of how we can establish for which object a sign stands that he will find it natural to have recourse to his pre-linguistic way of referring. A nd I im agine that you too, when confronted with this question for the first time, will find it natural to think that we m ust be able to re fe r to an object in a non-linguistic way. For how, one m ight ask, can one explain for which object the sign stands unless one is som ehow able to refer directly to th e object? B ut how is this pre-linguistic object-reference to be understood? We shall obtain the answer to this question from traditional philosophy itself by taking as o u r point o f d e p a rtu re a traditional theory of singular term s which can be reg ard ed as representative. We find such a theory in Jo h n Stuart Mill. By exam ining his theory we will be able to get a clear picture o f what a pre-analytical object-theory m ust presuppose in asking how we can explain, or establish, for which object a singular term stands. As before if we do not wish to proceed dogmatically we must allow the way forw ard to be determ ined only by the difficulties in which the traditional way of posing the problem itself becomes entangled. A n o th er reason for choosing Mill’s theory to debate with is that after having long been reg ard ed by analytical philosophers as disposed of it has recently been finding su p p o rte rs.1 B efore I begin the systematic enquiry into the em ploym ent of singu­ lar term s we should recall the hints for the u n d erstanding of singular term s yielded by the analysis o f the m ode o f em ploym ent of predicates. T hese hints cannot have a justificatory function in the investigation of singular term s th a t is now to be u n d ertak en . However, though com­ pletely hypothetical and vague, they can indicate a direction in which we m ust expect the explanation of singular term s to proceed if our explanation of th e m ode of em ploym ent o f predicates is to be retained.

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T h e distinction between predicates and what I have called quasi-pred­ icates involved no em pirico-genetic hypothesis; and it served only inci­ dentally to contrast predicate-language with m ore primitive languages. T h e indispensable significance of this distinction arose internally from the requirem ents of an explanation o f the mode of em ploym ent of predicates. As was shown in the last lecture this is relatively complex. T h e explanation o f quasi-predicates enabled us to isolate a first level at which we explain a classification-expression without using words like ‘tru e ’ and ‘applies’, but simply the word ‘correct’ in the sense of ‘con­ form ing to a ru le ’. If we could ignore the fact that a predicate is em ployed outside its verification-situation it would be a quasi-predicate. Because an expression which would otherwise be a quasi-predicate becomes a predicate by virtue of its need to be supplem ented by a sin­ gular term it seem ed plausible to suppose that the function of the sin­ gular term must be (a) to m ake the classification-expressions - now sup­ plem ented to form sentences - situation-independent and (b) to refer (verweisen) from the em ploym ent-situation to the verification-situation. T h a t which is classified no longer results of itself from the employmentsituation as in the case o f the quasi-predicate but is taken up into the linguistic expression by being represented by the singular term ; T h ere is thus constituted a speech-act which belongs to a class of speech-acts in o th er situations which all ‘say the sam e’. T he correctness of these speech-acts is in d ep en d en t o f the em ploym ent-situation and points for­ ward to a special situation in which this correctness is established, a correctness which we call ‘tru th ’. I then also indicated that it seems plau­ sible to suppose that in the constitution of situation-independence a special role is played by the situation-relative singular term s, the deictic expressions. A nd in addition we saw in the last lecture that deictic expressions also have a special role inasm uch as the reference (Verwei­ sung) o f the singular term to the verification-situation is to be u n d e r­ stood as the reference to a deictic expression to be used in this situation. T hese connections suggested by the explanation of the m ode of em ploym ent of predicates do not correspond to the usual, not even the usual language-analytical, conception o f singular term s which starts out from the relation of singular term s to objects as som ething obvious and requiring no fu rth e r explanation. But since, on the other hand, it can­ not be doubted th at singular term s stand for objects, then, if these per­ spectives for the u nderstanding of singular term s should tu rn out to be correct, one would have to be able to show, firstly, that such a thing as an object-relation is only m ade possible by the situation-independence of speech accomplished by means o f deictic expressions, a situation-

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independence which at the same tim e makes possible a truth-relation. Secondly, we would have to expect th at the m ost basic (ursprünglich) objects by reference to which all oth er objects in th eir objecthood are to be understood are the speech-situations themselves. T h e perspectives for the semantics o f singular term s arising from the discussion of predicates to which I have so far referred are relatively vague. However, the connection between the semantics o f singular term s and th at of predicates acquired a m ore determ inate form through the truth-definition. I said that the aim o f the investigation is a non-verbal explanation o f the em ploym ent o f the word ‘tru e ’ in p re­ dicative assertions (and th at could only mean: an explanation of how one establishes that assertions of this kind are true) by means of a non­ verbal explanation of (1) how one establishes th at a predicate applies to an object (i.e. the em ploym ent-rule o f predicates) and (2) how one establishes for which object a singular term stands (i.e. the employmentrule o f singular terms). T h u s what we are looking for is an explanation of the em ploym ent of (elem entary) predicative sentences in which not only the word ‘tru e ’ but also the words ‘applies’ and ‘stands for’ no longer occur (and in this way all th ree words - or the em ploym ent of the corresponding sem antic classes o f expressions - would be explained). Now in the last lecture I gave an explanation o f what it is to establish th at a predicate applies which no longer depends on an understanding of the word ‘tru e ’ but (a) rests only on an u n derstanding of the word ‘correct’ (in the sense of ‘conform ing to a ru le’) (b) presupposes an und erstan d in g of the em ploym ent o f singular terms. In this explana­ tion I used neither the expression ‘stands fo r’ nor the expression ‘object’, both of which themselves require explanation; I merely m ade use o f the u n d erstan d in g of the two-place predicate ‘is identical with’ (' = ’).

T h e following additional perspectives for our enquiry into the em ploym ent-rule of singular terms result from this. (1) In the last lec­ tu re the close connection between objecthood and identity - that objects are essentially som ething identifiable - was simply presupposed as plau­ sible. This was an anticipation which can only be justified in the context o f the systematic discussion of singular terms. (2) W hat is m eant by predicates applying to som ething cannot be understood w ithout at the same time u n d erstan d in g what is m eant by objects, or what it is for a singular term to stand fo r an object. Now that it has proved possible to explain this object-relation that is implicit in the notion of applying by, instead of speaking of a singular te rm ’s standing for an object, merely appealing to an u nderstanding o f the identity-sign in connection with

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singular term s and in p articu lar deictic singular term s, it would seem natural to expect th a t the standing-for o f singular term s, even when it is explained by itself, can be reduced to a corresp onding understanding of the identity-sign. Identity would th en not m erely be essential to objecthood (as is generally acknow ledged); the m eaning o f object­ hood could be u n d ersto o d w ithout re m a in d e r in term s of identifiability. T h e consequences of this for the concept of tru th would be as follows. Since th e u n d erstan d in g o f the word ‘tru e ’ in its application to predic­ ative assertions rests on the u n d erstan d in g of ‘applies’ and ‘stands for’ the elem entary use o f the w ord (which recursively underlies the other uses) could be explained purely on the basis of an u n d erstanding of ‘correct’ and the identity-sign. H aving looked at these hypothetical perspectives for a possible language-analytical explanation o f ‘standing fo r’ suggested by the discus­ sion o f predicates I shall now begin th e systematic discussion of the question o f how one can re fe r to objects by m eans of singular term s with a critical assessm ent o f the traditional conception. I shall for the most p art ignore singular term s which stand for abstract objects - such as properties, or states o f affairs - and concentrate on those which stand for concrete (and th at m eans perceptible) objects. In connection with the interpretation o f H usserl’s theory o f m eaning (p. 150) I pointed out that o ne can take as one’s starting-point a crude distinction of concrete singular term s into deictic expressions, p ro p e r nam es and descriptions. In the traditional theory, a p a rt from p ro p er-n am es only descriptions have played a role. It was prim arily orien tated tow ards p ro p e r names because these seem ed to exhibit the standing of a linguistic expression for an object in the most sim ple and direct way. A lready influenced by Frege, H usserl h ere d e p arted from th e usual conception. Like Frege he o rientated him self prim arily tow ards descriptions, for in th eir case one m ust distinguish the object and the m eaning o f the expression. As the classical traditional conception was incapable of dealing with a m eaning that could not be construed as an object it took the p roper nam e to be the prototype of all linguistic expressions. Even for Russell the m eaning of an expression was the sam e as its object.2 A definite description - ‘the so-and-so’ - seems somehow to refer indirectly to an object. It does not stand simply and directly for the object, but - w h eth er or not one wants to speak o f a m eaning h e re - by m eans o f an attribute, which, as the use of the definite article ‘the’ implies, belongs to only one object. As soon as one considers descrip­ tions and p ro p e r nam es the question o f th e ir m utual relationship arises. In H usserl th ere is no explicit theory o f p ro p e r nam es. Frege, on the

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other h and, took the revolutionary and, for the tradition which fol­ lowed him , decisive step of treating p ro p er names, not as the m ore elem entary, but as the higher-level expressions: to establish for which object a p ro p e r nam e stands we have to have recourse to descriptions.3 For exam ple, if we use the p ro p e r nam e ‘Aristotle’ and are asked for which object, for which person, this nam e stands, we can only give descriptions: A ristotle, that is the person who was born in such-andsuch a place at such-and-such a time, the pupil of Plato, the teacher of A lexander the G reat, the philosopher who wrote most of the texts that have come down to us u n d e r his nam e, and who died in Chalkis in 322 B.C. All these descriptions stand for the same object, and their d ifferent m eanings correspond to its d ifferen t ‘modes of presentation’. T hus underlying the prim acy of descriptions over p ro p er names urged by Frege is the ontological-epistem ological idea that there is no such thing as an ‘object as such’ behind its m odes o f presentation, which could be somehow directly re fe rre d to by means of a p ro p er name. T hough im portant, this insight, which was also taken over by Husserl, does not, as such, explain w hat it is fo r a singular term - and for Frege this means: a description - to ‘stand fo r’ an object. Let us now leave this conception and retu rn to a conception which also distinguishes betw een p ro p e r names and descriptions but which regards the object-relation of p ro p e r names as the m ore elem entary. We find such a view in Mill.4 Mill calls all categorem atic expressions, thus all so-called ‘term s’ o f traditional logic, ‘nam es’ and distinguishes general names and individual names. T h e for us im portant distinction between connotative and non-connotative names he also applies to gen­ eral term s; for us how ever it is only im portant in regard to individual names, singular term s. All individual names according to Mill are ‘de­ notative’, i.e. they stand for an object. But only descriptions are in addition ‘connotative’, i.e. they stand for their object by means of an attribute which they ‘connote’. P ro p er names, by contrast, are non-connotative. T hey do n o t refer to their objects as to the sole bearers of an attribute but are ‘attached to the objects themselves’. O f course, one im m ediately asks: what is one to understand by such a direct assignm ent? Unlike the meta-linguistic semantic theorists Mill does not evade this question. T h e rob b er in the tale of Alibaba m arks a house with a chalk-sign so as to be able to recognize it again as the same, and distinguish it from others; this is how one should think of the func­ tion of p ro p e r nam es. But the use of a nam e, one will object, does not consist in its being affixed to the object fo r which it stands. (For certain purposes, of course, this can hap p en , e.g. in the case of localities, ships,

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participants at a congress. But one would hardly seek to understand the general nam e-relation by reference to these special cases. O n the con­ trary, one will only be able to explain those special cases on the basis of an understanding of the general nam e-relation.) Mill him self raises this objection and answers it thus: what we ‘m ark’ with a nam e is not the object itself but the idea of the object. I do not think this view can be dismissed as a peculiar lapse on Mill’s part. I have already pointed out in the introductory discussions (p. 62 f) that it is characteristic of the object-orientated tradition that it conceives of the object-relation as representation (Vorstellung). At the same time I distinguished between a narrow er version of the representation-theory which is characteristic of the early m odern period and according to which that to which we directly relate is not the object but the represen­ tation as its representative (Repräsentant), and a broader version to which even the critics of this theory continued to subscribe and which even if not u n d e r this nam e - is also characteristic of the ancient and mediaeval conception. According to this bro ad er version, the relation now understood as direct - to the object is understood as a relation of representation: the object is represented; an object is essentially some­ thing representable. If one asks what is m eant by ‘representation’ here, one can find no answer to this question in traditional philosophy, because the concept of ‘representation’ is a basic concept for m odern traditional philoso­ phy.5 And of ancient philosophy one can say, retrospectively, that the concept of representation implicitly underlay its distinction between aisthesis and naus, for which there was no com prehensive generic concept.6 O ne cannot get a clear grasp of this concept from the outside either for it rests on an uncashable m etaphor. T h e only thing we can do is to m ake it clear to ourselves w hat this m etaphor is. T h e point of d ep arture of the m etaphor is a representation in the sense of a perceptual (anschau­ lich) or imaginative (optical) image, or image consciousness. Taking this as the basic model for the consciousness-relation in general, the relation to objects was conceived as a having-before-oneself (Vorsichhaben) of an optical image; only this having-before-oneself is no longer to be u n d e r­ stood as sensuous perception (Anschauung). How it is positively to be understood was bou n d to rem ain undecided, for the m etaphor becomes vacuous. A non-sensuous representation, a quasi-representa­ tion is a p u re fiction. For the concept of the object itself the conse­ quence was that it had to be essentially tho u g h t of as the correlate of such a non-sensuous quasi-representation. Every representative of tra ­ ditional philosophy will resist this apparently malicious interpretation.

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But then ask how he positively understands the relation between con­ sciousness and object. You can read the history of pre-analytical philosophy from Parm enides on from beginning to end and back again and you will find no answer, unless it be one in which one adds to the confusion by saying, as in G erm an Idealism , that the relation is to be u nderstood as a relation between subject and object. W hen we ask what this is we are told: the identity o f the d ifferen t (or: the identity of iden­ tity and non-identity) and suchlike. It is, o f course, simply nonsensical to say that a = b and ai=b. And even if this were not nonsensical it is impossible to see how this form al ontological relation, simply by being twisted in upon itself can be m ade to yield som ething like a consciousness-relation, regardless of how often this twisting is ‘reflected’ and repeated (as in H egel’s Logic). O f course the advocate of such theories will claim that he is h ere being criticized merely from the standpoint of the ‘u n d erstan d in g ’. But in th at case one should ask him how he can explain his special (‘reason’) concept o f identity, n o n ­ identity, etc., without presupposing it. A nd for our p art we can see his belief th at he has to appeal to such a special insight or structure inacces­ sible to ordinary h um an understan d in g as a desperate attem pt to escape from the dilem m a o f object-orientated philosophy w ithout su rre n d e r­ ing its basic presupposition which consists in not recognizing that we relate to objects by m eans o f linguistic signs which for this purpose must be em ployed in a specific way. It was not an avoidable accident but in­ evitable that traditional philosophy should take the m etaphorical con­ cept o f representation as its starting point; fo r if one ignores the logical, the linguistic, nothing is given to us in consciousness but the sensible. T h erefo re the only alternative to a language-oriented explanation of the relation to objects is an explanation in term s of a m etaphor based on perceptual images. Mill’s conception of the object-relation of names, according to which what is directly designated is not the object but the idea, belongs to the narrow er version o f the representation-theory. We can ignore this peculiarity; only when we view Mill’s conception as representative of the b ro ad er version of the representation-theory will its fundam ental significance for the whole tradition become evident. His theory can easily be detached from the narrow version of the representation-theory if instead of saying that the nam e does not stand directly for the object, but for its representation (idea), we say that it stands for the represented object, thus for an object as object of an act of representing. Mill’s specific conception is m erely a variant of this conception, which we can regard as the traditional conception p u re and simple.

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W hat follows from this general orientation towards the concept of representation for the nam e-object relation? R epresentations in the nonm etaphorical sense, that is p erceptual images, are sim ple data which can be taken in at a glance. It is this aspect that is carried over in the m etaphorical extension of the concept of rep resen tatio n to the objectrelation, or at any rate can be carried over. T h u s because objects are u n d ersto o d as what can be rep resen ted it becom es possible to in terp re t them as sim ple data like p erceptual images an d it thereby becomes pos­ sible to conceive of the object-relation o f a nam e as m ere association or assignm ent. A nd it is only if the object is conceived as a simple datum that it is possible to assume a direct relation o f a ‘non-connotative’ name, a p ro p e r nam e, to ‘th e ’ object, a relation which does not involve - as on Frege’s view it m ust - a reference to descriptions. F reg e’s conception, by contrast, presupposes that an object is n o t som ething representable, a simple d atum , but som ething which essentially manifests itself in m anifold m odes o f presentation. T h e idea th at the object-relation o f p ro p e r nam es is somehow m ore basic than, or at least in d e p e n d e n t of, th at o f descriptions implies th at there can be a relation between sign and object which can be understood as simple assignm ent. A nd this idea can only be either the pro d u ct of a m ere failure to th in k - and we m ust suppose this to be the case with m odern m eta-linguistic assignm ent-theories - o r if it is to be philosoph­ ically justified it implies that objects can be simply given, as simply as the signs to which they are assigned; and this m eans th a t it is based on a rep resen tatio n -th eo ry o f objects. At any rate I do not know o f any other possible way o f conceiving of objects as som ething simply given as this is req u ired by the assignm ent-theory. 1 should h ere m ention a possible objection. You could ask: by p re ­ senting. things in this way, do I not p resu p p o se that at least the signs them selves are representable, an d are n o t the signs also objects? T h e question is to be answ ered in th e affirm ative. T h e sign-types are indeed represen tab le and m oreover —this is crucial - in a non-m etaphorical sense. A nd clearly we m ust also reg ard th em as objects. How ever, as sign-types they are abstract objects, w hereas the objects ‘fo r’ which those signs th at are (concrete) singular term s stand are concrete objects. My opposition to the traditional idea th at referen ce to objects is essentially to be u n d ersto o d as representation, w here ‘rep resen tatio n ’ has an uncashable m etaphorical m eaning, does n o t rule out th at am ong other objects th ere are also objects which are actually - and in a harm less, non-m etaphorical sense - representable. Let m e again point out that Mill’s theory, w hether in his own narrow

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version or in my generalized version, is a theory o f the object-relation of nam es which implies that o u r relation to objects is as such not a lin­ guistic one. H ere too it seems to me th at the representation-theory is the only possible alternative to u n d erstan d in g the object-relation and what is m eant by objects in term s of the em ploym ent of a species of sign (at any rate the only one with which we are familiar). Although in another place (in the same §5 of C hap ter 2 of his Logic) Mill says it is the function of nam es to distinguish objects, in the place w here he speaks of the relation of nam es to representations (‘ideas’) he restricts the function of names, consistently, to that of arousing in the mind those representations of objects with which they are associated. And this clearly, is what it m eans, for the traditional position, for a nam e to ‘stand for’ an object. It m eans that it ‘stands fo r’ a representation of an object in the sense of being associated with it. It is now also clear why for the traditional con­ ception the sem antics o f singular term s is independent, does not involve reference to a sentence-context. For a representation in the non-m eta­ phorical sense does not belong to such a context; thus representation in the m etaphorical sense an d accordingly what is to be understood by an object does not belong to such a context either. You could object that so far all I have really shown is, at most, that the assignm ent-theory of nam e and object and the idea of the primacy of p ro p e r nam es are g ro u n d ed in the representation-theory. On the other hand it has not been m ade clear on precisely what my hostility to this theory itself rests. W hat are the criteria for deciding that it is incor­ rect or even impossible? We m ust here distinguish between the doubtful character of the extended representation-concept as such and that of the idea that w hat we m ean by objects is to be construed as rep resen ta­ tions, or som ething representable. As far as the extended, m etaphorical representation-concept as such is concerned I cannot add anything essential to what I have already said. My thesis is th at the m etap h o r cannot be cashed; that it does not make sense to speak of a non-sensuous or somehow intellectual re p re­ sentation. This first step in my critique is not conclusive, for an assertion that a w ord is m eaningless, that a m etap h o r cannot be cashed, cannot be explained, may simply reflect the narrowness of the person who makes it. In principle th en I m ust leave open the possibility that som eone will succeed in m aking good sense o f this ex tended use o f the term ‘re p re ­ sentation’. Secondly, ju st supposing th at it does make good sense to speak of representations, can we u n d erstan d w hat is m eant by objects, and ref­ erence to objects, in term s o f this notion? Let me begin by showing that

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this thesis of the representation-relation to objects is by no means merely som ething we find in the philosophical tradition; it also seems natural to us. I shall leave it open w hether this is because we belong to this tradition. It will be best if I rem ain subjective and merely relate to you how it was in my own case when I becam e aware of this problem ; I assume it could be similar with many of you. O rdinarily one does not reflect on what one means when one speaks of objects. W hen I reflected on this I noticed how strong my tendency was to think of an object as som ething over against me (ein Gegenüber). Indeed this seems to be already implied by the words ‘G egenstand’, ‘ob-ject’. I reflected further that w hat can most indubitably be term ed an over-against is the optical, pictorial view in which things manifest themselves to us (particularly when we are sitting still). A nd then I noticed that I was thinking of the relation to objects on this model. O f course I then immediately said to m yself: it is clearly not this optical view of the object, e.g. of this desk, that I mean when I m ean the object. I can walk ro u n d the desk, I can also perceive it with other senses. I can also talk about it - or, if you do not want to hear anything about talking, think about it - when I am not in the room. A nd without doubt when I do so I m ean the same object, namely this desk. So I clearly cannot stick to the naive idea of an optical over-against. However the idea of an over-against seems even then so natural that I say: the object is an over-against, only not a pictorial one. T hese reflections show that the thesis th at we relate to objects by means of representations in the m etaphorically extended sense can arise quite naturally. T h e doubt w hether this metaphorical sense still has any content should not now disturb us. We leave this question open, act as if there were such a m eaning and ask: could this really be what we mean when we speak o f an object? How can we approach such a question? Clearly only by already having some prelim inary conception of what we m ean by ‘object’. And how do we arrive at such? Surely not by m ere analysis of the use o f the word ‘object’. I shall come back to this question (cf. also p. 22). We do not need to answer it now for it suffices for o u r present purpose to fall back on one thing which is not a m atter of controversy between the traditional philosopher and his analytical critic, viz. the fact that th e re are certain linguistic expressions - singular terms - which somehow ‘stand fo r’ objects. O f course we cannot now understand what in general it is to relate to objects in terms of the use of these expressions; that would be a petitio principii in favour of the language-analytical posi­ tion. B ut we can assum e this much: that one m ust be able to explain how these expressions stand for objects, even if this should not be

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essential to the sense of the object-relation. A nd we can now apply to our problem that basic principle of analytical philosophy, which, as we have seen, m ust also be accepted by the traditional philosopher: that we m ust be able to explain how we use a linguistic expression. It is this principle on which the representation-theory appears to founder, even if there were such things as representations in the extended m etaphorical sense. For it would follow from the represen­ tation-theory th at when we are asked to explain for which object a name stands the question concerns what we represent when using this name. A nd that the question cannot be thus understood seems clear, at least as regards intersubjective speech. In the case of representations in the non-m etaphorical sense - images - one can u n d erstand what it m ight m ean intersubjectively to exhibit them . R epresentations in the m eta­ phorical sense, on the o th er hand, have not been understood intersub­ jectively by traditional philosophy and it is not clear how they could be understood intersubjectively. Again this result is not conclusive. If we ask how a singular term is used, thus if we ask for its explanation, we are not asking what (which object) the person who uses it represents to himself, but rather what (which object) he means, that we too can m ean (cf. above p. 63f). T h e linguistic object-relation is to be understood as m eaning (Meinen) w here this word is understood not in the sense in which it is supplem ented by a nominal sentence (‘I believe (meinen) that/?’) but in the sense in which it is sup­ plem ented by a singular term (‘I m ean N ’). How this m eaning is to be understood has of course still to be explained. This word does not am ount to an answer to o u r question; all we know is what we must ask if we are enquiring about the explanation of singular terms. Now the traditional philosopher could also try to bend this question to fit his conception. H e would say: one can only explain which object one means with a singular term by recourse to the corresponding representation. T hus it would seem that we cannot conclusively refute the traditional answer until we have given a new positive explanation of what it is to explain which object one means with a singular term. But this question m ust be orientated towards how one actually answers, in a particular case, the question ‘W ho or what do you m ean by that?’ A nd in fact nobody answers this question by pointing to representations. W eshall see that the question thus posed leads us to a completely new conception of how we refer to objects and o f what is m eant by ‘objects’. O f course the following m anoeuvre is still open to the traditional p h i­ losopher. Regarding the explanation that is now to be given of how it is established what or who we mean with an expression he could say that

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this is precisely w hat he m eant by his m etaphorically extended talk o f the rep resen tatio n of an object. H ow ever, this m anoeuvre would re p ­ resen t an abandoning o f the traditional position. For it would imply the admission that we cannot explain what it is to mean an object by recourse to rep resen tatio n but that, on the contrary, we can only explain what is m eant by ‘rep resen tatio n ’ by explaining what it is to m ean an object. T h e word ‘re p resen tatio n ’, if it is newly defined, is, of course, harmless - like any word.

LECTURE 2 1

T h e function of singular term s

At the end o f the last lecture it again became clear how limited the possibilities of internally refuting a philosophical basic conception are. O ne cannot show - assum ing one is p repared to accept the uncashed m etaphor of the representation-concept - that a representation-theory is impossible. Sponge-like thoughts have the advantage that they cannot be smashed. B ut to d em and an internal refutation would also involve an unrealistic view of the extent to which obsolete philosophical ideas can be put out of action. It is enough to show that the object-relation which we encounter w hen we exam ine how we actually establish for which object a sign stands is not a representation-relation and that the m eaning of objecthood which em erges from this exam ination cannot be understood in term s of representation. T h e genuine refutation of the traditional conception cannot be accomplished internally but only by means o f the positive construction of a new conception which right from the start can claim the advantage that it takes its d ep artu re from an actual form o f reference to objects, namely that by means of linguis­ tic expressions (for the present I leave it open w hether it is the only one). T he traditional conception is thus not shown to be impossible but disregarding the unclarity of its basic concept - only false. B efore I begin the positive construction of the new conception I wish to add som ething to what I said about the representation-theory. I have shown that th e doctrine of the prim acy of p ro p er names over descrip­ tions, which implies th at ‘standing fo r’ is to be understood as simple assignm ent or association, is gro u n d ed , if it has any philosophical fo u n ­ dation, on the representation-theory. However, it would be false to sup­ pose that the converse holds, viz. th at the representation-theory neces­ sarily leads to this conception of the nam e-relation and such a simplistic object-concept. T h at it need not do so is particularly well illustrated by the case of H usserl. H usserl’s object-theory is, on the one hand, a re p ­

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resentation-theory: what he calls intentionality is the not linguistically but representationally construed object-relation of consciousness. On the other hand, we have already seen that H usserl follows Frege in thinking that descriptions are semantically m ore fundam ental than proper-nam es. In Husserl this is connected with the ontological-epistemological idea that objects - spatial ones at any rate - are only acces­ sible to us in a manifold of modes of presentation, and that it is only in such modes of presentation that they are constituted as objects. If a presentation o f the object in a multiplicity of som ething like modes of presentation turns out to be also characteristic of the language-analyti­ cal theory of objects, then the language-analytical conception must be distinguished from the traditional conception (in so far as the latter is already able to see the object as a unity of modes of presentation) by what it understands by ‘modes of presentation’. We shall see that the modes of presentation to which the enquiry into the em ploym ent of singular terms leads us are to be understood as rules for identifying an object. In H usserl, on the o ther hand, the modes of presentation of the object are understood as ‘adum brations’ (Abschattungen), as the mani­ fold perceptual perspectives in which an object presents itself to an observer, depending on his standpoint and the surrounding circum­ stances. T hese adum brations are thus themselves representations, and, moreover, representations in the non-m etaphorical sense. For Husserl all spatial objects present themselves in a rule-governed synthesis of simple data - perceptual representations - and this synthetic objectconsciousness, as intentional consciousness, is itself understood as re p ­ resentation (though now in the metaphorically extended sense).1 Husserl is h ere clearly following in the tradition of Kant, who was the first to develop a theory of this kind. According to Kant the represen­ tation of an object depends on a ‘rule’ which makes a ‘synthesis’ of m an­ ifold ‘representations’ necessary.2 However K ant’s talk of the ‘object’ is misleading. He would have characterized his problem m ore clearly if, instead of speaking of ‘objects’, he had spoken of ‘objective connec­ tions’. His question is not: how is it possible for us to refer to things, to som ething (an object)? R ather it is: how far are the connections of our representations not merely subjective but objective? This can be seen clearly from the fact that the text from which I have just quoted is concerned with the justification of the law of causality, the question of why it is that we m ust regard the sequence of events as not merely subjective but objective. H ere then the problem is in fact a completely different one. T o imagine that the problem of what makes possible a relation to objects is approxim ately the same as the problem of what

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justifies what we refer to to have a claim to objectivity would be to let ourselves be deceived by an accident of language. W hereas the contrast with ‘subjective’ is essential to ‘objective’, no such contrast belongs to the m eaning of ‘object’. T he two problem s are, it is true, not completely indep en d en t of each other. B ut it is safer if we first separate them oversharply and say that they overlap: thus it makes perfect sense to speak of merely subjective objects - e.g. objects o f which we dream . On the other hand it is not merely the existence of objects that is objective (or subjective) but also properties of objects (predications) and connections of objects (e.g. sequences o f events). T h e lack of linguistic-logical reflection in the tradition also explains the failure - despite certain beginnings in K ant3 - to see that ‘objective’ is an adverb which qualifies veritative being and whose opposite is expressed by, for instance, such a term as ‘seem ing’. Even when we speak o f objects as ‘objective’ we m ean their existence; and this means that in this case too the term ‘objective’ refers, not to the object, but to the proposition, the state of affairs. T h u s when K ant says that a relation to objects becomes possible throu g h the synthesis o f representations that is subject to a necessary rule, what he really means is not objects but som ething objective. His problem is not the one which concerns us here, viz. how we can refer to som ething (where this means: to som ething for which a singular term can stand). In H usserl’s case, on the o th er hand, the situation is more complicated. In so far as he defines ‘object’ as the ‘subject of possible true predications’,4 what he means by ‘object’ corresponds exactly to what we are here concerned with, i.e. som ething for which certain lin­ guistic expressions (which can be supplem ented by predicates) can stand. But H usserl does not base this definition, which appeals to the function of singular term s, on a language-analytical conception of the object-relation. For he holds the view that the relation to objects, for which his definition serves merely to provide a m ark of identification, is grounded in intentionality; and this I have in terp reted as represen­ tation in the m etaphorically extended sense. If I can call H usserl a rep ­ resentative of the traditional conception of w hat is m eant by ‘objects’, then I must be able to assume that when he speaks of ‘objects’ he actually means objects and not, like Kant, som ething else; and the above definition is a clear indication of this. Now when H usserl speaks of a synthesis of m odes of presentation he does not m ean objects in general but specifically spatial objects. However, if one looks m ore closely, one sees that the problem which he deals with u n d er the heading ‘synthesis of m odes of p resentation’ is one which concerns not the spatial object

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as such (as the subject of possible tru e predications) but the various predicative determ inations o f this object: every property of such an object - its form , its colour, its o th er sensible qualities - is constituted in a rule-governed synthesis of adum brations. If, for exam ple, we describe this desk as brow n, this description does not stand for a simple sensation-quality, b u t for a m anifold of such qualities, which vary according to a rule, d ep en d in g on the illum ination and the position of the percipient. Now this problem is on a level with the Kantian problem which concerns not the object qua object b u t the objectivity of properties o f objects: the specifically objective colour-quality, for exam ple, is con­ trasted with its m anifold subjective appearance-m odes. However, H us­ serl starts the problem at a m ore basic level than Kant: the properties of im agined, or d ream t of, spatial objects, for exam ple, are also objec­ tive unities which are distinct from subjective m odes of presentation and are constituted in the rule-governed sequence of the latter. For H usserl the objective in K ant’s n arro w er sense o f the word is simply a rule o f the same kind though on a higher-level.5 T h a t the m odes of presentation dealt with by H usserl are not m odes o f presentation of the object as such b u t only o f its predicative determ inations is obscured by the fact that he speaks indiscrim inately o f things and properties of things. T h at he does so we can again explain by reference to his fu n ­ dam ental, traditionalist position: by construing the object-relation as represen tatio n h e reduces the object as it is given in perception to that in the object which is given representationally in the non-m etaphorical sense. A nd although H usserl occasionally distinguishes between the object as such and its predicative determ inations, the object as such he merely calls ‘the p u re X in abstraction from all predicates’.6 In other words, all that H usserl can say about w hat the singular term as such stands for is that it is a p u re X which underlies the predicative d ete r­ m inations. T h e m anifold m odes o f presentation which H usserl has in m ind are thus not such as concern the relation o f the singular term to the object. O r p u ttin g it an o th e r way: they are not modes of p resenta­ tion to which a plurality o f singular term s (descriptions) which some­ how all designate the same object correspond. It is not surprising that in the enquiry into the constitution o f the object-relation H usserl was not o rientated tow ards these m odes o f presentation. For although he defined objects as the subjects o f possible predications, thus as what a singular term stands for, he did not look to an analysis of the em ploy­ m ent o f singular term s for the explanation of the object-relation. Only in Investigation I of his Logical Investigations w here, following Frege, H usserl explicitly goes into the distinction betw een the m eaning and

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the object of ‘nam es’ (by which like Frege he understands descriptions as well as p ro p e r names), does he en counter those different modes of presentation of an object to which d ifferen t singular term s correspond. By contrast w here h e investigates the object-relation as such, and the constitution of spatial objects, he is not orientated towards the em ploy­ m ent of linguistic expressions at all. Frege, on the other hand, left open the question of how the differen t modes of presentation of the object which correspond to its descriptions are to be understood. Even less did he attem pt to investigate the question o f what it is for a linguistic expression to ‘stand fo r’ an object, how we refer to objects by means of such expressions and what follows from this for the notion of objects as such.7 T h ro u g h his enquiry into the m eaning of singular term s Frege p re ­ pared a new way of posing the problem . B ut he was not interested in the philosophical question of how such a thing as an object-relation is constituted in the em ploym ent o f such expressions; he dismissed it as psychological and epistemological. Mill and Husserl, by contrast, had a philosophical concept for the object-relation, namely, the concept of representation, a concept which Frege rejected w ithout being able to p u t an o th er in its place. O f course Mill, like Frege, and also the majority of analytical philosophers, simply took for granted the notion of objects. H usserl, on the other hand, m ade an attem pt analytically to elucidate the object-relation and with it the m eaning of the term ‘object’. However, he did so on a pre-linguistic basis, in terms of the concept o f representation. T h u s'alth o u g h Husserl does not have a sim­ ple object-concept like Mill, and although he did not simply presuppose the existence of an object-relation and a universe of objects, his approach is ju st as traditional as that of Mill. As we now tu rn to the question of the actual mode o f em ploym ent of singular term s I w ould like once m ore (cf. p. 271 f) to rem ind you that this question does not, as such, imply any prejudice in favour of a language-analytical conception of the object-relation. T h a t these expres­ sions stand for objects is not a m atter of controversy. An explanation of how one establishes for which object such an expression stands is nec­ essary in any case, regardless o f what position one holds. It is u n d e r­ standable that in explaining the object-relation the traditional philoso­ p h er did not take the function o f the sign as his starting-point. But he can have no objection to such a p recedure for however the object-rela­ tion is finally in terp reted it m ust be possible to explain what it is for signs to stand for objects in term s of this in terpretation. It may still turn out that the explanation of singular term s requires a non-linguistic

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object-relation. Only if it should tu rn out that the object-relation which the explanation of singular term s presupposes cannot be understood independently of a specific use of signs would we have achieved a spe­ cifically language-analytical object-theory. If we u nderstand the question of which object an expression stands for in term s of the use of that expression (and this means: its use by someone) then it becomes the question of which object someone means with the expression (above p. 282). It is of course possible for someone in a given case not to m ean with a singular term the object for which it stands, e.g. if he mistakenly believes that the expression stands for an object other than th at for which it in fact stands. But since there can be no sign-object relation independently of the use of signs by persons this discrepancy can only mean that in a particular case someone means with the expression a different object from that which is (or was) nor­ mally (or originally) meant with it. This is all that can be m eant by saying that an expression really stands for a particular object. So the question of which object a singular term stands for can only be understood as the question of which object is m eant with it, if not by an individual then by a linguistic community. Now this question - ‘who or what is m eant with “a”?’ —clearly belongs to the context of whole sentences. We can see this if, in addition to the question about m ode of em ploym ent, I also apply to singular terms the other question I applied to predicates, viz. the question concerning their function. T he question of function arises as soon as the sign-rela­ tion is brou g h t into connection with an em ploym ent of the sign by p e r­ sons; and that means: with an action of persons. Every action is d e ter­ mined by an intention and if the use of a thing - in this case the use of a sign - belongs to an action then the act-intention determ ines what we call the function of the thing (what it is used for). W hen I distinguished the function of predicates from that of singular terms I characterized the function of singular terms in the same way as it is characterized by the traditional theory: it is the function of a singular term to stand for an object. But it is precisely when we reflect on the aspect of function that we see how much in need of explanation this characterization itself is. For it rem ains unclear what is achieved by using som ething to stand for an object, what the standard intention is that determ ines an action which consists in the em ploym ent of som ething with this function. T h e traditional theory gives no answer at all to this question. But we should also be clear that the answer given by a pragm atist—behaviourist tradition, viz. that the function of the sign consists in its representing (vertreten) the object for which it stands in the sense that it evokes in

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the h earer the same (or a similar) response as that which the object itself would evoke8 is incorrect. A sign-theory of this kind is orientated towards so-called natural signs, i.e. symptoms (cf. p. 181) which are defined in the following way: a state of affairs functions as a symptom of another state of affairs if the belief that the first obtains (e.g. that it is now lightning) leads one to believe that the second obtains or is about to obtain (e.g. that it will thunder). One responds then to the perception of the first as one would respond to the second. One can describe this sym ptom -relation by saying that one state of affairs represents the other in a specific fashion; and one can in terp ret this relation pragm at­ ically in the sense described. We saw earlier (Lecture 13) that we can perhaps u n derstand quasi-predicates in this way (which would then be functioning as signals) but not whole sentences. T hat one could u n d e r­ stand singular terms in this way is ruled out in advance by the fact that the objects to which symptoms refer are not concrete objects but states of affairs. Also from the point o f view of the pragm atist-behaviourist interpretation it is clear that the only objects in question are states of affairs. O ne cannot respond to a concrete object. What one responds to is the presence of this object; and the presence of an object (that it is now here) is a state of aff airs. Those theorists who in terpreted a sign’s stand­ ing for an object as representation (Vertretung), and sought to interp ret the latter pragmatically, overlooked the sharp distinction between con­ crete objects and states of affairs. Only when we simultaneously keep in m ind these two things, viz. that the traditional description o f the sign-object relation as ‘standing fo r’ tells us nothing, and that the behaviourist-pragm atist representationtheory (Stellvertretertheorie) is inapplicable to it, will we become aware of just how little we u n derstand this seemingly so obvious sign-relation. Just as the traditional psychological representation-theory, according to which the sign represents (vertreten) a representation (Vorstellung), so the behaviourist-pragm atist representation-theory presupposes that what the sign merely represents could also be given to us independently of the signs. This applies both to representations (Vorstellungen) and to states of affairs. But what about objects? How can we refer to them at all? It thus begins to em erge that we will only u nderstand what is m eant by ‘objects’, and what it is to refer to objects, by analysing the corre­ sponding sign-relation. But how, you will ask, is the relation of the sign to the object to be understood if it can in no way be construed as rep ­ resentation (,Stellvertretung)? Doesn’t som ething like a representationrelation belong to the essence of any sign-relation? Certainly not. For

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we have already seen in the case of predicates that their function - that of characterizing - has nothing to do with a representation-relation. T h e singular term is supposed to have the function of standing for a certain object. But if we view the singular term in isolation the signifi­ cance of this function rem ains unintelligible. T h e singular term ’s func­ tion of standing for som ething thus seems to be an essentially non-inde­ pen d en t function. T his would m ean: one needs signs with this function so that o th er signs can fulfil their function. T h e act which consists in the em ploym ent of such an expression seems to have no independent intention and hence not to be an in d ep en d en t act. This is shown by the fact that som eone who utters a singular term - a nam e for instance by itself, has not done anything at the level of significant speech. He has of course done som ething at the level of utterance: he has uttered this sign. B ut with what intention? If som eone begins ‘T h e so-and-so’ and does not continue we will ask: ‘Well, what abo u t it? W hat do you want to say about it?’ Som eone who has merely u tte re d a nam e, then, has not yet said anything. H e has only said som ething if he supplem ents the nam e so as to form a com plete sentence. A nd at the level of assertoric sentences (to which for the time being the whole discussion is confined) this means: if he supplem ents the nam e with a predicate. (The use of names in the vocative constitutes an a p p a re n t counter-exam ple. How­ ever this use is always m ore than a m ere nam ing. W hen we use a nam e in the vocative by itself it does not ju st stand for the object; it does not function as a singular term but contains a dem an d to the person nam ed to answer or to come.) T h at the function of the singular term essentially needs supplem en­ tation becomes clear if we characterize the function of standing for an object as th at of indicating which object is m eant. If an action consists in indicating which object is m eant then it essentially refers {verweisen) to a com plem entary action which says som ething about a particular object and which th erefo re requires an indication o f which object this is. At the most elem entary level such an act which says som ething about a particular object is the characteriz.ation-act p erform ed by means of a predicate. A predicate is as we have seen a classification-expression the use of which is such that one cannot tell simply from the situation in which it is used what the expression relates to. It th erefo re needs a supplem entary expression by m eans of which one indicates what it is (which object) - and that means: which o f all - that is being classified by the predicate. In these reflections as well as using the form ulation ‘which object is m eant’ I have also said simply ‘what (which) is m eant’; and finally have

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also used the locution ‘which o f all’. W hat do these differences imply? As reg ard s the transition from ‘which object' to ‘which’ this step is clearly unproblem atic. T h e interrogative or relative pronouns ‘w hat’ or ‘which’ are an even better guide for our enquiry than the word ‘object’, for only they en su re that the enquiry is carried out at the requisite level of form al generality. T h e expression ‘w hat’ or ‘which’ can always be replaced by ‘which object’. B u t by using only the expression ‘w hat’ or ‘which’ we m ake sure that the purely form al notion of something is not given an extra m aterial connotation by the addition of the substantive ‘object’. We thus link up again with my original introduction of the term ‘object’ in Lecture 3. T h e re I started out from the statem ent: everything and anything is an object. T his implies th a t we cannot achieve the full extension which the term ‘object’ is in ten d ed to have by saying: an object is everything which . . . and then supplem enting this by a p red i­ cate. F or by so doing we would exclude o th er things which . . . , thus other things that are also som ething, fro m the extension of the term ‘object’. T h e expression ‘w hat’, u n d ersto o d as a relative pronoun, already implies th at one is speaking o f objects. Since, therefore, the term ‘object’ is not delim itable by a predicate, we m ust conclude that the w ord ‘object’ itself, in so far as it functions grammatically as a p red ­ icate is a pseudo-predicate, precisely because it does not serve to d e m ar­ cate a class of objects from o thers (and it was this function by reference to which predicates were semantically defined). But this means that for that which is h ere in question the expression ‘object’ is as such in ap p ro ­ priate. It is m erely th at p redicate that comes closest to what is m eant by words which are never predicates because they are essentially words that su p p lem en t predicates, viz. singular term s and the corresponding pron o u n s: ‘which’ (‘w hat’), ‘som ething’, ‘this’. This is the reason why I said in the last lecture that we cannot clarify o u r prelim inary conception of w hat we m ean by ‘objects’ by investigating the use of the word ‘object’. T h e w ords o f n atu ral language towards which we have to ori­ entate ourselves are ra th e r the p ro n o u n s ju st referred to and singular term s. You may think that this is to sm uggle in a language-analytical assum ption. B ut this is not so. T h e philosophical tradition was orien­ tated tow ards the equation ens —unum —res =aliquid, an equation which is not u n problem atic b u t which we may take seriously at least in connection with the word aliquid (‘som ething’). Equally we could start, as we did at the en d of the last lecture, from the traditional admission that every singular term stands for an object, i.e. for something. T h ese considerations m ake it ap p ear probable th at the explanation of w hat it is for a singular term to stand for an object - for som ething

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- will essentially involve an explanation of how the use of singular terms is connected with the use of the corresponding (definite and indefinite) pronouns. T h e fu rth e r characterization o f the function of singular term s that I have given, viz. that by means of a singular term one indi­ cates which of all is m eant, leads directly to this connection. B ut was I justified in supplem enting the characterization of the func­ tion of the singular term in this way, i.e. by saying not ju st ‘which’ but ‘which o f all’? It seems to me that this supplem entation is already implicitly contained in the question ‘which is m eant?’, and that it is only when we make this supplem entation explicit that the m eaning of this question, and hence that of the function of the singular term , becomes clear. For the need to indicate which object is m eant, thus which object it is that is classified by a classification-expression, only arises when a plurality of objects is presupposed. T h e function of the singular term is to indicate which of all objects that could come into question is meant. T hu s it is the function of the singular term to pick out one thing from a plurality as what is m eant - and this means: as that to which the p red ­ icate is supposed to apply. I shall call this function of picking out one thing from the presupposed plurality specification.9 We can now describe what happens in a predicative assertion as follows: by means of the predicate that which is specified by the singular term is characterized. O f course, this is not yet an answer. W hat this definition provides is merely a description of the function of singular term s, which, in con­ trast to the not incorrect, but em pty, notion of ‘standing for’, says what these expressions really achieve. And now the question to answer will be: how do they achieve it? Establishing the function o f these signs has given a definite direction to the enquiry into their m ode o f em ploy­ ment: the explanation of th eir m ode of em ploym ent m ust show what the em ploym ent-rules of these signs are which make it possible for them to specify an object (pick out which of a presupposed plurality is meant). T h e broadening of horizon which the question has thereby acquired vis-ä-vis merely speaking o f ‘standing for’ may not be im m e­ diately clear. It consists in this: whereas it seemed plausible to construe ‘standing for’ as a relation which holds m erely between the sign and its object, once the function of the singular term is understood as specifi­ cation a relation of the singular term to all objects (of a dom ain) is p re ­ supposed. This is im plied in the form ulation ‘indicate (pick out) which of all’. T h e relation of the singular term to the object for which it stands is thus m ediated by a relation to all objects o f the presupposed plurality; and this shows th at in fact it is not a relation at all. A sign has this ‘relation’ to an object in so far as som eone who uses it can refer by

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means o f it to this object. A nd this reference - as specification - presu p ­ poses that the person who uses such an expression, like the person who u nderstands it, has the presupposed plurality somehow p resent in his consciousness. If this were not so th en there would be no need to indi­ cate which o f all is meant. T h e d em and for such an indication p resu p ­ poses that it is initially open which o f all is m eant; and that means: that it could be any one of all. T h u s if to m ean an object with a sign is to m ean an individual object, and if this means: to indicate which of all it is, then an object-relation implies a sim ultaneous relation to a multiplic­ ity o f objects. T h u s we will not be able to explain the function of sin­ gular term s w ithout at the same tim e explaining this multiplicity-consciousness; and the question will arise w hether this too is not constituted in a certain em ploym ent o f linguistic expressions. If then the function o f a singular term consists in indicating which of all is m eant, then the understan d in g o f the w ord ‘all’ is as basic as the em ploym ent of singular term s. B ut at the present level o f reflection (where we merely have an abstract description of the function o f singular term s and are not yet clear how they are able to perfo rm this function) there is still m ore that m ust be adm itted to be essentially connected with the use o f singular term s. We have a plurality; and from this one thing is to be singled out as w hat is m eant. H ow ever this is concretely achieved, the idea of such a specification presupposes that we are able to distinguish one thing from others, and not ju st in so far as other predicates belong to it - if th at were all we could never be sure th at there is not also an o th er thing to which exactly the same predicates belong and exactly the same p re d ­ icates do not belong - b u t in so far as it is an o th er object. It is presu p ­ posed that every thing can be distinguished from every o th er thing as an individual. T o distinguish one thing from others, however, means to establish that th e one is d ifferen t from the others; and this means - I am thereby m erely saying the same thing in d iffe re n t words - that it is not the same as the others. T hus the use of singular term s also presu p ­ poses an u n d erstan d in g o f the expression ‘is th e same as’ o r ‘is identical with’ (‘ = ’). I f it is essential to what we m ean by an object th at it is an individual (or putting it in term s of the function of singular terms: if the specification of which is m eant implies th a t it is specified which individual is m eant), then essential to the u n d erstan d in g of what is m eant by ‘objects’, or to the u n d erstan d in g o f singular term s, is an und erstan d in g o f identity and non-identity and the possession of crite­ ria of identity. T h e possibility of being able to distinguish objects from one another

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is th e condition of the possibility o f o u r being able to count them . Objects are essentially countable. T h e u n d erstan d in g o f ‘all’ and ‘som e’, the u n d e rsta n d in g of ‘is identical w ith’ and ‘is not identical with’ an d the ability to co u n t are on all fours with each o th e r and with the possi­ bility of using singular term s. T h ese connections are com pletely general and hold for all singular term s w hether they re fe r to concrete o r to abstract objects. For all that has so far been explained followed com pletely generally from the func­ tion which sin g u lar term s have as expressions th a t supplem ent p red i­ cates; it was n o t yet assum ed that the objects th at are specified by means o f singular term s are perceptible objects. T h u s even speaking of individ­ uals does not as.such imply that one is dealing with concrete perceptible objects any m ore than does speaking o f countability. T h e term ‘individ­ ual’ is to be u n d ersto o d relative to the term ‘universal’ju st as singular term s are com plem entary to predicates. T h e re a re classification-expres­ sions whose use does not involve th e com plem entary use o f singular term s. T hese a re quasi-predicates an d as their use is situation-relative those singular term s which su p p lem en t classification-expressions which are analogous as reg ard s content to quasi-predicates (and this means: which are explained analogously to quasi-predicates, as we saw in the lecture before last) designate only objects that are specified by reference to situations an d are thus spatio-tem poral objects. T hus quasi-predicates only have analogues am ong predicates which classify concrete objects; they have no analogues am o n g h ig h e r-o rd er predicates, i.e. those which classify abstract objects. B ut clearly th ere are such highero rd e r predicates; and this m eans th at th ere are also h ig h er-o rd e r sin­ gular terms. N o d o u b t one will be able to say th at reference to abstract objects presupposes referen ce to concrete objects; but at p rese n t we are only concerned with the latter. O n th e o th er h a n d there have already been indications th at referen ce to at least one species of abstract object - states o f affairs - is as basic as referen ce to concrete objects (p. 224). H ow ever this may be, we can and m ust from the outset distinguish those aspects o f the use o f singular term s which distinguish them as singular term s as such - as expressions which have the function of spec­ ifying wThich o f all is m ean t - from those aspects which specially distin­ guish those singular term s which specify concrete objects. Now if (a) the distinction betw een concrete and abstract objects is one which concerns them as objects, and if (b) specificatory reference to objects by means of singular term s is essential to speaking o f objects, then we m ust also expect that w hat distinguishes that species o f singular term that speci­ fies concrete objects w ithin the genus of singular term s is precisely the

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particular form which the general function of specifying takes in their case; and in that case concrete objects themselves would be distin­ guished from abstract objects by the m an n er in which they are speci­ fied. H aving established the general function of those expressions which by supplem enting predicates distinguish them from quasi-pred­ icates we can now pursue our enquiry into their m ode of em ploym ent by asking how these expressions specify the objects for which they stand.

L E C T U R E 22

Russell and Strawson

T o tackle the question of what it means to speak of ‘objects’ and how a reference to objects is possible by asking how we can refer to objects by means of signs is already to adopt a language-analytical approach. However we have seen (p. 288) that such an approach still leaves it open w hether the answer to this question itself results in a specifically lan­ guage-analytical position. This would consist in holding that the re fe r­ ence to objects to which the explanation of such signs points cannot be understood independently of the use of ju st such signs. As with all signs the question of the m ode of em ploym ent of these signs can only be tackled by asking how they can be explained. A nd in this case that means: how it can be explained, or established, for which object the expression stands (p. 270). To prep are for this question I enquired in the last lecture into the function of these expressions. W hat em erged th ere regarding the purpose for which singular terms are used and what it means to speak o f ‘objects’ holds generally for all sin­ gular terms and all objects. We now know what in general is being asked when it is asked how it can be established for which object a singular term stands: one is asking which object is specified by the singular term , w here ‘specify’ means: to pick out what is m eant from a presupposed plurality. If we now ask, not about the function, but about the explanation, or m ode of em ploym ent o f these expressions then precisely because of what we have seen regarding the function of these expressions the question can no longer be posed in a formal, general way. Rather a specific type o f object, a specific plurality (that of perceptible objects or states of affairs or attributes, etc.) is presupposed and one asks how it is possible to pick out one object as the one m eant from am ong all objects o f this type. T h u s the question left open in the last lecture, viz. how a singular term can specify an object, m ust be p u t separately for each type

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of object (and this is because the d ifferen t types of object - though I have not shown this - are distinguished precisely by the m anner in which they are specified). A nd this question is identical with the ques­ tion about the m ode of em ploym ent, o r the explanation, of the type of singular term concerned. T h u s by appealing to the function of expressions a new and specifi­ cally language-analytical approach is achieved, both for the explanation of w hat it means to speak of ‘objects’ and for the distinction of objects into what H usserl called ‘regions of objects’. In essence this approach derives from P. F. Strawson who first introduced it in his p a p er ‘On R eferrin g ’ (1950) in a confrontation with Russell’s T heory of Descrip­ tions and subsequently developed it in his book Individuals (1958). Sin­ gular term s, according to Strawson, have the following function: some­ one who uses them can by m eans of them refer to an object. A nd this refe rrin g consists in the singular term ‘identifying’ the object with which the rem aining part of the sentence has to d o .1 This notion of ‘identifying’ roughly corresponds to w hat I have called ‘specifying’; though, as we shall see, certain additional distinctions will need to be draw n. T ho u g h his views have not rem ained undisputed Strawson is the stan d ard a u th o r for this problem . It will th erefore be ap p ro p riate in enquiring into the m ode of em ploym ent o f concrete singular terms to take his view o f how objects can be identified by means of such expressions as o u r starting-point. A nd because Strawson arrived at his view via a critique o f Russell’s T heory of Descriptions and because the latter theory is p resupposed positively o r negatively by the entire liter­ ature on our them e I shall begin with a brief exposition of Russell’s theory.2 It is called the ‘theory o f definite descriptions’, and by ‘definite descriptions’ Russell u n derstands expressions which have the form ‘the so-and-so’. Russell started out from the traditional view, that every sin­ gular term stands for an object, as a prem ise that is not fu rth e r ques­ tioned; he did not ask how this relation is to be understood. However, if it is a relation then it seem ed impossible for the object for which an expression stands not to exist. B ut now singular term s, and in particular definite descriptions, are used which have no object. For exam ple some­ one using the sentence ‘T h e King of F rance is bald’ in 1905, when Rus­ sell wrote his p ap er, makes the claim th at the singular term ‘the King of F rance’ stands for an object. In fact, however, this object does not exist. A nd if som eone corrects him by saying ‘T h e King of France doesn’t exist’ th en his use o f the singular term does not even involve the claim that it stands for an object. M einong, from whom Russell had

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taken his d e p a rtu re , had tried to overcom e this difficulty by saying that the expression stands for an object b u t th at an object, need not exist. Russell gave no conclusive a rg u m e n t to show th at M einong’s view is impossible (this is som ething we will have to clarify). In any event he foun d M einong’s view unsatisfactory, a n d thus the question arose o f how singular term s which it is possible do not stand for an object are to be understood. Russell held fast to the traditional view th at a p ro p e r nam e stands for an object in a m ore genuine sense than a description in that it desig­ nates th e object ‘directly’3 and not, as a description does, as that to which a certain attrib u te uniquely belongs, e.g. the attribute o f being the p resen t King o f France. Russell concluded from this that in the case of expressions which can correctly be called p ro p e r nam es it is not pos­ sible for them not to have an object. W hat follows from this in regard to sentences such as ‘H om er did not exist’ we shall see in a m om ent. Anyway this view led Russell to think th at the problem of how expres­ sions which possibly do not stand for an object are to be understood reduces to the problem o f how definite descriptions are to be u n d e r­ stood. Russell’s answ er to this question is: definite descriptions are not really singular term s at all. A sentence of the type ‘T h e so-and-so is F ’ only seems to be like a singular predicative sentence because of its gram m at­ ical form . I f we logically analyse it it becom es clear th at it is a general sentence and has the logical form ‘th e re is one, an d only one, object which is so-and-so an d this is F ’. W hat Russell m eans by ‘logical form ’ corresponds to w hat I call ‘sem antic fo rm ’; and his phrase ‘if we logi­ cally analyse the sentence’ we can replace, in the context of o u r enquiry, by ‘if we ask how the sentence is u sed ’. A ccording to this view, th en , the sem antic stru ctu re of a sentence like ‘T h e King o f France is bald’ only becom es visible in the sentence ‘T h e re is one, an d only one, object which is King o f France and this is bald.5In this form ulation th e re no longer ap pears a definite description. It no longer contains the definite article ‘th e ’; th e re only rem ains the predic­ ative com ponent o f the definite description (‘King o f France’). T h e case in which the object does not exist no longer presents any difficulties. We no longer have an expression th at stands for an object, and the case where th e object does not exist now reduces to th e case w here th ere is not one, o r only one, object o f th at kind. Since in the sentence itself, as now form ulated, it is asserted th at th e re is one, an d only one, such object, if th ere is not one o r only one such object th en the sentence is simply false. T h u s the sentence is not only false w hen the one so-and-

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so is n o t/ 7, b u t equally when th e re is no object, or m ore than one, that is so-and-so. A nd one can now easily und erstand the sentence ‘T h e King o f France does not exist.’ It is simply the negation of the sentence ‘T h e re is one, and only one, object that is King of F rance.’ T hus Russell’s solution to the problem consists in in terp retin g the singular predicative statem ent as an existential statem ent, and the latter as a general statem ent. A nd this general statem ent he interprets in term s o f the sem antic stru ctu re which was b rought to light by Frege and which we have already en co u n tered (p. 247). A presupposition of Russell’s T h eo ry o f D escriptions is thus the m odern theory of general existential statem ents (i.e. such sentences as ‘U nicorns exist’), which was first developed by Frege, but h ad already been anticipated by K ant.4 ‘Existence’ is not only not a real predicate in such a sentence, as K ant taught; th e word ‘exist’ does n o t have the sem antic function of a p re d ­ icate (classification-expression) h e re at all. R ather the sentence is to be un d ersto o d in precisely the sam e way as the sentence ‘T h e re are uni­ corns.’ A nd this, as we have seen (p. 246), has the sense o f a particular sentence. It says: ‘Som e o f all objects are unicorns.’ This view seems com pelling, for it enables one to relate the u n d erstanding of the sen­ tence to a truth-co n d itio n which corresponds to the way in which we verify such sentences. A ccording to the traditional view, in a sentence such as ‘U nicorns exist’ one w ould be saying of unicorns, thought of as possible, th at they exist. B ut to establish w hether unicorns exist we do not exam ine the possible unicorns with reg ard to w hether the predicate of ‘existence’ applies to them ; ra th e r we exam ine the objects of the spa­ tio-tem poral world with reg ard to w hether the predicate ‘u n icorn’ applies to some o f them . This result can be tra n sfe rre d directly from general existential sen­ tences to so-called singular existential sentences, to sentences of the form ‘T h e so-and-so exists’, b u t with the following difference: such a sentence not only says th at at least one object (‘som e’) is so-and-so but also that at most o n e object is so-and-so, in other words that one and only one (a single) object is so-and-so. T his conception also seems com ­ pelling in the case o f the singular existential sentence, for only this con­ ception explains the sentence’s sem antic stru ctu re in a way that co rre­ sponds to how we verify such a sentence. Now this o f course has the consequence that, contrary to appearances, so-called singular existen­ tial statem ents are also not statem ents about individuals but are always general statem ents. T his also provides us with the, in my view, decisive arg u m en t against M einong’s view. T his view that we can refer to objects which are merely objects and may or may not exist and of which we can

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predicate existence or non-existence is refu ted by the fact that it co n tra­ dicts the way in which we establish the existence or non-existence of something. Thus one does not have to accept Russell’s basic prem ise, viz. that it is impossible for the object for which a singular term stands not to exist, in order to find his T heory of Descriptions plausible. R ather its plausi­ bility rests on the following considerations: (a) with sentences of the form ‘the so-and-so is F* it is always possible th at there does not exist a single such object, and that, th erefore, (b) the existence of this object m ust be im plied by such a sentence, and (c) the existential statem ent in which this implication would be articulated m ust be in terp reted as a general statem ent. In d eed one could even say that the result of Russell’s theory contradicts the prem ise from which he started out. For it has now become clear th at speaking of existence always presupposes that one is speaking of all objects and that, consequently, one cannot say of an individual object th at it exists.5 But how then according to Russell are p ro p er nam es, which it is claimed cannot possibly not stand for an object, to be understood? R us­ sell’s answer is that what we call p ro p er nam es in natural language are not p ro p e r names at all. For it is perfectly possible in the case of such expressions - e.g. ‘H o m e r’ - to discover that there is no object for which it stands. T o explain this Russell applies to the proper nam es of n atural language F rege’s theory o f pro p er names. T h e proper nam es of natural language do not have the direct relation they appear to have to the object. R ather they d ep en d on descriptions; they are ‘really abbrevia­ tions for descriptions’.6 For exam ple, Rom ulus is the person ‘who did such-and-such things, who killed Remus, and founded Rome, and so o n ’.7 This Fregean view of p ro p e r nam es,8 albeit in various form s,9 went unchallenged in analytical philosophy for a long time. It has only recently been called in question, by K ripke and D onnellan.10 If the p ro p e r nam es o f natural language do not refer to objects in the direct way that Russell’s view and the traditional view would have led one to expect, m ust one not conclude that the idea of such a direct relation is simply a fiction? But fo r Russell taking such a step was out of the question, for his T h eo ry of Descriptions led to the conclusion that what looks like a singular predicative statem ent is, if its subject-expression is a description, really a general statem ent. A nd if the p ro p e r nam es of natural language are reducible to descriptions, then the state­ ments whose subject-expression is such a p ro p e r nam e are also really general statem ents. So the result would be th at there are no singular statem ents. But if we can always only say of all objects th at one of them

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is such-and-such then it would seem that we cannot directly refer to an individual object at all. Q uine, who has radicalized Russell’s theory, has accepted this conclusion: the basic statem ents are general statem ents and there are no singular statem ents.11 Such a conclusion appeared unacceptable to Russell, however, for the sam e reason that Strawson later rejected Q u in e:12 general statem ents themselves - as we have already seen (p. 246) - refer (verweisen) via th e specification o f their truth-conditions to singular statem ents. T h o u g h Russell did not p u t it like this, one cannot explain to som eone the m ode of em ploym ent of a general sentence w ithout presupposing that he already knows the m ode of em ploym ent of singular sentences. So on Russell’s view there m ust be some genuine singular sentences. And for him this could only m ean: sentences whose subject-expression stands for an object in the way th at the philosophical tradition assum ed that p ro p e r names stand for objects. Now the required direct sign-rela­ tion appears to presuppose a direct epistemological relation. For us to be able directly to assign a sign to an individual object, this object m ust be directly given to us - in perception. W here this is the case we can obviously use the deictic expression ‘this’. Now it is characteristic of ordinary objects that can be given to us in perception that they continue to exist outside the perceptual situation; if we still refer to them when they are outside the perceptual situation, we can no longer do so with the word ‘this’. It would seem plausible to say that if the object is given to us in perception, then not only can we re fe r to it with ‘this’, we can also assign to it an ord in ary p ro p e r name; and that when it is no longer perceived, though we can no longer refer to it by means o f the expres­ sion ‘this’, we can still do so by m eans of the p ro p e r nam e. No doubt this is in a sense what actually happens. B ut is is not at all clear how it is possible. For if we have only introduced the p ro p er nam e in the p e r­ ceptual situation, and hence as an equivalent of the expression ‘this’, then how do we know that we can still re fe r to it, the same object, by means o f the p ro p e r nam e when the object is no longer present to us? As which object do we m ean the object with the p ro p er nam e if it is no longer this now p resen t object? T o answer this question must we not have recourse to some descriptions o r other? B ut in that case the p ro p e r nam e would again presuppose descriptions and is thus ruled out for Russell. All that rem ains then is a p ro p e r nam e whose referential func­ tion ceases as soon as the object is no longer present, thus a p ro p e r nam e whose referential function reaches no fu rth er th an that o f the deictic expression. In this way Russell arrives at the view that ‘this’ is the

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only logically p ro p e r n a m e ,13 i.e. th e only one which in contrast to the m erely a p p a re n t p ro p e r nam es o f ord in ary language functions sem an­ tically in the way in which on Russell’s view p ro p e r nam es m ust fu n c­ tion; it is an am biguous p ro p e r nam e. O f course understood as a deictic expression th e word ‘this’ would not be am biguous. B ut if it is u n d e r­ stood as a proper name th en it m ust be term ed am biguous (though this am biguity could be rem oved by subscripts). Russell com bined this view with an epistem ological thesis according to which the only objects which can be directly given to us are sense-data. As these are ephem eral objects this m eans th at th e logically p ro p e r nam e not only designates an object in so far as it is p resen t b u t designates this object as such. It is im p o rta n t that with Russell’s theory o f logically p ro p e r nam es in addition to descriptions and p ro p e r nam es the third class of singular term s, viz. deictic pro n o u n s, is included in th e question of how an expression can stand for an object and in d eed takes precedence over the other two classes. Russell, it is tru e, does not construe the word ‘this’ as a deictic expression b u t as an am biguous p ro p e r nam e; the function of ‘this’ as a deictic expression rem ains unclarified. H owever, an im p o r­ tant feature o f deictic expressions, namely, th at they re fe r to an object th at is p resen t in the perceptual situation, is retained. As we shall see, Straw son in his positive conception latches onto this deictic com p o n en t o f Russell’s conception, th o u gh of course with the difference th at he recognizes the deictic expressions as such and does not in te rp re t them as p ro p e r names. H ow ever, Strawson has not em phasized this positive link with Russell. As he does not discuss R us­ sell’s theory o f logically p ro p e r nam es, but only his T h eo ry of D escrip­ tions, we should ask ourselves, b efore I move on to Straw son’s critique, how we should ju d g e Russell’s theory of logically p ro p e r names. T his question provides us with an o p p o rtu n ity to test the fruitfulness of what was achieved in the previous lecture reg ard in g the function o f singular term s (though at this stage of course only from the point o f view of criticism). Can Russell’s logically p ro p e r nam es do what they are su p ­ posed to do, namely, function as singular term s, if a singular term essentially specifies an object? We can im m ediately answ er this question in the negative if we recall that ‘specify’ means ‘indicate which of all’. In the object-relation o f a logically p ro p e r nam e th ere is no relation, not even an im plicit one, to a plurality o f o th er objects. Consciousness is only related to the p resen t sense-datum and th ere is no possibility, if these objects are not present, o f holding on to them by using a sign, not even in the sense of being able to re fe r back to them as past sense-data.

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A nd this has the consequence that the expression ‘this’ because it does not distinguish som ething from others fulfils no function at all and could ju st as well be om itted. It is instructive to com pare this language of logically p ro p e r names with th at variant o f the quasi-predicate language in which the word ‘this’ was used b u t in such a way that it was not replaceable by other expressions (above p. 263). In the case o f that language too I said that the w ord ‘this’ is not yet functioning as a singular term . Now, after the clarification of the function of singular term s, we can see m ore clearly why this m ust be so. T h e predicative sentences which can be form ed with Russell’s logically p ro p e r names represen t a language that is an exact co u n terp art, based on an introspectionist conception, to the exten d ed quasi-predicate language based on a behaviouristic concep­ tion. In both cases the speaker is tied to his perceptual situation, and the perspective of his speech does not extend beyond this situation. T he word ‘this’ is idling, because it is not u ndersto o d as a word that contrasts with o th er words which could take its place. (It has perhaps - as we saw in the case of quasi-predicate language - the minimal function of point­ ing to a p articular place in the situation; and som ething similar could be m aintained for Russell’s theory with respect to a place in perceptual space.) Russell believed that in the direct relation of the logically proper nam e to a perceptual datum he had fou n d that relation to an individual that is characteristic of singular terms. B ut singular term s do not simply have a relation to an individual - every object has this to every other object to which it stands in some relation. R ather it is characteristic of singular terms th at by m eans of them we refer to an individual as an individual by indicating which it is; and this they can only do by at the same tim e relating to all. T h e re is thus confirm ed from an o th er per­ spective what I h ad already anticipated in connection with the distinc­ tion betw een predicates an d quasi-predicates: that it must be the func­ tion o f singular term s to make the em ploym ent of predicates in d ep en d en t o f the perceptual situation. Even the deictic expression ‘this’ only functions as a singular term if it refers to what is present in such a way that the latter appears as what is m eant in contrast to all others. How it can do this is a question we have still to investigate. We can now see the peculiar dilem m a to which Russell’s theory of singular term s leads. Because Russell started out from the traditional view th at a singular term relates directly to an object he denied those expressions that are reg ard ed as singular term s - definite descriptions and the p ro p e r nam es of o rdinary language - the status o f singular term s; fo r he correctly perceived that they imply a relation to every­

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thing. As such they cannot, in his opinion, relate to an individual. But those expressions from which Russell rem oved all relation to a plurality, precisely so that they can relate to individuals, can for this very reason not refer to individuals. It is true that the use of general sentences can only be explained if familiarity with the mode of em ploym ent of sin­ gular sentences can be presupposed. O n the other hand, however, a peculiar generality seems already to characterize the singular term and, hence, the singular sentence. This is, as we shall see, a dilemma which Strawson too failed to see through and which has rem ained unresolved to this day. W hat form does Strawson’s critique of Russell’s Theory of Descrip­ tions take? His article ‘On R eferring’ is divided into five parts. T h e first three are devoted to criticism of Russell. In the last two parts Strawson indicates his own positive conception. P art I of the article is supposed to describe the premises and the question from which Russell started. Strawson points out that Russell did not distinguish between the m eaning of an expression and the object for which it stands. It would follow from this, Strawson claims, that a singular term which has no object also has no meaning; Russell developed his T heo ry of Descriptions in o rd er to avoid this absurd con­ sequence. Now it is true that Russell did not distinguish between m eaning and object.14 But it is u n fruitful to reduce the basis of Russell’s problem to this easily refutable premise. Q uine for example, although he accepted Russell’s theory and fu rth e r developed it, emphatically rejected this prem ise.15 Russell’s real problem was that of non-existent objects; and this problem rem ains even if one does not confuse the m eaning of a singular term with its object. By presenting a weakness of Russell’s view that is not essential to his theory as though it were its foundation Straw­ son has m ade criticism of it far too easy. T o refute Russell’s theory Strawson produces two argum ents in the second and third parts of his article which are presented as if they con­ cerned the same problem but are in fact independent. T h e first argum ent is as follows. O ne m ight distinguish with regard to an expression such as ‘the King of France’ between the expression and the use of the expression. T h e expression as such has a m eaning, but does not stand for a specific object. T h e expression only stands for a specific object if it is used in a specific situation - in this case, if it is used at a specific time. And it stands for a different object (whoever is King o f France at the time) or for none, depending on the time at which it is used. A corresponding distinction is to be m ade in regard to the

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whole sentence. T h e sentence ‘T h e King of France is bald’ has a m ean­ ing, but in itself no truth-value. Only when it is used at a particular time can it have a truth-value. Once one distinguishes between the expres­ sion and its use the confusion between m eaning and object which underlies Russell’s theory can, Strawson thinks, no longer arise. Against this argum ent Russell has him self pointed out (in his reply ‘Mr. Strawson on R eferrin g ’) that the distinction that Strawson makes, which specifically concerns deictic expressions, and which he, Russell, in no way denies, has nothing to do with the real problem . One can replace the situation-reference implicit in the expression ‘the (present) King of F rance’ by an objective specification by saying for instance ‘the King of France in 1905’ and see im mediately that the real problem , which concerns not a confusion o f m eaning and object but the talk of non-existent objects, is in d ep en d en t o f the special problem of deictic expressions. It is tru e th at with deictic expressions Russell’s problem only arises at the level o f the use o f the sentence but it arises at this level in ju st the sam e way as before. O r perhaps not? T his Strawson tries to show in the third section of his article. T h e thesis o f this section is that w hen som eone uses a sen­ tence like ‘T h e so-and-so is F' he presupposes th at one, and only one, object exists that is so-and-so but does not assert this. W hat is the d iffer­ ence? Strawson replies th at if som eone thinks that the existential p re ­ supposition a person m akes in em ploying such a sentence is m istaken he will not say that the latter’s statem ent is false but ra th e r that ‘the question of w hether his statem ent is true or false’ simply does not arise.16 T h e criticism o f Russell then simply boils down to this: that when such an object does not exist the statem ent is not false but neither tru e n o r false. Russell reacted sharply to this criticism too - and rightly so. Firstly, what is at issue, he claims, cannot be w hether one says one thing or the o th e r in ordinary language; besides one can give examples which show th at even in ordinary language one says in such a case that the state­ m en t is false, ra th e r than that the question of its truth or falsity does not arise. This criticism m ust be m ade even sharper. Firstly, Strawson writes as though this second point in his criticism were connected with the first, whereas in fact it is in d ep en d en t of it. Secondly, the second point is as irrelevant to the real problem as the first point. Strawson seems not to notice that the alternative which he presents to Russell’s view already involves acceptance of the essentials o f Russell’s theory. T h e existential statem ent, w hether m erely presupposed or implicitly asserted, is con­

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ceived by Straw son in exactly the sam e way as by Russell:17 consequently if the expression has no object the non-existence of the object cannot be understo o d by Straw son differently than by Russell. W hether the consequence o f this for the original statem ent is that the existence is asserted or m erely p resupposed, is a nuance th e relevance of which is not obvious. Straw son’s appeal to actual usage in o rdinary language, an d Russell’s reply that this cannot be w hat is at issue, has led people to think that the controversy betw een Russell and Strawson can be characterized as follows: the fo rm e r is concerned with the construction of an ideal logi­ cal language, the latter with the peculiarities o f o u r actual ordinary lan­ guage. This contrast, which in expositions of analytical philosophy is used virtually as a criterion for distinguishing the ‘ordinary language philosophy’ o f W ittgenstein and the O xfo rd School from those sem aildeists, such as Russell, Q u in e and C arnap, who are orientated m ore tow ards logic an d belong to the trad itio n of Frege, is absurd when understo o d in this sense. T h e appeal o f W ittgenstein and others, including Strawson, to o rd in ary language was not aim ed at bringing out the wealth o f sem antic n u an ce of o rd in ary language - an u n d ertak in g which, it could p roperly be objected, could be b e tter carried out by the em pirical science o f linguistics.18 Philosophy, even philosophy of ordi­ nary language, cannot be concerned with purely factual nuances o f ord in ary language; the m erely factual was never the object of philoso­ phy, only the possible. T h e appeal to natural language in W ittgenstein and those who have u n d ersto o d him has had a m ore fundam ental sig­ nificance. T h e appeal to natural language does not involve opposition to the idea of an ideal language as such, but only to the idea o f an ideal language built in a vacuum . W hat m ade necessary the recourse to nat­ ural language was the realization th at th e ideal language rem ains itself unexplained, o r is only explained by m eans o f an ordinary language m eta-language. It is m otivated, not by an in terest in factual nuances, b ut by m ethodological ideas, about the m eaning o f an ultim ate semantic explanation (ideas of the kind we have becom e acquainted with in con­ nection with the fu n d am en tal principle o f analytical philosophy). From o u r p o in t o f view it is a m atter o f indifference w hether the view th a t the existential statem ent is only p resu p p o sed in the use of the singular term is better attested for th e n atu ral languages with which we are fam iliar th an the view th at the existential statem ent is asserted. If both are possible, but the existential statem ent m ust at least be p resup­ posed, then Russell’s theory is vindicated. O n e m ust th erefo re conclude th at Straw son’s Russell-critique in ‘On

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R eferring’ fails in every respect. Even Russell’s starting point is p re ­ sented in a way which fails to m ake clear what is really at stake in decid­ ing the correctness or uncorrectness of Russell’s theory. And the two objections which Straw son then brings tu rn out to be both irrelevant. It is only in the concluding section o f Straw son’s article, in which he sketches his own view, th at it becom es clear what the real issue is. H ere he speaks o f the function (task) of singular terms. If one is speaking about individuals o ne needs expressions by means of which one can uniquely re fe r to individuals. Expressions can only fulfil this function if they function in such a way th at th ro u g h them a speaker enables a h earer to ‘identify w hat is being talked about’. But this can only be achieved by a specific referen ce to the speech-situation (the context of utterance); to identify the object re fe rred to, the object m ust ‘be in a certain relation to the speaker and to the context of utteran ce’.19 We shall have to see in the n ex t lecture how Strawson elaborates this view in his book. B ut what we m ust now ask is w hether by reference to Straw son’s positive view we can explain what the real difference is between him and Russell. Strawson rightly regards Russell’s logically p ro per names as fictions. However, he only criticizes this aspect o f Russell’s view in passing. H e thinks he can dispose o f it by p ointing out that the conception of ‘this’ as an am biguous p ro p e r nam e again rests on the confusion of m eaning and object. Strawson is, o f course, right in thinking that the word ‘this’, as it is actually used in natural language, is not an ambiguous p ro p er nam e but, as a deictic expression, has a unitary m eaning and designates d ifferen t objects d e p en d in g on the situation in which it is used. But Russell did not claim to be using this word as it is used in natural lan­ guage; n o r can one oblige him to do so. T h e test of his theory is not w hether it co rresponds to the ordinary-language use of words, but w hether it can explain how we can re fe r to individuals. T h e reason why it fo u n d ers on this is not because Russell fails to see that despite the fact that a deictic expression stands fo r d ifferen t objects (depending on the situation in which it is used) it has a unitary m eaning. Rather it is because he fails to take into account ano th er peculiarity of deictic expressions, viz. th at the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the p erceptual situation can be re fe rred to outside the percep­ tual situation by m eans o f a n o th e r deictic expression and then also by means o f o th er singular term s. It is this substitutability of deictic expressions which m akes it possible to re fe r to the same object when it is no longer perceived. Strawson also failed to go into this aspect of the use of deictic expressions which is crucial to the specification of objects, although he deserves credit for having raised the question of the func­

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tion of singular terms and, in particular, deictic expressions. It is, how­ ever, philosophically irrelevant to reproach Russell for having failed to take account o f certain aspects o f the use o f deictic expressions. This cannot touch him, for he does n o t regard ‘this’ as a deictic expression at all. It can only touch him, and only become philosophically relevant, if the aspect o f the use o f deictic expressions in question can be shown to be a necessary condition o f the possibility o f referring to individual objects. Strawson wanted to conduct his critique of logically p ro p er names in a m ore indirect fashion. He wanted to dem onstrate that it is not neces­ sary to postulate such expressions by rehabilitating the singular term s of natural language which, in Russell’s T heory of Descriptions, are in terp reted away. This was to be achieved firstly (and negatively) by the critique of Russell’s theory and secondly (and positively) by the appeal to the function of singular terms. O ne must, he says, recognize the use of these term s, whose purpose it is to refer to individuals, as the ‘h arm ­ less necessary thing’20 th at it is. B ut is it really so harmless? And has Strawson really succeeded in rehabilitating singular term s as such, if, as he believed, this requires a refutation of Russell’s theory? Does the neg­ ative critical p art of the article provide that critique which the positive part presupposes? Strawson holds fast to the same presupposition which Russell took as his starting-point, viz. that if one is to be able to refer to an individual with an expression that expression cannot imply a general statem ent. A refutation of Russell’s theory would have required Strawson to destroy its foundations rath er than simply offer an alternative version in the shape of the thesis that the general state­ m ent is not asserted but merely presupposed. If one only criticizes Rus­ sell in the way Strawson does then precisely that aspect o f Russell’s th e ­ ory to which Strawson took exception is preserved. Strawson him self adm its even in regard to the deictic expression ‘this’ that its use presu p ­ poses a general statem ent: if som eone points som ewhere and says ‘T his so-and so . . .’ then it is either asserted or presupposed that in that place th ere is one, and only one, so-and-so.21 T h e function of singular term s particularly of deictic expressions em phasized by Strawson thus in no way contradicts Russell’s theory; ra th e r it would even seem to p resu p ­ pose it. But in that case this function is harm less neither in the sense intended by Strawson - th at it makes Russell’s theory dispensable - n o r in the sense th at it requires no explanation. We shall have to ask: how can singular statem ents be understood if they already presuppose a re f­ erence to a totality and an existential statem ent that is a general state­ ment?

L E C T U R E 23

W h a t is ‘identification’?

At the end of the lecture before last we arrived at the result that the function of singular term s is to be u n derstood as that of specifying. By ‘specifying’ was m eant: indicating which o f all objects it is that is classified by the o th er sentence-com ponent. It has not yet been decided w hether the m eaning of o u r reference to objects is exhausted by the thus ch ar­ acterized object-relation that is m ade possible by the em ploym ent o f a species o f linguistic sign, n o r w hether we are to und erstan d what is m eant by ‘objects’ in term s o f it. And in particular it rem ained still unexplained how these linguistic expressions - singular terms - m ust be em ployed if they are to be able to fulfil the function of specifying as thus described. In o rd e r to p re p a re ourselves for this enquiry into the concrete form which the specificatory function of singular term s takes we shall begin by orientating ourselves towards the conception o f Strawson (who was the first to tackle this problem ). We saw in the last lecture that one cannot be satisfied with the way in which Strawson, in his early paper ‘On R eferring’, tries critically to distinguish him self from Russell. H ow ­ ever, his own positive conception (viz. th at singular term s have a socalled identificatory function) is merely sketched in th at paper. It is only worked out in his book Individuals (1958) and in his paper ‘Singular T erm s and Predication’ (1961) in which he argues with Q uine. So it is these writings towards which we m ust orientate ourselves in the hope of reaching, via Strawson’s talk o f identification, a concrete understanding of what I have term ed the function o f specification. In the 1961 p ap er Strawson states th at it belongs to the essence of a singular term th at it is ‘used for the p u rp o se of identifying the object’. A nd this identificatory function is said to consist in ‘bringing it about that the h earer knows which object it is, o f all the objects within the h e are r’s scope of knowledge or presum ption, that the other term ’ - the

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p redicate - ‘is being applied to ’.1 T his definition of w hat is m eant by ‘identification’ comes very close to the definition which I have given of ‘specification’; one m ight th erefo re think th at they stand for the sam e concept. H ow ever, as we shall see, the m atter is m ore com plicated. B ut it is worth noting that Strawson also takes account here o f the fact (which 1 have stressed b u t which he has otherw ise neglected), th at referen ce to an object implies a referen ce to all objects o f a dom ain. T h e only respect in which Straw son’s account differs from the one I gave is in the explicit m ention o f a hearer. In Individuals the problem o f identification is, from the start, treated as one th at concerns com ­ m unication betw een a speaker an d a h earer. T h u s it is th a t for Strawson the person who prim arily identifies an object is the hearer; he does so when he knows which object th e speaker m eans. In the case o f the speaker Strawson speaks only in a derivative sense of identification: that the speaker identifies an object m eans that the h earer identifies the object which he, the speaker, m eans.2 From this we can see why Strawson chose the term ‘identify’ for the function o f the singular terms in question: the hearer knows which object is m ean t by the speaker if he knows that the object which the speaker means is identical with an object so-and-so th a t is accessible to him , the h e a re r.3 It m ight at first sight seem a p articu lar virtue of Straw son’s conception th at from the outset he tries to u n d e rstan d referen ce to objects in term s o f the com m unication-situation. O n th e o th er h a n d we saw in the semantics o f whole assertoric sentences (in the debate with Grice) that, although linguistic expressions m ust be explained as they are used in in ter subjective com m unication, no explanation is acceptable that essentially presupposes that there are two separate speech-partners. For then the use o f the expression in soliloquy could not follow the same rules. In my description of th e function o f singular term s, viz. that they serve to pick out, or indicate, which object is m eant, the use of these expressions is u n d ersto o d in term s o f the function they have in discourse; b u t this can ju st as well be soliloquy. T h e exaggerated ten ­ dency th at is to be observed today in some q u arters tow ards a com m u­ nication-orientated sem antics at any price can only lead to a semantics that construes language as simply an instrum ent of com m unication. Such a sem antics would, like traditional philosophy, again p resuppose as prelinguistic the very epistemological structures which require explanation; such structures are then not understood in term s of the speech-situation. T h e apparently m ore radical com m unication-orientated approach (more radical because for such an approach the separation o f speaker and h earer is essential) is in reality less radical, fo r it inevitably rem ains on

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the surface. T h u s we saw th at a purely com m unication-orientated con­ ception of the use of assertoric sentences, such as that of Grice, has to presuppose ju d g m e n t or belief, and hence all the logical structures of semantics, an d th a t it th erefo re cannot explain them in term s of dis­ course. In the same way a theory o f singular term s according to which their function consists in this: that by their m eans one speech-partner com m unicates to an o th er which object he is re fe rrin g to, m ust p resup­ pose reference to objects as such as som ething th at does not first need to be explained in term s o f language and discourse. Such a theory of singular term s could th erefo re contribute nothing to the fundam ental enquiry into the object-relation and the concept of an object. You m ight say: ‘So what. O ne does not refu te a theory by pointing out th at a particu lar end cannot be achieved by it; for it could be that this end is o verdraw n.’ T h a t is correct. It can, however, be shown that Straw son’s explanation presupposes the very thing it is supposed to explain. T h e h e a re r identifies the object referred to by the speaker if he knows that th e object re fe rred to by the speaker is identical with the so-and-so. T h e second com ponent of this identity-statement is a singular term which, it is assum ed in this explanation, the hearer understands. So th e concept o f identification, as thus understood, can contribute nothing to the explanation of singular terms. This weakness in Strawson’s conception has been draw n attention to particularly by B. A. O. Williams in a review o f Straw son’s book.4 Consequently, the authors who have continued to w ork in the field of enquiry opened u p by Strawson have no longer used the term ‘identification’ in the com m unication-orientated sense in which Strawson first introduced it.5 A nd Strawson too finds him self com pelled to speak o f ‘identifying’ in a sense other than that initially intro d u ced . T h e hearer, he says, m ust be able to identify the in ten d ed object ‘for h im self’.6 And, one m ight well add, the speaker m ust also be able to identify the in ten d ed object ‘for him self’. In a later place in his book Strawson writes: ‘F or each of us can think identifyingly abou t particulars w ithout talking about them .’7 It is clear th at the term ‘identify’ is h e re being used in a completely d ifferen t sense from that in which it was in tro d u ced at the beginning of the book. For w hether the ‘thin k in g identifyingly’ o f which Strawson here speaks is understood as soliloquy or as som ething pre-linguistic, it can on no account be conceived as an internal c o u n te rp a rt o f the identification introduced by Strawson at th e beginning o f the book. For th at identification, when articulated, had the form o f an identity-statem ent the first com ponent of which was: ‘the object which the speaker m eans’. Trivially, such a reference has no place in soliloquy. So if one also speaks o f identifying in soliloquy then

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it would seem no longer to be a reference that is articulated in an identitystatem ent. In an identity-statem ent two singular term s are used. If the reference to an object which both speaker and hearer perform by means of one singular term is called ‘identification’, then ‘identification’ cannot m ean ‘holding som ething to be identical with som ething’. But what then does it mean? We find no real answ er to the question in Strawson. In this lecture and the next I shall have to put your patience to a severe test as, building on the m eagre beginnings we find in Strawson and others, I attem p t to reach a clear concept o f identification which will tu rn out to be a pre-em inent special case of the specification which, in the lecture before last, I showed to be the general function of singular term s. I f you w ant to know, before letting yourself in for this u n d ertak ­ ing, why you should be so patient, my reply would be that I believe that it is only by m eans of this narrow er concept of identification (which Strawson has not explained but hinted at) that the general function of specifying, and hence the m eaning o f reference to objects, can be understood. Strawson does not explain what he means by ‘identify’ in the non-com m unication-orientated sense. H e simply paraphrases the word, mainly by the expression ‘to pick o u t’; and Searle and others have followed him in this.8 W hat is m eant by the English ‘to pick o u t’? It is not only used for the physical act of picking out an individual object from a collection, e.g. a berry from a basket o f berries, but also for the merely designatory pick­ ing out of an individual as the one intended, e.g. an officer standing before his com pany picks out an individual as the one who is to perform a certain task, by pointing to him. And it is this picking out in the sense of singling out th at Strawson has in m ind when he uses ‘to pick o u t’ as a p arap h rase for ‘to identify’. T his is also shown by the fact that on one occasion he paraphrases ‘to pick out’ itself with the expression ‘to single out’.9 It means roughly: ‘to bring som ething into prom inence as the individual that is m eant’. So it now seems clear (1) th at Strawson uses the word ‘identify’ in two completely d ifferen t senses (2) th at in its first sense - ‘sp eak erhearer identification’10 - it presupposes in the case of both speaker and hearer identification in the second sense, and that, therefore, this is the basic sense, (3) that what is m eant by ‘identify’ in this second sense, paraphrased by ‘pick out’ and ‘single out’, appears roughly to correspond to what I have called ‘specification’: the act of indicating which of all it is that is classified by the supplem enting predicative expression. Strawson him self considered using the expression ‘specify’ (which has also been used by Q uine), b u t rejected it as too vague.11 It seems that

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he wished to exclude the following ambiguity. O ne could specify12 what is m eant simply by saying: it is that object to which such and such p ro p ­ erties belong. Clearly th ere are singular terms which specify the object for which they stand in this way, viz. definite descriptions. At any rate one can say this of all those definite descriptions which do not contain a deictic expression or a spatio-tem poral specification. A deictic expres­ sion serves subjectively to locate som ething, a spatio-tem poral specifi­ cation objectively to locate som ething. We shall have to deal with this in detail later on. Descriptions which do not locate in either of these ways we can call ‘purely descriptive definite descriptions’ (rein deskriptive Kennzeichnungen). O ne may doubt w hether one can distinguish an individual object from all others by the m ere accum ulation of merely descriptive expressions, i.e. predicates. However this possibility is rela­ tively clear in the case o f ‘ordinal’ properties, i.e. properties with respect to which objects can be o rd ered in a series.13 Examples o f this sort o f singular term would be ‘the highest m ountain’, ‘the second highest m ountain’. An object can fail to be distinguished from all others, and hence specified, by such descriptions, because there are two or m ore objects to which the p ro p erty in question belongs to the same degree, e.g. if there are two m ountains of exactly the same height. But the fact that the specification fails does not m ean that an expression is not used in this way (with this intention). Even the use of a dem onstrative expres­ sion - ‘this so-and-so’ - which is regard ed by m any authors, and also by Strawson, as the most unam biguous form o f identification can fail if it tu rn s out th at th ere is no so-and-so, or m ore than one so-and-so, at the place which is pointed to. So it cannot be because it can sometimes fail that Strawson does not recognize this form o f specification as identification; he m ust have o th e r reasons. If th erefo re Strawson paraphrases his second use of the word ‘identification’ so that it appears to correspond to what I have term ed ‘specification’ and if nevertheless he does not count as identification cases which clearly fulfil the function of specification then we m ust assum e that this talk o f ‘identification’ contains yet an o th er hidden ambiguity. W hat Strawson intends by ‘identify’ in the sense of ‘pick o u t’ m ust be a special, a pre-em inent case of the general function of indicating-which-of-all. T h e problem is clearly connected with Strawson’s opposition to Russell’s T heory of Descriptions which I discussed in the last lecture. For it is obviously the possibility ju s t m entioned, of purely descriptive specification, which Russell’s T heo ry of Descriptions fits. W hereas in ‘O n R eferring’ Strawson completely rejected this theory he now seems to accept it at least for one type of description; so now the

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objection would only be th at Russell has im properly generalized what is tru e o f this type and in so doing has overlooked that use of singular term s in particular by m eans of which an object is ‘identified’. We should now be in a position to, on the one hand, und erstan d better what it was in Russell that Straw son took exception to and, on the o th e r han d , obtain an indication from this o f what he means by ‘identification’. A lthough Russell of course does not him self speak of ‘specification’ an d although Strawson too does not call it ‘specification’, one can nevertheless say: th ere is a kind o f specification by m eans of a singular term in which it is said: ‘th ere is an object that is so-and-so’ or (if we re n d e r im plicit the explicit assertion o f existence which Strawson m ade m uch of, but which is in itself indifferent) ‘the one which is soand-so’. We can now easily see w hat it is th at Strawson still misses in such an expression and why he will still not g ran t it the function of identification. If we supp lem en t such an expression with a predicate to form a whole sentence and say: ‘the one which is so-and-so is F ’, then we have not indicated, one m ight say, o f which object it is asserted that it is F; we have only said th a t the only thing th at is so-and-so, whichever this may be, is F. O f course, this explanation is still unclear, for to som eone who were to argue in this way one could reply: ‘B ut we have specified which it is, precisely by saying “th e only one th a t is so-and so”.’ H owever, the o th er person could reply th at in this way the object is only indirectly designated as the sole b e a re r o f a p roperty; an object is only identified if it is itself directly designated. This contrasting of an indirect and a direct reference to an object is o f course still unclear. O ne can, however, clarify this contrast by m eans o f an exam ple. I f som eone says som ething about the highest m ountain on earth it is n o t yet clear of which object, of which m ountain, he is speaking. O ne can ask ‘and which m ountain is the highest th en ?’ Only w hen this question h ad been answ ered would we have ‘identified’ a specific m ountain. It is still unclear how this further specification of which it is is to be achieved; but we can now say that how ever it is achieved it is only this specification that should be called ‘identification’. Such a definition o f th e word ‘identify’ occurs in Searle. H e says: ‘By “identify” h e re I m ean th a t there should no longer be any do u b t o r am biguity about w hat exactly is being talked about. At the lowest level, questions like “who?”, “w hat?”, or “which one?” are answ ered.’14 You will still find this u nclear and ask: ‘what is this distinction of levels in re g a rd to the question “which o f all is m eant?” and w hat is it that distinguishes th e lowest level?’ So far as I can see the literature has up till now provided no m eans for systematically dealing with this question.

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Now in the fundam ental principle of analytical philosophy we have a natural clue to guide us in the enquiry into the semantics of singular term s. B ut though I re fe rred to this at the beginning we have not so far p u t it to use. T h e question o f what it is for a singular term to stand for an object, we saw then (p. 270), can only be answered by asking how it is established for which object a singular term stands. In the meantim e we have seen that the function o f the singular term is to specify an object, hence that ‘standing fo r’ is to be understood as specifying. T hus the question we have to ask is obviously: how is it established which object a singular term specifies? A nd if there are different kinds of singular term and d ifferen t levels of specification then we can expect that these can be distinguished by reference to the different ways in which it is established which object the expression specifies. M oreover, this should also explain how that narrow er concept of specification, which Strawson calls ‘identification’, an d whose m eaning he did not explain but merely hinted at by m eans o f paraphrases, is to be understood. H ow ever, in p rep aratio n for such a systematic analysis we should first make clear how far o ne can get with Strawson. So far I have only dis­ cussed the question o f what in general Strawson means by ‘identification’. We m ust now try to fo rm a clearer picture of the possibilities of identi­ fication o f perceptible objects by singular term s which he envisages. In this way we can p re p a re the g ro u n d for the systematic clarification of what distinguishes the narrow er concept of identification from the m ore com prehensive concept o f specification. Strawson distinguishes two sorts o f identification: direct (dem onstra­ tive) and indirect (non-dem onstrative). As one would expect he sees identification by m eans o f the deictic expression ‘this’ as the simplest case of identification. T h e question ‘which is the highest m ountain?’ can, so it would seem, be definitively answ ered by taking the questioner to a p articular m ountain and saying: ‘it is this o ne’. This ‘dem onstrative identification’ consists in this, th at ‘the h earer can sensibly discrim inate the individual object re fe rred to ’ and thus ‘pick it o u t’. H e is thereby able ‘directly to locate’ the object re fe rre d to.15 But an object can also be identified indirectly, in a non-dem onstrative way. T his can only be done by relating it to the situation o f dem onstrative identification, thus to the perceptual situation o f speaker and h earer. Such an identification is achieved th erefo re by means o f ‘a description which relates the p a r­ ticular in question uniquely to a n o th e r particular which can be dem o n ­ stratively identified’.16 Now there is a com prehensive system of unique relations to which all spatio-tem poral objects belong, namely the system o f spatio-tem poral relations. Every perceptible object has a place within

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this system and thus stands in a unique spatio-temporal relation to every o th er perceptible object. As the system of spatio-tem poral relations is unique, and com prehensive, every perceptible object can be identified, if not by an o th er unique relation at any rate by its spatio-tem poral rela­ tion to a directly identifiable object.17 If we m easure these two possible ways of identifying concrete objects which Strawson envisages against the idea - an idea which of course is not form ulated by Strawson him self - that a specification by means of a singular term V shall only count as identification if it no longer gives rise to the fu rth e r question ‘and which object isx?’, then one must raise the following objections: 1. If we take som eone who wants to know what the highest m ountain is blindfold to Mt Everest, rem ove the blindfold and say to him ‘It is this’, it is quite likely th at he will reply: ‘But which m ountain is it that I see here?’ Normally one would reply to such a question by giving the nam e of the m ountain. But that the answer ‘the highest m ountain (or: the m ountain which you see here) is Mt Everest’ is usually accepted as definitive is d ue simply to the fact th at it is presupposed th at one is clear which m ountain it is that is so nam ed. By the question ‘which is it?’ we m ean here ‘w here is it? in what spatial relations does it stand to other objects, to o th er geographical data?’ It is only after a reply to a question o f this kind that the fu rth e r question ‘and which is the m ountain that is at such-and-such a place?’ is meaningless. T hus one can only agree with Strawson that dem onstrative specification is a specification at the lowest level, an ‘identification’, to the extent that norm ally w hen we use the dem onstrative pronoun ‘this’ or the corresponding spatio-tem poral expressions ‘h e re ’ and ‘now’ we presuppose th at we can replace these expressions by other expressions which designate the objective spatiotem poral position in which the object is situated, thus the position which belongs to the object not ju st subjectively, from the standpoint of the speaker, but the position which belongs to it relative to all o th er possible standpoints. But then it is not possible to conceive of the identification o f perceptible objects in th at way in two steps as Strawson does. D em on­ strative identification if it is to be genuine identification itself presupposes spatio-tem poral, non-dem onstrative identification. What Strawson calls ‘direct location’ (above p. 316) presupposes the possibility o f an objective location. Strawson’s failure to see this results from his taking over the traditional assum ption, which is also implicit in Russell’s theory of logi­ cally p ro p er names, th at an expression’s standing for an object is to be understood as a direct relation. Like Russell, Strawson conceived this relation as a dem onstrative relation in which som ething present in p e r­

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ception is simply pointed at. H e failed to notice that to specify an indi­ vidual means: to indicate which of all. T his does not m ean that one must be able to give the relations o f the object referred to to all other objects (this is not the case with, e.g., most types of abstract objects). It does however m ean th at through the ‘indication which’ the object re fe rred to m ust be distinguishable from everything that is not identical with it. And in the specific case o f the specification of perceptible objects this has the consequence that the indication of which object is m eant by means of a m ere dem onstrative does not suffice for specification. One must also be able to distinguish the object m eant from all others. Why this can only be done by indicating in which spatio-tem poral relation it stands to all others is som ething we have still to investigate. 2. We have seen that Strawson distinguishes two sorts of non­ dem onstrative identification. In both cases the object m eant is identified by m eans of a unique relation to som ething dem onstratively identified, in the first sort by m eans o f its spatio-tem poral relation, in the second by m eans of an o th er relation. We have now seen that dem onstrative identification itself presupposes the first kind of non-dem onstrative identification. T h e presupposition is o f course a reciprocal one. All locating of som ething by indicating its spatio-tem poral relations to other objects is only an identification if the spatio-tem poral relations of these other objects to the perceptual situation are known. I shall come back to this point. But how is it with the o th e r kind o f non-dem onstrative identification - th at by m eans of other th an spatio-tem poral relations? O ne cannot reg ard this kind of identification as restricted to those cases in which som ething stands directly in a unique relation to som ething perceived. All specification by means o f a unique relation to som ething already identified clearly belongs to the sam e class; hence the relation to the perceptual situation can be as indirect as you please. Examples are: ‘the m u rd e re r o f this m an ’, ‘the wife of Mr M aier’, ‘the President of France’, ‘the first m an to climb Everest’. Now it is easy to see that the specification of an object by means of such a unique relation to something already identified in no way differs from specification by m eans of a merely descriptive expression, to which Strawson has denied the status of ‘identification’. A specification of the form ‘the only one that stands in the relation R to this h e re ’ does not differ qua specification from a specification of the form ‘the only one th at isF .’ In both cases som ething is only singled out as an individual by saying that it is the only thing which has a certain property or is related in a certain way to som ething identified. And in both cases the question rem ains open what it is that has this property or relation, e.g. ‘the m u rd e re r of M r X—’. A nd then

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the question arises: ‘who is that, who m u rd e re d M r X?’ T his question, like the question ‘which is the highest m ountain?’ can initially be answ ered by giving a p ro p e r nam e. B ut again this is a reply th at can only count as identification if it is assum ed th a t one knows which person it is th at is so nam ed. A nd h ere too this can only m ean: if one can spatiotem porally identify the person. It is difficult to see why Straw son believed th at specification by m eans of a uniq u e relation differs essentially from specification by m eans o f a unique property. Probably he th o u g h t that only a unique relation ensures that w hat is specified is really only one. B u t if this were so one could not adm it all relation-descriptions which in virtue o f th eir m eaning p re ­ suppose th at only one object stands in this relation (e.g. ‘the m u rd e re r o f . . .’) b u t only those w here not m ore th a n one object can have the relation concerned to a particu lar object (e.g. ‘the m o th er of . . .’). Spec­ ifications by m eans o f such relations, unlike those by m eans of a unique p rop erty , cannot fail in the sense th at it could tu rn out that the descrip­ tion applies to m ore than one object. B ut w ithout fu rth e r explanation it is n o t clear why a specification should n o t be an identification merely because it can fail. A nd, besides, all the kinds o f identification distin­ guished by Strawson can fail in the o th e r sense, i.e. in the sense o f it tu rn in g o u t that th e re is no such object. T h u s in the case o f dem o n stra­ tive identification it can tu rn o u t that w hen one says ‘this beetle’ there is no beetle in the place at which one points; and the sam e clearly holds for identification by m eans o f th e objective identification by m eans of the spatio-tem poral position at which the object is situated. Strawson has not sharply defined his concept o f identification, for he has not distinguished, as I have done, a n arro w er concept of identifi­ cation from a w ider one o f specification. It is th erefo re also n o t clear what his criterion is for distinguishing a specification in the narrow er sense from one in the w ider sense. C onsequently, my assertion that specification by m eans o f a u n iq u e relation does n o t differ, in th e sense relevant to identification, from specification by m eans of a unique p ro p ­ erty, does not tell decisively against him. O ne cannot arg u e definitively against an im precise position. T his assertion o f m ine is how ever conclu­ sive if, as I assum ed in connection with th e quotation from Searle, the relevant criterion for distinguishing identification from m ere specifica­ tion is th a t in the fo rm er case the question ‘which o f all is m eant?’ is answ ered at the lowest level, in o th er w ords, th at this question can no longer be repeated. If we now look at th e objections I have b ro u g h t against the two forms o f identification distinguished by Strawson tog eth er, they seem to point

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from two d iffe re n t sides to o ne and the same thing: namely that Straw­ son, who deserves the credit for draw ing attention to the special signif­ icance o f the system of spatio-tem poral relations for the identification of perceptible objects, has yet u n d erestim ated this significance. For Strawson this significance consists simply in this, that the spatio-temporal relations between objects constitute a com prehensive and unitary system of relations and thereby m ake it possible to identify an object, in so far as it is not dem onstratively identifiable, if not by m eans of o th er unique relations, then at least by m eans o f its spatio-tem poral relations. B ut it has now been shown, (a) th a t dem onstrative identification is only an identification if it is presu p p o sed that it can be replaced by spatio-tem ­ poral relations by which th e objective spatio-tem poral position which the object occupies is designated and (b) that specification by means of o th e r unique relations is not identification at all. It em erges then, not ju st th at the system of spatio-tem poral relations is specially significant for th e identification of perceptible objects, but th at there is only one sort o f identification o f perceptible objects: if an individual perceptible object is to be spoken of in such a way that the question ‘A nd which is that?’ is no longer possible, then it m ust be located in space and time. W here have we got to? T h e result at which we have now arrived has its foundation in an in tern al critical in terp retatio n o f Strawson and, at the sam e time, in the attem p t to p u rsu e the question ‘which is m eant?’ th ro u g h its various levels to the final one at which it can no longer be repeated. In this way I have situated my own enquiry and its fu rth er systematic elaboration in th e context o f the state o f the problem in con­ tem porary analytical philosophy, which, as far as I can see, has not essentially advanced beyond Strawson. T h e correction of Strawson’s view that it is m ost im p o rtan t to hold on to is the refutation of his conception of an isolated dem onstrative identification. This conception is a residue of the traditional theory o f the object-relation as a simple relation to som ething im m ediately given and contradicts the insight that reference to an object is to be u n d ersto o d as specification, as the indication of which o f all is m eant. W hat rem ains as the positive result o f the internal interpretation of Strawson how ever will scarcely strike you as transparent. T h a t all spec­ ification of perceptible objects at the lowest level is location by means of th eir spatio-tem poral relations is a result that m ust first be m ade intel­ ligible, in several respects. 1. So far it has not becom e clear why it is that th ere are several and essentially two levels o f specification o f perceptible objects and what it is, in principle, th at distinguishes the final level. We could get no answer

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to this question from Strawson, because his use of the term ‘identification’ is too unclear. So I confined my attention to the m ere fact that such levels are shown in the m an n er in which we specify an object. B ut if reference to an object is essentially to be understood as specification, and specification exhibits such differences, then the analysis o f these differences is clearly essential for understanding our reference to objects. 2. A lthough th e specification of perceptible objects at the lowest level has tu rn e d out to be spatio-tem poral location it has so far rem ained unexplained how this specification actually functions in the interplay of dem onstrative and objectively locating expressions. 3. Should we accept it simply as a fact that the specification of p er­ ceptible objects at this lowest level turns out to be spatio-tem poral loca­ tion? For Strawson this question did not need to arise because spatiotem poral location appeared to him to be merely one kind of identification am ong others. B ut if this fact is somehow to become intelligible then it must be possible to explain it by recourse to the concept of identification - specification at the lowest level - and we do not yet have such a concept. In o rd e r to answ er this question and in this way advance our enquiry into the m ode of em ploym ent of singular term s and reference to objects we will now have to bring to bear the conceptual means which we derive from o u r systematic approach: 1. I have already pointed out that from the standpoint of W ittgen­ stein’s principle it would have been obvious from the start to pose the question of the m ode of em ploym ent o f the various kinds of singular term (and that means: the question of the particular form which the specificatory function assumes) by asking how it is established for which object the expression stands (p. 316). M oreover we will now have also to bring in the question o f meaning; and we already know that the philosophical question concerning the m eaning of a form o f expression is the question concerning how individual expressions of this form are explained - and this means: how their m eaning is established. 2. In the introduction to the problem of singular term s I left open the question of w hether the ‘standing’ of a singular term ‘fo r’ an object can only be u nderstood in relation to the context of predication, for this question could not be decided on the basis of the truth-definition of the predicative sentence-form (p. 2 6 8 f). B ut as it then em erged that ‘standing fo r’ m ust be understood as specification it also became clear that singular term s are, as regards their object-relation, essentially incomplete expressions - they require to be supplem ented by something that is said about the object m eant, i.e. by a predicate (p. 291). T h e explanation of the m ode of em ploym ent o f singular term s can thus be

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reinforced by ap proaching the m atter from the o ther side and asking how perceptible objects m ust be specified if they are to be capable of being characterized by corresponding predicates, i.e. by predicates which are explained in perceptual situations. 3. T here is a third methodological perspective directly connected with this second one. If the specificatory function of singular term s is to be understood in connection with the need to be supplem ented by p re d i­ cates this m eans that the establishing of which object the singular term stands for m ust be u nderstood in connection with the establishing o f w hether the predicative statem ents into which the singular term enters as a d e p en d en t com ponent are tru e or false.

L E C T U R E 24

Specification and identification. Specification and tru th

T h e attem p t to clarify Straw son’s vague talk o f ‘identification’, which at first seem ed to correspond to what I had called the specificatory function of singular term s, led to the following result. W hat is thereby intended is not the general concept o f specification, but a p re-em in en t special case o f this function by m eans o f which is indicated at a lowest level which object is m eant, th at is, in such a way th at the question ‘A nd which object is th e one thus specified?’ can no longer be rep eated. A nd it em erged th at in the case o f perceptible objects this special case of specification is only given w hen the object is spatio-tem porally located by th e singular term . H ow ever, we have-so far not succeeded in describ­ ing this special case of specification in a way th at would justify speaking of a clear concept of identification. It th e re fo re also rem ained unclear what relevance this special case has for specification in general and hence for the possibility o f re fe rrin g to objects. A nd equally it rem ained unclear how this identification - specification by spatio-tem poral location actually functions and in w hat way spatio-tem poral location has such a pre-em inence fo r the ultim ate specification o f a perceptible object. A t the end o f the last lecture I re fe rre d to th re e m ethodological p e r­ spectives which can guide us in answ ering these questions which still rem ain open: 1. the orientation towards the actual m ode o f em ploym ent of singular term s and, in p articular, tow ards the question o f how it is to be estab­ lished for which object the expression stands. 2. consideration o f the fact that singular term s are expressions which su p p lem en t predicates. 3. consideration of the function which establishing which object the expression stands for has in establishing the tru th or falsity o f the sen­ tences th at can be form ed with it. O f these th re e perspectives the first is th e m ost concrete; and it is also

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decisive, for we clearly cannot attribute to singular terms through the expressions which they supplem ent or through those which arise from such supplem entation, an object-relation which they do not themselves yield. O n the o th e r hand, if the specificatory function of singular terms is essentially a partial function (Teilfunktion) which supplem ents the function of characterization-expressions in such a way that expressions with an assertoric function result, then from the other perspectives one should at least be able to shed light on those questions which concern not so much the descriptive phenom ena themselves as their intelligibility. T he th ird perspective is of particular im portance to us, for after all we are only u n d ertak in g the investigation of singular term s so as ultimately to arrive at an explanation of the use of the predicative sentence-form , or of the word ‘tru e ’ at this lowest level o f its recursive definition. T he best th in g th erefo re is for us to start from a global consideration of the th ird perspective as the most com prehensive. T he resulting orientation for the u n d erstan d in g o f singular term s will automatically lead us to the detailed investigation of singular term s from the point of view of how one establishes which object is specified by a singular term . Since we shall only be able to answ er a p art o f the open questions in this way, I shall revert, in the next lecture, to the second m ethodological p e r­ spective, to consideration of the fact that singular term s are expressions which supplem ent predicates - predicates which if they were not thus supplem ented would be quasi-predicates - and this perspective will lead to a deepening o f o u r understanding of the use of singular terms which, finally, should lead to a full u n d erstan d in g of singular terms from the third perspective, with the result that it is no longer necessary to use the locution ‘standing fo r’ in the truth-definition of predicative state­ ments and that the predicative sentence-form becomes intelligible. It would also seem ap p ro p riate to begin with the third perspective because, o f the th ree, it is the only one to have so far been considered in analytical philosophy by some authors. T h e reason for the unsatis­ factory state of the semantics o f singular term s, despite the vast literature, is that the discussion of such term s was only placed in the m ore general context o f the semantics o f assertoric sentences w here the latter was p u rsu ed at the level o f m eta-theory, thus w ithout enquiring about the mode o f em ploym ent of the expressions. W here the mode of employ­ m ent o f singular term s was enquired about this happened without an orientation tow ards m ore general sem antic principles and, most im por­ tantly, w ithout consideration o f the function o f singular term s in the sentence-whole. T his holds for Strawson and it also holds for other im p o rtan t m o d ern investigations of particular types of singular terms

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which represent views opposed to Strawson, in particular those of Kripke and Donnellan. Only in Dummett do we find a clear orientation towards the third perspective, inasmuch as, in his book on Frege, he maintains that the m eaning of a singular term , which is understood by him as a directive for establishing which object the expression stands for, is to be understood as the contribution it makes to the m eaning of the assertoric sentences into which it enters as a constituent. And to understand the m eaning of an assertoric sentence is also, for Dum m ett, to know how its truth or falsity is to be established. However, D um m ett has not devel­ oped the semantics of singular term s in detail. A similar conception is also to be found in Wiggins. However this conception has no conse­ quences for the details of his analysis in which Wiggins sticks to the fram ew ork m arked out by Straw son.1 T h e form ulation in Wiggins is so concise that we can take it as our starting point, especially as it presents itself as an attem pt (albeit a ‘rough and unsatisfactory’ one) to define the term ‘identify’. ‘I identify a if, for any