The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas

OXFORD THEOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS Editorial Committee M. MCC. ADAMSJ. EDWARDS P. M. JOYCEN. J. MACCULLOCH O. M. T. O'DONOV...

Author: Joseph Pilsner

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OXFORD THEOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS

Editorial Committee M. MCC. ADAMSJ. EDWARDS P. M. JOYCEN. J. MACCULLOCH O. M. T. O'DONOVANC. ROWLAND

OXFORD THEOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS THEODORE THE STOUDITE The Ordering of Holiness Roman Cholij (2002) HIPPOLYTUS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus J.A. Cerrato (2002) FAITH, REASON, AND REVELATION IN THE THOUGHT OF THEODORE BEZA Jeffrey Mallinson (2003) RICHARD HOOKER AND REFORMED THEOLOGY A Study of Reason, Will, and Grace Nigel Voak (2003) THE COUNTESS OF HUNTINGDON'S CONNEXION Alan Harding (2003) THE APPROPRIATION OF DIVINE LIFE IN CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA Daniel A. Keating (2004) THE MACARIAN LEGACY The Place of Macarius-Symeon in the Eastern Christian Tradition Marcus Plested (2004) PSALMODY AND PRAYER IN THE WRITINGS OF EVAGRIUS PONTICUS Luke Dysinger, OSB (2004) ORIGEN ON THE SONG OF SONGS AS THE SPIRIT OF SCRIPTURE The Bridegroom's Perfect Marriage-Song J. Christopher King (2004) AN INTERPRETATION OF HANS URS VON BALTHASAR Eschatology as Communion Nicholas J. Healy (2005) DURANDUS OF ST POURÇAIN A Dominican Theologian in the Shadow of Aquinas Isabel Iribarren (2005) THE TROUBLES OF TEMPLELESS JUDAH Jill Middlemas (2005) TIME AND ETERNITY IN MID-THIRTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT Rory Fox (2006)

The Specication of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas

Joseph Pilsner

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Joseph Pilsner 2006 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King's Lynn ISBN 0-19-928605-1 978-0-19-928605-8 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

For James and Mary

Preface I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the teachers, colleagues, friends, and family who have so generously assisted me in composing this present work. This monograph grew out of my doctoral dissertation at Oxford University, so I would first like to thank people associated with this stage of its development. Before I began my research, Fr Walter Principe, CSB, now deceased, supplied me with advice and an initial bibliography. The late Fr Herbert McCabe, OP, of Blackfriars, offered some helpful suggestions on an essay later incorporated into the sixth chapter. Dr Germain Grisez read an early version of the chapter concerning specification according to proximate and remote ends; his perceptive observations led me to revise my thinking on this subject. Above all, I am grateful to my dissertation supervisor, Prof. John Finnis: his exceptional insightfulness was responsible for numerous improvements to the work, and his kind personal support helped to sustain me many times during the long process of research and writing. I also received much welcome assistance in reworking the dissertation for publication. The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto permitted me, as part of a post-doctoral licentiate, to conduct research suitable for inclusion in this monograph; the first two chapters in particular show the fruit of this research. I would especially like to recognize Fr Armand Maurer, CSB, long-time fellow of the Institute, who oversaw my writing at this stage and offered many suggestions for improvement. Two former professors from whom I learned much about Aquinas's moral theory, Dr Joseph M. Boyle, Jun., and Fr Jack Gallagher, CSB, also assisted me. Fr Daniel Callam, CSB, Dr Ed Houser, Dr Gregory Coulter, Dr Thomas Osborne, Jun., and Sr Thien-An Do, OP, read and commented on various parts of the text. Frs Victor Brezik, CSB, James Farge, CSB, Rocco Volpe, CSB, Kevin Flannery, SJ, and Roberto Busa, SJ, helped me to obtain research materials. Dr Mary Catherine Sommers offered advice on publication-related matters.

vii Drs Richard Cross and Diarmaid MacCulloch patiently watched over this project as it was being prepared for publication; Enid Barker, Lucy Qureshi, Jenny Wagstaffe, Amanda Greenley, Jane Robson, and Elizabeth Robottom, of Oxford University Press graciously provided editorial assistance. I am also grateful to the many people who offered various other kinds of support. Just prior to graduate studies, I was serving as an assistant pastor at Holy Family Parish in Missouri City, Texas; the local Basilian community and parishioners there sent me off with a working laptop computer and much encouragement. Fr James McConica, CSB, provided for me in many ways during my stay at Oxford; he and two other Basilian confreres, Guy Trudel and Martin Dimnik, were wonderful companions. The Jesuits at Campion Hall cordially hosted me during my stay in England. I am grateful to Frs Joseph Munitiz, Ian Brayley, Alfred Buttigieg, Rodger Charles, Norman Tanner, Brother William Nash, and the late Frs Cyril Barrett, Vincent Bywater, and Ted Yarnold, and for their generous hospitality. Many men resided at Campion Hall with me on studies or sabbaticals. Though too numerous to mention by name, they were a most valued source of support and friendship to me, and I remember them warmly. It was a privilege for me while in England to serve on Sundays at Our Lady and St Hugh Parish in Witney. I am particularly grateful to the late Fr Patrick Taylor and to parishioners Christopher and Paula Flynn, Tom and Maureen Mullen, and Patricia and Philip Ogden for their hospitality. Those students who belonged with me to the Catholic Graduate Society at Oxford kept my spirits up during my studies; I think especially of Fr Michael Barber, SJ, Fr Dominic Robinson, SJ, Simon Uttley, Drs John Freeh, Marion Müller, Anne Lofaso, and Francisca Mutapi. Two friends in Oxford, Michal and Rosy Giedroyc, treated me with exceptional kindness. The Basilian Fathers at Maison Saint-Joseph in Annonay, France, welcomed me into their residence one summer while I was writing. Many friends and confreres in Toronto encouraged me while I was working on this project there. I am grateful to the president, fellows, and staff of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies for their firm support of both me and this project. The men I resided with in Toronto—Bishop Ronald Fabbro; very Rev Kenneth Decker,

viii Frs Michael Cerretto, Terry Kersch, James Murphy; Dr William Moreau, and Mark Yenson—assisted me in many ways. The local Basilian communities at the University of St Michael's College, Orsini House, and Anglin House were unfailingly hospitable. I brought this work to its completion while serving in my current position at the University of St Thomas in Houston, Texas. Again, I have been blessed with much support. I sincerely appreciate the generous assistance I have received from my confreres and coworkers at Donohue Hall, including Archbishop J.’Michael Miller, Frs Dennis Andrews, Ed Bader, Ted Baenziger, Patrick Braden, Robert Crooker, Anthony Giampietro, George Hosko, Janusz Ihnatowicz, James Keon, Harold O'Leary, Patrick Warden, Walter Werbylo, and William Young. Numerous faculty, administrators, board members, staff, and students at UST have encouraged me. I would especially like to recognize those faculty serving by my side in the theology department, and my colleagues in philosophy, many associated with the Center for Thomistic Studies. A number of friends in Houston have shown a sustained interest in the progress of this monograph; I sincerely appreciate their kindness. My religious community, the Congregation of St Basil, deserves special acknowledgement; my confreres generously provided for me in innumerable ways from this book's inception to its completion. My family has been a constant source of strength. I am most grateful to my parents, Arnold and Marcia, to my brothers Peter and John, and to John's wife, Concetta, for everything they have done. I would especially like to recognize with affection my brother and sister, James and Mary, who have died since I began working on this project; this monograph is dedicated to their memory. My uncle and aunt, Paul and Carolyn Guerra, and their family, have been wonderfully supportive during this project, as were the late Josephine Rowan, Anna Pilsner, Elizabeth Melenas, Eileen Williams, and Sr Paula Miller, OP. J.P.

Contents Abbreviations of Thomistic Works 1. Introduction 2. Human Actions and Aquinas's Moral Theory 3. Two Fundamental Types of Specification 4. End 5. Object 6. Matter 7. Circumstance 8. Motive 9. Proximate and Remote Ends 10. Conclusion Bibliography Index

x 1 9 30 47 70 141 172 199 217 239 247 257

Abbreviations of Thomistic Works Comm. De AnimaIn Libros de Anima II et III Comm. De CausisIn Librum de Causis Comm. De CaeloIn Libros de Caelo et Mundo Comm. De Generat.In Libros de Generatione et Corruptione Comm. De SensuIn Libros de Sensu et Sensato Comm. De Trin.In Librum Boethii De Trinitate Comm. Ethic.Sententia Libri Ethicorum Comm. IsaiaIn Isaiam Comm. Metaph.In Libros Metaphysicorum Comm. Phys.In Libros Physicorum Comm. Post. Anal.In Libros Posteriora Analytica Comm. Rom.Super ad Romanos Comm. ThrenosIn Threnos Hieremia Comm. I Cor.Super I ad Cor. I-VII L. 2 Comp. Theol.Compendium Theologiae De AnimaQuaestio Disputata de Anima De EnteDe Ente et Essentia De MaloQuaestiones Disputatae de Malo De PerfectioneDe Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae De PotentiaQuaestio Disputata de Potentia De Princip.De Principiis Naturae De RegimineDe Regimine Principium De Unione VerbiQuaestio Disputata de Unione Verbi De UnitateDe Unitate Intellectus De VeritateQuaestiones Disputatae de Veritate De Virtut.Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus Quodl.Quaestiones de Quodlibet I–XI Rep. De AnimaIn Aristotelis De Anima L. I

Rep. I Cor.Super I ad Cor. XI–XVI Rep. Eph.Super ad Ephesians Rep. Heb.Super ad Hebraeos Rep. Johan.Super Evangelium Johannis Rep. Matt.Super Evangelium Mattaei Rep. PsalmosIn Psalmos Rep. Symbolum Apost.In Symbolum Apostolorum Rep. Tit.Super ad Titum I, II, III, IV Sent.Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum SCGSumma Contra Gentiles I, I-II, II-II, IIISumma Theologiae Latin texts of Aquinas quoted in this monograph are taken from Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia (cum hypertextibus in CDROM), edited by Roberto Busa, 2nd edn. (Milan: Editoria Elettronica Editel, 1992). These texts are reproduced with Fr Busa's kind permission. All translations are the author's own.

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1 Introduction In moral theory, identifying a human action's kind1 is of considerable importance. Although in some instances making such a determination is relatively easy—it doesn't take a trained moralist to recognize flagrant cases of murder, stealing, or adultery—in other instances, the task can be a challenge. For example, if an expert in furniture finds a chair in an antiques shop ticketed with an impossibly low price and then holds off paying until the shop's owner is replaced at the till by an inexperienced clerk, is his action buying or theft? If a traveller to a Third World country has his luggage held by customs agents for an unreasonably long time with a hint that a gratuity might expedite the process, would slipping them money be bribery, the payment of a ransom, or perhaps even, in a country where civil servants are grossly underpaid, occult compensation for unjust wages? Answers to such questions are not always clear. Essential to identifying a correct moral kind is knowing what in a human action is relevant to making this determination. Not every aspect of a human action will be pertinent. For instance, a man exiting a bank may have a small build, a faded topcoat, and a slight limp. The money he is taking may be new and printed with certain serial numbers. The time may be 10.07 a.m.; the place, Witney in Oxfordshire; the weather, mild with a drizzle. All of these facts, though true and somehow related to the man's action, will not reveal its moral species. Was his taking the money a legitimate withdrawal, embezzlement, robbery, or something else? To answer this question, one needs to know such things as whether the money belonged to

1

Actio humana is the phrase Aquinas uses for a voluntary action; see Ch 2.

2

Introduction

him and how he obtained it. A sound moral theory, then, should indicate what in a human action is potentially relevant to identifying its moral kind and why. Thomas Aquinas gave serious consideration to the issue of moral specification. The second part of his Summa Theologiae is an extraordinary moral treatise; it contains Thomas's most prominent and systematic examination of the specification of human actions, the heart of which is found in questions 18–21 of the Prima Secundae.2 Works such as his Disputed Questions on Evil (De Malo) and his Commentary on the Sentences also contain pertinent material. Other writings of Thomas, even if they do not contain articles directly addressing how human actions receive their species, allude to his teaching on this subject or presume it while treating other concerns. Since a fair number of passages contain relevant material, one might hope that Aquinas's position on the specification of human action could be readily formulated. Unfortunately, synthesizing a coherent account of his teaching on this issue proves to be no easy matter. A careful look at his writings shows that Thomas uses five different terms to designate what specifies human actions: end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive. It is not immediately clear what some of these terms mean in this context, or how they are related to specification. What follows is a brief exposition of Aquinas's teaching on these five terms, along with some of the questions they raise.

1. End ‘End’ is the first term which Aquinas uses in the second part of his Summa Theologiae to identify what specifies human actions. He reasons that, since human actions do not have substantial forms3 to determine their species as plants and animals do, the closest analogue

2

The Summa's second part is so extensive that it is subdivided: Prima and Secunda Secundae.

3

For Aristotle and Aquinas, every corporeal being has two principles, substantial form and matter. Substantial form is what determines a being to be of a particular kind. A more detailed account of these principles will appear in the Ch. 3.

Introduction

3

will be whatever in a human action plays a comparable role. The end seems to him to be this corresponding principle, for just as no natural creature exists or has a species without a substantial form, so no human action can come to be or be of a particular kind unless an agent wills some definite end. Consequently, Thomas judges that the end is ‘as if ’ (quasi) the form of a human action, determining its species. Aquinas sometimes distinguishes between two different kinds of ends in human action, proximate ends (immediate goals) and remote ends (further goals for the sake of which immediate goals are pursued). Although his general presentation of ends, as described in the last paragraph, suggests that any end can specify a human action, his treatment of proximate and remote ends would lead one to question this supposition. In certain texts, Aquinas seems to indicate that only a proximate end is responsible for a human action's form and species. In illustrating this point, Thomas shows how a single proximate end could be pursued for the sake of numerous kinds of remote ends, some differing even as to their moral goodness or badness; for instance, an agent might ‘earn money’ for the purpose of ‘giving alms’, ‘bribing’, ‘satisfying debts’, ‘committing adultery’, and so forth. Aquinas argues that, if a human action were to take its species from remote ends, then the action related to the proximate end could potentially be subsumed into multiple and incompatible moral kinds. ‘Earning money’ could be determined as ‘almsgiving’, ‘bribery’, or any other number of species, depending on an agent's further intention. Since it seems untenable that an action possessing a distinctive character from its immediate goal (such as ‘earning money’) could be potentially placed into so many different species, Thomas concludes that a human action is specified by its proximate end regardless of why it is being sought. In a second group of texts on this same topic, however, Aquinas asserts something quite different. He maintains that a remote end not only gives a species to a human action but even influences its identity more than a proximate end does. To illustrate this position, he again presents an example where one end is being sought for another: a person is giving alms out of love for God (i.e. charity). Thomas observes that the overarching aim of the agent in this example is

4

Introduction

achieving the remote end of loving God; the proximate end of giving alms is subordinate, since it is here being done for charity's sake. Aquinas concludes that in this case the remote end of charity is more important for identifying the action's moral species than the proximate end of almsgiving.4

2. Object ‘Object’ is the term most frequently used by Thomas to describe what gives form and species to a human action. An object's place in moral specification can best be understood by first considering its role in the related context of human powers and their proper actions. In Aquinas's scheme, each human power and its proper action has a distinctive defining object; for instance, colour (not smell or taste) defines the power of sight and any acts of seeing; truth (not sensibles) defines the power of intellect and any acts of knowing. Human actions, the main concern of this study, are primarily related to the human power of will, and will has an object—intelligible good(s)—which defines this power and its related actions. In addition to this most basic level of the will's specification, Thomas sees differences in the objects of will which allow one to discriminate further among will acts; for instance, relevant differences in the object can determine whether actions are morally good or evil, and whether they belong to more particular moral species, such as fraternal correction or murder. While these basic points about objects are reasonably clear, some puzzles about Aquinas's use of this term can also be found. For instance, at times it seems as if ‘object’ is used by Thomas to refer to any human end (or good); at other times it seems as if it refers only to proximate ends.

4

Specification according to end is addressed in two chapters below: Ch. 4 examines Aquinas's basic treatment of this topic, while Ch. 9 examines those more complex’situations where a human action has both a proximate and a remote end relevant to specification.

Introduction

5

3. Matter Thomas sometimes says that matter specifies a human action and frequently uses matter as an alternative term for object. When called upon to clarify what he means, he says that not all matter can determine a human action's species, but only a certain kind; he refers to it in some passages as the ‘matter about which’ an action takes place, in other passages as an action's ‘due’ (debita) or ‘undue’ (indebita) matter. Unfortunately, it is not clear at first exactly what aspect of a human action such ‘matter’ refers to, or how matter which specifies is to be distinguished from other kinds of matter identified by Aquinas.

4. Circumstance A circumstance is an attendant property of an action, as in murder, one might take note of the time, the place, the type and colour of the weapon. Although Thomas in some contexts denies that any circumstance can give form and species to a human action, in other contexts he asserts that at least some circumstances do. For an example of the latter claim, Thomas points to a case where a stolen item also happens to be consecrated to God, as when a thief makes off with a chalice. He argues that, although the sacredness of what has been stolen may seem like an attendant property of the theft, it is the very factor which in this case indicates that a sacrilege has been committed; hence, this circumstance seems to bring with it a new species of sin.

5. Motive Speaking generally, a motive in Aquinas can refer to any principle of movement, but in the context of the voluntary, one often sees ‘motive’ referring to what attracts or moves a person to action, as when someone is drawn by a desirable goal. Although Thomas

6

Introduction

suggests that all human actions receive their species from motives, he hardly ever mentions this principle; it is usually invoked in certain special cases, the most noteworthy being the sin or vice of gluttony. Once these five terms have been considered, the difficulties in formulating Thomas's teaching on the specification of human action can be seen more plainly. One difficulty concerns the number and seeming incompatibility of these terms. Since plants and animals have a single principle underlying their species—a substantial form—we might also expect a single principle to determine a human action's species, whatever this principle might be. But when Thomas explains the specification of human action, instead of presenting a single, well-defined principle named by one term (or even by several univocal terms), he presents the five seemingly diverse terms just described. Although certain similarities in meaning can be recognized among them, no term seems to be a strict synonym of any other, ruling out an easy reconciliation. Further, since all five terms are used in Aquinas's teachings about specification from his earliest consideration of this topic in the Commentary on the Sentences to his latest in the Summa Theologiae, their variety can't readily be explained by a development in Thomas's thinking or word-use over time. Perhaps more confusing than the terminological differences are the apparent inconsistencies in some of Aquinas's teachings, even with regard to a single term. For example, I noted above how in some texts a remote end seems to be irrelevant for the specification of human actions, while in other texts it seems to be the most important principle for such specification. How can both claims be true at the same time? Further, Thomas sometimes denies that circumstances contribute to specification, while on other occasions, he says that some circumstances do specify, even illustrating how this can happen. How can this be? Teachings such as these suggest that Aquinas's account may not merely be complicated, but even self-contradictory. What is one to make of all this? Although one might be tempted to think that Thomas's account of the specification of human actions is insufficiently developed or even unsound, this monograph will contend that such an impression is deceptive. It will propose instead that, in spite of apparent difficulties, Thomas's teaching on how end, object, circumstance, matter, and motive contribute to a human action's specification possesses a fundamental coherence. While not

Introduction

7

all puzzles can be solved, Aquinas's approach can be shown to be more cogent and defensible than may first appear to be the case. This work is divided into ten chapters. After this first introductory chapter, the next two chapters provide background. Chapter 2 treats Aquinas's position on human actions generally and their place in the moral life. Chapter 3 explains how specification occurs in natural material creatures (such as plants and animals) and motions (such as the change from sickness to health); Thomas will compare these kinds of specification to the specification of human actions. In chapters 4 to 8, the five critical terms—end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive—will be examined individually with the intention of clarifying how each relates to the specification of human actions for Aquinas; difficulties suggested by the texts will also be resolved where possible. Chapter 9 will address the complex issue of how actions are specified when they possess more than one end, such as ‘stealing’ to ‘give alms’. Chapter 10 will conclude the monograph by proposing how a number of Thomas's apparently diverse teachings concerning specification of human action can be reconciled. If the present investigation succeeds, the most obvious benefit will be a deeper understanding of Aquinas's thought on this significant ethical question. But other benefits can be foreseen as well. The specification of human action is still a live issue. Proponents of certain contemporary moral theories, such as proportionalism, have proposed new ways of understanding end, object, and circumstance, and alternative accounts of how specification of human action occurs.5 Because such contemporary approaches are a significant departure from the traditional understanding, serious disagreements have arisen among moralists concerning how certain human actions are defined, even as to their rightness or wrongness. At times in this debate, prominent defenders of the traditional approach have appealed to Aquinas as an authority for their position.6

5

For a brief review of proportionalist opinion on this subject, see Richard A. McCormick, ‘Current Theology: Notes on Moral Theology: 1981’, Theological Studies, 43 (1982), 69–124 (pp. 83–6).

6

e.g. Pope John Paul II appeals to Aquinas's understanding of the object in his critique of proportionalism; see Veritatis Splendor (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1993), 119 (para. 78).

8

Introduction

A better understanding of Aquinas's thought on the specification of human action, then, may well bring greater clarity to this debate and ultimately help to define those human actions whose very identity is at issue.7

7

This current study limits itself to an investigation of direct willing in Aquinas. Other studies have addressed Aquinas's treatment of indirect willing, where effects of human actions are permitted but not intended. For instance, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jun., ‘Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas’, Thomist, 42 (1978), 649–65.

2 Human Actions and Aquinas's Moral Theory Before considering Aquinas's teaching on how human actions receive their species, a few preliminary matters should be addressed. This chapter presents some of Thomas's basic teachings on human actions so that this study of specification can be placed within the larger context of his moral theory.

1. Human Actions Human actions are at the heart of Aquinas's moral considerations. What distinguishes them from other actions, such as reflex motions, is that they are caused by a human agent's preconception of goals and his or her deliberate volition to pursue them. A hallmark of human actions is their freedom: Thomas believes the will is self-determining and is capable of pursuing an end without being coerced by causes external to itself. By free will, human agents have mastery over their actions and bear responsibility for them. Some human actions are performed routinely: reading the paper or eating dinner, for instance. Others may be quite involved and require most careful deliberation, such as pursuing a career. But even when human actions demand much attention, the agents who perform them are usually focused on what they desire and not directly on the various ways the will is involved. Just as someone can be aware of his own walking without considering directly all the complexities of muscle coordination and balance involved, so a person can pursue

10

Human Actions and Aquinas's Moral Theory

ends without attending carefully to the various stages of willing which make this possible. One noteworthy contribution of Thomas Aquinas to moral theory is his careful analysis of the will and how it is used by a human agent to produce free human actions. From the moment a person is first aware of the desirability of some goal to the moment when he or she achieves it, Thomas recognizes six distinct stages of the will's involvement: volition simply considered, consent, intention, choice, use, and enjoyment. (Of course, the intellect also has a significant role to play, but for the sake of brevity, I will here focus on the will's contribution.8) To clarify Aquinas's stages of willing, a continuing illustration will be presented below.

(i) The six stages of willing (a) Willing simply considered A man of modest means reflects that it might be appropriate for him to do something to help the poor. Though he is uncertain at first how this might be accomplished, he recognizes that his idea is worthwhile. In this first stage, the person in the illustration conceives of a possible end, ‘helping the poor’, and then is attracted by this end's intelligible goodness. Thomas identifies this as voluntas, that is, willing considered simply (absolute).9 It is a stage prior to human action properly so-called. Note well that a determination to pursue this end has not yet been made; the man may never proceed from attraction to action. Nevertheless, he recognizes that the proposal possesses merit, and ‘will’ is the power through which an agent is drawn to such an intelligible good.

8

The intellect plays a part at each stage: willing cannot occur unless some goal has been proposed. The two contributions of the intellect especially of interest to Thomas are counsel, which precedes the will's consent and choice, and command, which precedes use; see I–II, q. 14; I–II, q. 17.

9

I-II, q. 12, a. 1, ra 4.


11

(b) Consent After considering the matter, the man decides that making a financial contribution would be more sensible for him than doing volunteer work. He sets out to find a suitable recipient for a donation. On a community bulletin board, he sees two requests for assistance posted, one from a drug rehabilitation centre and another from a scholarship fund for schools in impoverished countries. After reading more carefully, the man discovers that the campaign for the scholarship fund is a special drive for elite donors willing to give £10,000 or more. Since such a sum is beyond his resources, he discounts a gift to this initiative. He judges, however, that a donation to the rehabilitation centre is suitable: it would meet his purpose admirably and any further means necessary to make the donation could easily be arranged. The man recognizes that the end of helping the needy is now practically possible for him, for even if no other suitable means can be found, he can always give to the rehab centre. Realizing he can commit to what is practically possible, the man resolves then and there to help the needy. But he also continues his search for additional charities in case another appeals to him more. After asking some friends, he discovers another potential recipient which meets his approval: a local homeless shelter which relies on community support. This section of the illustration depicts two stages of the will's involvement, consent and intention; I will first consider the former. In order for an agent to pursue an end, he or she must find means to achieve it. Some means which at first seem capable of attaining an end might be found impracticable upon more careful examination. For instance, in the illustration above, giving to the scholarship fund was judged to be beyond the donor's financial resources and disregarded. Means by which the agent can achieve the end, however, receive consent, as when the donor in the illustration approves of the drug rehabilitation centre and the homeless shelter as potential recipients.10 For consent to occur, an agent's will must be attracted to the means. What is the source of this attraction? For Thomas, although

10

I-II, q. 15, a. 3, cor.

12


means may sometimes be desirable in themselves, in this context, it is precisely their conduciveness to the end which accounts for their distinctive appeal. An intelligent being cannot desire some goal and then have no attraction for what will permit him to achieve it. Thomas calls this quality in the means ‘useful goodness’. It also attracts the will in the other two stages of a human action in which means are in focus, namely, choice and use.11

(c) Intention A second stage of willing observed in the illustration above is intention. The man commits himself to his end in a decisive way: he will now assist the needy. This marks a clear advance in his relation to the end. Earlier, he simply recognized its goodness (volition simply considered); presently, his will is set on achieving it (intention). An important relation exists between consent and intention, which is why they are best considered together. Aquinas says that intention is the willing of an end as acquired by means;12 consequently, an end cannot be intended unless a means has been found. Why is this so? Thomas sees that no agent can realistically decide to seek an end without a practical way to attain it; lacking at least one viable means, an end can only be wished for and not pursued.13 Intention can only begin, then, once a viable means has first been found.14 Thomas suggests that a viable means is identified when the agent first gives consent.15 For example, in the illustration above, the

11

I-II, q. 7, a. 2, ra 1. In evaluating the appropriateness of a means, an agent would have to consider not only his immediate aim but any further aim to which he has already committed himself. For instance, though stealing from an employer may on one level be a viable means for obtaining tuition money, consent might be denied if this means is not also conducive to a further end, such as acting justly.

12

I-II, q. 12, a. 1, ra 3, ra 4; I-II, q. 12, a. 5, sc, cor.

13

I-II, q. 13, a. 5, ra 1.

14

For intention to occur, an agent must be convinced that he has at least one practicable way of achieving the end in question. For instance, although someone whose end is ‘travelling to London’ may approve of journeying by train as a means, he can form no intention unless he also approves of any further means necessary to take the train, for instance, a way of getting himself to the train's point of departure, of paying his fare, and so forth.

15

Some commentators have suggested that intention appears with choice rather than consent. Thomas notes, however, that intention can precede choice; see e.g. I-II, q. 12, a. 4, ra 3.


13

man desiring to assist the needy can determine himself to pursue his goal once he has approved of (i.e. consented to) the drug rehabilitation centre as a potential recipient of his donation. Even after this has happened, of course, he is free to look for other charities to serve as means to his end. But he carries on without fear that his goal is impossible: even if no other suitable recipient is discovered, he now knows he can always achieve his purpose of helping the poor by giving to the rehabilitation centre. Once it first comes into being, intention continues concomitantly with the stages of willing primarily concerning means: consent, choice, and use. In all three of these stages, the means are sought for the sake of the intended end. Intention will only cease when the will's final act, enjoyment, has been attained.

(d) Choice The man now mentally places before himself the drug rehabilitation centre and the homeless shelter. Each appears good in its own way, and there seems to be no overriding reason for judging one to be a more worthy recipient than the other. After some deliberation, the man decides that the rehabilitation centre is the charity he would prefer to assist. This part of the illustration describes the moment of choice. Care must be taken to distinguish between consent and choice, since both concern the means: while consent is the will's approval of each means deemed conducive to an end, choice is the will's definitive movement to that one (previously-consented-to) means by which the agent seeks to achieve an end in this instance. Thomas says that choice is ‘the preferring of one thing to another’.16 As his description suggests, choice's object must initially include two or more means.17 Why? If a situation presented itself where only one means was judged as suitable for an end, then this one means would have to be used to obtain the end; no additional exercise of the will would be necessary.18 But if two or more means are in view, a further

16

I-II, q. 13, a. 2, cor.

17

Ibid.; see also ra 1.

18

The movement to a single means could be considered as either consent or choice, depending on how the act is viewed; see I-II, q. 15, a. 3, ra 3.

14


and distinct exercise of the will—choice—is necessary to determine which will be selected.

(e) Use After sitting at his desk and taking out his pen, the donor writes a cheque for the rehabilitation centre and places it in an envelope. He puts on his coat and walks to the shelter, gift in hand. Upon his arrival, he seeks out the business manager, hands him the envelope, and explains that a donation is enclosed towards the centre's work. This part illustrates the stage of ‘use’. ‘The use of something means the application of that thing to some operation’,19 states Thomas. Anything which is within a person's power and can contribute to the execution of an action can be ‘used’. Thomas suggests a number of examples: natural powers can be used, as when a person's intellect considers something, his eyes see something, or his arms move something; what extends natural powers can also be used, as when someone strikes with a stick or rides on a horse.20 Use brings to reality the means foreseen and chosen by the agent. Earlier in the illustration, the man saw that the means to make a donation were easily within his power; now he executes these: he uses his arm and a pen to sign the cheque; uses his legs to walk to the centre; uses his voice to explain the gift; uses the services of the bank to transfer the money. All such realization of the means continues until the end is finally achieved.

(f) Enjoyment The donor returns home. Several days later, he receives a note of thanks from centre's director who tells him that he has received the money and used it to replace ten old mattresses with new ones. Though the donor realizes that he has made a sacrifice, he experiences a sense of satisfaction that he has contributed to the lives of the poor who come to the centre. His goal has been achieved.

19

I-II, q.16, a. 1, cor.

20

Ibid.


15

The final stage of willing is called enjoyment (fruitio). Here, the agent's will relates to the end precisely in so far as this end is possessed; it pertains to ‘the delight one has in the desired goal’.21 Enjoyment brings perfection to the will; all that preceded is somehow directed to this moment. At the beginning of the illustration, the donor saw the merit of giving to the less fortunate; now he enjoys this good in the special sense that it is no longer simply a prospect or even an intended goal, but is actually possessed by him here and now. This stage marks the culmination of a human action.22

(ii) How the human act can be considered as one The breakdown of a human action into stages is bound to raise a question: how does one account for a human action's unity? In the presentation above, the five stages of an action properly so-called—intention, consent, choice, use, and enjoyment—might seem to be five actions sequentially arranged rather than a single human action. Is there any meaningful way in which a human action can be understood as one from start to finish? Thomas's teaching on how the will relates to means in human actions helps to answer this question. As mentioned above in the treatment of consent, the will can be attracted to a means in two ways: either because the means is attractive for its own sake or because a means is conducive to an end. For example, referring to the donor's walk to the rehabilitation centre in the illustration above, one could focus on either the walk's pleasantness in itself, or the walk's attractiveness precisely in so far as it contributes to the achievement of his goal. Although in the first perspective, the will's attraction to means and end can be considered separately, in the second perspective, the will's attraction to means and end is one and the same: the agent is attracted to the means because of a desire for his end.23 To illustrate

21

I-II, q. 11, a. 1, cor.

22

An indication of the importance of enjoyment for Thomas is that his Summa question on it (q. 11) precedes his treatment of intention (q. 12), choice (q. 13), consent (q. 15), and use (q.16), even though enjoyment is the final stage in willing.

23

In the first perspective, the ‘means’ is considered as a good; in the second perspective, the means is considered precisely as means, that is, as conducive to an end.

16


this point, Thomas uses an analogy from geometry. He imagines a line connecting three points, A, B, and C. The line from A to C is one, he observes, even though it passes through point B. Just so, the will's movement to an end can be considered as one act, even if the will is directed to this end through a means, the ‘point B’, as it were, of human action.24 Understanding the unity of the will's attraction to means and end is a key to understanding the unity of a human action. All of the stages of a human action properly so-called can be viewed as directed towards its end. This end can be related to the will in two ways: first, as desirable and achievable (in intention), and second, as possessed (in enjoyment). The second way, of course, is the agent's overarching aim. To progress from intention to enjoyment, an agent employs means. While the end is being intended, the will relates to means in three progressive steps: consenting, choosing, and using. In each step, a means can be understood as intelligibly good and willed precisely because the end can be achieved through it.25 To consider Aquinas's geometrical illustration again, an agent's intention of the end is like a movement from point A to C; consent, choice, and use are like different ways of the will's traversing a point B. The act in which the will finally enjoys the end completes the will's original act of intending this end. Formally speaking, then, what unifies human action is the agent's willing of one end and good. By such willing an end is initially pursued, means are willed for this end's sake, and this end is finally enjoyed. We can now summarize the stages of willing, showing how each relates, in its own way, to the end: (1) willing considered simply is an agent's natural attraction to an end prior to the ordering and volition of means to achieve it; it precedes human action properly so-called; (2) intention is willing an end as acquirable by means; (3) consent is willing means as conducive to an end (the same end as willed in intention); (4) choice is willing one already-consented-to means in preference to others (as conducive to the end intended);

24

I-II, q. 8, a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 12, a. 2, cor.

25

I-II, q. 12, a. 4, cor, ra 1, ra 2, ra 3; q. 15, a. 3, ra 1; q. 16, a. 3, ra 2.


17

(5) use is willing whatever is at a person's command for the realization of the means chosen (as conducive to the end intended); (6) enjoyment is willing the end in so far as it is possessed.

2. Human Actions and the Moral Life When examining Aquinas's moral theory, one should not only consider human actions in their more basic stages, as above; one should also situate human actions within the broader context of the moral life. The most fundamental principle presented in the last section is that a human action is directed to an end. I did not ask, however, whether the end being considered was the agent's final one. For instance, in the illustration about the donation, the man desiring to help the needy could also have had a further aim which we did not consider: he might have donated for the honour of being recognized as a philanthropist, for a deduction on his income tax, or for the purpose of impressing his business associates. It is also possible that any such further end might itself be sought for the sake of other more remote end(s) as yet unidentified. However many ends there may be in a human action, Aquinas believes that one of them must serve as the agent's final purpose. To understand why Thomas holds this position, one need only consider the contrary possibility. Suppose the man in the illustration always gave a further reason for seeking each end, with no final end in sight: Why are you donating money to the needy? For the honour of being recognized as a philanthropist. Why? I'm hoping to impress my uncle. Why? I want my uncle to leave more of his inheritance to me. Why? I want to buy an expensive house in the country. Why?… Positing further ends interminably would make no sense. If the agent does not reach some terminus in this series, there will be no principle for which all the other ends are sought, and the execution of this action will never begin. This argument helps to show the indispensability and importance of a final end in Aquinas's scheme. It is the primary principle of an

18


action: the intermediary ends (or means) are tailored to achieving a final end and are desired for a final end's sake. For Thomas, then, the whole human action hinges on the agent's commitment to some last end.26 Aquinas takes this point further. Not only is any particular human action with a series of intermediary ends directed towards a final end, but all human action is directed towards a single, final end. Why does he hold such a view? Aquinas maintains that the ultimate end of a human being—indeed, of any natural thing—is its own perfection.27 But since a human being has but one nature, there can be only one perfection of this nature, and hence, only one consummate human good. A person would be inconsistent if he asserted that some good fulfils him completely but then expressed a wish for something more. How could an agent want more than perfection? Something must be wrong: either the good is not really perfect or the desire is false. A perfecting good, then, implies that only one can exist.28 Is it not possible that a human being's good could in theory consist of more than one reality? What if human beings need a number of goods, say, virtue, honour, and pleasure, to be happy? If this were the case, says Thomas, these three together would be considered as the one consummate human good.29 Whatever it is that brings perfection to the one human nature has a kind of unity in serving this purpose. As we might expect, Thomas identifies this one ultimate end of human action as happiness (beatitudo). It is the first principle of the moral life, what every human agent ultimately seeks. Since it fulfils a human person in every respect, it attracts ineluctably: ‘a human being is unable not to wish to be happy’.30 To say that happiness is the perfect human good defines it in a general way. Can it be defined more precisely? In what does this perfect human good consist? Various ends have been proposed as an answer to this question: wealth, honours, fame, power, bodily goods (such as speed or strength), pleasure, goods of the soul (such as thought), and God. Aquinas considers in turn each of these possibilities.31 Those who claim that happiness can be found in something

26

I-II, q. 1, a. 4, cor.

27

I, q. 62, a. 1, cor.

28

I-II, q. 1, a. 5, cor.

29

I-II, q. 1, a. 5, ra 1.

30

I-II, q. 5, a. 4, ra 2.

31

I-II, q. 2, aa. 1–8.


19

other than God, he reasons, are not entirely off the mark, for wealth, honours, fame, power, bodily goods, pleasure, and goods of the soul all have some association with happiness, either by fulfilling certain limited needs, making happiness possible, or resulting from happiness. Nevertheless, none is ultimately sufficient. Each of these goods satisfy the human person only in some limited respect: someone who possesses any of these goods, or even all of them together, would still be lacking something. Thomas concludes that, of the possibilities originally listed, the only one that can satisfy every human potential is God. Since God is good in every respect, he alone can perfect our complex human nature, especially its spiritual aspect which yearns for ultimate explanations and the complete truth. Only God can make us perfectly happy.32

(i) Perfect happiness For Aquinas, happiness is best defined by its most perfect form, which will be achieved only in the next life. There, human beings will ‘see God as he is’, as the scripture promises (I John 3: 2). Thomas understands this to mean that people will possess God with their most spiritual power, intellect.33 Since in heaven human beings will have spiritualized, resurrected bodies after the final judgement, material goods which contribute to happiness in the present life will no longer be desired or sought. A body which neither takes nourishment nor grows will have no appetite for food; a body which does not reproduce will have no desire for sex.34 When sanctified human beings ‘see’ God in himself, they will understand with complete clarity that he is their perfection and will be unable to desire anything else.35 An eternal friendship with God will ensue.36 Every imperfect good humans seek in life, such as

32

I-II, q. 2, a. 8, cor.

33

I-II, q. 3, a. 2, cor; a. 4, cor; a. 8, cor. The will is not included in Thomas's definition of perfect happiness because happiness is what the will desires primarily. Just as the object of sight is ‘colour’, not ‘seeing colour’, so the primary object of will cannot include its own act—one first wills ‘happiness’, not ‘willing happiness’: I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ra 2; I-II, q. 3, a. 4, cor; I-II, q. 4, a. 2, cor.

34

I-II, q. 4, a. 7, cor; SCG 4, c. 83, n. 2.

35

I-II, q. 5, a. 4, cor.

36

I-II, q. 109, a. 3, ra 1; II-II, q. 23, a. 1.

20


those mentioned above, will find completion in him. What greater honour than to rule with God? What greater fame than to enjoy the authentic acclaim of God (and the saints)? What greater wealth than to enjoy God who is the summation of all good things?37 With perfect happiness defined, a second critical concern can be addressed: what role do human actions play in attaining this final goal? Since happiness is an end, one might be tempted to respond that achieving it requires nothing other than following the straightforward steps described earlier: intend this end; give consent to, choose, and use appropriate means; enjoy the end once it is attained. Thomas concedes, however, that these stages of human willing assume an atypical form when the end is perfect happiness. One usually thinks of means as what is achievable through an agent's own natural powers. According to Aquinas, however, no means lying within a human agent's power can possibly achieve his final end. What human action could bring someone into God's intimate presence or compel God to admit him thereto? Thus, for Aquinas, even when human beings have accurately identified their ultimate end, they do not themselves possess the power or means to attain it. Does this imply that human perfection—happiness—is impossible? No, asserts Thomas, it simply means that if human beings are to be happy, it will only be because God graciously wills it and admits people into his presence. The ultimate good, perfect happiness, has the character of a divine gift.38 This important clarification suggests that our previous question—what role do human actions play in attaining this final goal?—must be recast a bit. We now ask: what can human actions do, if anything, to influence God's bestowal of this divine gift? Thomas affirms that, although human actions cannot obtain God directly, they can play a modest role in achieving happiness: people can freely turn to God in love in the hope that God will respond with a beneficence characteristic of friendship.39 If God grants eternal happiness as a generous

37

SCG 3, c. 63, n. 3.

38

I-II, q. 5, a., 3, cor; I-II, q. 5, a. 5, cor, ra 1; I-II, q. 5, a. 6, cor; I-II, q. 109, a. 5, cor.

39

For Thomas, even this free-will decision to turn to God requires the assistance of God's grace: I-II, q. 109, a. 6, cor.


21

response to people's turning to him, then it can rightly be asserted that human actions have contributed to the attainment of God, even if this is true only in the limited sense just described. In explaining this point, Aquinas appeals to a quotation from Aristotle's Ethics: ‘what we can do through our friends, we can do, in a sense, ourselves’.40 In the present context, Thomas understands God to be the friend acting on our behalf. These human actions wherein we ‘turn to God in love’, hoping for his response of friendship, now need to be identified more precisely. One can find in Thomas's teaching at least two different kinds of such action. If a person desires a gift, the most obvious way of seeking it is to request it directly; thus, believers can use petitionary prayer to ask God for things,41 including even heavenly felicity. A second way of soliciting a gift is to do works pleasing to the person from whom one hopes to receive it; thus, believers perform human actions in conformity with God's will in the hope that he will graciously reciprocate, ultimately by admitting them into his divine presence. A clear link exists for Thomas between such an understanding of the role of human action in happiness and the doctrine of merit.42 Merit is the credit granted to people for their good deeds and serves as a basis for God's rewarding them. Thomas acknowledges that a precise meaning must be attributed to merit when used in the context of the divine–human relationship. In its primary sense, merit refers to a reward owed in justice to an agent for benefiting another, as when a neighbour is owed gratitude in return for a gift. Human beings cannot earn this kind of merit in their relationship with God, however, since it would require that they benefit God in some way. How could God, who is perfect and without need, gain something from a creature's gift? Such a state of affairs is obviously impossible. Aquinas contends, nevertheless, that there is another kind of merit which human beings can earn. Human actions, he notes, can be considered in two ways: in so far as they are caused by the free will of their agents, and in so far as they are actions of the Holy Spirit working through these agents. In the first way, good human actions earn merit, not because God owes something to

40

I-II, q. 5, a. 5, ra 1; see also sc, cor.

41

I-II, q. 114, a. 9, ra 1.

42

I-II, q. 5, a. 7, cor; I, q. 62, a. 4, cor; I, q. 62, a. 9, ra 1.

22


those who perform them, but because it is fitting that God recompense people when they do their best, as parents, for instance, reward a child for a home-made gift even when it doesn't benefit them. In the second way, good human actions are meritorious because the Holy Spirit acts in and through believers. What God does, even through human agents, is, of course, infinitely more worthy than what humans do on their own.43 Aquinas's careful understanding of merit, then, helps to explain how human actions contribute to the attainment of heavenly happiness. People's good deeds are not a direct means to happiness, nor do they create an obligation which God must somehow honour. Rather, good actions ‘earn’ their agents a kind of credit thanks to God's generosity. Heavenly happiness, then, especially manifests God's gratuity: God offers beatitude as a reward for merit, though no obligation binds him to do so; yet even the merit he accepts from people already is, in a sense, his gift to them. An introduction to the relation between human actions and happiness would not be complete without at least a passing mention of two things. The first is virtue. Good deeds are so important to the pursuit of future happiness that a person dedicated to living rightly not only wills such deeds, but also tries to make them as easy to do as possible. This second goal is accomplished primarily through the formation of virtues. Virtues are dispositions of human powers which facilitate right action. For instance, a person with the virtue of courage has his or her irascible appetite disposed so that it responds with appropriate force in the face of something fearful. The disposition of courage makes right action in a dangerous situation easier.44 Virtues are frequently formed by human actions. Aquinas holds that repetition of human actions of a certain kind impress a like disposition on the human powers from which such actions arise. For example, a soldier who repeatedly does courageous deeds eventually forms the irascible appetite with a kind of ‘second nature’, disposing it properly to danger. The soldier can now do difficult deeds with greater ease.

43

I-II, q. 114, a. 1, cor; I-II, q. 114, a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 21, a. 4, cor.

44

I-II, q. 51, a. 2, cor; II-II, q. 182, a. 4, ra 2.


23

The second is moral evil. Thus far, the focus on happiness has restricted our presentation almost exclusively to a consideration of good actions. It goes without saying that not all human actions are good and meritorious. Human agents are capable of performing deeds which are contrary to God's will and lead away from true human happiness. Such actions accrue demerit for their agents.45 Living a good life involves avoiding such evil actions and repenting of them when they are committed. It also involves avoiding vice, the contrary of virtue. Just as a repetition of certain kinds of good actions can dispose an agent to do good deeds more easily, so too a repetition of certain kinds of bad actions can dispose an agent to evil deeds. Like virtues, vices establish a kind of ‘second nature’ in the agent, making them difficult to remove if someone wants to be rid of them.

(ii) Happiness in the present life (a) A foretaste of heaven Although human desire is only completely fulfilled in heaven, it is not utterly frustrated in the meantime. Happiness is not an all-or-nothing proposition for Aquinas. Human beings can have a share of beatitude in this life and, once again, free human actions play an important role in achieving it. Thomas's teaching on temporal happiness is rich and multifaceted; indeed, it is more intricate than his teaching on heavenly happiness. Perfect happiness has a certain simplicity since it concerns only that one good which completely fulfils human nature. Temporal human happiness, on the other hand, is more complex, since it can be achieved in a number of different ways. We first turn our attention to a category of happiness which is like a bridge between perfect and imperfect happiness. For Aquinas, there are two ways in which people can experience the happiness proper to heaven, though not its definitive form, while still on earth. In one way, a few privileged people view the divine vision during their lifetimes, as when God allowed Moses to see him face to face (Num. 12: 8) and summoned Paul out of his body to a heavenly

45

I-II, q. 21, a 4, cor.

24


vision (2 Cor. 12: 2–4).46 This rare experience is called rapture. Although those receiving this gift really experience the object of all human desire, God in himself, they do not see him perfectly as those in heaven do.47 In a second, more accessible way, believers enjoy the future heavenly vision of God through the act and virtue of hope. At first glance, this proposal might seem odd: how can something which will happen in the future be the object of a human action and virtue in the present? Thomas explains how this is possible. Speaking of ends generally, he says that someone confident in the future achievement of an end already imperfectly possesses and enjoys this end in the present.48 To illustrate Aquinas's point, university students usually first begin to feel the joy of their graduation, not at the commencement ceremony, but at the moment they recognize the degree is within their grasp, say when they confidently complete their most difficult final exam. Thomas thinks something similar happens in hope. People confident that they will see God face to face in the future already enjoy this good imperfectly, though authentically, in the present life.49 Although hope comes chiefly from assurance in God's mercy,50 certain other things can help to fortify it. The merit gained through good actions strengthens the confidence of believers that God will be gracious and reward them with the beatific vision; they know that God has already promised to count good works to their credit.51 Divine gifts and virtues bring an inchoate happiness, a ‘first payment’ which also heightens assurance in God's future gift.52 Since merit and divine gifts/virtues can increase during a person's life, so can the happiness proper to hope.

(b) Happiness in God To this point, we have been focusing on the happiness proper to heaven. But there is more to the divine–human relationship than what the future holds: people already begin to know and love God

46

II-II, q. 174, a. 4, cor; II-II, q. 175, a. 3, 4, 5; II-II, q. 180, a. 5, cor.

47

II-II, q. 175, a. 6, ra 3.

48

I-II, q. 11, a. 4, cor, ra 2.

49

I-II, q. 5, a. 3, ra 1.

50

II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ra 2.

51

II-II, q. 17, a. 1, ra 2.

52

I-II, q. 69, a. 2, cor, ra 3.


25

during this life. Although temporal enjoyment of God is not heavenly bliss, it brings a real share of beatitude. It is important to underscore the difference between our present topic and hope, since the two are easily confused. Hope brings partial enjoyment of God in anticipation of full future possession; the knowing and loving of God we are about to examine concerns incomplete enjoyment of God precisely to the extent he is possessed in this life. To begin, we must first consider briefly what human beings typically know about God during their time on earth. For Aquinas, knowledge of God has several sources. A basic knowledge of God is possessed by nearly everyone. For instance, Thomas holds that the majority of people can reason easily from the order observed in nature to the existence of a primary orderer. Additional insight comes when those skilled in reasoning draw further conclusions from such basic knowledge, as when philosophers demonstrate that God must be immutable and immaterial. The most profound knowledge of God, however, is achieved in the act and virtue of faith: God reveals to believers many things hidden from their unaided reason, including truths about himself, such as his triune nature.53 Revelation also includes pivotal truths about how God relates to human beings. God communicates that he has special love for his intelligent creatures, dwells among the faithful, and desires to make them happy. These disclosures are more than just statements of fact; they are in effect a divine overture of love inviting a human response in kind. Thomas identifies human love for God as charity (caritas). Since God loves human beings from the beginning of their lives, human love towards God must always be a response to something already offered. Thus for Aquinas, charity has the character of friendship, which is defined as reciprocal love.54 No other human action on earth, with the rare exception of rapture, attains God more perfectly than charity. The other two human acts which concern God directly, faith and hope, imply some distance: faith is an imperfect knowledge of God, and hope, an imperfect

53

SCG 3, cc. 38–40; I, q. 12, a. 13, ra 1.

54

II-II, q. 23, a. 1, cor; II-II, q. 24, a. 2, cor; II-II, q. 179, a. 1, cor.

26


possession.55 For Thomas, charity is different because it possesses its object with a greater excellence. A man may not know everything about his fiancée on their wedding day, but he can still commit himself to loving her completely, even those aspects of her which remain as yet undiscovered. Similarly, though much about God remains mysterious to believers, they can still commit themselves to loving Him completely. Such a love unites believers to God with an excellence unattainable through other human acts.56 For this reason, Thomas considers charity the most perfect way of possessing God in this life. The relationship with God formed by charity has consequences. According to Thomas, love of God stirs in human beings a desire to know God more perfectly, to gaze on his beauty. But how can believers do this, lacking heaven's face-to-face vision? They can do so by making the best of what they possess in this world: since God is known to them through reason and faith, they can fix their minds upon this limited knowledge, hoping thereby to comprehend and enjoy God more deeply.57 Thomas calls such sustained attention contemplation. When God is its object, contemplation is for Aquinas an earthly mirror of the heavenly vision. It brings a true experience of beatitude: people who contemplate God have their yearning for truth authentically, if only partially, satisfied. The happiness experienced in contemplating God should not be considered as radically different from heavenly happiness, for it is a real beginning in this life of a hoped-for future beatitude. Contemplation brings a happiness destined to be completed rather than replaced.58 Just as charity invites deeper knowledge of God in contemplation, so too, in its turn, does contemplation invite a more profound charity: a person who knows God better has reason to love him more intensely. Aquinas believes that a selfintensifying cycle is thus established: the more one loves God, the greater the desire to contemplate him; the more one contemplates him, the greater the foundation for love; and so on. The more this cycle repeats, the greater the agent's share of temporal happiness.59

55

Even though hope's object is our heavenly beatitude with God, charity brings us closer to him in this life.

56

I-II, q. 66, a. 6, cor; II-II, q. 23, a. 6, cor, ra 1, ra 3.

57

II-II, q. 180, a. 1, cor.

58

II-II, q. 180, a. 4, cor.

59

II-II, q. 180, a. 7, ra 1; II-II, q. 24, a. 8, cor.


27

Unlike heaven's simple vision, contemplation occurs amid life's many difficulties and distractions. Thomas explains how certain human actions help to make contemplation possible. We have already seen the importance of reason and faith, for without these prior human actions, people would have no object for the intellect to consider. Contemplation is also assisted by certain moral virtues which help prevent distraction. Courage and temperance, for example, keep the passions of fear and concupiscence, respectively, from exceeding their due bounds and demanding the contemplator's attention. As we noted earlier, virtues are themselves typically developed through human actions; for instance, courage and temperance are formed through repeated actions where fears are overcome and concupiscences checked.60

(c) Happiness in goods other than God A final kind of imperfect happiness for Thomas is satisfaction achieved in temporal goods. Here we must tread carefully, for it is clear that preferring creatures to God leads away from rather than towards happiness. Nevertheless, Aquinas maintains that, if they are enjoyed with a proper respect for God and his will, temporal goods can give a share of beatitude. Thomas mentions a number of temporal goods specifically in this regard.61 Gifts of the Holy Spirit or rewards given to human beings in this life are understood as a first taste of life in God's kingdom.62 The contemplation of lofty creatures, such as angels or the unchangeable principles of speculative sciences, satisfies partially the desire for truth only completely fulfilled in heaven.63 Virtue also brings a participated happiness.64 Why? Virtues and good human actions reflect right reason, meaning that they have

60

I-II, q. 180, a. 2, cor; a. 3, cor.

61

For gifts, see I-II, q. 69, a. 2, cor; for contemplation, see I-II, q. 3, a. 6, cor; for virtue, see II-II, q. 129, a. 7, ra 3; I-II, q. 2, a. 4, cor.

62

I-II, q. 69, a. 2, cor, ra 3.

63

I-II, q. 3, a. 6; a. 7; I-II, q. 57, a. 1, ra 2.

64

In this context, Aquinas is including under virtue those good human actions which virtue disposes for; see I-II, q. 4, a. 8, cor; I-II, q. 5, a. 5, cor.

28


been conformed to God's will for human beings as revealed in divine and natural law (more on this in Chapter 5). Human beings, like all intelligent creatures, have an innate desire for beauty and nobility, a desire satisfied in part when they recognize the moral excellence in virtues and good deeds coming from their free choices.65 What about goods not specifically mentioned above? Are there principles for understanding Thomas's approach to any temporal good in its relation to happiness? It is hard to make generalizations on this topic because Thomas speaks about temporal goods differently in different contexts. In some texts, for instance, he says that all goods can bring a certain likeness to perfect satisfaction, since each created thing participates in God's perfect goodness in its own limited way.66 In other texts, Thomas suggests that the value of a temporal good lies in its ability to point beyond itself to God. Thus he says that contemplating created effects is worthwhile because the contemplator is led to consider their divine cause.67 When considering certain goods, Thomas emphasizes their role in making happiness possible; for instance, he treats the body, external goods, and friendship as conditions necessary for the exercise of virtue, which brings happiness in the way shown above.68 These three ways of viewing temporal goods are not necessarily incompatible, so Thomas may well have thought that certain temporal goods contribute to imperfect happiness in more than one way.

3. Concluding Observations At this point, we can now review the role of human actions in Aquinas's moral theory. Heavenly happiness will itself be a perpetual human action of knowing God in himself. In the present life, people know or enjoy God in actions of faith, hope, charity, and contemplation. Good human actions receive merit which God counts as contributing towards people's happiness; bad human actions lead

65

II-II, q. 145, a. 2, cor, ra 1.

66

De Malo, q. 5, a. 1, ra 5.

67

II-II, q. 180, a. 4, cor, ra 4.

68

I-II, q. 4, a. 6; a. 7; a. 8.


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away from the same. Through their free actions, human beings can attain certain temporal goods which give a taste of beatitude and help them call to mind their ultimate goal. Other human actions play various ancillary roles, as when certain kinds of good human actions form those virtues which can help to sustain contemplation. This summary helps to highlight an important point. While human happiness is clearly related to human actions, happiness cannot be achieved by pursuing any human action in any circumstance. Specific kinds of human actions must be pursued to achieve certain specific ends in the moral life. How these various kinds of actions are identified and willed will be the key question of this work. I will address this question following my second preliminary chapter, which treats specification outside of a moral context.

3 Two Fundamental Types of Specication In order to understand the specification of a human action, it is helpful first to explore the specification of two other kinds of realities: natural corporeal beings and natural actions (or motions). A natural corporeal being is any naturally occurring creature which has matter as a constituent, like a squirrel, a rose, a quartz crystal, and so on. According to Thomas, such a being has its species from its form. A natural action (or motion) refers to any naturally occurring change, such as growing, becoming healthier, going from one place to another, and so forth. Aquinas says that any such action receives its species both from its terminal point and its active principle. These two types of specification are significant for our present study, not only because they teach us important lessons about specification, but also because Thomas will explicitly use them both on a number of occasions as starting points from which to explain the specification of human actions.

1. Specication of Natural Corporeal Creatures: A Formal Expression of their Essence ‘[A]s natural beings take their species from their form, so moral things from their end, which is the object of the will, [and it is on this end and object that] all moral things depend.’69 As this passage by

69

‘Sciendum est igitur, quod sicut naturalia consequuntur speciem a forma, ita moralia a fine, qui est voluntatis obiectum, a quo omnia moralia dependent’: Comp. Theol. 1, c. 116; see also II–II, q. 4, a. 3, cor.

Two Fundamental Types of Specification

31

Thomas suggests, appreciating how ‘natural beings’ receive their species can illuminate how human actions receive theirs. The exact ways in which a species from form helps to explain a species from end will be explored in the next chapter. For now, it is important to lay the groundwork for such a comparison by presenting as clearly as possible how a form can be said to give a bodily creature its species. When Aquinas says that a natural corporeal being (hereafter corporeal being or creature) is specified by its form, what kind of form is he referring to? A reader may well suppose he means exclusively ‘substantial form’, that principle which, together with matter, constitutes a corporeal being. Such a supposition, however, would only be true in a qualified way. For Thomas, a substantial form can only be the basis for a species after a fashion; the form which primarily serves as the basis for the species of a corporeal creature is called the ‘form of the whole’. Aquinas's explanation of these two kinds of forms is subtle and needs to be delineated with care. To understand Aquinas's teaching on substantial form, one needs to begin with the most basic principles of beings.70 Thomas maintains that a corporeal creature has four principles or causes: final, efficient, material, and formal. Although each of these principles has its own role to play,71 Thomas believes that the two co-principles of matter and form are primarily responsible for a corporeal creature's ontological constitution. A person looking at a sparrow or a willow tree is not likely to be struck by the fact that he or she is observing a composite being constituted by two principles, matter and form. What Aquinas is suggesting only becomes apparent when substantial change is considered. When a tree dies and decomposes into minerals and water, for example, two conclusions can be drawn from observing this event. One is that some profound transformation in the being's identity has taken place: no one would point to water or minerals and call these things a tree, or vice versa. A second is that the transformation did not happen by a miraculous substitution of one being for another: something endures in the change such that the

70

For the sake of simplicity in expression, the opinions in this section will be attributed solely to Thomas, though much of his thinking on these matters is drawn from Aristotle.

71

There are four causes of a single being instead of one because each cause causes in a different way: Comm. Metaph. 5, lc. 2, n. 11.

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minerals and water can truly be said to have come from the tree. Thomas calls the principle which constitutes the new identity ‘form’—or, to be more specific, ‘substantial form’—and the principle of continuity during the change ‘matter’. Careful observation of and reflection on substantial changes reveals two things. First, matter and form are not just present during the change, they are always in a bodily creature, even when their presence is not obvious to an observer. If a being were not composed of these two principles prior to a substantial change, then the change simply could not occur. No new form can be introduced unless a being is already in possession of (1) matter to receive the new form and (2) a form which is present and able to be replaced. Second, form plays an active role with respect to matter.72 If matter were the active principle, then the coming or going of a form would not change a creature's identity (since the matter would be the same both before and after the change). Of course, just the opposite is true: the kind of creature changes (for example, the tree becomes water and minerals) precisely when one kind of form replaces another. Form is the active principle, then, the one which makes a being be of a certain kind.73 Once substantial form is recognized as the principle which determines a being's identity, one might reasonably conclude that substantial form also names a corporeal creature's kind or species. In spite of the seeming plausibility of this position, Aquinas would not entirely agree with it. Why? For Thomas, a species should designate ‘what a being is’—its ‘whatness’ or ‘essence’—as, for instance, the species ‘human being’ or ‘geranium’ designates a certain kind of corporeal creature. If a substantial form were to be the basis for such a species, then it would have to signify the essence of a certain kind of being, to express ‘what it is’. But a substantial form by itself cannot do this, because, as a co-principle of a being (along with matter), it can only express a part of what a being is.74 A corporeal creature, like a sparrow, is always constituted by both its substantial

72

Ibid. lb. 5, lc. 2, n. 13; see also De Veritate, q. 28, a. 7, cor.

73

De Ente, c. 1, l. 148–50; for Aquinas, the form is the principle which makes matter an actual being and this particular being: ibid., c. 1, l. 89–91.

74

Ibid., c. 1, l. 62–5; 96–8.


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form and its matter, so it would be a mistake to leave out the matter when expressing its essence, ‘what it is’.75 To omit matter in such a case would be to treat a corporeal creature as though it were a spiritual or mathematical reality which does not have matter as part of its constitution.76 Sparrows are not like angels or hexagons; one cannot understand essentially what they are without taking their matter into account. Someone might object that because substantial form plays an active role in determining a creature's kind (for example, a tree's substantial form makes it be a tree), this form should still be said to express a corporeal being's essence, regardless of the concern for acknowledging matter's contribution. Thomas's response is that, so long as substantial form is understood only as a constituent principle, it cannot properly express a creature's essence. No part as such can rightly be predicated of a whole. We cannot say, for instance, that Socrates is his rational soul (that is, his form understood by itself) or is his body (that is, his matter understood by itself); he is both, and only a concept which refers to him in his integrity can rightly be attributed to him.77 As a co-principle, then, form can only identify a creature's essence in conjunction with matter. If a substantial form does not determine the species, then what does? Aquinas recognizes a second way of understanding form. When the intellect of a person is presented with a bodily creature, it knows this creature in that manner proper to itself. Now Thomas thinks that the human intellect cannot know directly the particular matter that belongs to a singular creature (the matter of this walnut tree) for it is the senses which engage particular matter. Instead, the human intellect knows by abstracting a ‘form’ from the individual; for instance, it can know what makes a man or woman to be a human being apart from his or her particular matter. Note well that, for Thomas, this human ‘form’ or essence which the intellect abstracts consists of both substantial form and matter. But how can this be, if the human intellect cannot know the matter in a particular being?

75

Ibid., c. 1, l. 107–21.

76

Ibid., c. 1, l. 74–7; the existence of natural science as a distinct discipline depends on there being natural forms with determinate matter: Comm. Metaph. 11, lc. 7, n. 14.

77

De Ente, c. 1, l. 248–62.

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The matter in the essence ‘human’ is understood abstractly (conceptually) rather than as existing in a single corporeal creature. Aquinas observes that this essence ‘human’ (which again includes both the human substantial form and matter abstractly understood) can itself be thought of as a kind of ‘form’: Thomas calls it a ‘form of the whole’. He identifies this concept as a ‘form’ because it is as if a form for that particular matter which makes a creature to be an individual. For example, Anna can be understood to have everything which makes a human being human, namely the human substantial form and matter (understood abstractly); this ‘essence’ in turn can be styled as the form for the (particular) matter which makes her be an individual human being. The ‘form of the whole’ or essence, then, is not a component of a corporeal creature, but rather is a concept which expresses what the whole creature is.78 It is this ‘form of the whole’ (and not substantial form, the co-principle) which Aquinas identifies as a species. In spite of what has just been asserted, Thomas does identify a secondary sense in which a substantial form can also be considered the basis for a species. He notices that the substantial form and matter (both in the ‘form of the whole’) are not equally important in a material creature's constitution: as we have seen, such a being owes far more to its active principle than to its matter. When considered precisely as the more determinative of these two principles, then, substantial form can be understood as the foundation for a species.79 As long as these precise distinctions are taken into account, Thomas can have it both ways. Although form is the key to understanding a species, definition and categorization also assist significantly in the identification of a creature. Definition is a logical process which helps to make a species more intelligible by reducing it to analytically recognizable formal aspects. A good way to begin an examination of this topic is to take

78

‘Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est materia designari’: ibid., c. 1, l. 318–25; see also I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, cor.

79

De Ente, c. 1, l. 111–14; Comm. Metaph. 5, lc. 2, n. 2.


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an example of a definition and to identify its components. As is well known, a human being (species) is traditionally defined as a ‘rational animal’; in this definition, the term ‘animal’ is called a genus and ‘rational’ is called a specific difference. ‘Human being’, then, is a complete form which is identified by two formal aspects: ‘animal’ (the more indefinite of the two), and ‘rational’ (the formal aspect further determining the first, more indefinite one). It must be admitted, however, that this definition of a human being presents but the surface level, and that much is assumed which can be made explicit. The most basic element in this definition, the genus ‘animal’, can itself be analysed, and in it can be discerned other formal aspects which are even more fundamental. To illustrate, we could further define ‘animal’ as ‘a sensible living thing’ (as opposed to plants, which have no senses); we could then define a ‘living thing’ as an ‘ensouled substance’ (as opposed to rocks or minerals which are substances without souls). Once substance is posited, however, the process of analysis is ended: the most basic genus has been discovered, and no more basic formal dimension can be uncovered. What this illustration shows is that the standard definition of a human being includes implicitly a number of intermediary genera and their differences, which are as if understood in the final definition. What has been taken apart can be placed back together; thus, in a fuller expression, we can define a human being as an ‘animate, sensible, rational substance’. (In this example, the primary genus, substance, is made more specific by three successive differences.80) Analysing a human being into such basic definitional components can easily lead to a misconception which must be guarded against. In the definition of a human being, we have posited three genera: ‘substance’, ‘living being’, and ‘animal’. What is the relationship between them and the species? It might seem as if ‘human being’ is a kind of compound form, a combination of these various generic forms fused together. But Aquinas is clear that such an opinion misunderstands what the process of definition is trying to accomplish. For him, there is only one final form, the species. The genera are abstracted formal aspects of this species which can only be identified through analysis;81 one will never see an ‘animal’ walking

80

Comm. Metaph. 7, lc. 12, n. 7.

81

Ibid. 5, lc. 2, n. 2.

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about which is not a man, a cow, and so forth.82 When a difference is posited of such a genus, it is not as if this difference splices on a new form. Rather, a genus is indeterminate with respect to differences; for instance, the differences ‘living’ or ‘non-living’ are implicit possibilities for the genus ‘substance’.83 The final difference is particularly important because it gives the integral form (or species) to a being. All genera are contained in this final difference implicitly, so that in the specific difference which defines, for instance, a lion, is understood substance, body, living (body), and animal (as well as lion).84 Thus, as long as it is done properly,85 the final specific difference will complete86 and give unity to the definition.87 Definitions not only help to make intelligible the various species of creatures for Aquinas, they also ground classification. Classification is a systematic exposition of the interrelationship of a group of things; definition permits one to see more clearly similarities and differences which can serve as the basis for such categorization. According to Thomas, classification of natural corporeal creatures proceeds like this. First, the most basic genus ‘substance’ is posited as the starting point. It is then divided into two categories, usually contraries (say, ‘living’ and ‘non-living’). These two groups are then subdivided, and these subdivisions themselves are further subdivided, and so forth. Finally, the process of division ends when each kind of creature has been distinguished from every other on account of its own unique final specific difference.

82


83

De Ente, c. 1, l. 283–4; Comm. Metaph. 7, lc. 12, n. 13; see also De Ente, c. 1, l. 151–215; 265–82.

84

Comm. Metaph. 7, lc. 12, nn. 25, 28. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that, while a certain order exists among the genera in the definition, no such order is present in the being; it is simply one form in which these genera can be recognized: ibid., n. 27.

85

Ibid., n. 25; Thomas believes that necessity sometimes requires per accidens differences to be used instead of per’se differences; per accidens differences can act as signs of essential differences which are unknown to us; ibid., n. 16.

86

‘Nam specifica differentia est, quae complet substantiam rei et dat ei speciem’: ibid. 5, lc. 5, n. 15; also 7, lc. 12, n. 19.

87

‘Manifestum est quod si in definitione accipiantur differentiae, una erit ultima, scilicet quae est species et substantia, idest quae substantiam et speciem definiti comprehendet, et ab eius unitate definitio erit una’: ibid., n. 23.


37

In order for this dividing to happen properly, it cannot take place in any way, but must be essential. Once again, the specific difference plays a crucial role in assuring that this is the case. For example, Thomas points out that ‘animals with feet’ shouldn't be further divided into ‘those with wings’ and ‘those without wings’, since it is accidental to footed animals that they happen to have wings or not. But the division ‘those with cloven feet’ and ‘those without cloven feet’ is essential for footed animals, because ‘cloven’ is a certain kind of foot.88 The process ideally should lead to the proper categorization of all reality: every kind of being should be accounted for, there should be as many final differences as there are kinds of things,89 and we should be able to recognize when comparing beings which formal characteristics they share and which distinguish them. In sum, then, Thomas shows that form is the foundation for the species of a natural corporeal being: a ‘form of the whole’ properly signifies a species, while a ‘substantial form’ can be said to determine a species after a fashion. Definition and classification assist in our comprehension of species, permitting us to understand with greater precision what beings are and how they are related to one another.

2. Specication of Natural Subsensory Motions by Two Complementary Principles [S]ince there are four types of causes, they are attributed to diverse things in diverse ways. The formal and material cause properly regard the substance of a thing, and therefore substances are distinguished in their species and genus according to form and matter. Agents and ends, however, are directly related to motions and operations, and therefore motions and operations are distinguished in species by causes of this kind [i.e. by agents and ends], albeit diversely [i.e. in irreducibly different ways].90

88

Ibid., nn. 16, 17; see also I–II, q. 18, a. 7, cor; De Anima, a. 13, cor.

89


90

‘[C]um quatuor sint causarum genera, diversimode diversis attribuuntur. Causa enim formalis et materialis respiciunt proprie substantiam rei, et ideo substantiae secundum formam et materiam specie et genere distinguuntur. Agens autem et finis respiciunt directe motum et operationem, et ideo motus et operationes secundum huiusmodi causas specie distinguuntur; diversimode tamen’: I–II, q. 72, a. 3, cor.

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In the text following this passage from the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas will show in greater detail how the two principles ‘agent and end’ contribute differently to specification depending on whether a ‘motion’ (that is, a subsensory motion) or an ‘operation’ (here referring to a human action) is being considered. I will return to explore this point at greater length in Chapter 4. For the present, note Aquinas's more general point that bodily substances, subsensory motions, and human actions each rely on the four causes in a different way for specification.91 Note also that Thomas sees a special affinity between subsensory motions and human actions, as compared with bodily creatures: he believes that motions and actions have a greater dependence on agent and end, while bodily creatures depend more on form and matter. Aquinas's insight suggests that a discussion of how motions receive their species will bring us one step closer to understanding the principles relevant for the specification of human actions. Two points about subsensory motions are important to recall at the beginning of this investigation. First, when Thomas is speaking of motions here, he means more than just movement from one place to another (local motion); he is considering any naturally occurring change, such as growing or diminishing, whitening or blackening, becoming more or less healthy, and so forth. Thus Aquinas's teaching on subsensory motion will attempt to take all of these different kinds of change into account. Second, Thomas identifies not one, but two principles which can act as determinants in the specification of subsensory actions. One is the point towards which an action is directed, called by him the terminus ad quem; the second is that cause which naturally produces the motion, sometimes called the principium activum. Although it might seem inappropriate to have

91

Although Aquinas only rarely compares all three—corporeal creatures, subsensory motions, and human actions—in this way, one can find other texts where he makes this comparison in part; e.g. he compares specification of a motion by its term to specification of a natural corporeal creature by its form, noting the difference in approach: I–II, q. 35, a. 4, cor; see also I–II, q. 51, a. 2, cor; De Virtut., q. 5, a. 3, cor.


39

two determinants for the same motion at the same time, Thomas is convinced that both principles are complementary, so that the same motion can as easily be specified by one as by the other. How this can be true should become clearer in the two subsections which follow, where these two principles will each be examined in greater detail.

(i) Specication by ‘terminus to which’ Subsensory motions and human actions share certain similarities. First of all, as in a human action, a subsensory motion does not exist in itself but only in something else.92 For instance, if we consider a rock falling off a cliff, the rock can exist independently (whether it is falling or not), whereas its motion can exist only in the rock and during the time when it is falling.93 In a similar fashion, human actions can only exist in and through an agent; theft, for instance, can only exist in a thief so long as his will is set on stealing. Second, like a human action, a subsensory motion must be understood in its entirety; one takes into account a moving thing's course94 from the moment it starts moving until the moment it comes to rest.95 To use colour change as an example, if something is becoming white, this motion will not be complete until whiteness is reached; the motion cannot be properly grasped if consideration halts at some intermediary colour, such as red.96 Recall that, in a similar fashion, a human action proceeds according to an order, beginning with the intention of an end and finishing with its enjoyment. With such characteristics, motions pose a challenge for Aquinas. How does one determine the species of something which exists in another and which shows development over its course? It might be tempting at first to name such a motion by meticulously noting its entire pathway, so that, in the end, the motion can be identified by summarizing all that occurs from its beginning to its end. But while such a strategy might yield a good description of an individual

92


93

Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 1, n. 9; also lc. 2, nn. 8, 9; 3, lc. 4, n. 1; Comm. Metaph. 11, lc. 9, nn. 3, 20.

94

I–II, q. 114, a. 8, cor; II–II, q. 24, a. 9, cor; see also Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 6, n. 5.

95

III Sent., d. 3, q. 5, a. 2, ra 4.

96

IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1c, cor.

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motion, would it be helpful in identifying a species? Could we have as many species of motion as there are different possible pathways? As soon as these questions are posed, it becomes clear that such a way of proceeding is impracticable. But if the pathways of motions cannot serve as the basis for specifying motions, what factor or factors are pertinent? Thomas sometimes answers this question by singling out a particular factor relevant to motion.97 Of the five factors which he recognizes, namely, (1) the original mover; (2) the thing moved; (3) the time in which the motion occurs; (4) the beginning point of the motion; (5) the final point of the motion,98 Aquinas identifies the fifth, the final point (terminus ad quem)99 as being of the greatest importance to specification, even if certain other factors will be of interest in special cases.100

97

The presentation of Aquinas's teachings in this section relies in part on his Aristotelian commentaries, as the citations show; I am presuming that these commentaries offer Aquinas's own position unless he corrects Aristotle or unambiguously teaches the contrary elsewhere.

98

Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 1, n. 4; Comm. Metaph. 11, lc. 11, n. 7.

99

There are texts where Thomas identifies specifically the ‘terminus to which’ as that which names or specifies the motion or change: I Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 1, ex; IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 2, cor; d. 43, q. 1, a. 4b, ra 4; d. 50, q. 1, a. 2, ra 2; I, q. 23, a. 1, ra 3; I, q. 45, a. 1, ra 2; I–II, q. 113, a. 1, cor; II–II, q. 19, a. 5, ra 2; II–II, q. 26, a. 7, cor; II–II, q. 61, a. 1, ra 4; II–II, q. 118, a. 6, ra 2; De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, ra 5; Quodl., n. 5, q. 6, a. 1, cor; Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 1, nn. 6, 8; lc. 8, n. 6; 6, lc. 7, n. 2; lc. 8, n. 14. In other texts, Thomas simply says that motions receive their name or species from their termini: I Sent., d. 46, q. 1, a. 2, sc 2; II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ra 5; d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, sc 1; III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1a, ra 3; I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ra 3; I-II, q. 18, a. 2, cor, ra 3; I-II, q. 35, a. 4, cor; I-II, q. 52, a. 1, cor; I-II, q. 52, a. 2, cor; I-II, q. 72, a. 3, ra 2; I-II, q. 107, a. 1, cor; I-II, q. 113, a. 6, ra 1; II-II, q. 12, a. 1, ra 3; III, q. 35, a. 1, ra 2; III, q. 35, a. 2, cor; De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2, cor; De Potentia, q. 6, a. 8, cor; q. 10, a. 2, cor; De Malo, q. 16, a. 3, ra 14; De Unione Verbi, a. 2, ra 16; De Virtut., q. 4, a. 1, ra 16; q. 5, a. 3, cor; Comm. De Caelo, 1, lc. 8, n. 13; 2, lc. 7, n. 5; Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 3, n. 2; 7, lc. 3, n. 9; Comm. Ethic. 10, lc. 5, n. 9; 10, lc. 5, n. 9; in this latter group of texts, the context sometimes makes clear that Aquinas's use of ‘terminus’ refers to ‘terminus to which’. 100

Although the ‘terminus to which’ is of greatest importance, other factors related to motion can sometimes contribute to specification if the circumstances warrant. For instance, the ‘terminus from which’ is mentioned in connection with specification, though very rarely (see Comm. Metaph. 11, lc. 11, nn. 7–10); its role would presumably be ancillary. Also, Thomas recognizes that, at times, the path of a motion needs to be taken into account, as when a straight and a curved line are being distinguished (Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 6, n. 4). Finally, Thomas even recognizes perfection and imperfection in motions as a possible basis for a differentiation of species (I-II, q. 107, a. 1, cor; see also De Veritate, q. 8, a. 14, ra 12; Comm. Ethic. 10, lc. 5, nn. 10–12; Comm. Phys. 3, lc. 1, n. 8).


41

Why does Thomas single out the terminus ad quem? To grasp his reasoning, one must understand clearly where motion (motus, change) is found for him. Although it is necessary, according to Aquinas, to consider the final point when describing a motion, it is not technically a part of the motion itself: the beginning point and end point are states of rest, while the motion is found precisely in the period of transition in between. Aquinas holds that this relationship between motion and its final point can be described in terms of imperfection and perfection. The motion is as if a striving for something, and its completion is attained when its culmination is reached (as a movement towards health reaches perfection only when health is realized). For this reason, motion for Thomas is a kind of imperfection; it is a reality whose very meaning lies in its transition towards something not yet achieved.101 Now in other cases where he must classify something imperfect, Thomas employs a strategy called reductio; it works by associating what is imperfect with what is perfect for the purpose of explanation. For example, prime matter, since it only exists together with substantial form, is imperfect in itself, and therefore particularly difficult to classify: it doesn't seem to belong to any genus, given that it is only a principle of being and not an existent in its own right. In order to solve this problem, Aquinas, for the purpose of definition, associates prime matter with the more perfect reality of which it is a principle; that is, he treats prime matter as if it were a substance.102 In the case of motion, Thomas employs a comparable strategy. Motion is similarly difficult to classify, given its developing character. Aquinas, then, for the purpose of definition, allies motion to the terminus ad quem,

101

‘Sicut patet quod motus in ratione sui importat imperfectionem subiecti, est enim actus existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, unde quando illa potentia reducitur ad actum, iam cessat motus; non enim adhuc albatur, postquam iam aliquid factum est album’: I-II, q. 67, a. 4, cor; see also Comm. Metaph. 7, lc. 12, n. 27; 11, lc. 9, nn. 10, 17, 18; Comm. Phys. 3, lc. 2, nn. 3, 5.

102

Comm. Phys. 3, lc. 1, n. 7.

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letting imperfect motion be associated with the perfection towards which it is heading.103 Thomas sometimes illustrates this explanatory strategy through the example of colour change, showing the greater importance placed on the final term over the initial term. For example, he points out that if some object were changing from black to white, the common description for this process would be ‘whitening’, not ‘from-blacking’.104 For Aquinas, this name difference is no accident. If all that were known about a certain colour change is that it starts from black, he notes, this fact would not tell us much about the motion, since the whole rainbow of colours can start from black.105 On the other hand, if an object is heading to white, this movement is always called whitening no matter which colour is the starting point, since all colours can potentially be changed to white.106 For Thomas, the fact that the terminal colour plays such an important role in our descriptions of this change reveals an important truth about motion itself. Whiteness is determinative because it is for him the completion and perfection of the colour change, and best sums up the dynamic of the movement.107 Aquinas reasoned further that one could identify the different kinds of species in motion by determinative differences in their final points. The most basic of these differences correspond to the different categories of being in which there can be motion.108 In his metaphysical writings, Aristotle divides reality into substance and

103

‘Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum’: ibid. 3, lc. 5, n. 17; 5, lc. 3, n. 2.

104

IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 2, cor; something comparable can be said concerning health and sickness: Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 8, n. 6.

105

I, q. 23, a. 1, ra 3; see also IV Sent., d. 50, q. 1, a. 2, ra 2.

106

IV Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 4b, ra 4; in another common-sense proof, Thomas argues that if the ‘terminus a quo’ and ‘ad quem’ were both equally responsible for the species of motion, then motions ‘from white’ and ‘to white’ should be the same. Such a conclusion is obviously false, however, since these two motions can terminate in contrary colours: ‘to white’ can terminate in white and ‘from white’ can terminate in black: II-II, q. 19, a. 5, ra 2. 107

‘Motus videtur repugnare termino a quo, et convenientiam habere cum termino ad quem’: Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 1, n. 6; see also II-II, q. 37, a. 2, ra 2.

108



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nine accidents, and attributes motion to three of these categories:109 quantity (increase and decrease);110 quality (alterations such as in colour, or dispositions like health, etc.);111 and place (motion in space).112 Because each of these three accidents represents a distinct category of being, motion with respect to each accident will have a distinctive ‘terminus to which’ proper to that category, denominating the motion's kind or species.113 For example, knowing that the final point of a motion is a ‘sound body’ identifies the motion as a quality change rather than a quantity change or local motion. The motion can then be further specified within quality change: sound body is the final point of ‘becoming healthy’ rather than, say, ‘becoming intelligent’ or ‘becoming vicious’. As was the case with corporeal creatures above, in order for the specification of a motion to be proper, it must be related in a per’se manner to its ‘terminus to which’.114 To illustrate this point, Thomas imagines something falling, in one case towards earth and in another case towards water. Does either or both of these termini specify the motion? Thomas points out that since local motion is movement between points in space, it makes no difference in specifying whether the terminus is earth or water. It does make a difference, however, that these two termini are below the falling body; this is a relevant location in space, and reveals that the motion is specifically a downwards one.115 It is not any and every character of the terminus ad quem

109

Beyond the three categories mentioned here, there is also the category of ‘substance’, which is subject to generation and corruption. Thomas sometimes considers generation together with growth, alteration, and local motion under the common heading of change (‘mutatio’) (Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 2, n. 11; lc. 3, n. 1), and shows how all four categories are specified by the ‘terminus ad quem’ (I Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 1, ex; II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ra 5; III, q. 35, a. 1, ra 2). Aquinas makes clear, however, that only growth, alteration, and local motion are motions in a strict sense (Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 2, n. 1). For further references to these three species of motion, see Comm. Metaph. 11, lc. 12, n. 1; Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 1, n. 5; lc. 3, n. 2.

110


111

For colour and temperature change: ibid., lc. 4, n. 2; for sickness and health see, Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 6, n. 7; De Virtut., q. 5, a. 3, cor; Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 8, n. 6.

112


113


114

I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ra 3.

115

III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor. As other examples of per accidens differences which cannot specify, Thomas suggests the intensity of a motion (I-II, q. 52, a. 1, cor; a. 2, cor; II-II, q. 26, a. 7, cor) and the relative distance between two terms (De Virtut., q. 4, a. 1, ra 16).

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which is pertinent, then, but only that which relates per’se to the motion in question.116

(ii) Specication by agent principles [N]atural active principles are always determined to the same kinds of actions, and, therefore, diverse species in natural actions are considered not only according to objects, which are ends or terms, but also according to active principles; as heating and cooling are distinguished by species according to the hot and the cold.117 The second way of specifying subsensory motions requires us to focus our attention on a creature's form. Aquinas maintains that there is a well-defined relationship between such a natural form and those motions which proceed from it;118 for example, he says that ‘the proximate end of any agent whatever is to introduce the likeness of its own form into another: as the end of a fire which is heating is to introduce the likeness of its own heat into its recipient’.119 Why does

116

Comm. Phys. 5, lc. 1, n. 2 (see also ibid., n. 3).

117

‘Nam principia activa naturalia sunt determinata semper ad eosdem actus, et ideo diversae species in actibus naturalibus attenduntur non solum secundum obiecta, quae sunt fines vel termini, sed etiam secundum principia activa; sicut calefacere et infrigidare distinguuntur specie secundum calidum et frigidum’: I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor.

118

Thomas makes the claim a number of times that the form or species of the agent determines the form or species of the motion; e.g. ‘Actiones diversificantur secundum formam agentis, ut calefacere et infrigidare…quia semper agens imprimit formam suam in patientem, et movens in motum’: De Virtut., q. 1, a. 2, ra 3; see also II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, sc 2; d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, cor; IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4d, cor; SCG 2, c. 21, n. 9; I-II, q. 5, a. 6, ra 2; I-II, q. 20, a. 3, ra 3; De Veritate, q. 24, a. 7, cor; De Anima, a. 13, cor; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 3, cor; Comm. De Causis, lc. 8, ll. 43–5. (In the texts cited, heat and heating are used to illustrate.) In other texts, Thomas uses ‘active principle’ rather than ‘form’ or ‘species’ to designate what gives species to natural motions; see, I, q. 14, a. 5, ra 3; SCG 3, c. 8, n. 8. 119

‘Finis autem proximus uniuscuiusque agentis est ut similitudinem suae formae in alterum inducat, sicut finis ignis calefacientis est ut inducat similitudinem sui caloris in patiente…’: II-II, q. 123, a. 7, cor. It is good to keep in mind that when one body heats another in Aquinas's understanding of physics, it is not as if the heat is transferred from the first body to the second, but rather the form of the body heating moves the form of the body being heated from potency to act; see SCG 3, c. 69, n. 28. Although Thomas usually uses heat and heating as an illustration (see n. 50), he at times will use local motion, as when something light naturally moves upwards (I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ra 2), or something heavy naturally moves downwards (IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1a, cor; Comm. Metaph. 1, lc. 1, n. 3).


45

form give rise to motions in this way? Thomas claims that substantial form is not only the basis of a creature's kind and being, as we have already seen, but is also the basis of its nature, that is, of its innate disposition to act in a certain way.120 This form or active principle should not be confused with other factors pertinent to motion. For instance, the impression might easily be given that the additional determinant Thomas is referring to in the text above is the ‘starting point’ of a motion, the terminus a quo. This is not the case, however. Consider a kettle which is being heated by a fire. The ‘starting point’ for heating in this case is the temperature of the kettle before heating begins; upon reflection, one can see that this temperature doesn't determine the kind of motion which will ensue (the kettle could get colder). The active principle, on the other hand, is the fire, or speaking more precisely, the form of heat within the fire;121 this is what Thomas thinks reveals the motion's species. Why is it that subsensory motions are specified from this active principle? Frequently, a given form or nature is not predisposed to many different kinds of motions, but just to that one particular kind consequent upon it:122 for instance, an agent, in so far as it is hot, yields one and only one kind of motion, namely heating, and cannot through this form of heat directly cause cooling, whitening, healing, or any other kind of motion.123 And what causes a motion's form will also be crucial in accounting for its species. When considering motion in this second way, then, one need only look at the kind of cause (active principle) to know the kind of effect (species of motion).

120

Comm. Phys. 2, lc. 13, n. 3; lc. 1, n. 5; 3, lc. 1, n. 2.

121

According to Thomas, although an action is commonly attributed to a form's subject, as when heating is attributed to fire (I, q. 75, a. 2, ra 2; De Potentia, q. 9, a. 1, ra 3; De Anima, a. 14, cor; De Unitate, c. 1, l. 714–16), the form itself is the agent principle: heating is caused by the form of heat in the fire: De Veritate, q. 5, a. 9, ra 5; Comm. De Causis, lc. 8, n. 43–5. 122

‘In illis quae agunt per necessitatem naturae, oportet quod agens de necessitate agat secundum exigentiam formae quae in ipso est, ut per calidum calefaciat’: II Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, ra 4; see also Comm. Phys. 2, lc. 14, n. 7; De Potentia, q. 5, a. 3, cor.

123

Comm. Metaph. 9, lc. 2, n. 4; for how heat can lead to healing by being a part of health, ibid. 7, lc. 8, n. 19.

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Although specification from an active principle is in itself relatively straightforward, a question may arise about its compatibility with specification from a final point or terminus ad quem. Can it be that a motion receives its species from both principles at the same time? Aquinas is certainly aware of the relationship between these two causes. On several occasions, he shows them together specifying the same motion.124 This text from De Potentia is a good illustration: ‘An action seems to take its natural species from two things: its agent and its term. For heating differs from cooling because the former comes from heat and is directed to heat, while the latter comes from cold and is directed to cold.’125 Thomas is able to integrate these two causes so well because an active principle has more of an affiliation to a terminus ad quem than might first seem to be the case. Although natural forms are predetermined and cannot know their own end, Thomas believes they are, in a way, directed to an end.126 Forms for him are not the products of blind chance, but are designed by God, who fashioned them to give rise to just those motions which he intended.127 An active principle can be said to act for an end, then, even if it cannot perceive or know this end. This relationship between an active principle and its end makes clear how they can complement each other in specification. An active principle (being innately directed to a term or end) specifies in so far as it produces a natural motion of a certain kind, innately directed to a term (or end), while the final point specifies in so far as it serves as this term or completion of a motion. Now that these two kinds of non-intelligent specification have been considered, I will in the next five chapters direct my attention to human actions and the five principles said to specify them: end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive.

124

I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor (the passage which begins this subsection); I, q. 77, a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 1, a. 3, cor; De Anima, a. 13, cor; Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 6, n. 7.

125

‘Actio aliqua ex duobus naturalem speciem accipere videtur: scilicet ex agente et termino. Calefactio enim ab infrigidatione differt, quia una earum ex calore procedit et ad calorem terminatur; alia vero a frigore et ad frigus’: De Potentia, q. 6, a. 8, cor.

126

SCG 3, lc. 2, n. 2.

127

Comm. Metaph. 12, lc. 12, n. 8, Comm. Phys. 2, lc. 14, n. 8; I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, cor; II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ra 2; De Malo, q. 6, cor; Comm. Metaph. 5, lc. 16, n. 14.

4 End ‘[M]oral acts properly receive their species from end(s).’128 This statement is the first teaching Aquinas offers about the specification of human actions in the second part of the Summa Theologiae; it appears in an early question where he is setting down the most basic principles of his moral theory. Given the context, Thomas's statement rightly suggests the centrality of ends to his understanding of human actions and to the determination of their moral kinds. One can find this assertion from the Summa expressed in numerous other texts as well.129 In order to clarify and expound on Aquinas's position, this chapter will (1) explain specification of human actions by ends in greater detail, aided by comparisons to other kinds of specification already studied, and (2) examine the two most basic species of human actions, good and evil.

128 129

‘[A]ctus morales proprie speciem sortiuntur ex fine…’: I-II, q. 1, a. 3, cor.

II Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, cor; d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ra 1; d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ra 3; d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, sc 1, sc 2; d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, cor; d. 42, q. 2, a. 3, cor; III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; SCG 3, c. 8, n. 8; I, q. 48, a. 1, ra 2; I-II, q. 1, a. 3, cor, ra 2; I-II, q. 1, a. 5, cor; I-II, q. 7, a. 3, ra 3; I-II, q. 7, a. 4, ra 2; I-II, q. 18, a. 6, sc, cor; I-II, q. 34, a. 4, cor; I-II, q. 54, a. 2, ra 3; I-II, q. 72, a. 1, ag and ra 1; I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor, ra 1; ra 2; I-II, q. 107, a. 1, cor; II-II, q. 4, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 43, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 47, a. 11, cor, ra 3; II-II, q. 89, a. 5, ra 1; II-II, q. 98, a. 1, cor; II-II, q. 105, a. 1, ra 1; II-II, q. 125, a. 2, ra 2; II-II, q. 135, a. 1, cor; II-II, q. 181, a. 2, ra 1; II-II, q. 186, a. 1, sc; III, q. 90, a. 4, cor; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ra 12; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 12; q. 7, a. 4, cor, ra 4; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 2, ra 3; q. 2, a. 3, cor; Comp. Theol. 1, c. 116; Comm. Ethic. 4, lc. 2, n. 3; lc. 8, n. 12; Comm. I Cor., c. 3, lc. 2, l. 455–7; for an example where terminus seems to be used as an equivalent substitute for finis, see III Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, cor.

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End

1. A Comparison of Specication According to End with Other Kinds of Specication Much can be learnt about Aquinas's assertion that ends specify human actions by comparing and contrasting this teaching with the two other kinds of specification studied in the last chapter. First, Aquinas contends that an end determines ‘form’ and ‘species’ in a human action. These two terms, however, seem more suited to identifying substances, such as corporeal creatures, than accidents such as human actions. My inquiry will attempt to discover what ‘form’ and ‘species’ mean in the context of voluntary action. Second, Thomas contends that the way ends specify human actions is, in certain important respects, distinct from the way a motion is determined by its two specifying causes. Our inquiry will consider how Thomas uses the terminus ad quem and active principle in motions to make clear the distinctive role end plays in human actions.

(i) Form and species from an end: an analogy with substantial form in corporeal creatures It might seem sensible to think that the terms ‘form’ and ‘species’ should not be applied to human actions or to motions at all. When used of corporeal creatures, these two terms have clear referents: ‘substantial form’ is a constituent co-principle (with matter) of a corporeal being, and ‘species’ identifies a corporeal being's essence. But, as I pointed out earlier, human actions and natural motions do not exist independently, but only in something else. No motion can exist apart from the substance which is moving; no human action can exist apart from the man or woman who is acting. In Aquinas's metaphysical language, natural motions and human actions are accidents. Terms such as ‘form’ and ‘species’, crucial for identifying substances, don't seem easily attributable to accidents. Accidents cannot, by definition, possess a substantial form (that is, the form of a substance). Nor do accidents seem to have a species, since substantial form helps constitute a species (along with matter). At

End

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first glance, then, it might seem as if concepts other than ‘form’ and ‘species’ need to be introduced if motions or human actions are to be identified, defined, and classified properly. Thomas, however, does not allow these seeming problems to keep him from using the terms ‘form’ and ‘species’ regularly in his descriptions of either motions (as we saw in the last chapter) or human actions. Regarding human actions, he states that an end is, or is as if, the form of the will,130 that an end perfects the being and species of a human act,131 and that an end can provide specific differences by which the various species of human actions are identified.132 Although using ‘form’ or ‘species’ for human actions might seem puzzling at first, a reader acquainted with Aquinas's thought will rightly suspect that these terms are being used analogously. Analogy is a technique frequently employed by Aquinas where a term more proper to one reality is applied in a comparable way to some second reality in view of certain shared similarities. A commonly cited Aristotelian example involves the use of the word ‘healthy’. This adjective can be used to describe a number of realities: a healthy person, healthy food, healthy urine. The word ‘healthy’ is most properly attributed to the person possessing a sound body. The other uses are correct too, but they derive their meaning from the primary use: food is called healthy when it contributes to a person's health; urine is called healthy when it is sign of a person's health.133 Analogy allows Thomas to trace the unity of existence: a common term can draw attention to like characteristics which weave their way through reality, even if these characteristics exist in different ways in different kinds of beings. When analogy is employed, the interpreter's challenge is to discover the extent to which the secondary referent (the analogue) is similar to or different from the primary reality from

130 ‘[M]orales actus…specificantur ex fine, qui est quasi forma voluntatis’: De Potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ra 12; ‘Forma autem actus moralis dependet ex fine’: I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ra 1; see also II-II, q. 23, a. 8, cor. 131

‘Et ideo a fine perficitur et esse et species peccati’: I-II, q. 72, a. 3, ra 1.

132

‘Forma autem voluntatis est finis et bonum, quod est ejus objectum et volitum; et ideo oportet quod in actibus voluntatis inveniatur differentia specifica secundum rationem finis’: II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, cor.

133

Comm. Metaph. 5, lc. 8, n. 14

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End

which the concept is properly derived. A poor discernment of such similarities and differences risks attributing aspects of the primary meaning to the secondary referent inappropriately. To understand Aquinas's analogous use of ‘form’ and ‘species’ in human action, then, one must discover what these two terms are referring to in a human action. An initial attempt to do so might seem to lead down a cul-de-sac, however. As noted above, when Thomas is describing human action, he sometimes speaks of its end as if it were its form. Such a suggestion seems nonsensical, however. These two principles are radically dissimilar: form expresses the identify of a thing (what), and end expresses that for the sake of which something is or is done (why).134 The difference between these two is so fundamental, in fact, that Thomas considers form and end to be two of the four irreducible kinds of causality—formal, final (end), efficient, and material. Because form and end seem to share nothing more substantive than the fact that both are causes, where is the likeness between them that can stand as the basis for an analogy? In spite of this apparent difficulty, Thomas has a way of approaching this situation which allows him to draw an analogy. The impasse described above occurs because form and end are both being considered with regard to substance. But Thomas's analogy depends on form and end each being referred to that distinct order of reality to which each is especially related: he is comparing the role of form with respect to substance to the role of end with respect to action. This more precise way of drawing the analogy is crucial. An end may be external to the fundamental constitution of a creature—form and matter account for this—but an end is essential to a creature's action or motion, in somewhat the same way as heat may have no direct causal influence on a being's substance, but can have a direct and per se causal influence on its temperature. For the analogy to work, then, end must be compared to form precisely in so far as each relates to a particular order of reality. So what is the influence that an end has with respect to action? We can introduce Aquinas's answer to this important question here, even though this topic will be explored in greater depth in the next section. In one of his earliest articles in the Prima Secundae, Aquinas

134

Comm. Phys. 2, lc. 13, n. 6; Comm. Metaph. 5, lc. 2, n. 9; 2, lc. 4, n. 1; 3, lc. 4, n. 6.

End

51

wonders whether there can be actions without ends, and he concludes that ends are indispensable. ‘For if an agent is not determined to some effect, it does not do this rather than that; therefore, in order that it produce some determinate effect, it is necessary that [the agent] be determined to something definite, which has the character (ratio) of an end.’135 To express Aquinas's point more concretely, unless people conceive of some end—to run, to pray, to embezzle, or something—and bestir themselves to pursue this end, they will do nothing at all. Consequently, the very existence and character of every action depends on that end which the agent determines.136 This basic explanation of an end's role with respect to action paves the way for a better rendering of Aquinas's analogy: a similarity can now be recognized between form and end which can serve as a basis for a comparison. Just as a substantial form is the basis of the being and kind of a corporeal creature, so end is the basis for the being and kind of a human action. End is, or is as if, the form of a human action for Thomas, then, not because end is a (substantial) form, but because in its relation to a human action, end performs certain functions which are comparable to what a (substantial) form gives to a bodily creature. And once such formlike characteristics are recognized in the end, extending the analogy to species is easy: Aquinas contends that just as (substantial) form is the co-principle of primary importance in determining a species, so an end contains a formal aspect (ratio)137 which places human actions into their species of good or evil, or into more particular (sub)species such as almsgiving or theft.138 How this happens will be explored in greater depth both in section 2 below and in the next chapter.

135

‘Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud, ad’hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis’: I-II, q. 1, a. 2, cor.

136

Thomas sometimes takes the analogy between form and end a step further: he compares the proportioning which a form gives to a natural corporeal being with the proportioning which an end gives to means which are ordered to this end: II-II, q. 4, a. 3, cor; see also III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2d, ra 4.

137

See n. 5.

138

‘[E]x relatione ad diversos fines diversificentur species…’ : II-II, q. 47, a. 11, cor.

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End

(ii) A comparison of end in human action with term and active principle in natural motion Although the analogy between form and end helps to clarify Aquinas's understanding of specification in human action, a second comparison serves this purpose even better. As I noted in the last chapter, Thomas holds that the specification of natural motions and of human actions have a strong affinity; indeed, these two kinds of specification are closer to each other than either is to the specification of corporeal beings. Thus, a comparison between an end in human action and the two complementary principles (term and active principle) in natural motion allows one to understand with even greater acuity what makes specification by ends distinctive. Since natural motions and human actions have certain key resemblances, it is not surprising to discover similarities in the way each is specified. One such similarity can be seen in a passage from Aquinas's Commentary on the Sentences: Thomas presents an argument that ends specify human actions because, at one level, a human action is a kind of motion (motus, change) and an end is a term for such a motion: ‘Every motion receives a species from its term. But the term of a will act is its end. Therefore the goodness of the act ought to be judged by the goodness from the end.’139 This relatively short passage condenses more than one argument. If the first argument is presented more formally, with implied assertions made explicit, one finds Aquinas arguing that (1) every motus (motion or change) is specified by its terminus; (2) a will act is a kind of motus; (3) therefore, a will act is specified by its terminus or end (end having been identified as a will act's terminus). If this expansion of the argument is convincing, then Aquinas is proposing here a rather simple proof that a human action is specified by its end. It should be noted that this syllogism reaches the desired conclusion in spite of a certain limitation in viewpoint. This argument considers the end only in so far as it is a terminus of motion. As

139

‘Omnis motus recipit speciem ex termino. Sed terminus actus voluntatis est finis. Ergo ex bonitate finis judicandus est bonus actus voluntatis’: II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, sc 1. Although arguments appearing in a sed contra occasionally don't reflect Aquinas's opinion, there is no serious reason to question his approval of this one.

End

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we shall soon see, Thomas believes an end specifies a human action for reasons more involved than this. Be that as it may, this argument demonstrates that Thomas can offer a proof that ends specify human actions simply by arguing from what he holds concerning the specification of motion. In the passage above, Thomas focuses on a similarity between the principles which specify motion and human action; in other texts, however, he will focus on differences between these principles, allowing him to show what makes ends in human action distinctive. First, we can consider a passage where ‘active principles’ are the focus of Aquinas's attention. As the argument above from the Sentences suggests, a human action can (at least in one respect) be considered as a motion. But for Aquinas, a motion is specified not only by its terminus but also by its active principle. Given that such is the case, it is natural to wonder whether human actions can also be specified by active principles. Thomas answers this question in the following argument from the Summa Theologiae: Natural active principles are always determined to the same act, and therefore, diverse species in natural actions are observed not only according to objects, which are ends or terms, but also according to active principles, as heating and cooling are distinguished by species according to the hot and the cold. But active principles in voluntary actions…are not related from necessity to one thing, and therefore diverse species of sins are able to proceed from one active or motive principle; as from fear which lowers him, it can happen that a man steals, kills, or deserts the flock committed to his care; and these same actions can proceed from love. Whence it is clear that sins do not differ in species according to diverse active or motive causes, but only according to the diversity of final cause.140

140

‘Nam principia activa naturalia sunt determinata semper ad eosdem actus, et ideo diversae species in actibus naturalibus attenduntur non solum secundum obiecta, quae sunt fines vel termini, sed etiam secundum principia activa; sicut calefacere et infrigidare distinguuntur specie secundum calidum et frigidum. Sed principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cuiusmodi sunt actus peccatorum, non se habent ex necessitate ad unum, et ideo ex uno principio activo vel motivo possunt diversae species peccatorum procedere; sicut ex timore male humiliante potest procedere quod homo furetur, et quod occidat, et quod deserat gregem sibi commissum; et haec eadem possunt procedere ex amore. Unde manifestum est quod peccata non differant specie secundum diversas causas activas vel motivas; sed solum secundum diversitatem causae finalis. Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis, ostensum est enim supra quod actus humani habent speciem ex fine’: I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor; see also ra 1.

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Aquinas explains here a crucial difference in the specification of natural motions and human actions: the former can be specified by active principles while the latter cannot. An active principle in a natural motion such as heating is fixed to a single end, and thus it always produces an act of just the kind (or species) to which it is determined. Human agents, however, are different: nothing in a human action mirrors exactly the kind of active principle found in a natural motion. Thomas suggests in the passage above that perhaps the closest analogy would be human emotions, which can urge people to act in certain ways. Even though human agents experience the sometimes powerful movement of passions, however, these passions simply do not exercise the same necessary influence over human action that a natural efficient cause does over a natural motion such as heating.141 Thomas demonstrates this fact by showing how the same passion, fear, can give rise to stealing, killing, and desertion, sins clearly belonging to different species; he also points out that all three of these kinds of sins could arise from an entirely different passion, namely love. (And one might add that if a passion such as fear did compel a person to perform a particular kind of action, such compulsion would compromise the person's freedom, rendering the action involuntary in any case142.) In the end, Thomas concludes that, since no principle in human action is determinative in the way an active principle is in a natural motion, the specification of human action must depend solely on its final cause, that is, its end. This argument, like the earlier one from the Commentary on the Sentences, reaches the desired conclusion: a human action is specified by its final cause (or end). It also shares the similarity of considering

141

‘In illis quae agunt per necessitatem naturae, oportet quod agens de necessitate agat secundum exigentiam formae quae in ipso est, ut per calidum calefaciat. Hoc autem in voluntariis non tenet: unde etiamsi homo gratiam habuerit, nihilominus potest in contrarium actum transire’: II Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, ra 4; for other texts which compare necessity in natural action to freedom in the will, ibid., d. 39, q. 2, a. 1, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, ra 2. Thomas argues that the lack of necessity in human actions is witnessed to by the fact that human agents can take their time in willing, whereas natural actions arise immediately from their cause; see SCG 2, c. 35, n. 4.

142

See I-II, q. 6, a. 6.

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specification from a limited perspective. Aquinas's argument begins by assuming that only two causes might explain a human action—active principle and/or final cause—and finishes by rejecting the first as a viable possibility. The argument, therefore, tells us more about why active principles don't specify human actions than about why ends do. But Aquinas's argument in the Summa text above does raise a question which can prompt a more penetrating examination of the role of ends in specification of human actions. He seems to call the efficient cause of a natural motion an ‘active’ principle because it directly gives rise to the motion (as opposed to the terminus, which is the passive point of arrival in this way of conceiving of motion). But if no strict equivalent to an ‘active’ cause in motion can be found in human action, then what can be said to play the active cause's role in the voluntary realm? Thomas will answer this question in another passage from the Summa Theologiae which contains his most direct consideration of the role which ends play in the specification of human action. In it, he will make a careful comparison between the active and passive dimensions of a natural motion and those of a human action: [S]ince motions, in a certain way, are distinguished according to activity and passivity [i.e. undergoing], each of these takes its species from an act; for action [takes its species] from that act which is the beginning of the acting, and passivity [undergoing] from that act which is the terminus of motion. Whence, heating qua action is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat, heating qua passivity [undergoing] is nothing other than a movement to heat…As for human acts, whether they are considered in so far as they are actions or undergoings, they take their species from end(s). For human acts can be considered in either way, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. For it was said above that acts are called human in so far as they proceed from a deliberate will. The object of the will, however, is good(s) and end(s). Therefore it is clear that end is the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human. And likewise [end] is their term, for that to which a human act is directed is that which the will intends as its end; as in natural agents, the form of the thing generated conforms to the form of the thing generating. [Therefore]…moral acts properly receive their species from their end(s)…143

143

‘Cum enim motus quodammodo distinguatur per actionem et passionem, utrumque horum ab actu speciem sortitur, actio quidem ab actu qui est principium agendi; passio vero ab actu qui est terminus motus. Unde calefactio actio nihil aliud est quam motio quaedam a calore procedens, calefactio vero passio nihil aliud est quam motus ad calorem: definitio autem manifestat rationem speciei. Et utroque modo actus humani, sive considerentur per modum actionum, sive per modum passionum, a fine speciem sortiuntur. Utroque enim modo possunt considerari actus humani, eo quod homo movet seipsum, et movetur a seipso. Dictum est autem supra quod actus dicuntur humani, inquantum procedunt a voluntate deliberata. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis. Et ideo manifestum est quod principium humanorum actuum, inquantum sunt humani, est finis. Et similiter est terminus eorundem, nam id ad quod terminatur actus humanus, est id quod voluntas intendit tanquam finem; sicut in agentibus naturalibus forma generati est conformis formae generantis. Et quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, mores proprie dicuntur humani, actus morales proprie speciem sortiuntur ex fine, nam idem sunt actus morales et actus humani’: I-II, q. 1, a. 3, cor.

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This passage permits us to see the difference between the specification of natural motions (or actions) and human actions in greater detail. Thomas begins his argument in this text by suggesting that natural actions (such as heating) and human actions can both be considered from two points of view: as undergoings (passiones) or as activities (actiones). As undergoings, both natural motions and human actions are specified in the same way, since both arrive at that terminus to which they are moved (as the earlier argument from the Sentences also suggests). But in so far as natural motions and human actions are understood from the point of view of activity, a significant difference exists between them. A natural motion has as its active principle the nature from which this motion arises, as heating arises from heat. A human action, on the other hand, has as its active principle the end which the agent pursues. Why is an end of human action ‘active’? Thomas points us back to an earlier article for an explanation: ‘For it was said above’, he notes, ‘that acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberate will. The object of the will, however, is good(s) and end(s).’ These two sentences are a synopsis of an earlier article where Thomas is investigating the features which make human actions distinctive from animal movements and involuntary human movements. The argument which he presents in this earlier article is both fundamental and familiar: human actions are distinct from other kinds of movements because human agents have a mastery over their actions, a condition made possible by intellect and will.144 In the context of

144

I-II, q. 1, a. 1, cor.

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this present argument, Thomas is saying, in effect, that ends actively specify human actions because, when ends are known by intelligent beings, these ends can directly attract their wills. An understood end is the will's object and hence the very principle of rational appetite. Such direct attraction to an end is absent from natural motions (like heating): natural agents cannot even know, much less desire, an end. Rather than being attracted by the end directly, the final cause in such creatures exists only virtually in their active principle. Once the active nature of a human end is better understood, Aquinas's comparison and contrast between a natural motion and a human action can be presented more precisely. While it can rightly be said that a natural action like heating is specified by its end, this claim can only be made in so far as a motion is viewed as an undergoing (passio) and an end is viewed as a terminus. A human action, on the other hand, is more obviously and completely specified by its end, since this happens both with respect to undergoing and activity; human agents are both moved to their ends (passio) and moved by them (actio).145 Now an observant reader might notice that, in the passage above, Thomas has chosen a particular kind of natural action, namely, a non-sensory one, to serve as an a counter to human action. The reason for this decision is not hard to discern: a natural motion like heating presents such an evident contrast to intelligent action that it brings into sharper focus the active role of ends in the latter; this, of course, is the very point which Thomas wishes to emphasize. But there is a second kind of natural action not mentioned in this article whose comparison to a human action proves a little more difficult to sort out. Sensory (but non-rational) actions bear a much greater likeness to human actions than non-sensory actions such as heating do. Aquinas's teaching about (subrational) animals demonstrates this point: he thinks that animals such as dogs or fish have knowledge of and even a kind of volition for ends, given that sensation brings a

145

For a perceptive comparison of natural motion from its inclination and human action from its end, see Carlos Steel, ‘Natural Ends and Moral Ends According to Thomas Aquinas’, in J. Follon and J. McEvoy (eds.), Finalité et intentionalité: Doctrine thomiste et perspectives modernes: Actes du Colloque de Louvain-la-Neuve et Louvain, 21–23 mai 1990, Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain, 35 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1992), 113–26 (pp. 115–16).

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(quasi) knowledge of some goal and a subsequent desire for it.146 Unlike terms for motions of subsensory beings, ends for actions of sensory beings seem to play an active role in the specification, since they attract these agents directly. Indeed, it might even be argued that ends of sensory agents are more ‘active’ than ends of human agents. Why might this be so? If it is assumed that an end is ‘active’ to the degree that it moves the agent, then the end of a (non-rational) sensory agent, which compels it to move in a certain way,147 seems (to this extent) more active than an end in human action, where the agent is not thus necessitated and can freely pursue or reject an end.148 Unimpeded, a hungry tiger cannot help but seek a meal which appeals to its senses; however, when in possession of his reason and free will, a hungry man can choose to eat or not to eat, even when presented with a feast. Though Thomas never directly compares sensory and human actions for the purpose of assessing the active influence of their respective ends, certain texts give us a good idea as to how he would have handled such a question. In his comparisons of human and (subrational) animal actions, Aquinas not only considers how determinately an agent is moved by its end, but also the perfection with which such an end is sought: There is a twofold knowledge of an end: namely, perfect and imperfect. A perfect knowledge of an end exists when a thing which is an end is not only apprehended, but [when] the ratio of the end is also known, [along with] the proportion of those things which are ordered to [this end]. And such a knowledge of an end belongs to a rational nature alone. An imperfect knowledge of an end…consists in the apprehension of the end alone, without knowing the ratio of its end and the proportion of the act to this end. And such knowledge is found in brute animals, through sense and natural judgement (aestimatio). Perfect voluntariness follows from perfect knowledge of an end…; [i]mperfect voluntariness follows from an imperfect knowledge of an end.149

146

A comparison of the three kinds of motion presently under discussion appears in Comm. Metaph. 5, lc. 16, n. 14.

147

I-II, q. 10, a. 3, cor.

148

Ibid., a. 2, cor.

149

‘Est autem duplex cognitio finis: perfecta scilicet, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur res quae est finis, sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio eius quod ordinatur in finem ad ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis competit soli rationali naturae. Imperfecta autem cognitio finis est quae in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis, et proportio actus ad finem. Et talis cognitio finis invenitur in brutis animalibus, per’sensum et aestimationem naturalem. Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam…Imperfectam autem cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem imperfectam…’: I-II, q. 6, a. 2, cor. For the difference between animals and humans concerning the volitional act of enjoyment, see I-II, q. 11, a. 2, cor.

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Can this passage, which distinguishes between the perfection in which ends are sought by rational and sensory agents, have relevance for the question of the active role which such ends play in specification? The answer would seem to be yes. It can plausibly be argued that, when assessing how active an end is, one must take into account not only how definitively it moves its agent, but also how perfectly. While the end in a sensory action compels the agent with an ineluctability which the end of a human action does not, the end of a human action moves its agent with a perfection which the end of sensory action does not: only an intelligent agent can know its end as end, be attracted to it as rationally good, and pursue it in freedom.150 In short, then, we can say that, compared with an end in sensory action, an end in human action is ‘active’ in a way which is less compelling but nonetheless more perfect.151 Since Thomas holds that human agents pursue their ends more perfectly than other agents do (whether sensory or non-sensory), it is not surprising to discover that a human action epitomizes for him what end-directed action means. One text which helps to illustrate his conviction on this issue appears in the Summa Contra Gentiles: Every agent acts either through nature or through intellect. Concerning those beings acting through intellect there is not a doubt that they act on account of an end: for they act preconceiving in the intellect that which follows through action, and they act from such a preconception; for this is [what it means] to act through intellect. As however in the preconceiving intellect there exists the whole similitude of the effect which is achieved through the actions of an intelligent agent, thus in natural agents there

150

‘Unde, cum homo maxime cognoscat finem sui operis et moveat seipsum, in eius actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur’: I-II, q. 6, a. 1, cor.

151

This point will be developed further in the next section, where I will explore Aquinas's contention that ‘good’ exists in human ends and actions in a way which is qualitatively different and more pre-eminent than the way it exists in non-rational ends and actions.

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End pre-exists a similitude of the natural effect from which the action is determined to this effect: for fire generates fire, and olive trees generate olive trees. As an agent [acting] through intellect tends to an end determined through his own action, thus an agent through nature. Therefore, every agent acts on account of an end.152

Aquinas's goal in this argument is to prove that every agent acts on account of an end. But where does he begin? Instead of starting with the proposition that non-rational creatures act for ends and then arguing that intelligent beings bear certain key resemblances demonstrating a similar dependence on ends, he does just the opposite: he takes it as a given that intelligent beings act for ends, and argues from this premise that other natural creatures do so as well.153 Why is it a given for him that intelligent action is for an end? As we have seen already, an end for Aquinas is that cause on account of which something is done. This definition would seem to be most clearly realized, then, in whatever acts on account of such a cause most perfectly. But this distinction belongs precisely to intelligent agents, since, according to Thomas, they know effects by ‘preconceiving’ them and act in view of a rational attraction to these effects based on this more spiritual knowledge. Contrarily, in other kinds of action, the similitude of the future effect is in the agent in some less perfect way. Consequently, we can say that, for Thomas, human action is the touchstone according to which one judges to what extent other actions or motions can be said to be end-directed.

152

‘Omne agens vel agit per naturam, vel per intellectum. De agentibus autem per intellectum non est dubium quin agant propter finem: agunt enim praeconcipientes in intellectu id quod per actionem consequuntur, et ex tali praeconceptione agunt; hoc enim est agere per intellectum. Sicut autem in intellectu praeconcipiente existit tota similitudo effectus ad quem per actiones intelligentis pervenitur, ita in agente naturali praeexistit similitudo naturalis effectus, ex qua actio ad hunc effectum determinatur: nam ignis generat ignem, et oliva olivam. Sicut igitur agens per intellectum tendit in finem determinatum per suam actionem, ita agens per naturam. Omne igitur agens agit propter finem’: SCG 3, c. 2, n. 6.

153

Although Thomas sometimes uses specification of motion as a basis to prove specification of human action, as we saw earlier, he does so by assuming a certain limited point of view concerning the end.

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2. The Species of Good and Evil In the last section, although I explored why an end is said to determine the species in human action, little was said explicitly about what these species might be. The reason for this omission is simply that the nature and division of these species is itself a rather complex issue, one which needs to be considered in its own right. As is the case with corporeal creatures (which were examined in Chapter 3), human actions have more than one difference which divides them. According to Thomas, the primary essential division of human actions is between good and evil,154 followed by more precise divisions based on the special character of the various goods which an agent may pursue or contravene. A consideration of this second level of divisions will be deferred until the next chapter, since it can be discussed more profitably in the context of objects. At present, our attention will be directed to the primary division of good and evil, in order to determine how and why these two categories identify the species of human actions.

(i) Why good and evil are species of human action Thomas Aquinas thinks that good and evil are differences which essentially divide human actions. Someone hearing this might not be surprised in the least; what else would he say? This proposal, however, should not be taken for granted. As Servais Pinckaers has shown in a carefully researched article, when Thomas takes this position, he sets himself against his teacher, Albert the Great, his colleague, Bonaventure, and a number of other medieval thinkers, all of whom considered good and evil to be accidental, not essential, to the proper identification and division of human actions and habits.155

154

That good and evil are the essential differences of human action (sometimes also called specific or constitutive), see II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ra 2; d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ra 3; d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, sc 1, sc 2, cor, ra 1, ra 5; SCG 3, c. 8, n. 8; I, q. 48, a. 1, ra 2; I-II, q. 18, a. 5, cor; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ra 12; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ra 12; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 2, ra 3.

155

Servais Pinckaers, ‘Le Rôle de la fin dans l'action morale selon saint Aquinas’, Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 45 (1961), 393–421 (pp. 395–8).

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When Thomas teaches about the essential character of good and evil in this context, then, he is setting forth a bold position which helps to characterize his moral thought. Aquinas's teaching on this issue is enunciated especially clearly in a few responses to objections. As is well known, Thomas in his writings frequently follows a scholastic convention where his own position on an issue is accompanied by opposing arguments and his responses to them. Three such opposing arguments or objections, for different reasons, question the proposition that good and evil divide human actions essentially. Aquinas's responses provide some of his keenest insights into the special significance of good and evil in a moral context. One such objection appears in Aquinas's Disputed Questions on Virtues De Virtutibus. The objection begins with the seemingly sensible presumption that, if good and evil specify, they should do so in whichever subject they happen to be, whether a corporeal creature, a natural action, a human action, and so forth. The argument points out, however, that, aside from human actions and habits, there doesn't seem to be any kind of subject matter where good or evil is a specific difference. For instance, although people can clearly be good or evil, these two differences do not divide human beings into two further species, ‘good human beings’ and ‘bad human beings’. Put simply, then, the objection wonders why good and evil should play a role in human actions and habits which it doesn't seem to assume with respect to any other kind of reality.156 Thomas responds to this objection by contrasting the active principle which determines a human action with the one which determines a natural motion: [A]ctions are diversified according to the form of the agent, as heating and cooling. Good and evil are as if the form and object of the will; because the agent always imprints its own form in the patient, and the thing moving in the motion. And therefore moral acts, of which the principle is the will, are diversified by species according to good and evil. For the principle of natural operations is not the end, but the form; and therefore such actions are not diversified in their natural species according to good and evil; but in moral

156

De Virtut., q. 1, a. 2, ag 3; for similar objections, see II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ag 5; I-II, q. 18, a. 5, ag 1; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ag 4; q. 2, a. 4, ag 10.

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matters, it is so [that is, moral actions are diversified according good and evil].157 Aquinas argues that a difference in an active principle can influence significantly the character of the action to which this principle is primarily related. A natural action such as heating or cooling takes its identity especially from its agent's form or nature, in the way explained earlier.158 In voluntary action, however, the active principle is the end itself because the end (and good) is the will's special object. This relationship of greater dependency means that the will's form will be marked by any determinative quality in an end.159 But, as Thomas notes, the end of the will can be (morally) good or evil (depending on its relation to right reason, as we shall soon see). This character of the end, then, leaves its stamp on the will;160 natural motions, on the other hand, do not relate to an end in this way. Thomas concludes that this special dependence of human actions on

157

‘[A]ctiones diversificantur secundum formam agentis, ut calefacere et infrigidare. Bonum autem et malum sunt quasi forma et obiectum voluntatis; quia semper agens imprimit formam suam in patientem, et movens in motum. Et ideo actus morales, quorum principium est voluntas, diversificantur specie secundum bonum et malum. Principium autem naturalium operationum non est finis, sed forma; et ideo non diversificantur in naturalibus species secundum bonum et malum; sed in moralibus sic’: De Virtut., q. 1, a. 2, ra 3; see also II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ra 5; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ra 4; and in the context of a more extended article, ibid., q. 2, a. 4, cor. In one place, Aquinas responds to this objection in a conspicuously different way from the De Virtutibus text and other similar texts just cited. In I-II, q. 18, a. 5, ra 1, rather than asserting that good and evil are not species apart from human actions and habits, he asserts that good and evil can, in certain circumstances, determine the species of natural corporeal creatures; as an example, he notes that a living body and a dead body are not in the same species. Although Aquinas's analogy is noteworthy, it must be recognized that death in a living substance is not strictly parallel to evil in a human action. Death brings a new species by corrupting a substantial form; hence, death would only be strictly parallel to an evil human action if an evil end caused a human action to cease being such. 158

A more careful explanation of natural motions would include the terminus ad quem, which is an end. Nevertheless, as we saw earlier, when active principles are considered, a subrational motion is more dependent on its nature and a human action on its end for specification.

159

‘[M]orales actus, et per consequens habitus, specificantur ex fine, qui est quasi forma voluntatis…’ : De Potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ra 12; see also II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ra 5.

160

‘Quia bonum habet rationem finis, ideo bonum et malum sunt differentiae specificae in moralibus…’ : I, q. 48, a. 1, ra 2; see also De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 10.

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ends accounts for the fact that good and evil are specific differences in human actions but not in other realities.161 A second objection, this one from the Commentary on the Sentences, also opposes the use of good and evil as species in human actions, but is based on a supposed breach of the principles governing specification. The objection begins by recalling the common-sense axiom of division that no specific difference should be more general than the genus it is dividing. For example, one shouldn't use the difference ‘living’ to further distinguish between kinds of footed animals. ‘Living’ is too broad; it is already implied in footed animals and in any other living thing. Only a more specific feature, like ‘cloven’, can properly divide ‘footed animals’. The objection then recalls Aristotle's insight that good and being are convertible; that is, whatever exists is also good, and vice versa.162 If good is attributable to all that exists, presses the objection, then good is a category broader than human habits (and actions);163 it cannot be used as a specific difference in morality without violating the axiom articulated above.164 This second objection makes an argument noticeably different from the first. Rather than comparing specification in human actions with that found in other kinds of realities, it wonders why good in voluntary matters is different from good as it is understood in other contexts (for example, good which is convertible with being). This difference in the objection will prompt a somewhat different reply from Thomas: [A]lthough good is converted with being, nevertheless it is found in a certain special way in those things which are animate and have the power of choice, as is said in V Metaphysics. The reason for this is that good is named from the character of end, and therefore, although it is found in all things in which there is an end, nevertheless, it is found more specially in those things which determine beforehand the end for themselves, and know the intention of

161

‘[Q]uia moralia a voluntate dependent, inde est quod bonum et malum in moralibus specie differunt; non autem sic est in aliis’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 10. For other texts which stress the special dependence of the moral action on the end and good, see I, q. 48, a. 1, ra 2; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ra 4; SCG 3, c. 8, n. 8.

162

See I, q. 5, a. 1, cor.

163

Although Aquinas's objection and reply arise during a discussion about human habits, his conclusions would presumably be applicable to human actions as well.

164

II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ag 2; see also I-II, q. 55, a. 4, ag 2.

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their end; and it is from this that elective habits take their species from the end; and on account of this that good and evil in such habits are constitutive differences…165 This answer provides an interesting complement to the previous reply. In his response to the objection in De Virtutibus, he speaks only about a natural motion's active principle, that is, its form or nature; he doesn't consider how nonvoluntary motions might be said to be moved by an end. (Some motions of brute animals depend on these animals sensing their ends, as we have seen.) In this reply from the Sentences, he addresses the point directly. Aquinas accepts not only that human actions move towards a good, but also that ‘good…is found in all things in which there is an end’. This point having been conceded, Thomas must show why a human action is specified by its good, while actions of subintelligent beings are not. Aquinas predictably responds to this challenge with a distinction, and insists that a qualitative difference exists in the way good is understood in human actions and in other realities: ‘good…is found more specially in those things which determine beforehand the end for themselves, and know the intention of their end’. In a parallel text from the Summa, he identifies this special human good precisely as the ‘good of reason’.166 Although he does not elaborate further concerning what this good is, his meaning is not difficult to discern. When animals are moved to some sensible good, this kind of good offers only that limited aspect of attraction possible to the concupiscible power acting alone. When human agents are attracted

165

‘[Q]uamvis bonum convertatur cum ente, tamen quodam speciali modo invenitur in rebus animatis et habentibus electionem, ut in 5 metaphys. dicitur. Cujus ratio est, quia bonum dicitur ex ratione finis; et ideo quamvis inveniatur in omnibus in quibus est finis, tamen specialius invenitur in illis quae finem sibi praestituunt, et intentionem finis cognoscunt; et inde est quod habitus electivi ex fine speciem sortiuntur; et propter hoc horum habituum bonum et malum sunt differentiae constitutivae…’ : II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ra 2.

166

‘[B]onum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod dionysius dicit, in iv cap. de div. nom., quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse’: I-II, q. 55, a. 4, ra 2; for the rational good, see also III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; III, q. 78, a. 3, cor; SCG 3, c. 8, n. 8; for other relevant texts where this saying of Dionysius is quoted, see III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; I-II, q. 18, a. 5, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, cor.

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to something, however, their comprehension of the good is far more penetrating: they can understand the good (and its privation) according to its universal aspect167 and can be aware of their responsibility in realizing this good (or evil). This dissimilarity can be noticed clearly when actions are contrasted: one recognizes a different kind of good when a dog fetches something for its owner and when a person retrieves something out of charity; a different kind of evil when a shark attacks human prey and a person commits a calculated murder.168 A human agent can consider good in this fuller way which intellectual appetite makes possible; he or she can appreciate the good as such and be attracted to the rational order which should characterize human relations with God, others, and material reality.169 Thomas thinks, then, that this special kind of good which attracts voluntary creatures explains why human actions and habits are specified by good (and evil), while other actions are not. Thus, in these two replies to objections above, we see Thomas proposing complementary arguments for the division of human actions into good and evil: first, that ends (good or evil) are a more decisive principle for human agents, and second, that a rational good or end, proper to human agents, is of a qualitatively different kind than the good or end for non-intelligent creatures.

(ii) How evil can be a proper species Although Thomas meets some important challenges when responding to the two objections above, an additional objection also needs to be addressed, one which challenges the appropriateness of a division of human actions into good and evil from a markedly different

167

‘Quia enim voluntatis objectum est bonum universale, quidquid sub ratione boni continetur potest cadere sub actu voluntatis’: II-II, q. 25, a. 2, cor; Thomas's teaching on the universal good is very important. Other appetites are restricted to a particular sensible good, but the intellectual appetite (will) desires not only the good of intellect, namely truth (see I, q. 59, ag and ra 3), but all human goods: De Malo, q. 8, a. 3, cor. Thomas teaches that wherever such a universal appreciation of good exists, the capacity for free choice must accompany it: see I, q. 59, a. 3, cor.

168

Thomas explains the difference between evil in voluntary action and in natural motion in I, q. 49, a. 1, ra 3.

169

This point will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.

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perspective. It attempts to undermine Aquinas's claim about good and evil by alleging that evil is incapable of serving as a proper specific difference or contrary. This further objection asks us to reflect again on the specific difference and its role. As we saw in Chapter 3, a specific difference is the last intelligible note in a definition which includes implicitly all of the differences preceding it: it is the difference which constitutes the species. When Aristotle is explaining differences in the Metaphysics, two of the characteristics which he attributes to them are being and unity. This assertion seems to make sense: if a difference did not have being, it would not be intelligible, and if it did not have unity, it would not be able to assimilate into one the differences which are logically prior to it. The present objection makes appeal to this point, and its logic is plain: if being is a necessary property of a specific difference, and if evil as such is non-being, then evil cannot be a specific difference. And, of course, if evil cannot play this role, then neither can evil serve together with good as a species of human actions.170 Aquinas's response requires him to take a careful look at the way in which actions are evil: [E]vil, in so far as it indicates privation alone, cannot be called an essential difference, but [evil can be called an essential difference] in so far as it is based on some inappropriate end, an end which nevertheless does not completely lack goodness; whence it is in this way (and not as privation) that evil is contrary to good.171 Thomas's brief explanation in this reply from the Commentary on the Sentences can be expanded by supplementing it with material from other passages. Aquinas maintains that, although evil is a kind of non-being, it cannot ‘exist’ apart. Rather, evil must be understood as a lack in something which would naturally possess the absent good; in a word, it is a privation. To illustrate this point, Aquinas notes that, while lack

170

See I-II, q. 18. a. 5, ag 2; II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ag 2; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ag 8.

171

‘[M]alum prout dicit privationem tantum, non potest dici essentialis differentia; sed secundum quod fundatur in aliquo fine indebito, qui tamen finis non omnino bonitate caret; unde sic malum est contrarium bono, et non privatio’: II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ra 2; see also I-II, q. 18. a. 5, ra 2; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 8.

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of sight is evil for a man, it is not evil for a stone, since it is of man's nature, and not a stone's, to see.172 If this understanding of evil is valid in whatever subject it may be found, then someone attempting to recognize evil in a human action must identify precisely what this action has been deprived of. Aquinas's response quoted above acknowledges what this missing element is: a human action is evil when it lacks due order to an appropriate end. This due order is sometimes called the bonum rationis, the good of reason, by Thomas.173 I have already touched on what it means for an action to be related to reason, and this point will be taken up again in much greater detail in the next chapter. For now, it is necessary to express only summarily how privation of the good of reason is evil for an action, and how this evil can be a contrary. We can use eating as an illustration. Although there are a number of things which a reasonable person must attend to when dining, an especially important one, according to Thomas, is that the pleasure taken in the food be moderate; this helps to constitute the good of temperance. One can imagine, on the other hand, a person who intentionally overindulges in the pleasure of eating. According to Thomas, this second action can be considered from two points of view. From one perspective, a recognizable privation can be identified: the action is clearly lacking the order which it would have possessed had reason been its guide. From another perspective, this privation is not found by itself, but exists in an action which has many real, identifiable aspects: the eating involves a certain food, taken in certain way, for a certain amount of time, for a certain end, and so forth. Once these two perspectives on an evil action have been more precisely distinguished, Aquinas's point concerning how evil can be a specific difference is easier to grasp. If evil were referring only to the privation in the action, then evil could not divide human actions, and the contention of the objection above would be entirely justified.

172 173

De Malo, q. 1, a. 3, cor.

Thomas speaks on a number of occasions about the privation of the due end of reason; e.g. ‘Est igitur malum morale et genus et differentia, non secundum quod est privatio boni rationis, ex quo dicitur malum; sed ex natura actionis vel habitus ordinati ad aliquem finem qui repugnat debito fini rationis’: SCG 3, c. 8, n. 10. For some passages where privation in form or natural action is used to explain privation of due end (or order) in human action, see Comp. Theol. 1, c. 116; II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 3, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 8.

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But Thomas insists that when he is speaking of an evil action, the evil to which he is referring is not the privation of due order, but rather the action in which the privation is found. Good and evil as species of human actions, then, do not contrast perfection and privation in themselves, but human actions with a due order to an end and human actions (positively described) which lack such a due order. Since these two kinds of positively described actions oppose one another with respect to their differing relation to reason, they can be contraries; for instance, Thomas says that the unqualified good of sobriety is not compatible with immoderate delectation in food.174 So long as ‘evil act’ is describing the positive reality to which the privation is joined, then, Thomas believes it can serve as a legitimate difference and contrary for human action.175

(iii) How good and evil divide human actions essentially With the objections answered, the way is cleared for a more precise summary of how human actions are divided into good and evil. In any kind of classification, some primary measure is used to divide the subject. In human actions, this measure is reason in so far as it relates to ends: so, when a human action has an end which is in accordance with reason, it is called good in species, and when it has an end which is contrary to reason, it is called evil in species.176 This division of human actions according to good and evil is proper: it includes all individuals, since every individual human action must be either good or evil, and it is essential, since the division is taken with respect to the per’se determinant of human action (that is, the end measured by reason and not some accidental feature).177 Thus, as ‘living’ or ‘nonliving’ divide natural creatures, and ‘local motion’, ‘alteration’, and ‘dimension change’ divide natural motion, so ‘good’ and ‘evil’ divide human actions.

174

II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 5, cor.

175

Ibid., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ra 3; see also SCG 3, c. 8, n. 10; I, q. 48, a. 1, ra 2; De Potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ra 12; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ra 12.

176

SCG 3, c. 8, n. 8.

177

I Sent., d. 1, q. 3, ra 3; II Sent., d. 40, a. 5; IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, cor; I-II, q. 18, a. 9, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 5, cor. Although every individual action must be either good or evil, certain types of actions can be indifferent; more on this in Chs. 5 and 9.

5 Object Aquinas's most direct and well-known explanation of the present topic can be found in the second article of question 18 in the Prima Secundae, which is entitled ‘Whether an action of man has goodness or evil from its object?’. In the corpus, Aquinas asserts that: [T]he goodness and evil of an action, as is true of other things, is observed in the fullness of its being or in its deficiency of such fullness. The first thing which seems to pertain to the fullness of being, however, is that which gives something a species. As a natural thing has its species from its own form, thus an action has a species from its object, as also motion from its term. And therefore, as the primary goodness of a natural thing comes from its own form which gives a species to it, thus also the primary goodness of a moral act comes from having a suitable object; whence, such an act is called by some good from its genus, as, for example, using one's own thing. And as in natural things, there is a primary evil if the thing generated does not attain its specific form, as when [in human generation] instead of a man something else is begotten, so the primary evil in a moral action comes from its object, as taking another's thing…178

178

‘Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum et malum actionis, sicut et ceterarum rerum, attenditur ex plenitudine essendi vel defectu ipsius. Primum autem quod ad plenitudinem essendi pertinere videtur, est id quod dat rei speciem. Sicut autem res naturalis habet speciem ex sua forma, ita actio habet speciem ex obiecto; sicut et motus ex termino. Et ideo sicut prima bonitas rei naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti; unde et a quibusdam vocatur bonum ex genere; puta, uti re sua. Et sicut in rebus naturalibus primum malum est, si res generata non consequitur formam specificam, puta si non generetur homo, sed aliquid loco hominis; ita primum malum in actionibus moralibus est quod est ex obiecto, sicut accipere aliena. Et dicitur malum ex genere, genere pro specie accepto, eo modo loquendi quo dicimus humanum genus totam humanam speciem’: I–II, q. 18, a. 2, cor.

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In this influential passage, we see Thomas once again comparing specification in human actions to specification in natural things and motions, but this time, instead of attributing the specification of human actions to ends, he relies on a second, seemingly distinct concept, ‘object’.179 Although a number of good reasons could be put forward for using this article from question 18 to introduce specification from objects—it addresses the issue directly, it appears prominently in the Prima Secundae, and so forth—a serious reader of Aquinas would know that this text is only one of many where he makes this claim about object. In fact, Thomas uses ‘object’ to explain specification of moral action more often and in more of his writings than any other single moral determinant.180 Given that Thomas attributes specification to objects so straightforwardly and so often, it is obviously in our interest to understand better what he means. Careful investigation is required to meet this

179 180

For another example of this comparison between form in natural things and objects in human actions, see De Virtut., q. 4, a. 4, cor.

The following is a list of texts where Thomas makes the assertion that actions receive their form or species from their object; a look at the variety of works represented gives one a sense of how widely Thomas repeated and applied this principle: I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 4, cor; d. 47, q. 1, a. 4, cor; ra 2; d. 48, q. 1, a. 2, cor; II Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 4, cor; d. 42, q. 2, a. 2a, ra 1; d. 43, q. 1, a. 2, cor; III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, ra 2; d. 9, q. 2, a. 2, cor; d. 13, q. 2, a. 2b, ra 1; d. 23, q. 1, a. 4a, cor; d. 23, q. 2, a. 1, cor; d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, cor; d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ra 8; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; d. 35, q. 1, a. 2a, cor; IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, ra 2; d. 18, q. 1, a. 1b, cor, d. 31, q. 1, a. 3, ra 4; d. 33, q. 3, a. 3, cor; SCG 3, c. 25, n. 3; 3, c. 61, n. 3; 3, c. 139, n. 2; I, q. 50, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 8, a. 3, sc; I–II, q. 9, a. 1, cor; I–II, q. 11, a. 4, ra 2; I–II, q. 18, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 4, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 5, cor, ra 2; I–II, q. 18, a. 6, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 8, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 9, cor; I–II, q. 19, a. 1, cor; I–II, q. 23, a. 1, cor; I–II, q. 31, a. 8, ra 3; I–II, q. 54, a. 1, ra 1; I–II, q. 54, a. 2, sc; I–II, q. 72, a. 1, sc, cor, ra 2; I–II, q. 72, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 72, a. 4, cor; I–II, q. 72, a. 5, ra 1; I–II, q. 72, a. 6, cor; I–II, q. 73, a. 3, sc, cor; I–II, q. 73, a. 4, cor; I–II, q. 88, a. 2, cor; II–II, pr; II–II, q. 19, a. 3, cor; II–II, q. 19, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 23, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 25, a. 1, cor; II–II, q. 26, a. 7, cor; II–II, q. 39, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 47, a. 5, cor; II–II, q. 92, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 99, a. 3, sc; II–II, q. 111, a. 3, cor; II–II, q. 117, a. 3, cor; II–II, q. 118, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 154, a. 1, cor; III, q. 80, a. 5, cor; De Veritate, q. 14, a. 8, ra 3; q. 23, a. 7, cor; q. 26, a. 6, ra 7; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ra 4; q. 2, a. 3, ra 1; q. 2, a. 4, cor, ra 2, ra 5, ra 9, ra 11; q. 2, a. 5, cor; q. 2, a. 6, cor, ra 2, ra 9; q. 2, a. 10, cor; q. 6, cor; q. 7, a. 3, cor; q. 9, a. 2, ra 10; q. 10, a. 1, cor; q. 10, a. 2, cor; q. 12, a. 3, cor; q. 14, a. 2, cor; q. 16, a. 2, ra 4; De Anima, a. 13, cor; De Unione Verbi, a. 5, cor; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 10, cor; q. 4, a. 4, cor; Quodl., n. 3, q. 12, a. 2, cor; De Unitate, c. 5, l. 184–5; Comp. Theol. 2, c. 9; Comm. Ethic. 3, lc. 3, n. 18; Comm. I Cor. 2, c. 3, lc. 2; Rep. De Anima, 1, lc. 8, n. 5; Rep. I Cor., c. 11, lc. 7, l. 126–32.

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objective, however: object is a complex concept in Aquinas's thought, one which suggests at least three meanings: (1) On one level, the word objectum in Aquinas simply signifies that to which an action relates. (We mean something similar in English when we say that someone is the object of another's affection or hatred, for example.) An investigation of this first meaning of object affords us an opportunity to explore an important question: just what realities does Thomas have in mind when he identifies an object in moral action? Is an object what an external action relates to? Is it the will's object? Is it the effect of an action? Or perhaps something else? (2) On a second level, objectum implies a certain technical meaning, one not ordinarily understood in the English term ‘object’. Thomas asserts that an object possesses as an essential constituent a certain ‘formal aspect’ which is responsible, properly speaking, for the specification of a related action, habit, or power. To illustrate, he holds that when the object of sight is being considered more properly, it should be depicted not as a ‘thing’, but as a ‘coloured thing’, since the formal aspect ‘colour’ is that very factor by which something is visible. Similarly, Thomas asserts that the object of a human action ought to include formal aspects identified as essential by a comparison to right reason. For instance, an object described as ‘taking something’ does not yet include sufficient information for making a moral determination. If, however, the object is compared to right reason, it can be recast as ‘taking one's own thing’ or ‘taking someone else's thing’; the comparison identifies the attributes ‘one's own’ and ‘someone else's’ as relevant formal aspects essential for determining whether the taking is just or unjust. This sense of object naturally needs further elucidation. What, more precisely, is this formal aspect of an object, and how does it specify a human action? What is right reason, and how does a comparison with it identify an object's formal aspect? (3) Finally, there is a third meaning of ‘object’. It often happens that Thomas must discuss a state of affairs where one end is being sought for the sake of another; he typically alludes to Aristotle's example of someone stealing in order to commit adultery. In

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some cases, Thomas describes this situation as a ‘proximate end’ being pursued for the sake of a ‘remote end’. In other cases, however, he will employ different terminology: he will use the word ‘end’ by itself to refer to a further end and the word ‘object’ to refer to that more immediate end sought for the further end's sake. This third meaning of object also raises some questions. Where does Aquinas instantiate this sense of ‘object’? Are there any clear examples where Thomas distinguishes object as a proximate end from the other meanings suggested above?

1. Object as that to which an Action Relates The sense of obiectum being examined in this first subsection is one readily suggested by the word's etymology. The noun obiectum originates from the past participle of the verb obiicio; this verb can mean ‘to throw or put before or in the way’, ‘to place up against’, or ‘to be situated near or opposite (to)’.181 These definitions can readily be derived from a combination of obiectum's two semantic components, the preposition ob, which can mean ‘in front of or in the way of (so as to block)’182 and the verb iacio, whose principal meaning is ‘to throw’. The word obiectum, then, as a past participle of obiicio, can mean ‘thrown or placed in front of another’. There is a sense of the English derivative ‘object’ which reflects this meaning of its Latin root. For example, an English speaker can use ‘object’ to describe individual material things placed before him or her, as when someone says that a cluttered room is filled with various objects.183 It is not difficult to see how this sense of obiectum just described can be used more particularly with reference to powers, habits, and actions. By their nature, powers, habits, and actions are related to

181

Oxford Latin Dictionary (1976), 1212–13.

182

Ibid. 1210.

183

This meaning of object has been noted by Pinckaers: ‘Objet a d'abord désigné toute réalité matérielle extérieure qui se trouve devant un homme, devant son action, la chose ou la matière qu'atteint son action, entendue elle-même au sens concret d'action de tout l'homme, antérieurement à la distinction des facultés en lui’: Pinckaers, ‘Le Rle de la fin’, p.’410 n. 11.

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various realities standing apart from them: in action, for instance, a person sees, thinks about, desires, hits, uses, etc., some thing. Consequently, these various realities standing apart can easily be thought of as ‘placed against’ or ‘situated opposite to’ an agent's abilities, dispositions, and activities, and thus be construed as objects.184 Now it must be admitted that Thomas does not often advert to this meaning of object. It is difficult to say why this is so; perhaps the roots of obiectum suggest this meaning so obviously to Latin speakers that Thomas considers it unnecessary to draw their attention to it in most circumstances. But whatever the explanation for his usual reserve, Thomas does refer to this sense of object on occasion. One such example arises in a passage from his Commentary on the Ethics. Thomas says: ‘often a habit is known by its own object, which is like matter “objected” for a habit's operation’ (multotiens habitus cognoscitur a suo obiecto, quod est quasi materia obiecta operationi habitus).185 Note especially here the word ‘objected’, which is a literal translation of the Latin ‘obiecta’. ‘Obiecta’ in this context is the perfect passive participle of ‘obiicio’ being used adjectivally to modify ‘materia’. If obiecta were translated more idiomatically in this passage, one might say an object is ‘like matter which is placed opposite to [or projected before; situated in relation to] a habit’. The technique for describing an object employed by Thomas in this passage is similar to what English speakers might do if they described a ‘president’ as a ‘presiding person’: the verbal adjective ‘presiding’ calls attention to the semantic roots of the noun ‘president’ which may have become obscured due to over-familiarity. Thomas seems to have something similar in mind when he reminds his readers that objects are as if ‘objected’ matter. A second reference to this sense of object can be observed in a passage from Thomas's Commentary on De Anima where he is clarifying Aristotle's insight that powers are defined by their proper actions, and proper actions by what they relate to. To illustrate

184 One OED definition expresses well an English equivalent for this sense of obiectum: ‘[an object is that] to which action, thought, or feeling is directed; the thing (or person) to which something is done, or upon or about which something acts or operates (= the materia circa quem in Scholastic philosophy)’ OED, 2nd edn. (1991), x. 640. 185

Comm. Ethic. 5, lc. 1, n. 8.

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Aristotle's point, it would be impossible to know the definition of the power of vision, ‘an ability to see’, if no one had experienced seeing; further, it would be impossible to know seeing's definition, ‘an act of sensing colour’, if no one had experienced colour. In his Commentary, Thomas identifies that which relates to actions as opposita, idest obiecta.186 The word ‘opposita’ comes from the verb oppono (ob + pono); it means ‘to be placed up against, in front of, or in the way of ’. If one translates literally, Aquinas is saying that what relate to actions and powers are ‘opposed things’ (‘opposed’ here meaning, ‘set over against’). Oppositum is clearly a synonym of obiectum.187 Now it should be noted that Thomas's use of ‘opposita’ in this context is not original to him; ‘opposita’ is the word which appears in the Latin translation of Aristotle's De Anima upon which he is basing his commentary.188 But when Thomas says that these opposita are obiecta (objects), this identification is his own addition. Since ‘opposita’ so clearly signifies things ‘placed in relation’ to an action, Thomas's introduction of ‘obiecta’ as an alternative term strongly suggests that he considers opposita and obiecta to be synonymous in this context.189

186

‘[E]t hoc ideo, quia secundum rationem definitivam, actus et operationes sunt priores potentiis. Potentia enim, secundum hoc ipsum quod est, importat habitudinem quamdam ad actum: est enim principium quoddam agendi vel patiendi: unde oportet, quod actus ponantur in definitionibus potentiarum. Et si ita se habet circa ordinem actus et potentiae, et actibus adhuc sunt priora opposita, idest obiecta. Species enim actuum et operationum sumuntur secundum ordinem ad obiecta’: Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 6, n. 6, n. 7. 187

See Oxford Latin Dictionary, pp.’1255–6.

188

‘Priores enim potentiis, actum et operationes secundum rationem sunt. Si autem sic, adhuc his priora apposita (sic) oportet considerare, de illis primum utique oportebit determinare, propter eamdem causam, ut de alimento, et sensibili, et intelligibili’: De Anima, 415a14 (old Latin tr.) in Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia, 34 vols. (Paris: Vives, 1871–80), xxiv. In Aristotelis Stagiritae Nonnullos Libros Commentaria; In De Anima, 2, lc. 6 (1875), p.’74, col. 1; ‘opposita’ in Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium, ed. A. M. Pirotta (Turin, 1959), 77; see Lawrence Dewan, ‘ “Objectum”: Notes on the Invention of a Word’, Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 48 (1981), 37–96 (p. 77 n. 92). The tr. is that of William of Moerbeke; it is a revision of an earlier tr. by James of Venice. There is a place in book 1, lect. 1 where William of Moerbeke himself will substitute objecta in a passage where James uses oppossita (sic); see Dewan, ‘ “Objectum” ’, 76–7, esp n. 93. 189

Thomas also presents this insight of Aristotle in the Summa, and when he does so, he again says that what relates to actions are opposita and associates them with obiecta ‘[P]osteriora distinguuntur secundum priora. Sed philosophus dicit ii de anima, quod priores potentiis actus et operationes secundum rationem sunt; et adhuc his priora sunt opposita, sive obiecta. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum actus et obiecta’: I, q. 77, a. 3, sc. Although this argument appears in a sed contra, the context makes it clear that Thomas is quoting this passage with approval.

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The meaning of ‘object’ just presented is the most obvious, and the one most closely linked to the word's semantic roots. The two senses of this term to be discussed in sections (2 and 3) are more specialized and, in a certain way, presume this present sense. One advantage of beginning with this basic meaning is that it provides us with an opportunity to pose a certain fundamental question. Although it is clear that ‘object’ can refer to what comes into relation with powers, habits, and actions, it has not yet been determined just what kinds of realities can serve as objects. Answering this question might seem to involve little more than basic observation and description, but in the context of Aquinas's moral teachings, the issue is more complex than one might initially anticipate. Although Thomas uses ‘object’ with some frequency in his moral texts, differences of opinion exist among his interpreters concerning just what he is referring to. To illustrate the problem, consider the various kinds of things which might be construed as coming into relation to a human action. Suppose a person buys a loaf of bread at local market. What would be identified as the object of this action? Would it be the loaf of bread? This item is what the agent's external action concerns and is, in a way, the point of the trip. Would the money be included as a part of the object? The money is also handled in the action, and ‘buying’, by definition, seems to include some medium of exchange. Would the object be the external behaviour, namely, the exchanging of the bread for money? The external action seems to depict more fully what the agent is willing. Would the object be the immediate effect of the action, namely, the situation resulting from the exchange where each party possesses something equal in value? Just commerce requires that such an outcome be intended. Or could it be something else? How one answers these questions can potentially make a difference in the moral evaluation of such an action. Since Thomas teaches that an object gives the species to a moral action, it is important to know which of the above he means.

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At least three possibilities have been suggested by commentators for what Thomas is referring to by ‘object’ in human actions: (1) what the external action is relating to (e.g. bread), (2) ‘the external action, together with what it is relating to (e.g. buying bread), (3) the action's effect (e.g. what is accomplished through buying).190 For instance, in an informative article, Fr Théo Belmans refers to a late sixteenth-century Jesuit commentator, Juan Azor, who was so convinced that an object is ‘what an external action relates to’ that he preferred the phrase ‘objected thing’ (objecta res) to the term ‘object’ (objectum) when trying to express Aquinas's meaning.191 Belmans disagrees with such an interpretation. Azor and other like-minded interpreters, he thinks, mistakenly reify Thomas's notion of object.192 Belmans proposes instead that object in Aquinas always signifies both the exterior action and whatever this exterior action is relating to. A third way of describing the object can be taken from the noted Thomistic scholar Dr Ralph McInerny. Drawing on Aquinas's insight that the proportion of an action to its effect is the reason for its goodness,193 he describes the object of moral action as ‘that which the agent sets out to do, to effect’.194 In using the verb ‘to effect’ here, Dr McInerny does not seem to be restricting his consideration only to actions which produce something; rather, he seems to understand ‘effect’ to mean whatever the agent hopes to accomplish in acting. One reason behind these different ways of understanding object may be the ambiguity of certain examples which Thomas proposes in

190

‘External’ in this context means standing apart from the will.

191

J.’Azor (Instit. Morales. [i.e. Institutionum Moralium] Lyon 1610, liber 2, caput 1, quinto quaeritur); cited in Theo G. Belmans, ‘La Spécification de l'agir humain par son objet chez saint Thomas d'Aquin’, Divinitas, 22 (1979), 336–56; 23 (1979), 7–61 (p. 31 n. 98).

192

‘Nulle part chez S. Thomas ne se trouve un semblable pointillisme soucieux de sectionner l'agir en une forme (le verbe employé) et une matière (le complément). Il use certes de l'expression consacrée actus cadens supra debitam materiam mais sans jamais manifester la moindre envie de la dépecer au scalpel ou d'entendre par materia une chose tangible; le terme plus technique objectum actus (objet de l'acte volitif) a du reste de loin sa préférence. Or nous croyons ne pas nous tromper en admettant que l'emploi fort répandu du terme materia avant et après lui ne soit pas resté sans effet sur la conception chosiste de la notion d'objet qui a survécu jusqu'en nos jours’: Belmans, ‘Spécification’, 31.

193

I–II, q. 18, a. 2, ra 3.

194

Ralph McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 81.

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his texts. For instance, in I–II, q. 18, a. 2, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Thomas says: ‘the primary goodness of a moral act comes from its own suitable object…as, for example, using one's own thing…[and] the primary evil in moral actions comes from its object, as taking another's thing’. What does Aquinas understand to be the object here? Is he proposing ‘using’ as the action and ‘one's own thing’ or ‘another's thing’ as objects? Is ‘willing’ the presumed action—‘willing’ can rightly be understood as present in any voluntary undertaking—and are ‘using one's own thing’ and ‘using another's thing’ meant to be the objects of willing?195 In light of Thomas's remark above about actions being proportioned to their effect, are his examples meant to refer ultimately to what an agent hopes to accomplish or enjoy in using his own or someone else's thing? In this text and others like it, Thomas's examples are indefinite enough to be open to various interpretations.196 Given such uncertainty, is there any way to clarify what Thomas is referring to by ‘object’? Since Thomas never seems to treat this issue explicitly, one indirect approach is to examine as many of Thomas's examples of objects as possible to see what can be learnt from analysing a wider sample. Such an investigation yields an interesting conclusion: Aquinas's use of object cannot be restricted exclusively to any of the interpretations suggested above. Clear instances can be found of Thomas using object to refer to ‘what the external action relates to’, ‘external action’, ‘effect’, and even to other aspects of human action. First let us consider texts where Aquinas refers to a ‘thing related to an external action’ as an object. One clear example can be found in the Commentary on the Sentences where Thomas is answering the question of whether the objects ‘God, self, and neighbour’ can form

195 The Latin phrase meant to exemplify obiectum is sicut accipere aliena. After the conjunction sicut, this phrase consists of a verb, accipere (to take) and a substantive adjective aliena (another's thing). The question is whether the substantive adjective is meant to signify the object of an external action: accipere (action), aliena (object), or whether the entire phrase is meant to signify the object of the will: velle (implied action) accipere aliena (object). 196

Many of Aquinas's examples of object are ambiguous in this way. For instance, just in question 18 of the Prima Secundae, we see the following referred to as obiectum by Thomas: tollere aliena: a. 5, ra 2; accipere rem alienam: a. 7, cor; dare eleemosynam indigenti: a. 8, cor; tollere aliena: a. 8, cor; tollere alienam: a. 10, cor.

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the basis for a proper division of sin.197 Since ‘God, self, and neighbour’ in this context name who is offended by sin rather than what the external action concerns, this question affords Thomas an opportunity to distinguish between various realities in an unjust action which can be referred to as objects. ‘Injustice’, notes Aquinas ‘has as if two objects: namely that which is taken away, and this is properly the matter of the act from which the sin is specified, and he from whom it is taken away, such as the man whose possession is carried off on account of injustice.’198 Note how Thomas, in this careful distinction, affirms that injustice is specified precisely by ‘that which is taken away’, a clear instance of something related to an external action identified as its specifying object.199 Several other examples can be added to this one. A few passages about theft (a special act of injustice) identify what is taken as theft's object. For instance, in one such text, Thomas remarks plainly, ‘another's thing is the proper object of theft, giving to it its species’.200

197 II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 2b, ag 1. In the Summa, Thomas will argue that these ‘objects’ (i.e. God, self, and neighbour) do, in fact, form the basis for a proper division of sin (I–II, q. 72, a. 4, cor, ra 3; see also q. 73, a. 9, cor). Not every supposed division of sin considered by Aquinas will be judged proper: for instance, divisions of sin according to ‘debt of punishment’ (i.e. mortal and venial), ‘commission and omission’, and ‘thought, word, and deed’ are determined to be either accidental or incomplete (see I–II, q. 72, a. 5, aa. 6, 7, respectively). 198

‘Injustitia autem est ex hoc quod detrahitur alicui quod sibi debetur; et ideo injustitia habet quasi duo objecta: scilicet illud quod detrahitur, et hoc est proprie materia actus, et unde peccatum specificatur: et ille cui detrahitur, sicut homo cui per injustitiam aufertur res sua; et penes hoc objectum sumitur haec peccati divisio: quia homo aliquid debet deo, sibi, et proximo’: II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 2b, cor. For other passages where Thomas speaks about actions having as if two objects (though not with the intention of distinguishing between the specifying and non-specifying object as above), see SCG 1, c. 91, n. 9; I–II, q. 46, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 46, a. 3, cor; II–II, q. 39, a. 2, ra 3; III, q. 7, a. 6, cor; De Malo, q. 10, a. 2, ra 8; De Virtut., q. 4, a. 1, cor; Comm. Rom., c. 8, lc. 3, ll. 87–92.

199

An object of injustice need not always be a physical thing; for instance, in an act of unjust speech such as reviling (contumelia), the thing taken is ‘another's honour’. But in some cases the object of injustice is certainly a physical thing, as in theft where the object is ‘another's possession’ (see n. 23).

200

‘Sicut res aliena est proprium obiectum furti dans sibi speciem: potest etiam res aliena esse magnae quantitatis; et haec circumstantia non dat speciem, sed aggravat tantum…’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, ra 8; ‘Et ideo secundum diversitatem obiectorum attenditur diversitas gravitatis in peccatis.…[U]nde peccatum quod est circa ipsam substantiam hominis, sicut homicidium est gravius peccato quod est circa res exteriores, sicut furtum…’ : I–II, q. 73, a. 3, cor; ‘Sicut in obiecto non dicitur circumstantia furti quod sit alienum…sed quod sit magnum vel parvum’ (with ‘magnum’ and ‘parvum’ clearly referring to a quality of that ‘res exterior’which theft regards): I–II, q. 7, a. 3, ra 3; see also III Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ra 2.

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Regarding liberality and avarice, money (or things which money can buy) is sometimes said by Thomas to be their object. In the sin of ‘striking’, Thomas identifies the person being assailed as its object, offering as examples ‘one's father’ or ‘a stranger’. Certain ‘things’ are named by Aquinas as among the possible objects of sacrilege; for instance, he demonstrates how ‘sacred vessels’ can be shown disrespect. And Thomas calls the donation given to a needy person an object of almsgiving.201 Unambiguous as these examples are, it would be a mistake to think that they alone represent what can serve as an object of human action for Aquinas. Other examples show external actions serving this purpose just as clearly.202 The best illustrations can be found in passages where Aquinas is considering the relationship between ‘interior acts’ of the will and ‘exterior acts’ which are realized through them. In De Malo, for instance, Thomas states: ‘an act has its species from its object, and on account of this, a sin is denominated by its exterior act insofar as…[this act] is placed in relation to [the act of the will]…as [its] object’.203 There are a number of other texts where Aquinas makes this very same point.204 And in addition to referring to external actions in this generic way, one can find Thomas using obiectum to identify more specific kinds of actions, as when he says

201 Object of liberality is money: II–II, q. 117, a. 2, ra 1; II–II, q. 117, a. 3, cor; object of avarice is money: II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 3, ra 1; II–II, q. 118, a. 2, cor (that money in these cases includes any external thing with money value which can come into use, see II–II, q. 117, a. 3, cor; II–II, q. 118, a. 2, ra 2); object of striking can be one's father or a stranger: De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor; object of sacrilege can be sacred vessels: II–II, q. 99, a. 3, sc, cor; object of almsgiving can be what is donated: IV Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1a, ra 2. 202

Ripperger correctly recognizes that ‘object’ in Aquinas can refer to either of these two senses just outlined; see Chad Ripperger ‘The Species and Unity of the Moral Act’, Thomist, 59 (1995), 69–90 (pp. 74–8).

203

‘[A]ctus habet speciem ab obiecto; et propter hoc peccatum denominatur ab actu exteriori secundum quod comparatur ad ipsum ut obiectum’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 3, ra 1; the objection to which Thomas is responding (ag 1) gives clear evidence that ‘ipsum’ in this text refers to an act of the will.

204

See De Malo, q. 2, a. 3, cor, ra 3, ra 8; II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 3, cor, ra 6; I–II, q. 20, a. 1, ra 1; perhaps also III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1a, ra 2; I–II, q. 19, a. 8, cor.

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that venereal acts are objects of temperance, or that base acts are objects of both shame and penance.205 Finally, there are examples which don't fit neatly into the categories just described and which demonstrate further Thomas's versatility in using obiectum. For instance, an object can refer to the result or effect of an action which passes into external matter; one example suggested is a ‘finished building’ as an object of a builder.206 Dispositions are sometimes called objects, as when virtues are said to be the object of a person's good or bad use.207 Various nonmaterial realities, too, are named as objects, as when vindication is said to be the object of anger,208 or excellence, the object of pride.209 Given the variety we have just seen, it is not surprising to find Thomas presenting the object of some actions or habits as belonging to more than one of the categories just considered. Perhaps the best illustration occurs in Aquinas's examination of justice. In the course of the same question, II–II, q. 58, one finds Thomas referring to objects of justice as exterior things (res exteriores), as exterior actions (along with those things to which these actions are related), and even as the relationship between people and acts and things (called jus).210

205

Venereal acts as the object of temperance: Comm. Ethic. 4, lc. 1, n. 4; base acts as the object both of penance and shame: IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1e, ra 4; for other examples: actions as the object of virtues: SCG 1, c. 93, n. 2; passions or operations as an object of moral virtue: III Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, cor; works of perfection as objects of charity, see III Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 8c, cor.

206

I, q. 14, a. 2, cor; I, q. 56, a. 1, cor.

207

II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ra 5; d. 27, q. 1, a. 6, expositio; IV Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 3a, ra 1.

208

Thomas recognizes the different degrees of carnality and spirituality which can exist in objects: ‘Quaedam ergo sunt peccata quorum obiectum et delectatio est spiritualis, sicut ira. Nam vindicta, quae est obiectum irae, et delectatio eius, est quid spirituale, et similiter inanis gloria. Quaedam vero sunt omnino carnalia et obiectum et delectatio; sicut gula et luxuria. Sed avaritia tenet medium, quia eius obiectum est carnale, scilicet pecunia, sed delectatio est spiritualis, quia animo quiescit quis in pecunia’: Rep. Eph., c. 5, lc. 2, ll. 44–53; see also I–II, q. 72, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 118, a. 6, ra 1. 209

Excellence as the object of pride: II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 3, ra 1; I–II, q. 72, a. 1, ra 3; II–II, q. 162, a. 2, cor, ra 4; in other examples, Thomas speaks of: honour as an object: I–II, q. 32, a. 1, ra 1; delight as an object: III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 3, ra 2; truth as an object: SCG 3, c. 26, n. 2; I–II, q. 2, a. 8, cor. 210

Object of justice as external things: II–II, q. 58, a. 9, ra 2; object of justice as operations by which man is ordered to another: I–II, q. 66, a. 4, cor; see also II–II, q. 58, a. 8, cor; object of justice as right: II–II, q. 57, a. 1, tt, sc, cor; II–II, q. 58, a. 1, cor; II–II, q. 59, a. 2, cor.

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The evidence taken together suggests that obiectum in Aquinas can refer to many different kinds of realities related to human actions and habits. This explains why commentators have disagreed about this topic: examples can be found to support all of the interpretations of object presented earlier. The recognition that object can refer to many kinds of realities solves some problems, but raises others. If it is possible for an object to be either the thing related to an external action, or an external action, or an action's effect, then how would one evaluate a human action in which all these seem to be present? Which is the object? If a moral system offers a concept or term, objectum, which cannot adequately distinguish between these three, how will someone know what to look for when attempting to identify an action's species? A description Aquinas gives of the sin of simony helps to illustrate this problem with respect to two of the components of human action just mentioned, external thing and external action: [B]ecause every sin consists in an act of the will, therefore in the definition of simony, these three aforementioned [aspects] are posited; first, the act of the will…, second, the proximate matter of the sin, namely the buying and selling…, third the remote matter, namely the object of the aforementioned action, [which object is] a spiritual thing or something annexed to a spiritual thing.211 This description of simony is one of the few examples where Thomas explicitly identifies both the internal action of the will and the external action when treating a particular species of human action.

211

‘Et quia omne peccatum in actu voluntatis consistit, ideo in definitione simoniae haec tria praedicta ponuntur; et primo actus voluntatis in hoc quod dicit: studiosa voluntas; secundo materia proxima hujus peccati, scilicet emptio et venditio, ibi: emendi vel vendendi; tertio materia remota, scilicet objectum actionis praedictae, ibi: spirituale, aut spirituali annexum’: IV Sent., d. 25, q. 3, a. 1a, cor. There are other texts besides this one where Thomas distinguishes between what he calls a proximate matter and a remote matter or object; see esp. III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 2b, ag and ra 2, and also Comm. Ethic. 4, lc. 1, n. 4; for another important illustration of proximate and remote matter in a moral context, see III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 2c, ag and ra 3 (also cor); for a parallel where the phrase ‘immediate matter’ (immediata materia) is used instead of ‘proximate matter’, see II-II, q. 117, a. 2, ra 1.

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(His description, however, seems to illustrate how Thomas could depict any will act which refers to an external action and its matter.) What is the object of simony here? Thomas uses ‘object’ to name what relates to the external action, namely, ‘a spiritual thing’.212 In addition, however, we can reasonably infer the presence of another object. Thomas in this passage explicitly identifies the internal will act. Since he holds that every such will act has an object, it is reasonable to wonder what he thinks it would be in this case. Given that in passages examined earlier, he names external action as the will's object, the act of buying/selling (together with the matter, sacred thing)213 is most probably what Thomas would have identified as the will's object here had he chosen to do so.214

212

A ‘spiritual thing’ here can designate a physical item, such as a chalice; a sacred action, such as a sacrament; or even a financial arrangement, such as a benefice (II-II, q. 100, a. 3; a. 4, cor, ra 2). That ‘things’ and ‘actions’ can both be objects of an action like buying and selling is perfectly in keeping with Aquinas's understanding of justice (the more general virtue under which buying and selling falls), see II-II, q. 58, a. 8, cor. For some other occasions when Thomas will mention ‘things’ and ‘actions’ as what justice is about, though without using the word obiectum see II-II, q. 58, a. 10, cor; II-II, q. 58, a. 11, cor. That Thomas believes justice can involve whatever can come into human use, whether things, persons, or works, see II-II, q. 61, a. 3, cor. 213

Although a human action possesses unity, it still has aspects or components which can be discerned. In certain cases of simony, we can observe three (quasi) ‘actions’, two of which are objects: a person wills (interior action) to buy (exterior action and object of willing) a sacrament (spiritual action which is the object both of buying and of willing). Thomas illustrates how an object can be either an ‘action’ or an ‘action about an action’ in a passage where he is considering delight. He argues that when a man is thinking about fornication, the object of this delight can be either the fornication itself, or his act of thinking about the fornication: I-II, q. 74, a. 8, cor, ra 4.

214 There are good reasons to think that the object of the internal action (willing) would include here both the external action (buying and selling) and its object (spiritual things). First, why would the external action be included in the will's act? ‘Buying and selling’ are described in Aquinas's text above as ‘proximate matter’. As we shall see more clearly in the next chapter, matter is often used by Thomas to refer to what an action is relating to (object). Since ‘buying and selling’ can't very well be their own proximate matter, the only other action in this passage which ‘buying and selling’ might be the matter of is willing. Second, why would spiritual things also be included in the object of willing? For one thing, it would make little sense for the action ‘buying and selling’ to be the object of willing without its matter, sacred things. How can someone will an external action apart from its matter? Also, in a similar text regarding the virtue of justice, Thomas shows explicitly how an exterior operation and its matter can together serve as the ‘matter’ of an interior (will) act (III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 2c, ag and ra 1). The text above seems to propose a similar case.

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If this conclusion is accepted, then the passage contains two plausible candidates for the object of simony. Can both be defended as acceptable? Or is one of them unsuitable? Between the two candidates, the one most vulnerable to the accusation that it is unsuitable to specify simony is ‘spiritual thing’ (this, in spite of the fact that Thomas explicitly names it as object). Someone challenging Aquinas might argue as follows. Suppose ‘a spiritual thing’ is identified as object of a certain unnamed human action. Is knowing the object ‘spiritual thing’ itself enough to identify the action's species? While it is true that ‘spiritual thing’ is often associated with ‘buying and selling’ to define ‘simony’, ‘spiritual thing’ could also come into relation with many other kinds of action. For instance, someone could steal a ‘spiritual thing’ (instead of buying or selling it), and this would define sacrilege rather than simony. Someone could also ‘repair’ or ‘admire’ a ‘spiritual thing’. As described here, the three actions of sacrilege, repairing, and admiring share with simony the same external ‘object’, yet fall in very different moral species. A similar difficulty could easily be demonstrated for other external things Aquinas identifies as objects (see above): for instance, ‘another's thing’ (theft's object) could easily be associated with actions other than ‘taking’, and ‘one's father’ or ‘a stranger’ could be associated with actions other than ‘striking’. Surely one must conclude from this evidence that many ‘external things’ (including ‘spiritual thing’ in simony) are not adequate for moral specification, contrary to what Aquinas seems to propose. While such an objection seems cogent, a person who makes it must soon contend with a paradox. A careful look at Thomas's texts shows that, although he uses ‘object’ to refer to certain external things, he nevertheless understands very well the argument just presented as to why external things by themselves are sometimes inadequate for specification. Indeed, Aquinas will at times make just such an argument himself. In De Malo, for instance, Thomas demonstrates that the very same external thing can help to determine human actions of essentially distinct species, depending on the kind of the external action to which this thing is relating. In a first example, he shows that, although it is wrong to take another's thing, it is certainly not wrong to look at it; gold used to adorn public places, he says, may be viewed

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but ought not to be appropriated. In a second example, Thomas notes that although it is wrong to have intercourse with ‘another's wife’, looking at ‘another's wife’ or employing her as a housemaid are perfectly acceptable, morally speaking.215 In other texts, Thomas takes this point a step further, suggesting that even if both the external action and what it relates to are known, these two together can be insufficient to determine a definitive moral species. As we saw earlier, ‘taking another's thing’ is sometimes understood as an example of a moral object. But when he is called upon to distinguish more carefully, Aquinas concedes that this basic description is not enough. In the Summa, for instance, he shows that ‘taking another's thing’ can fall into either of two moral species, depending on the manner of the taking: if a possession is taken secretly, the species is theft; if by force, it is robbery.216 More tellingly, Aquinas recognizes that ‘taking another's thing’ may not even be morally wrong, depending on the circumstances. If a person ‘takes another's thing’ with the owner's consent in order to use it, this is ‘borrowing’. If a person ‘takes another's thing’ at the owner's request in order to care for it, this is ‘safeguarding’.217 Note how ‘taking another's thing’, which includes both an external action and its object, could accurately (though insufficiently) describe human actions belonging to at least four different moral species.218 More than a basic description of an external action and its object, then, is sometimes required to identify a human action's moral kind. Why would such descriptions be insufficient for specification? What might be missing? Aquinas suggests an answer to this question in a passage from De Virtutibus where, among other things, he is considering what specifies justice.219 He notes that ‘necessities for this

215 216

De Malo, q. 15, a. 1, ag and ra 2. II-II, q. 66, a. 4, cor.

217

II-II, q. 62, a. 6, cor.

218

If in the phrase ‘accipere aliena’, ‘aliena’ is understood to mean more that just possessions (for instance, another's honour, wife, etc.), a number of other species of human actions could be added to these four as contained under this description.

219

‘[A]liquid dicitur esse obiectum virtutum dupliciter. Uno modo sicut illud ad quod virtus ordinatur sicut ad finem; sicut summum bonum est obiectum caritatis, et beatitude aeterna obiectum spei. Alio modo sicut materia circa quam operatur, ut ab ea in aliud tendens; et hoc modo delectationes coitus sunt obiectum temperantiae, non enim temperantia intendit huiusmodi delectationibus inhaerere, sed istas delectationes compescendo, tendere in bonum rationis. Similiter fortitudo non intendit inhaerere periculis superando pericula, sed consequi bonum rationis; et idem est de prudentia respectu dubitationum, et de iustitia respectu necessitatum huius vitae’: De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, ra 5.

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life’ are sometimes identified as objects for justice. Thomas points out, however, that for the purpose of specifying, it would be insufficient for an agent merely to obtain and cling to these necessities. Simply establishing a relationship with the correct kind of object isn't enough to specify an action. The further requirement, Aquinas insists, is that these objects be ordered to the good of reason. Other texts help to fill out what he means: these ‘necessities’ must be associated with certain kinds of external action and be shown to possess that arrangement which reason deems necessary for determining a certain species of justice.220 This passage from De Virtutibus, then, underscores the key role which reason plays in determining species. Aquinas does not dismiss the importance of necessities of this life, of course, but insists that reason may have other requirements as well. At this point, we can see that Thomas not only uses ‘object’ to refer to several different aspects of action, but that he uses ‘object’ to refer to aspects of action which he knows are incapable of specifying, at least by themselves. How can this be? The answer may well be that Thomas is using the word ‘object’ analogously. As I pointed out in Chapter 4, Aquinas is perfectly content to refer to different realities with the same term, so long as these realities share some common feature and the proper distinctions between them can be drawn if necessary. Analogy may also explain Thomas's various accounts of how an object specifies: he may be using ‘object’ in some contexts to refer to what in itself determines the species of an action, and in other contexts, to what provides an indispensable element for such a determination. To understand how this might work, we would benefit from some examples in Aquinas's writings where he explains carefully how ‘object’ could refer to different aspects of some external action referred to the will. Unfortunately, Aquinas doesn't seem to have such an explanation in texts where he is considering objects. He does,

220

‘Possunt autem per rationem rectificari…exteriores actiones, et res exteriores quae in usum hominis veniunt…[et ideo justitia est] circa exteriores actiones et res secundum quandam rationem obiecti specialem…’ : II-II, q. 58, a. 8, cor.

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however, address a similar problem in another context which proves quite useful in suggesting how he might resolve the problem for object. In his discussion of end (finis), Thomas distinguishes carefully between the various sorts of realities which can serve as an end: things, effects, external actions and so forth. He also considers directly how a complex end (such as an external action and its matter) can be viewed from different perspectives. His teaching on such concerns for ‘end’, then, provides a sound model for approaching our present puzzle about object. In certain passages where he treats ‘end’, Thomas recognizes explicitly how both things and actions can be willed. For instance, he states that a ‘res’ (thing) can be an end and illustrates this by showing how a miser can place his end in money.221 He also acknowledges that an ‘actio’ (action) can be an end, showing how an agent can have as goals ‘understanding’, ‘sensing’, ‘contemplating’, and ‘playing’.222 Furthermore, he recognizes that ‘things’ and ‘actions’ are not ends in exactly the same way. For instance, he suggests that, while certain ‘actions’ can serve as ends in themselves, a ‘thing’ (whether it is an effect of a human work or some reality already existing) can serve as an end only if a related action is taken into account. Sometimes, the relationship between the action and thing is causal. Thomas notes, for instance, that when a doctor is said to will ‘health’ (an effect) as an end, it is understood that he seeks it through certain medical interventions; hence, one can rightly describe a doctor's end either as ‘health’ alone or as ‘inducing health’ (where the related action is included in the end's description). At other times, the relationship between the action and thing is such that the thing is attained in the

221 222

See e.g. I-II, q. 13, a. 4, cor; more on this later.

‘Actio vero quandoque quidem terminatur ad aliquod factum, sicut aedificatio ad domum, sanatio ad sanitatem: quandoque autem non, sicut intelligere et sentire. Et si quidem actio terminatur ad aliquod factum, impetus agentis tendit per actionem in illud factum: si autem non terminatur ad aliquod factum, impetus agentis tendit in ipsam actionem’: SCG 3, c. 2, n. 2; see also SCG 3, c. 3, n. 5; see esp Comm. Ethic. 6, lc. 4, n. 7. For contemplation and play: ‘Sed sciendum quod actiones contemplativae non sunt propter alium finem, sed ipsae sunt finis. Actiones autem ludicrae interdum sunt finis, cum quis solum ludit propter delectationem quae in ludo est’: SCG 3, c. 2, n. 9. For other instances where human actions or operations are said to be ends: III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 3, ra 4; I-II, q. 14, a. 2, ra 2; I-II, q. 20, a. 4, cor, ra 2; I-II, q. 56, a. 1, cor.

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action. For instance, Aquinas asserts that when a miser is said to will ‘money’ as his end, it is understood that this ‘money’ is attained in his ‘using’ or ‘enjoying’ it; hence, a miser's end can be described as either ‘money’ alone or as ‘possessing money’.223 According to Aquinas, is it more correct to understand an end as a ‘thing alone’ or as the ‘thing together with its related action’? Thomas believes that both ways of considering an end are completely acceptable; how the end is presented just depends on one's point of view.224 If what is willed is considered ‘simply’, he says, then a ‘thing’ such as ‘money’ can be regarded as an agent's end: Aquinas deems this perspective defensible on the grounds that no agent would pursue ‘money’ unless there were some good in it to attract him. If, on the other hand, an end is considered ‘from the agent's viewpoint’, then a ‘thing and action’, such as ‘possessing the money’,225 can be seen as the end. This perspective is also justifiable, he contends, on the grounds that no agent would seek the good in money unless there were a desire in him to possess it.226 Aquinas's solution to this problem, then,

223

‘Finis autem vel est actio, vel res aliqua. Et cum res aliqua fuerit finis, necesse est quod aliqua humana actio interveniat: vel inquantum homo facit rem illam quae est finis, sicut medicus facit sanitatem, quae est finis eius (unde et facere sanitatem dicitur finis medici); vel inquantum homo aliquo modo utitur vel fruitur re quae est finis, sicut avaro est finis pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae’: I-II, q. 13, a. 4, cor.

224

‘[F]inis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet cuius, et quo, idest ipsa res in qua ratio boni invenitur, et usus sive adeptio illius rei. Sicut si dicamus quod motus corporis gravis finis est vel locus inferior ut res, vel hoc quod est esse in loco inferiori, ut usus, et finis avari est vel pecunia ut res, vel possessio pecuniae ut usus’: I-II, q. 1, a. 8, cor; Thomas makes this distinction concerning the two ways of viewing an end in a number of other texts: *IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 1b, cor*; *I, q. 26, a. 3, ra 2*; I-II, q. 2, a. 7, cor*; *I-II, q. 3, a. 1, cor; I-II, q. 3, a. 8, ra 2*; I-II, q. 5, a. 2, cor*; I-II, q. 11, a. 3, ra 3*; *I-II, q. 13, a. 4, cor; *I-II, q. 16, a. 3, cor; *I-II, q. 34, a. 3, cor*; I-II, q. 56, a. 1, cor; Quodl., n. 8, q. 9, a. 1, cor*. The text citations here marked by an asterisk at the front contain the illustration of the miser and his money. An equally important example for Thomas is ‘God’ and ‘contemplating God’; see those citations above marked by an asterisk at the end, and III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2a, cor; IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 5d, cor; I, q. 26, a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 1, a. 8, cor. 225

For a discussion of different ways in which an object can be possessed (e.g. seeing something, thinking about it, using it), see I-II, q. 32, a. 1, ra 1.

226

‘Sed considerandum est quod ultimus finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter; et’alio modo, quoad aliquem. Cum enim finis, ut supra dictum est, dicatur quandoque quidem res, quandoque autem adeptio rei vel possessio eius, sicut avaro finis est vel pecunia vel possessio pecuniae; manifestum est quod, simpliciter loquendo, ultimus finis est ipsa res, non enim possessio pecuniae est bona, nisi propter bonum pecuniae. Sed quoad hunc, adeptio pecuniae est finis ultimus, non enim quaereret pecuniam avarus, nisi ut haberet eam. Ergo, simpliciter loquendo et proprie, pecunia homo aliquis fruitur, quia in ea ultimum finem constituit, sed inquantum refert eam ad possessionem, dicitur uti ea’: I-II, q. 16, a. 3, cor.

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is not to present these alternatives as incompatible positions between which one must choose, but to recognize them as two valid perspectives a person can take concerning a complex end.227 We can take Aquinas's approach in the context of end and apply it to our present concern regarding object. In human action, the will's object is often complex. Like the end described above which involves both ‘possessing’ and ‘money’, the object of will often includes both an action and its matter.228 When considering specification, one can certainly see advantages to understanding such a complex object of will to be object of human action. As I have shown above, many kinds of external things, such as ‘spiritual thing’ in simony, are not exclusively associated with a corresponding external action and consequently seem incapable of determining a human action's kind by themselves. The will's full object, which includes both the external thing (e.g. spiritual thing) and its related action (e.g. buying and selling) seems more comprehensive and more capable of providing what is necessary for determining a species.229 Moreover, any additional requirement concerning specification (for instance, whether something is taken by force or by stealth) can easily be included as a feature of this broader description of object. Now in spite of the misgivings just expressed, it seems as if ‘what the external action is related to’, for example, ‘external thing’, ought also to be understood in some contexts as a specifying object. Although at first this way of viewing object may seem inadequate, the fact remains that Thomas speaks this way; for instance, in the description of simony above, ‘spiritual thing’ is what he explicitly names as object rather than some broader conception referred to the will. How could Aquinas have identified as object something so patently insufficient for determining a species? In order to understand,

227

Thomas illustrates this point in another context when he shows that ‘God’ and ‘enjoyment of God’ are the same end: I-II, q. 11, a. 3, ra 3.

228

Finnis recognizes that either the outward action or what that action is about can be the object of the will for Aquinas; see John Finnis, ‘Object and Intention in Moral Judgments according to Aquinas’, Thomist, 55 (1991), 1–27 (p. 19).

229

Ripperger understands this point; see ‘Species and Unity’, 78–9.

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we might see this text on simony in light of Thomas's example of the miser. As a miser is said to be justified in calling money his end because he desires the good in money, so a simoniac could be said to be justified in calling a ‘spiritual thing’ his object because his buying and selling is meant to take advantage of what is good in the sacred thing.230 As for specifying the action, one can consider the spiritual thing, not as an isolated component, but as the final and decisive element to be added to what is already assumed about the external action.231 A final piece which completes a puzzle can be said, in a way, to give the puzzle its form. Suppose an agent is eager to buy a certain spiritual thing, but is uncertain whether the owner is ready to sell it. If the spiritual thing becomes available, the final component necessary for determining simony falls into place and this spiritual thing could be said to define the sin. To put the point the other way around, if only something other than a ‘spiritual thing’ can be found for sale, then buying this thing can never determine simony, even if everything else necessary for this sin is present. If such a solution be granted, then Thomas's broad use of object is not a great difficulty. One can see object specifying in somewhat different ways in different contexts, depending on the viewpoint being assumed. Such a solution would help to explain how, at different places in the very same question on justice, Thomas could use ‘object’ to signify external things, external actions, and the proper relation between persons, actions, and things. If for the determination of species, several realities must sometimes concur (that is, one needs a certain kind of external thing and external action arranged in a certain way according to reason), then Thomas could attribute specification either to all the necessary components together or to some required part. Understanding an object in this way would be analogous to Aquinas's two perspectives on a miser's end: object could be more broadly conceived (comparable to ‘possessing the

230

On occasion, one can observe Thomas portraying an object of an external act as also being an object of the will. For instance, in one passage, Thomas suggests that ‘food’ can, at the same time, be the cause of someone's desire for eating and the object of the agent's will act: I-II, q. 80, a. 1, cor.

231

This perspective is the one assumed by Thomas in I-II, q. 18, a. 2, ag and ra 1, where he argues that, although ‘things’ are always good ontologically, they do not always have ‘a due proportion to this or that action’.

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money’) or focused on the external thing sought (comparable to ‘money’ considered by itself).

2. Object and its Formal Aspect Having examined the basic meaning of obiectum as that which an action or habit, or power relates to, a second meaning of this term will now be explored. When Aquinas is considering objects carefully, he makes a critical distinction. An object has two ‘aspects’, he maintains, one formal and the other material. Of these two, Thomas identifies the formal aspect as what constitutes or defines an object. This point is nowhere clearer than a text where Aquinas refers to this formal aspect as ‘an object in so far as it is an object’.232 Further, he asserts that this formal aspect is, strictly speaking, the very factor which accounts for an object's function of specification. ‘[T]he material diversity of objects suffices for diversifying acts according to number’, avers the Angelic Doctor, ‘but acts are not diversified according to species except from the formal diversity of an object.’233 Given that, for Thomas, this ‘formal

232

233

‘Sed sciendum est, quod ex obiectis diversis non diversificantur actus et potentiae animae, nisi quando fuerit differentia obiectorum inquantum sunt obiecta, id est secundum rationem formalem obiecti…’ : Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 6, n. 9.

‘[M]aterialis diversitas objectorum sufficit ad diversificandum actum secundum numerum; sed secundum speciem actus non diversificantur nisi ex diversitate formali objecti’: III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4a, ra 3; for other texts where the formal ratio of objects is said to specify acts: III Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 2, cor; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; IV Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 3, cor; I, q. 77, a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 19, a. 10, ra 5; I-II, q. 31, a. 8, ra 3; I-II, q. 72, a. 1, ra 3; II-II, q. 1, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 10, a. 5, ra 1; II-II, q. 25, a. 1, cor; II-II, q. 47, a. 5, cor; II-II, q. 99, a. 2, cor; II-II, q. 137, a. 1, cor; De Veritate, q. 14, a. 8, ra 3; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, cor, ra 2; q. 8, a. 2, cor; De Malo, q. 9, a. 2, ra 10; Quodl., n. 3, q. 12, a. 2, cor; (operations) De Anima, a. 15, ra 18; For additional examples where the formal ratio of objects is said specify powers, habits, or passions: III Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1c, cor; d. 24, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; d. 26, q. 2, a. 3a, ra 1; d. 27, q. 2, a. 4b, cor; IV Sent. d. 45, q. 2, a. 2d, ra 3; I, q. 1, a. 3, cor; I, q. 59, a. 2, ra 2; I, q. 59, a. 4, cor; I, q. 79, a. 7, cor; I, q. 79, a. 11, cor; I, q. 80, a. 1, ra 2; I-II, q. 54, a. 2, ra 1; I-II, q. 54, a. 4, cor; I-II, q. 62, a. 2, cor; I-II, q. 63, a. 4, cor; II-II, q. 4, a. 6, cor; II-II, q. 5, a. 1, cor; II-II, q. 17, a. 6, ra 1; II-II, q. 31, a. 4, cor; II-II, q. 47, a. 11, cor; II-II, q. 50, a. 2, ra 2; II-II, q. 50, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 59, a. 2, cor; II-II, q. 81, a. 3, cor; De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2, ra 3; q. 22, a. 10, ra 1; De Potentia, q. 9, a. 9, ra 3; De Malo, q. 12, a. 2, cor; De Anima, a. 13, ra 3; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 4, cor; q. 2, a. 13, ra 6; Comm. Ethic. 6, lc. 1, n. 14; Comm. Post. Anal. 1, lc. 41, n. 11; Comm. De Anima, 3, lc. 14, n. 9.

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aspect’ seems both to define the essence of an object and to account for its specifying function, it certainly needs further elucidation.

(i) The formal aspect of objects and the specication of human powers A good entryway into Aquinas's teaching on formal aspects (rationes) of objects is to examine them in a context less complex than the voluntary. With this in mind, I will begin by considering human powers. It is when examining human powers that Aquinas explains some of his most fundamental insights on formal aspects of objects; he will often use these insights to illustrate his teachings on formal aspects in his ethical writings. One can best begin to understand Aquinas's teaching on objects of human powers by considering Aristotle's treatment of them, since Thomas appropriates much of his own thought on this subject from his illustrious Greek predecessor. In book 2 of De Anima, Aristotle examines the external senses. One of his goals is to determine exactly what it is that people see, hear, taste, smell, and touch. Aristotle's treatment of this topic is very precise. Ordinarily, when a person identifies what is being sensed, a substance is named; for instance, someone might say, I am seeing (touching, smelling, etc.) ‘a rose’, ‘an orange’, and so forth. But the Philosopher notes that such an identification, strictly speaking, is not correct. Aristotle identifies two kinds of qualities which he believes can rightly be called sensible. The first kind includes colour, sound, odour, flavour, and, in certain respects, the tangible.234 He groups these qualities together because they share two common characteristics: (1) each sensible is related exclusively to one sense and (2) there can be no error concerning them. Aristotle's first observation is relatively easy to grasp. The qualities he identifies are related in a unique way their proper actions and powers. For instance, colour can only be seen, and never heard or tasted; similarly, odour can only be smelt, and never touched or seen. His second observation requires a

234

b

The tangible presents a complex case, since it can include such qualities as temperature, moisture, firmness, etc.; see Aristotle's De anima 2. 10 (422 ).

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bit of explanation. When Aristotle says that there can be no error concerning these qualities, this might seem like a rash claim, since people are deceived about what they sense all the time. But to understand Aristotle's statement in this way is to miss his point. He is not asserting that people cannot be deceived about judgements relating to sensation, but that people cannot be deceived about the sensation itself. For instance, he thinks that a person can be mistaken that the sound he is hearing comes from a certain animal, but cannot be deceived that what he is hearing is a sound. There is a second category of qualities which Aristotle also presents as sensible: they often go by the name of common sensibles and include such properties as size, shape, number, motion, and rest. They are called common because, unlike those qualities mentioned above, each can be perceived by more than one sense. For instance, the shape of a sugar cube can be perceived through both sight and touch; so can its size, number, and so forth. Now although it is true that these two categories are the only ones which can rightly be called sensible according to Aristotle, there is a third category of qualities which he considers affiliated with them. This category includes incidental properties which can be ‘sensed’ only through their association with the sensibles already mentioned. As an illustration, Aristotle considers the assertion that someone has ‘seen’ Diares' son. Strictly speaking, he argues, there is no way that such a claim could be true. One cannot know a person's identity or familial relationships from sensation alone; these facts must be acquired in other ways. Nevertheless, Aristotle recognizes that such an assertion is not entirely incorrect: the person making the claim really does see a colour in a certain figure, and this colour is coextensive with what the person knows from other sources to be the son of Diares. Hence, there is a sense in which a person can legitimately claim to have ‘seen’ Diares' son.235 Now of the three categories just mentioned, the first one, those qualities which are perceived only by a single sense, are of particular interest to us here. The name Aristotle uses to refer to these sensibles

De Anima (Aristotle) 2. 6 (418a); for a description of these common sensibles in Aquinas, see Comm. De Anima 2, lc. 13, nn. 4–12; for things incidental to proper’sense, see ibid. , nn. 13–16. 235

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is τὰἴδια,236 a Greek term (here a substantive adjective) meaning something which is one's own or pertains to oneself. Thomas was probably unfamiliar with this word. As scholars have discovered, he did not use the original Greek text in his commentary on De Anima but rather a translation revised by William of Moerbeke in 1268.237 What term did Thomas actually see? When in a key section of this translation, Moerbeke needs a way of expressing τὰἴδια in Latin, he does so by using the words ‘propria’ and ‘obiecta’.238 Thomas accepts this terminology without question, and with good reason.239 As Fr Lawrence Dewan, OP, has shown, ‘obiectum’ was already being used by medieval authors even before Moerbeke's translation to refer to that which properly relates to powers (and actions); William was simply borrowing a term already known in the academic discourse of his time.240 ‘Object’, then, was the term through which Thomas came to understand Aristotle's insight about what is proper in sensation. One can see in Thomas's use of object his attempt to preserve Aristotle's insights explained above. Sometimes, Thomas uses obiectum to refer only to that quality which is proper in sensation, as when he suggests that colour is the object of sight.241 At other times, however, Thomas speaks about what is proper to sensation in a different way, one which involves a more complex depiction of the object:

236

Aristotle, De Anima 2. 6 (418a).

237

James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 378; see also p.’235.

238

‘Sed unusquisque sensus judicat de his, et non decipitur. Neque visus, quoniam color, neque auditus, quoniam sonus sit; sed quid est coloratum, aut ubi, aut quid sonans. Hujusmodi igitur dicuntur propria uniuscujusque sensus objecta’: De Anima, 415a14 (old Latin tr.) in Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia, 34 vols. (Paris: Vives, 1871–80), xxiv: In Aristotelis Stagiritae Nonnullos Libros Commentaria; In De Anima, 2, lc. 13 (1875), p.’94, col. 1. Here (and elsewhere) Latin quotations from Aristotle are taken from the Vives edn. of Aquinas's Opera Omnia because this edn. reprints some of the medieval translations which (presumably) would have been used by Thomas. 239

‘Dicit ergo primo, quod antequam determinetur de sensu quidnam sit, oportet primo dicere de sensibilibus secundum unumquemque sensum, quia obiecta sunt praevia potentiis’: Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 13, n. 1.

240

Dewan, ‘ “Objectum” ’, 77.

241

‘Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis’: I, q. 77, a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 1, a. 1, ra 2.

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[I]n the object there is something considered as formal and something as material. What is formal in the object is that according to which the object is referred to the power or habit; material is that in which this [formal aspect] is founded: so if we speak of the object of the power of vision, its formal object is colour (or something of this kind), for in so far as something is coloured, it is visible; but what is material in the object is that body in which the colour is found. From this it is clear that a power or habit is referred to the formal aspect (formalis ratio) of the object per’se, and to that which is material in the object per accidens. And since what is per accidens does not differentiate something, but only what is per’se; therefore, the material diversity of an object does not diversify the power or habit, but only the formal. For the visual power by which we see stones, men, and the heavens is one, because this diversity of objects is material, and not according to the formal aspect (formalis ratio) of the visible.242 Thomas here conceives of the object more broadly than above: it contains not only what Aristotle calls ta idia (the proper (sensible)), but also realities associated with this proper’sensible (for example, that substance in which this sensible is founded). But if the object contains both, one may ask, will not the distinction between what is proper to sensation and what is not become blurred? In order to avoid obscuring this important distinction of Aristotle, Thomas divides the object into two diversitates, one formal, the other material. In the formal aspect or ratio of the object,243 Thomas includes

242

‘Sed in obiecto consideratur aliquid ut formale et’aliquid ut materiale. Formale autem in obiecto est id secundum quod obiectum refertur ad potentiam vel habitum; materiale autem id in quo hoc fundatur: ut si loquamur de obiecto potentiae visivae, obiectum eius formale est color, vel aliquid huiusmodi, in quantum enim aliquid coloratum est, in tantum visibile est; sed materiale in obiecto est corpus cui accidit color. Ex quo patet quod potentia vel habitus refertur ad formalem rationem obiecti per’se; ad id autem quod est materiale in obiecto, per accidens. Et ea quae sunt per accidens non variant rem, sed solum ea quae sunt per’se: ideo materialis diversitas obiecti non diversificat potentiam vel habitum, sed solum formalis. Una est enim potentia visiva, qua videmus et lapides et homines et caelum, quia ista diversitas obiectorum est materialis, et non secundum formalem rationem visibilis’: De Virtut., q. 2, a. 4, cor.

243 The word ratio has a number of different meanings for Thomas, a good many of which are reflected in the way we use the English word ‘reason’. Just as we use ‘reason’ to mean the human faculty by which we arrive at truth, the activity of this faculty, and the motive for doing something (having a good reason to do x), Aquinas can use ratio to mean all of these. In this present context, however, ratio has a meaning unlike any which the word ‘reason’ signifies in English; Deferrari defines it as ‘the formal relationship of a thing to a faculty or the precise aspect under which it is object’; see entries for ‘ratio’ and ‘obiectum’ in A Latin–English Dictionary of St Thomas Aquinas, compiled by Roy J.’Deferrari (Boston: Daughters of St Paul, 1986), 713, 889.

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what is proper and per’se, such as colour in vision;244 the ‘material’ diversity includes certain incidental things, such as that substance in which the colour is based.245 As an illustration, Thomas asks his readers to consider three creatures of different natural species: stones, men, and the heavens. Although the difference between them is essential ontologically (for example, a stone has a different substantial form than a man or the heavens), Aquinas points out that no essential difference exists between them so far as their relation to the power of vision is concerned: all three are coloured (and visible because they are coloured). All three, therefore, have the same formal ratio with respect to vision and equally define this power and its act.246 In other texts, Thomas demonstrates his point that a formal ratio specifies a correlated power by pointing to the absurdities which would follow if, instead of colour, some other quality were said to define vision. For instance, he argues that if, instead of a creature's colour, its substantial form could specify sense powers, then people would need different senses to perceive plants and to perceive animals. Furthermore, he argues that if differences among the colours could specify, people would need different powers to sense black and

244

‘[P]otentiae non diversificantur secundum materialem distinctionem obiectorum, sed secundum formalem distinctionem, quae attenditur secundum rationem obiecti’: I, q. 59, a. 2, ra 2; see also I, q. 59, a. 4, cor; I-II, q. 54, a. 2, ra 1; De Potentia, q. 9, a. 9, ra 3; De Anima, a. 15, ra 18; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 4; for the phrase ‘diverse rationes’, see III Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1c, cor; I, q. 80, a. 1, ra 2; De Veritate, q. 22, a. 10, ra 1; ratio objecti: Comm. De Anima, 3, lc. 14, n. 9.

245 246

‘[V]idere indiget corpore, sicut obiecto, quia color, qui est obiectum visus, est in corpore’: Rep. De Anima, 1, lc. 2, n. 4.

Below are some texts which employ an example similar to the one just recounted from De Virtut., q. 2, a. 4, cor, followed in parentheses by the different ways in which they describe the formal aspect of the object: II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ra 5 (‘proprias rationes, quibus ad invicem distinguuntur, sunt propria objecta sensus’); IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3a, ra 1 (‘visibilis per’se’); I, q. 1, a. 3, cor (‘una formali ratione colorati’); I, q. 1, a. 7, cor (‘coloratum est proprium obiectum visus’); I, q. 77, a. 3, cor (‘differentia eius ad quod per’se potentia respicit’); I, q. 79, a. 11, cor (‘ratio obiecti’); De Veritate, q. 15, a. 1, sc 9 (‘sensibili in quantum est sensibile’); De Potentia, q. 9, a. 9, ra 3 (‘per differentiam formalem obiectorum; sensibilis in quantum est sensibile’); De Anima, a. 13, ra 2 (‘per’se differunt quantum ad immutationem sensus’); Quodl., n. 3, q. 12, a. 2 (‘ratio objecti, per’se’); Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 6, n. 9 (‘rationem formalem objecti’).

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to sense white.247Reductio ad absurdum arguments such as these bolster Thomas's claim that ‘colour’ is the quality related to vision properly and per’se, while other qualities must be contained under colour materially.248 Now to this first way of considering the formal aspect of vision, a second way should be added, one which appears in a number of Thomas's texts.249 Although it is potentially problematic to have two ways of conceiving a formal aspect in the same object (the visible), Thomas sees this second way as complementing the first rather than conflicting with it. He posits this second way because he realizes that what is proper to a visible object cannot be described completely unless, in addition to colour, light is taken into account. Light, for Aquinas, acts as the formal aspect for colour, just as colour acts as the formal aspect for that body in which the colour is founded.250 Now

247

‘Non enim quaelibet diversitas generis in obiectis requirit diversas potentias, alioquin non eadem potentia visiva videremus plantas et’alia animalia, sed sola illa diversitas quae respicit formalem rationem obiecti…’: Comm. Ethic. 6, lc. 1, n. 14; ‘[S]i proprium objectum potentiae visivae est color secundum rationem coloris, non distinguuntur plures potentiae visivae secundum differentiam albi, et nigri. Sed, si proprium objectum alicujus potentiae esset’album, inquantum album, distingueretur potentia visiva albi a potentia visiva nigri’: I, q. 59, a. 4, cor. Colours, of course, can differ in species within the genus of colour, without necessitating a difference in power (De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, cor; De Anima, a. 13, ra 2).

248

To illustrate qualities of an object contained in it materially or incidentally, Thomas shows how vision, specified by colour, is not further differentiated by black and white: III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4a, ra 3; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; I, q. 79, a. 7, cor; De Anima, a. 13, ag and ra 1. Other examples of incidental aspects include: near or far: III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4a, ra 3; light or dark: Comm. Ethic. 6, lc. 1, n. 12; great or small, a musician or grammarian: I, q. 77, a. 3, cor.

249 The relationship of light to colour is one of Aquinas's favourite illustrations for a formal/material distinction: I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, cor; d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, cor; d. 45, q. 1, a. 2, ra 1; d. 48, q. 1, a. 2, cor, ra 1; II Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2; d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, cor; d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ra 6; d. 20, q. 2, a. 2, ra 2; d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, cor; d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ra 1; d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, ra 1; III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1b, cor; d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, cor; d. 24, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; d. 24, q. 1, a. 2a, ra 5; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; d. 34, q. 2, a. 3a, ra 3; IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ra 15; I, q. 105, a. 5, cor; I, q. 106, a. 2, ra 1; I-II, q. 8, a. 2, ra 2; I-II, q. 8, a. 3, ra 2; I-II, q. 12, a. 4, cor; I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ra 2; II-II, q. 1, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 25, a. 1, cor; SCG 1, c. 76, n. 2; De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ra 5, ra 11; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 4, ra 11; Comm. Ethic. 6, lc. 1, n. 14; for an example where Thomas uses nature instead of light to explain the formal ratio, see De Veritate, q. 22, a. 10, ra 1. 250

‘Contingit autem quod illud quod est perfectio unius secundum unam rationem, sit perfectum ab alio secundum rationem aliam, sicut lux perficit colorem, et color perficit superficiem, et superficies corpus, cujus terminus est…’: II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ra 1; see also Comm. De Sensu, lc. 6, n. 4. When considering both light and colour in the same object, Thomas will sometimes adjust his terminology, referring to light as ‘formal’, colour as ‘material’, and incidental qualities as ‘accidental’: see III Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1a, cor.

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one might rightly ask why light should be formal with respect to colour, given that both are equally necessary for something to be seen. Thomas believes that whenever two things concur in a unity, one will be formal with respect to the other,251 and the discernment of which is formal depends on which of the two is playing the active role. In this present case, Thomas sees light as active;252 his reason is that light can always be seen, whether colour is present or not (as in sunlight), whereas colour cannot be seen unless light is present.253 So

251

‘Quandocumque autem duo concurrunt ad aliquid unum constituendum, unum eorum est ut formale respectu alterius’: I-II, q. 13, a. 1, cor.

252

How does light play an active role in the perception of colour? If Aquinas's Commentary on De Anima is reflective of his thinking on this topic, then his understanding of light's role in perception is markedly different from our own. We think of light as possessing wavelike qualities. When light reflects off a surface, its frequency is changed, and this alteration is sensed and then interpreted by our minds in such a way that it leads to our perception of colour. In the scheme of Aristotle and Aquinas, however, colour is not a perception of such a frequency; colour is light itself in so far as it has been obscured by its mixture with something opaque (‘Color nihil aliud est quam lux quaedam quodammodo obscurata ex admixtione corporis opaci;…patet quod, cum lux sit quodammodo substantia coloris, ad eamdem naturam reducitur omne visibile’: Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 14, n. 27, n. 28 respectively). Now Thomas believes that all light travels through a transparent or diaphanous medium, such as air, water, the heavenly spheres (through which starlight travels), and even some material bodies like glass or crystal. Because colour is light, it has the power itself of moving the transparent medium, and needs no external assistance from other light: (‘[O]mnis color est motivus diaphani secundum actum’: Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 14, n. 5). But because the motive power of colour is not as strong as pure light, it can only effect a change if the diaphanous medium has been made ready for colour by having been moved from potency to act by light. Thus, light is, in a certain sense, formal to the coloured body in the sense that it enables something which is visible in potency to be visible in act; it is not formal, however, in the sense that it ‘activates’ the colour, for its only service is to render the medium capable of receiving colour: Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 14, 15; I, q. 79, a. 3, ag and ra 2.

253

‘Semper enim illud quod est ratio alterius, se habet ad illud sicut formale ad materiale; puta, in actu sensus color videtur per lumen, et se habet ut materiale ad lumen, quod potest videri etiam sine colore, licet color non possit videri sine lumine’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ra 5; ‘Color manet in corpore colorato quocumque praesente vel absente, licet non sit actu visibilis sine lumine’: Comm. De Sensu, lc. 6, n. 5. Light was considered to be the most spiritual element involved in sense perception, and sight was considered the most spiritual of the sense powers (II Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, ra 5; I, q. 78, a. 3, cor). One proof offered for this contention is that light is the only sensible thing which comes to us from the heavens (Comm. Metaph. 1, lc. 1, n. 7).

Object

99

light for Thomas acts as an additional formal ratio, complementing colour and constituting that single object which is visible per’se.254 A comparison of the object of vision with objects of other powers can lead to an even clearer appreciation of the formal aspect's role (see Table 1). This table allows the object of vision to be compared more easily with the objects of other powers. Notice that each power, from growth, to memory, to the irascible appetite, relates to reality on account of a distinctive formal aspect. To illustrate, the same thing, physically speaking, can be the object of many of the powers here, but only in so far as that thing possesses a distinctive formal aspect corresponding to each power to which it is related.255 For instance, the same bird can be considered as an object of vision, in so far as it is coloured; as an object of hearing, in so far as it is making sound; as an object of the common sense in so far as it is sensible (generally); and as an object of intellect, in so far as it is true (that is, a real example of a bird).256 Although each of these four objects is the same substance (the bird), each is essentially distinguished from

254

‘[O]mne quod comparatur ad alterum ut ratio ejus se habet ad ipsum sicut forma ad materiam; unde ex duobus fit unum sicut ex materia et forma. Et propter hoc color et lumen sunt unum visibile, qua color est visibilis propter lumen’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 2, ra 11; see also III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 4a, cor.

255

‘[E]adem res comparatur ad diversas potentias animae non secundum eamdem rationem obiecti, sed secundum aliam et’aliam’: De Anima, a. 13, ra 3; ‘[D]istinctio potentiarum non ostenditur ex obiectis secundum rem consideratis, sed secundum rationem: quia ipsae rationes obiectorum specificant ipsas operationes potentiarum’: De Veritate, q. 22, a. 10, ra 1; see also I, q. 77, a. 3, ag and ra 3. For other examples where the same thing is considered under different rationes, see the same thing under the diverse rationes of true and good: De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2, cor; the same thing under the ratio of common sense and proper’senses: ibid., a. 1, ra 3; SCG 1, c. 61, n. 5; same thing (food) presented under the ratio of the concupiscible (pleasurable) and irascible (poisonous): De Veritate, q. 25, a. 4, ra 4; same thing as known by the active and passive intellect: ibid., q. 15, a. 2, cor; same thing engaged by the sensitive appetites and the will: De Malo, q. 8, a. 3, cor; by the will and all other powers: I-II, q. 11, a. 1, ra 2. 256

‘[N]ihil prohibet inferiores potentias vel habitus diversificari circa illas materias, quae communiter cadunt sub una potentia vel habitu superiori, quia superior potentia vel habitus respicit obiectum sub universaliori ratione formali. Sicut obiectum sensus communis est sensibile, quod comprehendit sub se visibile et audibile, unde sensus communis, cum sit una potentia, extendit se ad omnia obiecta quinque sensuum’: I, q. 1, a. 3, ra 2; for sense and intellect, see De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, cor; see also Pinckaers, ‘Le Rôle de la fin’, p.’410.

100

Object

Table 1. Human powers and their objects Powers

Objects

1. Vegetative

the living body

(i) generative

the living body of another being in so far as it acquires existence

(ii) augmentative (growth)

the living body in so far as it acquires due quantity

(iii) nutritive

the living body so far as it is preserved and sustained in its due quantity

2. Sensitive (i) exterior senses

sensibles proper exterior sensibles

(a)

vision

colour

(b)

hearing

sound

(c)

smell

odour

(d)

taste

tastable

(e)

touch

tangible (including hot, cold, pressure, pain)

(ii) interior senses

apprehensions of the senses so far as they are preserved

(a)

common sense

sense apprehensions as received

(b)

imaginative

sense apprehensions as stored

(c)

cogitative

intentions found in the apprehensions as received

(d)

memorative

intentions found in the apprehensions as stored

3. Intellective

the knowable, being in general

(i) active intellect

knowable so far as it is capable of being known actually through abstraction

(ii) passive intellect

knowable so far as it moves the intellect of its own accord

4. Appetitive

something extrinsic as an end

(i) sensitive appetite (a)

concupiscible

something as it inclines the sensitive appetite to seek it and to avoid what is harmful to it

(b)

irascible

something as it requires to be resisted from hindering what is suitable and from inflicting harm

(ii) intellective appetite (will) 5. Locomotive

something so far as it manifests the general aspect of good a something extrinsic so far as it is the term of a being's operation and movement

a

I, q. 78, a. 1, 2, 3, 4; I, q. 79, a. 1, 2, 3, 4; I, q. 80, a. 1, 2; I, q. 81, a. 1, 2, 3; I, q. 82, a. 1, 5; also De Anima, a. 13, cor; in ranking these powers, Thomas follows the principle that the more universal the formality of the object, the higher the power: III Sent., q. 1, a. 1a, cor; I, q. 1, a. 3, ra 2; I, q. 77, a. 3, ra 4; De Anima, a. 13, ra 4.

other objects on account of that distinctive formal ratio which properly relates it to a specific power.257

257

Another way of illustrating the importance of a power's formal ratio is to examine a text where Thomas denies that a separate power exists because he considers its object not to possess a distinctive ratio. One good example is Aquinas's respectful correction of Aristotle over whether the higher and lower intellects are separate powers. Aristotle says that the higher intellect regards necessary truths, and the lower, contingent truths; he seems to suggest that this difference in object makes the higher and lower intellects specifically distinct (Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a5–11). Aquinas argues that contingent and necessary things cannot define separate powers because they have the same formal ratio: they are both known in so far as they are true. Their difference, he says, is like the difference between perfect and imperfect in the same genus, as seeing dark and light are both acts of seeing nonetheless: Comm Ethic. 6, lc. 1, nn. 11–15; see also II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ra 5; III Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1c, ra 2; I, q. 79, a. 9, ra 3; De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2, ra 13.

Object

101

Aquinas makes some important claims about these formal aspects of objects: he says that each gives its related power unity, definition, perfection, and proper categorization. There are good reasons for each of these attributions. According to Thomas, the formal ratio of an object gives unity to a power because many things materially speaking are all considered as one under it, as many specifically different creatures can all be equally visible.258 The formal ratio defines (gives form to) a power because a ratio's relationship to its respective power is distinctive and unique. Colour can only be the ratio of the object of sight; it cannot relate to hearing or growth, since these powers only engage a thing under different aspects (namely as sound-producing or as properly sized, respectively).259 The ratio perfects a power, since a power is completely realized only to the extent that it fully achieves the ratio of its object; for instance, sight is called imperfect when colour is only poorly perceived.260 Finally, a ratio provides the basis for a proper classification. A good diversification into species is one which includes all relevant realities and then divides them in a per’se manner. Since all of the human powers known to Aquinas are accounted for by the rationes of their objects, and since these aspects divide powers according to what is essential to

258

‘Est enim unitas potentiae et habitus consideranda secundum obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem obiecti, puta homo, asinus et lapis conveniunt in una formali ratione colorati, quod est obiectum visus’: I, q. 1, a. 3, cor; see also I–II, q. 8, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 54, a. 4, cor.

259

‘Cum enim actus alicuius potentiae non se extendat ultra virtutem sui obiecti, omnis operatio quae non potest reduci in eamdem rationem obiecti, oportet quod sit alterius potentiae, quae habeat aliam obiecti rationem’: De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2, ra 3.

260

‘Alio modo, sicut obiectum attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui obiecti’: I–II, q. 3, a. 7, ra 3; see also cor; I–II, q. 3, a. 8, cor; De Anima, a. 13, sc 2; ra 5; De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 54, a. 4, cor.

102

Object

them and not something accidental, the rationes of objects permit a per’se division of powers, as in Table 1.261

(ii) The formal aspect of objects and the specication of human actions (a) An initial consideration of formal aspects In the last subsection, objects of human powers were examined, with special attention to their formal rationes. As attention turns to objects of human actions, it is natural to wonder if formal aspects play a comparable role with them.262 Thomas addresses this matter directly: ‘[I]n moral concerns, an object constitutes the species, not according to that which is material in it, but according to the formal ratio of its object’.263 The following passage from De Malo illustrates well Aquinas's understanding of the formal ratio's role in moral specification: [S]ince an act receives its species from its object, the act will be specified from some ratio of this object [in so far as the act is] compared with one

261

262

In his treatment of the division of powers by their objects, Thomas makes it clear that the formal aspect of these objects is what makes the significant difference: see I, q. 77, a. 3, cor, especially in light of ra 3. a

ae

For a brief consideration of formal rationes in the context of moral action, see Thomas Gilby, appendices and glossary to Principles of Morality (1 –2 18–21) (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), xviii. 121–96 (pp. 168–70); see also the glossary definition of object (p. 194). 263

‘[I]n moralibus obiectum constituit speciem, non secundum id quod est materiale in ipso, sed secundum formalem rationem obiecti’: De Malo q. 9, a. 2, ra 10; ‘Actus enim et habitus distinguuntur specie secundum formales obiectorum rationes…’: q. 8, a. 2, cor; ‘[C]um autem species actus ex obiecto sumatur secundum formalem rationem ipsius, necesse est quod idem specie sit actus qui fertur in rationem obiecti, et qui fertur in obiectum sub tali ratione’: II–II, q. 25, a. 1, cor. For other instances where, in a moral context, Thomas attributes specification of an action to the formal aspect of its object, see III Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 2, cor; d. 27, q. 2, a. 4b, cor; d. 27, q. 3, a. 3, ra 4; IV Sent., d. 15, q. 3, a. 1c, cor; I–II, q. 19, a. 10, ra 5; II–II, q. 1, a. 3, cor; II–II, q. 2, a. 5, cor; II–II, q. 47, a. 5, cor; II–II, q. 99, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 137, a. 1, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, cor, ra 2; Quodl., n. 3, q. 12, a. 2, cor; for texts where the formal rationes of objects are said to specify moral habits, see III Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; d. 27, q. 2, a. 4a, ra 3; d. 27, q. 2, a. 4b, cor; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; IV Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 3, cor; I–II, q. 62, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 4, a. 6, cor; II–II, q. 5, a. 3, cor; II–II, q. 31, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 47, a. 11, cor; II–II, q. 50, a. 3, cor; II–II, q. 59, a. 2, ra 1; De Virtut. q. 2, a. 4, cor; q. 2, a. 13, ra 6.

Object

103

active principle, [which the act] would not be specified from were [the act] to be compared with another [active principle]. For ‘to perceive colour’ and ‘to perceive sound’ are acts diverse with respect to species if they are referred to the senses, because [colour and sound] are sensible according to themselves; not, however, if they are referred to the intellect; because they are understood by the intellect under one common ratio of the object, namely of being or of truth… If objects of human acts are considered, which have differences according to something pertaining per’se to reason, acts will be differing by species in so far as they are acts of reason, although they will not be differing in so far as they are acts of some other power; as ‘to have intercourse with one's own wife’ and ‘to have intercourse with a woman not one's own wife’ are acts having objects with a difference according to something pertaining to reason; for ‘one's own’ and ‘not one's own’ are determined according to the rule of reason; which differences, nevertheless, are accidentally related if they are compared to the generative power or even to the concupiscible power. And therefore to have relations with one's own [wife] and with a woman who is not one's own [wife] differ by species in so far as they are acts of reason, but not, however, in so far as they are generative or concupiscible acts.264 In this passage, Thomas shows how the formal aspects (rationes) in objects of powers can serve to illuminate the formal aspects in objects of human actions. In the early part of the text, Aquinas makes a point very similar to the one noted in the last subsection. The powers of sight, hearing, and intellect each relate to a single ‘thing’ under a

264

‘[C]um actus recipiat speciem ab obiecto, secundum aliquam rationem obiecti specificabitur actus comparatus ad unum activum principium, secundum quam rationem non specificabitur comparatus ad aliud. Cognoscere enim colorem et cognoscere sonum sunt diversi actus secundum speciem, si ad sensus referantur, quia haec secundum se sensibilia sunt; non autem si referantur ad intellectum; quia ab intellectu comprehenduntur sub una communi ratione obiecti, scilicet entis aut veri.…[S]i ergo obiecta humanorum actuum considerentur quae habeant differentias secundum aliquid per’se ad rationem pertinentes, erunt actus specie differentes, secundum quod sunt actus rationis, licet non sint species differentes, secundum quod sunt actus alicuius alterius potentiae; sicut cognoscere mulierem suam et cognoscere mulierem non suam, sunt actus habentes obiecta differentia secundum aliquid ad rationem pertinens; nam suum et non suum determinantur secundum regulam rationis; quae tamen differentiae per accidens se habent si comparentur ad vim generativam, vel etiam ad vim concupiscibilem. Et ideo cognoscere suam et cognoscere non suam, specie differunt secundum quod sunt actus rationis, non autem secundum quod sunt actus generativae aut concupiscibilis’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, cor.

104

Object

distinctive formal ratio, so that sight relates to something in so far as it is coloured, hearing in so far as it is producing sound, and understanding in so far as it is true.265 These three different rationes of a thing make for three different objects, formally speaking. Thomas then attempts to show that a will act also has a distinctive formal ratio for its object as compared to other human powers. In order to illustrate this point, he analyses the action ‘having intercourse with a woman’ from three perspectives. From a first point of view, one can understand this action, not in its totality, but precisely in so far as it is capable of resulting in the birth of a child; this way of looking at intercourse reveals that ratio according to which it is an exercise of the generative power. From a second point of view, one can see the action from the restricted perspective of its sensual attractiveness; this consideration reveals the ratio according to which intercourse relates to the concupiscible power. Yet while both of these ways of looking at intercourse are valid, they do not yet reveal the perspective significant for human action as such; the mating of many subrational animals could also be considered from the point of view of reproduction or appetitive allure. It is the third point of view, then, which is for Thomas the crucial one. He says that the relevant ratio of an act of intercourse precisely as voluntary (or as an actus rationis) is observed in a comparison of the object to reason. Aquinas shows how this comparison reveals two possible ‘differences’ (differentiae or rationes): the woman can be considered as either ‘one's own wife’ or ‘not one's own wife’. These two aspects, finally, identify the ratio of the action precisely in so far as it is voluntary. Why are ‘one's own’ and ‘not one's own’ the crucial factors in this case? Thomas does not answer this question in great detail in the De Malo text above. In other texts, however, he will explain more thoroughly how objects and their rationes are related to right reason. (I will explore these texts shortly.266) For the purpose of commenting

265

For a similar example, see I, q. 80, a. 1, ra 2. A second point Thomas makes in this passage is that, although colour and sound are mutually exclusive as objects (one cannot see sound or hear colour), these two aspects can, in a sense, be contained together under an object with a more general ratio, since both can be an object of intellect in so far as they are true. 266

See especially ‘The comparison between the formal aspect of the object and the rule for right action’ below.

Object

105

on this text, however, it will be useful to summarize Thomas's position as it applies here. Human agents are attracted to rational goods and can discern which characteristics formally constitute these goods. One such good is temperance: human agents should recognize the suitability and benefit of pursuing the pleasure of sex according to reason's direction. But what constitutes proper ordering between the appetite and the sensible thing in the case of temperance? For Thomas, intercourse is ordered to the generation and upbringing of children, goods which are only properly pursued and safeguarded in matrimony. Thus, a key to discerning the proper bounds for pursuing the pleasures of sex will be whatever factor indicates inclusion in or exclusion from the connubial state. Since by marriage vows, the partners are said to ‘belong’ to each other, Thomas maintains that the characteristics ‘one's own’ and ‘not one's own’ are the crucial factors for indicating whether right reason is being respected when pursuing the pleasures of intercourse. One's partner may be attractive or plain, cultured or unrefined, reliable or capricious, but none of these factors makes any difference for temperance; it is the fact that a partner is ‘one's own’ which makes it appropriate to seek the pleasures of intercourse with him or her, and ‘not one's own’ which makes this action unreasonable. ‘One's own’ or ‘not one's own’, then, should be seen as an integral part of this object of voluntary action. In a way analogous to what happens when ‘coloured’ or ‘sensually attractive’ identifies a distinct object for a human power, ‘one's own’ or ‘not one's own’ is a ratio which gives formal completion to this object of human action. ‘One's own’ or ‘not one's own’ in this context does not describe a merely incidental trait of the woman; this aspect is essential to this object of the will as it is compared to right reason regarding temperance. One knows whether this human action is morally good or bad (here temperate or intemperate) when one knows whether the woman is ‘one's own’ or ‘not one's own’. Although this De Malo text provides a suitable introduction, it is by no means the only passage which discusses the role of the formal aspect or ratio in the object of human action. Among Aquinas's other texts treating this issue, some stand out for the clarity with which they present his teaching. For instance, in a few texts, the formal

106

Object

aspect or ratio of an object is presented as the key to solving a problem. Because attention is focused so directly on formal aspects in such texts, they often express or illustrate Aquinas's teaching particularly well. Two types of such problems are especially worth considering.267 The first concerns situations where a single thing (considered materially) is identified as an object of more than one species of action (or habit). Certain human actions dealing with ‘money’ fall into this category. For instance, Thomas holds that the virtue of liberality disposes people to be free of immoderate attachment to money (and by extension what money can buy) so that they can be generous in giving. Given what liberality is focused on, Aquinas identifies ‘money’ as its object. But in other cases, money seems to be, not an object of liberality, but of justice: a person can give to another, not out of generosity, but on account of obligation, as in the repayment of a loan. Someone who knows Aquinas's principles for specification might raise an obvious complaint. Thomas contends on a number of occasions that specifically different moral actions have distinctive objects. How can there be two specifically diverse human actions, liberality and justice, which both deal with ‘money’ as their object? Doesn't this violate Aquinas's principle? Thomas answers this question by showing that a moral object involves more than just a physical description of that thing to which these two kinds of human actions are related. ‘[W]here a thing is the same’, asserts Aquinas, ‘there are diverse rationes of the object, as when the same thing is an object of liberality so far as it is given, and of justice, so far as it has the ratio of the due’.268 The key to solving this problem for

267

There are other kinds of cases besides the two treated here where Thomas uses the formal ratio. For instance, Thomas introduces the ratio: (1) to clarify the definition of an act or virtue, as in his examination of piety (II–II, q. 101, a. 3, cor); (2) to be precise about why certain virtues and vices are contrary, as in his treatment of envy and charity (II–II, q. 36, a. 3, cor); (3) to discern whether virtues which appear to be similar formally belong to the same species, as in natural and political friendship (De Virtut., q. 2, a. 7, cor); joy, peace, and pity (II–II, q. 30, a. 3, ra 3); fasting and temperance (IV Sent., d. 15, q. 3, a. 1c, cor); beneficence and charity (II–II, q. 31, a. 4, cor).

268

‘[H]abitus specificantur ex objectis suis secundum rationem quam principaliter attendunt. Ratio autem objecti sumitur secundum proportionem rei circa quam est operatio habitus vel potentiae, ad actum animae, in qua sunt habitus vel potentiae. Quia autem per operationem animae dividuntur quandoque quae secundum rem conjuncta, et summe unum sunt; ideo contingit quod ubi res est eadem, sunt diversae rationes objecti, sicut eadem res objectum est liberalitatis, ut est donabilis, et justitiae, ut habet debiti rationem’: III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4b, cor. For a similar analysis of a material thing (riches) which is able to be considered under various rationes, see II–II, q. 117, a. 3, ra 1.

Object

107

Aquinas, then, is to show that something which is the same physically speaking can have two different formal aspects, each of which constitutes a different object, properly speaking.269 Money is the object of liberality qua donatable, and of justice qua tender for a debt. A second type of case presents the reverse of the problem just examined. Instead of determining how the same thing, materially speaking, can be considered as an object of different species of human action, Thomas must determine how different things, materially speaking, can be considered as objects of the same species of human action. A good example of such a problem can be observed in the object of pride. The sin (or vice) of pride seems to have many different possible objects. Unlike a sin such as self-inebriation, whose object is restricted—relatively few kinds of substances can intoxicate270—pride seems to have no such limit: one can be proud of many kinds of things, including material things (such as one's wealth) and spiritual things (such as knowledge). This situation easily invites a question: how can realities of such remarkable variety all be considered as the object of the same action or habit? Again, Thomas answers by rejecting a merely physical understanding of obiectum: ‘[N]othing prohibits us finding in diverse things,…one formal ratio of an object, by which a sin receives its species…[and] in this way pride seeks ‘excellence’ concerning diverse things’.271 Thomas solves

269

For some other examples: a soldier's act of defending a city can be understood as either fortitude or justice, depending on which ratio of the object is being considered (II–II, q. 104, a. 2, ra 1); the same act of telling the truth can belong to the virtues of truth, justice, adoration, or penance, depending on the ratio of the object (IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 2c, cor); the same act of committing adultery can be prohibited by either general or legal justice, depending on the ratio (Comm. Ethic. 5, lc. 2, n. 13).

270

Thomas says that the virtue of sobriety is concerned with (as its matter), ‘not any kind of drink, but that which by its volatility arises to disturb the head; as wine, and anything which is able to inebriate’: II–II, q. 149, a. 1, cor.

271

‘[N]ihil prohibet in diversis rebus specie vel genere differentibus, invenire unam formalem rationem obiecti, a qua peccatum speciem recipit. Et hoc modo superbia circa diversas res excellentiam quaerit…’: I–II, q. 72, a. 1, ra 3; see also II–II, q. 162, a. 2, cor, ra 4; De Malo, q. 8, a. 2, cor, ra 3.

108

Object

this problem, then, by identifying pride's formal aspect, then showing how it can be sought in many kinds of realities. The ratio ‘excellence’ formally constitutes pride's object, uniting under itself what seem to be disparate objects materially considered.272 To these two illustrations just presented, we can add a final, more detailed illustration of particular interest. Of all the human actions and habits where Thomas considers the formal ratio of an object, the one where he examines it most carefully is the virtue of faith. Aquinas's treatment of faith serves not only to reinforce what has already been discovered concerning the formal ratio, but also adds further precision to his understanding.273 Aquinas relies on the ratio of faith's object to solve a number of challenges. The first such challenge can be better explained if the objects of the theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity) are contrasted with those of the cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude). Thomas notes that while cardinal virtues are often defined through some distinctive matter or object (for instance, temperance is about pleasures of touch, that is, food and sex; fortitude is about dangers of death, etc.),274 the theological virtues all seem to relate to the same ‘object’, namely, God himself.275 The fact that faith, hope, and charity regard a common object, however, seems to call into question their essential distinctiveness. If all three regard God, wouldn't this suggest that faith, hope, and charity more properly

272 In addition to pride, there are a number of actions or habits where Thomas shows the formal ratio of an object to contain under itself things considerably different from a material point of view; for instance, see (1) avarice: I–II, q. 72, a. 1, ag and ra 3; II–II, q. 118, a. 2, cor; (2) magnanimity: III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1b, cor; d. 33, q. 3, a. 3d, ra 1; IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1c, ra 2; De Malo, q. 8, a. 2, ra 3; Comm. De Trin., ps. 2, q. 3, a. 2, co. 5; (special ratio): II Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, cor; (3) magnificence: IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 2c, cor; (4) worship (latria): III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1b, cor, ra 2; (5) religion: Comm. De Trin., ps. 2, q. 3, a. 2, co. 5; (6) perseverance: III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 3d, ra 1; (7) obedience: II Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, cor; (8) penance: IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1c, cor, ra 2; (9) prudence: III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1b, cor. 273

For a discussion of an object's formal ratio in Aquinas, both as it determines moral actions generally and defines faith in particular, see William Vander Marck, ‘Faith: What it is Depends on What it Relates to: A Study on the Object of Faith in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas’, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 43 (1976), 121–66 (pp. 124–33, 149–50, 158–63).

274

II Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, ra 3; I–II, q. 61, a. 3, cor.

275

See I–II, q. 62, a. 2, cor.

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comprise a single virtue (perhaps ‘encountering God’)? Wouldn't faith, hope, and charity be more accurately understood as names for three incidental differences within this one virtue? To demonstrate that faith, hope, and charity are essentially different, then, Thomas must explain what distinguishes them in spite of what appears to be a common object. Note how he resolves this dilemma: [T]he same substance in so far as it is a thing is the object of all the theological virtues, but it differs with respect to ratio: because in so far as [God] is the first truth, he is the object of faith; in so far as he is the highest good, he is the object of charity; and in so far as he is of the highest difficulty [to attain], he is the object of hope.…[For] virtue[s] and power[s] do not differ by objects according to a real difference of an object, but according to diverse rationes of their object: which rationes indeed formally complete that object.276 As with ‘money’ above, Thomas relies on the formal ratio to distinguish many objects where there seems to be but one. While it is true that faith shares the same object with hope and charity materially speaking (all three concern God), faith can be said to approach God in a distinctive way according to its formal aspect: faith recognizes Him as ‘first truth’, while hope and charity regard Him as ‘difficult to attain’ and ‘highest good’ respectively. The way in which Thomas presents the formal ratio of the object in this passage is especially noteworthy because of its precision and clarity. Observe, for instance, how Thomas differentiates between the ‘real distinguishing feature’ of a substance (differentia realis) and the ‘ratio’ specific to each virtue. Note especially his assertion that this ratio ‘formally completes the object’ (formaliter complet objectum), a point which he rarely expresses so clearly. A second challenge regarding the object of faith provides a distinct contrast to the first. It concerns, not how faith can be distinguished from other virtues, but how so many different things can be

276

‘[I]dem secundum rem est objectum omnium virtutum theologicarum, sed differt secundum rationem: quia inquantum est primum verum, est objectum fidei; inquantum est summum bonum, est objectum caritatis; inquantum est altissimum arduum, est objectum spei.…Virtus autem et potentia non differunt ex objectis secundum differentiam realem objecti, sed secundum diversas rationes objecti: quae quidem rationes formaliter complent objectum ipsum’: III Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3a, ra 1; see also II–II, q. 17, a. 6, ra 1.

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contained under faith. As we have just seen, Thomas thinks that the object of faith is God in so far as he is ‘first truth’. Now this way of describing the object of faith seems perfectly sufficient so long as we are considering only God himself. But it does not take long to realize that faith commits Christians to many beliefs which aren't directly about God: for instance, tenets about angels, the communion of saints, morality, and so forth. Aquinas's definition of the object of faith, then, seems to exclude these and many other realities contained in articles of the creed. Fully recognizing this fact, Thomas must show why his account of faith has not overlooked these important matters: [N]othing is able to be under some power or habit or even an act, unless by means of the formal ratio of the object, as colour is not able to be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion is not able to be known except through the mean of demonstration. It was said, however, that the formal ratio of the object of faith is the first truth. Whence, nothing is able to come under faith unless in so far as it stands under this first truth.277 As in the case of pride, Thomas must show how things which seem disparate can fall under the same object, and once again, he relies on a formal ratio to accomplish this. What strikes one in Aquinas's answer here is his use of an analogy with light (discussed earlier in section 2(i)) to show how the formal ratio is relevant to this situation. Just as colour in a visible object cannot be seen unless some light illuminates it, a proposition is not able to be believed (as an act of faith) unless God as first truth reveals it. Even when believers commit themselves to assertions about angels or the Church, then, their object is still ‘first truth’, because they only accept these propositions in so far as first truth authenticates them and not for any other reason.278

277

278

‘[N]ihil subest alicui potentiae vel habitui aut etiam actui, nisi mediante ratione formali obiecti, sicut color videri non potest nisi per lucem, et conclusio sciri non potest nisi per medium demonstrationis. Dictum est autem quod ratio formalis obiecti fidei est veritas prima. Unde nihil potest cadere sub fide nisi inquantum stat sub veritate prima’: II–II, q. 1, a. 3, cor.

Aquinas's point is confirmed in another passage, where he argues that even if a heretic holds the very same proposition as a believer (say, that people should love one another), he cannot be said to have faith. The heretic's formal ratio is different, opines Thomas, because his affirmation of this assertion is based on some factor other than faith's proper formal ratio, which is the attestation of first truth precisely as manifested in the doctrine of the Church; see II–II, q. 5, a. 3, cor, ra 1.

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There is one final feature of a formal ratio which the object of faith can help to illustrate. When corporeal creatures were considered in Chapter 3, it was shown how their form could be analysed into a genus and a number of ‘differences’, each of which further specifies the creature until a final form is identified. Thomas suggests that a similar analysis can sometimes be carried out on the formal ratio of an object: the ratio can be seen as composed of several defining aspects, each of which contributes to this ratio's final form. This point can be illustrated by Aquinas's attempt to explain why ‘faith’ is specifically different from our ‘seeing’ God in heaven. A problem arises in discriminating between these two because faith and vision seem to have identical objects: both not only attain God, but also attain him in so far as he is first truth. According to Aquinas's principles of specification, it seems that faith and vision should be formally identical. Indeed, it might even seem as if heavenly vision should be more entitled than faith to have ‘first truth’ as its object, since in heavenly vision people encounter God directly, whereas in faith, they only know him as in a mirror darkly. In spite of their apparent identity, however, Thomas is of the opinion that faith and vision are distinct in species, and in order to explain why, he must carefully express what their respective objects are: ‘[F]irst truth’ is the object of vision in heaven as ‘appearing’ in its proper form, and of faith as ‘not appearing’ [in its proper form]; whence although the object of the act of each is the same thing, it is not, nevertheless, the same with regard to ratio. And thus the object differing formally makes the species of act different.279 In order to prove that faith and heavenly vision are different in kind, Thomas must show that they have distinct objects. In his argument to establish this point, he is willing to make some interesting concessions. He agrees, for instance, that, at least to a certain extent, faith and heavenly vision do have the same object: materially considered, both

279

‘[V]eritas prima est obiectum visionis patriae ut in sua specie apparens, fidei autem ut non apparens; unde etsi idem sit re utriusque actus obiectum, non tamen est idem ratione. Et sic formaliter differens obiectum diversam speciem actus facit’: De Veritate, q. 14, a. 8, ra 3; see also III Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 1c, cor; De Veritate, q. 14, a. 3, ra 6; a. 9, cor; De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, ra 10.

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are about God, and even formally considered, both relate to him in so far as he is first truth. But this having been granted, he then argues that something more is necessary in each case to understand their respective formal objects. Both faith and heavenly vision have a further aspect which completes their ratio: faith has ‘first truth’ as its object precisely as ‘not appearing’, while heavenly vision has ‘first truth’ as its object precisely as ‘appearing’. ‘Not appearing’ may seem like a rather odd specifying difference, but, in another text, Thomas contends that it is in fact proper. For those who may find ‘not appearing’ irrelevant, he points out that it regards the distinctness with which one understands; such a difference is directly pertinent to the genus of knowledge and is therefore proper to this division. For those who may find ‘not appearing’ questionable because it is ‘negative’, Thomas reminds them that natural creatures can also have such negative differences: for example, a (brute) animal like an ass is partly specified by its ‘irrationality’. Take that ‘irrationality’ away from an ass, suggests Aquinas, and this subtraction would substantially alter its form. A similar effect would occur if someone changed the formal aspect of faith in a like manner. Faith must include both ‘first truth’ and ‘not appearing’ in the ratio of its object; if either of these is taken away, what is essential to faith (as a type of disposition of mind and will) is lost.280

(b) Some further observations concerning the formal character of an object I have shown in a number of ways how a formal ratio of an object specifies a human action for Thomas. But we have not yet examined carefully enough the nature of the species which objects determine, or the role a ‘comparison to reason’ (comparison to a rational standard) plays in this process. An examination of these issues can help to clarify Aquinas's meaning.

280

‘[A]blatio alicujus quod est de substantia rei, inducit corruptionem rei illius; non autem sublatio alicujus quod se habet accidentaliter ad rem illam. Imperfectio autem illa quam tollit gloria a fide, est substantia fidei, et ad speciem ejus pertinens: quod patet ex hoc quod accipitur secundum rationem objecti, a quo fides speciem recipit. Obscuritas enim, quam aenigma importat, ad genus cognitionis pertinet. Et ideo oportet quod, remota ista imperfectione, substantia et species fidei destruantur, sicut si ab asino removeatur sua irrationabilitas’: III Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 1c, cor.

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(1) An exploration of species identied by the formal aspect of the object In Chapter 4, I examined how ends give human actions their species. Aquinas's consideration of object adds more detail to this earlier presentation: the formal ratio assists Thomas in explaining further dimensions of specification in human actions. As we saw earlier, Aquinas's most fundamental division of moral action is between good and evil. In accounts which appear mostly in texts where he is treating objects, however, Thomas adds a third basic category. This passage from De Malo is a good example of Aquinas's presentation of the three divisions: [A] moral act has its species from its object according to its order to reason…[First], there is that object which involves something suitable to reason and makes…[a moral action] to be good from its genus, as [for instance] ‘clothing the naked’; [second], there is that object which involves something in opposition to reason, as [for example] ‘taking another's thing’, and this makes [the moral action] evil in its genus; [third], there is that object which neither involves anything rationally fitting nor anything out of line with reason, for example, picking up a piece of straw from the ground, or something of this kind;…[actions] of this kind are called indifferent.281 In this De Malo passage, Thomas introduces indifferent actions. As he says, a human action is specified according to its object's relation (ordo) to reason. Reason (as understood in this context) measures human actions against conceptions of rational goods. For instance, the good of charity is realized when alms are given, while the good of justice is opposed in the taking of another's thing. But suppose there is a type of human action which has no relation to any of the goods of reason. Picking up a piece of straw from the ground (or tapping one's fingers, taking a deep breath, etc.) can be done with full knowledge and freedom, yet, as kinds of actions, they bear no special relation to

281

‘[A]ctus moralis est bonus vel malus, sed aliquis est indifferens; quia actus moralis speciem habet ex obiecto secundum ordinem ad rationem, ut supra, dictum est. Est autem aliquod obiectum quod importat aliquid conveniens rationi, et facit esse bonum ex genere, sicut vestire nudum; aliquod autem obiectum quod importat aliquid discordans a ratione, sicut tollere alienum, et hoc facit malum in genere; quoddam vero obiectum est quod neque importat aliquid conveniens rationi, neque aliquid a ratione discordans, sicut levare festucam de terra, vel aliquid huiusmodi; et huiusmodi dicitur indifferens’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 5, cor.

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rational goods, neither realizing nor contravening them. Thomas believes that actions such as these are neither good nor evil in their kind, but fall in this third moral category, indifferent human actions.282 In identifying this kind of human action, however, an important distinction must be kept in mind: Thomas believes that human actions can be indifferent in species only if considered apart from those ends to which individual actions are directed. For example, even a gesture as seemingly innocent as ‘picking up straw’ can be part of a larger good or evil action, depending on the end: one can ‘pick up a straw’ in order to contribute tinder to a much-needed fire or to signal enemy forces to attack. We will explore this teaching of Thomas further in Chapter 9. Based on these three most basic kinds of moral action—good, evil, indifferent—Thomas makes additional, more specific determinations; for instance, good human actions can be further specified into kinds such as almsgiving, courage, or fasting, and evil actions into kinds such as theft, cowardice, or gluttony.283 Aquinas bases these more particular species on morally relevant differences in what is willed: a different species of human action is determined, he asserts, whenever a special ratio of good or difficulty exists in an object.284 It would be a worthwhile project to catalogue all of the species of human actions mentioned by Aquinas in his writings and to attempt to identify the various rational goods either realized or opposed in these actions. Since such a project is far too extensive for our purposes, a more limited illustration will be offered here. I will examine one kind of human action, theft, in order to consider how a certain formal ratio both determines it and categorizes it in relation to certain other kinds of unjust action. The following is a definition of theft offered by Aquinas in the Summa:

282

See also II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 5; I–II, q. 18, a. 8, cor.

283

Thomas offers no more particular species of indifferent actions. This makes sense, given that no further per’se divisions can exist in a category which is distinctive only by reason of its lack of relation to a relevant standard. 284

‘[U]bi occurrit specialis ratio difficultatis vel boni, ibi est specialis virtus… uno quidem modo, ex specie ipsa actus, quae accipitur secundum rationem proprii obiecti’: II–II, q. 137, a. 1, cor; see also II–II, q. 109, a. 2, cor.

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[T]hree things contribute to the ratio of theft. Of these, the first belongs to it in so far as it is contrary to justice, which allots to each one what is his own. And in this respect, it belongs to [theft] that it ‘usurps another's thing’. The second [contributing factor] pertains to the ratio of theft so far as [theft] is distinguished from sins against the person, such as homicide and adultery. And in this respect, it belongs to theft that it is about a ‘thing possessed’. For whoever takes something belonging to another which is not in some way a possession but [rather] in some way a part, as if he amputates a limb; or if he takes away a person [not a thing] related [to another], such as a daughter or wife, [this act] does not properly have the ratio of theft. The third difference completes the ratio of theft, namely that another's thing is taken ‘secretly’. And according to this, the proper ratio of theft is the ‘secret taking of another's thing [possession]’.285 This passage is a careful examination of the ratio of theft. (Thomas doesn't use the term ‘object’ here, but the ratio of an action seems to mirror the object's ratio, as we will see in the next section.) Thomas analyses the ratio of theft into constitutive elements (as the ratio of faith's object was analysed into (1) God as (2) first truth (3) not appearing).286 The term ‘difference’ (differentia) is used to name the conditions which make up this ratio. ‘Difference’ is precisely the same word which Aquinas uses to describe those formal aspects which further determine the genera of natural corporeal creatures, as when in a human being, ‘rational’ is a (specific) difference for ‘animal’ (see Chapter 3). The first definitional element of theft, according to Aquinas, is that it involves the ‘taking of another's thing’. This aspect of the ratio demonstrates that theft is against a particular good of reason, namely

285

286

‘Respondeo dicendum quod ad rationem furti tria concurrunt. Quorum primum convenit sibi secundum quod contrariatur iustitiae, quae unicuique tribuit quod suum est. Et ex hoc competit ei quod usurpat alienum. Secundum vero pertinet ad rationem furti prout distinguitur a peccatis quae sunt contra personam, sicut ab homicidio et adulterio. Et secundum hoc competit furto quod sit circa rem possessam. Si quis enim accipiat id quod est alterius non quasi possessio, sed quasi pars, sicut si amputet membrum; vel sicut persona coniuncta, ut si auferat filiam vel uxorem, non habet proprie rationem furti. Tertia differentia est quae complet furti rationem, ut scilicet occulte usurpetur alienum. Et secundum hoc propria ratio furti est ut sit occulta acceptio rei alienae’: II–II, q. 66, a. 3, cor.

For other illustrations of how various differences can be considered in the ratio of an object, see Aquinas's account of hope, both as a passion (I–II, q. 40, a. 1, cor) and as a virtue (De Virtut., q. 4, a. 4, cor); I will discuss the first in more detail in Ch. 7.

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justice (rather than, say, temperance). Justice demands that each person should be given his or her due, and the fact that one takes what belongs to ‘another’ violates this norm which reason establishes concerning the proper distribution of goods and regulation of exchanges. A second difference further determines the ratio of theft by identifying what has been taken: theft regards things possessed rather than persons.287 This aspect separates theft from certain other sins against justice. For instance, in addition to a person's possessions, injustice can be about the very substance of a person, as when someone takes away another's life or bodily integrity; it can be about dignity, as when someone besmirches another's good name; it can be about a person closely related, as when someone usurps another's wife or servant. Thus, from the many ‘things’ which justice can be about, theft names only that sin which regards another's possessions. Finally, the difference which completes the ratio of theft is that another's possession is appropriated ‘secretly’. Since ‘secretly’ seems to name the way in which something is taken (rather than what is taken), one might rightly wonder why this factor should be pertinent to determining its species. Aquinas explains that in cases of injustice, one of the essential characteristics is that the taking be against the victim's will.288 The truth of this insight becomes apparent if one considers the many actions where another's property is taken but where no theft occurs: for instance, buying and selling, loaning,

287 As is the case with the word ‘thing’ in English, the Latin word res can be used very flexibly. In some contexts, for instance, res can be used to refer to a person, as when Aquinas says that the wrongfulness of adultery lies in the inordinate use of ‘another's res’ (‘In adulterio enim, secundum quod est contra justitiam, attenditur usus inordinatus, scilicet rei aliena’: III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 4a, cor). This is one reason why Thomas must specify in his explanation of theft that a res must not/does not, in this case, refer to a person. 288

See I–II, q. 94, a. 5, ra 2. Just as Thomas recognizes cases where ‘taking another's thing’ is not wrong because the owner is willing to let the thing be taken, he also recognizes cases where taking from an ‘unwilling’ subject is morally acceptable because the property in question does not really belong to him. For instance, Aquinas shows that when the state appropriates a person's ‘property’ against his will as a punishment, this is not theft but restitution, since the thing taken no longer belongs to the subject, strictly speaking: ‘[I]llud quod alteri non debetur, non est proprie loquendo ejus, etsi aliquando ejus fuerit;…res materialiter eadem est: non tamen est eadem secundum formalem rationem, quam respicit justitia, quod est esse suum alicujus’: II–II, q. 62, a. 1, ra 1; see also cor.

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depositing, and using property as a pledge.289 What these kinds of action have in common is that the full consent of the one giving up a possession is taken for granted. Given, then, that the victim's involuntariness is essential to injustice, Aquinas reasons that further determinations of ‘taking another's thing’ will be found whenever there are morally relevant differences in the way such involuntariness occurs. Two ways of foiling an agent's will are noted: force and ignorance. These two factors determine two species of seizure of possessions: robbery, where force is the modus operandi, and theft, where the victim is initially ignorant of his loss (it is secret).290 With this final difference, Thomas is able to express the ratio of theft completely: ‘the secret taking of another's possession’. When the specification of natural creatures was treated in Chapter 3, it was shown how species could be categorized using the various genera and differences to reveal more clearly the distinctions among them. In a similar way, a number of species of injustice can be catagorized; the ratio of theft can be seen more clearly when compared with differences defining other unjust actions. Although Figure 1 does not include all possible actions against justice, it nevertheless illustrates how some of them are defined and categorized according to their distinctive rationes by Thomas in the Summa.291 Each sin listed above is first included in injustice because it involves the taking of what belongs to another; it is then further divided according to the kind of thing taken and the kind of involuntariness. Thomas considers these differences to be proper to sins or vices regarding injustice, and thus, he believes this division to be per’se.292

289

See II–II, q. 61, a. 3, cor.

290

II–II, q. 66, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 73, a. 1, ra 1; II–II, q. 66, a. 3, ra 1.

291

The differences necessary for these divisions can all be found in II–II, q. 61, a. 3, cor. Although Thomas names ‘openly’ and ‘secretly’ as specifying features here and claims elsewhere that they apply generally to involuntary commutations (II–II, q. 73, a. 1, ra 1), he only uses them in his particular treatment of vices in the Secunda Secundae to distinguish species for two related pairs: theft and robbery (II–II, 66, 4, cor); backbiting and reviling (II–II, q. 73, a. 1, cor). By ‘stealthy injuring’, Thomas seems to have in mind actions such as secretly poisoning someone. 292

One could, of course, look to examples other than justice or injustice to observe how objects help to classify human actions and habits. For another illustration, see Aquinas's treatment of how the various virtues disposing the passions are determined by their respective objects (I–II, q. 60, a. 5).

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(2) The comparison between the formal aspect of the object and the rule for right action So Thomas does not always depict the formal ratio of an object in the same way. For instance, in the case of the power of taste, the ratio is a certain characteristic of what is being tasted, namely its flavour, and nothing else is necessary in terms of the object to make a determination of this power's species. In the case of vision, however, the situation is a little more complex: not only is colour required, but a second formal aspect, light, is also necessary for colour to be visible. An analysis of an object of moral action reveals that its formal ratio frequently bears more resemblance to the latter of these two examples. Although the formal ratio of a moral object is a characteristic belonging to it (for instance, a thing willed really can be ‘one's own’ or ‘someone else's’), this ratio is recognized on account of its relation to something beyond itself: as colour becomes visible through light, the formal aspect of an object becomes apparent through a comparison of this object to a standard of reason which transcends and measures it.

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Because this comparison to reason plays such a central role in identifying an object's ratio in human action, a more precise understanding of it is worth seeking. Unfortunately, although Thomas mentions this comparison in general terms in his texts concerning objects,293 he does not explain it in detail. He does, however, have texts which consider the comparison of the rule of reason to human actions (without alluding much to object).294 Why might he present the comparison in this way? A probable reason is that Thomas is abbreviating his fuller account. Rather than explaining, first, how the rational standard identifies the formal aspect of an object, then, second, how this formal aspect specifies a human action, Aquinas passes over the discussion of objects and simply speaks about a rational standard measuring human actions. An attentive consideration of Thomas's texts about the comparison of human actions to the rule of reason, then, can help us to fill in how Thomas understands the comparison of right reason to an object. So how is a human action related to the rule of reason? Aquinas holds that a human action possesses a natural determinateness of sorts even apart from any comparison to right reason. For instance, an action can be described as ‘taking something’, or ‘killing’, and so forth; such species do not imply moral goodness or evil. When an action is considered in relation to right reason, however, the action is placed in a very different light: this standard of reason helps to define the action in a new way, identifying certain features of it as significant from a moral perspective, and defining the human action in a moral species, such as ‘theft’ or ‘murder’. A good text to introduce Aquinas's understanding of the application of such a rule to human action comes from his Commentary on the Sentences; it describes how an act of justice is measured: [E]very equality constituted through some action requires some rule according to which this equalization is made. [W]hence, since justice consists in this, that it constitutes equality in giving or receiving through some action, it

293 294

For instance, see De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, cor.

‘[P]eccatum nihil aliud est quam actus humanus malus…Habet autem actus humanus quod sit malus, ex eo quod caret debita commensuratione. Omnis autem commensuratio cuiuscumque rei attenditur per comparationem ad aliquam regulam, a qua si divertat, incommensurata erit’: I–II, q. 71, a. 6, cor; see also I–II, q. 72, a. 4, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 13, ra 5.

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is necessary for all justice to have some rule according to which this equalization is made. The rules of justice, however, are rationes constituted in the mind, according to which the just man constitutes equality; and therefore when his actions are concordant with these rationes, he is said to preserve justice; when however they are discordant [with them], he is said to act unjustly.295 Aquinas's depiction of ratio in this passage is noteworthy. The ratio here seems to be a conceptual grasp of what constitutes the good of justice; that is, an understanding of what is essential to a just (or opposed in an unjust) action. This ratio is then used to measure particular actions. In a different text, Thomas says that the rule of human actions contains ‘principles of right by which a good work is regulated’.296 What might a ratio or ‘principle of right’ look like? As we have seen, Thomas in his writings sometimes explains what is necessary for the good of justice to be realized or opposed. Some such articulations are general, as when justice is defined as ‘a perpetual and constant will for giving to each person his own right’;297 other expressions are more particular, such as the precept opposing murder, ‘the innocent and just one you shall not kill’.298 Now Thomas in the Sentences passage above presents rationes as directly measuring actions with regard to justice, but we can easily expand on his explanation to show how the formal ratio of an object might fit in. That the same word, ratio, is used of the standard and of the object's formal character strongly suggests a relation. As noted,

295

‘[O]mnis aequalitas per actionem aliquam constituta requirit aliquam regulam secundum quam adaequatio fiat; unde cum justitia consistat in hoc quod aequalitatem per suam actionem constituat in dationibus et acceptionibus; oportet omnem justitiam aliquam regulam habere secundum quam adaequatio fiat. Regulae autem justitiae sunt rationes in mente constitutae, secundum quas homo justus aequalitatem constituit; et ideo, quando ejus actiones illis rationibus concordant, dicitur justitiam servare; quando autem discordant, dicitur injuste agere’: IV Sent., d. 46, q. 1, a. 1c, cor.

296

‘Est autem aliud bonum opus etiam virtutem antecedens, quod virtutem acquisitam causat, et ad infusam disponit, ut patet in eo qui justa operatur non sicut justus, quia indelectabiliter; et talis operatio naturalem perfectionem rationis non excedit, quia tota rectitudo hujus operis est secundum regulam rationis, in qua sunt principia juris, quibus opus bonum regulatur…’: II Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, ra 5.

297

‘[P]erpetua, et constans voluntas jus suum unicuique tribendi’: II–II, q. 58, a. 1, tt. Thomas approves of this definition, but then reformulates it slightly to refer to the habit of justice: II–II, q. 58, a. 1, cor.

298

II–II, q. 64, a. 6, sc; see also cor; II–II, q. 122, a. 6, cor.

Object

121

the ratio in the standard as presented above seems to be a conceptual grasp of just and unjust kinds of actions. The ratio of an object seems to be this same formality understood as belonging to a goal of an agent's willing. For instance, adultery can be defined as ‘having intercourse with another's spouse’, since this phrase expresses what essentially constitutes this kind of unjust sexual encounter. This same expression can also be styled as the ratio of adultery's object, since willing any action with this formal aspect would determine the action to be adultery. This ratio of adultery can measure the particulars of persons who might be involved. Suppose a man considers ‘having intercourse’ (an action's pre-moral species) as a possible goal. The woman considered as a potential partner might be of a certain height, smoke a certain brand of cigarettes, have a boarding school education, and be someone else's wife. The ratio or intelligible grasp of what constitutes just and unjust sexual relations permits the agent to realize that of all the many possible conditions of this action, it is the fact that the woman is ‘someone else's’ (not her height, etc.) which determines that adultery would be committed if this action were chosen. If the agent decides to have relations with the woman in spite of what the comparison to right reason has revealed, the particular act of sexual relations which comes to be on account of this choosing will have the ratio (or definition) of adultery, since it will be a voluntary commitment to (and execution of) an action which is known to be opposed to just sexual relations between spouses. If this account is correct, we see how ratio in this illustration can be envisioned in different ways: what is essential to adultery can be a ratio in the mind (standard), a ratio of the object (formal aspect), a ratio of a particular action (defining features). Which sense of ratio is understood will depend on how a moral action is being considered. Clearly the notion of ‘comparing’ or ‘measuring’ is important to this process. Aquinas calls ‘rationes constituted in the mind’ a rule (regula), and rules are applied to something. In other texts, Thomas offers some analogies to help illustrate this notion of comparison. He likens the ‘measuring’ of a moral action to the work of an artist: just as a craftsman uses the form of an artefact in his mind to make something, so a person can use a certain ratio pre-existing in his

122

Object

mind to bring forth a just action.299 He also compares this measuring to human well-being: just as a person is called healthy through the perfect commensuration of his humours to his own nature, so a human action is perfect when it is entirely in conformity with its rule.300 Much can be learnt about Thomas's understanding of the rule and the process of comparison (or measurement) by examining how he treats the rule for different kinds of human actions. Aquinas says in the Commentary on the Sentences above that a just man tries to establish an ‘equalization’ (adaequatio) in applying the rule. This raises the important issue of the mean. Aquinas says on many occasions that the good of human actions comes through the establishment of a mean.301 The Sentences passage gives the impression that the ratio is the very factor through which the mean (equalization) is established. In spite of the plausibility of such a conclusion, other texts might seem to call such a presumption into question. We can understand the problem of setting a mean in human actions better by comparing how the mean is established in various kinds of virtue. In justice, the mean is set by establishing an equality. A person who sells goods to another should receive in payment something equal in value. Justice ought to dispose an agent for finding this amount, and anything above or below violates the mean (too much or too little). But following Aristotle, Thomas states that virtues regarding the passions should not dispose for an exact equality between extremes: fortitude, for instance, is best disposed by inclining the irascible appetites towards activity, even as temperance ought to set the concupiscible appetites closer to restraint. But why move away from the mean between extremes? The strategy employed by Thomas is akin to a person's shifting his body weight towards an oncoming force to brace himself: a person who is aware of the

299

‘[S]icut eorum quae per artem exterius fiunt quaedam ratio in mente artificis praeexistit, quae dicitur regula artis; ita etiam illius operis iusti quod ratio determinat quaedam ratio praeexistit in mente, quasi quaedam prudentiae regula’: II–II, q. 57, a. 1, ra 2; see also I–II, q. 64, a. 1, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 13, cor.

300

‘[S]icut enim bonum sanitatis consistit in quadam commensuratione humorum per convenientiam ad naturam animalis, ita bonum virtutis consistit in quadam commensuratione humani actus secundum convenientiam ad regulam rationis’: I–II, q. 73, a. 3, cor.

301

See, for instance, I–II, q. 64.

Object

123

powerful aversion caused by certain fearsome objects, such as danger of death, or the strong attraction of sexual pleasure, should adjust his disposition in anticipation of encountering such a potent object. This insight about courage and temperance naturally raises a question: if these two cardinal virtues do not reflect equality between extremes as justice seems to, then how can Thomas insist that all virtues respect a mean? This question provides an opportunity for Thomas to express an important truth about how the standard for human actions brings equality to them: [T]he mean is understood in something in two ways. In one way from a comparison to the extremes of the same thing, as the middle (medium) in a circle; and it is necessary for such a mean that it stand equally distant from the extremes. Another way is from a comparison to some rule beyond it; and then it is not necessary that the mean stand equally apart from the extremes, but that it be equal to the rule: as it is clear that when wood is cut according to some rule, there is not always as much taken away as there is left: and such a mean is the mean of moral virtue, which has right reason through a rule: whence sometimes it approaches more to one extreme than to another, so far as it belongs to the rule of reason.302 In this text, Thomas makes a significant point: the proper mean in all cases of morality should only be judged with respect to how well it conforms to the standard of reason measuring it. The differences in the various virtues mentioned above help to show why this is so. Although it is true that in commutative justice there is a mean regarding things (for instance, in buying and selling, one strives for an equality in exchange), there is also a second mean with respect to the standard of reason: it just so happens that in commutative justice, the mean according to reason is established in the action precisely

302

‘[M]edium accipitur in aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo ex comparatione ad extrema ejusdem rei, sicut medium in circulo; et tale medium oportet quod aeque distet ab extremis. Alio modo ex comparatione ad aliquam regulam extra; et tunc non oportet quod medium aeque distet ab extremis, sed quod aequetur regulae: sicut patet quod quando secatur lignum ad aliquam regulam, non semper tantum aufertur quantum dimittitur: et tale medium est medium virtutis moralis, quae habet rectam rationem pro regula: unde quandoque appropinquat plus uni extremo quam alteri, secundum quod competit rationi rectae’: III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3a, ra 2; see also cor. Looked at from the point of view of reason, this adequation can also be considered as an extreme, since it is the very perfection of conformity: I–II, q. 64, a. 1, ra 1.

124

Object

when this real mean or equality is discovered ‘in things’ (in the objective arrangement of persons, actions, and things).303 But in other virtues, this concurrence need not be the case.304 When one seeks the good of reason in regulating the passions through courage and temperance, the agent's goal should not be that the passions be equally placed between extremes like cowardice and daring, or insensitivity and overindulgence. Rather, the good sought is the good of right reason, namely, to dispose the passions in the most effective way possible so that they contribute to and do not hinder the performance of good deeds.305 Since courage is more likely to accomplish this goal by disposing the irascible appetites more towards activity (and the converse for temperance), it is proper to set these virtues more towards such an extreme.306 It is important to emphasize again that, even though the dispositions of these passions are not equally distant from their extremes, they are not thereby in violation of Aquinas's understanding of the mean for human virtue.307 In fact, the only way in which the passions can achieve this mean, harmony with the rule of reason, is to abandon the mean between the various extremes.308 Thomas in his passage above once again likens the measurement of a human action to a work created by a craftsman. The perfection of an artisan's work lies not in whether the wood is

303

See II–II, q. 58, a. 10, ag and ra 1.

304

‘[I]n aliis virtutibus moralibus accipitur medium secundum rationem, et non secundum rem. Sed in iustitia accipitur medium rei…’: II–II, q. 61, a. 2, ra 1.

305

‘Iustitia autem est huius boni factiva, inquantum scilicet ad ipsam pertinet ordinem rationis ponere in omnibus rebus humanis. Aliae autem virtutes sunt conservativae huius boni, inquantum scilicet moderantur passiones, ne abducant hominem a bono rationis’: II–II, q. 123, a. 12, cor. Thomas also thinks that a good man should co-opt his sensitive appetites into supporting his good actions where possible (II–II, q. 123, a. 10, cor).

306

There are also other virtues and vices where Thomas supports the primary importance of the mean of reason at the expense of a real mean in things: see, for instance, his analysis of magnanimity and magnificence: I–II, q. 64, a. 1, ra 2; II–II, q. 134, a. 1, ra 2; meanness: II–II, q. 135, a. 1, ra 1; poverty: SCG 3, c. 134, n. 7, n. 12; magnanimity, virginity, poverty, fasting: De Malo, q. 14, a. 1, ra 6. 307

‘Omne autem regulatum, in quantum est huiusmodi, habet rationem medii; quod autem a regula discedit, aut superfluum aut diminutum est’: De Virtut., q. 4, a. 1, ra 7.

308

‘Medium autem in passionibus virtus moralis constituit…non secundum quantitatem rei, sed secundum quantitatem proportionis, ut scilicet passio non excedat regulam rationis’: III, q. 46, a. 6, ra 2.

Object

125

equidistant from some central point, he notes, but rather in whether the artefact conforms perfectly to the preconceived pattern in the mind of the artisan.309 Just so, the mean or equality of moral virtue is ruled according to those rationes which are a standard for right action, and not according to any other measure. The need for human actions to conform to a rule can also be illustrated, though in a different way, through the theological virtues. In this passage from De Virtutibus, Thomas explains the regulation of faith, hope, and charity: [M]oral virtues consist in a mean, because it pertains to moral virtue to attain the rule of reason concerning its proper and per’se object, namely concerning human passions and operations.…But theological virtues have for an object the first unruled rule itself. And therefore it is sufficient for the ratio of this virtue to attain its rule to whatever extent it can. Thus, concerning its operation with respect to its proper and formal object, a theological virtue does not consist in a mean.310 In justice, a mean is established in two senses (in the exchange and in relation to the standard); in courage and temperance, in only one sense (in relation to the standard); but here in faith, hope, and charity, there is no mean at all, even for those who excel in these virtues.311 How can this be? Theological virtues, unlike moral virtues, are ruled by God himself as their object. An equality in faith, hope, and charity could be achieved if people could attain the formal ratio of the objects of these virtues perfectly, but since these rationes are certain aspects of God himself, such as his truth and goodness, such an endeavour is humanly impossible. People can never believe in, hope in, or love God as much as he ought to be; much less can they

309

Thomas also compares good human acts to a well-made coat: ‘In omnibus autem regulatis et mensuratis bonum consideratur per hoc quod aliquid propriam regulam attingit, sicut dicimus vestem esse bonam quae nec excedit nec deficit a debita mensura’: II–II, q. 17, a. 1, cor.

310

‘[V]irtutes morales consistunt in medio, quia ad virtutem moralem pertinet attingere regulam rationis circa proprium et per’se obiectum, scilicet circa passiones et operationes humanas…Sed virtus theologica habet pro obiecto ipsam primam regulam non regulatam. Et ideo sufficit qualitercumque attingere regulam ad rationem virtutis; propter quod secundum operationem ad proprium et formale obiectum virtus theologica in medio non consistit’: De Virtut., q. 4, a. 1, ra 7.

311

See III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3d, cor; I–II, q. 64, a. 4, cor, ra 2; II–II, q. 17, a. 5, ra 2; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 13, ra 5; q. 2, a. 2, ra 10, ra 13; Comm. Rom. 12, lc. 1.

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Object

do so to excess.312 Virtue can only be measured in the theological virtues by considering how close an agent comes to the unruled rule. Again, a mean or an equality does not determine the virtue, but reason's standard, which measures what is possible for human beings in this case. The passages just discussed, then, help to show how human actions are ruled by a standard and also give us a sense of how the ratio of an object fits into this picture. Actions of moral virtues, such as justice, courage, or temperance, are measured by certain rationes or principles in the mind. This standard is the only valid measure Aquinas uses to judge whether these actions or habits are virtuous or vicious, not placement between extremes. In the case of the theological virtues, God himself is the rule, since these virtues can only be realized to the extent that this transcendent object is attained. In all cases, Thomas can make the claim that human actions take their species from the rationes of their objects; this is true whether a ratio is identified by a comparison to some external rule (moral virtues), or whether a ratio of the object is a formal aspect of the very rule itself (theological virtues).

(3) The nature of the rule of reason in human action Although we have seen an initial presentation about the standard of right reason, an important question still needs to be answered. How does one discover it? When Thomas describes the rule for human actions, he usually mentions two complementary sources: (1) reason and (2) God's law (either eternal or divine).313 Both of these sources deserve further consideration; I will briefly address each of them here in turn.

312 313

I–II, q. 64, a. 4, cor; see also ra 2; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 13, ra 5.

‘In his vero quae aguntur per voluntatem, regula proxima est ratio humana; regula autem suprema est lex aeterna. Quando ergo actus hominis procedit in finem secundum ordinem rationis et legis aeternae, tunc actus est rectus, quando autem ab hac rectitudine obliquatur, tunc dicitur esse peccatum’: I–II, q. 21, a. 1, cor; see also I–II, q. 71, a. 6, cor; II–II, q. 8, a. 3, ra 3; II–II, q. 52, a. 2, cor; for reason and divine law, see; I–II, q. 63, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 74, a. 7, cor; I–II, q. 75, a. 1, cor, ra 3; I–II, q. 75, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 141, a. 2, ra 1; De Malo, q. 1, a. 3, cor, ra 13; q. 2, a. 1, cor; Comm. Rom., c. 2, lc. 2, ll. 124–7; reason informed by divine law: De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, cor; reason concerning oneself, reason concerning one's neighbour, and divine law: I–II, q. 72, a. 4, cor.

Object

127

Aquinas believes that reason contributes to human actions in different ways. One way is by ordering proportionate means for proper human ends; the virtue of prudence assures that reason is well disposed for carrying out this task.314 But, as we have seen, Aquinas also thinks that the term ‘reason’ can be used to refer to principles relevant to action which can be known by reason.315 When understood in this way, ‘reason’ can be considered as a rule because these principles can be used by human agents to help them discern the species of their actions and regulate them. Such principles form the body of what Thomas refers to as natural law.316 Aquinas shows that natural law has as its basis the human inclination to various human goods.317 But how does reason discover principles for human action from these inclinations? One can begin to answer this question by considering carefully Thomas's teaching on good itself.318 For our present purposes, the most important kind of good he defines is bonum honestum, ‘honest good’. This kind of good is attractive, according to Aquinas, not because it is useful or pleasant, but because it is desirable in itself. ‘Something is said to be honestum’, maintains Thomas, ‘in so far as it has a certain decorum from the order of reason; that however which is ordered according to reason is naturally suitable to man’.319 Aquinas's point here seems to be that a harmony of proper order exists in certain’situations, and only rational creatures, themselves capable of ordering things, can

314

I–II, q. 57, a. 4; a. 5.

315

‘[R]atio humana secundum se non est regula rerum, sed principia ei naturaliter indita, sunt quaedam regulae generales et mensurae omnium eorum quae sunt per hominem agenda, quorum ratio naturalis est regula et mensura…’: I–II, q. 91, a. 3, ra 2.

316

For the natural law (together with divine law) as a measure of human actions, see I–II, q. 95, a. 3, cor.

317

I–II, q. 94, a. 2, cor.

318

Aquinas's teaching on goods is more complex than our presentation suggests; the focus here will be on those goods of virtue for which precepts are a guide.

319

‘Dicitur enim aliquid honestum, sicut dictum est, inquantum habet quendam decorem ex ordinatione rationis. Hoc autem quod est secundum rationem ordinatum, est naturaliter conveniens homini. Unumquodque autem naturaliter delectatur in suo convenienti. Et ideo honestum est naturaliter homini delectabile…’: II–II, q. 145, a. 3, cor.

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appreciate the inherent goodness which such an arrangement may present.320 Keeping this point in mind, Thomas asserts further that virtuous human actions are desirable precisely because they possess the character of honest good.321Bonum honestum, then, explains why any of the cardinal virtues have appeal for us. Human beings desire justice, for instance, because they possess a natural inclination to see a proper harmony in activities concerning human relationships to persons and things.322 It should be emphasized that this attraction to justice is not limited to the personal good of possessing one's own things; it is instead an appreciation of the harmoniousness of a world in which all people have what is their own. The rational appeal of virtue is no less present when an agent is attracted to passions suitably managed so that they assist and do not hinder right action, as in someone possessing temperance or courage.323 These well-regulated passions possess a harmoniousness or beauty inherently desirable to a rational agent who can discern that particular order

320

‘[C]um autem bonum, secundum August. in lib. de Nat. Boni (cap. 3), consistat in ordine, necesse est specialem rationem boni considerari ex determinato ordine’: II–II, q. 109, a. 2, cor. Chereso recognizes the importance of the honest good for virtue, but seems to interpret its contribution somewhat differently than I do here: Cajetan Chereso, The Virtue of Honor and Beauty according to St. Thomas Aquinas: An Analysis of Moral Beauty (River Forest, Ill: [n.publ.], 1960), 36–51; for the Aristotelian background to this notion, see Joseph Owens, ‘Human Reason and the Moral Order in Aquinas’, Studia Moralia, 28 (1990), 155–73 (pp. 163–4). 321

‘Et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc consistit quod conversatio hominis, sive actio eius, sit bene proportionata secundum spiritualem rationis claritatem. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem honesti, quod diximus idem esse virtuti, quae secundum rationem moderatur omnes res humanas’: II–II, q. 145, a. 2, cor; ‘[H]onestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute’: II–II, q. 145, a. 1, cor; ‘Unde cum anima rationalis sit propria forma hominis, naturalis inclinatio inest cuilibet homini ad’hoc quod agat secundum rationem. Et hoc est agere secundum virtutem’: I–II, q. 94, a. 3, cor.

322

‘Actus enim hominis bonus redditur ex hoc quod attingit regulam rationis, secundum quam humani actus rectificantur. Unde cum iustitia operationes humanas rectificet, manifestum est quod opus hominis bonum reddit’: II–II, q. 58, a. 3, cor.

323

‘[Q]uod hoc ipsum quod est conformari rationi rectae est finis proprius cuiuslibet moralis virtutis, temperantia enim hoc intendit, ne propter concupiscentias homo divertat a ratione; et similiter fortitudo ne a recto iudicio rationis divertat propter timorem vel audaciam. Et hic finis praestitutus est homini secundum naturalem rationem, naturalis enim ratio dictat unicuique ut secundum rationem operetur’: II–II, q. 47, a. 7, cor; see also, for temperance: II–II, q. 141, a. 6, cor; for fortitude, II–II, q. 123, a. 12, cor.

Object

129

passions must have so that they are best suited to promoting the human good.324 To illustrate how rational goods can be recognized in a particular instance, we might consider again the action of ‘eating’. According to Thomas, the rule of reason dictates that certain goods should be respected when food is taken. One such good is corporal sustenance.325 A calculation which needs to be considered when pursuing this good is the amount of food which is proportionate to a particular person's body.326 But this physical measure does not stand alone as the rule; an action's relation to goods of virtue must also be assessed before deciding on a right amount. For instance, Thomas holds that intermittent fasting helps to realize the good of temperance (by moderating the concupiscible appetite) without unduly compromising sustenance of the body.327 While someone might contend that taking an amount of food smaller than what is called for by a person's body size is a violation of the corporal mean and disproportionate, Aquinas insists that fasting is perfectly proportionate, so long as one is regarding, not just body size, but the rule of right reason, which measures an action according to a number of different rational goods, including temperance.328 When a rationally attractive order is found in some state of affairs (as in a virtuous action or habit), the person discovering it can often conceptualize and express what essentially comprises this order or what opposes it. For instance, a person who transgresses against the good of properly ordered appetites by over-consuming violates a norm of temperance. This contravention of good could be formulated in a principle: ‘a pursuit of the pleasure in eating entailing a disproportionate consumption of food is wrong (and ought not to be done)’. Such a precept allows an agent to see clearly how the good of temperance can be violated amid all the other circumstances which are inevitably present in a particular act of eating. Once recognized,

324

‘[O]mnes passiones animae regulari debent secundum regulam rationis, quae est radix boni honesti’: I–II, q. 39, a. 2, ra 1; see also II–II, q. 162, a. 1, ra 2.

325

De Malo, q. 14, a. 1, ra 1; for sustaining of nature, see also II–II, q. 148, a. 5, ra 1.

326

De Malo, q. 14, a. 1, ra 2.

327

II–II, q. 147, a. 1, cor; Thomas also notes that fasting benefits people by freeing their minds for contemplation and providing a means of satisfaction for sins.

328

De Malo, q. 14, a. 1, ra 6.

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Object

such a principle helps an agent to regulate future actions, saving him or her from having to rediscover how temperance is found in’situations of eating over and over again through reflection on experience.329 Reason is not the only source for the standard of human actions: Aquinas clearly believes that God makes a significant contribution to the rule as well. God's influence on the rule can be seen in two ways, in so far as God is known (1) through natural reason and (2) through revelation.330 Aquinas maintains that those who know God through natural reason alone possess a rather limited understanding of Him. Even so, certain truths about God learnt in this way influence the standard for human actions. For instance, a careful consideration of order in the world can lead to the conclusion that a first intelligence must exist who is the source of all order.331 Since any situation where justice is found exhibits a certain kind of rational order, Thomas contends that this order of justice must also have been established through the creator's wisdom.332 Such a conclusion has a profound effect on Aquinas's understanding of natural law. For him, natural law should not be thought of as if it were based on some fortuitous order of nature having no discernible cause; instead, it should be defined precisely as our participation as rational creatures in God's eternal law by which he orders the universe.333 This deeper grounding of the natural law gives its precepts a new kind of rational desirableness: people are attracted not only to the virtuous goods

329

‘Praecepta enim legis cuiuslibet dantur de actibus virtutum’: I–II, q. 107, a. 1, ra 2.

330

A complete account of the measurement of human action should include a consideration of God in so far as he is our final end. The good of human virtue consists principally in its proper proportion to the final end, and consequently, union with God is the primary purpose of natural and divine law (II–II, q. 161, a. 5, cor); for natural law guiding to a due end, see I–II, q. 91, a. 2, cor; for divine law leading to eternal happiness, see I–II, q. 98, a. 1, cor.

331

I, q. 2, a. 3, cor; ra 2.

332

‘Et ideo primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis iustitiae, est sapientia divini intellectus, quae res constituit in debita proportione et ad se invicem, et ad suam causam: in qua quidem proportione ratio iustitiae creatae consistit’: De Veritate, q. 23, a. 6, cor.

333

‘Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura’: I–II, q. 91, a. 2, cor; see also ra 3.

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131

realized through natural law precepts, but also to the good of establishing a concord between their will and God's will (in so far as his will is expressed in his ordering of our goods).334 A second and more direct way in which God contributes to the standard for human actions is through his revelation of moral precepts, part of what Aquinas calls ‘divine law’. According to Thomas, God begins his disclosure of moral law in the Old Testament by revealing precepts regulating external human actions.335 Not surprisingly, he thinks that the most important of these precepts are contained in the Decalogue,336 but he is also careful to include moral precepts revealed elsewhere. For instance, Thomas shows that in addition to the sixth commandment forbidding adultery, the Old Testament includes regulations prohibiting prostitution and sins against nature.337 He argues that these two less central laws are implicitly contained in the sixth commandment, and that they have been made explicit in the books of Deuteronomy and Leviticus respectively thanks to Moses' wisdom as a lawgiver.338 All such precepts taken together form a substantial moral code, which, according to Thomas, continues to be valid even with the appearance of Christ.339 When he treats the New Law, Aquinas demonstrates how it enriches and fulfils what has been given in the Old. In an insight which differs considerably from conventional understandings of law, he contends that the Holy Spirit is the greatest law of the New Testament, that is, the most significant principle for regulating our human actions. Thomas takes seriously the notion that the third person of the Trinity is ‘a law written within our hearts’ through whose grace we are able to do good works.340 This singular supernatural gift gives rise to the need for further moral precepts: people are directed under the New Law, first, to do what is necessary to receive the Holy Spirit, as when they are adjured to be baptized and to celebrate the Eucharist, and second, to perform certain deeds which follow from the Spirit's grace, as when precepts prescribe that they should confess

334

I Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 4, cor; for the divine will as a norm, see also I–II, q. 19, a. 9, cor; De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, sc 2, cor.

335

I–II, q. 108, a. 2, cor.

336

I–II, q. 99, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 100, a. 3, cor.

337

I–II, q. 100, a. 11, cor.

338

I–II, q. 100, a. 3, cor.

339

I–II, q. 108, a. 3, ra 3.

340

I–II, q. 106, a. 1, cor.

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Object

Jesus as Lord. (The contrary to what these norms prescribe is, of course, forbidden, as when believers are directed not to deny Christ before men.341) Other precepts found in the New Testament bring to perfection the moral rule given in the Old. For instance, while the Old Law regulates external actions, the New Law provides additional norms regulating those inner actions from which external actions spring, as when Jesus prohibits not only murder, but anger which can give rise to murder.342 Once Aquinas's presentation of the moral precepts of divine law is laid out, one can easily compare them with precepts of natural law. Several kinds of human actions seem to be prescribed or prohibited by both: for instance, the divine commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’ appears to repeat reason's injunction that innocent life should not be taken. This duplication naturally leads to a question. Why would God bother revealing precepts if they are already available through natural law? Isn't this redundant? For Thomas, the answer to this question lies in the greater certainty and clarity which the divine law affords. Although reason is often sufficient for discerning precepts, especially when they are fundamental (for instance, Thomas notes that precepts of the Decalogue are most evident to reason);343 nevertheless, reason can sometimes falter, especially when considering contingent matters. As a consequence, doubt or confusion can arise. The divine law allows greater perfection, permitting us to pursue good (and avoid evil) confidently and free from error, especially in cases where reason hesitates.344 And what if it happens that precepts of natural and divine law should seem to contradict one another? Aquinas maintains that, whatever may appear to be the case, no real disparity can exist between these two rules. Natural law and divine law both ultimately rely on same divine source.345 The difference between them lies in the way they are known: natural law comes from understanding God's order discovered in the world, divine law from God's own communication of his ordering. Thomas is convinced that we should look to

341

I–II, q. 108, a. 1, cor; see also I–II, q. 106, a. 1, cor.

342

I–II, q. 107, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 108, a. 3, cor.

343

II–II, q. 122, a. 1, cor.

344

I–II, q. 91, a. 4, cor.

345

I–II, q. 19, a. 4, cor; see also III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1d, ra 2; I–II, q. 63, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 74, a. 7, cor; II–II, q. 8, a. 4, ra 3.

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divine law for a final determination in cases of apparent contradiction; what comes directly from God will always prove more reliable than what people discover through their potentially fallible reasoning.346 In sum, then, Aquinas believes that human beings have a God-given natural inclination to intelligible good(s) which forms the basis for their practical reasoning. The intelligible character or ratio of these goods (or what opposes them) can be understood and expressed in the form of precepts. These precepts come from two sources: reason (natural law) and revelation (divine law). Human agents can take these conceptual expressions of morally good (and evil) kinds of actions and compare them to prospective objects of the will in order to determine whether these objects have any relevant conditions (rationes) which make them morally right or wrong to pursue. These objects, in their turn, specify individual human actions if chosen.

3. Object as a Proximate End, and How it can be Distinguished from Object as Dened by a Formal Ratio In this section, a third meaning of object is introduced. It sometimes happens that Thomas must describe a state of affairs where one end is being sought for the sake of another. When doing so, he sometimes refers to the further goal as a ‘remote end’ and to the more immediate goal as a ‘proximate end’. On a number of occasions, however, Thomas refers to these two related goals employing somewhat different terminology: he uses ‘end’ by itself to mean the further goal and ‘object’ to mean the more immediate or proximate goal.347 This third sense of object can be recognized in his writings in a few ways.

346 347

I–II, q. 19, a. 4, cor.

This sense of object has been noted before by other authors. See Finnis, ‘Object and Intention’, 13, along with citations in n. 30; see also Karl Hörmann, ‘Das Objekt als Quelle der Sittlichkeit’, in L. J. Elders and K. Hedwig (eds.), The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Proceedings of the Third Symposium on St. Thomas Aquinas' Philosophy, Rolduc, November 5 and 6, 1983, Studi Tomistici, 25 (Vatican City: Pontifica Accademia di S. Tommaso e di Religione Cattolica, 1984), 118–32 (pp. 122–3).

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Passages where Thomas says explicitly that an object is a proximate end are relatively rare. For this reason, a reader will likely first encounter this sense of object in a text where Thomas presumes rather than proposes this meaning. An example of such a text can be found in I-II, q. 18, a. 7, ‘Whether the species which is from an end is contained under the species which is from an object, as under a genus, or vice versa?’ Although the corpus of this article does not define ‘object’ and ‘end’, it does give a number of examples which assist an interpreter in understanding Thomas's meaning. Aquinas identifies three hypothetical instances where what is specified by an ‘object’ is ordered to an ‘end’: (1) ‘fighting well’ ordered to ‘victory’; (2) ‘taking someone else's thing’ ordered to ‘almsgiving’; and (3) ‘stealing’ ordered to ‘committing adultery’.348 In each of these three examples, ‘object’ seems to refer to what gives the species to the immediate goal,349 while ‘end’ refers to the agent's purpose (remote goal). When presented in this way, obiectum certainly seems to be functioning as a proximate end. If one were to consider I-II, q. 18, a. 7 together with the many other texts where Thomas relates object and end in a similar way,350 their collective witness would in itself be sufficient to establish that Aquinas sometimes understands obiectum as a proximate end. But even more compelling evidence exists in a few key texts where Thomas explicitly asserts that object is to be understood as a proximate end. Presently, we will consider two somewhat different ways in which Thomas makes this significant identification.

348

There is an additional example in the sed contra, where Thomas says that ‘theft’ can be ordered to ‘many possible good or bad ends’.

349

In examples (1) and (2), Thomas uses the more particular phrase ‘object of the exterior action’: ‘obiectum exterioris actus dupliciter potest se habere ad finem voluntatis, uno modo, sicut per’se ordinatum ad ipsum, sicut bene pugnare per’se ordinatur ad victoriam; alio modo, per accidens, sicut accipere rem alienam per accidens ordinatur ad dandum eleemosynam’: I–II, q. 18, a. 7, cor.

350

For examples of object and end related as proximate and remote end in the same passage, see I Sent., d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, ex.; III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 1, cor, ra 2, ra 5, ra 8; d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, ra 6; IV Sent., d. 38, q. 2, a. 2b, cor; I–II, q. 18, pr.; I–II, q. 18, a. 4, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 6, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 7, sc, cor, ag and ra 1, 2, 3; I–II, q. 19, a. 2, ra 1; I–II, q. 19, a. 7, ag and ra 1; I–II, q. 19, a. 8, cor; I–II, q. 88, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 11, a. 1, ra 2; II–II, q. 19, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 110, a. 1, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 2; q. 7, a. 4, cor; q. 8, a. 1, ag and ra 4; Rep. Matt., c. 12, lc. 2; for examples where object (proximate end) is related to God as ultimate end, see III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, ra 5; d. 33, q. 1, a. 2d, ag and ra 4; d. 33, q. 2, a. 1b, cor, ag and ra 1, ra 2; d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, cor; De Veritate, q. 22, a. 6, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, cor; q. 2, a. 5, ra 2.

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One particularly clear passage can be found in De Malo. An objection in q. 2, a. 4, attempts to discredit Aquinas's position that some actions can be good or evil from their end. The argument begins by recalling that diverse kinds of actions can be directed to a single end. (Although Thomas doesn't offer an example, one can easily think of a hypothetical case where ends such as ‘earning money’ and ‘stealing’ are both directed to a single further end such as ‘almsgiving’.) Now if it were true that ends give actions their species, reasons the objection, then it would seem that actions of a very different character would all be drawn into the single moral species of the single end to which they are directed. (To refer back to the case above, although ‘earning money’ and ‘stealing’ have a distinct and easily identifiable moral character, both would have to be identified as ‘almsgiving’ if specified by this end.) By this reasoning, the objection concludes that Aquinas's teaching about ends specifying is untenable. In order to answer this challenge, Aquinas must show why an end does not subsume diverse actions into its single species, and this requires a careful distinction between those ends which are relevant for specification and those which are not: Ends are twofold: proximate and remote. The proximate end of an act is the same as its object, and from this [an act] receives its species. From the remote end, however, [an act] does not have its species; but the order to such an end is a circumstance of an act.351 Thomas disarms the objection by uncovering a false supposition: the objection's argument assumes that the end relevant to specification in this case is the ‘remote’ end, while Thomas considers it to be the ‘proximate’ end. The remote end, says Thomas, is only a circumstance which does not determine a species as the objection alleges. Of course, Aquinas's argument here is of interest for its own sake; it will be explored more thoroughly in Chapter 9 where I will attempt to sort out how proximate and remote ends contribute to specification. For present purposes, what is significant is the identification Thomas makes in the course of his response. In the context of this

351

‘[D]uplex est finis: proximus et remotus. Finis proximus actus idem est quod obiectum, et ab hoc recipit speciem. Ex fine autem remoto non habet speciem; sed ordo ad talem finem est circumstantia actus’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 9.

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careful distinction between ends, he identifies the proximate end (which specifies) as the action's object. One can find Thomas offering this insight (using like terminology) in four or five other texts as well.352 Such assertions express explicitly what is only implied in passages such as I-II, q. 18, a. 7, cor. There is another, somewhat different way in which Thomas explicitly recognizes obiectum as a proximate end. The text which follows appears in an article where Thomas is considering the question of whether the will ought to be judged right from its end: [I]t does not follow that a will is good if its end is good, because what is willed (volitum) can be evil, and for malice of a will it suffices that either its end or what is willed be evil. And although, in one way, it is the same act of the will which bears on (fertur) an end and to what leads to this end, nevertheless, ‘intention’ names this act in so far as it is ordered to its end, while ‘will’ names the same act so far as it is ordered to its proximate object (which itself is ordered to [this act's] end). Therefore, in such a case, the will is evil, while the intention is good.353 Aquinas's main aim in this article is to show that a voluntary act will be evil if either its means or end is evil. (To put the point in a positive way, both means and end must be good in order for a voluntary act to be good.) Again, the import of Aquinas's assertion will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 9. What is of interest at present is the terminology which he chooses for describing this situation: Thomas calls ‘what is willed’ (volitum) a ‘proximate object’ (obiectum proximum), and then shows how this volitum is further directed to an ‘end’.354 The adjective ‘proximate’ is clearly being used here by

352

For other texts where proximate ends are called objects, see II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, ra 5; II–II, q. 11, a. 1, ra 2; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 9; q. 2, a. 7, ra 8; for proximus terminus, see III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, ra 5. 353

‘[N]on sequitur, si finis est bonus, quod voluntas sit bona; quia potest esse id quod est volitum, malum, et unum tantum sufficit ad malitiam voluntatis, sive finis sive volitum sit malum: et quamvis uno modo sit idem actus voluntatis qui fertur in finem et in id quod est ad finem, tamen intentio nominat illum actum, secundum ordinem actus ad finem; sed voluntas nominat actum eumdem, secundum ordinem ad objectum proximum, quod in finem ordinatur: et ideo in tali casu voluntas est mala, sed intentio bona’: II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, cor.

354

Although this phrase ‘proximum obiectum’, which is found in five or six passages (see n. 178), seems to imply the existence of a ‘remotum obiectum’ as its counterpart, there is no known use of this phrase in any of Aquinas's completed works (though one can find ultimum obiectum; see II–II, q. 19, a. 12, ra 3). ‘Proximum’ here is not used by Aquinas to imply a distinction between two kinds of objects (proximate and remote), but rather is used to indicate the relative position of object with respect to end in this context.

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Thomas to indicate the relative situation of object with respect to end: object is a ‘closer’ goal (what is being done), while end is an agent's further aim. There are several other examples in Aquinas's writings where the word ‘proximate’ is used to specify obiectum's position in this same way.355 This text, then, reaffirms in its own way what all the preceding evidence has established, namely, that when Thomas uses ‘object’ in certain contexts, he intends it to be understood as an immediate goal as opposed to a remote one. This sense of object just presented is markedly different from the one discussed earlier where object is constituted by a formal ratio. Is there any place in Aquinas's writings where one can find him identifying and distinguishing clearly between these two senses? Although Thomas never directly explains the difference as we might wish, there is one virtue where he uses the two meanings of object described above in a way where the distinction between them is unmistakable. In examining the virtue of religion, Aquinas presents its object both in terms of its formal aspect and its function as a proximate end. Since it is rare for both meanings of ‘object’ to appear in a context where they can be easily discerned and contrasted, such a case is of obvious interest to our present study. First, consider the ‘object’ of religion as constituted by a formal ratio. A good text for observing this sense is found in the Summa where Aquinas is defining this virtue: ‘[H]abits are distinguished according to the diverse rationes of their respective objects. It pertains to religion however to exhibit reverence to the one God on account of one such ratio, namely, so far as he is the first principle of the creation and governance of things’.356 As we saw in section 2, each object

355

For other texts where Thomas uses the phrase ‘proximum obiectum’, see I Sent., d. 47, q. 1, a. 4, ra 2; II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, cor; d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 11, a. 1, ra 3; II–II, q. 110, a. 1, cor. For texts where a ‘proper object’ is said to be related to an end, see III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 1a, cor; d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, ra 5; d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, ag and ra 3; I–II, q. 63, a. 4, ag and ra 1; II–II, q. 11, a. 1, ra 2.

356

‘[H]abitus distinguuntur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Ad religionem autem pertinet exhibere reverentiam uni deo secundum unam rationem, inquantum scilicet est primum principium creationis et gubernationis rerum…’: II–II, q. 81, a. 3, cor.

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possesses a certain formal character or ratio; in this text, Thomas is attempting to discern what this ratio is for the object of religion. Since the theological virtues already include God in their definition, part of Aquinas's concern is to show that religion too has a distinctive aspect under which it regards God. So, as faith, hope, and charity approach God in so far as he is ‘first truth’, ‘of highest difficulty to attain’, and ‘highest good’, respectively, Aquinas shows here that religion approaches God in so far as he is ‘first principle of creation and governance’. This formal ratio, then, gives religion a unique identity and distinguishes it from other virtues which concern God.357 Though the positing of such a ratio might seem straightforward enough, a difficulty can arise concerning the relationship of religion's object to the objects of the theological virtues. To understand the source of this problem, Aquinas's scheme for classifying virtues must be recalled. Thomas in his ethical writings attempts to associate every virtue in some way to one of the seven primary virtues, which include the four cardinal virtues (justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude) and the three theological virtues (faith, hope, and charity). When the opportunity arises to classify religion, Thomas thinks it best to annex it to the virtue of justice; his reason is that he sees in religion a certain aspect of what is owed, justice's defining characteristic. Aquinas contends that, although religion cannot completely exhibit the ratio of justice, since no human person can fully repay God for creating and governing the universe, religion nonetheless has something of justice in it in that the honour paid to God returns in some small way the gifts he has given us. Convincing as such an argument might appear, a solid objection can be raised against it. Aquinas in other texts teaches that the difference between the theological and cardinal virtues is that the former have God for their object, while the latter are concerned with temporal human goods.358 Since religion clearly is about people's relationship to God, it appears to have the same object as faith, hope, and charity; hence, a strong counterclaim can be established that religion should be annexed to one of the theological virtues rather than to justice.

357

For more on the virtue of religion, see II–II, q. 80, cor; II–II, q. 81, a. 2, 3, 4.

358

I–II, q. 62, a. 2, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, cor.

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Thomas answers this objection by discriminating between the immediateness with which people relate to God through religion and through the theological virtues. In the context of this distinction, consider how Aquinas's use of the term ‘object’ takes on a second meaning: [I]t is religion which offers due worship to God. Two things, therefore, are considered in religion: one is what religion offers to God, namely worship, and this is related to religion as matter and object. Another is Him to whom…[this worship] is offered, namely God.…Whence, it is clear that God is not compared to the virtue of religion as its matter or object but as its end. And therefore religion is not a theological virtue, the object of which is the ultimate end, but a moral virtue, which concerns things conducive to [such an] end.359 Aquinas attempts to show in this passage why the object of the theological virtues is different from the object of religion. The object of faith, hope, and charity is God himself, so in any virtue which directly regards life's ultimate goal, object and end will always be the same.360 But religion presents a different picture: it is not directly about God, says Thomas, but about offering things to God. The object and end of religion can therefore be distinguished as separate elements, the object being ‘what is offered’, the end being God himself. Since in this way of describing religion, God is placed as a remote end, Thomas is reassured that religion need not be annexed to the theological virtues, all of which have God as their proximate end.361 One cannot help but notice the difference in the depiction of obiectum between the first passage quoted above and this present

359

‘[R]eligio est quae Deo debitum cultum affert. Duo igitur in religione considerantur. Unum quidem quod religio Deo affert, cultus scilicet, et hoc se habet per modum materiae et obiecti ad religionem. Aliud autem est id cui affertur, scilicet Deus.…Unde manifestum est quod deus non comparatur ad virtutem religionis sicut materia vel obiectum, sed sicut finis. Et ideo religio non est virtus theologica, cuius obiectum est ultimus finis, sed est virtus moralis, cuius est esse circa ea quae sunt ad finem’: II–II, q. 81, a. 5, cor.

360

‘[U]nde et theologicae dicuntur, quia Deum habent non solum pro fine, sed etiam pro objecto’: De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, cor.

361

For other passages concerning religion where Aquinas uses ‘object’ to signify a proximate end, see II–II, q. 81, a. 5, ra 2; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, ra 11; for object as proximate end in worship (a subspecies of religion), see III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1c, cor, ra 2.

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text. The passage which considers ‘object’ as defined by its ratio focuses on the distinctive aspect under which God is sought in religion, while the passage which considers object as a proximate end shows how ‘what is offered’ (object) is willed more immediately in religion than is its remote end, God. Notice that God, who is religion's ‘object’ in the first sense (understood according to a certain ratio), is deliberately excluded from ‘object’ as used in this second sense.362 Does this second meaning suggest a contradiction in Thomas's understanding of religion? Not necessarily. There is nothing inherently contradictory in the assertions that we worship God as the source of creation and governance, and that our relation to God in such worship is less immediate than our relationship to him in faith, hope, and charity. But there is a problem trying to express both these insights using Aquinas's terminology. Thomas's two meanings of object have here caught up with him in that each refers to a different reality in the virtue (and act) of religion. It would take some ingenuity to explain just what Thomas considers the specifying object of religion to be.

362

One of the reasons Thomas is able to employ these two senses of ‘object’ successfully is that each appears in a separate article of the Summa; hence, there isn't as much chance that they will be confused. Observe what happens, however, in Aquinas's Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate when an opportunity arises to consider both meanings of object in the very same passage: ‘[R]eligio est specialis virtus, in actibus omnium virtutum specialem rationem obiecti considerans, scilicet Deo debitum; sic enim est iustitiae pars…Ipsa tamen religio non est virtus theologica. Habet enim pro materia quasi ipsos actus vel fidei vel alterius virtutis, quos Deo tamquam debitos offert. Sed Deum habet pro fine. Colere enim Deum est huiusmodi actus ut debitos Deo offerre’: Comm. De Trin., ps. 2, q. 3, a. 2, co. 5. Note how in this passage Thomas uses matter (materia) to describe ‘what is offered’ to God in religion; in texts above, Thomas uses ‘object’ (obiectum) to describe this same reality. Indeed, this is the only text in Aquinas's writings about religion where ‘matter’ (materia) by itself is used to refer to ‘what is offered’. One cannot say for certain why Thomas expresses himself in this unusual way here, but there is a plausible explanation: Aquinas prefers an atypical use of the word ‘matter’ in this passage to the possible confusion which would result if ‘object’ were to be used in two senses in the very same text.

6 Matter In the previous chapter, it was noted that, when Thomas is considering objects carefully, he distinguishes between their formal and material aspects. Recall, for example, this passage: [I]t is clear that a power or habit relates per’se to the formal aspect of its object and per accidens to that which is material in its object. And since what is per accidens does not vary something, but only what is per’se, a power or habit is not diversified by the material diversity of its object but only by the formal diversity.363 Someone who examines this text and others like it364 would be liable to conclude that matter does not make an important contribution to specification of acts, habits, or powers in Aquinas. After all, the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘material’ suggested is based on whether a given aspect of an object plays an essential (per’se) or merely tangential (per accidens) role in diversifying a habit or power. Hence, by definition, the matter of an object seems inconsequential

363

‘Ex quo patet quod potentia vel habitus refertur ad formalem rationem obiecti per’se; ad id autem quod est materiale in obiecto, per accidens. et ea quae sunt per accidens non variant rem, sed solum ea quae sunt per’se: ideo materialis diversitas obiecti non diversificat potentiam vel habitum, sed solum formalis’: De Virtut., q. 2, a. 4, cor.

364 For other examples where Thomas uses ‘matter’ to refer to what is per accidens in the object with respect to specification, see III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 4a, cor; d. 27, q. 2, a. 4a, ra 3; I, q. 1, a. 3, cor; I, q. 59, a. 2, ra 2; I, q. 59, a. 4, cor; I, q. 80, a. 1, ra 2; I–II, q. 19, a. 10, ra 5; I–II, q. 54, a. 2, ra 1; II–II, q. 47, a. 5, cor; II–II, q. 59, a. 2, ra 1; II–II, q. 99, a. 2, cor; De Malo, q. 9, a. 2, ra 10; q. 12, a. 2, cor; De Anima, a. 15, ra 18; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 4, cor; q. 2, a. 13, ra 6; Quodl., n. 3, q. 12, a. 2, cor; Comm. Post. Anal. 1, lc. 41, n. 11.

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with respect to specification and only of passing interest in a study such as ours. But as we have already seen, Thomas often uses terms analogously, and ‘matter’ is a good case in point. Other texts seem to present a very different sense of matter in a moral context. Consider, for example, this selection from De Malo: The moral act, as was said, receives its species from its object so far as it is compared to reason; therefore, it is commonly said that certain acts are good or evil from their genus, and that an act which is good from its genus is one bearing on due matter, as to feed the hungry, while an act evil from its genus is one bearing on undue matter, as to take another's thing; for the matter of the act is called its object.365 What a different sense of matter a passage like this suggests; far from appearing inconsequential, matter here seems to be right at the centre of ethical determination. First, notice Aquinas's statement that ‘the matter of the act is called its object’. While someone might observe that the first passage above from De Virtutibus also associates matter and object, the differences in this De Malo passage are conspicuous: (1) Thomas does not restrict matter to a mere constituent of an object as in the initial text, but relates matter and object in an unqualified way; (2) in the examples of almsgiving and stealing suggested by Aquinas, matter assumes an object's role by determining an action's moral character. Such a strong association between matter and object is not unique to this passage, but is indicative of a way which Thomas has of relating these two terms throughout his ethical writings. While it is true that Thomas only rarely identifies matter as object in the explicit way which we find above,366 there are many passages where he

365

366

‘Actus autem moralis, sicut dictum est, recipit speciem ab obiecto secundum quod comparatur ad rationem; et ideo dicitur communiter, quod actus quidam sunt boni vel mali ex genere; et quod actus bonus ex genere, est actus cadens supra debitam materiam, sicut pascere esurientem; actus autem malus ex genere est qui cadit supra indebitam materiam, sicut subtrahere aliena; materia enim actus dicitur obiectum ipsius’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 5.

There are a few other texts where the identification is explicit, e.g. ‘[C]ircumstantia…non dat speciem actui morali, sed eius species sumitur ab obiecto, quod est materia actus’: II–II, q. 154, a. 1, cor; ‘[H]oc est quasi secundum causam materialem: obiectum enim est quasi materia actus’: De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, cor; ‘[M]ultotiens habitus cognoscitur a suo obiecto, quod est quasi materia obiecta operationi habitus’: Comm. Ethic. 5, lc. 1, n. 8.

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143

matter-of-factly alternates the two terms. For example, he says, ‘the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter or object’ and ‘the object or matter of liberality is money’, and many other like statements.367 That Thomas so frequently alternates object and matter indicates that he often took their synonymity for granted in certain contexts. A second important feature in this De Malo text is Aquinas's use of ‘due’ and ‘undue’ to modify the term ‘matter’. These two adjectives, which invoke the language of justice, intimate that matter in this passage has a meaning specially relevant to moral concerns. ‘Due’ and ‘undue’ are not the only words Thomas uses to qualify ‘matter’ in a moral context. For example, the phrase ‘matter about which’ is a second way Thomas has of identifying matter related to specification. A number of adjectives—‘proper’, ‘special’, ‘moral’, and ‘determinate’—are also used by Aquinas to designate a particular sense of ‘matter’ relevant to ethical concerns. (One cannot help but notice that some of these adjectives are also used to modify ‘object’.) This evidence suggests that ‘matter’ is a significant term in Aquinas's moral theory, a term which at times designates that very aspect of a human action which determines its moral kind. I will here attempt to identify the nature of this ‘specifying’ matter and look at Aquinas's explanations as to how matter can play this role in human action.

367

‘Oportet autem diversificare species virtutum secundum diversitatem materiae, vel object’ (*II–II, q. 143, cor); ‘objectum autem, sive materia liberalitatis est pecunia’ (*II–II, q. 117, a. 3, cor); for other examples where the terms object and matter are alternated, see II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, cor; *III Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1a, ra 2; d. 23, q. 2, a. 4a, cor; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, cor; d. 33, q. 2, pr.; d. 33, q. 2, a. 1a, cor; d. 33, q. 2, a. 1d, cor; d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, cor; IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1c, ra 2; d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, cor; d. 49, q. 1, a. 1a, ra 5; *SCG 1, c. 93, n. 2; I, q. 56, a. 1, cor; I–II, q. 66, a. 4, cor; *II–II, princ.; II–II, q. 58, a. 1, cor; II–II, q. 81, a. 5, cor; II–II, q. 95, a. 3, ra 2; II–II, q. 142, a. 3, cor; *II–II, q. 154, a. 1, cor; II–II, q. 181, a. 3, cor; III, q. 85, a. 3, ra 1; III, q. 90, a. 1, ra 3; De Veritate, q. 14, a. 2, cor; q. 14, a. 8, ra 13; q. 14, a. 9, sc. 1; q. 23, a. 7, cor; q. 25, a. 5, ra 10; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 5, *ra 11; q. 2, a. 6, cor; q. 2, a. 10, cor; q. 7, a. 1, cor; q. 10, a. 1, cor; q. 10, a. 2, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 13, cor; *Comm. Ethic. 2, lc. 8, n. 7; 3, lc. 3, nn. 9, 10, *n. 18.; 3, lc. 9, n. 1; 5, lc. 1, n. 80 (Passages marked by an asterisk explicitly mention that the matter or object is contributing to specification.)

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1. What ‘Matter’ Refers to in the Moral Act As we have just seen, ‘matter’ can have different meanings, even in ethical usage. Since specification is the primary concern of this work, our first challenge here will be to discern exactly what element of a human action Aquinas is referring to when he asserts that matter specifies. As I mentioned above, Thomas has two ways of identifying such matter: ‘matter about which’ and ‘due’ or ‘undue matter’. Each of these phrases will now be examined more closely in turn.

(i) ‘Matter about which’ Thomas uses the phrase ‘matter about which’ (materia circa quam) in a number of texts which address moral issues, and on several occasions, he explicitly associates it with object368 or specification.369 The best way to begin a discussion of ‘matter about which’ and its significance is to consider a certain answer to an objection from the Summa Theologiae in which this phrase appears. Question 18 of the Prima Secundae is the most important locus for Aquinas's discussion of the various elements which contribute to the determination of moral actions; the second article of this question focuses on how objects are involved in specification. The second objection in article 2 tests Aquinas with an argument of particular interest for our present concern. The objection begins with a

368

Materia circa quam is identified as object eight times: For a direct identification, see I–II, q. 18, a. 2, ra 2; II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, ra 4; I–II, q. 72, a. 3, ra 2; I–II, q. 73, a. 3, ra 1; De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, ra 5; I–II, q. 55, a. 4, cor. Thomas makes the attribution indirectly in Rep. Heb. 11, lc. 1, ll. 16–22, where he substitutes object and matter in successive sentences, and in IV Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 3, cor, where he identifies the matter about which in a general way, then gives an example where he calls it the object. It might also be mentioned that what is identified as the materia circa quam by Thomas in Table 2 is sometimes called object in other texts; e.g. (1) that either ‘fear and daring’ or ‘dangers of death’ are the object of fortitude: II–II, q. 129, a. 1, ra 2; II–II, q. 137, a. 1; Comm. Ethic. 2, lc. 8, n. 7; (2) that the object of temperance is pleasures of touch: II–II, q. 137, a. 1; II–II, q. 143, cor; Comm. Ethic. 2, lc. 8, n. 7. 369

Five times, Thomas says directly that the materia circa quam specifies an action: De Veritate, q. 20, a. 3, ra 3; I–II, q. 55, a. 4, cor; I–II, q. 72, a. 3, ra 2; I–II, q. 73, a. 3, ra 1; I–II, q. 18, a. 2, ra 2.

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significant assumption: the object is compared to the action as its matter. It then reminds us—it would seem with good reason—that it is form, rather than matter, which determines species. The objection concludes by drawing out the obvious implication: an object cannot determine a species for a human action as Aquinas supposes, because, as matter, it cannot do what only form can do. Thomas could have replied to this challenge in a number of ways. One simple riposte would have been to deny that objects are like matter, thereby undermining the objection's argument at its first step. Tellingly, Thomas takes a different approach: ‘[T]he object is not the matter out of which (materia ex qua) but the matter about which (materia circa quam), and has in a certain measure the aspect of form, in so far as it gives the species.’370 Note here how, in spite of the potential difficulties, Thomas does not deny the objection's premise that objects are like matter. Because he is willing to concede this point, Aquinas must resort to other means to rebut the objection's conclusion, and he does so by distinguishing between two kinds of matter: the ‘matter out of which’ and the ‘matter about which’. This distinction allows him to claim, in effect, that the objection's plaint can be dismissed as a case of mistaken identity. Thomas intimates that the objection would have been correct to argue that matter cannot specify if ‘matter out of which’ had been under consideration. Instead, he makes it clear that he has been operating under a different assumption: the matter in this context is ‘about which’ and demonstrates a likeness to form (and object) by determining species. This response of Aquinas in q. 18, a. 2, is of evident importance for identifying that matter pertinent to moral specification. What could be more revealing than a text where two senses of ‘matter’ are distinguished and only one is designated as capable of specifying? The problem is that, while we can understand in a formal way how Thomas is handling the objection, his succinct answer doesn't give a clear picture of what ‘out of which’ and ‘about which’ mean in this context.

370

‘Ad secundum dicendum quod objectum non est materia ex qua, sed materia circa quam: et habet quodammodo rationem formae, inquantum dat speciem’: I–II, q. 18, a. 2, ra 2.

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The obvious next step is to look for other texts where Thomas identifies these two senses of matter more exactly. Unfortunately, Thomas never seems to define or describe what he means by ‘matter about which’, the more crucial of the two phrases for our investigation. He does, however, give a more precise account of what he means by matter ‘out of which’. Aquinas's definition appears not in a context of morals, but in a context of natural philosophy: ‘[There is a noteworthy difference between kinds of potency]…what is in potency to substantial being is called the matter out of which (materia ex qua), while what is in potency to accidental being is called the matter in which (materia in qua).’371 In this passage, Thomas is attempting to describe the principles which constitute natural corporeal creatures. As I noted in Chapter 3, Aristotle and Aquinas believe such beings to be composed of two co-principles, matter and form, matter being the principle of potency, and form, of actuality. In the passage above, Thomas states that the materia ex qua refers to that potency which underlies a corporeal creature's substantial form, as when an oak tree is said to be composed of the form of oak and its matter; the materia in qua refers to that potency which underlies accidental forms (i.e. nonessential characteristics belonging to something), as when an oak tree (materia in qua) is perfected by certain colours. These two types of potency constitute the two most common meanings of ‘matter’ in Aristotelico-Thomistic thought.372 This metaphysical distinction, though primarily relevant to composite creatures, is also used by Aquinas when considering human actions and habits. One good illustration occurs in an article where

371 ‘Sed in hoc differt: quia materia quae est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur materia ex qua; quae autem est in potentia ad esse accidentale, dicitur materia in qua’: De Princip., c. 1, ll. 19–23. 372

How do we know about these two potencies? They can be reasoned to by careful observation of change. For example, when a plant dies and turns into something wholly different, namely, its decomposed elements, something must provide continuity from the plant to its elements, allowing the successive forms to manifest themselves: this is what Thomas is calling the materia ex qua. On the other hand, although a potted plant is still a plant whether placed in an office or a house, whether its leaves are green or slightly yellowed, these differences are real and must happen to something. This potency is not a potency ‘from which’ some new being arises, but a potency ‘in which’ the new accidental form can be accommodated: hence, Thomas calls it the materia in qua.

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Thomas is trying to identify the four causes of a virtue. After finding the final, efficient, and formal cause, he presents the following considerations of what virtue's matter might be: Virtue does not have a matter out of which (materia ex qua), as neither do other accidents; but it does have a matter about which (materia circa quam), and a matter in which (materia in qua), namely, the subject. The matter about which (materia circa quam), however, is the object of the virtue…373 It is interesting to see a passage where all three kinds of matter are mentioned together and attributed to a moral habit. Thomas says that a virtue, unlike a corporeal creature, has no materia ex qua. This is because materia ex qua is only a potency for a substance, and a virtue is not a substantial form. A virtue, however, does have a materia in qua because a virtue is a disposition, which is a kind of accidental form, and a human being is in potency to receive it. For example, a person's irascible appetite is the matter (subject) in which the virtue of courage resides. One sign that a virtue is an accidental (rather than a substantial) perfection is that a virtue can come or go without its subject's identity being changed: a human being is a human being, whether virtuous or not. With these two senses of matter excluded, one can discern the materia circa quam more clearly. The materia circa quam seems to be that reality to which an action is specially related, a contention supported by the fact that Aquinas identifies this matter as ‘object’ in the passage above.374 Some additional evidence supporting this definition can be found further on in the text just quoted. Thomas

373

374

‘Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia: sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis…’: I–II, q. 55, a. 4, cor.

Thus far, when I have been translating the Latin phrase materia circa quam, I have used the English word ‘about’ to render the Latin word circa. One meaning of circa (probably the primary one) describes a certain spatial relationship where one thing is surrounding another; in English, we sometimes use the word ‘about’ in this same way, as in the phrase ‘the wall about the city’. The examples above, however, lead us to believe that circa and ‘about’ also share a second meaning. In English we can use the word ‘about’ to mean ‘engaged in’ or ‘concerned with’ as in the phrase ‘to be about one's business’; this use seems to be what Thomas has in mind here: the various actions and dispositions on the list are ‘about’ what they especially relate to, as temperance is ‘about’ pleasures of touch (see entry for ‘about’ in Standard College Dictionary, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1977).

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asserts that, although ‘matter about which’ is not included in a general definition of virtue, it is included in definitions of particular habits and actions, which receive their species by being related to such matter.375 His point here seems to be that certain kinds of virtues are properly related to certain kinds of realities which define them. For instance, pleasures of touch are a special matter of the virtue of temperance, because pleasures of touch stir the concupiscible appetite, which temperance properly regulates. This conclusion about the nature of the matter about which can be further corroborated by examining examples Thomas gives of this kind of matter appearing throughout his writings (see Table 2). In spite of the large variety of actions listed here (even many which are not of ethical significance), one can discern a pattern. The common characteristic in each case seems to be that the ‘matter about which’ is what the action or habit is particularly engaged with or specially related to during its operation, especially what is the direct recipient of the motion or activity. For example, a carpenter is a carpenter by virtue of his working with wood (not with iron or marble); a person's digestive system is designed for working on undigested food (in a way that it is not suited to coping with poison or knowledge); a person possessing fortitude regulates himself with respect to dangers of death (since other realities do not incite fear in the same way). A similar kind of analysis could be offered for the other elements on the list.376 Once these three senses of matter are posited, Aquinas's reason for distinguishing between them becomes apparent. Substantial potency (materia ex qua), accidental potency (materia in qua), and that towards which an action or virtue is oriented (materia circa quam) are three very different realities in a human action, and failure to discern between them could cause considerable confusion. Not the

375

‘[M]ateria autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi’: I-II, q. 55, a. 4, cor.

376 ‘La matière ne signifie pas seulement ce qui est matériel à la différence de ce qui est spirituel, mais ce sur quoi porte un acte. Une personne peut être la matière d'un acte, comme dans le case de l'amour, de la connaissance’: Servais Pinckaers, ‘Le Problème de l'“intrinsece malum”: Esquisse historique’, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 29 (1982), 373–88 (p. 377).

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Table 2. Actions/habits and their related ‘matter about which’ Action or Disposition to Action

Materia circa quam

fire burning

wooda

digestive power working on

undigested foodb

carpenter working with

types of woodc

builder house-building with

construction materialsd

rhetorician speaking about

whatever possible topic (i.e. the individual acts of men)e

clergyman using

sacred things (e.g. sacred vessels or the Eucharist)f

art concerning itself with

a particular subjectg

will acting upon

the thing willedh

temperance (claims as its own)

enjoyments of sex, or pleasures of touchi

intemperance (relates to)

enjoyments of sex, or pleasures of touchj

fortitude (claims as its own)

dangers of death, or fear and daringk

justice (works to obtain the good of reason concerning)

necessities of this life or contracts and judgementsl

prudence (works to obtain the good of reason concerning)

doubtful or changeable thingsm

continence (relates to)

enjoyments of sex or pleasures of touchn

incontinence (relates to)

enjoyments of sex or pleasures of toucho

magnanimity (is actively concerned with)

honours (and all other virtues)p

heresy (errs about)

things related to the end of human lifeq

studiousness (claims as its own)

knowledge (cognitio)r

a lignum: I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ra 1; b alimentum nondum transmutatum: I–II, q. 18, a. 2, ra 3; c de nuce et de quercu: III Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, ra 2; d I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ra 1; e actus singulares hominum: Comm. Post. Anal. 1, lc. 1, n. 12; f res aliqua consecrata: IV Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1c, cor; g Comm. Metaph. 4, lc. 4, n. 4; h volitum: I Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 2, cor; i delectatio tactus, II–II, q. 166, a. 1, cor; delectationes coitus: De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, ra 5; also Comm. j concupiscentiae et delectationes tactus: Comm. Ethic. 7, lc. 3, n. 8; k pericula mortis: II–II, q.166, a. 1, cor, also De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, ra 5; timores et audaciae: Rep. Heb., c. l necessitates huius vitae, (contractus et judicia): De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, ag et ra 5; m dubitationes: De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, ra 5; mobilia: De Virtut., q. 5, a. 2, ra 14; n concupiscentiae et delectationes tactus: Comm. Ethic. 7, lc. 3, n. 8; see also 7, lc. 7, n. 1; o concupiscentiae et delectationes tactus: Comm. Ethics. 7, lc. 3, n. 8; see also 7, lc. 7, n. 1; p honores: II–II, q. 129, a. 1, cor; actus omnium aliarum virtutum: IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1c, ra 2; q finis vitae humanae, vel…id quod ad fidem pertinet et bonos mores: Rep. Tit., c. 3, lc. 2, ll. 90–5; r

Ethic. 7, lc. 3, n. 8; 11, lc. 1, ll.22–8; III Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2c, ra1;

cognitio: II–II, q. 166, a. 1, cor; the cases and word order in some of the above words or phrases have been modified.

least confusion would be to imagine that all three contribute to specification, when, in Aquinas's estimation, only one, the materia circa quam, does so.

(ii) ‘Due’ and ‘undue’ matter In addition to the ‘matter about which’, there is a second expression involving matter which needs to be explored here. Recall how in the

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De Malo text quoted at the start of this chapter, Thomas uses the adjectives ‘due’ (debita) and ‘undue’ (indebita) to describe matter which determines the goodness or evil of a human action. Recall also that he identifies this matter as object. Such a way of speaking is not unique to this De Malo text; there are a number of places in the Thomistic corpus where ‘due’ and ‘undue’ matter are used in the same fashion.377 Evidence of the relationship between the specification of human action and ‘due’ or ‘undue’ matter can be seen when comparing Aquinas's listings of moral determinants. There are several occasions in his ethical texts where Aquinas reviews the factors contributing to an action's moral character. In the corpus of I–II, q. 18, a. 4, for instance, Thomas identifies four elements pertinent to determining a human action's goodness (or evil): (1) the being of an action (which accounts for its fundamental or ontological goodness); (2) the object (which accounts for its moral species); (3) circumstances; and (4) ends. A number of lists in other texts closely resemble this one.378 In a few, however, a noteworthy difference can be observed. Thomas offers a significant alternative for one of the key terms: The first goodness [of actions], which is from the essence of the act, is common to all actions; whence this goodness underlies all other goodnesses. Among the others, the first added is the goodness which is from the due matter, and on this substratum is introduced that further goodness which comes from end, other circumstances, and the form of the habit.379 Besides the addition of a fifth element, ‘form of the habit’, note the difference between this list and the one given above: Thomas has used ‘due matter’ in place of object.380

377

Like ‘matter about which’, due matter is sometimes equated with the object (II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4, cor; II-II, q. 154, a. 1, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 5) or used in such a way that it is a clear substitute for object (I-II, q. 20, a. 2, cor). 378

See II Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 2, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 11; q. 7, a. 4, cor.

379

‘Sic ergo patet ratio distinctionis bonitatis actuum quae in littera ponitur, et quomodo hae bonitates ad invicem se habeant. Prima enim bonitas, quae est ex essentia actus, communis est omnibus actibus: unde ipsa substernitur omnibus aliis bonitatibus; inter quas primo supervenit sibi bonitas quae est ex debita materia; super quam iterum inducitur alia bonitas quae est ex fine, et’aliis circumstantiis, et ex forma habitus’: II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, cor; note also sc 2; ag and ra 5.

380

That Thomas understands ‘due matter’ to be substituting for ‘object’ is confirmed by his use of ‘object’ earlier in the corpus of II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, cor.

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Such a replacement, whether in this passage or in others like it,381 is significant for two reasons. First, Aquinas's employment of ‘due matter’ seems very deliberate in this context. In a list like this, the elements of human action are the main focus of attention; consequently, one can be fairly confident that Aquinas is carefully choosing his terms and not speaking casually or imprecisely. Second, a comparison of all such lists reveals that Thomas will never use any other expression besides ‘due matter’ as an equivalent of ‘object’: it is his only alternative. Such evidence confirms the close links which exist between due matter, object, and specification for Thomas. Since ‘due matter’ is significant, a fuller understanding of this phrase is desirable. Unfortunately, as was the case with ‘matter about which’, a wider search through Aquinas's writings does not provide a more precise definition or description. Once again, however, much can be learnt by examining examples where Thomas uses ‘due matter’. In the De Malo passage quoted at the start of this chapter Thomas relates ‘due or undue matter’ to almsgiving and stealing; several more examples can be found in Table 3. What conclusion can be drawn from the table? One cannot help but notice that even though most of the actions here382 are in a different moral species from those recounted in the list for ‘matter about which’ above, ‘due matter’ points to the same reality in human action. In each of the five examples from the table, the matter depicted is neither the substantial nor the accidental potency, but is that element with which each action is engaged. On this count, then, the conclusion reached in the last section identifying the kind of matter relevant to specification receives further support. The examples in the table also help us to discern why Thomas uses ‘due’ and ‘undue’ to qualify matter in this context. ‘Due’ or ‘undue’

381

See De Virtut., q. 5, a. 1, cor; due matter is also included in a listing in Quodl., n. 4, q. 9, a. 1, cor, although not all four factors are represented; also, for due matter included as a determinant in external human actions, see I-II, q. 20, a. 1, cor; a. 2, cor; a. 4, cor; De Malo, q. 7, a. 1, cor; for use of the shorter phrase ‘due matter and circumstances’, see II-II, q. 44, a. 4, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 5.

382

There is some overlap; for instance, a thing willed (res volitum), the matter of rational appetite (see Table 2), can be understood as one kind of matter for appetite described generally (see Table 3).

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Table 3. Actions/habits and their related due (or undue) matter Action

Due (debita) or undue (indebita) matter a (i) one's own thing (due matter) buying or selling (ii) spiritual thing (undue matter) b having intercourse with (i) one's own wife (due) (ii) woman who is not one's wife (undue) committing oneself through Godc (i) [good deeds] (due) to (ii) sinful, illicit, or harmful deeds (undue) d what is not in the mind (undue) signifying by one's words desiringe what is good (due)

Species [just commerce] simony [chaste love] luxuria swearing unjust swearing lying right appetitea

‘illud potest esse debita venditionis materia cuius venditor est dominus; emptionis autem et venditionis est materia indebita res spiritualis’: II–II, q. 100, a. 1, cor; b ‘sua uxore non est secundum indebitam materiam’: II–II, q. 154, a. 1, ra 4; ‘actus luxuriae est secundum se mortale peccatum, quia habet materiam indebitam caritati repugnantem’: De Malo, q. 15, a. 2, ra 6; see also II–II, q. 154, a. 1, ra 4; c ‘sed jurare per deum est actus cadens super debitam materiam’: III Sent., d. 39, q. 1, a. 2b, sc 2; ‘ita scilicet quod in aliquo eventu potest esse illicitum vel nocivum, et per consequens non esse debita materia iuramenti’: II–II, q. 89, a. 9, ra 1; see also III Sent., d. 39, q. 1, a. 3a, cor; d ‘[mendacium] est enim actus cadens super indebitam materiam, cum enim voces sint signa naturaliter intellectuum, innaturale est et indebitum quod aliquis voce significet id quod non habet in mente’: II–II, q. 110, a. 3, cor; e ‘debita autem materia appetitus est bonum. unde appetere quodcumque bonum, est bonum in genere’: Quodl., n. 4, q. 9, a. 1, cor. suggest that a certain kind of matter is ‘suitable’ or ‘unsuitable’ (respectively) for a certain kind of action from a moral point of view. For instance, Thomas identifies ‘one's own thing’ as ‘due matter’ of buying and selling, and ‘a spiritual thing’ as ‘undue matter’. Why is this so? When Thomas analyses simony in the Summa, he shows that, in justice, one can only treat as a commodity what one has legitimate dominion over; hence, it is suitable for people to dispose of what belongs to them, unsuitable for them to dispose of what has been set aside for God.383 Similar relationships can be discerned in other examples from the table: it is suitable for someone to promise ‘good deeds’, to love ‘his own wife’, to reveal honestly ‘what is on his mind’; unsuitable to promise ‘evil deeds’, love someone who is ‘not his wife’, reveal (as though true) ‘what is not on one's mind’ (i.e. what one knows to be false). a

383

II-II, q. 100, a. 1, cor.

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This judgement of suitability or unsuitability was treated in greater detail in Chapter 5. An object has a certain formal character, which, when compared to right reason, is suitable or unsuitable with respect to a particular kind of action; for example, taking ‘someone else's thing’ is considered evil precisely because such an object is ‘not due’ to the wouldbe proprietor when right reason is consulted. In effect, then, the use of ‘due’ and ‘undue’ shows that Thomas considers ‘matter’, when used in this context, to be subject to the same kind of moral evaluation as an ‘object’. ‘Due’ and ‘undue’ attribute explicitly to a certain matter a suitability or unsuitability for a certain action by virtue of a comparison to right reason; this judgement is implied when an object is determined to be good or evil in just such a comparison.384 This demonstrates even more clearly the tight link between due or undue matter and object in Aquinas's mind.

2. How Matter Species That Aquinas sometimes uses the term ‘matter’ to designate that which a human action or habit relates to should be clear by now. Why does he assign such a meaning to matter? The likeliest explanation is that he is simply following a convention which preceded him. Some recent studies have shown, for instance, that both materia circa quam and debita materia appear in the moral writings of Aquinas's teacher, Albert the Great.385 But whatever his reason,386 it cannot be

384

The word ‘due’, when used in its primary context of justice, refers to a kind of ‘convenientia’ or suitability: ‘[I]n operationibus exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur…non secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam convenientiam rei in seipsa; secundum quam convenientiam accipitur ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae…’: I-II, q. 60, a. 3, cor.

385 Kevin L. Flannery, ‘The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas’, Thomist, 67 (2003), 95–118 (pp. 104–5); Tobias Hoffmann, ‘Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Duns Scotus’, Thomist, 67 (2003), 73–94 (pp. 81–2). 386

Why should ‘matter’ be used to designate what a human action is specially related to? One explanation concerns the application of Aristotle's four causes to human action. Aquinas makes such an application in a number of contexts: (1) conformity of the human and divine will with respect to the thing willed: I Sent., d. 48, q. I, a. 2, cor; I-II, q. 19, a. 10, cor; De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, cor; a. 8, cor; (2) one sin causing another sin: II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, cor; d. 42, q. 2, a. 3; I-II, q. 75, a. 4, cor, see esp. ag and ra 1; De Malo, q. 8, a. 1, cor; (3) four causes regarding circumstances: IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1b, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor; Comm. Ethic. 3, c. 3, nn. 414–15; I-II, q. 7, a. 3, cor; (4) four causes in definitions: I, q. 5, a. 5, cor; I-II, q. 55, a. 4, cor; (5) analysis of certain good or bad actions: II-II, q. 27, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 153, a. 5. To what aspects of a human action are the four causes related? The first three causes can easily be associated with aspects of human action: the final cause is related to end, the efficient cause to an agent, the formal cause to an action's species. What about matter? As we have shown, Thomas uses ‘matter’ in human actions in two ways: materia in qua, the subject of action, and materia circa quam, what an action is ‘about’ or specially related to. Since ‘matter’ is being used analogously here—an action is an accident rather than a substance—both matter in qua and circa quam were likely understood to have some aspect of potency or receptivity analogous to what matter has in a substance. The human subject is obviously in potency for a human action, but what about the ‘matter about which’? Potency might have been recognized in this component of action for two reasons: (a) what is engaged by an action does take on the role of potency in cases where an action passes into something exterior, as when a building is formed by a builder (e.g. see I, q. 56, a. 1, cor); (b) what is engaged as the proximate end (object) is considered material with respect to the remote end (e.g. De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, cor).

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denied that using matter in this way raises an apparent paradox where specification is concerned. As several objections in the Summa and elsewhere note (including the objection from I–II, q. 18, a. 2, discussed above), if matter is understood as the equivalent of object, and if object determines a human action's form and species, then it seems as if matter is determining form. Given the usual meanings of ‘matter’ and ‘form’ (passive versus active co-principle), this conclusion seems exactly the opposite of what should be the case. Thomas is occasionally called upon to explain how ‘matter’ could assume such an atypical role. As pointed out earlier, he sometimes responds by asserting that only certain kinds of matter specify (i.e. materia circa quam, debita materia). This response only answers the question at one level, however: it has told us what kind of matter specifies, not how or why it does so. So, when an objection or problem requires Thomas to elaborate on how matter specifies, he has two more detailed explanations. On a couple of occasions, Thomas will take the surprising position that matter determines the form in human actions similar to the way in which matter determines the form in corporeal creatures. His argument defending this position is rather complex, however, and not suited to all situations. On other occasions, Thomas will solve the problem by

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appealing to more standard approaches: while using the term ‘matter’ to describe what specifies the human action, he will understand this ‘matter’ in terms more proper to ends or objects.

(i) Matter's predetermination of form and species As noted above, Aquinas argues in certain texts that matter can, after a fashion, be responsible for the species of an action or habit. The most succinct presentation of this view can be found in his Commentary on the Sentences (here with reference to virtues): [T]he matters of all the moral virtues do not share in the influence of reason and intellect in the same way, since the mean of reason is rightly found in diverse matters in a diverse way: and therefore such diversity of matter causes a diversity of form and of species. This also happens in natural things, when diverse matters are not proportioned to receiving a single formal character.387 This passage is more difficult to explain than its brevity might suggest. It contains two parts: the first assertion claims that a diversity in matter can predispose how form is found in particular virtues, and the second claims that matter predisposes for form in natural corporeal creatures. Both propositions need to be looked at more closely; for the sake of a more logical development, I will take them in reverse order.

(a) Determinate matter's contribution to specication in corporeal creatures Admittedly, attributing to matter some influence over form or species in corporeal beings sounds highly implausible. Thomas repeats

387

‘[I]d quod est rationis et intellectus, non eodem modo participatur in materiis omnium moralium virtutum, cum in diversis materiis diversimode medium rationis recte inveniatur: et ideo talis materiae diversitas diversitatem formae et speciei causat; sicut etiam accidit in naturalibus, quando diversae materiae non sunt proportionatae ad recipiendum formam unius rationis’: III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1a, ra 2; see also I-II, q. 60, a. 1, cor, ag and ra 2. The most complete text, De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor, will be discussed later in this chapter. This way of speaking about matter may be also be seen in Aquinas's discussion of mode with respect to the good; see I, q. 5, a. 5, cor.

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the assertion that form actualizes matter and determines species so frequently388 that it seems naive to suggest that it might also work the other way around. One can begin to understand such an unconventional proposal by examining in greater depth a point introduced in Chapter 3 about how the matter of a corporeal being relates to its nature and species: That which the definition signifies pertains to the nature of the species. But the definition in natural things does not signify the form only, but form and matter. Whence matter is part of the species in natural things; not signate matter, which is the principle of individuation, but common matter. For as it is characteristic of this particular man that he is from this soul, this flesh, and these bones, so it is characteristic of man generally that he is composed of soul, flesh and bones. For whatever generally belongs to the substance of all the individuals contained under a species must belong also to the substance of that species.389 According to Aquinas, matter not only should be thought of as a constituent principle of individual corporeal creatures,390 but also should be understood in the essence or species of such a creature391

388

e.g. ‘Unumquodque sortitur speciem secundum actum, et non secundum potentiam: unde ea quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, constituuntur in suis speciebus per proprias formas’: I-II, q. 1, a. 3, cor; see also De Ente, c. 1, ll. 146–50, 240–5.

389

‘Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam. Unde materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis; sed materia communis. Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub specie contentorum’: I, q. 75, a. 4, cor.

390

Aquinas calls matter which is the principle of individuation signate matter: IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3a, cor; SCG 1, c. 21, n. 4; 1, c. 63, n. 2; 4, c. 40, n. 8; De Veritate, q. 2, a. 7, cor; De Ente, c. 1, ll. 122–41; Comm. Metaph. 10, lc. 11, n. 5.

391

‘Dico, quod cum esse consequitur compositionem materiae et formae, quamvis forma sit principium esse, non tamen denominatur aliquod ens a forma sed a toto; et ideo essentia non dicit formam tantum; sed in compositis ex materia et forma, dicit totum; et hoc etiam dicitur quidditas et natura rei’: I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, cor. Matter which falls in the very definition of something is called the common matter by Aquinas; for further examples of common matter in the definition of man, see I, q. 119, a. 1, cor; De Veritate, q. 10, a. 5, cor; De Ente, c. 1, ll. 122–41, 236–9; Comm. De Trin., ps. 3, q. 5, a. 2, co 2; Comm. Metaph. 7, lc. 10, nn. 9, 10; Comm. De Caelo, 1, lc. 19, n. 4; Comm. De Generat. 1, lc. 17, n. 6. For texts where Thomas asserts that natural forms are in need of matter: II Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, cor; SCG 4, c. 84, n. 5; De Veritate, q. 8, a. 6, ra 5; De Anima, a. 3, sc 2; Comm. De Anima 2, lc. 1, n. 13; 2, lc. 4, n. 16; Rep. De Anima, 1, lc. 2, nn. 10–13; Comm. De Caelo, 1, lc. 19, n. 6.

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and included in its definition.392 He takes this position because it seems absurd to him that matter should exist as a coprinciple of every individual substance in a species, but then be omitted from the general definition of this same species. To illustrate, since every individual horse has matter, a horse's essence and definition should include this material dimension; to omit matter would be to treat horses as though they were spiritual or mathematical realities. As Thomas is explaining this insight, he makes a statement in passing which is an important starting point for our present concern. He says that it is ‘characteristic of man generally that he is composed of soul, flesh and bones’. The use of ‘flesh and bones’ in this passage is not just a literary device for referring to matter generally; this phrase is employed very deliberately. To appreciate the significance of this expression, we must examine other texts where Aquinas describes the relationship between body and soul more precisely. For example, in the text below, Thomas considers what human bodies will be like after the resurrection from the dead: The soul is united to the body as form to matter. But every form has determinate matter: for it is necessary that there is a proportion of act and potency. Since, therefore, the soul is the same according to species [after death as before], it seems that it should have the same matter according to species. Therefore, there will be the same body according to species after the resurrection and before. And thus it is necessary that it consist of flesh and bones, and other parts of this kind.393

392 393

For a text which describes how matter can enter into a definition, see IV Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1a, cor.

‘Anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae. Omnis autem forma habet determinatam materiam: oportet enim esse proportionem actus et potentiae. Cum igitur anima sit eadem secundum speciem, videtur quod habeat eandem materiam secundum speciem. Erit ergo idem corpus secundum speciem post resurrectionem et ante. Et sic oportet quod sit consistens ex carnibus et ossibus, et’aliis huiusmodi partibus’: SCG 4, c. 84, n. 4; see also ibid., n. 5. Aquinas is answering here those who think that resurrected bodies become so ‘spiritualized’ they no longer have recognizable human matter (nn. 1, 2); see also Comp. Theol. 1, c. 153; Thomas is able to use this argument that the human soul and body must be properly proportioned to each other to argue against a number of positions which he deems heretical; e.g. it precludes the transmigration of souls after death (SCG 2, c. 44, n. 7); the existence of a single intellect for all bodies (De Anima, a. 3, sc 2); and a Gnosticism which denies a fully human body to Christ (III Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3a, cor; d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, cor).

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When Thomas says that the matter which constitutes a human being must be of ‘flesh, bones, and other parts of this kind’, he is obviously not speaking about prime matter (materia ex qua) which is the co-principle with substantial form; instead, he is referring to matter so far as it has reached a certain state of development. His point is that the human soul cannot be imagined as entering into just anything, because certain configurations of matter (like a rock) would be unable to accommodate the soul's powers. The soul requires a certain special kind of matter (flesh, bones, etc.)394 of a certain acceptable quantity.395 Flesh and bones, then, is matter specially proportioned to the human soul, and other kinds of matter will not suffice. The need for a correlation between the kind of matter and form is not restricted to human beings. As Thomas says towards the beginning of the passage just quoted, ‘every form has determinate matter; for it is necessary that there be a proportion of the act and potency’. Note especially here his use of the phrase ‘determinate matter’; it is a significant expression in this context. In a number of texts throughout Aquinas's corpus, determinata materia is used to describe that matter which is ‘determined’ or conditioned to form (as ‘flesh and bones’ are specially tailored to the human soul).396

394

Thomas repeats on a number of occasions that only a proper human body, or flesh and bones, can be considered the matter for a human being: ‘Cum enim forma hominis sit quaedam res naturalis, requirit determinatam materiam, scilicet carnes et ossa, quae in hominis definitione poni oportet’: III, q. 5, a. 2, cor; see also III Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3a, cor; d. 3, q. 2, a. 1, cor; I, q. 91, a. 3, cor; De Ente, c. 1, ll. 122–41; Comm. Metaph. 7, lc. 10, n. 11; Comm. De Trin., ps. 3, q. 5, a. 2, co 2; Comm. De Anima, 2, lc. 4, n. 16. Matter also falls into definitions of bodily movements like the passion of anger (Rep. De Anima, 1, lc. 2, n. 10), body parts like the foot (Comm. De Caelo, 1, lc. 19, n. 4), and shapes inextricably linked to the human form, like the shape ‘pug’, which can only be used to describe the human nose (Comm. Metaph. 11, lc. 7, n. 11). 395

396

According to Thomas, the human body must achieve a certain minimum quantity and cannot exceed a certain maximum quantity in order to accept the human soul (see, respectively, III Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, sc 2; IV Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 2e, cor).

Is this insight that matter has a determinate character Thomas's innovation or did he take it from another author? Aquinas may well have understood this to be Aristotle's teaching. In De Anima, Aristotle criticizes the Pythagoreans, who supposedly believed that any soul could inhabit any body (transmigration). Aristotle calls this ‘an absurd view’, arguing that ‘each body seems to have a form and shape of its own’ to accommodate a particular kind of soul. He states, ‘It is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could embody itself in flutes [as it is to say that a human soul could inhabit a brute animal's body]; each art must use its tools, each soul, its body’ (1. 3; 407b: Aristotle, De Anima, tr. J.’A. Smith, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 533–603 (p. 546).

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How does Thomas recognize this ‘determinate matter’ in natural creatures? The following text from his Commentary on the Metaphysics identifies the conditions under which matter can receive new forms: [I]t is not the case that just anything can be made from just any other thing, for diverse things are made from diverse matters. For whatever is capable of being generated has a determinate matter from which it is made, because it is necessary for form to be proportioned to matter. For although prime matter is in potency to all forms, nevertheless it accepts them according to a certain order. For first [prime matter] is in potency to elemental forms, and then as these [elemental forms] are mixed according to diverse proportions, [the matter] is in potency to other diverse forms…397 This passage suggests that Aquinas's views on ‘determinate matter’ may be traced back, at least in part, to his understanding of the pathways which corporeal beings follow in their generation. Aquinas reports here an easily discoverable fact about the natural world: not every being will yield every other—as wood will not yield gold, for example—unless it can first be reduced to some pre-elemental form. This restriction on the development of creatures needs some explanation. Thomas supposes that matter is influenced or conditioned by its relation to the form adjoined to it. Matter takes on a certain character such that, in a future substantial change, it can accommodate certain kinds of forms, but not others.398

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‘[N]on tamen fit quodlibet ex quocumque; sed diversa fiunt ex diversis materiis. unumquodque enim generabilium habet materiam determinatam ex qua fit, quia formam oportet esse proportionatam materiae. Licet enim materia prima sit in potentia ad omnes formas, tamen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius enim est in potentia ad formas elementares, et eis mediantibus secundum diversas proportiones commixtionum est in potentia ad diversas formas: unde non potest ex quolibet immediate fieri quodlibet, nisi forte per resolutionem in primam materiam’: Comm. Metaph. 12, lc. 2, n. 15.

The form and matter must be proportioned to each other: ‘[P]rincipalius requiritur ad esse rei determinata forma quam determinata materia, materia enim determinata quaeritur ut sit proportionata determinatae formae’: III, q. 60, a. 7, cor; ‘[C]uiuslibet rei naturalis materia accipit determinatam quantitatem secundum comparationem ad formam determinatam’: III, q. 74, a. 2, ra 1. Thomas mentions on a number of occasions that a condition or disposition of the matter affects the acceptance of forms: II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, cor; d. 34, q. 1, a. 3, cor; d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, cor; I, q. 78, a. 2, ra 3; I-II, q. 85, a. 6, cor; SCG 2, c. 22, n. 6. God, unlike human beings, is able to change the disposition of matter as well as the form: I, q. 92, a. 2, ra 2; I-II, q. 5, a. 7, cor; III, q. 28, a. 1, ag and ra 5; SCG 4, c. 45, n. 7; De Potentia, q. 6, a. 1, ra 11; Rep. Symbolum Apost., a. 1, ll. 276–86.

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This passage clarifies the remark from the Commentary on the Sentences quoted earlier that the form of a natural thing needs to be proportioned to its matter. Aquinas sometimes is considering matter, not in so far as it is a primary potency, but in so far as it has attained a certain state of development through the influence of form(s). This state of development in matter predetermines to a certain extent what kind of form can subsequently be introduced as a new co-principle in substantial change.

(b) Matter's predisposition for form in actions and habits If matter in natural things can, after a fashion, precondition which form and species such natural things can have, does matter in human actions and habits function in a comparable way? The most complete explanation of matter's role in the determination of human acts appears in an article from De Malo where Thomas is discussing sins. At one point, when the topic of objects arises, Thomas demonstrates how an object contributes to specification not only formally, but even materially: Materially, [the object] is able to diversify [the species of sin] through opposition to virtue. Indeed, virtues differ by species so far as reason discovers the mean in diverse matters: for example, when reason establishes the mean in exchanges, distributions, and actions of this kind, there is justice; in desirable things, temperance; in feelings of fear and boldness, fortitude; and so on concerning other virtues. And no one should contend that it is inappropriate for the species of virtues to be diversified according to their diverse matters, on the grounds that diversity of matter is not usually the cause of diversity of species but of individuals. For even in natural things, diversity of matter causes diversity in species when this diversity of matter necessitates diversity of form. Whence even in moral concerns, it is required that virtues of diverse species engage diverse matters in which the reason is able to discover the mean in diverse ways. As in concupiscences, the mean comes by restraint; so too, therefore, virtue established in those things is closer to defect than to superabundance, as the very name of temperance shows. In feelings of boldness and fear, reason finds the mean not by pulling

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back, but by impelling; so virtue constituted in these things is closer to superabundance than to defect, as the very name of fortitude shows; one sees this in a like manner in the rest of the virtues.399 In this passage, Thomas gives a presentation of the material and formal components of the cardinal virtues. It is significant to note that, for the sake of his argument here, when presenting what is formal in these virtues, Thomas does not try to identify their distinctive characters or rationes as he sometimes does in other texts,400 but begins by depicting the form as the mean introduced by right reason. Such a broad way of conceiving the formal component of virtues gives rise to a potential problem: it would seem as if all of the virtues should be assigned a single species under the one form of the mean, since all virtues try to respect a mean. This difficulty provides Thomas with an opportunity to show the difference matter can make in specification. Aquinas, echoing closely the Sentences text quoted at the beginning of section (i) above, argues that, just as a determined matter in natural creatures can predispose for a certain kind of form, so a certain kind of matter in human action influences the way in which the mean is established in a correlated habit. (I have spoken already

399

‘Hoc autem quod est non conveniens rationi circa obiectum consideratum diversificare potest peccati speciem dupliciter: uno modo quidem materialiter, alio modo formaliter. Materialiter quidem per oppositum ad virtutem. Differunt enim virtutes specie, secundum quod ratio medium adinvenit in diversis materiis; puta, iustitia est secundum quod ratio medium constituit in commutationibus et distributionibus; et huiusmodi actionibus; temperantia autem secundum quod in concupiscentiis; fortitudo secundum quod in timoribus et audaciis; et sic de aliis. Nec debet’alicui inconveniens videri, si diversificantur species virtutum secundum diversas materias, cum diversitas materiae consueverit esse causa diversitatis non specierum, sed individuorum; quia etiam in naturalibus diversitas materiae diversitatem in specie causat quando diversitas materiae diversitatem formae requirit; unde et in moralibus necesse est diversas specie virtutes esse circa diversas materias, in quibus ratio diversimode adinvenit medium. Sicut in concupiscentiis adinvenit medium refrenando; unde et virtus in eis constituta propinquior est defectui quam superabundantiae, ut ipsum temperantiae nomen ostendit. In audaciis autem et timoribus non retrahendo, sed magis impellendo ratio adinvenit medium; unde virtus in his constituta propinquior est superabundantiae quam defectui, ut ipsum fortitudinis nomen ostendit; et similiter est videre in ceteris’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor.

400

‘Praedicta quatuor [generales modos virtutum] dicuntur quatuor virtutes non propter diversas species habituum quae attenduntur secundum diversa obiecta, sed secundum diversas rationes formales’: De Virtut., q. 5, a. 1, ra 1.

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about these differences in establishing the mean in Chapter 5.) For example, in temperance, the matter has as a distinctive characteristic a certain attractiveness. To compensate for this allure, the mean must be calibrated in a certain way, set closer to restraint than would otherwise be necessary. When considering fortitude, on the other hand, it must be recognized that its matter can cause hesitation, paralysis, or even flight. In guarding against this, the mean is aligned differently, with the proper balance set closer to sallying forth. Thus, the mean of reason is not received in a univocal way by the appetites it regulates; on the contrary, when considering each appetite, one must take into account the character of its matter, since this affects the appetite and predisposes how the mean of reason must be established in it.401 At this point, it is worthwhile to consider a distinction which Thomas sometimes makes in his account of virtues. Most of the virtues in Aquinas's moral writings can be understood as possessing a ‘special matter’, that is, some distinctive kind of reality to which it is related. Only in his portrayal of cardinal virtues does Thomas also understand habits to have a ‘general matter’. This difference can best be explained with the help of an illustration. When considered generally, temperance is understood as a moderation with respect to any kind of pleasure, as when someone deals in a balanced way with pleasures relating to commerce, speech, etc. But when it is considered specially, temperance refers only to moderation with respect to pleasures of food and sex. Why is the same name used to describe both? Thomas calls this second use of temperance a kind of antonomastic predication:402 just as one can use the word ‘city’ to

401

402

‘Aliquando vero materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eandem rationem, prout est in agente…[e]t tunc formae receptae in materia ab eodem agente, non sunt unius speciei sed diversificantur secundum diversam proportionem materiae ad recipiendum influxum agentis, sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum secundum diversam proportionem materiae. Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem…’: I-II, q. 60, a. 1, cor.

‘Secundum consuetudinem humanae locutionis, aliqua nomina communia restringuntur ad ea quae sunt praecipua inter illa quae sub tali communitate continentur, sicut nomen urbis accipitur antonomastice pro roma’: II-II, q. 141, a. 2, cor; see also Comm. Rom., c. 1, lc. 1, ll. 139–40. Thomas gives a number of other illustrations of antonomastic predication: (1) ‘the feast’ is sometimes used in scripture to refer particularly to the Passover, because this is the most famous feast of the Old Law (Rep. Johan., c. 13, lc. 1, ll. 68–76); (2) ‘the Apostle’ is sometimes used as a title for Paul, because he claims to have laboured more diligently than the others (Comm. Rom., c. 1, lc. 1, ll. 135–46); (3) the noun ‘religious’ is sometimes used to describe those who dedicate their life to God, because they are most excellent in the pursuit of the virtue of religion (II-II, q. 186, a. 1, cor; De Perfectione, c. 11, ll. 48–53); for further examples, see IV Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 2b, ra 4; d. 8, q. 1, a. 1c, cor, ra; d. 41, q. 1, a. 4a, cor; d. 47, q. 1, a. 3b, ra 1; SCG 1, c. 1, n. 7; I-II, q. 99, a. 4, sc; II-II, q. 154, a. 9, ra 1; III, q. 73, a. 4, ra 2; Quodl., n. 3, q. 6, a. 3, ra 1; De Regimine, 1, c. 2, ll. 81–4; Comm. Threnos, c. 1, lc. 8; Rep. Psalmos, p.’9, n. 1, ll. 12–15; Rep. Johan., c. 1, lc. 12, ll. 230–3; c. 7, lc. 5, ll. 284–90; c. 15, lc. 5; Rep. Eph., c. 1, lc. 5, ll. 38–46; Rep. Heb., c. 1, lc. 2.

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refer to Rome, the greatest city, so one can use ‘temperance’ to refer to that habit which regulates our attraction only to food and sex, since these pleasures are the realities about which it is most difficult to keep moderation.403 In the passage quoted from De Malo above, Thomas presents matter as general rather than special: for example, temperance is associated with concupiscences, rather than just pleasures of food and sex. This raises a question: is Aquinas's explanation of how matter specifies in this passage something peculiar to his presentation of virtues understood generally, or can matter be understood to determine the species for special virtues as well? Although Thomas says nothing directly about this latter possibility, implicit evidence can be found in other texts that he also understands special matter to specify its related virtues in much the same way as described by the De Malo text above. Consider for example this description of fortitude: ‘In another way, one can take fortitude as it implies a certain firmness in sustaining and repelling those things in which it is most difficult to remain firm, namely in certain grave dangers.… And thus fortitude is placed as a special virtue, namely one having determinate matter.’404 This quotation describes

403

For instance, although music, knowledge, and play are pleasant and attractive, they are not sufficiently compelling to qualify as matters of temperance understood antonomastically or specially (for music, II-II, q. 141, a. 4, ra 3; knowledge, II-II, q. 166, a. 2; play, II-II, q. 168, a. 2).

404

‘Alio modo potest accipi fortitudo secundum quod importat firmitatem animi in sustinendis et repellendis his in quibus maxime difficile est firmitatem habere, scilicet in aliquibus periculis gravibus.…Et sic fortitudo ponitur specialis virtus, utpote materiam determinatam habens’: II-II, q. 123, a. 2, cor; see also ra 2.

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fortitude as a special virtue: Aquinas is here considering it antonomastically, identifying fortitude's matter as difficulties of the most serious kind (i.e. dangers of death) rather than just any obstacle. In other passages, Thomas identifies this matter as ‘special’,405 but note here that he uses the adjective ‘determinate’ instead. Recall that when ‘determinate’ is used to qualify ‘matter’ in the context of natural creatures, it refers precisely to matter conditioned such that it is specially suited to its form (and, consequently, potentially compatible or incompatible with other forms which might be introduced). It is telling to see Thomas use this very same adjective here in the context of a special virtue. This passage is not alone: a number of other moral texts can be found where Aquinas uses the adjective ‘determinate’ to describe the matter, and his examples always refer to what he would identify as ‘special’ matter in other texts.406 In short, then, it seems quite likely that ‘determinate’ (or special) matter is understood by Thomas to regulate the form of the habit to which it is related in a way reminiscent of how determinate matter in natural creatures predisposes for particular substantial forms.407

(ii) The association of matter with other concepts to which Thomas attributes specication From a certain point of view, Aquinas's proposal that (determinate) matter can influence form was a resourceful way of solving a problem. But Aquinas sometimes discusses how matter specifies human

405

For special matter of fortitude, see II-II, q. 128, cor; II-II, q. 141, a. 2, cor; II-II, q. 149, a. 1, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, ra 23; q. 5, a. 1, cor.

406

‘Virtutes cardinales dupliciter accipiuntur. Uno modo, secundum quod sunt speciales virtutes habentes determinatas materias’: II-II, q. 58, a. 8, ra 2; ‘[O]mnis virtus in cujus definitione ponitur materia, habet specialem et determinatam materiam’: III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 2a, sc 1. For special virtues and determinate matter, ibid., q. 1, a. 1c, ra 2; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, ra 23. For examples of particular virtues and their determinate matters, see: (1) temperance (pleasures of touch): II-II, q. 141, a. 4, ra 1; (2) fortitude (dangers of death): II-II, q. 123, a. 2, cor; ra 2; (3) justice: III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1c, ra 3; (4) prudence: III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 2a, sc 1; (5) magnanimity (honours): II-II, q. 129, a. 4, cor; (6) magnificence (things bought): II-II, q. 134, a. 4, ra 1; (7) mildness and anger: Comm. Ethic. 7, lc. 3, n. 5.

407

‘Ad specialem virtutem pertinet quod modum rationis in aliqua determinata materia ponat’: II-II, q. 129, a. 4, cor.

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actions without any recourse to this explanation. Why? Thomas never says, but his reason is not difficult to guess at. His solution described in the last section is rather complex and requires that matter be understood in a particular way. So Thomas saves his explanation from ‘determinate’ matter for certain appropriate occasions, and in other contexts, he takes a different tack. Aquinas's alternative approach to matter's specification shows his versatility in adapting his terminology to meet the needs of a situation or context. Rather than attempting to show how the passive principle (matter) can somehow predetermine the active principle (form), as above, he takes advantage of the flexibility inherent in analogy, realizing that ‘matter’ understood in this present context can take on a meaning different from prime matter. So, in the cases now under consideration, when objections press him, Thomas will solve the problem of matter giving form and species by lending to matter characteristics proper to ends and objects. This accommodation allows Aquinas to retain his use of the term ‘matter’ while at the same time taking advantage of his two most cogent explanations for how human actions receive their form and species.

(a) Matter as End The relationship between matter and end is a topic not frequently broached in Aquinas's ethical writings. On the few occasions where it is, however, one discovers that these two terms have a more complex alliance than might be expected. A first important passage appears in an article from the Sentences Commentary entitled ‘Whether the Distinction between Good from Genus and Good from End is Suitable?’ The fourth objection begins by quoting Aristotle's Metaphysics to the effect that good is from ends. It then cites a second text, this time from the Physics, which holds that matter and end do not coexist in the same reality. From these premises, the objection concludes that no act can be called generically good simply because it engages ‘due matter’; to do so would be to treat matter as an end, and this has been deemed impossible by Aristotle's Physics. Aquinas's answer to this objection is striking because it resembles so closely his reply in I–II, q. 18, a. 2, ra 2 which served as the key text

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for presenting ‘matter about which’ above (see 1.(i)). ‘[M]atter is twofold: ex qua (or in qua), and materia circa quam; and in the first way, matter is not said to be the same as end, but in the second way, it is the same as end, because the object is an end of the act.’408 It is noteworthy to see Thomas here making the same distinction between the materia ex qua and circa quam which he will later repeat in the Summa. Along with this similarity, however, an important difference can also be observed between the replies, undoubtedly occasioned by the difference in the objections. I–II, q. 18, a. 2 (ag 2) protests that matter cannot give form; this present objection is concerned that matter and end cannot coexist in the same reality. Because of this variance in the challenge, Thomas responds differently in the Sentences text, focusing on whether and how something can be matter and end at the same time. So, after distinguishing between the different kinds of matter in this passage, Aquinas makes an additional remark not contained in the Summa: ‘matter about which’ can indeed serve as an end, and this explains why it is responsible for the goodness of an action.409 A second key text builds on what was discovered in II Sent. d. 36; it is found in I–II, q. 72, a. 3, which is entitled ‘Whether sins are distinguished by species according to their causes?’ In this article, the first objection creates an interesting opportunity for Thomas when it compares the four causes of Aristotle with respect to their ability to specify. The objection begins by making the sensible observation that, of all the four causes of Aristotle, the material cause seems to have the least reference to species. But it then recalls that matter has already been proven to play some role, since it is considered as if the object of the act, and objects are a proven cause of

408

409

‘Ad quartum dicendum, quod est duplex materia: ex qua, vel in qua, et materia circa quam; et primo modo materia dicta non indicit in idem cum fine, sed secundo modo est idem cum fine, quia objectum finis actus est’: II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, ra 4.

Also, there is implicit evidence in his response that Thomas is thinking in this text specifically of the proximate end rather than the remote end. Note again his remark that the ‘matter about which’ is ‘the same as end, because the object is an end of the act’. Aquinas's use of the term ‘object’ to link ‘matter about which’ and end here is significant. In the very next reply to an objection (II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, ra 5), he will explain how the object refers particularly to the proximate end (a use of ‘object’ already explored in Ch. 5). Thus Aquinas's use of ‘object’ helps us to identify the kind of end (i.e. proximate) which he has in mind in this passage.

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differentiation in sins.410 Consequently, the objection voices its expectation that the other three causes (final, efficient, and formal) should each play an even more important part than the material cause in specification, since all are more prominent. Thomas is now in a position where he not only needs to explain why a material cause should give form, but he must also compare its influence to that of the other three causes. He takes advantage of this opportunity to focus especially on the relationship between matter and ends: [O]bjects, in so far as they are related to exterior acts, have the character of the matter about which (materia circa quam); but in so far as they are related to the interior act of the will, they have the character of ends; and it is from this that they give the species to the act. However, even in so far as they are the matter about which (materia circa quam), they have the character of termini, from which motions are specified, as it is said in V Physic. and in X Ethic. But, nevertheless, the termini of motions give the species to motions, in so far as they have the character of end.411 Here, Thomas explains more clearly than in any other text how the materia circa quam can have a dual role as ‘end’; it can be considered both as terminus and as finis. On one level, the materia circa quam can act as the final point which marks the cessation of an external motion, and on another level, the materia can be engaged voluntarily, which accounts for its being called end. Thus, both in this text from the Summa and the one from the Sentences above, the reality bearing the name ‘matter’ is shown to be specifying, not in so far as it is matter, but rather in so far as it can be engaged by the will as a good to be sought through action; in short, the matter here is specifying precisely by virtue of its being an end.

410

See I-II, q. 72, a. 1.

411

‘Ad secundum dicendum quod obiecta, secundum quod comparantur ad actus exteriores, habent rationem materiae circa quam: sed secundum quod comparantur ad actum interiorem voluntatis, habent rationem finium; et ex hoc habent quod dent speciem actui. Quamvis etiam secundum quod sunt materia circa quam, habeant rationem terminorum; a quibus motus specificantur, ut dicitur in V Physic. et in X Ethic. Sed tamen etiam termini motus dant speciem motibus, inquantum habent rationem finis’: I-II, q. 72, a. 3, ra 2. This reply is virtually repeated in a shortened form in I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ra 1.

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(b) Matter as possessing a formal aspect like an object does Chapter 5 explained that specification involves not only willing some goal, but also identifying that special formal character discovered in this goal through its relation to right reason. This formal aspect is the hallmark of the term ‘object’. It is significant to note, then, that just as Thomas sometimes portrays matter as end, so he will also, on other occasions, portray matter as if an object; he does this by attributing to matter precisely that formal character or ratio which is the object's distinctive feature. One good example of such a depiction of matter appears in Aquinas's treatment of luxuria (i.e. intemperance regarding sex). In the first article of II–II, q. 154, Aquinas attempts to identify six species of this vice. He bases his distinction on differences in what he calls the matter; to be more specific, these differences are various traits which can belong to a woman, whether she is married (adultery), single (fornication), under the care of a guardian (seduction), and so forth. The first objection demurs at this differentiation, taking issue precisely with Aquinas's decision to use ‘matter’ in this context. It begins by agreeing with Thomas up to a point: the objection has no qualms assigning the term ‘matter’ to women of different types and even grants that the differences suggested by Aquinas can be used to divide the sin. But then it recalls a truth which Thomas himself teaches on numerous occasions: a legitimate specification must be based, not on some merely material difference, but on a formal one. Since Thomas clearly understands the differences in this case to be material, the objection reasons that they can't be responsible for any proper, formal specification of luxuria (lust). This objection seems to have Thomas in a quandary, saying to him in effect: you must either desist from using ‘matter’ or content yourself with a merely material division. This dilemma gives Thomas the opportunity to comment on how matter can be responsible for a formal distinction: ‘[T]he aforementioned diversity of matter has annexed to it a formal diversity of object, which is understood according to the diverse modes of repugnance to right reason, as was said.’412

412

‘Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praedicta diversitas materiae habet annexam diversitatem formalem obiecti, quae accipitur secundum diversos modos repugnantiae ad rationem rectam, ut dictum est’: II-II, q. 154, a. 1, ag and ra 1. For nearly identical objections and answers, see IV Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 4a, ag and ra 1; De Malo, q. 15, a. 3, ag and ra 1.

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In his reply, Thomas cedes the objection's point: matter considered as a passive substrate cannot account for formal specification; something else is needed. He thereupon presents the matter as having a formal diversity ‘annexed’ to it. The problem raised by the objection is therefore solved by seeing in the matter precisely that formal component which is distinctive of objects and which accounts for their contribution to specification; in short, matter in this context appears and functions like an object. Aquinas's approach in this text is also employed in similar cases elsewhere.413 A second example involves a somewhat different kind of problem. In his ethics, Thomas not only wishes to demonstrate how actions and habits receive their species, but also to show how they are related to one another. In the preceding chapters, we have seen something of Aquinas's scheme of organization at work: all the virtues and vices are somehow attached to the seven main virtues of faith, hope, charity, prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. Thomas expends a great deal of effort in the second part of the Summa carefully fitting virtues or vices into their proper places in this scheme. One way of relating virtues to each other is through ‘annexation’, where one virtue is associated with another through some shared similarity. A good illustration of this kind of association was seen in Chapter 5: religion is annexed to justice by Aquinas, not because religion is exactly like justice—human beings could never adequately give return to God for his creation and governance of the universe—but because religion bears some similarity to justice in that people, recognizing their debt to God, try their best to show gratitude. It is not always easy to know which virtues ought to be annexed to which others, and a question arises in the Summa with respect to magnificence. This virtue, which Thomas inherits from Aristotle, disposes a person to spend large sums of his own wealth on behalf of the common good. In his scheme of organization, Thomas decides to place magnificence as a secondary virtue under fortitude. His

413

For other examples, see Thomas's treatment of the matter of sacrilege (II-II, q. 99, a. 3, ag and ra 1); and his discussion of the species of contrary pleasures (I-II, q. 31, a. 8, ag and ra 3).

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reasoning is that, although it is not as difficult to remain steadfast in great giving as it is when confronted with dangers of death, nevertheless, people are naturally reluctant to dispossess themselves of their own property, and hence, it is useful for them to cultivate a disposition which makes such giving easier. Thus, because magnificence involves the overcoming of something difficult, albeit in a lesser way, Thomas annexes it to fortitude, the virtue par excellence of standing fast. As might be surmised from the discussion above, Thomas considers the matter of magnificence to be great expenditures.414 This apparently sensible identification calls forth a complaint from an objection in II–II, q. 134, a. 4. Although content with Aquinas's observation about what the matter of magnificence is, the objection insists on a different classification of the virtue. It begins by recalling the matters of two primary virtues: fortitude, which is about emotions of fear and daring; and justice, which concerns buying and selling. It then observes that expenditures, the matter of magnificence, resembles much more closely the matter of justice, buying and selling, than it does the matter of fortitude, fear and daring. The objection concludes that Thomas has mistakenly annexed magnificence to the wrong virtue. Aquinas's response to this challenge is telling: ‘[M]agnificence, although it does not belong with fortitude in matter, nevertheless belongs with it in the condition of the matter, namely, so far as it tends to something arduous concerning buying, as fortitude tends to something arduous concerning fears.’415 Note what Thomas does here. He agrees with the objection in part, conceding that the matter of magnificence really does resemble the matter of justice more. But he continues that this likeness is not what is crucial when considering how the two virtues are to be related. Both fortitude and magnificence share some ‘condition’, namely the aspect of the difficult, and it is in virtue of this similarity that they are associated, and not by virtue of the likeness of matter. The phrase ‘condition of the object’

414

See II-II, q. 134, a. 3, cor.

415

‘[M]agnificentia, etsi non conveniat cum fortitudine in materia, convenit tamen cum ea in conditione materiae, inquantum scilicet tendit in aliquid arduum circa sumptus, sicut fortitudo in aliquid arduum circa timores’: II-II, q. 134, a. 4, ra 2.

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(as we shall see more clearly in the next chapter) is used by Thomas to signify an object's formal ‘ratio’ or aspect. In this text, the phrase ‘condition of the matter’ seems to mean the same thing: a formal character which both fortitude and magnificence share. Once again, a way of speaking which is characteristic of objects has been added to matter to explain its function in the context of specification.

7 Circumstance The act of ‘killing an innocent person’ could be mentioned without further elaboration, and listeners would need no additional information to identify this action's moral kind. Yet, in any concrete situation, this act would be attended by many particular qualities which could rightly be said to belong to it. For example, the victim might be obscure or famous; the perpetrator might make use of his fists or a bludgeon; his manner of attack might be graceful or awkward; the act might take place at daybreak or at midday, in a marketplace or in a pub. None of these factors would seem prima facie to change the essence of the act: it would still be an act of ‘killing an innocent person’, whichever of these particulars happens to be true. It is also perfectly clear, however, that the act could not take place without some such characteristics coinciding; for example, although the act need not happen at a particular time, like midday, it must happen at some time. An action cannot occur, then, without being attired by some such properties. These properties are what Aquinas refers to as circumstances. Clearly a consideration of circumstances completes and enriches an account of human action and must be included in any adequate moral theory. While it is appropriate in the present study to consider circumstances generally, our ultimate purpose is to discover whether circumstances can ever determine moral species. Even a brief look at Aquinas's texts shows that circumstances are more for him than just ornamentation for actions. In those passages where he lists the various factors which contribute to the goodness or evil of a

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human action, one sees circumstances listed right alongside end and object as being significant.416 A person attempting to determine the precise role of circumstances with respect to specification, however, will encounter a puzzle. Aquinas's texts present apparently conflicting evidence concerning whether the goodness or evil contributed by the circumstances is an added goodness (above and beyond the moral species), or whether it also extends to the very determination of the species itself. For example, in some texts, Aquinas seems to assert that circumstances have no involvement in specification: ‘a circumstance, as such’, he remarks, ‘does not give the species to a moral act, but its species is taken from its object’.417 In other texts, however, Thomas seems to assert precisely the opposite: ‘every circumstance is capable of changing the species of sin’.418 Certain fundamentals are useful for understanding Aquinas's position on this subject; hence, Aquinas's general presentation of circumstances will be outlined first, followed by the special question of their place in the specification of human actions.

416 For texts where Thomas lists of the various factors contributing to the moral quality of an act (which includes circumstances), see I–II, q. 18, a. 4, cor, II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, cor; d. 41, q. 1, a. 2, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 11; q. 7, a. 4, cor. For texts which mention circumstances adding a goodness or evil beyond what has already been given by the genus or species, see II Sent. d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, ra 1, ra 2, ra 3; d. 37, q. 2, a. 2, sc; d. 40, q. 1, a. 5, cor, ra 2; I–II, q. 18, a. 3, cor, ra 3; I–II, q. 18, a. 4, ra 3; I–II, q. 18, a. 9, cor; I–II, q. 73, a. 7, ra 1, ra 3; II–II, q. 6, a. 2, ra 2; II–II, q. 44, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 147, a. 1, ra 1; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 5, ra 6; a. 5, cor; a. 6, ra 15; a. 10, cor; q. 12, a. 4, cor. 417

418

‘[C]ircumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, non dat speciem actui morali, sed eius species sumitur ab obiecto…’: II–II, q. 154, a. 1, cor; see also ra 4; I–II, q. 72, a. 9, sc; I–II, q. 19, a. 2, sc and cor.

‘Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod omnis circumstantia potest speciem peccati mutare, sed non semper mutat’: IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, cor. This statement is less extreme than might first appear to be the case: Thomas is not saying that each and every circumstance is capable of specifying, but rather that every kind of circumstance is capable of specifying (I will enumerate the eight kinds shortly). For other texts where Thomas makes the claim that circumstances can specify a moral act, see I–II, q. 73, a. 7, cor, ag and ra 1; IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, sc; I–II, q. 18, a. 3, sc; I–II, q. 18, a. 10, sc; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, sc; q. 2, a. 7, ra 6.

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1. The Nature of Circumstances Thomas calls a circumstance a condition (conditio), property (proprietas), or accident (accidens) of a human act.419 The Latin word circumstantia literally means to stand around something. Thomas explains why it is an apt word for signifying conditions of human actions. The best way to understand a less familiar thing or relationship, he notes, is to use terms from something more familiar. In this present case, the term ‘circumstance’ is borrowed from descriptions of spatial relations: the phrase ‘stands around’ describes a situation where one body is situated outside another, yet touches it or is placed along side of it, as people might ‘stand around’ a table. Thomas shows how this well-known and observable relationship applies to the human act. A condition or property, such as the time when an act takes place, ‘stands around’ an act, as it were, because although it is not a part of what is essential to an action, it has a close (and in some ways indispensable) association with what is essential. Thus, for Aquinas, what ‘stands around’ a material body helps us to describe and understand qualities which are associated with human action.420 As we saw above, Thomas sometimes calls circumstances ‘accidents’ of a human action.421 Yet it is good to keep in mind that when he uses the word ‘accident’ in this context, he is giving it a meaning somewhat different from its typical one: for Aquinas, a circumstance is not an accident of a human action in the same way that redness or

419

Conditio: IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1a; I–II, q. 7, a. 1, sc; Comm. Ethic. 3, lc. 3, n. 9; proprietas: IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1a; accidens: I–II, q. 7, a. 1, sc, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 3, cor, ra 1; I–II, q. 19, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 88, a. 5, sc, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 5, cor; compared as accident: De Malo, q. 2, a. 8, sc; q. 2, a. 10, cor.

420 421

I–II, q. 7, a. 1, cor; see also De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor.

It is good to remember that, for Thomas, circumstances are not just any sort of accident. The number of any action's properties can be infinite, so Thomas makes a distinction: those accidents which are in every way accidental to an act are not considered by the moral science, but only those which ‘touch the act in some way, by being systematically related to it’ (‘actum aliquo modo contingunt, ordinatae ad ipsum’: I–II, q. 7, a. 2, ra 2). These Thomas calls proper accidents, and he asserts that only they are rightly called circumstances (I–II, q. 7, a. 2, ra 2; I–II, q. 18, a. 3, ra 2; see also De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, ra 6). In other texts, Thomas will claim that circumstances are infinite, but only in possibility and not in any actual cases: see II–II, q. 39, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 10, a. 5, cor; II–II, q. 49, a. 7, ra 1.

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sweetness is an accident of an apple. The reason is that an action is itself an accident: a human action happens in and through that person who is its subject. To call a circumstance an accident according to the ordinary and strict use of this term would amount to making one accident (an action) the subject of another accident (a circumstance), which is impossible in Aquinas's philosophy of nature. Aquinas circumvents this problem by suggesting a second, analogous use of the word ‘accident’. When two accidents are in the same subject at the same time, he determines, they are not only accidents of that subject, but they are also, after a manner, accidents of each other. Thomas suggests two ways in which this can happen. First, two accidents can be related because both independently inhere in the same subject, as when white is said to be an accident of music playing ability when both exist in the same person, say, Socrates. Second, two accidents can be related because one inheres in a subject on account of the other, as when a body is coloured through its surface. Thomas believes that both kinds of relationship between one accident and another can be recognized in the relationship between a human action and its circumstances. For instance, a circumstance of the human action walking might be the fact that the agent is large. Note, however, that strictly speaking, it is not the action walking which is large, but the person performing the action. We say that an agent's largeness is a circumstance of walking, then, only because both the size and action belong to the same subject: that human person, who is both large and walking. An example of the second type of relationship between accidents is one where an agent is walking swiftly; here the speed would be identified as a circumstance of the action walking. This example differs from the one suggested in the last paragraph because the circumstance is dependent on the action for its existence: a person can be large, whether walking or not, but there can be no swiftness apart from the act of walking. Yet even in spite of the closer relation between the accidents in this case, it must be admitted that the speed is a circumstance of the human action only because both the speed and the action are dependent on the subject: there could be neither swiftness nor walking if there were no walker.

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Thus, however one considers them, circumstances are related to a human action, not as accidents are related to a substance, but as one accident is related to another.422 Having defined what circumstances are, Thomas has the additional task of identifying, arranging, and comparing them. Two listings of circumstances already in the tradition are important sources for him.423 The first is a list from Cicero's De Inventione 1. 1. 24;424 it contains circumstances a rhetorician has to keep in mind: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when.425 A second list is put forward by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics in connection with moral acts: who, what, about what, in what, by what instrument, why, and how.426

422

I–II, q. 7, a. 1, ra 2, ra 3; I–II, q. 7, a. 3, ra 1; De Anima, a. 13, ra 8.

423

There is a third listing of circumstances known to Aquinas. It is found in De vera et falsa poenitentia, a work of unknown authorship which was attributed to Augustine (see IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1c, ag 5); this list was known to the medievals through Lombard's Sentences: ‘Consideret qualitatem criminis, in loco, in tempore, in perseverantia, in varietate personae, et quali hoc fecerit tentatione, et in ipsius vitii multiplici exsecutione. Oportet enim poenitere fornicantem secundum excellentiam sui status vel officii, vel secundum modum meretricis, et in modum operis sui, et qualiter turpitudinem egit; si in loco sacrato, si in tempore orationi constituto, ut sunt festivitates et tempora ieiunii. Consideret quantum perseveraverit, et defleat quod perseveranter peccavit; et quanta victus fuerit impugnatione. Sunt enim qui non solum non vincuntur, sed ultro se peccato offerunt; nec exspectant tentationem, sed praeveniunt voluptatem. Et pertractet secum quam multiplici actione vitii delectabiliter peccavit’: from Augustinus in libro De poenitentia; quoted in the Sentences of Peter Lombard, 4. 16. 2; see Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, 3rd edn., 2 vols. (Grottaferrata [Rome]: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1981), ii. 337–8. Thomas observes that this list (which includes such circumstances as place, time, perseverance, status of the person, etc.) is particularly relevant to sacramental penance, since it contains those properties most likely to bring about sorrow for sin (IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1c, cor); he also attempts to show how it can be reconciled with the lists of Aristotle and Cicero (ibid., cor, ra 5). Thomas declines, however, to make explicit use of this text as a source in his own consideration of circumstances, probably because the De vera is more discursive and more closely tied to a particular issue (i.e. penance) than are the lists of Cicero and Aristotle. 424

This list is also found in Boethius, IV De Differentiis Topicis, in Patrologiae Cursus Completus, series Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1844–82), lxiv. Opera Omnia (1891), col. 1212.

425

Expressed in a tag: ‘quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando’: IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1b, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor; I–II, q. 7, a. 3, cor.

426

‘Forsitan igitur non malum determinare, haec et quae et quot sint, et quis utique et quid, et circa quid, vel in quo operatur, quandoque autem et quo, puta instrumento, et gratia cujus, puta salutis, et qualiter, puta quiete vel vehementer’: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (old Latin tr.), 1111a (3 lec. iii), in Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1871–80), xxv. In Aristotelis Stagiritae Nonnullos Libros Commentaria; In X Libros ad Ethicorum (1875), p.’327, col. 1; referred to in I–II, q. 7, a. 3, cor; Comm. Ethic. 3, lc. 3, nn. 9–11.

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A closer look at these two lists reveals that they are not identical. Each list has seven circumstances. They agree on five (who, what, why, how, by what instruments), and disagree on two (Cicero has ‘when’ and ‘where’, while Aristotle has ‘about what’ and ‘in what it is done’). Thomas believes that this small discrepancy can easily be reconciled, contending that, where Aristotle uses ‘in what it is done’, he is including both the ‘when’ and ‘where’ of Cicero; and where Cicero uses ‘what’, he is including both Aristotle's ‘what’ and ‘about what’.427 These two lists hold almost equal importance in Aquinas's eyes. While it could be argued that Aristotle's list is treated with slightly higher regard than Cicero's in the Summa Theologiae,428 Thomas does not adhere exactly to either of these lists in his own work, but rather conflates them; that is, he freely borrows ‘when’ and ‘where’ from Cicero, and ‘about what’ from Aristotle.429 In practice, then, Thomas recognizes eight circumstances, even though he never explicitly presents such an expanded list as his own. When examining these two lists above, a reader cannot always easily tell exactly what each circumstance might correspond to in individual actions. Thomas in his writings gives examples of circumstances which can be helpful in identifying them:

427

For the most complete discussion of the reconciliation of these two lists, see IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1b, ra 5.

428

The proposals which Thomas defends in the title of an article can sometimes give a clue as to where he is focusing his attention. For example, in his Commentary on theSentences, Aquinas asks whether the list from Cicero is suitably enumerated and, as he is defending this list, he also introduces Aristotle's list. In the Summa, the situation is reversed: he asks whether Aristotle's list is correct, and introduces Cicero's list as he defends Aristotle (IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1b, ag 1; I–II, q. 7, a. 3, title). 429

Circa quid is associated with the object or matter for Aquinas. This circumstance is important enough to Thomas that he never enumerates the full list of circumstances from Cicero without adding the circa quid of Aristotle; see IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1b, ra 5; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor; Comm. Ethic. 3, lc. 3, n. 10; I–II, q. 7, a. 3, cor.

178 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Circumstance who: the dignity or lack thereof in the agent why: the liberation of the state as the goal an agent is fighting for about what: father or a stranger as two possible victims of an assailant's attack what: injury or death as two possible outcomes or effects of an attack how: lightly or forcefully, frequently or once as possible ways of attacking by what aids: an underling who assists; or attacking with a sword (see note) place: sacred as a possible condition of a location time: sacred as a possible condition of a moment430

Aquinas organizes the various kinds of circumstances according to two different schemes. The first is according to the different ways in which circumstances are related to an action. In this approach, he divides circumstances into three groups, according as circumstances touch the act itself, its causes, or its effects: (1) those circumstances which belong to the act itself include ‘how’ the act is done, and the ‘measure’ of the act from time and place; (2) those circumstances associated with the causes of the act are ‘why’ (final cause); ‘about what’ (material cause), ‘who’ (efficient cause), and ‘by what aids’ (instrumental efficient cause); (3) the single circumstance associated

430

Who: ‘Dignitas enim personae est quaedam circumstantia’ (I–II, q. 89, a. 3, cor); see also being under a vow (II–II, q. 110, a. 4, ra 5); the state of perfection of the sinner (II–II, q. 164, a. 4, cor). Why: ‘[finis est circumstantia] si fortiter agat propter liberationem civitatis’ (I–II, q. 7, a. 3, ra 3). About what: ‘sive consideremus obiectum sive materiam actus, puta utrum percusserit patrem vel extraneum’ (De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor). What: ‘etiam effectum quem agendo induxit, puta utrum percutiendo vulneraverit, vel etiam occiderit’ (ibid.); see also chilling or scalding by water (I–II, q. 7, a. 3, ra 3). How: ‘sive consideremus modum agendi, puta utrum lente vel fortiter percusserit, frequenter, aut semel’ (ibid.). By what aids: Thomas seems to include under this circumstance both efficient auxiliary causes, such as servants, and instruments, such as swords (‘ex parte instrumenti, cum consideramus quo instrumento fecerit vel quibus auxiliis’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor); ‘gladius’: IV Sent. d. 44, q. 1, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 117, a. 3, ra 2 (in both texts, the examples are mentioned as an instrument, but not explicitly as a circumstance). Place: ‘loco sacro’ (I–II, q. 18, a. 10, cor; see also IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1c, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, sc, cor, ra 2, ra 3; I–II, q. 18, a. 10, sc). Time: ‘tempus sacrum’ (De Malo, q. 6, a. 2, ra 2).

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with the effects is ‘what’. Thus, circumstances can be seen to touch the act in every important way.431 The second scheme of arrangement ranks circumstances according to their relative importance. Following Aristotle's lead, Thomas identifies ‘why’ (propter quid) and ‘what’ (quid) as the two most crucial, since they are associated with the two most important causes of the act's form, object and end.432 The other circumstances are ranked according to how closely each approaches to the ‘substance’ of the act: thus, Thomas lists person, mode, instrument, time and

431

I–II, q. 7, a. 3, cor. The identification and division of circumstances proposed above follow Aquinas's presentation in the Summa; in his other writings, one sometimes encounters variants. The most important difference with respect to identification concerns Aquinas's treatment of ‘what’ (quid). I have already noted that when attempting to reconcile quid on Cicero's list with Aristotle, Thomas divides Cicero's quid into ‘what’ quid and ‘about what’ (circa quid). Once this division has been made, however, the second quid (the one distinguished from circa quid) is sometimes said to refer to the species or genus of the act (IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1b, cor, ra 5; Comm. Ethic. 3, lc. 3, nn. 9–10), and at other times to the effect (De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor, where Thomas names this circumstance as quod, and I–II, q. 7, a. 3, cor). These two meanings of ‘what’ do not appear to be the same: species seems to refer to the act's form (which is taken from its object or end), while effectus seems to refer to the action's consequences (for effectus as consequences, see the examples from De Malo and the Summa in n. 15 above). This difference concerning quid may account for the variations in Aquinas's categorization of the circumstances. For instance, in the Sentences, his divisions include ‘in the act’ (what (quid) and how), ‘outside the act from measure’ (when and where), ‘outside the act by cause’ (why, who, by what means). (The quid here is understood in Cicero's sense. According to Thomas, this quid contains quid and circa quid as Aristotle understands them, and thus both seem to belong ‘in the act’.) In the Summa Theologiae, on the other hand, we see divisions touching ‘the act itself ’ (when, where, how), ‘the causes’ (why, who, about what (circa quid), by whose help), and ‘the effect’ (what (quid)). Notice the differences: circa quid is associated in the Summa with the causes of action (material cause) instead of being associated with ‘the act itself’, and quid is in its own category, ‘effect’. This rearrangement may have been an attempt by Thomas to associate one of the traditional circumstances with ‘effect’, an important element of action not explicitly named in the lists of Cicero and Aristotle. It is telling that in the very next article of the Summa following his account of the division of circumstances, Thomas shows quid referring to the ‘substance of the act’ (substantiam actus; see I–II, q. 7, a. 4, cor). It seems, then, that Thomas has no problem associating quid with either meaning, and that this shift is not a profound one. (For charts of these different ways of organizing circumstances, see Johannes Gründel, Die Lehre von Umständen der menschlichen Handlung im Mittelalter, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 39/5 (Münster, Westf.: Aschendorff, 1963), 588, 596, 604, 614.) 432

I–II, q. 7, a. 4, cor, ra 1, 2, 3; IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2b, cor; Comm. Ethic. 3, lc. 3, n. 18.

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place in descending order of significance. He notes, however, that nothing stops any one of these from taking precedence over others of higher ranking in individual cases.433

2. A General Consideration of the Role of Circumstances in Moral Evaluation In the previous section, a circumstance was shown to be related to an action in the same way that one accident is related to another when in the same subject. It must be confessed that, on the surface, this relationship is rather weaklooking; after all, how much influence does the sweetness of an apple have on its redness, or vice versa? Such a question leads one to wonder about the possible effect of circumstances on human actions: can circumstances have any influence on actions which would affect their moral character? And if so, how would this happen? While some circumstances are only tangentially relevant for a given moral action, Thomas thinks that others can have a significant influence. One important contribution of circumstances has to do with properly relating means to end(s). As was shown in Chapter 2, whenever a human action cannot be immediately achieved through the exercise of an agent's powers, some intermediary goal(s) must be sought first. Thomas sees this relationship in terms of a proportion: a means has to be so arranged that it is adequately suited to achieving an agent's end(s).434 Human end(s) can involve considerable sophistication and possess a detailed particularity. Identifying a means of the right general kind is often insufficient; the end desired can only be reached if relevant conditions regarding the means are properly adjusted to achieving this end. For example, a person whose end is passing a particular physiology exam could describe the means as ‘studying’. While this description is accurate, it requires greater

433 434

IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2b, cor.

For texts where circumstances are said to be involved in proportioning an action to its end, see: II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, ra 4; d. 40, q. 1, a. 3, cor; IV Sent. d. 16, q. 3, a. 1a, cor; a. 1b, cor; a. 2a, cor; a. 2b, cor; I–II, q. 7, a. 2, cor, ra 1; with reference to virtue, II–II, q. 44, a. 4, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, ra 23.

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specificity. After understanding the end better by ascertaining the extent and difficulty of the test material, the student must decide how best to study in this particular case: what study techniques to use, where to study, how long to study, and so forth. In short, the person being tested must proportion his studying (means) so that it favours success on this particular exam (end). One way Thomas has of referring to especially significant conditions of action is ‘due circumstances’ (debitae circumstantiae). For instance, he observes that ‘[a]cts are proportioned to end[s], according to a certain commensuration which is accomplished through due circumstances’.435 Although ‘due circumstances’ can refer to any morally relevant conditions of actions,436 their contribution to proportioning means is certainly noteworthy. Aquinas's comparison of temperance and fasting is a good illustration of how a circumstance can proportion an action to its end. As an acquired virtue, notes Thomas, the end of temperance is a ‘civil’ good, that is, a temporal or thisworldly good. When looked at from this perspective, a person who refrains from eating for a period of time (given no other supervening conditions) would be consuming less than moderation would allow for—he would be eating ‘too little’ from the point of view of right reason—and therefore his action would be judged wrong. If that same person were to become a believer and to receive the infused virtue of fasting, however, a change in evaluation would take place. The person's end would no longer be the ‘civil’ good alone, but eternal life with God. This new end would have an effect on how the

435 436

‘Actus autem proportionantur fini secundum commensurationem quandam, quae fit per debitas circumstantias’: I–II, q. 7, a. 2, cor.

‘Ita etiam est in actione. Nam plenitudo bonitatis eius non tota consistit in sua specie, sed aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam accidentia quaedam. Et huiusmodi sunt circumstantiae debitae. Unde si aliquid desit quod requiratur ad debitas circumstantias, erit actio mala’: I–II, q. 18, a. 3, cor; see also I–II, q. 73, a. 7, cor; I Sent., d. 43, q. 2, a. 2, cor; II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, cor; III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 3, ra 4; I–II, q. 7, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 20, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 20, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 44, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 58, a. 10, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 3, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, ra 23; for examples of particular actions and virtues and their need for debitae circumstantiae, see II–II, q. 32, a. 2, ra 4; II–II, q. 33, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 33, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 51, a. 1, ra 3; II–II, q. 54, a. 1, ra 3; II–II, q. 55, a. 7, cor; II–II, q. 101, a. 4, cor; II–II, q. 108, a. 1, cor; II–II, q. 109, a. 1, ra 2; II–II, q. 110, a. 3, ra 5; II–II, q. 115, a. 1, ra 1, ra 2; II–II, q. 154, a. 1, cor.

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right amount of food is calculated. As noted earlier, right reason shows that a person dedicated to God can pursue certain spiritual goods and avoid certain related evils by refraining from food periodically. What was immoderate (i.e. too little) is now understood in comparison to this new end to be the right amount. It is thus by adjusting a circumstance (the amount) that the proper proportion to each of these ends is achieved.437 A second illustration drawn from Aquinas's teachings about self-intoxication shows the complexity which can arise when several circumstances of an action prove relevant to its moral evaluation. Suppose that someone has an opportunity to drink wine. If committed to living virtuously, this person will recognize the need to drink moderately: this action must be guided by right reason and divine law.438 The drinker must pay special attention to the wine's inebriating power. Immoderate use of intoxicants involve a special deviation from the standards for right action: according to Thomas, impairing one's own reasoning capacity unnecessarily (absque necessitate), even temporarily, is wrong, because reason directs human beings to God and helps them to avoid many sins.439 The drinker must therefore strike a mean in the use of wine such that its benefits may be enjoyed without incurring any harms, including the disabling of reason.440

437 III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2d, ra 2; for another text on fasting II–II, q. 147, a. 1, ra 2; for other texts on the distinction between acquired and infused virtues, see I–II, q. 63, a. 4, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 10, ra 8, ra 9; q. 5, a. 4. Another example which illustrates this point somewhat differently concerns loving another person. Aquinas says that, in ordinary circumstances, showing signs of love is an appropriate means for awakening love in the heart of a friend. Certain circumstances, however, can cause these means to be inappropriate: e.g. a certain friend may be given to pride or suspicious of flattery. In this case, what was once a legitimate means to the end of evoking love is no longer so, on account of supervening circumstances. A different means, one which takes these circumstances into account, must be chosen for the same end (II–II, q. 49, a. 7, cor). 438

‘[B]onitas est ex quadam commensuratione actus ad circumstantias et finem, quam ratio facit’: II Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 1, cor; see also I–II, q. 73, a. 7, ra 3; I Sent., d. 43, q. 2, a. 2, cor; I–II, q. 20, a. 2, cor; ‘Manifestum est autem quod peccatum causatur ex defectu alicuius circumstantiae, ex hoc enim receditur ab ordine rationis, quod aliquis in operando non observat debitas circumstantias’: I–II, q. 73, a. 7, cor; see also ra 3; II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 5, cor. 439 440

I–II, q. 88, a. 5, ra 1; II–II, q. 149, a. 1, cor, a. 2, cor.

‘[M]edium et extrema considerantur in actionibus et passionibus secundum diversas circumstantias…’: I–II, q. 64, a. 1, ra 2; see also III Sent. d. 33, q. 2, a. 3, cor, ra 4; II–II, q. 33, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 58, a. 10, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor; De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, ra 23; a. 13, ra 9. Achieving the mean does not regard quantity, but the use of circumstances to achieve the proper balance according to right reason: e.g. although the magnificent man donates a large amount, nevertheless he strikes a balance by giving it when and where and how he should: I–II, q. 64, a. 1, ra 2; II–II, q. 92, a. 1, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 5. See also virtues such as magnanimity, obedience (II–II, q. 104, a. 2, ra 2), and religion (II–II, q. 81, a. 5, ra 3; II–II, q. 92, a. 1, cor).

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But how much is the correct amount? Aquinas maintains that no set measure can be given as an answer to this question. The mean is taken from a comparison of the wine to the drinker; the question is ‘what is too much or the right amount for him or her?’441 In trying to determine this mean, circumstances can play a crucial role: many conditions are capable of influencing how this commensuration is worked out. Especially important are conditions of the person; for example, according to Thomas, some people (1) are easily the worse for taking wine, (2) are bound by a vow not to drink,442 (3) hold an office which requires particular astuteness of mind (like a teacher, a king, or a bishop),443 (4) uphold a vocation to pursue the perfection of wisdom444, or (5) suffer from a certain illness.445 Each of these circumstances would have an influence over the determination of the mean. In the first four cases, the right amount would be less than what might otherwise seem advisable. For example, an individual with a weak constitution might learn from experience that even a little alcohol impairs him: he must take this into account when determining the appropriate amount of wine for him. In the fifth case described above, on the other hand, the mean might be reached by drinking more than is usually advisable: Thomas recognizes certain illnesses where a physician might be required to prescribe a large quantity of wine as a remedy. What would normally be considered excessive could, given this circumstance, be judged the right amount.446 Of course, circumstances besides a condition of the person can also come into play. Someone might be excessive regarding the ‘way’ (mode) in which he or she drinks.447 ‘Frequent repetition’ of

441

II–II, q. 58, a. 10, cor.

442

II–II, q. 149, a. 3, cor.

443

Ibid., a. 4, cor.

444

II–II, q. 150, a. 3, ra 1.

445

Ibid., a. 2, ra 3.

446

Ibid. Thomas is nevertheless insistent that an intoxicant should not be used as a medication when other equally viable non-intoxicating substances have the same effect.

447

II–II, q. 149, a. 3, cor.

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drunkenness might indicate an additional disorder, if it signifies contempt for a divine precept.448 The drinker might have the ‘effect’ of scandalizing another by his or her action.449 Finally, the ignorance of certain circumstances, such as the strength of the wine, might lessen the drinker's responsibility.450 All of the above circumstances can play a role in determining the moral character of this act. A number of these circumstances are present before the act is performed and are non-negotiable; these must be taken into account as the agent fixes those circumstances which are within his or her control. (For example, the agent cannot help having a weak disposition but can regulate the strength of the drink, the amount taken, and the speed of its consumption.) In both of Aquinas's illustrations given above, we can observe how circumstances help to establish a kind of harmony in the action. Thomas compares a well ordered action to a work of art, since the circumstances give a proper proportioning to such an action not unlike that belonging to something beautiful.451 The human virtue which disposes one's reason to arrange the circumstances correctly is prudence.452 In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas mentions several parts of prudence, that is, what needs to concur for the perfect act of prudence; for example, memory, understanding, docility, shrewdness, etc.453 That part of prudence particularly relevant to circumstances is called, appropriately, circumspection (circumspectio).454 The circumspect person is one who is able, once a good end has been recognized, to compare the means with the circumstances in order to make sure that the proper balance is maintained in the concrete conditions which belong to the act

448

De Malo, q. 2, a. 8, ra 3.

449

II–II, q. 150, a. 3, cor, ra 2.

450

Ibid., a. 1, cor, ra 3; a. 2, cor; for other examples like abstinence where many circumstances are shown to be relevant to a moral act, see defending the needy (an advocate's responsibility), which depends on circumstances of time, place, relationship, etc. (see II–II, q. 71, a. 1. cor, ra 2), and joking or playing, which requires respect for the circumstances of matter, mode of acting, person, time, and place (see II–II, q. 168, a. 2, cor; a. 3, cor).

451

Comm. Ethic. 1, lc. 13, n. 6; 2, lc. 7, n. 2.

452

‘Sed hoc bonum rationis determinatur secundum quod constituitur medium in actionibus et passionibus per debitam commensurationem circumstantiarum, quod facit prudentia’: III Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 3, cor; see also ra 4; II–II, q. 49, a. 7, ra 2.

453

II–II, q. 48, cor.

454

II–II, q. 49, a. 7.

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in question. Because there can be so many circumstances in a given act, Thomas realizes that determining the exact proportion in a particular case is often difficult.455 While such calculating is by no means an exact science, those who have cultivated prudence are able to judge actions and their circumstances better than those who have not.456

3. The Types of Circumstances, as Distinguished by their Differing Contributions to the Moral Act In the last section, I recounted how circumstances can influence the character of a moral act, but without much specificity concerning the roles different kinds of circumstances play in specification of human actions. In this section, I will focus precisely on this second issue.457 When considering the role of circumstances in specification, Thomas recognizes three basic types: (1) some circumstances help to constitute a moral species, (2) some increase or decrease the seriousness of an existing species, and (3) some are morally irrelevant.458

(i) Circumstances which determine a moral species (a) Circumstances which help to give the initial specication to an act Thomas maintains that an action can be thought of without considering its relation to right reason (see Ch. 5, s.2). An action so

455

Comm. Ethic. 2, lc. 11, n. 11.

456

Of course, circumstances cannot proportion every means to every end. Thomas definitively states that some acts are wrong in themselves, and nothing can make them right, as e.g. acts of homicide, adultery, and blasphemy (see e.g. De Malo, q. 7, a. 1, cor; see also II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 2, cor; IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 3d, ra 5; II–II, q. 19, a. 3, ra 3; II–II, q. 33, a. 2, cor; II–II, q. 158, a. 1, cor; Comm. Ethic. 2, lc. 7, nn. 11–13; 3, lc. 2, n. 4). 457

Some of the conditions which Thomas names as circumstances were already presented during our discussion of end and object. Why these conditions are also considered as circumstances should become clearer by the chapter's end.

458

De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, cor and ra 6.

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conceived possesses a recognizable essence and circumstances: for instance, the action ‘taking something’ might include such conditions as whether it was done quickly or slowly, whether the agent was a pharmacist or a banker, whether the item taken was produced locally or in a foreign country, and so forth. Two circumstances which could be added to this list are whether the thing taken is ‘one's own’ or ‘another's’. Looked at apart from a comparison to right reason, these two circumstances are like all the rest and irrelevant to determining the action's kind: it makes no difference to the act of ‘taking something’ that the thing taken happens to be a neighbour's rather than one's own possession. When the comparison to right reason is introduced, however, a new perspective emerges. Since justice requires that everyone receive what is due to him, the circumstance ‘another's’ (which was formerly just one among several circumstances) is now the very factor which indicates that the item taken was wrongfully acquired. Thomas maintains that when the circumstance ‘another's’ is considered from this new viewpoint, it determines the moral species of stealing.459

(b) Circumstances by which an act already possessing a species is placed into a more determinate (sub)species Some human acts, although already possessing a moral species, can be further defined as belonging to a more particular subspecies on account of a second determining condition. Thomas illustrates this kind of circumstance when considering the sin of lust (i.e. luxuria, a seeking of venereal pleasure outside the bounds of right reason) and

459

Ibid., a. 6, cor; for other texts where ‘another's’ is said to determine an act of ‘taking something’, ibid., q. 7, a. 4, cor; IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 10, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 11, cor. For other examples of acts which seem to be specified in this way, see how the circumstance ‘delay’ (time) can constitute an act in the species of unjust detention of property (see II–II, q. 62, a. 8, ra 3; II–II, q. 104, a. 2, ra 2); how the circumstance of ‘undue respect’ for parents (mode) can lead to an act of impiety (II–II, q. 101, a. 4, cor); and how concerning oneself about a seasonal duty, such as harvesting in winter (an inappropriate time) can constitute the species of undue solicitousness (II–II, q. 55, a. 7, cor).

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its various subdivisions. Lust has six (sub)species, namely, vice against nature, simple fornication, incest, adultery, seduction, and rape.460 In any act simply identified as lust, some additional condition should be present which further determines the act as one of these six kinds of sin. To illustrate, if our knowledge of an action is restricted to the fact that a man is having an affair, we can assume his activity is defined as lust, even if we do not yet know to which more particular kind it belongs. As soon as it is discovered that this man has been having intercourse with ‘someone else's wife’, however, this added circumstance shows that the action is in the species of adultery rather than incest or simple fornication.461 It is important to emphasize that circumstances in this case do not add a second species—the action is not both lust and adultery—but rather adds further determination to the already existing species, just as Socrates is not two substances because he is both an animal and a man, but one only.462

460

‘[V]itium contra naturam, fornicatio simplex, incestus, adulterium, stuprum, raptus’: II–II, q. 154, a. 1, cor; De Malo, q. 15, a. 3; IV Sent, d. 41, q. 1, aa. 4a, 4b.

461

See De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 2, ra 12, for instances where Thomas uses the example of lust/adultery. A second and favourite type of example for Aquinas is when stealing is further denominated in the (sub)species of sacrilege in the event that the purloined item is found to be ‘consecrated’ or from a ‘sacred place’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, sc, cor, ra 2, ra 3; see also IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, cor; I–II, q. 18, a. 10, cor; II–II, q. 53, a. 2, ra 3; De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, ra 8; A third type of example is when involuntary commutations are further determined by the circumstances ‘secretly’ and ‘openly’. To illustrate, the action ‘injuring another by words’ is further determined as backbiting (detractio) when done ‘secretly’ or as reviling (contumelia) when done ‘openly’ (II–II, q. 73, a. 1, cor, ra 1); also ‘taking someone else's thing’ is recognized as belonging to the subspecies of theft (furtum) if done ‘secretly’ or robbery (rapina) if done ‘openly’ (II–II, q. 66, a. 3, cor, ra 1; a. 4, cor; see also ra 1 for the additional examples of fraud and guile). 462

De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 3, ra 12. Aquinas also includes another subcategory where the constitution of a new species happens ‘materially’ through a circumstance, rather than ‘formally’, as illustrated above. As an example, he considers the act of ‘using what belongs to someone else’, and notes that, thus far forth, the act can be identified only as stealing; he then says that a person could consider the additional circumstance that the thing being used is someone's ‘wife’. Here, says Thomas, adultery is further specified from an act of injustice. It is uncertain why Thomas calls this specification ‘material’ rather than ‘formal’. One possibility is that he is thinking in terms of the specification of subspecies just described. In the usual course of classifying adultery, one would first recognize the species of lust, and then its subspecies of adultery. In this example, however, the process goes backwards, and we recognize the injustice (which constitutes the ‘sub’ species) before recognizing the lust (which constitutes the species): De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor; see also sc.

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(c) Circumstances by which an act possessing a species is placed additionally into a completely disparate species In contradistinction to the last kind, the circumstances now being considered add an entirely different moral species to a human action without either nullifying or changing its original species.463 Judging from his examples, Thomas thinks this can happen in at least two ways. In a first way, a circumstance is identified by Aquinas as a further end for a human action already possessing a moral species; his examples include the circumstance committing simony as a reason for stealing, and earning human praise as a reason for almsgiving.464 He then shows that such further ends can possess their own distinctive relation to right reason which give a second moral determination to the action; for instance, in the first of the two examples above, Thomas would say that the action is both stealing and simony at the same time. (The way in which an end is able to constitute a second species will be discussed at length in Chapter 9.)465 In a second way, the circumstance is some additional condition related to the will's immediate end (or object). Aquinas's example of ‘an indecent act performed during a sacred time’ can serve as an illustration. ‘Behaving indecently’ is already a kind of evil action, but the circumstance ‘sacred time’ introduces a new condition which opposes right reason in a different way: to act indecently during a ‘sacred time’ places the act in the additional species of ‘showing contempt for God’. Again in this case, Thomas would understand

463

‘Aliquando autem per circumstantiam constituitur quaedam alia species disparata, non pertinens ad illud genus peccati…’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor; see also ra 2, ra 3.

464

De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor, and a. 7, cor, respectively. Other examples include committing adultery in order to steal (ibid., a. 6, ra 2); picking up a straw from the earth in contempt of another (ibid., a. 7, cor) and, with special reference to the question of mortal and venial species, joking in order to provoke lust or hatred (ibid., a. 8, cor); saying an idle word with a view to fornication (I–II, q. 88, a. 6, cor). Further examples which probably fall in this category are: making a great contribution (an act of grandeur) for the purpose of building a church (an act of religion) (De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 10); spending too much for the sake of intemperance (II–II, q. 119, a. 3, ag and ra 2); and fasting for the sake of causing strife (II–II, q. 147, a. 1, ra 1). 465

For Aquinas's discussion of two species existing in the same act in the context of circumstances, see De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor, ra 3, ra 8, ra 12.

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the human action under discussion to belong to both species at the same time.466

(d) Circumstances which give the names to a related set of (sub)species The most important example of circumstances of this kind can be found in the various (sub)species of gluttony; namely, ‘too soon, sumptuously, too much, ardently, and fastidiously’. On inspection, one notices that the names of these species are all circumstances.467 Denominating species by circumstances is rather uncommon, and, in fact, will cause some theoretical challenges for Aquinas (as we shall see more clearly in the next chapter).

(ii) Circumstances which increase or decrease the goodness or evil of an action (a) Circumstances which can make mortal sins to be venial (and vice versa) The various species of evil acts examined so far can be further determined as belonging to the species of mortal or venial sin. Thomas considers these two species to be stable; that is, he believes that no circumstance can make a sin which is venial in kind to be mortal in kind (or vice versa) unless this circumstance introduces a

466

De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 2. Other examples seem to include the following: when a person ‘under a vow’ (a circumstance) sins, the act can fall into two species, whatever sin and the vow-breaking (I–II, q. 89, a. 3, cor); when a person commits a sin ‘many times’, the act could fall into two species, whatever sin and contempt (I–II, q. 88, a. 5, ra 1); when a cleric ‘forbidden under obedience’ tells jokes, the act could fall into two species (joke-telling and disobedience) (De Malo, q. 2, a. 8, ra 5). In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas sometimes presents adultery as an action falling into disparate categories. While in the De Malo, Aquinas emphasizes how adultery is a (sub)species of lust, as was shown earlier, in the Summa, he emphasizes how the circumstance ‘someone else's wife’ brings the act into another genus, making a sin of lust to be a sin of injustice as well (I–II, q. 73, a. 7, cor; I–II, q. 88, a. 5, cor).

467

‘Praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, studiose’: II–II, q. 148, a. 4; IV Sent., d. 15, q. 3, a. 4c, ag and ra 2; De Malo, q. 14, a. 3.

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second, disparate species of sin (like those circumstances considered in section (i)(c) above).468 A mortal sin, however, can lose its full character and become venial if some condition is compromising the agent's willing of it. For example, circumstances which lead to a non-culpable ignorance or a restriction of the will's freedom deprive a mortal sin of its formal completion and make it venial;469 contrariwise, circumstances which restore an agent's knowledge and freedom restore the fullness of a mortal sin.470 It should be stressed that such circumstances do not affect the species of the act; instead, an act made venial in the way described is called venial ‘from the cause’ by Thomas.471 Aquinas holds that ignorance of a circumstance can cause an act to be better or worse than the agent understands it to be.472 An illustration of this point can be seen in the sin of drunkenness. A person who intoxicates himself commits a sin mortal in species. The drinker, however, may have been unaware of certain circumstances; for example, he may not have known the drink's strength or his own unfitness. In this case, he was ignorant of conditions crucial for making a judgement about the mean, and his action may have depended on these erroneous assumptions. Such an act could be venially sinful instead of mortally sinful (or perhaps not even sinful at all).473 The very hallmark of a human act is that it proceeds from a free will; hence, any circumstance which sufficiently compromises this freedom can cause an action to lose the full formality of a mortal sin.474 Such circumstances would include the strength or suddenness

468

‘Id ergo quod est peccatum veniale ex genere non potest fieri mortale per circumstantiam quae manet in ratione circumstantiae, sed solum per circumstantiam quae transit in aliam speciem’: De Malo, q. 7, a. 4, cor; also ibid., q. 2, a. 8, cor, ra 5; I–II, q. 88, a. 6, cor; II–II, q. 110, a. 4, ra 5.

469

I–II, q. 88, a. 6, cor.

470

De Malo, q. 7, a. 4, cor; see also I–II, q. 88, a. 5, cor.

471

‘In parte quidem, sicut cum habet in se aliquid diminuens culpam, ut cum fit ex infirmitate vel ignorantia. Et hoc dicitur veniale ex causa’: I–II, q. 88, a. 2, cor.

472

For ignorance of circumstances affecting the moral act, see IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1a, sc; I–II, q. 73, a. 7, sc; I–II, q. 19, a. 2, ra 3; II–II, q. 59, a. 4, ra 1; III, q. 80, a. 5, cor; Comm. Ethic. 3, lc. 3, n. 9; 5, lc. 13, n. 4. 473

I–II, q. 88, a. 5, ra 1; II–II, q. 150, a. 1, cor, ra 3; a. 2, cor.

474

‘Si autem coactus accipiat, talis circumstantia peccatum excusat in parte: quia causa peccati, scilicet voluntarium, minuitur’: IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, cor.

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of a temptation; the weakness, carelessness, or innocence of an agent; and the extent to which an agent was coerced by violence or fear.475 Aquinas's discussion of anger exemplifies how this can occur. Anger is a mortal sin in its species. If the anger is ‘sudden’, then this circumstance can diminishes the will's freedom and make the sin venial. If the anger subsequently lasts ‘for a long time’, however, this second circumstance can return the sin to being mortal, because the additional time can permit sufficient consent of the will to return.476

(b) Circumstances which increase or decrease that condition of an action by which it is already specied Some circumstances do not exceed the order of reason ‘unless another circumstance is presupposed, from which the moral act has its species of good or evil’.477 Thomas often uses more or less to illustrate this kind of circumstance. In themselves, opines Thomas, more or less have no special order to reason. If, however, they directly qualify that very aspect of an action which possesses such a special relation to reason, then more or less do make a difference in moral evaluation. For instance, if one steals with more or less haste or more or less competency, these two circumstances are irrelevant to the action's moral character, but if one takes more or less of another's thing, then the moral seriousness of the sin is exacerbated or diminished respectively because more or less increases or decreases precisely that condition—another's thing—which makes the action to be opposed

475

Strength of temptation reduces seriousness of fornication: IV Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 3b, ra 4; suddenness of anger reduces the seriousness of this sin: I–II, q. 88, a. 5, ra 1; the weakness or carelessness of the speaker can diminish backbiting: II–II, q. 73, a. 3, cor; Adam's friendly goodwill towards Eve diminishes his first sin: II–II, q. 163, a. 4, cor; violence can diminish the will's freedom: Comm. Ethic. 5, lc. 13, n. 4; IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, cor; fear of sin being discovered diminishes the sin of those who hold back matter in penance: III, q. 80, a. 5, cor; pressures of poverty can reduce the sinfulness of theft: De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 5. 476 477

I–II, q. 88, a. 5, ra 1; see also De Malo, q. 12, a. 3, cor.

‘Contingit autem quandoque quod circumstantia non respicit ordinem rationis in bono vel malo, nisi praesupposita alia circumstantia, a qua actus moralis habet speciem boni vel mali’: I–II, q. 18, a. 11, cor. For texts which speak about this kind of circumstance, see I–II, q. 18, a. 11, ra 2, ra 3; IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2a, cor; ra 1; a. 2c, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, sc, cor, ra 2, ra 3, ra 4, ra 5, ra 7.

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to justice. So when more or less qualify such a determining condition, they make the action more or less opposed to right reason itself.478

(c) Circumstances which extend the character of an action According to Aquinas, although this kind of circumstance does not bear directly upon that aspect of an action which helps to constitute the moral species, as above, it does expand the appropriateness or inappropriateness which such an aspect introduces. For example, it behoves a person possessing the virtue of liberality not only to use wealth well—this constitutes liberality's species—but to regulate all other circumstances related to such good use. A man, therefore, who commits the sin of prodigality (in opposition to liberality) may not only be guilty of excessive giving, but also of giving to whom he should not, when he should not, and so forth. In this way, the circumstances who and when add a further inappropriateness to the sin of prodigality without bearing on that condition essentially determining its species.479

(iii) Circumstances which have no bearing on an action's moral character Finally, Thomas speaks of those circumstances which have no special relation to right reason and therefore no effect on the moral evaluation of an act.480 For example, in the action ‘taking something’, the fact that the item taken is black or white, or is grasped with the right

478 For the circumstances ‘more’ and ‘less’ influencing the seriousness of taking of another's thing, see I–II, q. 18, a. 11, cor; I–II, q. 73, a. 7, cor; IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, sc, cor, ra 8. ‘More’ or ‘less’ also makes a difference in the species of mortal and venial sin. Thomas was aware of cases where taking ‘less’ of another's thing (a small bunch of grapes) would only be enough to constitute a venial sin, whereas taking ‘more’ (perhaps a cartload) would constitute a mortal sin (De Malo, q. 12, a. 3, cor). 479 480

See I–II, q. 72, a. 9; I–II, q. 73, a. 7, cor and ra 3; II–II, q. 53, a. 2, ra 3. This type of circumstance will be considered at greater length in the next chapter.

‘Si ergo circumstantia addita nullam specialem repugnantiam ad rationem importet, non dat speciem actui…’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor; see also IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, cor, ra 6, ra 8.

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or left hand, makes no difference at all with respect to a moral evaluation of the taking.481

4. Circumstances as Conditions or Differences of Objects In the last section, we introduced three kinds of circumstances said by Aquinas to determine the species of human action (3(i)(a)–(c)); they include: (1) those circumstances which give an initial moral determination to a human action; (2) those which determine a (sub)species; (3) those which add an entirely disparate species.482 Since all three kinds appear unambiguously in Thomas's texts, one might think that the specifying role of circumstances in Aquinas is secure. Yet, remarkably, a different set of texts can be found which appears to deny that circumstances specify. For instance, as I noted in the introduction to this chapter, Thomas says in one passage that: ‘a circumstance, as such, does not give the species to a moral act, but its species is taken from its object’.483 Given that such a statement appears to contradict directly what Thomas says in the last section, further investigation is warranted. How can Thomas make such a blatant counterclaim? Two passages indicate the point of view Thomas is assuming when he denies that circumstances specify human actions. One passage is a more general treatment of this issue found in the Prima Secundae: [A] circumstance, as such, is an accident of a moral act; nevertheless, it [may] happen that a circumstance is understood as the specific difference of

481

Black or white: De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, ra 8 (also ibid., a. 6, cor, for ‘using a white thing’); right or left hand: IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, cor. Another example Thomas uses is whether a man struck by an assailant is wearing a red or white garment: De Malo, q. 2, a. 7, cor. 482

Setting aside the case, for now, of circumstances providing the names for (sub)species (see s. 3(i)(d)).

483

‘[C]ircumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, non dat speciem actui morali, sed eius species sumitur ab obiecto…’: II–II, q. 154, a. 1, cor; see also ra 4; I–II, q. 72, a. 9, sc; I–II, q. 19, a. 2, sc and cor.

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a moral act, and then it loses the character (ratio) of a circumstance, and constitutes the species of [this] moral act.484 A second passage allows us to see this same point expressed in a more particular context. Recall that when we were addressing circumstances giving an initial moral species to an action in the last section (3(i)(a)), we showed how the circumstance ‘another's’ can serve as the crucial property which makes an act of ‘taking’ be an act of ‘stealing’. In the De Malo passage which follows, Thomas explains more precisely how ‘another's’ should be understood in such a case: Just as rationality is not understood in animal, but is understood in man, so too something can be a circumstance with respect to an act considered generally which cannot be called a circumstance when this act is considered in a more special way. For example, if we consider the act ‘to take money’, it is not understood here that what is taken is ‘another's’; hence ‘another's’ relates to the act [of taking money] considered in this way as a circumstance. In theft, however, it is understood that what is taken is ‘another's’; hence, ‘another's’ is not a circumstance of theft.485 This passage permits us to understand how Thomas can deny that circumstances determine species. We noted earlier how sometimes the very same property can be either relevant or irrelevant to specification, depending upon whether the action is being considered in comparison to right reason or not. In this present passage, Thomas adds an important clarification to this account: an essential property of a moral action is a circumstance when the action is considered apart from reason, but is not a circumstance when the action is compared to reason. For instance, he notes that the property ‘another's’ is a circumstance of ‘taking something’ (action considered apart from reason), but is not a circumstance of ‘theft’.

484

‘[C]um de circumstantiis ageretur, circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, est accidens actus moralis, contingit tamen circumstantiam accipi ut differentiam specificam actus moralis, et tunc amittit rationem circumstantiae, et constituit speciem moralis actus’: I–II, q. 88, a. 5, cor.

485

‘[U]t rationabile est praeter rationem animalis, quod tamen est de ratione hominis; ita aliquid est circumstantia respectu actus communius considerati quod respectu actus magis in speciali considerati, non potest circumstantia dici: sicut si consideremus hunc actum qui est accipere pecuniam, non est de ratione eius quod sit aliena; unde alienum se habet ad actum sic consideratum ut circumstantia; sed de ratione furti est quod sit aliena, unde non est circumstantia furti’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor.

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In other texts, Thomas explains that a change in perspective concerning whether a property is a circumstance or not can be relevant, not only to properties which give an initial specification, but also to properties which determine a (sub)species or a disparate species. For example, he says that while ‘sacred’ might at first be considered as a circumstance of ‘another's thing’ in the act of theft, a further comparison with reason will reveal that ‘sacred’ is essential to determining the (sub)species of sacrilege; from this perspective ‘sacred’ can no longer be considered as a circumstance.486 Similarly, while the further end of ‘committing adultery’ might be thought of initially as a circumstance of ‘stealing’, if it discovered that this further end is the very reason for the stealing, then adultery is a defining end and no longer just a circumstance.487 Aquinas's adjustment of terminology in the texts above raises an important question. If a ‘property’ essential to a moral action cannot be considered a ‘circumstance’ when a comparison is made to right reason, then what should it be called? In other passages, Thomas identifies more precisely the new status such a ‘property’ assumes: ‘[A] circumstance sometimes is taken as an essential difference of an object, so far as it is compared to reason, and then it is able to give a species to a moral act.’488 Or, put another way: ‘[W]hat in one act is taken as a circumstance superadded to the object which determines an act's species, can, on the other hand, be taken by the ordaining reason as a principal condition of the object determining the species

486

‘Unde tollere aliquid alienum de loco sacro addit specialem repugnantiam ad ordinem rationis. Et ideo locus, qui prius considerabatur ut circumstantia, nunc consideratur ut principalis conditio obiecti rationi repugnans’: I–II, q. 18, a. 10, cor.

487

‘Quando vero species peccati ex circumstantia proveniens, non est species peccati praeintellecti, sed est quaedam alia species disparata; tunc potest intelligi quod circumstantia dat speciem, non secundum quod ex ea resultat aliqua conditio circa obiectum, sed secundum quod illa circumstantia consideratur ut obiectum alterius actus circumstantis; sicut si aliquis moechatur ut furetur, additur quaedam alia species peccati propter actum intentionis tendentem in malum finem qui est obiectum intentionis…’: De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 2. (For convenience of explanation, object and end in the example have been reversed in my paraphrase in the text above.) See also ‘[N]on quaelibet circumstantiarum corruptarum diversitas variat peccati speciem, sed solum quando referuntur ad diversa obiecta vel diversos fines, secundum hoc enim morales actus speciem sortiuntur…’: II–II, q. 92, a. 2, cor. 488

‘[C]ircumstantia quandoque sumitur ut differentia essentialis obiecti, secundum quod ad rationem comparatur, et tunc potest dare speciem actui morali’: I–II, q. 18, a. 5, ra 4; see also I–II, q. 88, a. 5, cor; De Malo, q. 7, a. 4, cor.

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of the act.’489 In these two texts, Aquinas is asserting that when a ‘property’ is discovered to be essential to defining a human action, it takes on a new name indicative of this role, becoming a ‘specific difference of the object’ or a ‘condition of the object’.490 Although it is difficult to tell from these two short passages exactly what such a ‘difference’ or ‘condition’ refers to in an object, other passages help to identify what Aquinas means. Recall how, in Chapter 5, we examined the action ‘theft’. When describing what defines this action, Thomas lists three formal elements which must be present for theft's ratio to be complete: (1) what is taken must be another's; (2) it must be a (material) possession; and (3) it must be taken secretly. Significantly, Thomas identifies such a formal element as a ‘difference’ (differentia) of theft. Likewise, in his treatise on the passions from the Prima Secundae, Thomas analyses hope's object. He notes that four formal elements must be included: (1) a good which is (2) future, (3) difficult, and (4) possible. In the corpus of his article, he again makes an important identification, calling these four formal elements ‘conditions’ of the object.491 These texts provide a key to interpreting the terms ‘difference’ and ‘condition’ used by Aquinas above. An object can have a number of different formal aspects constituting what is essential to it. These formal aspects, however, are only recognized as pertinent when the object is compared to right reason. Before such a comparison is made, these aspects can be called circumstances, since they are no more significant than any other accident. When the comparison is

489

‘Et ideo quod in uno actu accipitur ut circumstantia superaddita obiecto quod determinat speciem actus, potest iterum accipi a ratione ordinante ut principalis conditio obiecti determinantis speciem actus’: I–II, q. 18, a. 10, cor; for ‘conditio objecti’, see also IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 1b, ra 5; I–II, q. 7, a. 3, ra 3; I–II, q. 18, a. 10, ra 1, ra 2; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 2, ra 9; a. 7, ra 8. Thomas makes this point in another way when he explains that everything which can bring the species to the moral act is included in the circumstance quid (which is the object): IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2b, cor. 490

Aquinas's reinterpretation of a circumstance to a condition is widely recognized: see e.g. Thomas Nisters, Akzidentien der Praxis: Thomas von Aquins Lehre von den Umstanden menschlichen Handelns (Freiburg: Alber, 1992), 50; Louis-Marie Simon, ‘Substance et circonstances de l'acte moral’, Angelicum, 33 (1956), 67–79 (pp. 73–5); Gründel, Die Lehre, 626.

491

I–II, q. 40, a. 1, cor; for a similar analysis when hope is being considered as a virtue, see De Virtut., q. 4, a. 4, cor; for a text where Thomas clearly attributes specification to a ‘condition’, see I–II, q. 30, a. 2, ra 1.

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made, however, these aspects are considered to be qualities ‘on which the substance of the act depends’,492 and should no longer be designated as mere circumstances, but as ‘conditions’ or ‘differences’ which help to constitute the object formally speaking.493

5. The Meaning of the Word ‘Circumstance’ in Specication The evidence of the last section may well convince a reader that Thomas does not consider properties which enter into the essence of a moral action to be circumstances, strictly speaking. This insight, however, does not completely explain the apparent contradiction in Aquinas's way of treating circumstances. If Thomas doesn't think that circumstances (as such) give species, then why does he sometimes assert in his writings that they do? The answer to this question is that Thomas, on some occasions, speaks about properties of actions strictly and, on other occasions, loosely. When he is speaking strictly, circumstances do not specify human actions, as we have just shown. Circumstances are by definition accidents of human actions, and species can be determined only by what is essential. But when Aquinas is speaking loosely, however, circumstances can (after a fashion) be said to specify. Certain properties which are circumstances when actions are considered apart from reason provide critical differences when this comparison is engaged; hence, these (quasi) circumstances can be presented as if morally determinative. Thus, these two perspectives make it possible to understand how Thomas could propose two sets of apparently contradictory statements concerning circumstances specifying. In spite of such an explanation, someone might reasonably protest that, even if Aquinas's statements are not strictly contradictory, they

492 493

‘[I]lla conditio causae ex qua substantia actus dependet, non dicitur circumstantia…’: I–II, q. 7, a. 3, ra 3.

For texts on the specifying ‘circumstance’ losing its character as a circumstance, see IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, ra 1; a. 2d, cor, ra 3, ra 4; I–II, q. 7, a. 3, ra 3; I–II, q. 18, a. 5, ra 4; I–II, q. 18, a. 10, cor, ra 1, ra 2, ra 3; I–II, q. 88, a. 5, cor; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ra 1, ra 2, ra 7, ra 9, ra 11; a. 8, ra 2; q. 7, a. 4, cor.

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are at least imprudent. Didn't he realize that expressing his position in two apparently incompatible ways would cause unnecessary confusion? Although it is impossible to know for certain why Thomas continues to call essential properties of human actions ‘circumstances’ even after he has made it clear that they are not, some plausible suggestions can be offered. For one thing, it is helpful to remember that Aquinas's medieval predecessors did consider circumstances to be one of the factors which contribute to moral specification.494 When Aquinas includes circumstances in lists of various factors pertinent to giving species, he is repeating a taxonomy which he inherited. Retaining the term ‘circumstance’ permits Aquinas to continue to work within traditional categories, even if he has adjusted their meaning. One might also consider some of the practical advantages of using ‘circumstance’. A first obvious benefit is that people already understood this term; using it freed Thomas from continually having to explain technical phrases like ‘condition of the object’ or ‘difference of the object’. A second benefit is that circumstances, having already been studied in the tradition, possessed a refined nomenclature by which they could be identified, something ‘condition’ and ‘difference’ lacked. If Thomas had insisted on using the two technical terms, then he would have been required to devise some equivalent system for referring to them, depending on how they influenced the action (who, what, how, etc.). Thomas, then, may well have judged it easier to use the term ‘circumstance’ and to indicate his own meaning when necessary, than to use ‘condition’ or ‘difference’ with the prospect of having to explain and devise new ways of speaking about them.

494

Pinckaers, ‘Le Rôle de la fin’, 394.

8 Motive Of all the terms used by Aquinas to describe what specifies human actions, ‘motive’ (motivum) is the least recognized. This fact is not surprising. ‘Motive’ is used infrequently by Aquinas, and when it does appear, it is often irrelevant to ethical concerns. There are, however, a few texts where Thomas clearly associates motive with specification of moral action. For example, in the Prima Secundae, Aquinas attests that ‘wherever a different motive for sinning is present, there is another species of sin’.495 Unambiguous assertions such as this one can be found in a few other passages as well.496 A careful look at the context of these statements reveals a strong (though not exclusive) correspondence between motives which specify and a particular issue mentioned in the previous chapter. Recall Aquinas's claim that certain circumstances can give their names to (sub)species, as when the five circumstances ‘too soon’, ‘sumptuously’, ‘too much’, ‘ardently’, and ‘fastidiously’ are identified as the species of gluttony.497 ‘Motive’ is featured in Aquinas's explanation of how circumstances can denominate such species. Further investigation is needed to understand what Aquinas is proposing. What is a ‘motive’? Is it simply a synonym of other terms already examined, or does it have its own characteristic meaning? And why is it so closely linked to the question of circumstances naming related (sub)species?

495

‘[U]bi occurrit aliud motivum ad peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species…’: I-II, q. 72, a. 9, cor.

496

II Sent. d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ag 4, cor; I-II, q. 72, a. 8, cor, ra 1; I-II, q. 72, a. 9, cor, ra 2, 3; II-II, q. 53, a. 2, ra 3; II-II, q. 148, a. 4, ra 3; De Malo, q. 14, a. 3, cor, ra 1, ra 2, ra 3.

497

See Ch. 7, s. 3(i)(d ) in the chapter on circumstances above.

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1. The Meaning of Motivum The word motivum is derived from motus, the past participle of the Latin verb movere, to move.498 While at times Thomas uses motivum as an adjective (as in the phrase motivum principium, i.e. ‘motive principle’),499 it is usually a substantive. The word motivum can refer to anything with the power to move another. For this reason, numerous instances of its use can be found in texts of Aquinas not specifically about human action. For example, ‘motive’ is used in passages recounting basic truths about motion (which could include but are not restricted to human action), as when Thomas says, ‘it is necessary for a motive to be proportionate to what it is moving’, or ‘a sufficient motive of some power is nothing other than an object which completely has the character of a mover’.500 Motive also appears as an explanatory principle for movements which are obviously non-voluntary. Sometimes, motivum is portrayed as a final cause, as when Thomas says that something apprehended by the sense or imagination is the motive of the sensitive appetite.501 At other times, it appears as an efficient cause, as when the hot is identified as the motive principle of heating (see the discussion of active principles in Chapters 3 and 4).502

498

See the entry on ‘motive’ in The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

499

For motivum principium, see e.g. I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 52, a. 2, cor; De Malo, q. 6, cor; De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, cor; SCG 4, c. 19, n. 4; other examples of motivum being used adjectivally would include motiva causa (I, q. 36, a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 112, a. 1, ra 2); vis motiva (I, q. 80, a. 2, ra 3); anima motiva (SCG 2, c. 82, n. 10).

500 ‘[O]portet motivum esse proportionatum mobili…’: I, q. 80, a. 2, cor; see also De Malo, q. 6, ag 9; q. 8, a. 3, cor; ‘[S]ufficiens motivum alicuius potentiae non est nisi obiectum quod totaliter habet rationem motivi’: I-II, q. 10, a. 2, ra 1. For other examples, see I, q. 82, a. 3, ra 2; SCG 3, c. 82, n. 5. 501

I-II, q. 17, a. 7, ag 3; De Malo, q. 16, a. 11, ra 6; in this latter text, Thomas shows how the sensitive apprehension can have both an exterior motive (things to the soul) and an interior motive (soul to the thing). The motive of a passion can be what causes the passion to be stirred, as when an evil suffered is called a motive of sorrow (II-II, q. 30, a. 1, sc, cor; III, q. 15, a. 6, cor).

502 Active or motive principle as the cause of a natural motion (I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor); for other examples, see how celestial bodies can be motives of earthly bodies (SCG 3, c. 82, n. 5; refer to I, q. 115, a. 3, ra 2); how the sensitive appetite is motive for changes in the body, especially the heart (I, q. 20, a. 1, ra 1); how higher motive principles (spirit) are said to move lower ones (bodies) (II-II, q. 52, a. 2, cor); and how a power can be called a due motive of an appetite (SCG 3, c. 10, n. 15).

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In his considerations of voluntary action, Thomas again employs the term motivum broadly, using it to designate both final and efficient causes.503 When referring to a final cause, motive can assume a number of roles. Good is called a motive of the will;504 an apparent good, a motive for sin.505 An end is sometimes called the motive of a human action, as when a person giving alms is said to be motivated by an intention to assist the needy.506 When a final cause, like charity, is said to command the actions done for its sake, Thomas calls this final cause a motive for the means.507 In examining the efficient cause of human action, Aquinas names various factors which can act as a motive principle. For instance, passions are sometimes called motives of human actions, as when

503

The use of the Latin motivum to refer to both efficient and final causes is paralleled, to some extent, by the way in which ‘motive’ is used in English. For example, certain causes in the earth can be called ‘motive forces’ behind continental drift (efficient cause), and taking revenge can be called the motive for murder (final cause); see OED entry on motive. 504

‘Voluntatis autem motivum et obiectum est finis’: I-II, q. 7, a. 4, cor; see also I-II, q. 10, a. 2, ag and ra 1; IV Sent., d. 46, q. 2, a. 1c, cor 11; De Malo, q. 6, ra 12.

505

I-II, q. 75, a. 2, cor; for examples where Thomas speaks of a motive for sinning, see I, q. 63, a. 7, cor; II-II, q. 113, a. 2, cor; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 12, ra 11, ra 13.

506

Relief of the needy as the motive for giving alms (II-II, q. 32, a. 1, cor); other examples include: mischief and joking as motives for lying; inordinate aversion to lifting oneself up as the motive for irony; gain and honour as motives for boasting (II-II, q. 113, a. 2, cor); respecting one's parents as the motive of piety; alleviation of an evil as the motive of mercy (II-II, q. 157, a. 4, ra 3); the good of another as the motive of envy (De Malo, q. 10, a. 1, ag and ra 3); gain or honour as motives for flattery; denying the truth or contemning a speaker as motives of quarrelling (II-II, q. 116, a. 2, cor); various motives of fortitude (III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 3c, ra 1; II-II, q. 128, ra 7, with q. 123, q. 1, ra 2); the thing willed as a motive for counsel (I-II, q. 14, a. 1, cor, ra 1); pride as a motive of various actions (II Sent., d. 22, q. 1, pr., a. 1, cor, ra 4; I, q. 63, a. 7, cor; I, q. 64, a. 2, ag and ra 3). 507

Charity is said to hold itself as the principle and motive with respect to whatever is done for its sake (I-II, q. 65, a. 3, ra 1) as when in martyrdom, charity is the chief motive for the act of fortitude (II-II, q. 124, a. 2, ra 2; a. 3, cor). The art of building is said to be the motive principle of the various acts under its direction, like laying the foundation, the erection of the columns, and the completion of the building (De Virtut., q. 5, a. 4, cor). Thomas sometimes associates command with the efficient motive cause (I, q. 36, a. 3, cor).

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love or fear is said to give rise to actions in various species of sin.508 A human action of a particular species can be called a motive for another human action of the same species if the first action helps to form a habit which disposes for the second action.509 A habit of one species can sometimes be called a motive for an action or habit of another species if the former frequently gives rise to the latter; for instance, pride is called the ‘interiorly motive and impelling cause’ of boasting, since pride so often inclines an agent to this sin.510

2.Motivum as an End in Human Actions Aquinas's use of motivum in voluntary actions naturally raises a question. As we have just seen, ‘motives’ can refer to both efficient and final causes of human actions. In the texts referred to in this chapter's introduction, however, Thomas maintains that motives can specify human actions. From these two assertions, one might conclude that motives determine species of human actions both as efficient and final causes. Is this true? An examination of relevant texts reveals that when Thomas attributes specification to motives in human action, he is referring only to final causes, not efficient. This assertion can be confirmed in two ways. First, passages can be found where the motive constituting a species is clearly shown to be serving as an end. For example, Thomas says that: [I]n distinguishing the species of moral acts, it is necessary principally to pay attention to motives, which are the proper objects of acts of the will, because

508

‘[E]x uno principio activo vel motivo possunt diversae species peccatorum procedere…’: I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor; see also I-II, q. 72, a. 6, cor and pp. 53–4.

509

‘Primo quidem, secundum modum causae efficientis vel moventis, et per’se et per accidens.…Per se autem, sicut cum ex uno actu peccati homo disponitur ad’hoc quod alium actum consimilem facilius committit, ex actibus enim causantur dispositiones et habitus inclinantes ad similes actus’: I-II, q. 75, a. 4, cor.

510

‘[P]eccatum iactantiae potest considerari…[a]lio modo, secundum causam suam, ex qua, etsi non semper, tamen frequentius accidit. Et sic procedit quidem ex superbia sicut ex causa interius motiva et impellente, ex hoc enim quod aliquis interius per arrogantiam supra seipsum elevatur…’: II-II, q. 112, a. 1, ra 2.

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the object which moves the will is as its form; whence voluntary acts are distinguished according to diverse motives.511 Motives are here identified as ‘proper objects of acts of the will’; it is evident from other passages that Thomas understands the will's proper object to be an end.512 Other passages make the same point about motives, including a passage which declares straightforwardly that ‘the motive for sinning is the end and object [of the sin]’.513 Second, Aquinas explicitly denies that human action can be specified by motives which are efficient causes. Recall this statement of Aquinas quoted in Chapter 4: ‘[S]ins do not differ by species on account of diverse active or motive causes; but only on account of a diversity of final cause.’514 Thomas draws this conclusion because he recognizes that the same human passion can lead to actions in various species of sin; for instance, fear might drive someone either to neglect others, steal, or murder. Since a passion potentially gives rise to actions in many species, it cannot by itself be said to determine the species of the action which actually comes to be.515

3. An Explanation of How Motives Specify Human Actions Once it is established that a motive only specifies a human action as a final cause, the stage is set for addressing the further question of how Aquinas thinks a motive can accomplish this. One initial approach is

511

‘[I]n distinguendis speciebus moralium actuum, oportet praecipue attendere ad motiva quae sunt propria obiecta actuum voluntariorum, eo quod obiectum movens voluntatem est sicut forma ipsius; unde actus voluntarii distinguuntur secundum diversa motiva…’: De Malo, q. 14, a. 3, cor.

512

I-II, q. 18, a. 6, cor; I-II, q. 19, a. 2, ra 1.

513

‘[M]otivum ad peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species, quia motivum ad peccandum est finis et obiectum’: I-II, q. 72, a. 9, cor; other texts: ‘[U]bicumque occurrit diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est diversa species peccati’: I-II, q. 72, a. 8, cor; ‘[S]ed illa deformitas est principalior et formalior, complens speciem peccati, quae ex principali motivo relinquitur, in quod ordinantur alia: quia finis est id quod primum cadit in voluntate, ex qua est origo peccati; et ex fine actus morales specificantur…’: II Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, cor.

514

‘Unde manifestum est quod peccata non differant specie secundum diversas causas activas vel motivas; sed solum secundum diversitatem causae finalis’: I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor.

515

I-II, q. 72, a. 3, cor.

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to compare motives with ends. Clearly, these two concepts have much in common: both are related to final cause and both are said to specify. Is there any difference between an end and a motive (as final cause) regarding their relation to specification? In many texts, it seems to make little practical difference to Aquinas whether the final cause is referred to as finis or motivum. One sometimes finds him interchanging these two terms in descriptions of particular actions otherwise virtually the same. For example, in one text from the Summa, mischief and joking are called ‘ends’ of lying, while in another passage only three questions later, they are called ‘motives’ of lying.516 In texts such as these, Thomas transposes end and motive with such spontaneity and ease that, if there is some difference in meaning between them, it seems of little practical import.517 But a second group of passages can be found where motivum seems to mean more than just ‘final cause’. It is in these passages that Thomas will consider most often the contribution motives make to specification.518 The best article for introducing this more complex sense of motive is I–II, q. 72, a. 9, ‘Whether sins are differentiated by

516

Mischief and joking as ends of lying (II-II, q. 110, a. 2, cor), or as motives for lying (II-II, q. 113, a. 2, cor). Thomas also sometimes transposes motive and object; see how another's good can be the motive of envy (De Malo, q. 10, a. 1, ag and ra 3), or the object of envy (II-II, q. 36, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 158, a. 1, cor; De Malo, q. 8, a. 2, ra 7; q. 10, a. 1, ra 8). 517

In some contexts, motivum's root meaning of ‘something which moves another’ helps Aquinas to express a point more clearly than the word ‘end’ probably would. ‘Motive’ helps him to emphasize the power of something attracting or driving an agent. For example, when discussing anger, Thomas uses motive with greater frequency and in circumstances where one might otherwise expect the terms object or end; see I-II, q. 47, a. 1, tt, ag 1, 2, cor; a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 72, a. 7, cor. Motive also proves useful when Thomas is comparing the relative attractive force of two ends. Can sin still attract someone, even after he has charity? Did venial sin have the power to move Adam before the fall? In responding to questions like these, Thomas finds it beneficial to use the word ‘motive’: it helps him to focus precisely on the ability of an end to attract with greater or lesser force; (for charity eliminating motives for sinning, see II-II, q. 24, a. 11, ag and ra 4; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 12, ra 7, ra 11; for Adam and venial sin, see II Sent., d. 21, q. 2, a. 3, sc 2).

518

Thomas asserts that motives can account for the specification of an action in only six articles (see n. 2); four of them treat the issue of how circumstances name subspecies: III, q. 72, a. 9, cor, ra 2, 3; II-II, q. 53, a. 2, ra 3; II-II, q. 148, a. 4, ra 3; De Malo, q. 14, a. 3, cor, ra 1, ra 2, ra 3.

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species according to different circumstances?’ Thomas answers affirmatively, showing how circumstances can name species of gluttony, illustrating with ‘too soon’, ‘sumptuously’, and ‘too much’. But how is it possible for circumstances to name species? Each circumstance, he says, is associated with a distinctive motive; this motive is what actually determines the action's species. In this Summa article, Aquinas's proposal that motives specify is conceived broadly. ‘[W]herever a different motive for sinning is present’, he says, ‘there is another species of sin…’519 This statement seems to be a general principle which could refer to any number of different human actions and habits where motives determine species. If Thomas does consider this principle to have wide application, however, one wonders why he alludes to it so rarely. In only two places aside from his discussion of gluttony does Thomas apply this principle to particular actions or habits. In one text, he shows how motives divide the species of intemperance and insensitivity;520 in another, he shows how the sin of avarice might be divided into further species according to motives.521 It is worth noting, however, that these examples appear in articles dedicated to subjects other than the sins just named. Indeed, Aquinas's teaching concerning avarice just mentioned appears in an article about gluttony; his clear purpose in explaining how motives specify avarice is to illuminate how the same happens for gluttony. Tellingly, articles which explicitly examine intemperance, insensitivity, and avarice ignore motives entirely.522 Such evidence leaves one with the distinct impression that Aquinas's proposal about motives specifying mainly serves the purpose of helping him to sort out the problem raised by the atypical species of gluttony. If we are to understand specification by motives, then, an examination of Aquinas's thought on gluttony seems essential. Gluttony is divided into rather idiosyncratic species—too soon, sumptuously, too much, ardently, and fastidiously—all of which are accidents related to eating. This list is not of Aquinas's own making;

519

‘[U]bi occurrit aliud motivum ad peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species…’: I-II, q. 72, a. 9, cor.

520

I-II, q. 72, a. 8, cor, see also ra 1.

521

De Malo, q. 14, a. 3, cor.

522

See e.g. II-II, q. 142; De Malo, q. 8.

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he is simply repeating a division found in the Moralia in Job the Great.523 Those familiar with Aquinas's moral writings will not be surprised that he appropriates species found in the Moralia. Aquinas rarely devises his own species; as a rule, he accepts what has been handed on to him from sources such as Aristotle, Patristic authors, or ecclesial documents. While this respectful acceptance of the tradition often presents Aquinas little or no difficulty, in the case of gluttony, a challenge must be met: explaining how Gregory's list can be reconciled with Thomas's usual approach to specification is no simple matter. Chronologically, the first important text for understanding the species of gluttony is De Malo, q. 14, a. 3.524 Although Thomas presents Gregory's species in texts written earlier than this one, the De Malo article is the first occasion when he is directly called upon to justify them.525 The objections in this article do a fine job of exposing the potential difficulties of Gregory's list. Three of their arguments are particularly compelling: 1. Circumstances cannot name species. A species should name the form of something, signifying what is essential to it. But Gregory's list is no more than a collection of accidents related to eating.

523

‘Sciendum praeterea est quia quinque nos modis gulae vitium tentat (De consecr., d. 5, c. Quinque modis). Aliquando namque indigentiae tempora praevenit; aliquando vero tempus non praevenit, sed cibos lautiores quaerit; aliquando quaelibet quae sumenda sint praeparari accuratius expetit, aliquando autem et qualitati ciborum et tempori congruit, sed in ipsa quantitate sumendi mensuram moderatae refectionis excedit. Nonnunquam vero et abjectius est quod desiderat, et tamen ipso aestu immensi desiderii deterius peccat’: Gregory the Great, Moralium, 30. 18, in Patrologiae Cursus Completus, series Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1844–82), lxxvi. Opera Omnia (1849), cols. 556–7; the origin of the verse is uncertain. 524

The three most important texts for Aquinas's teaching on gluttony are De Malo, q. 14; I-II, q. 72, a. 9, where gluttony is used as an illustration; and II-II, q. 148. The De Malo text appears to be the earliest of these: see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, 363–4.

525

In passages written before De Malo, q. 14, Thomas uses the circumstances of gluttony in an objection against fasting (IV Sent., d. 15, q. 3, a. 4c, ag and ra 2), and in a commentary on Isaiah containing a divine reproach against reckless drinkers (Comm. Isaia, c. 5, commenting on ‘Vae qui consurgitis mane adebrietatem sectandam…’). In two questions where Thomas is considering whether circumstances can specify acts, he offers the species of gluttony as evidence that they can: IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c, sc 2; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, cor.

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A new set of species is needed, then, based on what is essential to gluttony rather than on what is merely accidental. 2. Some of the circumstances naming species in Gregory's list are not essential to defining it. Although a sin or vice has some condition which distinctively opposes it to right reason and determines its species, other conditions which simply extend this deviation to other aspects of the action don't seem to add new species. For instance, the sin of illiberality is defined by whatever condition(s) make the acquisition or holding of possessions excessive; no additional species of illiberality are posited if this excess is manifested at ‘an inappropriate time’ or in ‘an inappropriate place’. The same should hold true for gluttony. If a condition or circumstance related to desire for food distinctively opposes right reason, it should determine a species of gluttony. Additional circumstances, however, should not name further species; hence, the species of gluttony based on time, ‘too soon’, and on manner, ‘ardently’, should not be upheld. 3. If every improper circumstance specifies, then species not named by Gregory should be added to the list. If we presume what seems implicit in Gregory's argument, namely, that any deviant circumstance can name a distinctive species, why stop at five? Aren't there seven (or more) kinds of circumstances for human action? Why shouldn't an additional species of gluttony be based on someone's eating in the wrong place? Or perhaps using the wrong instrument? Don't these two circumstances have as much right to name species as the five presented by Gregory?526 To respond to these objections adequately, Thomas must address all of their concerns in a self-consistent manner. He must show: (1) how circumstances can name species; (2) why circumstances which denominate the species of gluttony do not always name species in other kinds of sins (such as illiberality); and (3) why only the five circumstances identified by Gregory name the species of gluttony, while others do not. Aquinas's standard approach does not seem sufficient to rescue him from this predicament. He usually holds that those conditions (or

526

De Malo, q. 14, a. 3, ag 1, 2, 3; the first two objections are paralleled by II-II, q. 148, a. 4, ag 1 and 3.

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circumstances) distinctively opposed to right reason are responsible for determining species. An opponent, however, might retort that if this principle were valid here, one would expect gluttony and other comparable sins to have similar species. This is not always the case, however. The species of illiberality, for instance, are quite different from those of gluttony, even though both sins involve departures from an ordered disposition of appetite. Why are they not specified by the same circumstances? Thomas needs another determinant, then, which will permit him to show why the five circumstances from Gregory's list further specify gluttony but not necessarily other kinds of human actions. Aquinas addresses this challenge by proposing motive as the additional factor which determines the five species of gluttony. What are the motives of gluttony? Aquinas answers this question in the corpus of De Malo, q. 14, a. 3; this is the article with which the objections above are associated. Since a motivum is a cause of movement, he considers a motive of gluttony to be whatever ‘moves’ the concupiscence to disorder. While our first inclination might be to limit the motive of eating to one thing only, namely, the pleasure taken in food, Thomas identifies five different factors which can decisively influence this kind of concupiscence. Aquinas begins by distinguishing between the pleasure of concupiscence and the act of concupiscence. Turning first to the pleasure, he discerns two types, natural and artificial. He notes that a person's attraction to both kinds of pleasure can be excessive and sinful. The attraction to natural pleasure transcends its proper bounds when a person desires only the best which nature has to offer, such as the choice lambs in the flock. He describes this errancy with the circumstance sumptuously. The attraction to artificial pleasure can be excessive in its way when a person desires only foods which have received the most meticulous preparation. In this case, the circumstance fastidiously marks the excess. Concerning the act of concupiscence itself, Thomas explains that while motion in a virtuous action has a certain measure, the motion in a sin becomes inordinately vehement. A bodily motion can manifest inordinate vehemence in three ways: the action can be so intense that it starts too soon, it can press so hard to its object that it becomes inordinately attached, or it can be so strong throughout that it won't

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subside even at completion. These three excesses can be recognized in gluttony's concupiscence: a person can be unable to wait until the appropriate moment to begin eating (as a fast breaker), he can consume his food with inordinate intensity, or he can desire additional food even after a reasonable meal. Thomas identifies these three deviations with the circumstances too soon, ardently, and too much, respectively.527 This is as far as the explanation goes when Aquinas presents it in De Malo. His description of the three circumstances related to the act of concupiscence, however, might leave some readers hoping for a clarification. Thomas identifies here three ways in which motion can be too intense, but he doesn't seem to identify how these three deviations arise from different motives. Aquinas addresses this issue in the Summa, where he seeks a more precise explanation of where these motions originate. Note how he attempts to identify certain somatic causes: Sometimes, however, it happens that the corruption of diverse circumstances arises from diverse motives. For instance that someone eats ‘too soon’, is able to come from [the fact] that a man is not able to bear the delay of food, on account of easy consumption of digestive juices (facilem consumptionem humiditatis); that he desires an immoderate amount of food can happen on account of the forceful power of his nature for digesting much food (virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum multum cibus); that someone desire delicious food, happens on account of an appetite for pleasure which is in food. Whence in such corruptions of diverse circumstances, diverse species of sin are introduced.528

527 De Malo, q. 14, a. 3, cor; Thomas offers a somewhat different explanation of the species of gluttony in the Summa. In De Malo, there are two circumstances concerned with pleasure (sumptuously and daintily), and three with the act of concupiscence (too soon, ardently, too much). The first two are divided into natural and artificial pleasures. In II-II, q. 148, a. 4, cor, the circumstance ‘too much’ (nimis), is removed from the second group, and placed with the first group. Instead of natural and artificial pleasures, the reconstituted first group is based on conditions of the food: substance or species, quality, and quantity (sumptuously, daintily, too much). The two remaining circumstances in the second group (too soon and ardently) are explained as in De Malo. (One gets the sense from these changes that Thomas is struggling a bit to make this explanation work.) 528

‘Quandoque vero contingit quod corruptiones diversarum circumstantiarum proveniunt a diversis motivis. Puta quod aliquis praepropere comedat, potest provenire ex hoc quod homo non potest ferre dilationem cibi, propter facilem consumptionem humiditatis; quod vero appetat immoderatum cibum, potest contingere propter virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum multum cibum; quod autem aliquis appetat cibos deliciosos, contingit propter appetitum delectationis quae est in cibo. Unde in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones inducunt diversas peccati species’: I-II, q. 72, a. 9, cor.

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Aquinas's point seems to be that every circumstance which names a species of gluttony expresses an excess in desire (appetite's ‘motion’) which arises from a different cause relevant to concupiscence. Thus a certain kind of pleasure, rapid exhaustion of digestive humours, and strong digestion can each be a different motive of concupiscence. (Of course, the other two circumstances not referred to in this corpus would presumably be explained by causes of their own.) Once five motives have been identified, Thomas has a way of distinguishing between those errant circumstances in eating which name a species and those which don't. Although other circumstances in eating can be immoderate, they do not pertain precisely to the five motive causes which distinctively affect a person's attraction to food. For example, if a glutton is eating in the ‘wrong place’, this disorder does not distinctively affect the concupiscence as the five specifying motives do, but is a kind of additional deviation. These arguments permit Thomas to respond to the protests of the objections in the De Malo above. If asked how circumstances can determine species, he explains that it is not the circumstances but the motives of gluttony which actually specify, and that the five circumstances name the excess which each of these motives brings. If asked why circumstances crucial for gluttony's specification do not name species in other sins such as illiberality, Thomas replies that motives can vary from one sin to another, so we should not be surprised to discover different numbers and/or kinds of circumstances related to the determination of different species of sins. If asked why circumstances other than these five do not determine additional species of gluttony, he points out no other circumstance related to eating has a critical relation to gluttony's five distinctive motives.529 Aquinas's treatment of gluttony certainly makes understanding specification by motives more challenging. Motive now seems to have two meanings relevant to specification: (1) end and (2) cause related to appetite. On one level, it is easy enough to comprehend

529

De Malo, q. 14, a. 3, ra 1, ra 2, ra 3; II-II, q. 148, a. 4, ra 1, ra 2.

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why motivum is an appropriate term for both: an agent is moved by an end; an appetite is moved by a cause such as pleasure. What is initially hard to see, though, is how the second, a cause of appetite, could make a difference in the specification of human actions, since human actions are by definition acts of the will. To put the question concretely with respect to gluttony, what do digestive humours have to do with voluntary actions? To find an answer, we can consider Aquinas's teaching on how the passions can be voluntary. Thomas recognizes that passions such as the concupiscible appetite cannot always be controlled by a human agent and, to that extent, are nonvoluntary. To illustrate, people usually have no control over the disposition of bodily organs from which their passions arise or over the sudden imagining of objects likely to incite passions. But Aquinas notices that passions can be subject to will in certain ways. People can often control whether objects likely to incite passions are introduced, allowing them some dominion over the passions themselves.530 For instance, a person desiring to stir the passion of fear can choose either to go directly into the presence of something frightening or to imagine such a thing. When passions arise in this way, Aquinas believes they can be regulated by reason and assume a moral species. For example, a person who purposely incites him or herself to sorrow at another's good has introduced a passion contrary to right reason and is guilty of the sin of envy.531 If passions must be voluntary to be morally relevant, then the concupiscible appetite must somehow be an end of the will if it is to assume a moral species in the case of gluttony. Any motive of a concupiscible appetite for food able to be introduced through human willing would allow an agent to incite this passion. (Contrarily, a concupiscible passion arising from a motive outside of an agent's control is non-voluntary, and such a motive cannot determine a moral species.) Although Thomas does not describe explicitly how the motives determining gluttony might be under a person's control, we have some idea how this might happen. It is relatively easy to discern how certain of the five motives of gluttony can be

530

I-II, q. 17, a. 7

531

I-II, q. 24, a. 1; a. 4

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voluntary. For example, a person could control appetite for the pleasure of meticulously prepared food (the pleasure associated with the species fastidiously) by regulating his access to such food, say, by frequenting or avoiding certain restaurants. Understanding how the will influences certain other motives of gluttony is more difficult. How, for instance, can a person control ‘easy consumption of digestive humours’? On one level, there's not much a person can do about a bodily disposition. But sometimes a person can influence indirectly the effect such a disposition has on appetite. Earlier, we gave an example concerning people whose constitution makes them easily susceptible to drunkenness. Although such people can do nothing about their bodily constitution, they can regulate the strength of the drink, the amount taken, and the speed of its consumption. Similarly, people who, because of ‘rapid exhaustion of digestive humours’ (‘facilem consumptionem humiditatis’), are disposed to desire food before a religious fast ends (the species ‘too soon’) might not be able to control the strength of their digestive processes, but may be able to control such conditions as their proximity to food.

4. Motive and its Relation to ‘Extending’ Circumstances A certain point that Aquinas makes during his examination of motives and gluttony deserves further elaboration. The second objection from De Malo above notes that, in avarice, the circumstances when and where do not determine additional species of this sin, even when they bring some disorder. The third objection similarly points out that the circumstance where brings no additional species to gluttony, since eating ‘in the wrong place’ does not determine a new kind of sin. Instead of contesting the fact that a circumstance can bring a disorder without specifying, Thomas concedes this point and engages the objections' arguments on other grounds. Indeed, in the corpus of the article associated with these objections from De Malo, he elaborates on the second objection's point, explaining that

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an avaricious person might not only take another's thing, but also do so in a time, in a place, and from a person he ought not.532 Aquinas's admission here is worth noting: it appears to mark the first time he acknowledges the existence of this type of circumstance.533 (I have already described them briefly in Chapter 7.) This kind of circumstance does not belong to any of the categories Aquinas explicitly recognizes prior to this De Malo article: they do not specify a sin (such as the circumstance ‘another's’ in theft), nor do they aggravate or diminish the condition which specifies a sin (as when more or less of ‘another's thing’ makes the action of taking this thing more or less evil), nor are they irrelevant (as when a thing taken is a certain colour). Instead, Thomas supposes that this new kind of circumstance is somehow able to exacerbate the wrongfulness of an act without directly bearing on that condition by which the act is specified. After this De Malo article, Thomas will mention these circumstances a few more times in his writings. They will be brought up again in conjunction with motives, and will appear in an article cataloguing the various circumstances capable of aggravating sins.534 In this latter article, Aquinas will say that such a circumstance ‘multiplies the character’—multiplicat rationem535—of a sin. This Latin phrase is difficult to render satisfactorily in English; for the sake of convenience, we will call them ‘extending’ circumstances. The word ‘extending’

532

De Malo, q. 14, a. 3; see also ag and ra 2; II-II, q. 53, a. 2, ra 3; see also the illiberal person giving when and where he ought not (I-II, q. 72, a. 9; I-II, q. 73, a. 7, cor and ra 3; De Malo, q. 14, a. 3, ag and ra 2); someone taking what belongs to another when and where he ought not (II-II, q. 53, a. 2, ra 3); someone failing with regard to various conditions requisite for prudence: reason, intelligence, docility, and so forth (II–II, q. 53, a. 2, ra 3). In another illustration, Aquinas uses Cicero's recounting of the many offences connected with patricide (one hurts him from whom one is begotten, fed, educated, and so forth) to show how one sin by species can involve corruption of many circumstances (I-II, q. 73, a. 7, cor). 533

It is probably not happenstance that these ‘extending’ circumstances are mentioned for the first time in an article about the species of gluttony. Identifying the circumstances which specify in this unusual case may well have brought to Aquinas's attention this other kind of circumstance which extends but does not specify.

534

For additional references to ‘extending’ circumstances in the context of motives, see I-II, q. 72, a. 9 and II-II, q. 53, a. 2, ra 3 (also, their existence is implied in II-II, q. 92, a. 2, cor). For the list which includes ‘extending’ circumstances, see I-II, q. 73, a. 7, cor and ra 3.

535

I-II, q. 73, a. 7, cor.

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seems appropriate in view of the analogy Thomas uses as an illustration: just as a sickness can sometimes spread beyond the area primarily affected to other parts of a person's body, so what primarily causes the disorder in a sin can extend to other parts (or circumstances) of an action.536 Although it might seem that the initial appearance of ‘extending’ circumstances in an article on gluttony is coincidental, a careful observer will recognize their important connection with motives. These circumstances help to create the problem motives are introduced to solve. Thomas recognizes that a number of circumstances can be disordered in a sin such as gluttony or avarice, with some bringing new species, and others only ‘extending’ the sin. He therefore needs some additional factor to determine which circumstances belong to which category. Aquinas proposes motives to solve this problem, showing how they permit a distinction between those circumstances which bring new species from those which merely extend a disorder. Once ‘specifying’ and ‘extending’ circumstances have been recognized and distinguished, one can speculate with greater clarity on what wider significance motives might have in Aquinas's moral theory. We have already seen that he uses motives to determine the species of very few human actions or habits. Are there human actions and habits requiring motives for specification which he does not identify as such? One way to answer this question is to focus, not on motives themselves, but on the problem motives are introduced to solve. If motives are used to differentiate between specifying and extending circumstances, how many instances are there in Aquinas's writings where both kinds of circumstances occur in the same act and need to be distinguished? A search reveals several kinds of human actions or habits where specifying and extending circumstances seem present together, even though they are not explicitly named as such. In certain texts, Thomas examines some kind of human action, such as joking, playing, correcting a brother or a prelate, counselling, seeking retribution, and so forth, but then, in an effort to be more complete, he lists in summary fashion additional circumstances which must also

536

I-II, q. 73, a. 7, cor.

Motive

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be ordinate for the act to be entirely right. For instance, he says that a joke needs to be told about decent material, in a balanced way, with respect to all other particulars of person, time, place, and other due circumstances.537 To each kind of human action or habit named above, then, we can direct the following question. How does one tell the difference between circumstances which determine one or more species, and circumstances which merely extend the goodness or evil established by the circumstances which specify? Would we need some additional determining factor as we did in gluttony to sort out this issue? This query could be taken one step further. Looking beyond the examples which Thomas offers, we could ask if any reason exists in theory for us to deny the existence of extending circumstances in any kind of human act. To illustrate, how many species of sins or vices can be thought of where there is not at least one circumstance which can be inordinate in addition to those specifying the sin or vice? If most human actions or habits are attended by such ‘extending’ circumstances, then the problem of distinguishing them from specifying circumstances would seem to exist for most actions and habits, whether Thomas alludes to it or not. Even if these two kinds of circumstances do need to be differentiated, it is unclear whether Thomas would rely on motives to do the job in every case. His contention in I-II, q. 72, a. 9 (see earlier) that ‘wherever a different motive for sinning is present, there is another species of sin’ may intimate that he would allow for a wider application of specification according to motives. One should keep in mind, however, that when Aquinas actually uses motives as a basis for specification, he always focuses on acts involving disorders relevant to the concupiscible appetite (e.g. gluttony, avarice, and intemperance). Perhaps Thomas would have reserved ‘motives’ for factors

537

II-II, q. 168, a. 2, cor; other examples: (1) a person must not play at the wrong time, the wrong place, concerning the wrong thing, or with the wrong person (II-II, q. 168, a. 3, cor); (2) a person must seek a brother's amendment, but not at all places and times (II-II, q. 33, a. 2, cor); (3) a person should correct a prelate, so long as his act is moderated by all the due circumstances, especially a becoming manner (II-II, q. 33, a. 4, cor); (4) an act of good counsel must regard the time, mode, and other circumstances (II-II, q. 51, a. 1, ra 3); (5) retribution must show due regard for all the circumstances (II-II, 108, a. 2, ra 3).

216

Motive

inordinately moving passions in opposition to right reason, and would have used some other factor(s) for distinguishing between specifying and extending circumstances in other cases.538 We simply do not know. Given the uncertainty of these answers, the questions linger. If specifying and extending circumstances ever needed to be distinguished in actions aside from gluttony, how would Thomas do it? If by motives, then what would the motives be for other kinds of actions or habits? If not by motives, then by what other aspect of human action?

538

See II-II, q. 148, a. 4, ag and ra 3, for his brief explanation concerning why other vices differ from gluttony.

9 Proximate and Remote Ends In Chapters 4–8, I have examined different explanations for how the species of human actions are determined. But I have not yet directly addressed an important additional complexity. In the majority of actions, the end which an agent wills cannot be pursued immediately; it is attainable only if other end(s) which are conducive to it are also willed for the end's sake. In order to illustrate such an ordering among ends, Aquinas shows how a doctor's willing would relate to the various procedural steps in a medical treatment.539 First, a doctor intends as his end the health of his patient. After diagnosing that his patient's body is distended, this doctor then wills (as a mediate end) the reducing of his patient's body size back to normal. Achieving this result requires that the doctor wills the purging of his patient. But in order to purge, he must administer a potion, and in order to administer a potion, he must prepare it through various instruments. Note here how the doctor's prospective action is constituted of a series of intermediary ends leading to a final end: (1) procuring of instruments → (2) preparation of potion → (3) purging → (4) reduction of bodily size → (5) healthy patient.540

This example can be found in Aristotle: see Metaphysics, 5. 2 (1013b); Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 681–926 (pp. 752–3).

539

540

‘Et ulterius [Aristoteles] addit quod omnia quae sunt intermedia inter primum movens et ultimum finem, omnia sunt quodammodo fines: sicut medicus ad sanitatem inducendam extenuat corpus, et sic sanitas est finis maciei; maciem autem operatur per purgationem; purgationem autem per potionem; potionem autem praeparat per aliqua instrumenta. Unde omnia haec sunt quodammodo finis: nam macies est finis purgationis, et purgatio potionis, et potio organorum, et organa sunt fines in operatione vel inquisitione organorum’: Comm. Phys. 2, lc. 5, n. 6; cited by Finnis, ‘Object and Intention’ , 11; see also Comm. Metaph. 5, lc. 2, n. 9; SCG 3, c. 17, n 5.

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Proximate and Remote Ends

As we have already seen in previous chapters, Thomas uses a special terminology to describe these ordered goals, depending on their relative position with respect to one another. To identify an immediate goal and a further goal, he uses correlative pairs: proximate end/remote end;541 object/end;542 means (ea quae sunt ad finem)/end; end of the work/end of the worker.543 Which pair he uses will depend in part on the issue being addressed and the context. Such a series of interrelated ends is bound to provoke questions about specification. Chapter 4 presented Aquinas's claim that an end specifies a human action, but with this new consideration, we must now ask: ‘which end specifies?’ Is this medical treatment a single human action, where the final end gives the species to all of the intermediary ends? Or does each intermediary end give the action an additional species? Or is it perhaps the case that the medical treatment described above is not a single human action at all, but rather a series of several distinct human actions somehow linked together, each with its own specifying end? As was the case with circumstances in Chapter 7, the way Thomas addresses this issue in his writings presents us with a problem. On some occasions, Aquinas seems to contend that the proximate end is

541

For the explicit division of ends into proximate and remote, see II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, ra 5; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 9; a. 7, ra 8; I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ra 3. Examples include: (1) the mixing of medicine (proximate end) for the sake of health (ultimate end): I-II, q. 12, a. 3, cor; (2) dissembling or lying (proximate end) for the sake of gain or glory (remote end): II-II, q. 111, a. 3, ra 3; (3) use of a vice (proximate end) for the sake of leading someone else to sin (ultimate end): II Sent., d. 21, q. 1, a. 1, ra 2; (4) acting bravely (proximate end) for the sake of God or happiness (remote end): II-II, q. 123, a. 7; (5) giving alms (proximate end) for the sake of love of God (ultimate end): IV Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1a, ag and ra 5. Thomas thinks that an act can be viewed from different vantage points, so the terminology used is relative. For example, in the medical illustration above, if ‘procuring instruments’ is the end focused on, all the other ends could be considered ‘remote’ with respect to it. 542 543

See p. 134, n. 173.

The distinction between the finis operis and finis operantis is made much of by some commentators of Aquinas. In fact, however, he only rarely uses these categories when explaining the relation between proximate and remote ends. (Thomas does attempt to explain these phrases in II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, cor, but his presentation is predictable and not particularly revealing.) For an interesting assessment of the problems caused by commentators' overemphasis of this distinction, see Pinckaers, ‘Le Rôle de la fin’ , 407, 417–18.


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crucial for specification, while the remote end is inconsequential. On other occasions, however, he appears to assert just the opposite: he holds not only that a remote end gives a species to a human action, but also that this species has greater formal influence than the species from a proximate end. Again, we seem faced with two incompatible sets of assertions which need to be reconciled.

1. Specication from a Proximate End Certain statements in Aquinas's writings seem to leave little doubt as to how he views the relative importance of the contribution of ends in specification: ‘moral matters do not receive their species from the remote end’, he remarks, ‘but from the proximate end’;544 or again: ‘an act which is one in number is only ordered to one proximate end, from which it has its species; but it can be ordered to many remote ends’.545 In these propositions, and in others like them, Thomas clearly identifies the proximate end (or object) as the end responsible for specification in human action.546 Someone attempting to understand Aquinas's position here will find it helpful to examine a certain text from the Secunda Secundae in which he defends this approach. This passage is found in a consideration of whether hypocrisy (or dissimulation)547 is contrary to the virtue of truth. The third objection in this article begins by recalling that the species of a moral act is taken from its end. It then proposes (using as evidence a text from St Gregory's gloss on Job) that the end of hypocrisy is either gain or vainglory. In order for hypocrisy to be in opposition to truth, insists the objection, it must be in the species of falsity. Given the argument above, however,

544

‘[M]oralia non recipiunt speciem a fine remoto, sed a fine proximo’: De Malo, q. 8, a. 1, ra 14.

545

‘[I]dem actus numero, secundum quod semel egreditur ab agente, non ordinatur nisi ad unum finem proximum, a quo habet speciem, sed potest ordinari ad plures fines remotos…’: I-II, q. 1, a. 3, ra 3.

546

See also II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, ra 3; I-II, q. 60, a. 1, ra 3; De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ra 9; a. 6, ra 9; I-II, q. 63, a. 4, ag and ra 1; for object as proximate end, see Ch. 5, s. 3.

547

For the relationship between hypocrisy and dissimulation, see II-II, q. 111, a. 2, cor.

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hypocrisy appears instead to be in the species of either gain or vainglory, since it will be determined by one of the two ends suggested by Gregory. The objection concludes that hypocrisy is not in opposition to truth, as Thomas has proposed. To answer this objection, Thomas must carefully distinguish between the proximate and remote ends of hypocrisy: [W]ealth or glory is a remote end of the dissembler [simulator or hypocrite], as also of the liar; whence the species is not taken from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to present oneself as other than one is. For it can sometimes happen that a person feigns great things concerning himself for no other reason than the pleasure of dissimulating, as the Philosopher says in 4 Ethics, and as it is also said above concerning the liar.548 The objection assumes that the remote end will specify the act. In his response, therefore, Thomas presents two arguments as to why the remote ends ‘gain’ and ‘glory’ cannot give the species to hypocrisy. First, Aquinas maintains that the proper distinction between hypocrisy and other kinds of human actions, such as lying, would be lost if it were assumed that a remote end specifies. Gain or glory, he points out, can be a remote end not only of a hypocrite but also of a liar. Why does this point show that the proximate end specifies? The implication of Aquinas's observation is that, if both lying and hypocrisy were specified by the same remote end (e.g. gain), both would be given a single species from this common end. Lying and hypocrisy would then no longer be two different kinds of moral action but one kind (gain); this common specification would eradicate the distinction between the sins of lying and hypocrisy which Thomas has already shown to exist in the articles previous to this one.549 The second argument in Aquinas's answer to the objection above also reaches the conclusion that the proximate end specifies, but for a different reason. Citing Aristotle, Thomas shows that a person can

548

‘Ad tertium dicendum quod lucrum vel gloria est finis remotus simulatoris, sicut et mendacis. Unde ex hoc fine speciem non sortitur, sed ex fine proximo, qui est ostendere se alium quam sit. Unde quandoque contingit quod aliquis fingit de se magna, nullius alterius gratia, sed sola libidine simulandi, sicut philosophus dicit, in iv ethic., et sicut etiam supra de mendacio dictum est’: II-II, q. 111, a. 3, ra 3.

549

For Aquinas's distinction between lying and hypocrisy, see II-II, q. 111, a. 1, cor.


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seek hypocrisy for its own sake, without having to resort to a further end for explanation. Why does this premise imply specification by the proximate end? If it were the case that only a remote end specifies hypocrisy, intimates Thomas, then hypocrisy could not be determined without this remote end. In fact, however, the opposite is true: the species of hypocrisy can be found even where there is no remote end of any kind. This must mean that hypocrisy's species is taken, not from gain, vainglory, or any other remote end, but from ‘presenting oneself as other than one is’, its proximate end. These two arguments are not particular to this question concerning hypocrisy. The heart of the first argument just proposed can be seen in other texts of Thomas as well. For instance, several objections attempt to reduce to absurdity Aquinas's contention that ends specify human actions. As above, they demonstrate how specification by a remote end can blur the distinction between species from proximate ends. (Recall how the distinction between hypocrisy and lying is compromised if both are specified by the remote end, gain; similarly ‘earning money’ and ‘stealing money’ would both seem to fall in the moral species of ‘almsgiving’ if both are done for this remote end.) Although Thomas agrees that the distinction between species would be muddled if remote ends specified, he argues that such an outcome ought not to be feared, since only proximate ends (or objects) are meant to perform this function. (We have already seen a clear illustration of such an objection and reply in Chapter 5.550) Other objections put this argument in its most radical form. If a remote end specifies, they contend, and if all human actions are capable of being directed ultimately to love of God, then it would seem as if every human action performed by a charitable person would fall in the single species of charity. Using a remote end as the basis of specification, then, would seem to lead to the untenable consequence of fusing all human actions into a single species.551

550 551

See p. 135.

This argument is made by one of Aquinas's objections in an attempt to prove that there are not many virtues, but one. Thomas responds by saying that it is the proximate and not the remote end which specifies: De Virtut., q. 1, a. 12, ag and ra 1; see also II Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, ra 3. Other objections also use this argument to show that the remote end cannot specify; see De Virtut., q. 1, a. 10, ag 9; IV Sent., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1a, ag 5.

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The second argument Aquinas makes in his response to the objection about hypocrisy above, though tailored to the issue at hand, can also be adapted and applied to other human actions, since it points to a basic truth about the relationship between proximate and remote ends. The second proof depends on the fact that a proximate end is capable of being willed without its remote end. Now Thomas is aware that not every proximate end can be willed for itself; he recognizes instances when an end is willed only in so far as it conduces to some further end, as when foultasting medicine is desired for health.552 Nevertheless, Aquinas's argument would seem to be valid in any case where a proximate end can be desired for its own sake. Wherever a species of action can be determined without any remote end, then, the proximate end would seem to be the principle responsible for giving this action its moral character, rather than a remote end.

2. Specication from a Remote End If the only texts presented to us were those cited in the last section, it would be easy to conclude that species are always determined by proximate ends for Aquinas. But when we look further, we come face-to-face with other passages which seem to present an opposing point of view. In I-II, q. 18, a. 6, the second objection proposes the following argument: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute a species, as was said earlier. But it is accidental that some particular act is ordered to a particular end, as when someone gives alms on account of vainglory. Therefore acts are not diversified by species according to that good and evil which is from their end.553

552

See, for instance, I-II, q. 8, a. 3.

553

‘Praeterea, id quod est per accidens, non constituit speciem, ut dictum est. Sed accidit alicui actui quod ordinetur ad aliquem finem; sicut quod aliquis det eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam. Ergo secundum bonum et malum quod est ex fine, non diversificantur actus secundum speciem’: I-II, q. 18, a. 6, ag. 2.


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Given what has already been established in the last section, what response might we anticipate from Thomas? We might expect him to say that an action like almsgiving is specified by its own proximate end, and that the remote end, vainglory, is but a circumstance which is accidental to its specification. His answer, however, is different from what we might have anticipated: ‘[A]lthough it is accidental to the exterior act that it is ordered to such an end, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, which is compared to the exterior act as formal to material.’554 In his response, Aquinas not only contends that the will act is specified by what appears to be a remote end (vainglory), but he even suggests that this end is formal with respect to the exterior act (which assumes a kind of material role). Although one might suspect that the problem is simply a difficulty in interpreting this text, there are other passages where Thomas puts his case even more starkly. One example occurs in I-II, q. 75, a. 4; the issue being addressed is the way in which one sin can be the cause of another: According to the genus of final cause, one sin is the cause of another in so far as on account of the end of one sin someone commits another sin: as when someone commits simony on account of the end of ambition, or fornication on account of theft. And because an end gives the form in moral concerns, as is held above, from this it follows also that one sin is a formal cause for another: for in the act of fornication which is committed on account of theft, fornication is as if material, and theft is as if formal.555 Again, Thomas interprets his saying that ‘the end gives the form in moral matters’ to mean that a remote end has a formal influence in actions which already seem to have a species from a proximate end.

554

‘Ad secundum dicendum quod ordinari ad talem finem, etsi accidat exteriori actui, non tamen accidit actui interiori voluntatis, qui comparatur ad exteriorem sicut formale ad materiale’: I-II, q. 18, a. 6, ra 2.

555

‘Secundum vero genus causae finalis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, inquantum propter finem unius peccati aliquis committit aliud peccatum, sicut cum aliquis committit simoniam propter finem ambitionis, vel fornicationem propter furtum. Et quia finis dat formam in moralibus, ut supra habitum est, ex hoc etiam sequitur quod unum peccatum sit formalis causa alterius, in actu enim fornicationis quae propter furtum committitur, est quidem fornicatio sicut materiale, furtum vero sicut formale’: I-II, q. 75, a. 4, cor; see also II Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 1; II-II, q. 110, a. 1, cor.

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One can observe Aquinas employing this approach to action even where questions of the ultimate end are concerned. Recall how in the last section we presented the most radical form of one argument against remote end specification, namely, that if all intermediary ends were directed to the love of God, then all species of human action would seem to be absorbed into the one species of charity. Though when answering such an objection Thomas will sometimes deny that a remote end specifies, as we noted, there are other texts where one can observe him proposing what appears to be the opposite opinion: ‘In all voluntary actions, that which is from the part of the end is formal.…It is clear, however, that the act of all other virtues are ordered to the proper end of charity, which is its object, namely, the highest good.’556 The question addressed in this passage is whether charity is the form of the other virtues. In the text from his De Virtutibus from which this excerpt is taken, Aquinas begins by establishing that habits should in certain respects be judged according to principles which govern human actions. He recalls that an end is formal in human action, suggesting as an illustration the formal influence that fornication has over theft when someone thieves for fornication's sake. As the final line of the passage quoted above shows, Thomas concludes that the formal influence which charity exhibits is similar to that of a remote end in action, since it gives the form to any other virtue which is directed to charity's proper end, the highest good.557 Thomas makes this same claim about charity in a number of texts. It can also be found in his depiction of other ‘directing’ virtues: for instance, the vice of pride (charity's counterposition) can order various other vices to its end, and the virtue of general justice can order certain other virtues to its end (the common good).558

556

‘In omnibus autem actibus voluntariis id quod est ex parte finis, est formale… Manifestum est autem quod actus omnium aliarum virtutum ordinatur ad finem proprium caritatis, quod est eius obiectum, scilicet summum bonum’: De Virtut., q. 2, a. 3, cor.

557

Ibid.; see also I-II, q. 13, a. 1, cor; II-II, q. 23, a. 8; II Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4, ra 5; d. 38, q. 1, a. 2; III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 1a, cor.

558

For pride, see II-II, q. 162, a. 2, cor; De Malo, q. 8, a. 2, cor; for general justice, see II-II, q. 58, a. 5.


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Having examined several passages illustrating this second perspective on a remote end's contribution to specification, we can explore what arguments Thomas uses to support such a teaching. In book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle compares two men, one who commits adultery for the sake of monetary gain and another who spends his own money to commit adultery, incurring a financial loss. Aristotle discerns that the former should more properly be considered greedy, the latter, lustful.559 Aquinas finds this argument persuasive. He shortens Aristotle's considerations to the dictum ‘he who commits adultery for the sake of theft is more a thief than an adulterer’ and quotes this principle on numerous occasions in support of the formal influence of remote ends.560 Perhaps the best way of appreciating how Thomas understood Aristotle's argument is to consider Thomas's commentary on this passage from the Nicomachean Ethics just described: For it is clear that if an act of vice or evil is ordered to some undue end, from this end, the [act] obtains a certain new species of evil. Someone, therefore, who commits adultery for the sake of wealth (that is, that he might steal from the woman, or something of this sort) accepts [the species of his action] from this [end]. It can also happen sometimes that someone commits adultery absolutely on account of concupiscence [and] not in order that he might grow wealthy; rather, he uses his own things and suffers a loss in his belongings. Properly, such an act is seen to be lustful, because the vice of lust is principally ordered to the satisfaction of concupiscence. He who commits adultery in order that he may steal does not seem to be lustful, speaking per’se, because he does not intend the end of lust. But it seems more

559

a

Nicomachean Ethics 1130 24–8; ‘Adhuc si hic quidem lucrandi gratia moechatur, et accipiat, hic autem apponens, et jacturam patiens propter concupiscentiam, iste quidem luxuriosus videtur utique esse magis, quam avarus. Hic autem injustus, luxuriosus autem non. Manifestum enim ergo, quoniam propter lucrari’: Nicomachean Ethics 5. 3, old Latin tr., in Opera Omnia, xxv (Paris: Vives, 1875), 436.

560

‘Et ideo actus humani species formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum obiectum exterioris actus. Unde philosophus dicit, in v ethic., quod ille qui furatur ut committat adulterium, est, per’se loquendo, magis adulter quam fur’: I-II, q. 18, a. 6, cor; see also II Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, cor; De Malo, q. 7, a. 3, cor; III, q. 88, a. 4, cor; for virtue or vice see II-II, q. 85, a. 3, cor; II-II, q. 154, a. 10, cor, ra 1, ra 2; II-II, q. 181, a. 1, ra 3; De Malo, q. 8, a. 1, ra 15 see in addition; II-II, q. 181, a. 2, cor; (perhaps De Virtut., q. 1, a. 10, ra 10); De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, ra 2; SCG 3, c. 138, n. 5; De Virtut., q. 2, a. 3, cor, for theft arising from avarice, see II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 3, cor; Comm. Metaph. 5, lc. 22, n. 17.

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to be [an act of] injustice, because he acts against justice on account of wealth.561 Aquinas's explanation of Aristotle helps to elucidate his own thinking about remote ends. One noteworthy addition Thomas makes to a basic recounting of Aristotle's text is an assessment of the kinds of causality in the willing of the ends. He argues that in a case where lust (proximate end) is directed to theft (remote end), theft is what the will desires ‘principally’ and ‘per’se’; that is, the agent desires monetary gain first and for its own sake, whereas adultery is willed only secondarily and for the sake of achieving gain. In light of such an evaluation, one can easily understand why Thomas considers the remote end to be more significant and more ‘formal’ for determining the action than the proximate end. A second observation Aquinas makes in his commentary is also worth noting. Although this point has been implied by other passages presented in this chapter, it is made explicit here. Thomas says that the remote end adds a ‘new species’ (nova species) to the human action. Given his understanding of ends presented in the commentary, Aquinas's addition of such a species makes perfect sense: how could he say that the ‘principal’ and ‘per’se cause’ (remote end) of an action does not give a species, when the secondary and instrumental cause (proximate end) seems to? The explicit attribution of a second species to a human action by Thomas is both important and potentially confusing. Since in natural corporeal creatures, such as plants and animals, two species implies two separate beings, one might get the impression that the remote end gain in this passage introduces a second, distinct human action, somehow affiliated with the action related to the proximate end. It must be emphasized, however, that this is not Aquinas's point.

561

‘Manifestum est enim quod, si actus unius vitii vel malitiae ordinetur ad alium finem indebitum, ex hoc ipso sortitur quamdam novam speciem malitiae. Sit ergo aliquis qui adulterium committat causa lucri, ut scilicet spoliet mulierem, vel qualitercumque ab ea accipiat. Contingit etiam quandoque quod aliquis adulterium committit propter concupiscentiam, non quidem ut lucretur, sed magis apponit aliquid de suo et in rebus suis patitur iacturam; talis autem proprie videtur esse luxuriosus, quia vitium luxuriae praecipue ordinatur ad satisfaciendum concupiscentiae. Ille autem qui moechatur ut accipiat aliena non videtur esse luxuriosus, per’se loquendo, quia non intendit luxuriae finem. Sed magis videtur esse iniustus, quia propter lucrum contra iustitiam fecit’: Comm. Ethic. 5, lc. 3, n. 4.


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Other texts express his opinion on this matter more clearly: ‘he who steals in order to commit adultery commits two evils in one act’.562 When a proximate end is done for the sake of a remote end, it is a single human action with two ends, each of which gives its own proper species to this action. As odd as it might sound, then, Thomas believes that the same human action can possess two moral species at the same time (and presumably even more species, if there are further ends which have a special relation to reason).

3. The Problem of Two Moral Species in the Same Human Action As plausible as the arguments in favour of remote end specification might sound, they certainly give rise to a consequence which is difficult to accept; the simultaneous appearance of two species in the same human action. The difficulty which this proposition entails can be expressed more clearly if we look again at the comparison between natural corporeal creatures and human actions raised at the end of the last section. It is not without reason that the appearance of a new species implies a new being in corporeal creatures. Each species is grounded in a distinct substantial form. To assert that a corporeal creature has two species at the same time would indicate that it is two things at once, a blatant violation of non-contradiction. If such a difficulty presents itself in corporeal creatures, then why not in human actions? At first consideration, it would seem equally absurd to claim that a single human action has two moral species. How can a human action be two things at once? Thomas is aware of this problem. In fact, he concedes that if human actions were exactly like natural creatures, then there would

562

‘Unde dicimus quod ille qui furatur ut moechetur, committit duas malitias in uno actu’: I-II, q. 18, a. 7, cor; ‘Contingit enim unum actum duorum vitiorum esse, dum actus unius vitii ad finem alterius vitii ordinatur: ut, cum quis furatur ut fornicetur, actus quidem secundum speciem suam est avaritiae, secundum intentionem vero luxuriae’: SCG 3, c. 138, n. 5; ‘[U]no actu homo non committit duo peccata, cum ipsa essentia peccati sit actus; sed tamen in uno actu possunt esse duae peccati deformitates…’: De Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, ra 2.

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be no possibility of two simultaneous species. To illustrate, in Aquinas's discussion of charity, an objection wonders how this virtue can claim to bring a second form to a human action when a proximate end has already endowed the action with its own proper form. Thomas responds: [T]here is no such thing as a ‘form of a form’ where one form stands as the subject of the other. Nothing, however, prevents there being many forms in the same subject according to a certain order, such that one is formal with respect to the other, as colour is formal with respect to a surface. It is in this latter way that charity is able to be the form of other virtues.563 As this passage witnesses, Thomas understands that having two forms (or species) in a moral action is not the same as having two substantial forms coexisting in the same natural corporeal creature. What permits the two forms to concur in a single human action, he submits, is that these forms possess a ‘special order’ with respect to each other. Given that such is his claim, our quest, it would seem, is to try to identify just what this ‘special order’ is. A passage from the Summa provides a good entryway into this complex question. It arises in an article concerning whether heresy is a species of unbelief. The second objection in this article begins by maintaining that vice takes its species from its end; it quotes in support of this position the dictum of Aristotle (mentioned in the last section) that ‘he who commits adultery for the sake of theft is more a thief than an adulterer’. The objection then proposes that the end of heresy is not the false opinions themselves, but the temporal profit to be gained by inventing them (citing as his authority a passage from St Augustine's De utilitate credendi). On these premises, the objection concludes that the real end of heresy, temporal profit, should take precedence in specification and place heresy in the species of pride or covetousness rather than unbelief. The objection is obviously trying to determine the species of heresy by a remote end rather than its proximate end, providing Thomas with a perfect opportunity to address our present problem: [V]ices have their species from the proximate end, but from a remote end they have their genus and cause. To illustrate, when someone commits

563

De Virtut., q. 2, a. 3, ra 2; for another description of how one formality can coexist with another, see II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ra 1.


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adultery in order to steal, the species of adultery comes from the proper end and object, while the remote end shows that adultery arises from theft and is contained under it, as an effect under its cause, or as a species under its genus (as is clear from those things which were said earlier concerning acts in general).…Whence also in the case presently under consideration, the proximate end of the heresy is to adhere to one's own false opinion, and from it [heresy] has its species; but from the remote end, its cause is revealed, namely, that it arises from pride or covetousness.564 What Thomas says here about the proximate end seems to confirm what has already been established earlier in this chapter (in section 1); namely, that a proximate end gives the proper species to a human action (in this case, ‘adherence to one's false opinion’ specifies heresy). But this passage also proposes a very prominent role for the remote end (here, pride or covetousness): Thomas asserts that the proximate end is under the remote end ‘as an effect under its cause, or as a species under its genus’. Even when this statement about the role of the remote end is presented, however, it is difficult to interpret just what Aquinas means. How, for instance, is a proximate end under its remote end as ‘a species under its genus’? When Thomas uses the term ‘genus’ in this context, he is certainly not employing it in its usual sense. As we saw in Chapter 3, ‘animal’ is a genus of ‘human being’ because ‘animal’ is a formal aspect understood in ‘human being’ through abstraction; ‘covetousness’, however, cannot be a genus of ‘heresy’ in this same way, since covetousness is in no way understood in heresy. It is equally difficult to know how a proximate end is under its remote end as ‘an effect under its cause’. Can't the proximate end, in its own way, also be understood as a cause of heresy? Aquinas's discussion of the relationship between ‘general’ virtues such as charity or justice (which dispose the agent in pursuing a final end) and those proximate ends directed by such general virtues helps

564

‘Ad secundum dicendum quod vitia habent speciem ex fine proximo, sed ex fine remoto habent genus et causam. Sicut cum aliquis moechatur ut furetur, est ibi quidem species moechiae ex proprio fine et obiecto, sed ex fine ultimo ostenditur quod moechia ex furto oritur, et sub eo continetur sicut effectus sub causa vel sicut species sub genere, ut patet ex his quae supra de actibus dicta sunt in communi. Unde et similiter in proposito finis proximus haeresis est adhaerere falsae sententiae propriae, et ex hoc speciem habet. Sed ex fine remoto ostenditur causa eius, scilicet quod oritur ex superbia vel cupiditate’: II-II, q. 11, a. 1, ra 2.

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to shed some light on the claims made in the passage above. We can begin by considering Aquinas's statement about cause and effect; why would the species from a remote end and the species from a proximate end be related in this way? In an article from the Summa concerning whether charity is the form of the virtues, one objection protests that charity cannot assume this role. A form must be either exemplary or essential, it argues. But charity can be neither, since if it were exemplary, it would place the virtues under it in the same species, and if it were essential, it would unite itself with the virtues under it so they would no longer even be distinct. The objection therefore concludes that charity cannot be the form of the virtues. Thomas answers by denying that charity is either the essential form or the exemplary form: ‘Charity is said to be the form of other virtues not as exemplar, or essentially, but more as a producing cause (effective); namely, in so far as it places its form on all [other virtues] in the way mentioned earlier.’565 Thomas solves the problem by appealing to a ‘producing cause’, but what could he mean by this? His response maintains that charity exercises this ‘productive’ influence ‘so far as it places its form on all [other virtues] in the way mentioned earlier’. The phrase ‘in the way mentioned earlier’ directs us back to the corpus: ‘[W]hence it is necessary in moral concerns that that which gives an act its order to an end, also gives it its form; it is clear, however,…that acts of all other virtues are ordered to the ultimate end through charity.’566 In this passage, Aquinas clarifies his understanding of the causality which joins charity to its subordinate virtues. Charity is indeed giving a form to these other virtues, he contends, but it must in this context be understood in a special sense: the form is that which a person who orders gives to whatever he or she is ordering. This form which charity gives bears more likeness to a producing cause than to an essential or exemplary cause because charity neither absorbs subordinate ends into itself, nor transforms them into an exact

565

‘[C]aritas dicitur esse forma aliarum virtutum non quidem exemplariter aut essentialiter, sed magis effective, inquantum scilicet omnibus formam imponit secundum modum praedictum’: II-II, q. 23, a. 8, ra 1; see also De Virtut., q. 2, a. 3, ra 1, ra 5.

566

‘Unde oportet quod in moralibus id quod dat actui ordinem ad finem, det ei et formam. Manifestum est autem secundum praedicta quod per caritatem ordinantur actus omnium aliarum virtutum ad ultimum finem’: II-II, q. 23, a. 8, cor.


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likeness, but ‘produces’ its own character in these subordinate ends to the extent that their order is an effect of charity's ‘ordering’.567 It is in this nuanced way, then, that the form from a remote end can be as if a cause of the form from a proximate end (which is as if an effect), as Thomas notes above in the passage concerning unbelief from the Summa. What about Aquinas's second statement, namely, that the species determined by a proximate end is under the species determined by a remote end as ‘a species under its genus’? Again, Aquinas's treatment of ‘general’ virtues helps to illuminate his opinion. At one point in his De Virtutibus, Thomas faces an objection which wonders why it is necessary for charity to be the form of other virtues, given that other virtues seem sufficiently endowed with their own form. He responds by saying that ‘although charity does not give the proper species to whatever virtue, it nevertheless gives to each virtue a common species’.568 (In other answers to objections, he will refer to the common species as ‘general’, and to the proper species as ‘special’.569) Once again, we find Thomas asserting that a remote end (here, the final end) determines a second species for human action. But what is the relationship between this general species and a proper species? In the Secunda Secundae, during a discussion of how justice can be a general virtue, Thomas identifies carefully what the word ‘general’ means in this context: Something is said to be general in two ways. In one way through predication, as ‘animal’ is general to man, horse, and other like things.…[For something to be] general in this way, it is necessary that [what is predicated] be essentially the same for those things for which it is general, because a genus pertains to the essence of a species and falls in its definition. In another way, something is said to be general virtually (secundum virtutem),

567

Klubertanz recognizes this special efficient causality, showing how charity is a form so far as it ‘orders (directs) the acts of all the virtues to the supreme good’; see George P. Klubertanz, ‘The Unity of Human Activity’ , Modern Schoolman, 27 (1950), 75–103 (pp. 79, 77–8, 85); see also Gerard Gilleman, Le Primat de la charité en théologie morale: Essai methodologique, Museum Lessianum: Section théologique, 50 (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1952), 42–3, 46–7. 568

De Virtut., q. 2, a. 3, ra 1.

569

Ibid., ra 5, ra 9, ra 10.

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as a universal cause is general to all its own effects; as the sun [is general with respect] to all the bodies which are illuminated or changed through its power (virtutem).…[For something to be] general in this way, it is not necessary that it be the same in essence with those things for which it is general, because the essence of a cause and of an effect is not the same. In this way, legal justice is said to be a general virtue; namely, in so far as it orders acts of other virtues to its own end, that is, to move all other virtues through command: as…charity is able to be called a general virtue, in so far as it orders the acts of all other virtues to the divine good…570 If we consider this passage carefully, two things come to our attention. First, we see more clearly why the word ‘general’ would be used to describe a habit like justice, charity, or pride. Just as the sun might be called a ‘general’ cause on account of the fact that it can illumine or change many kinds of things, so justice is called ‘general’ on account of the fact that it can direct many kinds of proximate ends to its own end. Such an analogy probably accounts for Aquinas's use of the term ‘general’ in the phrase ‘general species’ which was used with reference to the form of charity above. But this explanation still leaves us with the question which most concerns us here. Just how in the same human action does this ‘general’ species coexist with the proper species determined by the proximate end? A second look at this passage provides some information germane to this second question. Thomas compares the way in which a genus relates to a species in a natural corporeal creature to the way in which a form from a remote end relates to a form from a proximate end in a human action. In the first case, he affirms, a genus such as ‘animal’ is understood to be in a species such as ‘human being’ essentially, since the genus is wholly contained in the species;

570

‘[G]enerale dicitur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, per praedicationem, sicut animal est generale ad hominem et equum et ad alia huiusmodi. Et hoc modo generale oportet quod sit idem essentialiter cum his ad quae est generale, quia genus pertinet ad essentiam speciei et cadit in definitione eius. Alio modo dicitur aliquid generale secundum virtutem, sicut causa universalis est generalis ad omnes effectus, ut sol ad omnia corpora, quae illuminantur vel immutantur per virtutem ipsius. Et hoc modo generale non oportet quod sit idem in essentia cum his ad quae est generale, quia non est eadem essentia causae et effectus. Hoc autem modo, secundum praedicta, iustitia legalis dicitur esse virtus generalis, inquantum scilicet ordinat actus aliarum virtutum ad suum finem, quod est movere per imperium omnes alias virtutes…[s]icut…caritas potest dici virtus generalis inquantum ordinat actus omnium virtutum ad bonum divinum…’: II-II, q. 58, a. 6, cor.


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in the second case, however, Thomas says that charity is understood to be in the related proximate end virtually (secundum virtutem). But how is one form ‘virtually’ in another? Once again, Thomas explains this relationship by referring to cause and effect: justice or charity exercises an influence on a subordinate proximate end as the sun influences those realities upon which it shines. Just as the sun can leave its stamp on earthly things in such a way that both the cause and the effects remain in their proper natural species, so justice or charity can leave their ‘form’ on those proximate ends which have been ordered to justice or charity, in such a way that both ultimate and proximate ends determine their own species. To clarify this point in the text, Thomas suggests yet another analogy: the form given by justice or charity to a directed proximate end is like the form which someone who commands confers on the person who is commanded.571 This passage, then, helps us to understand better Aquinas's use of the terms ‘genus’ and ‘species’ when they are used to explain the relationship between a remote end and that proximate end which it directs. A remote end is not a genus in a natural thing, but it does bear some similarities. In the definition of a natural creature, a genus is a formal aspect which serves as that foundation to which the specific difference brings a further determination. In a similar way here, the remote end brings a certain species which is posited first (a genus of sorts), since the remote end is what the will desires per’se. The species from the proximate end brings a further determination (a difference, as it were) by adding the new species to the one which is given by the remote end. And as a genus and species belong to the same creature (essentially), so the species from the remote end and the species from the proximate end belong to the same human action (virtually).572

571

Thomas sometimes uses command to explain the directing role of a remote end; for instance IV Sent., d. 38, q. 2, a. 2b, cor. For an interesting account of the relation of command to the will when one end is being directed to another, see IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1a, ra 3. 572

William May solves this problem of the remote end's formality in specification by appealing to I-II, q. 18, a. 7, ra 3, where Aquinas notes that a genus is considered more formal inasmuch as it is ‘more absolute [i.e. unlimited] and less restricted’; see William E. May, ‘Aquinas and Janssens on the Moral Meaning of Human Acts’, Thomist, 48 (1984), 566–606 (p. 589). While this suggestion needs to be taken seriously, I suspect that Aquinas in this response is more concerned with explaining how a ‘genus’ can be called formal rather than with explaining what accounts for the formality of a remote end (which ‘genus’ is meant to illuminate through the analogy).

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4. A Resolution of Aquinas's Seeming Contradictions Concerning Proximate and Remote Ends Thus far I have presented two apparently contradictory positions about the role of proximate and remote ends (section 1 and 2), and also tried to address a problem regarding the second of these two positions (section 3). But I have not yet attempted to bring any resolution to the dilemma which these two conflicting positions introduce. How can Thomas claim, at one and the same time: (1) that a remote end cannot specify a human action, but only a proximate end; and (2) that a remote end does specify a human action, giving an additional (more formal) species to the one which is determined by its proximate end? As might be expected, the key to resolving this apparent contradiction is the realization that Thomas understands human actions in two ways and that his presentation of specification in any given text will depend on which perspective he has assumed. These two viewpoints on human action can be better understood if we consider a distinction which Thomas makes in his examination of indifferent human actions. Thomas has two ways of approaching human actions: he looks at them either secundum suam speciem or secundum individuum.573 The first approach considers human actions as kinds, abstracted from any ends to which they might be directed, while the second considers human actions in so far as they exist in reality, that is, with all of the particular conditions of an individual situation, including any further ends for which they might be sought. If understood in the first way, Aquinas thinks that some human actions are indifferent in species. Why? As I noted in Chapter 5, a human action is specified according to its object's relation (ordo) to reason, with reason identifying and expressing intelligible human goods and what opposes them. For instance, the good of charity is

573

‘Secundum suam speciem’ (I-II, q. 18, a. 8, tit.); ‘secundum individuum’ (ibid., a. 9, tit.).


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realized in the action of healing the sick, while the good of justice is opposed in adultery. A human action which has no relation to any of the goods of reason, however, such as picking up a piece of straw from the ground, can be done with full knowledge and freedom, yet, as a kind of action, bear no special relation to rational goods, neither realizing nor contravening them. Thomas believes that an action such as this one, considered apart from ends, is neither good nor evil in its kind, but falls into the moral category of indifferent.574 If human actions are considered in the second way mentioned above (i.e. secundum individuum), however, they need to be assessed differently. According to Aquinas, actions which are indifferent in kind will always assume a moral quality of either good or evil if they are considered within the context of an individual action. Why is this so? If an action such as ‘picking up straw’ were (implausibly) the final end of an agent, it would be evil, since it would have to be willed in place of God, who is the only proper final end for human beings. If, on the other hand, it were willed as a proximate end, it would (ultimately) have to be directed to some final end. Since, according to Thomas, the only two possible final ends for human beings are God or some unworthy alternative (and since the final end gives its species to all other ends ordered to it), any proximate end in an individual action will be rendered good or evil on account of its being directed to God or some ersatz substitute.575 Aquinas assumes a similar dual perspective when he is speaking about actions other than those that are indifferent. On some occasions in his writings, Thomas is exploring what elements are necessary to determine that a particular species of human action is present; for instance, he wishes to know which conditions constitute theft, which murder. This way of approaching human action leads the investigator to abstract from the particulars of individual actions in order to focus on what is essential to a species. In this process of excluding non-essential elements, such an investigator would put aside any remote ends to which a certain kind of action might be directed. But is such an omission wise? This is what some of the objections in Aquinas's writings are probing when they raise the question of remote ends

574

See also II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 5; I-II, q. 18, a. 8, cor.

575

I Sent., d. 1, q. 3, ra 3; II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 5; IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4; I-II, q. 18, a. 9.

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specifying; they want to know if any further ends (for example, almsgiving) should be included among those factors necessary to determine a species like theft or murder. It is when human action is being considered in this way that Thomas claims that a proximate end specifies while a remote end does not. The proximate end of murder, for instance, would (formally) be ‘taking the life of an innocent person’, and such an end is self-sufficient for determining its species. Anything added by a possible remote end (like revenge or greed) is superfluous to murder's definition as murder, and even the most noble of remote ends (say, helping the poor) cannot sanitize murder by placing it into some less serious species. From such a perspective, then, remote ends simply do not enter into the moral equation.576 Is there any underlying reason which would account for why remote ends don't make a difference here? The key for understanding the relationship described above is to recognize that, when they serve as ordered ends, one species of action (as a kind) is often related accidentally to another species of action (as a kind). An essential relation occurs where one end is necessary for the achievement of another; an accidental relation occurs when a proximate end creates some condition or removes some impediment which can permit the remote end to be pursued.577 In the case of theft for adultery, for instance, neither end necessitates the other: stolen money can be used for any number of further ends, whether good or evil, and not just adultery; adultery can be secured through means other than through

576 One apparent exception would be those actions such as active scandal which are specified in part by a remote end. Formal scandal involves saying or doing something with the intention of leading another astray; its definition contains both what is done (the saying or doing of something) and why it is done (leading another to sin) (IV Sent., d. 38, q. 2, a. 2b, cor; II-II, q. 43, a. 3, cor). Even in this case, however, when the two ends which constitute active scandal are understood as a unit, any further remote end is irrelevant to the moral evaluation in the way described above. Scandal is scandal, whether it is done for good or bad reasons. 577

This difference between essential and accidental relationships in actions can be seen in I-II, q. 18, a. 7, cor; I-II, q. 88, a. 3, cor; for more on the distinction between essential and accidental causality, see I, q. 114, a. 3, cor; I-II, q. 75, a. 4, cor; I-II, q. 76, a. 1, cor; I-II, q. 85, a. 5, cor; II-II, q. 3, a. 1, ra 2; II-II, q. 4, a. 7, cor; II-II, q. 64, a. 8, cor; II-II, q. 163, a. 3, ra 3; II Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 3, ra 2; De Malo, q. 1, a. 3, ra 14, ra 15; q. 2, a. 11, cor; q. 3, a. 6, cor.


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payment.578 What theft (as a kind of act) does in this case is to create a condition which could allow the adultery to occur if the agent wished to arrange these ends in such a manner, but no necessary connection exists such that theft by its nature must lead to adultery. But to this first way of considering human action, one can add a second. On other occasions, Thomas poses a different kind of question. He is not asking if certain (theoretically possible) remote ends are pertinent to specifying a proximate end; rather, he is wondering what the species of an action would be in a case where a particular proximate end (like theft) is already being ordered to a particular remote end (like murder or almsgiving). It is when he considers action in this second way that Aquinas attributes a more influential specification to a remote end. Why? In an action where one end is ordered to another, it should not be imagined that the will is divided between the two ends or that the agent must will one end at the other’s expense; Aquinas is clearly convinced that both ends are really being willed at the same time (though one for the sake of the other). If it is true that each of these willed ends has a special relation to reason, then each end must bring its own species to the action. To deny this would amount to admitting that the will is not really pursuing one of these ends. Yet, even if both ends are willed, it must be admitted that this occurs, not just in any way, but in a certain sequence and with certain priorities. As Thomas suggested above in his Commentary on the Ethics, the remote end is willed primarily and per’se, while the proximate end is willed secondarily and (in the context of this will act) for the sake of the remote end. In such a relationship, it must be conceded that the proximate end relies on the remote end in some significant ways. For one thing, the proximate end depends on the remote for its existence: if the remote end were not desired first and for its own sake, then the agent would have no need to pursue the proximate end (in so far as it is a means to the remote). Also, the proximate end depends on the remote end to an extent for its character: as I showed above, when the remote end orders a subordinate proximate end to itself, it endows this proximate end with a certain formal quality. The remote end leaves its mark on the proximate end.

578

Even if money were the only available means for adultery in a particular case, there is no necessary connection between them as kinds of action.

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For all these reasons, then, Aquinas is convinced that when one end is willed for the sake of another, both the (quasi formal) species from the remote end and the (quasi material) species from the proximate end are truly present in the single human action. Again it behoves us to see if there is an underlying explanation. How is it possible for two ends to coexist in one action? To understand the reason, we again return to a consideration of the causality involved. Thomas believes that, when one end is sought precisely for the sake of another, the relation between them is no longer accidental, but essential. We saw this in Chapter 2. Aquinas argues that a will act's unity is like the unity of a line in geometry: just as line A to C is one, even if it passes through point B, so a human action for an end is one, even if it passes through a means. He also explains this point by referring to one of his paradigms for ‘object’. The same action, he notes, can relate both to an object and to that by which the object is known (i.e. its formal ratio); to illustrate, he recalls how the same act of vision relates to both light and colour (see Chapter 5). Thomas claims that the same is true in human willing. What the will intends (remote end), and the way in which this end is attained (means) are one object of the will; they are analytically separable, but essentially the same.579 The will is not directed to end A and to end B as if separately, but to end A (remote) through end B (proximate). The willing of end B is explained in this case by the willing of end A; indeed, the very same will act which wills A, wills B as a means to A. This, finally, permits the two viewpoints to be explained more definitively. Human acts, like adultery and theft, are related accidentally when considered as kinds, but are related essentially and in an important sense unified when they are ordered to one another through an action of the will—that single will act of choosing this as a means to that.580

579

‘Cuius ratio est quia finis ratio est volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Idem autem actus cadit super obiectum, et super rationem obiecti: sicut eadem visio est coloris et luminis…’: I-II, q. 12, a. 4, cor; see I-II, q. 8, a. 3; II Sent., d. 38, a. 4; De Veritate, q. 22, a. 14; see also Finnis, ‘Object and Intention’ , 8–10; Ripperger, pp.’85–90.

580

For an insightful treatment of these two viewpoints, see Pinckaers, ‘Le Rôle de la fin’ , 413–15.

10 Conclusion In the foregoing chapters, I have looked at five terms which, according to Aquinas, designate what specifies a human action: ‘end’ (both proximate and remote), ‘object’, ‘circumstance’, ‘matter’, and ‘motive’. I have examined what aspect of a human action each signifies and how each is related to specification. Seemingly contradictory claims made about certain of these terms were resolved where possible. But I have not yet addressed a broader issue: can an account be given which coherently integrates these various ways of depicting specification of human action? I will begin with the two most important concepts related to specification, end and object. As we have already seen, end and object can each be viewed as belonging to a certain broader scheme of explanation. End, for instance, can be understood as one of the four causes. This well-known explanatory strategy of Aristotle attempts to identify the irreducible kinds of principles which account for any reality. Two of these causes, efficient and final (end), are especially important in explaining actions. As we have seen, Aquinas considers the actions of intelligent agents to be more perfectly moved by ends than any other kind of action, since intelligent agents alone can preconceive and freely will ends. Consequently, Thomas thinks that the character of a human action is especially dependent on its end. In a context where Thomas is using the four causes to explain human actions, then, one can understand why he would single out final cause or end as what determines a human action's species. Object, on the other hand, is principally related, not to the four causes, but to Aristotle's scheme for defining human powers (and their proper actions). As we have seen, each human power (and its

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Conclusion

proper action) is defined by a particular formal aspect in those realities to which it relates, as vision is defined by things precisely as coloured; intellect, by things precisely as true, and so forth. The human power of will and its proper actions are defined in this way, since will relates to reality under the formal aspect of ‘good’. Human actions, of course, are principally attributed to the will. So in a context where Thomas is considering human actions in view of this model for defining powers (and their proper actions), one can understand why he identifies ‘object’ as what specifies human actions. Now even though end and object are each primarily associated with a distinctive explanatory scheme, reconciling their contribution to specification of human action, at least on a fundamental level, is a straightforward exercise. It is easy to show that end and the will's proper object, good, can both refer to precisely the same reality in human action. To illustrate, the same human goal, say, reading a book, can be considered both as a human action's end (or final cause) and as that good to which the will has directed itself (object).581 Thomas himself recognizes this convergence on numerous occasions, saying that an end is an ‘object of the will’, and that the will's object is ‘the end according to the ratio of good’.582 Although this basic reconciliation of specification by end and object is a good start, our explanation requires further elaboration. Human actions have numerous species: they are divided essentially into good and evil, and then subdivided into more particular kinds, such as almsgiving, murder, fraternal correction, or theft. How can one explain more particularly why any action belongs to its own species rather than another?

581

582

‘Tout peut être objet et tout peut être fin et la fin est une sorte d'objet et n'importe quel objet peut devenir une fin pour la volonté. Le tout est de saisir l'aspect de chaque chose, la formalité que ces termes indiquent, ce que veut dire pour n'importe quoi: être une fin pour la volonté, être un objet pour une faculté humaine déterminée’: Pinckaers, ‘Le Role de la fin’ , 411.

‘[F]inis est obiectum voluntatis, non autem aliarum virium. Unde quantum ad actum voluntatis, non differt bonitas quae est ex obiecto, a bonitate quae est ex fine…’: I-II, q. 19, a. 2, ra 1; see also I-II, q. 18, a. 6, ra 1; ‘voluntas habet completam rationem causae, inquantum objectum ejus est finis secundum rationem boni, qui est causa causarum’: I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, ra 4; see also I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, ra 6; II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, cor; sometimes the end is even called the obiectum actus (as opposed to the more common obiectum voluntatis); see De Malo, q. 7, a. 4, ra 4.

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Even though Aquinas uses both ends and objects to explain how human actions receive species of good and evil, when treating more particular species, he shows a preference for ‘object’ in his explanations. Why might this be so? The object has a constitutive feature which an end lacks, namely, its formal aspect or ratio. In the context of powers and their proper actions, this aspect makes it easier for someone to discern and speak about the precise aspect of reality which gives a power or action its species; indeed, it permits someone to distinguish two or more formal objects in the same physical reality, as when the same bird is the object of vision qua coloured and hearing qua sound-producing. Thomas cleverly adapts this formal aspect of the object for use in the moral realm. When people compare a possible object of will to the standard of right reason, he says, they discern different kinds of intelligible goods and what opposes these goods. Thomas calls the essential identifying character of each good—or what opposes it—its formal aspect; this formal aspect is said to determine a human action's species. For example, Aquinas says that the formal aspect which defines adultery is ‘having intercourse with another's spouse’; this phrase identifies the intelligible character proper to adultery, just as the formal ratio, colour, identifies the aspect of reality which properly determines vision. The formal aspect of the object, then, provides Thomas with a useful conceptual tool when treating human actions and habits, permitting him to identify what is essential to intelligible goods and what opposes them. Although Aquinas occasionally uses ends to explain more particular specification, showing how ends of different kinds determine human actions of different kinds, the end does not naturally contain a feature like a formal aspect which can provide greater precision in an explanation.583

583

Although Thomas will speak on the rare occasion about ratio of an end as a basis for specific differences in human actions (II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, cor), this ratio does not seem to be formally constitutive of an end (that is, it does not make an end to be an end) in the same way that a ratio is formally constitutive of an object (i.e. Aquinas says explicitly that the formal ratio is ‘the object in so far as it is an object’, see p. 91).

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A third term used by Aquinas to designate what specifies moral action is ‘matter’. As we have shown, Thomas has a particular meaning of matter in mind here, namely, that reality ‘about which’ an action takes place, or to which an action is specially related, as when temperance is said to be ‘about’ pleasures of touch. In attributing such a meaning to matter, Thomas is following a convention already in use among moralists of his time. It is not clear why the term ‘matter’ was originally used to describe that ‘reality about which’ an action takes place. The reason might simply be that actions often play an active role with regard to those things to which they are related, as when the act of sculpting shapes clay or marble. Whatever the reason, Thomas accedes to the tradition, teaching that matter specifies human action. As we have seen, Aquinas has two different ways of explaining how matter can specify. On occasion, he argues that, just as particular kinds of matter predispose for certain substantial forms (for instance, only flesh and bones can accommodate the human soul), so the characters of things willed predispose for certain kinds of human actions and habits (for example, pleasures of touch predispose for temperance, not courage). In other contexts, however, Aquinas uses language more common in his moral teaching: he says that matter specifies because an agent wills some matter as an end, or because matter possesses a distinctive formal aspect (like an object). Especially regarding these latter explanations, it seems clear that end, object, and matter can be used to refer to the same reality in a human action. For this reason, one can easily see how these three concepts could be used compatibly (and in some contexts interchangeably) in his general scheme for specifying human action. Thomas's contention that a circumstance can specify a human action now needs to be reconciled with the previous three explanations. ‘Circumstance’ typically designates an incidental property of an action, like the time at which something happens. When a circumstance is said to specify a human action, however, it clearly takes on a more significant role. How can a property be both incidental to a human action, yet essential to the determination of its species? The key to understanding this seeming paradox lies in recognizing that the same human action can be viewed from two perspectives. The very same property in an action can be incidental when the action is

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considered apart from a comparison to right reason, but essential when this standard is invoked. For instance, the fact that an item being stolen happens to be ‘consecrated’ is just one circumstance among many until the action is compared to right reason; then, this property ‘consecrated’ is recognized as essential for defining the act as sacrilege, since sacrilege concerns a disrespect towards something ‘sacred’. When speaking with greater precision, Thomas says that a quality or property essential with respect to right reason, such as ‘consecrated’ , even deserves a new name: instead of a ‘circumstance’ it should be called a ‘condition of the object’ or a ‘difference of the object’. With this insight, understanding how specification from circumstances is reconcilable with specification from object is not difficult. A (quasi) circumstance—or better, a ‘condition of the object’—specifies because it constitutes, in whole or in part, something essential to an object's formal constitution, what I have already identified above as an object's formal ratio. If the formal ratio of theft is ‘taking another's possession secretly’, to say that the condition ‘secretly’ specifies this action is simply to acknowledge that ‘secretly’ is one of the object's essential constitutive features in relation to right reason. It might be argued that since Thomas calls a morally determining circumstance a ‘condition of an object’, explanations using end or matter are, by implication, excluded in this context. This is not so. A goal of a human action—whether named object, end, or matter—has certain features recognized as essential in relation to right reason. Although an object's formal aspect is the most useful and convenient way to describe such determining formal features, Thomas, on rare occasion, will speak about a ‘difference’ in an end or a ‘condition’ of matter, as we have seen above. Aquinas's explanation of specification using ‘end’ or ‘matter’, then, can accommodate a formal property, even if he prefers ‘object’ for this purpose. The fifth explanation needing integration is specification from motives. As we have seen, in his most detailed illustration, Aquinas shows that gluttony is differentiated into five species (named by circumstances) because each species is associated with a distinctive motive. In gluttony, a motive seems to be that principle on account of which concupiscible appetite for pleasures of the table is moved to

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immoderation. For example, a person with rapid digestion (motive) has an inordinately vehement concupiscence which urges him to break a religious fast before the appointed time; it defines that species of gluttony called ‘too soon’. Given that Thomas's only other examples are intemperance and avarice, motives seem to be of particular importance for him in identifying causes which make passions inordinate. Aquinas addresses motives specifying human actions so infrequently that it is difficult to make confident generalizations about how motives accomplish this role. In his few teachings on this subject, however, Thomas refers to motives as ‘proper objects of the will’ and insists that they specify only as ‘ends’ of human action. These two assertions suggest that, even when motives are somatic principles, they must somehow be subject to a human agent's will to be morally relevant. And, significantly for our present purposes, the fact that Thomas thinks motives must be an ‘object of the will’ or ‘end’ demonstrates his conviction that their contribution to specification is compatible with his more familiar explanations already treated. Finally, we need to integrate the explanations for specification examined thus far with the further complexity observed in cases where the achievement of a final goal depends on one or more intermediary goals. As we have seen, Thomas uses correlated pairs of terms to describe these concatenated goals: means/end; object/end; proximate end/remote end.584 (For the sake of consistency below, I will use ‘end’ to designate any human goal, and describe the relative position of these ends in the agent's order of willing by using adjectives such as ‘proximate’ and ‘remote’.) As Chapter 9 shows, Thomas espouses the position that an action with two or more ends can assume two or more moral species, depending on how these ends are related to right reason. For example, if someone were to kill an innocent person so that he might have intercourse with someone else's spouse, this action would have the species of both murder and adultery. Although it might seem odd that one moral action would possess two or more species, Aquinas believes that such a conclusion is

584

When Thomas uses ‘object’ to designate a proximate goal, and ‘end’ to designate a remote goal, he is giving these two terms a special restricted meaning. In the broader acceptation, any goal of an action can be called an object or an end.

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warranted. He recognizes that if an agent is pursuing some final end through intermediary ends, then each end in this series is preconceived and freely willed. Only an intelligent agent can understand ends as such and can freely pursue them; this is the very reason that ends exercise a more profound influence in determining species of human actions than of subrational motions. To say that someone who murders in order to give to the poor has performed an action only in the species of almsgiving would be to suggest that the proximate end, murder, had no determinative influence on the action's moral character. But how could this be if murder is an object of the agent's free self-determination? The murder must be included in any determination of the action's kind; one could hardly describe what happened without referring to it. For Aquinas, then, if both ends are willed, then both determine a species, so long as each end has a distinctive moral character with regard to right reason. What can we make, then, of Aquinas's assertion that the species from a remote end is ‘formal’ with respect to the species from a proximate end? By this point, Thomas simply wishes to show that a remote end, having been willed primarily, has a certain directive influence over ends pursued for its sake. For instance, when an agent ‘takes medicine’ to ‘regain health’, he or she must proportion the proximate end to the requirements of attaining the remote end, not the other way around. Similarly, the proximate end has an intelligible attractiveness because an agent understands its utility in attaining the remote end; it does not work conversely. The remote end, then, is ‘formal’ with respect to the proximate end only to the extent just described; a separate species is determined by the proximate end, even given this directing influence from the remote end. Now that the additional complexity of specification of human actions possessing two or more ends has been addressed, our final concern is to examine whether Thomas's teaching on this subject can be harmonized with his teaching on specification from end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive. Though fitting together all the various pieces might appear especially difficult at this culminating point in the process, it is easier than it seems, so long as the two different kinds of problems being addressed by Thomas are carefully distinguished. In the chapters which treated end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive, most of the texts examined focused on

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the issue of how to identify what is essential to a particular kind of action. For instance, just what in the human action of murder places it in its own moral kind rather than in another? Note that, at this level of analysis, a single goal was typically the focus. Certain factors will make murder be murder; any further reason an agent might have for committing murder are not relevant to this determination. In certain texts presented in Chapter 9, Thomas addresses a different sort of question. He is no longer focusing just on how to determine the moral kind of an action; he wants to know what the species of a human action is when a person wills one end for the sake of another where each end holds a morally relevant relationship to right reason. Note that what was extraneous to the earlier analysis at this point becomes essential. A further end is no longer just an accidental quality to be filtered out when considering what is essential to an action's kind. This further end is now to be seen precisely as an agent's more fundamental purpose, the reason for which the proximate end is being sought. In these two ways of viewing action, the first can be seen as a necessary preliminary step to considering the second. For instance, suppose there is a human action with a final goal pursued through six intermediary goals. Each goal must be assessed to determine if it has a distinctive relation with respect to right reason. In making such a determination, a person could use end, object, matter, circumstance, or motive as described earlier. Thus, the more complex specification present in actions with multiple ends does not oppose what was examined earlier; rather, it builds on and makes use of it. In sum, then, we have seen that a first look at Aquinas's account of the specification of human action appears confusing. Although Thomas's various explanations converge at certain points, nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how he can signify what determines the species of human actions by five different terms whose meanings do not appear to be identical. The fact that actions can have multiple ends adds to the difficulty of sorting out Thomas's position. But a careful examination of his texts reveals a more coherent picture than first appears. Though multifaceted, Aquinas's thought on specification possesses a fundamental consistency if read in the light of the careful distinctions he draws.

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Index abstraction, see intellect accidents,; and circumstances, see circumstances; human actions as, see human action; and substance, 43, 146–8, 154 n., 222–3 act,; and passivity (passio), 55–7; and potency, 44 n. 51, 98 n. 75, 157–8; see also potency active principle, 32, 34, 103; and specification of human action, see specification of human action by end; and specification of natural motion, see motion and specification Adam, 191 n. 60, 204 n. 23 adultery, 85, 107 n. 92, 115–16, 118 (fig.), 121, 131, 134, 168, 185 n. 41, 187, 189 n. 51, 195, 225–9, 235–8, 241, 244; see also sex; and its object (another's spouse), 85, 121, 168, 187, 189 n. 51, 241 agent, 37–8, 51, 59–60, 62; human, 9–26, 39, 54, 56–9, 61, 65–6, 74, 76–8, 86–8, 90, 105, 121, 126–9, 133, 154 n., 178, 186, 190–1, 204 n. 23, 211, 217, 225–6, 235, 237, 242, 244–6; intelligent, 59–60, 63–4, 127–8, 130, 190, 237, 239, 245; non-intelligent, 44–6, 55, 57–60, 63, 65–6 agent principle, see active principle Albert the Great, 61, 153 almsgiving, 51, 80, 113–14, 134, 142, 151, 188, 201, 218 n. 3, 222–3, 236–7, 240, 245; and its object (donation), 80 analogy, 16, 48–51, 54, 86, 90, 105, 110, 142, 154 n., 165, 175, 214, 232–3, 234 n. 34 angels, 27, 33, 110 anger, 81, 132, 158 n. 32, 191, 204 n. 23; and its object (vindication), 81 animal,; genus, 35–6, 96, 187, 194, 226, 229, 231–2; nonrational creature, 37, 56–8, 59 n. 22, 64–5, 104, 112, 158 n. 34, 226 antonomastic predication, 162, 163 nn. 40–1, 164 appetite, 100 (table), 151 n. 20, 162, 200, 208; see also passion; concupiscible, 19, 27, 65, 66 n. 40, 100 (table), 103–5, 122, 129, 148, 160, 163, 200, 208–12, 215, 225, 243–4

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appetite (cont.),; irascible, 22, 66 n. 40, 99, 100 (table), 122, 124, 147, 200; rational, see will Aristotle, 21, 31 n. 2, 40 n. 29, 42, 49, 64, 67, 74–5, 92–5, 98 n. 75, 101 n. 80, 122, 128 n. 143, 146, 153 n. 24, 158 n. 34, 165–6, 169, 176–7, 179, 206, 217 n. 1, 220, 225–6, 228, 239; Works,; De Anima, 75, 92–4, 158 n. 34; Metaphysics, 64, 67, 165, 217 n. 1; Nicomachean Ethics, 21, 101 n. 80, 167, 176, 220, 225; Physics, 165, 167 artisan, 121, 124–5 Augustine, 176 n. 8, 228; De utilitate credendi, 228 avarice, 80, 108 n. 95, 205, 212–15, 225, 236, 244; and its object (money), 80 Azor, Juan, 77 backbiting, 117 n. 114, 118 (fig.), 187 n. 46, 191 n. 60; see also reviling; and its object (dignity), 116, 118 (fig.) baptism, 131 beauty:,; of God, 26; of good actions and virtues, 28, 128, 184 being,; act of existing, 42, 64, 67, 103, 150; an existent, 239; see also angels; corporeal beings; mathematical realities Belmans, Théo, 77 Bible,; Old Testament, 131–2 Leviticus, 131 Numbers, 23 Deuteronomy ,131 Isaiah, 206 n. 31; New Testament, 131–2II Corinthians, 24 bodily creature, see corporeal beings Boethius, 140 n., 176 n. 9; De Differentiis Topicis, 176 n. 9 Bonaventure, 61 borrowing, 85 Boyle, Joseph M., Jun., 8 n. 7 buying and selling, 76–7, 82–4, 90, 116, 123, 152, 170 categories (of Aristotle), 42–3 categorization, see classification cause, 190, 208, 210, 223, 226; accidental/essential, 236, 238; divine, 28; and remote end, 228–33; universal, 232 causes, four (of Aristotle), 31, 37–8, 50, 147, 153 n. 24, 166, 178, 239; efficient, 31, 37–8, 45–6, 50, 53–5, 147, 154 n., 167, 178, 200–3, 230–1, 239; see agent; active principle; final, 31, 37–8, 46, 50, 53–5, 57, 60, 63 n. 30, 147, 154 n., 167, 178–9, 200–4, 223, 239–40; see end; formal, 31, 37–8, 50, 147, 154 n., 167, 223; see form, substantial

Index ; material, 31, 37–8, 50, 147, 154 n., 160, 166, 167, 178, 179 n. 16; see matter change, 38; in place, see local motion; in quality, see quality change; in quantity, see quantity change; in substance, see substance charity, 25–6, 81 n. 28, 106 n. 90, 108–9, 113, 125, 138–40, 169, 182 n. 22, 201, 204 n. 23, 221, 224, 228–34; see also virtue, theological; and its object (God as highest good), 109, 138, 224, 232 Chereso, Cajetan, 128 n. 143 choice, 10, 13–16, 28, 66 n. 40; and consent, 12 n. 8, 13; definition of, 13–14; and freedom, 58; and intention, see intention; and useful good, 12 Church (Catholic), 110, 111 n. 101 Cicero, 176–7, 179 n. 16, 213 n. 38; De Inventione, 176 circumspection, 184; see also prudence circumstances, 85, 129, 135, 150, 154 n., 172–193; as accidents, 174–6, 180, 193, 196–7, 206–7, 242; classification of, 178–80; see specification of human action by circumstance; as conditions/differences, see condition; due or undue, 151 n. 19, 181, 215; as extending a sin's deviation, 207, 212–16; as increasing or diminishing goodness or evil, 189–92; kinds of, 176–8; nature of, 174–7; and proportioning action, 180–5; as specifying, see specification of human action by circumstance classification, 34, 36–7, 41, 49, 69, 101, 113, 117, 118 (fig), 138, 169–70 colour, see quality change; vision command, 10 n. 1, 17, 201, 232–3 common good, 169, 224 common sense, 99–100 concupiscence, see appetite condition, 243; circumstance as, 174, 178, 180–1, 183–4, 185 n. 42, 186, 190, 193–7, 207, 212, 234; as a disposition of matter (for form), 158–60, 164; formal aspect of object/matter, 115, 121, 133, 170–1, 186–8, 191–8, 209 n. 33, 213, 235, 243; see also formal aspect consent, 10–13, 15–16, 20, 85, 117, 191; and intention, 12–13; and choice, 12 n. 8, 13 contemplation, 26–8, 87, 88 n. 47, 129 n. 150 contempt for God, 184, 188, 189 n. 51 corporeal beings, 18, 34–8, 43–5, 61, 146 corporeal beings and specification, 30–4, 62, 155–60

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corporeal beings and specification (cont.),; compared with human action/habit, 48–52, 61, 63 n. 30, 69, 70–1, 111–12, 115, 117, 147, 154, 161, 164, 226–8, 232–3; compared with natural motion, 37–8, 69, 70 counsel, 10 n. 1, 214 courage, 22, 27, 107 n. 92, 108, 114, 122–6, 128, 138, 144 n. 6, 147–8, 149 (table), 160–4, 169–71, 242; see also virtue, cardinal; and its object (dangers of death), 108, 123, 144 n. 6, 148, 149 (table), 164, 170; (fear and daring) 144 n. 6, 160 cowardice, 114, 124 creation, 27–8, 130, 137–8, 140, 169 danger, 22, 163; of death, see courage daring, 124, 144 n. 6, 149 (table), 160, 170 De vera et falsa poenitentia, 176 n. 8 Decalogue, 131–2 definition, 34–7, 41, 49, 67, 75, 90, 101, 110, 114–15, 121, 138, 148, 154 n., 156–7, 231–3 desertion, 53–4 Dewan, Lawrence, 75 n. 11, 94 difference (of a genus), 35–6, 42–3, 111, 115, 117; of human action/habit, 49, 61–9, 103–4, 114–17, 168; of object, 111, 114, 193–8, 143, 243; per accidens, 36 n. 17, 43 n. 47, 95, 103, 109; per’se, 36 n. 17, 43–4, 95, 103, 112, 117; specific, 35–7, 49, 62, 64, 67, 112, 115, 193, 196, 233 disposition,; in a human being, 22, 43, 45, 74, 123–4, 147, 149 (table), 170, 208, 211–12; see also habit; vice; virtue; in matter, 155, 160; see also matter, determinate; in a natural being, 45 division,; accidental, 61, 79 n. 20; and contraries, 68–9; essential, 61–2, 69, 101, 141; of human actions, 61, 64–6, 68–9, 71, 113, 117, 118 (fig.), 168, 187, 205–6; of human powers, 101–2; of natural beings, 36–7, 42–3, 64; proper (per’se), 37, 43, 79, 112, 114 n. 106, 117, 118 (fig.) doctor, 87, 183, 217 drunkenness, see intoxication eating, 129–30, 181, 205–12; see also fasting; gluttony effect, 28, 45, 51, 59–60, 76–8, 81–2, 87, 178–9, 184; and proximate end, 229–33 elements, 146 n. 10, 159 end, 9, 16–17, 24, 49–51, 58, 100 (table), 127, 134–6, 139, 150, 154 n., 173, 179, 185 n. 42, 188, 217–18, 234–5; as an action or thing, 87–9; definition of, 50; final, 17–18, 20, 29, 130 n. 153, 134 n. 173, 139, 217–18, 224, 229–233, 235, 244–6

Index ; and good, 30, 64 n. 34, 240; see also will; and intention/ enjoyment, 12–16, 39; and matter, see specification of human action by matter; and motive, 201–4, 210–11; as possessing a formal aspect, 49, 63, 241 n.; as proportioning means, 51 n. 9, 58, 180–5; and intelligent agents, 12, 59–60, 64–6; and nature/ natural action, 46, 59–60; and specification, see specification of human action by end; ultimate, see final (above); of the work/worker, 218 end, proximate, 44, 133–40, 154 n., 166 n. 47, 188, 218–19, 235; and specification, see specification of human action by end end, remote, 17, 133–5, 137, 139–40, 154 n., 166 n. 47, 188, 195, 218–22; and specification, see specification of human action by end enjoyment, 10, 13–17, 20, 24–7, 39, 59 n. 22, 88, 89 n. 50 envy, 106 n. 90, 204 n. 22, 211; and its object (another's good), 204 n. 22, 211 equalization, 76, 119, 120–6; see also mean essence, 30, 32–4, 48, 156–7, 230–3; of a moral action, 150, 172, 174, 186, 195–7, 235 Eucharist, 131, 149 (table) Eve, 191 n. 60 evil,; moral, 23, 51, 61–9, 70, 78, 113–14, 119, 132–3, 135–6, 142, 150, 152–3, 154 n., 172–3, 182, 188–91, 215, 222, 225, 227, 235–6, 240–1; see also good; species; in non-intelligent beings/motions, 66 n. 41, 67–8; sensible, 200 n. 7 excellence, see pride external action, 76–87, 89–90, 131–2, 134 n. 172, 151 n. 19, 167, 223 external things, 28, 76–91 faith, 25–7, 108–12, 115, 125, 138–40, 169; see also virtue, theological; and its object (God as first truth), 19, 26, 109–12, 115, 125, 138 fame, 18–20 fasting, 106 n. 90, 114, 124 n. 129, 129, 181–2, 206 n. 31, 209, 212, 244; see also eating fear, 22, 27, 53–4, 123, 144 n. 6, 148, 149 (table), 160, 170, 191, 203, 211; see also courage Finnis, John, 89 n. 51, 133 n. 170, 238 n. 41 Flannery, Kevin L., 153 n. 23 flesh and bones, 156–8, 242 food, 19, 49, 68–9, 90 n. 53, 99 n. 78, 108, 129, 148, 149 (table), 162–3, 182, 207–12 force (coercion), 9, 54, 85, 89, 117, 190–1, 237; see also involuntary form,; accidental, 146–7

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form, (cont.); as attributed to human action/habit, 48–51, 71 n. 3, 154, 160, 179, 206, 223–6, 228, 230–3, 237–8; effective, 230–1; essential, 230; exemplary, 230 ‘form of the whole’, 31, 33–4, 37; as basis for species, 31, 34 form, substantial,; and a being's goodness, 70; and nature, 44–6, 55, 62; and species, 34, 51, 145, 227; and change, see substance; as co-principle of a corporeal being, 31–4, 41, 48, 50–1, 96, 146–7, 154–60, 164–5, 227–8; as compared to form in human action, 48–51; as compared to object, 70–1; as compared to term/end, 37–8, 46, 70–1 formal aspect (ratio),; of end, 51, 58, 241; in a human action or habit, 114–18, 133, 161; as essential formal character, 118–22, 125–6; genus as, 34–5, 37, 229, 233; of matter, 155, 168–171; of object, see object fornication, 83 n. 36, 168, 187, 191 n. 60, 223–4; see also sex fortitude, see courage freedom, 9, 10, 20, 23, 28, 54, 58–9, 106, 113, 129, 190–1, 235, 239, 245 friendship, 19–21, 25, 28, 106 n. 90, 182 n. 22, 191 n. 60 generation, see substance generative power, 100 (table), 103–4 genus, see also difference,; and substance, 35–7, 41, 64, 111–12, 117, 232–3; and human action, 70, 113, 134, 142, 165, 173 n. 1, 179 n. 16, 189 n. 51, 228–9, 231, 233 Gilby, Thomas, 102 n. 85 Gilleman, Gerard, 231 n. 29 gluttony, 114, 189, 199, 205–12, 213 n. 39, 214–16, 243–4; see also eating Gnosticism, 157 n. 31 God, 25, 66, 78–9, 88 n. 47, 89 n. 50, 137–40, 152, 160 n., 169, 181–2, 224, 235; as creator of natures, 46; contempt for, see contempt for God; and friendship, 19–21, 25; knowledge of, 25–6, 130; as lawgiver, 28, 126–7, 130–3, 182; and merit, 21–2; as object of contemplation, 26–8, 88 n. 47; as object of theological virtues, 24–5, 108–12, 115, 125–6, 138–9, 221, 232; triune, 25, 131; as ultimate human good, 18–20, 23–4, 134 n. 173; will of, 20, 27–8, 131, 153 n. 24 good,; apparent, 201; convertible with being, 64, 90 n. 54, 99 n. 78, 150; and end, 12, 15–16, 52, 55–6, 64–5, 165; highest, see charity; God; honest, 127–8

Index ; moral, 21–2, 28, 47, 52, 61–70, 77–8, 105, 113–14, 119, 124 n. 128, 125 n. 132, 129, 130 n. 153, 131–3, 135–6, 142, 150, 153, 154 n., 166, 172–3, 189, 191, 215, 222, 235–6, 240–1; see also evil; species; pleasant, 127; of reason (intelligible), 10, 59, 65–6, 68–9, 86, 104–5, 113, 124, 129–30, 133, 234–5, 241; see also right reason; sensible, 65; useful, 12, 127; and will, see will goods, temporal, 18–19, 138, 181; and imperfect beatitude, 27–8 governance, 137–8, 140, 169 grace, 20 n. 32, 131 Gregory the Great, 206–8, 219–20; Moralia in Job, 206, 219 growth,; increase in quantity, see quantity change; human power of, 99, 100 (table), 101 Gründel, Johannes, 179, n. 16, 196 n. 75 habit, 73–4, 76, 81–2, 95, 129, 146–8, 150, 202, 232; see also virtue; vice; specification of, 61–2, 63 n. 30, 64–6, 91 n. 56, 102 n. 86, 106, 108, 110, 126, 141, 149 (table), 155, 160–4, 169, 205, 214–16, 224, 241 happiness (general), 18–19 happiness, imperfect,; and contemplation, 26–7; and faith/charity, 24–6; and goods other than God, 27–8; and hope, 24; and rapture, 23–4 happiness, perfect, 19–23, 111–12, 130 n. 153 harmony, 124, 128, 184; see also mean; measure health, 49, 122; becoming well or ill, see quality change hearing, 92–3, 99–101, 103–4, 241; and its object (sound), 92–3, 99, 100 (table), 101, 103–4, 241 heating, see quality change heaven, 19–28, 111–12, 181 heavenly vision, 23–4, 26, 111–12; see also happiness, perfect heresy, 110 n. 101, 149 (table), 157 n. 31, 228–9 Hoffmann, Tobias, 153 n. 23 Holy Spirit, 21–2, 27, 131 homosexual acts, see sins against nature honour, 18–20, 79 n. 22, 81 n. 32, 85 n. 41, 138, 149 (table), 164 n. 44, 201 n. 12 hope, 20–1, 24–6, 108–9, 115 n. 109, 125, 138–40, 169, 196; see also virtue, theological; and its object (God as good of highest difficult), 109, 125, 138 Hörmann, Karl, 133 n. 170

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Index

human action, see also will,; as an accident, 48, 175, 180; definition of, 9; as dependent on agent, 39, 48, 175; as forming virtues, see virtue; freedom of, see freedom human action, see also will (cont.),; human mastery over, 9, 56; individual, 114, 235; and merit, see merit; span of, 10–17, 39; specification of, see specification of human action; unity of, 15–16, 83 n. 36, 238 human being, see also agent,; body of, 19, 23, 28, 33, 49, 63 n. 30, 100 (table), 129, 157, 158 n. 32, 214, 217; definition of, 35, 62, 115, 147, 194, 229, 231; end of, see happiness; essence of, 32–4; nature of, 18–19, 22–3, 58, 68, 122, 209; soul of, 18, 33, 156–8 hypocrisy, 219–22 ignorance, 117, 184, 190 illiberality, 207–8, 210, 213 n. 38 imagination, 100 (table), 200, 211 immoderation, 69, 106, 181–2, 209–10; see also moderation impiety, 186 n. indifferent action, 69 n. 50, 113–14, 234–5; see also species individual,; a being as, 33–4, 73, 156–7, 160; human action as, 69, 114, 133, 235; motion as, 39–40 initial term, see terminus from which injustice, 79, 114–18, 120–1, 186 n., 187 n. 47, 189 n. 51, 226 insensitivity, 124, 205; see also temperance intellect,; and abstraction, 33–5, 100 (table), 229, 234–5; and happiness, 19, 24–5, 111; and human action/ habit, 10, 14, 27, 56–60, 64–6, 155, 190, 235; and its object (intelligible or true), 67, 99, 100 (table), 101 n. 80, 103–4, 110–122 intemperance, 105, 149 (table), 168, 205, 215, 244 intention, 10–13, 15–17, 20, 39, 55, 64–5, 136, 201, 217, 225, 236 n. 38, 238; definition of, 12–13; as related to consent, choice, use, 12–13, 16 intercourse, see sex internal action, 80, 82–3, 167, 223; see also intellect; will intoxication, 107, 182–4, 190 involuntary, 54, 56, 116–17, 118 (fig.), 187 n. 46; see also force; will James of Venice, 75 n. 11 Jesus Christ, 131–2, 157 n. 31 John Paul II, Pope, 7 n. 6 joking, 184 n. 35, 188 n. 49, 189 n. 51, 204, 214–15 justice, 21, 76, 81, 83 n. 35, n. 37, 85–6, 90, 106–8, 113, 115–16, 118 (fig.), 119–26, 128, 130, 138, 143, 149 (table), 152, 153 n. 22, 160, 164 n. 44, 169–70, 186, 192, 235; see also injustice; virtue, cardinal

Index ; general, 224, 229, 231–3; and its object, 81 killing (premoral species), 119; see also murder Klubertanz, George, 231 n. 29 knowledge, 25–6, 58, 93, 107, 130, 132, 148, 149 (table), 163 n. 41; see also intellect law,; divine, 28, 126, 127 n. 139, 130 n. 153, 131–3, 182; eternal, 126, 130; moral, 131; natural, 28, 127, 130–3; New, 131–2; Old, 131–2 liberality, 80, 106–7, 143, 192; and its object (money), 106–7, 143 life, 116, 132, 236 light, 97–9, 110, 118, 238 local motion, 30, 38, 43, 44 n. 51, 69, 100 (table); downwards, 43, 45 n. 51; upwards, 44 n. 51 love,; as a passion, 53–4, 202; as a will act, see charity lust, 103–5, 152, 168, 186–7, 189 n. 51, 225–6 luxuria , see lust lying, 152, 204, 220 magnanimity, 108 n. 95, 124 n. 129, 149 (table), 164 n. 44, 183 n. 25 magnificence, 108 n. 95, 124 n. 129, 164 n. 44, 169–71, 183 n. 25 man, see human being marital intercourse, 103–5, 152 matrimony, 105; see also sacrament McCormick, Richard A., 7 n. 5 McInerny, Ralph, 77 materia circa quam, see matter about which materia ex qua, see matter materia in qua, see matter material creatures, see corporeal beings mathematical realities, 33, 157 matter,; condition of, 170–1, 242–3; as co-principle of corporeal being, 30–4, 37–8, 41, 48, 50, 145–6, 154, 156–60, 165, 169; and object, 74, 79, 81–3, 89, 108, 139, 140 n., 141–5, 147, 150–1, 153–5, 160, 165–6, 168–71, 177, n. 14, 242; out of which, 145–8, 158, 166; particular/common, 32–4,156–7; as predisposing for form, see matter, determinate; and proximate end, 223, 238; proximate/remote, 82, 83 n. 37; special/general, 148, 162–4; and specification of, see specification of human action by matter; in which, 146–8, 154 n., 166 matter about which, 77 n. 7, 143–9, 150 n. 15, 151, 153–4, 166–7, 177–8, 242; see specification of human action by matter matter, determinate, 33 n. 8, 143, 154–61, 163–5, 242; see specification of human action by matter

265

266

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matter, due or undue, 142–3, 149–54, 165; see specification of human action by matter May, William, 233 n. 34 mean, 122–6, 129, 155, 160–2, 182–3, 190; see also harmony; measure means, 11–18, 20, 22, 136, 201, 218, 236–8; as desirable because of end, 12–13, 15–16, 18, 201, 245; as tailored to an end, 18, 51 n. 9, 58, 127, 180–1, 182 n. 22, 184, 185 n. 41, 245 measure,; application of rule, 113, 118–22, 123–6, 129, 130 n. 153, 208; rule, 69, 125–6, 127 n. 139, 129, 183; see also right reason medicine, 87, 183, 217–18, 222, 245 merit, 21–4, 28 miser, 87–8, 90 moderation, 68, 129, 162–3, 181–2, 215 n.; see also immoderation money, 80, 87–91, 106–7, 109, 143, 194, 225, 236 moral theory, 9–29, 30, 47, 62, 76, 82, 102, 110, 130–3, 143, 162, 172, 174 n. 6, 180, 206, 214, 242 Moses, 23, 131 motion, 37, 52–3, 93, 148, 200, 208–10 motion, sensory,; compared to intelligent action, 57–60; compared to subsensory motion, 58; nature of, 58–9 motion and specification,; and active principle, 30, 37–8, 44–46, 53–7, 62–3, 65; as compared to specification of human action, see specification of human action by end; and differentiating species of, 43–4, 69; and motion's path, 40 n. 32; problem of, 39–40; and ‘terminus from which’, 40 n. 32, 42, 45; and ‘terminus to which’, 30, 38–44, 46, 52, 54, 55–7, 70, 167 motion, subsensory, 37–46, 52, 66 n. 41; change in colour, health, temperature, see quality change; change in size, see quantity change; change in space, see local motion; as dependent on moving thing, 39, 48; as lacking knowledge of end, 57; and relation to human action, 37–9; specification of, see motion and specification motive, 53, 199; and end, see motive; etymology, 200; and ‘extending’ circumstances, 212–16; meaning of, 200–2; and specification, see specification of human action by motive murder, 53–4, 115, 118 (fig.), 119–20, 132, 172, 185 n. 41, 235–7, 240, 244–6

Index natural philosophy, 146, 175 natural things, see corporeal beings nature,; cosmos, 25, 97 n. 72, 130, 159, 208; disposition to action, 45, 56–7, 59–60, 63, 65, 73, 156; human, see human being Nisters, Thomas, 196 n. 75 non-voluntary, 65, 211; see also will object, 13, 19 n. 26, 24, 26–7, 173, 218; actions with two, 79; and circumstance, 177 n. 14, 179; condition of, 170, 193–8, 243; etymology, 73–6; and formal aspect, 61, 66, 72, 91–126, 137–40, 141, 153, 168–71, 191–2, 196–7, 207, 238, 240–3; and matter, see matter; and motive, 200, 202–3, 204 nn. 22–3; as proximate end, 133–40, 179, 188, 219, 241 n., 244 n.; and right reason, 126–133, 142; and specification, see specification of human action by object; as that to which action relates, 73–91 odour, see smell order, see also proportion,; in a beautiful thing, 154; in human action, 39, 51, 58, 68–9, 86, 105, 113, 127–30, 131, 134, 136, 154, 191, 224–5, 218, 224–5, 230–2, 236–7; in nature, 25, 66, 130, 132, 159, 228 Owens, Joseph, 128 n. 143 passion, 27, 54, 81 n. 28, 117 n. 115, 122, 124, 128–9, 158 n. 32, 201, 203, 211–12, 216; see appetite; and moral species, 211–12 passivity, see act Paul, St, 23, 163 n. 40 penance, 81, 176 n. 8 perfection,; of God, 21; of a human action, 49, 58–60, 69, 123 n., 125; of a human being, 18–20, 23–6, 28, 122, 132, 147; of a human power, 101; of a natural thing, 18, 41; of a subsensory motion, 40 n. 32, 41–2; of will, 15; of a work of art, 124–5 Peter Lombard:, Sentences, 176 n. 8 Pinckaers, Servais, 61, 73 n. 6, 148 n. 14, 198 n. 79, 218 n. 5, 238 n. 42, 240 n. 1 plants, 35, 96, 146 n. 10, 226 play, 87, 163 n. 41, 184 n. 35, 214, 215 n. pleasure, 18–19, 68, 83 n. 36, 105, 108, 123, 129, 144 n. 6, 147 n. 12, 148, 149 (table), 162–3, 169 n. 51, 186, 208–12, 220 possessions, 70, 78–9, 85, 115–17, 118 (fig.), 128, 152, 170, 186, 207, 225

267

268

Index

potency, 44 n. 51, 146–8, 151, 154 n., 157–60 power, 18–19 powers, natural, 14, 20, 22, 73–4, 76, 100 (table), 158, 180, 200; appetitive, see appetite; external senses, see hearing; smell; taste; touch; vision; intellective, see intellect; interior senses, see common sense; imagination; locomotive, see local motion; proper actions of, 74, 92; specification of, 74–5, 92–105, 109–110, 118, 141, 239–41; vegetative, see generative power; growth; will, see will precept, 120, 127 n. 141, 129–33; see also law; divine, 184 pride, 81, 107–8, 110, 182 n. 22, 202, 224, 228–9, 232; and its object (excellence), 81, 107–8 privation, 66–9 prodigality, 192 property:,; attribute or quality, 67, 174, 194–8, 243; belongings, see possessions proportion, 51 n. 9, 58, 77–8, 90 n. 54, 127, 129, 130 n. 153, 155, 157–60, 180–2, 184–5, 200, 245 proportionalism, 7 prostitution, 131 prudence, 108, 127, 138, 149 (table), 164 n. 44, 169, 184–5, 213 n. 38; see also virtue, cardinal Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, 65 n. 39 Pythagoreans, 158 n. 34 quality change, 43; colour (whitening or blackening), 38, 39, 42–3; health (becoming well or ill), 38, 41, 42 n. 36, 43, 45, 87, 217, 222, 245; temperature (heating or cooling), 43 n. 43, 44–6, 50, 53–7, 62–3, 200 quantity, 158, 183 n. 25 quantity change, 43; diminishing, 38, 43; growing, 19, 30, 38, 43 rapture, 24–5 ratio , see formal aspect reason:,; intellectual faculty, 25–7, 58, 95 n. 66, 127, 130, 132–3, 160, 182, 184, 213 n. 38; rule for action/habit, see right reason reductio (as explanatory strategy), 41 religion, 108 n. 95, 137–40, 163 n. 40, 169, 183 n. 25; and its object, 137–40 rest, 41; see also motion resurrection, 19, 157 revelation, 25, 28, 130–2 reviling, 79 n. 22, 117 n. 114, 118 (fig.), 187 n. 46; see also backbiting; and its object (dignity), 116, 118 (fig.) rhetorician, 176 right (ius), 81, 82 n. 33, 90, 120; see also justice

Index right reason, 27, 63, 68–9, 86, 103–5, 112–13, 118–33, 142, 153, 155, 160–2, 168, 181–2, 183 n. 25, 185–6, 188, 192, 194–7, 207–8, 211, 216, 227, 234, 237, 241, 243–6; see also law; rule; measure; standard Ripperger, Chad, 80 n. 25, 89 n. 52, 238 n. 41 robbery (rapina), 85, 117, 118 (fig.), 187 n. 46; see also stealing rule (for human action), 103, 118–19, 126–7; see also right reason sacrament, 83 nn. 35–6 sacrilege, 80, 84, 169 n. 51, 187 n. 46, 195, 243 sacredness, 80, 83, 90, 149 (table), 178, 187 n. 46, 188, 195 safeguarding, 85 scandal, 184, 236 n. 38 science,; natural, 33 n. 8; speculative, 27 sensation, 33, 35, 57–9, 65, 66 n. 40, 87, 92–9, 100 (table), 101, 103–5, 200 sensibles,; common, 93; proper, 92–3, 95, 99 sex, 19; see also adultery; fornication; lust; marital intercourse; as premoral species, 104–5, 121 shame, 81 sight, see vision Simon, Louis-Marie, 196 n. 75 simony, 82–4, 89–90, 152, 188, 223; and its object (spiritual thing), 82–4, 89–90, 152 sin, 53–4, 79–80, 82, 90, 107, 116–17, 118 (fig.), 129 n. 150, 152 (table), 154 n., 160, 166–8, 173, 176 n. 8, 182, 186–7, 189 n. 51, 191–2, 199, 201–5, 207–15, 220, 223; see also evil; mortal/venial, 79 n. 20, 189–91, 192 n. 63, 204 n. 23 sins against nature, 131 smell, 92, 100 (table); and its object (odour), 92, 100 (table) sobriety, 69, 107 n. 93 sorrow, 176 n. 8, 200 n. 7, 211 sound, see hearing species, 30–7, 145, 154 n., 155–7, 172, 173 n. 1, 179 n. 16, 187, 190; common or general, 231; and essence, 33–4, 48; good, evil, indifferent, 61–9, 113–14, 191; see also good; evil; indifferent action; moral, 121, 103–5, 186, 211; as particular kinds, 51, 114, 186–7, 240; pre-moral, 121, 186; proper, 227, 229, 231–2; and proximate end, 229–33; two in one human action, 188–9, 226–33 specification of human action (general),; and difficulties in Aquinas, 6; and importance to the moral life, 29; and species in natural beings, 48–51; question of, 1–2, 7–8

269

270

Index

specification of human action by circumstance, 172–3, 245–6; and conditions/differences of objects, 193–8, 242–3; and determining subspecies, 186–7, 189; and disparate species in the same action, 188–9; and mortal/venial sin, 189–191; and naming related species, 189, 243; and pre-moral species, 185–6 specification of human action by end, 47–69, 71, 135, 165–7, 218–19, 239–42, 244–6; compared to active principle, 37–8, 48, 52–60, 62–3, 65, 203; compared to sensory agent's end, 57–60; compared to substantial form, 30, 37–8, 48–51; compared to terminus to which, 37–8, 48, 52–3, 55–60, 167; proximate end, 135, 218–23, 226–33, 234–8, 244–6; remote end, 219, 222–6, 227–33, 234–8, 244–6 specification of human action by matter, 79, 139, 140 n., 141–3, 242, 245–6; determinate matter, 160–4; due/ undue matter, 149–53; and end, 165–7; matter about which, 144–9; and object, 168–71 specification of human action by motive, 199, 243–6; and circumstances which name species, 203–12; and end, 202–3, 210–11; and ‘extending’ circumstances, 212–16 specification of human action by object, 141–2, 144–5, 150, 154, 160, 193, 234, 239–41, 245–6; compared to specification of motion by a terminus, 70–1; and role of formal aspect, 72, 102–126, 127, 137–8, 140, 168–71, 241–2; and question of object's identity, 76, 78–82, 84–6, 89–90; and proximate end, 133–40, 188, 22 spiritual thing, see simony standard, 112, 118–21, 123, 125–6, 130–1, 182; see also right reason stealing (accipere aliena), 12 n. 4, 70, 78–9, 84–5, 113, 115–18, 134–5, 142, 153, 186, 187 nn. 46–7, 191, 192 n. 63, 195, 213, 225; see also taking (pre-moral species); theft; robbery Steel, Carlos, 57 n. striking, 80, 84 substance, 35–8, 41–2, 48, 50, 92, 95–6, 146–7, 154 n., 156–7; see also form, substantial; generation and corruption, 31–2, 43 n. 41, 55, 63 n. 30, 70, 105, 159–60 sun, 98, 232–3 taking (pre-moral species), 119, 186, 194; see also stealing tangible, see touch taste, 92, 100 (table), 118; and its object (flavour), 92, 100 (table), 118

Index temperance, 27, 68, 81, 105, 108, 116, 122–6, 128–30, 138, 144 n. 6, 147 n. 12, 148, 149 (table), 160, 162–3, 164 n. 44, 169, 181; see also intemperance; insensitivity; virtue, cardinal; and its object (pleasures of touch, i.e. food and sex), 144 n. 6, 149 (table), 162–3; (desirable things/pleasures) 160, 162–3 temptation, 191 Ten Commandments, see Decalogue terminus from which (a quo), 40, 42, 45 terminus to which (ad quem),; and end, 47 n. 2; see specification of human action by end; and specification of natural motion, see motion and specification theft (furtum), 39, 51, 53–4, 79, 80 n. 23, 84–5, 114–19, 134, 187 n. 46, 188, 194, 196, 213, 223–6, 227–9, 235–8, 240, 243; see also stealing Thomas Aquinas,; personal, 2, 6, 61–2, 92–4, 153, 198, 205–6; works,; Commentary on De Anima, 74–5, 94, 98 n. 75; Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, 140 n.; Commentary on the Ethics, 74, 101 n. 80, 225–6, 237; Commentary on Isaiah, 206 n. 31; Commentary on the Metaphysics, 159; Commentary on the Sentences, 2, 6, 52–4, 56, 64–5, 67, 78–9, 119–20, 122–3, 136, 155, 160–1, 165–7, 177 n. 13; De Malo, 2, 80, 84–5, 102–5, 113, 135, 142–3, 150–1, 160–1, 163, 189 n. 51, 194, 206–10, 212–13; De Potentia, 46; De Virtutibus, 62–3, 65, 85–6, 95–6, 125, 141–2, 224, 228, 231; Summa Contra Gentiles, 59; Summa Theologiae (Prima Pars), 75 n. 12; (Prima Secundae) 2, 15 n. 15, 37–8, 47, 50–1, 53, 55, 65, 70–1, 78, 79 n. 20, 134, 136, 144–5, 147, 150, 154, 165–7, 169, 177, 179 n. 16, 189 n. 51, 193–4, 196, 199, 204–5, 209, 215, 222–3, 233 n. 34; (Secunda Secundae) 81, 85, 114–15, 117, 127, 137, 140 n., 152, 168–71, 184, 204, 209 n. 33, 219–20, 228–32 time, 39–40, 54 n. 14, 68, 172, 174, 176 n. 8, 178–9, 184 n. 35, 186 n., 188, 191, 207, 213, 215 touch, 92–3, 100 (table), 108, 147 n. 12, 148, 149 (table), 164 n. 44, 242; and its object (tangible), 92, 100 (table) transmigration of souls, 157 n. 31, 158 n. 34 truth, 27, 66 n. 40, 81 n. 32, 95 n. 66, 99, 101 n. 80, 103–4, 107 n. 92, 130, 152, 240; virtue of, 219–20

271

272

Index

unbelief, 228, 231 unity:,; of a definition, 36; of a difference, 67; of a human action, see human action; of human nature, 18; of a human power, 101; of reality, 49, 98 universe, 130, 138, 169 use (will act), 10, 12–17, 20; and intention, see intention using one's own thing, 70, 78 vainglory, 219–23 Vander Marck, William, 108 n. 96 Veritatis Splendor, 7 n. 6 vice, 23, 124 n. 129, 126, 169, 207, 215, 216 n., 224–5; see also habit virtue, 22, 81, 106 n. 90, 109, 117 n. 115, 122–6, 128–30, 138, 143, 147–8, 160–2, 169–70, 180 n. 19, 182, 219, 221 n. 13, 224, 228, 230–1; see also habit; and annexation, 138–9, 169–70; formed by human actions, 22–3, 27, 181, 182 n. 22; general, 162–3, 229–32; and happiness, 27–8; infused, 24, 181, 182 n. 22; moral, 27, 81 n. 28, 123, 125–6, 139, 155; see virtue, cardinal; special, 162–4 virtue, cardinal, 108, 123, 128, 138, 161–2; see also courage; justice; prudence; temperance virtue, theological, 108–9, 125–6, 138–9; see also faith; hope; charity; God vision, 19 n. 26, 68, 74–5, 92–9, 100 (table), 101, 103–4, 110, 118, 238, 240–1; and its object (colour), 19 n. 26, 75, 92–99, 100 (table), 101, 103–5, 110, 118, 146, 175, 213, 228, 238, 240–1 volition simply considered, 10, 12, 16 voluntary action, see human action; will vow, 105, 178 n., 183, 189 n. 51 wealth, 18–19, 20, 107 n. 91, 169, 192, 225 Weisheipl, James, 206 n. 30 whitening, see quality change will, 19 n. 26, 52, 76, 77 n. 13, 78, 82, 116–17, 118 (fig.), 131, 188, 190, 211–12, 217, 233 n. 33, 238, 239, 244–5; see also involuntary; non-voluntary; as basis for human action, 55–8, 62, 211, 240; described as rational appetite, 57, 66, 100 (table), 151 n. 20; freedom of, 9, 20 n. 32, 21, 54 n. 14, 58, 190–1, 239, 245; and object (good/end), 30, 49, 52, 55, 57, 62–3, 78, 80, 83, 86–8, 89, 90 n. 53, 99 n. 78, 100 (table), 104–5, 114, 121, 133, 136, 151 n. 20, 167, 188, 201–3, 211, 217, 222–3, 226, 233, 235, 237–8, 240–1, 244–6; perfect/imperfect, 58

Index ; six stages of, 10–17, 20; see also consent; choice; enjoyment; intention; use; volition simply considered William of Moerbeke, 75 n. 11, 94 wisdom, 131, 183; divine, 130 worship, 108 n. 95, 139–40

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