The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy (Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture)

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THE POLITICS OF EXILE IN RENAISSANCE ITALY

Christine Shaw

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Political exiles were a prominent feature of political life in Renaissance Italy, often a source of intense concern to the states from which they were banished, and a ready instrument for governments wishing to intervene in the affairs of their rivals and enemies. This book provides the ®rst systematic analysis of the role of exiles in the political life of ®fteenth-century Italy. The main focus in on the experiences and reactions of the exiles, and on how Italian states dealt with their own exiles and those of other powers. Siena, notorious in the 1480s for the numbers of her citizens in exile, is used as the model to which other cities are compared. Such a detailed study of the phenomenon of exile also provides fresh perspectives on the nature and power of governments in ®fteenth-century Italy, and on ideas about the legitimacy of political authority and political action. c h r i s t i n e s h a w is Senior Research Fellow in the Department of History, University of Warwick.

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cambridge studies in italian history and culture

T H E P OL I T IC S OF E X I L E I N R E NA I S SA NC E I TA LY

cambridge studies in italian history and culture Edited by gigliola fragnito, UniversitaÁ degli Studi, Parma cesare mozzarelli, UniversitaÁ Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan robert oresko, Institute of Historical Research, University of London and geoffrey symcox, University of California, Los Angeles This series comprises monographs and a variety of collaborative volumes, including translated works, which concentrate on the period of Italian history from late medieval times up to the Risorgimento. The editors aim to stimulate scholarly debate over a range of issues which have not hitherto received, in English, the attention they deserve. As it develops, the series will emphasize the interest and vigour of current international debates on this central period of Italian history and the persistent in¯uence of Italian culture on the rest of Europe. For a list of titles in the series, see end of book

THE POLITICS OF EXILE IN RENAISSANCE ITALY CHRISTINE SHAW

PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (VIRTUAL PUBLISHING) FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia http://www.cambridge.org © Christine Shaw 2000 This edition © Christine Shaw 2003 First published in printed format 2000

A catalogue record for the original printed book is available from the British Library and from the Library of Congress Original ISBN 0 521 66325 3 hardback

ISBN 0 511 00877 5 virtual (netLibrary Edition)

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Abbreviations

page viii ix

Introduction: The wheel of fortune

1

1 Into exile

5

2 The justice of exile

55

3 Places of exile

87

4 Life in exile

110

5 Keeping track

143

6 Finding friends

172

7 Going home

203

Conclusion

234

Bibliography Index

240 247

vii

AC K NOW L E D GE M E N T S

This book was researched and written while I was fortunate enough to hold research fellowships at Warwick University funded by the Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy. The Leverhulme trustees in particular have had to be very patient before seeing the results of their grant. I am very grateful to both bodies for their support. At Warwick Professor Michael Mallett, the Director of the Elites Project of which my research forms a part, has been a constant source of advice and encouragement. The support of Professors Nicolai Rubinstein and George Holmes for our work has been much appreciated. Most of the archival research for this book was done in Siena, where the courtesy and unfailing helpfulness of the Directors and all the staff of the Archivio di Stato have made it a pleasure to work. Like so many scholars who have worked in Siena, I am endebted to Professor Mario Ascheri of the University of Siena for his help and friendship.

viii

A BBR E V I AT ION S

Archival sources ASF

ASMa, AGonzaga ASMi, ASforzesco ASMo ACapitolino ASS

Florence, Archivio di Stato, Archivio della Repubblica Otto di Guardia (repubblica) Otto di Pratica, Carteggi, Responsive Otto di Pratica, Missive interne Dieci di BalõÁa, Carteggi, Responsive Dieci di BalõÁa, Legazioni e Commissarie Signori, Carteggi, Responsive Signori, Missive, Minutari Signori, Dieci di BalõÁa, Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, Missive e Responsive Medici avanti il Principato (MAP) Mantua, Archivio di Stato, Archivio Gonzaga, Serie E, xxv Milan, Archivio di Stato, Archivio Sforzesco, Potenze Estere Modena, Archivio di Stato, Cancelleria Ducale, Carteggio Ambasciatori Rome, Archivio Capitolino, Archivio Orsini, Serie I Siena, Archivio di Stato BalõÁa Concistoro Consiglio Generale Notarile ante Cosimiano Particolari Famiglie Senesi Archivio Sergardi-Biringucci

ix

x

list of abbreviations

ASTodi

Todi, Archivio Comunale, Archivio Secreto di San Fortunato, 55 (Lettere al Comune) Venice, Archivio di Stato Consiglio dei Dieci Senato, Deliberazioni segrete (Senatus Secreta)

ASV

Manuscript diaries and histories `Diario senese' `Frammento di diario senese' Tizio, `Historiarum senensium' Tommasi, Ìstorie'

`Diario senese dal 1479 al 1500, scritto da uno contemporaneo', Archivio di Stato di Siena, MS D58 `Frammento di diario sanese d'incerto autore', Biblioteca Comunale degl'Intronati, Siena, MS B.iii.2, `Storie di Siena di vari', ff. 215r±225r Sigismondo Tizio, `Historiarum senensium', vol. vi, Biblioteca Comunale degl'Intronati, Siena, MS B.iii.11 Giugurta Tommasi, Ìstorie di Siena, Parte II', Biblioteca Comunale degl'Intronati, Siena, MS A.x.74 Printed sources

AMSPPR

Atti e memorie della R. Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Provincie di Romagna ASI Archivio storico italiano ASL Archivio storico lombardo ASLSP Atti della SocietaÁ Ligure di Storia Patria ASPN Archivio storico per le province napoletane ASRSP Archivio della SocietaÁ Romana di Storia Patria BSPU Bollettino della Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria per l'Umbria BSSP Bullettino senese di storia patria Lorenzo de' Medici, Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, ed. Riccardo Fubini Lettere (vols. i±ii), Nicolai Rubinstein (vols. ii±iv), Michael Mallett (vols. v±vi) (Florence, 1977-90) RIS Rerum italicarum scriptores, ed. L. Muratori (Milan, 1723±51) RRIISS Rerum italicarum scriptores, new edn (Bologna and CittaÁ di Castello, 1900± )

I N T RODUC T ION: T H E W H EE L OF FORT U N E

Every day these exiles seem to me to be in worse condition ± they ¯ock together like starlings, and they are discontented, and they have spread many rumours, as those who have been turned out do, which are not very pleasing to your friends.1

Much of the experience of political exiles in Renaissance Italy is encapsulated in this quotation from a report by a Sienese ambassador in Rome in March 1485 ± their clustering together with other exiles from their home to seek support, and comfort; their ®nancial dif®culties and their periods of discouragement; their efforts to undermine the regime back home that had driven them away; the close surveillance by the agents and friends of their political enemies, a token of the threat they were considered to be; and the hostility and disparagement with which those enemies spoke of them and treated them. Another common aspect of the experience of exiles is also exempli®ed by this report of the ambassador, Guidantonio Buoninsegni. Only a few years before he had himself been in exile in Rome, and the year after he spoke so scornfully of the opponents of the regime in Siena he fell foul of it himself, and was once again in Rome as an exile. Many an exile did return, sometimes to be reconciled to his opponents, sometimes to take his revenge on them. Many a member of the political elites of Italy knew what it was like to be bound to fortune's wheel. Not all the political exiles of Renaissance Italy behaved like these discontented Sienese, intriguing in Rome in 1485. Some lived peacefully where they had been sent, trying to win the favour of the government back home, or building a new life for themselves elsewhere. Some were exiled princes, treated with honour, entertained at courts. The exile as solitary, disconsolate wanderer, pining for home, family and friends ± one of the most universal of all literary topoi from ancient Rome to 1

ASS, Concistoro 2457, 90: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 21 Mar. 1484(5), Rome.

1

2

the politics of exile in renaissance italy

modern Latin America, from the poetry of the Vikings to the writings of Dante ± is perhaps the ®gure least frequently found in reality in Renaissance Italy. There the proverbial exiles of everyday political life were the `starlings', banding together, doing all they could to return. These starlings could be much more than a noisy nuisance: they could be a cause of disorder and political turmoil, not just in their place of origin but far beyond. Often they could turn to powerful friends in other states, or to factional allies, or simply to the enemies of their enemies, and ®nd encouragement, diplomatic help, money, perhaps troops. Few con¯icts between Italian states could not provide an opening for some group of exiles or other to pursue their own goals. Employing the exiles of a rival state to annoy or threaten its government was a common ploy in the diplomacy and warfare of Renaissance Italy, even in the period between the Peace of Lodi of 1454 and the beginning of the Italian Wars in 1494. Focusing this study of exiles on the second half of the ®fteenth century provides an opportunity to see how they fared at times when there was general peace in Italy as well as during times of con¯ict, and to assess the impact of the disruption of the political system of Italy brought about by the French, with the conquest of Naples by Charles VIII in 1494, and of Milan by Louis XII in 1499±1500. It is the practical realities of political exile, and the practical consequences for the states of Renaissance Italy of the ferment produced by political exiles, with which this book is concerned, not exile as a literary topos or a state of mind. The ®rst chapter is intended to serve as both an examination of the circumstances that gave rise to political exile, and an introduction to the more important individuals and groups of exiles that ®gure in later chapters. In the rest of the book, the experiences of exiles from one state, Siena, are highlighted and compared with those of exiles from elsewhere in Italy. How were sentences determined, and by whom? What other penalties might be imposed on exiles? Where were they sent, and where did they actually go? How did they support themselves? What happened to their families? How far did governments try to track and control their exiles, and how successfully did they do this when they tried? What did exiles who did not reconcile themselves to their fate try to do about it? Where did they turn for help and with what success? In what circumstances did exiles return home? At least partial answers to all of these questions can be found in the Sienese archives. Siena was chosen for particular scrutiny in this study not only because of the sheer numbers of Sienese exiles ± running into thousands ± during this period, and their signi®cance in Sienese political life, but also because of the abundance of information on the exiles to

introduction

3

be found in the surviving records. Enough information has been found on 610 Sienese exiled for political reasons between 1456 and 1500, some of them exiled more than once and thus providing a total of 691 cases of exile, to make possible some statistical analysis. Until similar studies have been done on the exiles of other states, it is not possible to be sure how far the experiences of Sienese exiles were representative of other Italian political exiles. But there is enough information available in print, notably for Florence but for other states as well, to allow some comparisons to be made. It is regrettable that more information is not available on those exiled by princes who were not members of the prince's own families, so that it would be possible to make more systematic comparisons of the exiles from republics with those from principalities. This is the ®rst time such a comparative study has been made of political exiles in ®fteenth-century Italy. Randolph Starn's Contrary Commonwealth: The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy (1982) is principally concerned with the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries; the section on Renaissance Italy is largely concerned with Florentine exiles in the late fourteenth and ®fteenth centuries. For Starn, exiles in ®fteenth-century Italy were not only less numerous than in the thirteenth, but were so closely supervised by the stronger and better organized Renaissance states that they were more inclined to accept their fate with resignation than to resist: There were still outlaws, bandits, and fuorusciti of course. But with the parceling out of Italy among something like territorial states the landbased and urban strategies of exiles during an earlier age could be more closely controlled. Internal consolidation extending watchful institutions and intensifying pressures for ideological conformity within each political unit left still less room for the brash maneuvers and clear consciences of exiles in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.2

Jacques Heers in his L'exil, la vie politique et la socieÂteÂ (French edition ®rst published in 1995) also deals with the thirteenth to the ®fteenth centuries, and also concentrates on the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The examples he draws on for the later fourteenth and ®fteenth centuries come largely from Florence and Genoa. To a greater extent than Starn's, Heers's treatment of the subject of political exile touches on themes that are discussed here, but not in a way that facilitates comparisons between the later ®fteenth century and the earlier periods. Heers treats the period as a whole, and does not consider how changes in the political life and the political structures of Italy from the early 2

Randolph Starn, Contrary Commonwealth: The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy (Berkeley, 1982), p. 87.

4


fourteenth to the later ®fteenth century shaped the incidence and experience of political exile. But political exile in the second half of the ®fteenth century was a more widespread and more signi®cant phenomenon than Starn argues or Heers implies. Most regimes, princely or republican, had opponents in exile. Many of the principal actors in Italian politics had at least one episode of exile in their career. All regimes were prepared to manipulate the exiles of others for their own advantage, if the opportunity arose. The political life of Renaissance Italy cannot be properly understood unless the practice and experience of exile is appreciated as one of its de®ning characteristics.

chapter 1

INTO EXILE

Italy was not the only region of Western Europe in which there were political exiles in the later ®fteenth century. When Henry VI ¯ed to Scotland after the defeat of his supporters at the battle of Towton in March 1461, he was not unusual among the English kings of the ®fteenth century in having personal experience of exile. `His grandfather [Henry IV] had won the kingdom from exile; Henry's successor [Edward IV] was to recover it from exile. Starting out from exile . . . his nephew, Henry Tudor, was likewise to secure a kingdom for himself in 1485.'1 The future Louis XI of France took refuge at the court of the Duke of Burgundy in 1456, and he did not return to France until he came to take possession of the French throne in 1461 after his father's death. But if the highest in the land knew exile in England and France, as some members of Italian ruling families did, there do not seem to have been the equivalents there of the exiles from civic strife that were so common in Italy. Towns in England, France and Spain, even the great cities of the Low Countries, did not have the degree or type of political independence that gave rise to the kind of contest for power that resulted in the exile of political opponents. The Imperial cities of the Holy Roman Empire had greater autonomy and powers of self-government. Although only a few had their own territories, like the contado so jealously guarded by Italian towns and cities, some could appear familiar political entities to Italian travellers. The city of Ulm, for instance, was described by one traveller from Italy as à big town, governed as a free republic, rich and full of merchants'.2 Civic strife and contests for power in such cities could result in the exile of the vanquished. One such exile was the pioneer printer Johann Gutenberg,

1 2

Bertram Wolffe, Henry VI (London, 1983), p. 333. F. R. H. Du Boulay, Germany in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1983), p. 118.

5

6


who was banished twice, for long periods, from his native city of Mainz. Nevertheless, nowhere else in Western Europe could rival Italy for the sheer numbers of political exiles. In Italy, it was not just men wielding power in large, rich cities governing extensive territories, independent republics such as Florence or Venice, who considered that they had the right to exile their political rivals. Men in towns subject to such cities, or to a prince, men in backwoods communities that had little to ®ght over but the meagre fruits of of®ce or the exploitation of communal property, might also consider that they had the legal power to expel their rivals. The fragmentation of political authority in mediaeval Italy had meant that many towns, not just the great merchant cities, had come to see themselves as autonomous political entities, and the patterns of thought and behaviour that had developed in the turbulence of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries persisted, even when such towns had fallen under the domination of a larger neighbour or of a prince. The tradition that those who held power in a commune had the right to exclude and expel their rivals was widespread and ®rmly rooted (even if it might be contested, in the case of subject towns, by their superiors). If political differences appeared irreconcilable, not amenable to compromise, the exile of those worsted in the contest was the usual way of removing them from the scene. Long-term imprisonment was rare in Renaissance Italy. Locking up large numbers of political opponents for lengthy periods was not an option, though small groups might be incarcerated by a con®dent regime with secure prisons at its disposal. Political executions of those found guilty of political crimes were infrequent too, and regarded as shocking, unless it was for an act such as an assassination attempt. Political executions for which there was less obvious justi®cation were regarded as vindictive, and harmed the reputation of a regime at home and abroad. Exiling political opponents might be regarded as injudicious, or even in some cases unjust, but would not attract anything like the same adverse comment. There were exiles from independent republics and from subject towns, from the kingdom of Naples and from other signorie, large and small. There were disgraced courtiers, members of ruling families, the leaders and the foot-soldiers of urban factions, sober professional men who had been defeated in political disputes, men who had contravened the rules governing elections to political of®ce in their city, men who had tried to assassinate their rivals. Within this varied multitude, four broad categories of exiles can be distinguished. The ®rst comprised the members of ruling or at least dominant families, who were the losers in dynastic quarrels. Some were expelled by their rivals, some by other

into exile

7

powers ± intervention by Italian states in the dynastic disputes of their neighbours was a frequent occurrence, and required little excuse other than self-interest. Opponents of such dynasties, who rebelled against them or challenged their rule, formed the second category; those who contested the policies or structure of republican government the third. The fourth, the most numerous, was those who had been defeated in struggles between political factions. Not all exiles fall neatly into one or other of these categories, as we shall see, but they do provide some help in understanding the circumstances in which so many ®fteenth-century Italians were forced into political exile. Exiles who fell into the ®rst category included some of the most prominent individuals who found themselves in that predicament in ®fteenth-century Italy. A future Duke of Milan, more than one King of Naples, several past or future Doges of Genoa, members of several signorial families, all spent some time in exile. The uncertain legitimacy of the position of many ruling families, the lack of ®xed rules of succession, a disposition to regard states as a kind of family property which could be divided up among family members, all contributed to the stock of banished aspiring or deposed signori, of various degrees of power and rank. The French invasions of Italy in 1494 and 1499±1500 were the cause, direct or indirect, of the exile of many more. The reluctance by younger brothers to accept the right of the eldest to be sole ruler of the state was the root of the disputes that wracked the Sforza dynasty in Milan in the late 1470s and early 1480s, and led to the exile of several of its members. Galeazzo Maria, the eldest legitimate son, who succeeded his father Francesco as duke in 1466, relished his role as prince of one of the most powerful states of Italy. Two of his brothers, Sforza Maria and Lodovico, may have conspired to kill him. In November 1476, a few months after this plot was supposed to have been hatched, they were sent to France. Galeazzo Maria claimed that they were going of their own accord, because they wanted to `see the world', but it was clear that they were, in effect, going into exile.3 Within days of their arrival at the French court, on 26 December 1476, Galeazzo Maria was assassinated by a group of young Milanese patricians. Sforza Maria and Lodovico immediately returned to Milan. There Galeazzo Maria's widow Bona had assumed the regency for her young son Giangaleazzo Maria, and she was supported by Cicco Simonetta, the powerful ducal secretary. Even before the Sforza brothers returned from France, a conspiracy was brewing in Milan to make 3

A. Dina, `Lodovico il Moro prima della sua venuta al governo', ASL 13 (1886), 764, 766; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. II, p. 534.

8


Sforza Maria head of the government, if not duke; but the arrest of one of the leading conspirators, Ettore da Vimercate, put an end to that design. The Sforza brothers claimed that Francesco had never intended that Galeazzo Maria should rule alone, but that they all should have had a share in the government. They came to terms with Bona, promising to live in Milan, although she really wanted them to leave and tried to arrange this by asking Milan's allies to give them condotte.4 It was Cicco Simonetta who brought matters to a head by ordering the arrest of a veteran condottiere of the Sforza, Donato del Conte, who was alleged to know all about the conspiracy against him and the duchess. The brothers Sforza Maria, Lodovico, Ottaviano and Ascanio, together with their cousin Roberto da Sanseverino, mustered what forces they could and tried to arouse the people, but met with little response. Sforza Maria, Lodovico and Ascanio submitted, while Ottaviano, the youngest brother, panicked and ¯ed, drowning as he tried to ford the River Adda. Roberto, whom Bona treated as the main conspirator, a disloyal ingrate who had suborned her brothers-in-law, also ¯ed. He was condemned as a rebel; the three surviving Sforza brothers who had taken part in the rising were ordered into exile. They returned home in 1479: a combination of Roberto da Sanseverino's military skills and support for the brothers in Milan and elsewhere in the duchy brought about the submission of several towns to them, and induced Bona to negotiate. Sforza Maria had died suddenly during the campaign, but Lodovico and Roberto were back in Milan in September 1479, and Ascanio joined them the following month.5 Three days after Lodovico came back, Cicco Simonetta was arrested; he was executed a year later. The power struggle at the Milanese court is dif®cult to decipher, but Lodovico was the undoubted victor. Ascanio, who also aspired to a role in the government, was sent into exile again in early March 1480, accused of intriguing with the leaders of the Ghibellines in Milan and with the Neapolitan ambassador. In October, Lodovico was involved in manoeuvres that separated the young duke from his mother, and forced her to agree to the immediate exile of her favourite, Antonio Tassini, and his father from the duchy 4

5

Ibid., pp. 523±35; Riccardo Fubini, Òsservazioni e documenti sulla crisi del Ducato di Milano nel 1477' in Sergio Bertelli and Gloria Ramakus (eds.), Essays Presented to Myron P. Gilmore, 2 vols. (Florence, 1978), vol. I, pp. 47±103; Carlo de' Rosmini, Dell' istoria di Milano, 4 vols. (Milan, 1820), vol. IV, pp. 158±62. Carlo de' Rosmini, Dell'istoria intorno alle militari imprese e alla vita di Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio detto il Magno, 2 vols. (Milan, 1885), vol. I, pp. 61±77, vol. II, pp. 16±19, 20±4, 41±62; Rosmini, Dell' istoria di Milano, vol. IV, pp. 163±5; Bernardino Corio, Storia di Milano, 3 vols. (Milan, 1857, 1975), vol. III, pp. 319±22; Franco Catalano, Lodovico il Moro (Milan, 1985), pp. 26±8; Caterina Santoro, Gli Sforza (n.p., 1968), pp. 206±14.

into exile

9

for ten years. The departure of Tassini and the loss of custody of her son left Bona desperate. She declared her intention of leaving Milan: she had thought of returning to her family in Savoy, but she was compelled to go to the castle of Abbiategrasso and to stay there.6 Lodovico was now the dominant member of the government in Milan, but he was still not the undisputed master. Roberto da Sanseverino, for one, was an in¯uential ®gure, but he became increasingly estranged from Lodovico. He felt slighted and sidelined, but the last straw seems to have been when his pay as a condottiere began to fall into arrears. In October 1481 he left Milan for his castle at Castelnuovo. In January 1482 he was given an ultimatum: either he came to Milan within two days, or he must leave the duchy. When he did not come, troops were sent against him, and in early February he escaped into exile.7 Ascanio Sforza came back to Milan in September 1482. He was given an honourable role in the government, but one clearly subordinate to that of Lodovico. The diplomatic pressure Lodovico brought to bear on the pope, which ®nally procured a cardinal's hat for Ascanio in March 1484, had a dual motive. It secured a position of honour and in¯uence for his brother, and it provided a good reason to send him away from Milan.8 The d'Este of Ferrara had been established as a ruling family for much longer than the Sforza, but no rules of succession had become ®xed. NiccoloÁ d'Este, just before his death in 1441, ordered that he should be succeeded by his natural sons Lionello and Borso, with his much younger legitimate son, Ercole, being placed only third in line. On Lionello's death in 1450, he was duly succeeded by Borso, but Lionello's young son NiccoloÁ grew up believing that he, not Ercole, should be Borso's heir. As Borso lay gravely ill in the summer of 1471, Ercole and NiccoloÁ squared up to dispute the succession. Ercole had the support of Venice, NiccoloÁ of his mother's family, the Gonzaga of Mantua. When Borso died, Ercole waited until Venetian ships had reached Ferrara along the Po before proclaiming the death of the duke and his own succession. NiccoloÁ and his Gonzaga relatives could do nothing, and he 6

7 8

Santoro, Gli Sforza, pp. 216±26; Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, vol. I, pp. 78±90, vol. II, pp. 62±75; Rosmini, Dell' istoria di Milano, vol. IV, pp. 178±221; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. V, pp. 41±2, 93; Marco Pellegrini, Àscanio Maria Sforza: la creazione di un cardinale ``di famiglia''' in Giorgio Chittolini (ed.), Gli Sforza, la Chiesa lombarda, la corte di Roma. Strutture e pratiche bene®ciarie nel ducato di Milano (1450±1535) (Naples, 1989), pp. 258±62; Zelmira Arici, Bona di Savoia, Duchessa di Milano (1449±1503) (Turin, 1935), pp. 146±63. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. VI, pp. 64±5, 101, 153±4, 172, 194±5, 209, 229±30, 258, 269. Pellegrini, Àscanio Maria Sforza', pp. 262±8.

10


had to stay in exile in Mantua, where he had been sent by Borso. He tried to depose Ercole in September 1476 but found little support in the city, and was captured and executed. Another member of his family to cause Ercole concern was his half-brother Alfonso. Alfonso had supported Ercole when he took power in 1471, and his only offence may have been his personal popularity in Ferrara. Nevertheless, Ercole sent him into exile in 1474, and despite further proofs of his loyalty, Alberto was kept away from Ferrara for a decade.9 In the case of two old-established families of Romagnol signori, the Ordelaf® and Manfredi, family quarrels and succession disputes not only led to exile for some members of the families, but also provided openings for an ambitious papal nipote, Girolamo Riario, to take over their states. It was another will stipulating the succession of one brother to another that was at the root of the dispute among the Manfredi of Faenza in the 1470s. By the terms of their father's will, Galeotto Manfredi was to succeed his brother Carlo as signore of Faenza, but they quarrelled and Galeotto and another brother, Lanzalotto, were sent away from Faenza in 1476. By late 1477 Carlo was very ill, and on 2 October a fourth brother, Federico, who was Bishop of Faenza and had been acting as Carlo's lieutenant, made the Faentini swear fealty to Ottaviano, Carlo's young son, as his heir. A ®rst attempt by Galeotto to return failed in October, but a second attempt on 16 November, the day after a popular uprising against grain speculation by Federico, was successful, and Galeotto was greeted rapturously by the Faentini. He also had troops from Girolamo Riario, Pino Ordelaf® of ForlõÁ, Bologna and Venice to back him up. Carlo and Federico, who had retreated to the fortress in the city, sent to Naples for help. King Ferrante sent 40 squadrons to Fano, and tried to negotiate an agreement to keep Carlo in power. As Florence and Milan also decided to back Galeotto, Ferrante had to yield. When no help arrived from Ferrante, Carlo surrendered on 9 December, and left for Ferrara and then for Naples; Federico had already ¯ed.10 Exploitation by Galeazzo Maria Sforza of a family dispute among another branch of the Manfredi resulted in their exile and the loss of 9

10

Antonio Capelli, `NiccoloÁ di Leonello d'Este', Atti e memorie delle RR. Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Province Modenesi e Parmensi 5 (1870), 413±38; Thomas Tuohy, Herculean Ferrara: Ercole d'Este, 1471±1505, and the Invention of a Ducal Capital (Cambridge, 1996), p. 42. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. II, pp. 411±14, 438±43, 448±9; Anonimo Veronese, Cronaca 1466±88, ed. G. Soranzo (Venice, 1915), pp. 331±2; Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, ed. A. Sorbelli, RRIISS, 18, i (CittaÁ di Castello, 1906±Bologna, 1940) pp. 446±7; Andrea Bernardi, Cronache forlivesi dal 1476 al 1517, ed. Giuseppe Mazzatinti, 3 vols. (Bologna, 1895±7), vol. I, pp. 16±20.

into exile

11

their state, Imola. Galeazzo Maria won over Guidaccio, the son of the lord of Imola, Taddeo Manfredi, by the promise of the hand of his illegitimate daughter Caterina. When Taddeo was suspected of intriguing to sell Imola to Venice, Guidaccio asked the duke to send a Milanese garrison. Galeazzo Maria did so, and then came to terms with Taddeo, who ceded Imola to him on 31 December 1471. Taddeo Manfredi agreed to leave Imola in May 1473, in return for the promise of a ®ef in the duchy of Milan; his sons had to join him in exile. In October of that year Galeazzo Maria agreed to sell Imola, for 40,000 ducats, to Girolamo Riario. It became, in effect, part of the dowry of Caterina Sforza, to whom Riario had been betrothed in January. Taddeo did not get the promised ®ef, but was instead given a pension by Galeazzo Maria, on condition that he did not return to Imola, while Guidaccio was married off to a distant relative of the duke.11 ForlõÁ came into the hands of Girolamo Riario because of a family quarrel among the Ordelaf®. In 1468 Cecco Ordelaf® had been ousted, imprisoned and murdered by his brother Pino, with whom he had shared the lordship of ForlõÁ. Cecco's wife and children managed to escape from prison into exile after his death. Pino died in 1480, leaving a natural son, Sinibaldo, who was only about twelve years old, to succeed him. Cecco's sons, Antonio Maria and Francesco, were invited by the people of ForlõÁ to come to take over the signoria. They arrived in ForlõÁ on 8 July and immediately took possession of the town, but the citadel was held by Sinibaldo and his stepmother. The brothers' success brought them covert encouragement and the prospect of help from Florence and Milan, but neither power was willing to commit itself too openly to them for fear of offending Pope Sixtus IV, Girolamo Riario's uncle. Riario wanted ForlõÁ for himself; Ferrante of Naples and, more reluctantly, Milan and Florence agreed to this as part of the complex series of negotiations being carried on among the Italian powers that summer. When the Duke of Urbino arrived with troops on behalf of the pope in early August, sent reinforcements into the fortress and called on the citizens to choose whom they would support, they decided they had, perforce, to submit to the pope. The Ordelaf® brothers left, and a week later Sinibaldo Ordelaf® died, apparently from natural causes, although there were inevitable rumours of foul play. The way was clear for Girolamo Riario to be invested with the signoria of ForlõÁ.12 11

12

Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. I, pp. 443±5; Anonimo Veronese, Cronaca, p. 290; Ernst Breisach, Caterina Sforza: A Renaissance Virago (Chicago, 1967), pp. 17±18, 21, 268, 271; Santoro, Gli Sforza, pp. 140±1. Breisach, Caterina Sforza, pp. 43±6, 277±8; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. V, pp. 28±33, 47±9, 68; Anonimo Veronese, Cronaca, p. 355; ASMi, ASforzesco,

12


Elsewhere in the Papal States, NiccoloÁ Vitelli's attempt to establish himself as the unof®cial signore of CittaÁ di Castello cost him years in exile, not least because his ousted rivals found favour in Rome. In April 1468, while the papal governor was absent, NiccoloÁ secretly brought two hundred peasants into CittaÁ di Castello and attacked the houses of his rivals the Fucci and Giustini, several of whom were killed. Those who escaped the slaughter took their complaints to Rome, where Amadeo Giustini and his son Lorenzo had the ear of Pope Paul II. The pope sent a legate to order NiccoloÁ either to appear before him or to leave CittaÁ di Castello and stay at least ®fty miles away. NiccoloÁ refused to do either. Finally, an embassy from the city, which included NiccoloÁ's son Giovanni, went to the pope in February 1470, and came to terms with him.13 Lorenzo Giustini continued to ®nd favour under the new pope, Sixtus IV, and soon became attached to Girolamo Riario. Sixtus declared his intention of ensuring that NiccoloÁ lived as a citizen and not as a signore. In late June 1474 a papal army led by another nipote of Sixtus, Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, arrived before CittaÁ di Castello. After a siege lasting two months, NiccoloÁ agreed to leave CittaÁ di Castello with his family, and stay at least ®fteen miles away; he departed on 31 August. According to the terms of his surrender, Lorenzo Giustini and his father Amedeo were not to be allowed to stay in CittaÁ di Castello either, although the other exiles would be.14 NiccoloÁ enjoyed the protection of Florence, where his friends and contacts included the Medici. In June 1482, when Florence and the pope were at war, a substantial force of Florentine troops was sent to restore the Vitelli to CittaÁ di Castello. Even before they arrived, NiccoloÁ had appeared at the gates of the city with a large number of partisans and infantry and had been welcomed in. When negotiations opened between the pope and the league of Florence, Milan and Naples in late 1482, the fate of the Vitelli and CittaÁ di Castello was one of the more dif®cult issues under debate. It was rendered more dif®cult by the fact that the envoy negotiating for the pope in Naples, where the talks were taking place, was Lorenzo Giustini. In February 1483, the Florentines were forced to concede that NiccoloÁ Vitelli and his family should leave. A campaign against CittaÁ di Castello was launched by papal troops in June, with Lorenzo Giustini as one of the commanders. The

13 14

b. 300: Antonio da Ghiacato to Signoria of Florence, 8 Aug. 1480, Castrocaro; ibid., Captain of Castrocaro to Otto di Pratica of Florence, 9 Aug. 1480. G. Nicasi, `La famiglia Vitelli di CittaÁ di Castello e la repubblica ®orentina ®no al 1504', BSPU 15 (1909), 138±40. Ibid., 142±3; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. II, pp. 31±2.

into exile

13

capture of NiccoloÁ's son Camillo in January 1484 at last induced him to think of surrendering, and in early April he left for Rome to come to terms with the pope. He had to agree to go into exile where the pope ordered, and that Sixtus should make provision for the safety of Lorenzo Giustini. But NiccoloÁ himself was given an appointment as papal governor of the Campagna and Marittima, and his four sons were given papal condotte.15 In August 1485, there was a formal peace-making between the factions in CittaÁ di Castello, and in September NiccoloÁ was allowed to return there. After his death in January 1486, his sons succeeded to his position of superiority in the city. One of them, Paolo, took revenge on Lorenzo Giustini, who had remained in Rome, by murdering him in October 1487. Paolo was condemned to death, but then Innocent VIII commuted the sentence to ten years' exile ± meaning exile from Rome, not from CittaÁ di Castello.16 In Genoa the of®ce of Doge, head of the republic, was disputed by members of one family, the Campofregoso, both among themselves and with their rivals, the Adorno. In theory, Doges (who had to be popolari, not nobles) were elected for life; in practice, Doges came to power after faction-®ghting or as the outcome of (often obscure) power-broking. Members of both the Adorno and the Campofregoso, the defeated or the disgruntled, spent many years in exile, and rarely stayed in of®ce more than a few years. In the middle of the ®fteenth century it was the Campofregoso who were dominant in Genoa. In September 1450, Pietro Campofregoso was elected Doge to succeed another member of the family, Lodovico, who had been deposed. Pietro managed to survive as Doge for eight years ± which was no mean achievement ± but his dictatorial ways soon made him unpopular. Among the enemies he made were several of his relatives. One, NiccoloÁ, he assassinated himself in May 1452, with the help of NiccoloÁ's brother Spinetta, only to lose the support of Spinetta 18 months later. Spinetta left Genoa to join the exiles, as NiccoloÁ's sons had done after their father's death.17 The Doge also had an enemy in King Alfonso of Naples, who was 15 16 17

Nicasi, `La famiglia Vitelli', 149±53, 157±8, 161±8, 222±33, 237±8. Ibid., 168±71. ASMi, ASforzesco, bb. 407±9; for accounts of Genoese politics and the activities of the exiles using this material see Adriana Sambati, Ì carteggi diplomatici sforzeschi relativi alla serie Genova (1450±1454)', ASL 98±100 (1971±3), 159±207; Chiara Prandini, Ì carteggi diplomatici sforzeschi relativi alla serie Genova (1450±1454)', ibid., 208±46, and Giovanna Balbi, Ùomini d'arme e di cultura nel Quattrocento genovese: Biagio Assereto', ASLSP 76 (1962), 97±206.

14


intent on making war on Genoa, and was ready to use the exiles. Rather than agree to Alfonso's insistence that the Adorno should return, in February 1458 the Doge and his council agreed to cede Genoa to the French; Pietro left for exile in May. He soon repented of his bargain, and died in September 1459 attempting to force his way back into the city. The French had already expelled some of his relatives, including his brothers, Tommasino and Paolo, Archbishop of Genoa.18 In March 1461, the people of Genoa revolted, the exiles returned, and immediately the Adorno and Campofregoso began a contest for the Dogeship. A peace was negotiated between Prospero Adorno and Archbishop Paolo Campofregoso, and on 12 March Prospero Adorno was elected Doge with the agreement of the archbishop. When Charles VII sent a ¯eet against Genoa in early July, among those who fought hard in the battle to defeat the French were several Campofregoso. As they arrived back at Genoa àll bloody, sweaty and exhausted by such a cruel and ®erce battle', Prospero Adorno sent to tell them not to enter the city. Naturally, the Campofregoso were not prepared to obey, and they were the victors in the ensuing street ®ght; Prospero Adorno hastily departed.19 Dissension and competition among the Campofregoso continued, with Paolo and Lodovico alternating as Doge for the next three years. Negotiating the peaceful submission of Genoa to Milanese rule after Louis XI had formally invested Francesco Sforza with Genoa as a ®ef of the French crown in December 1463 was a delicate matter, not least because the incumbent Doge, Paolo Campofregoso, was very reluctant to relinquish his of®ce. As the Milanese occupied more of the Riviera, and the other Campofregoso refused to put aside their quarrels and unite behind him, he at last decided to go, leaving by sea on the night of 24±5 March 1464.20 The Genoese seemed to settle down under the rule of Francesco Sforza and, when he died in March 1466, accepted Galeazzo Maria without hesitation. By their standards, the Genoese proved remarkably patient under Galeazzo Maria's government. But after his assassination in December 1476 weakened the Milanese government, the Fieschi, the powerful noble family, gathered their forces and entered Genoa in March 1477, 18

19 20

Emilio Nunziante, Ì primi anni di Ferdinando d'Aragona e l'invasione di Giovanni d'AngioÁ', ASPN 17 (1892), 353±6, 753±67, 19 (1894), 59±96, 300±14; Agostino Giustiniani, Annali della Repubblica di Genova, ed. G. B. Spotorno, 2 vols. (Genoa, 1854), vol. II, pp. 409±18. Franco Catalano, Francesco Sforza (Milan, 1984), pp. 229±33, 282±3; Giustiniani, Annali, vol. II, pp. 420±32. Ibid., pp. 439±43; Catalano, Francesco Sforza, pp. 306±8, 312±22.

into exile

15

routing the Milanese troops there. Other faction leaders, including Paolo Campofregoso, hurried to the city. Members of the Adorno faction offered their support to the Milanese if Prospero Adorno was released from the fortress of Cremona, where he had been imprisoned. Prospero was freed, and joined the Milanese troops being despatched to put down the rebellion. As he neared the city, two thousand partisans came to join him, and on 11 April marched on Genoa with him. After ®erce ®ghting, he defeated Paolo Campofregoso and Obietto, the leader of the Fieschi, and entered Genoa in triumph, becoming not Doge, but governor on behalf of Milan.21 By early 1478 the Milanese wanted to dismiss him from the governorship, but Prospero forestalled this move, and with the backing of the popolo became the independent governor of Genoa. The Milanese tried to recover Genoa through the return of another exile, Battista Campofregoso, son of the former Doge Pietro, promising to recognize him as Doge if he could procure his own election. Battista returned to Genoa in October 1478; the Milanese troops still occupying the fortresses in Genoa surrendered them to him. When the Campofregoso brought their men out onto the streets on 25 November, Prospero Adorno abandoned the palace without a ®ght, and left for exile again. Three days later, Battista Campofregoso was elected Doge. While af®rming his loyalty to Milan, Battista informed the Milanese of his determination to preserve the independence of Genoa. He seems to have shared his power with other Campofregoso; but in November 1483 he was deposed by his own family and faction. His deposition caused no trouble: it was regarded almost as a private matter of the Campofregoso. He was replaced as Doge by Paolo Campofregoso, who since 1480 had been a cardinal as well as Archbishop of Genoa.22 Battista went into exile, nursing schemes to revenge himself. Paolo Campofregoso was unable to hold on to power for more than a few years. In order to try to conserve his position, he was prepared to submit Genoa to Milan again; Lodovico Sforza was more than ready to accept and terms were agreed in July 1487. Obietto and Gianluigi Fieschi plotted against Paolo with Agostino and Giovanni Adorno (who, like the Fieschi, had been staying outside Genoa because of their 21

22

Catalano, Ludovico il Moro, pp. 14±15, 33; Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, vol. II, pp. 13±14; Antonio Gallo, Commentarii rerum genuensium, ed. E. Pandiani, RRIISS, 23, i (CittaÁ di Castello, 1911), pp. 39±48. Gallo, Commentarii, pp. 51, 61±2, 75±8; Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, vol. II, pp. 37±8; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. III, pp. 318±19; Giustiniani, Annali, vol. II, pp. 536±7; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 993: Gianfrancesco Pasqualigi to Giovanni Mocenigo, Doge of Venice, 24 Nov. 1483, Genoa.

16


opposition to the cardinal) and with Battista Campofregoso, still hungry for revenge against his uncle. In early August 1488, Battista Campofregoso and the Fieschi came to the city with armed men, and the cardinal ¯ed to the main fortress, the Castelletto, pursued by Battista. Agostino and Giovanni Adorno also returned, warmly welcomed by their supporters.23 Some Genoese wanted to be under Milan, some under France; some wanted to be independent. At last it was agreed that Battista Campofregoso would have to return to exile, and that Genoa should once more be ruled by Milan, on the same terms as before. On 11 September, Agostino Adorno was appointed governor of Genoa for Milan. He and his brother Giovanni remained in power until the downfall of Lodovico Sforza in 1499 brought about their own, and the surrender of Genoa to the French. Cardinal Paolo Campofregoso had ®nally left for exile in Rome in October 1488, after some hard bargaining; he died in Rome in 1498. The French invasions of Naples and Milan that began in 1494 brought a spate of exiles from ruling or dominant families, affecting four of the ®ve major Italian states. The expulsions of the Sforza from Milan and of the Aragonese kings from Naples were the direct result ± and aim ± of French military action; in the case of King Federico, of Spanish military action as well. French troops assisted papal troops commanded by Cesare Borgia to drive the Riario from Imola and ForlõÁ. Dominant families exiled as an indirect consequence of the French invasions were the Medici from Florence, and the barons and signori left exposed to the ambitions of the Borgia by the disruption wrought by the invasions on the systems of patronage and protection that had linked them to other Italian powers. Two of the last three kings of the Neapolitan branch of the Aragonese dynasty, Alfonso II and his brother Federico, died in exile; the third, Alfonso's son Ferrandino, spent some of his short reign in exile too. As the long-threatened invasion by Charles VIII became a reality in late 1494, Alfonso, aware of his unpopularity with his subjects, lost his nerve. When he heard that Charles had crossed the border into his kingdom, he resigned the throne to his son Ferrandino on 23 January 1495. Ten days later he left for self-imposed exile, taking with him the treasure Ferrandino needed to confront the invaders.24 He died in exile in Sicily in December 1495. 23 24

Bartolomeo Senarega, De rebus Genuensibus commentaria, ed. Emilio Pandiani, RRIISS 24, viii (Bologna, 1929±32), pp. 6±7. Carlo de Frede, L'impresa di Napoli di Carlo VIII. Commento ai primi due libri della Storia d'Italia del Guicciardini (Naples, 1982), pp. 266±8.

into exile

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Although Ferrandino was as beloved by his subjects as his father was loathed, they still had no stomach to ®ght the French on his behalf. Soon nearly all the kingdom was in the hands of the French. Ferrandino was offered estates in France as compensation, but he was ready to ®ght to regain his kingdom and he went to Sicily to gather forces. Even before Charles had begun his journey back to France in May 1495, Ferrandino was recovering territory in Calabria, helped in his reconquest by Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, and by his Italian allies. There were setbacks. After one defeat, Ferrandino retired brie¯y to Sicily again, before returning with a Spanish ¯eet. He died in October 1496, and was succeeded by his uncle Federico, who had to face another French invasion.25 Charles VIII's successor, Louis XII, was determined to enforce the claim to Naples that he had inherited with the French crown. As the French army reached Rome on its way to Naples in June 1501, Alexander VI declared Federico to be deposed from the throne and sanctioned the plan agreed between France and Spain the previous year in the Treaty of Granada, to divide the kingdom between them. Under cover of coming to the aid of Federico, the Spanish monarchs were able to position their troops to take over their share of the kingdom. The discovery of the treachery of his Spanish relatives caused Federico to resign himself to his fate. Preferring to yield to the French rather than the Spanish, he made a truce with them on 25 July, surrendering to them the half of the kingdom assigned to Louis by the Treaty of Granada. On 6 September Federico embarked for an honourable but closely watched exile in France.26 Lodovico Sforza, who had encouraged Charles VIII's plans to invade Naples, would himself die in exile in France. He had made himself duke of Milan on the death of his dissolute nephew Giangaleazzo Maria in 1494, but he had a dangerous rival in Louis XII, whose claim to the duchy of Milan came from his grandmother, Valentina Visconti. The military commander who conquered the duchy for Louis was himself a Milanese exile, Giangiacomo Trivulzio. He conducted the campaign in 1499 with such resolution that by early September, barely seven weeks after it had begun, Lodovico was seeking refuge in Germany. Lodovico's sons and his brother Ascanio had already been sent there. The return of Ascanio and Lodovico in February 1500 was brief. Lodovico could not organize an effective campaign to drive the French from the 25 26

Ibid., pp. 282±97, 317±26, 340±50, 409±26. Frederic J. Baumgartner, Louis XII (Far Thrupp, 1994), pp. 122±3; Jerry H. Bentley, Politics and Culture in Renaissance Naples (Princeton, 1987), pp. 38±9; Notar Giacomo, Cronica di Napoli, ed. Paolo Garzilli (Naples, 1845), p. 242.

18


duchy. Captured, he was taken to France, and died a prisoner there in May 1508. Those of his supporters who would not return to Milan and submit to Louis were condemned as rebels. Ascanio, who had been captured on the same day as his brother, by the Venetian allies of the French, was also taken to France and imprisoned.27 The powerful French cardinal Georges d'Amboise, the leading minister of Louis, sought to obtain credit in Rome by having him released in 1502. Among the ®rst to be driven into exile as an indirect consequence of the French invasion in 1494 were the sons of Lorenzo de' Medici. After the death of Lorenzo in April 1492, his eldest son Piero soon showed that he lacked his father's ®ne political skills. His arrogant and lordly ways offended his fellow citizens. His persistence in his support for Alfonso, when Charles VIII was calling on the Florentines to stand by their traditional friendship with France, came to seem to many Florentines not only misguided but dangerous. As the French army was approaching Florence, Piero left to go to see Charles, but without an of®cial mandate to negotiate. Charles was pitching his demands very high, but Piero, when he ®nally met the king personally, conceded everything. His capitulation to Charles heightened the anger and hostility felt by many even of the former supporters of the Medici. On 9 November, the day after he returned to Florence, Piero tried to enter the Palace of the Signoria. He insisted that his armed escort should go in with him, and this was refused. Rather than go in without them, Piero turned back and went home. This incident was later presented as an attempt to take the Palace by force. That evening, perhaps after hearing reports of plans to declare him a rebel, Piero ¯ed from Florence, followed by his younger brothers, Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano. Several of Piero's closest associates sought safety in ¯ight too.28 Political changes brought about in Italy by the intervention of the French were fatal to several signorial dynasties in the Papal States, once Alexander VI had set his sights on creating a duchy of Romagna for his son Cesare. Signorial families had been accustomed to looking for 27

28

LeÂon-G. PeÂlissier, Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza (8 avril 1498±23 juillet 1500), 2 vols. (Paris, 1896), vol. II, pp. 283±313; LeÂon-G. PeÂlissier, Documents pour l'histoire de la domination francËaise dans le Milanais (1499±1513) (Toulouse, 1891), pp. 39±54, 360±6; Catalano, Ludovico il Moro, pp. 293±9; Santoro, Gli Sforza, pp. 333±43. Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 to 1494) (2nd edn, Oxford, 1997), pp. 267±9; Nicolai Rubinstein, `Politics and constitution in Florence at the end of the ®fteenth century' in E. F. Jacob (ed.), Italian Renaissance Studies (London, 1960), pp. 148±51; Alison Brown, Bartolomeo Scala 1430±1497, Chancellor of Florence: The Humanist as Bureaucrat (Princeton, 1979), pp. 116±17.

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support and protection to Florence, Milan, Naples or Venice. But by late 1499, while the forces of the papacy were strengthened by the alliance of Alexander with Louis XII, the Sforza had been removed by the French conquest of the duchy of Milan, Federico of Naples faced the prospect of the loss of his own kingdom, the Florentines were preoccupied with their own political upheavals, and the Venetians were preoccupied with the threat from the Turks to their overseas empire, as well as bound by an alliance with Louis. French troops helped Cesare Borgia take ForlõÁ and Imola from Girolamo Riario's widow, Caterina, in December 1499. She had already sent her children to safety in Florence, where she joined them in exile after eighteen months of imprisonment in Rome. In October 1500 it was the turn of Giovanni Sforza of Pesaro to be driven out; the Manfredi of Faenza followed, after six months of resistance. Cesare then turned to Tuscany, where Piombino fell to his troops in July 1501, sending Jacopo d'Appiano into exile. The following year a surprise attack on the duchy of Urbino sent Guidobaldo da Montefeltro to join the other deposed papal vicars in exile in Venice. Giulio Cesare Varano of Camerino, who had given refuge to exiles from several places in the Papal States, was the next to lose his state. Urbino and Camerino were brie¯y lost to the Borgia when Cesare's Italian condottieri, several of whom feared for their own security, rebelled against him. After an ostensible reconciliation with them, and the recovery of Urbino and Camerino, Cesare attacked and took Senigallia, whose vicar was Francesco Maria della Rovere. The fall of Senigallia was accompanied by Cesare Borgia's famous coup against his condottieri. One of those strangled at Senigallia was Vitellozzo Vitelli; all the remaining Vitelli departed from CittaÁ da Castello a few days later, before Cesare's army arrived to take it over. Another of the condottieri, Gianpaolo Baglioni, and the rest of his family left Perugia in advance of Cesare's troops as well. Pandolfo Petrucci, who had been involved in the conspiracy against Cesare, was exiled from Siena at the end of January at Cesare's insistence. Pandolfo was the ®rst of those driven into exile by Cesare Borgia to go back, after only two months; Louis XII had made it clear that he did not want Siena disturbed. All the others or their heirs returned too, after the fall of Cesare Borgia, except for the Riario. The return of Francesco Manfredi (who took the name of Astorre) to Faenza and of Pandolfo Malatesta to Rimini was brief, as they were soon forced out by the Venetians, who wanted those towns for themselves. Giulio Cesare Varano had been killed during the conquest of his state, but his family recovered the signoria. The Baglioni, Vitelli, Sforza da Pesaro,

20


Montefeltro, d'Appiano and della Rovere all returned without dif®culty.29 Other victims of the ambitions of Alexander for his family were members of the major Roman baronial families. The Caetani, the weakest of the major clans, were the ®rst to be dispossessed in 1500. The Colonna and Savelli lost their lands in 1501, after they were weakened by their involvement in the defeat of Federico of Naples. The Orsini lost most of their estates in 1503, as Alexander and Cesare Borgia took their revenge for their involvement in the conspiracy against Cesare in 1502. Most of the con®scated estates were granted or sold to members of the Borgia family, but were recovered by the barons soon after Alexander's death.30 In that Alexander's aim in dispossessing the barons was to destroy their power and replace them by his own relatives, the barons could be regarded as falling into the ®rst major category of exiles. In the extent of their control and jurisdiction over those who lived on their estates, and in their independence of papal authority, the Roman barons were indeed more like the signori of the Romagna than mere landowners. From another angle, they could be regarded as falling into the second major category of exiles, the opponents of princely and signorial families. After the conspiracy against Cesare Borgia, the Orsini could certainly be so regarded by the pope. The barons did not challenge the pope for control of Rome, but they were still powerful enough to cause him considerable trouble. Those who continued to behave as if they were a law unto themselves, such as Everso d'Anguillara, were liable to ®nd that their de®ance brought retribution. Everso was fortunate enough to die before he could be called to account, but his sons Deifebo and Francesco, who set out to continue in their father's ways, soon found that Paul II would not tolerate such behaviour. All their lands and strongholds were captured within the space of three months in 1465. Francesco was captured and imprisoned in the Castel Sant'Angelo in Rome, while Deifebo escaped into exile.31 Those barons who recognized that times had changed could still be very threatening to the pope, especially if they served as the condottieri of 29

30 31

Breisach, Caterina Sforza, pp. 130±1, 251, 304; Michael Mallett, The Borgias (London, 1969), pp. 169±72, 183±9, 193±205; Philip Jones, `The end of Malatesta rule in Rimini' in E. F. Jacob (ed.), Italian Renaissance Studies (London, 1960), pp. 217±21, 248±9, 253±5; Christine Shaw, Julius II, The Warrior Pope (Oxford, 1993), pp. 127±35; ASS, BalõÁa 253, ff. 166r±v, 173r±v. Christine Shaw, Àlexander VI, Cesare Borgia and the Orsini', European Studies Review 11 (1981), 12±19. V. Sora, Ì conti di Anguillara dalla loro origine al 1465: Everso d'Anguillara', ASRSP 30 (1907), pp. 83±97.

into exile

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other Italian powers who were at war with him, and put their estates near Rome at the disposal of their employers. Prospero and Fabrizio Colonna did this when Sixtus IV was at war with Ferrante of Naples in 1482 in the early months of the War of Ferrara. In October 1482, several of the Colonna were publicly proclaimed on the Campidoglio to be outlaws (sbanditi).32 If they clashed with the popes, the barons could be excommunicated, anathematized or declared rebels; but they were rarely sentenced to exile. There was indeed little point in declaring the barons to be formally exiled from Rome, as most of them were seldom there, spending their time on their estates or serving as condottieri. Another group of sometimes powerful individuals, potential challengers to the authority of the popes ± the cardinals ± were not sent into exile from Rome either. Except for a few who had been created cardinals largely because they were already important ®gures in their own country, the cardinals were generally expected to be resident in Rome. For most cardinals, not to be usually resident in Rome was tantamount to opposition to the pope, or at least an implicitly critical stance towards him. The popes preferred to keep even their critics and opponents within the College of Cardinals in Rome, where they could keep an eye on them. Dissident cardinals outside Rome could provide the means for a secular ruler at odds with the pope to call a general council of the Church, and force the pope to battle to preserve his authority. During the ponti®cate of Alexander VI, several cardinals went into self-exile from Rome. One did not need to believe all the gossip about Alexander and his family that formed the stuff of later legends about the Borgia in order to feel safer out of his reach once he had marked you down as an enemy. Some of the cardinals who left were caught up in the persecution of their families. Cardinal Giovanni Colonna left Rome for his family estates in 1499; after Alexander con®scated the Colonna lands in 1501, he thought it safer to spend the rest of the ponti®cate in Sicily. When Cesare Borgia set out to capture Imola and ForlõÁ, Cardinal Raffaele Riario, nephew of Girolamo, felt that he would be safer in France.33 Other cardinals exiled themselves from Alexander's Rome because they disapproved of him or his policies. Most dangerous of all was an early exile, Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal San Pietro ad Vincula. One of the most powerful ®gures in Rome, he did not trust the 32 33

Antonio de Vascho, Diario della CittaÁ di Roma 1480±1492, ed. Giuseppe Chiesa, RRIISS, 23, iii (CittaÁ di Castello, 1911), p. 501. Dizionario Biogra®co degli Italiani (Rome, 1960± ), vol. XXVII, p. 343; Johannes Burchard, Liber notarum, ed. E. Celani, RRIISS, 32 (CittaÁ di Castello, 1906), p. 177; Antonio Giustinian, Dispacci, ed. Pasquale Villari, 3 vols. (Florence, 1876), vol. I, p. 85.

22


pope at all, and openly quarrelled with him, going to stay in his fortress at Ostia on the mouth of the Tiber. In late April 1494, he left Ostia by ship for France. There he joined the Neapolitan exiles in urging Charles VIII to take his army to Italy; he wanted Charles to go to Rome in force and call for a general council of the Church to depose Alexander.34 Few others were exiled from Rome for challenging the authority of the pope. One was Stefano Porcaro, exiled by Nicholas V after Porcaro had made a number of in¯ammatory speeches. Porcaro came back clandestinely in 1453, and conspired with members of his family to restore republican government to Rome, killing the pope and cardinals if need be. The conspiracy was discovered, and Porcaro was arrested and hanged.35 Elsewhere in the Papal States, it was not so much opponents of the pope that were banished, as the opponents of local signorial and dominant families. At ForlõÁ, for example, there was a series of conspiracies against Girolamo Riario by partisans of the Ordelaf®. The chronicler Bernardi recorded ®ve conspiracies and counted over 68 individuals outlawed (banditi) and 24 exiled between 1480 and 1487 for plotting against Riario.36 The conspiracy which ®nally led to Girolamo Riario's death in April 1488 was not, however, one in which the Ordelaf® were involved; the members of the Orsi family who planned and executed the assassination had personal grievances against Riario. Seventeen of those involved in the conspiracy managed to escape into exile, including Lodovico and Checco Orsi and their sons, but their father Andrea was one of those executed in Caterina Sforza's bloody revenge. About thirty others were sent into exile by Caterina, mostly to Imola.37 In Bologna, Giovanni II Bentivoglio succeeded in 1463 to a position of pre-eminence that had been hard won by three generations of his family, but that still had little of®cial underpinning. He told a Milanese envoy that he lived in constant anxiety lest he should be exiled, and that all his efforts were directed towards avoiding this fate.38 Within the inner circle of power, some of the Malvezzi family, who had helped the Bentivoglio against their enemies and rivals, were envious, and they were becoming estranged. On 27 November 1488, a plot to murder 34 35 36 37

38

Shaw, Julius II, pp. 81±115. Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages, ed. F. I. Antrobus and R. F. Kerr, vols. I ± VI (London, 1923±33), vol. II, pp. 220±30. Bernardi, Cronache forlivesi, I, i, pp. 91±3, 203±29. Ibid., ii, pp. 91±3, 203±71; Leone Cobelli, Cronache forlivesi, ed. G. Carducci, E. Frati and F. Guarini (Bologna, 1874), pp. 316±46; Pier Desiderio Pasolini, Caterina Sforza, 3 vols. (Rome, 1893), vol. III, pp. 118±23. Cecilia Ady, The Bentivoglio of Bologna: A Study in Despotism (London, 1937), p. 96.

into exile

23

Giovanni Bentivoglio and his family, take over the palace of the Anziani and change the regime in Bologna was discovered. The principal conspirators were Giulio Malvezzi and four sons of Battista Malvezzi. Some other younger Malvezzi were involved, but it was widely believed that Battista himself and his three other sons were not. This did not save Battista from being exiled with his immediate family. Of his four sons who had been involved in the conspiracy, two, Girolamo and Filippo, escaped from Bologna. Giulio Malvezzi was also exiled, as were several other members of the family. Not all the Malvezzi were banished, but those who remained felt unwelcome and unsafe. Over the next few years, they gradually left Bologna on their own initiative.39 The Sforza made something of a practice of exiling those who they believed might cause trouble, without necessarily waiting until they made a move ± as Lodovico did with Roberto da Sanseverino and Ascanio. Francesco Sforza aimed to forestall trouble by exiling those citizens who had dominated Milan during the Ambrosian Republic (1447±50) established after the death of Filippo Maria Visconti. A list of forty-four men `sent away' (`mandati fora') after Francesco's accession to the duchy survives,40 but there was no general prosecution of all who had opposed him. After the death of Roberto da Sanseverino in the service of Venice in 1487, the most dangerous exiled opponent of Lodovico Sforza was Giangiacomo Trivulzio. One of the leading Guelfs of the duchy, and one of the best Italian generals of his day, Trivulzio had been a loyal servant of the Sforza dukes. Loyal, but outspoken: as Trivulzio's reputation grew, he considered that he had a right to demand due recognition of his worth, and would protest if he felt slighted. Lodovico began to make him feel unwelcome. He did not formally exile him ± Trivulzio gave him no reasonable grounds to do so ± but was happy to agree to his going to Naples to take up an invitation from Alfonso, Duke of Calabria. Trivulzio served Ferrante and Alfonso, and Ferrandino, but when the young Aragonese king was himself preparing to go into exile he released Trivulzio from his service, leaving him free to make terms with the French. Charles appointed him his lieutenant in Italy, based in Asti on the borders of the duchy of Milan, and when Louis succeeded Charles, he con®rmed Trivulzio's appointment. Thus it was that Trivulzio came to lead into Milan the French army that deprived Lodovico Sforza of his duchy.41 39 40 41

Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, pp. 495±6, 505±8; Ady, The Bentivoglio, pp. 103±8. Evelyn Welch, Art and Authority in Renaissance Milan (London, 1995), p. 278. Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, passim.

24


The most prominent exiles from the kingdom of Naples were disaffected barons. Generally they chose to go into exile rather than fall into the clutches of the king. The Aragonese kings of Naples preferred to keep potentially dangerous barons in the kingdom, preferably within reach. While there were Angevin claimants to the throne, and a fortiori when the Angevin claim passed to the crown of France, exiled barons could help to raise up dangerous challenges to the Aragonese kings. Some barons who had fought with the Angevin claimant, ReneÂ d'Anjou, against Alfonso during his conquest of the kingdom left when ReneÂ ®nally conceded defeat in 1442.42 One of them, Giovanni Cossa, became a most valued servant of the Angevins, and throughout his career was regarded as unshakeably loyal to them. He would be an important member of the retinue that ReneÂ's son Jean brought with him in 1459 when he challenged the succession of Alfonso's son, Ferrante. Many barons fought against Ferrante at some stage in the ensuing war. Few felt so committed, or so compromised, in the cause of the Angevins that they were prepared to go into exile with Jean d'Anjou when he left the kingdom in 1464. Most preferred to try to make their peace with the king. There was little love lost between them. The barons were wary of the king, and he did not wish to be dependent on them in any way. As Ferrante's eldest son, Alfonso, grew to manhood, he came to constitute another obstacle to better understanding between the king and the barons. By the 1480s, he was speaking quite openly of his desire to reduce the power of the Neapolitan barons. It was rumoured that he intended to bring all the area within thirty miles of Naples into the royal demesne. This would have meant taking the major estates of the most powerful baronial clan in the kingdom, the Sanseverino.43 The leader of the clan, Antonello da Sanseverino, Prince of Salerno, was a dangerous man to provoke against the crown, not just because of his network of relatives and allies in the kingdom. Through his marriage to Costanza, a daughter of Federico da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino, he was brother-in-law to members of some powerful families outside the kingdom, including Giovanni della Rovere, the brother of Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere. When the Sanseverino and their allies decided to revolt before they were attacked by Alfonso, it was the support they 42

43

Nunzio Federigo Faraglia, Storia della lotta tra Alfonso V d'Aragona e Renato d'AngioÁ (Lanciano, 1908), pp. 291±2; Angelo di Costanzo, Istoria del Regno di Napoli (Milan, 1805), p. 106. Giuseppe Paladino, `Per la storia della congiura dei Baroni: documenti inediti dell' Archivio Estense, 1485±1487' (1919), 358±60.

into exile

25

received from the pope, urged on by Giuliano della Rovere, that made them a real danger to the king. Most of the ®ghting in the Barons' War took place outside the kingdom in the Papal States. Discouraged and weary of the war, Innocent agreed to make peace with Ferrante in August 1486. The barons, once they were convinced that Giuliano della Rovere would not be able to change the pope's mind, had little option but to try to make peace with Ferrante too.44 Distrustful as the barons were, they were still reluctant to choose exile. Even when Ferrante insisted that they should hand over their fortresses to him, they put their hopes in the protection of the pope. One exception was Antonello da Sanseverino, who, it was said, was not notably wiser than the others, just more suspicious by nature. He asked permission from Ferrante to go to Rome. Ferrante seems to have considered it to be too risky forcibly to prevent his leaving, and allowed him to go in January 1487. Some other barons managed to leave as well. More wanted to do so, as it became evident that Ferrante was not prepared to forgive and forget, and he began to con®scate their estates. He prevented any further escapes of important barons by arresting a number of them. Most of those arrested died in prison. The pope felt honour bound to help the imprisoned barons, and tried, to no avail, to persuade Ferrante to free them and assign them a place of exile and an income to live on.45 From Rome, Antonello da Sanseverino made his way to France, where he and other Neapolitan barons encouraged the young king in his dreams of conquering the kingdom of Naples. Some of the exiles who came back with Charles VIII were among the forces which held out longest for the French as Ferrandino reconquered his kingdom. When Ferrandino's uncle, Federico, became king, he was generous to Antonello, but Antonello said he would prefer to return to exile. Federico published a detailed account of Antonello's behaviour, recalling how at his accession Antonello had been preparing to leave the kingdom, his estates con®scated, and how Federico had restored his lands and treated him with favour, only to be repaid with distrust, ingratitude and hostility. The king attacked his lands in October 1497; over two months of sieges were needed to induce Antonello to concede 44 45

Shaw, Julius II, pp. 63±9. Paladino, `Per la storia della congiura dei Baroni' (1923), 275±81, 284; Ernesto Pontieri, `La ``Guerra dei Baroni'' napoletani e di Papa Innocenzo VIII contro Ferrante d'Aragona in dispacci della diplomazia ®orentina', ASPN 90 (1972), 249±50, 94 (1976), 162; Camillo Porzio, La congiura de' baroni del Regno di Napoli contra il Re Ferdinando I, ed. Stanislas d'Aloe (Naples, 1859), Appendix of documents, pp. CXLIII ± CCLXXIII.

26


defeat. Once again he was to go into exile, where he died in January 1499.46 In Genoa, the main opponents of the Doges, other than their rivals for the of®ce, were members of the major Genoese noble families ± the Doria, Spinola and Fieschi. Nobles could not become Doge, but they could be Doge-makers and Doge-breakers. Whoever the Doge might be, and whether Genoa was under the rule of the French or the Duke of Milan, there were usually some of the nobility in exile, threatening the security and stability of the city and the regime. Their families held lands and many fortresses in the mountains surrounding Genoa and on the Riviera, and could raise thousands of men, some bound to serve them as their vassals, others ready to ®ght simply as their partisans. While Pietro Campofregoso was Doge in the 1450s, the chief threat came from the most powerful of the Fieschi, Gian®lippo, who was the focus for other Genoese exiles. In May 1453, after around eight young Spinola men had risen in support of an unsuccessful raid on Genoa by Gian®lippo Fieschi, many Spinola were exiled by the Doge. In January 1454, after prolonged negotiations, there was an ostensible reconciliation between the Doge and Gian®lippo Fieschi, but there were still many exiles remaining unreconciled. Other nobles left Genoa as Pietro Campofregoso, courting the popolari to bolster his regime, sought to redistribute the burden of taxation so that the bulk of it fell on the nobility.47 Many Genoese nobles were content to stay in the city under the rule of the French governors, who tended to favour their interests; in January 1459 the Spinola returned. Some, including Gian®lippo Fieschi, were not prepared to accept the French, though after he was killed during an unsuccessful attack on Genoa in January 1459, several Fieschi left the exiles and went to Genoa.48 After Gian®lippo's death, his brother Obietto became the most troublesome exile from Genoa. Apparently he found it dif®cult to be on good terms for very long with whoever ruled in Genoa, be he Doge or duke. An apostolic protonotary, like Paolo Campofregoso he did not let his ecclesiastical status restrict his involvement in Genoese political con¯icts. During the period of Milanese rule he was at odds with Galeazzo Maria Sforza, who imprisoned him and con®scated his property. Obietto managed to escape and became involved in conspiracies against the Sforza with the Campofregoso. In 1477 he slipped away from 46 47 48

de Frede, L'impresa di Napoli, pp. 79±80, 409±26; Porzio, La congiura de' baroni, pp. 207±17. See above, note 17. Nunziante, Ì primi anni di Ferdinando d'Aragona', 17 (1892), 353±6, 753±67, 773±6, 19 (1894), 37±46, 59±96, 300±14; Giustiniani, Annali, vol. II, pp. 409±18.

into exile

27

Rome to join the revolt against the Milanese regime, and would not accept Prospero Adorno as governor of Genoa. Defeated by Milanese troops, Obietto agreed to go to Milan on the understanding that he could return when he chose. Implicated in the plot against Cicco Simonetta, he ¯ed Milan with Roberto da Sanseverino, but was captured and imprisoned.49 After Prospero Adorno broke with the Milanese, the nobili were suspected of Milanese sympathies and were excluded from the government. Worried that their exclusion might be permanent, they persuaded the Milanese to release Obietto Fieschi, in return for a promise that he would lift the siege of the fortresses still held for the Milanese. Obietto made all the promises that were asked of him, but kept none of them once he had been released and returned to Genoa. He helped in the deposition of Adorno and in the election of Battista Campofregoso as Doge, but he quarrelled with Archbishop Paolo Campofregoso and left Genoa in late 1480. By then the Fieschi were allied in opposition to the Campofregoso with the Adorno and the Spinola, but in December they made a separate peace with the Doge, and the Adorno and some Spinola left Genoa. Obietto's reconciliation with the Doge was shortlived, but in August 1481 he made new terms with him, which were reported to include the right for him to return freely to Genoa. He does not seem to have taken advantage of this. Although he was among the exiles who came to Genoa to overthrow the doge Paolo Campofregoso in 1488, he did not stay.50 He died in exile in 1497. One attempt at rousing revolt in Genoa against Galeazzo Maria Sforza was made by a group of young men who were not exiles, and not members of the families that usually took the lead in Genoese political turmoil. Their leader, Gerolamo Gentile, a rich, well-educated merchant, spoke of the restoration of Genoese liberty. Gentile met little effective resistance from the Milanese garrison as he and around three hundred armed men ran through the streets on 4 June 1476, crying `San Giorgio and liberty!' But by daybreak they had accomplished little, and his supporters began to disperse. He and his remaining followers were allowed to withdraw from the city.51 49 50

51

Gallo, Commentarii, pp. 48±51. Ibid., pp. 62±74; Cronica gestorum in partibus Lombardie et reliquis Italie, ed. Giuliano Bonazzi, RRIISS, 22, iii (CittaÁ di Castello, 1904±11), p. 81; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 992: Battista Campofregoso to Giangaleazzo Sforza, 13 Dec. 1480, Genoa; ibid., b. 995: Gianfrancesco da Sanseverino to Lodovico Sforza, 22 Sept., 1 Dec. 1488; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. VI, pp. 10±12, 18; ASF, Otto di Pratica, Resp. 1, cc. 420±1, 429±30: Tommaso Ridol®, 17, 29 Aug. 1481, Milan; Senarega, De rebus genuensibus commentaria, pp. 8±10. Michele Rosi, `La congiura di Gerolamo Gentile', ASI 5th ser. 16 (1895), 177±205.

28


Some of those exiled from Florence could be regarded as personal opponents of the Medici, notably the Pazzi and their allies in 1478. The Pazzi family was among the oldest in Florence but was not at the centre of political life. Despite the marriage of his sister Bianca to Guglielmo de' Pazzi, Lorenzo de' Medici did not trust them. While they became increasingly discontented with their political lot, their business affairs were ¯ourishing. The head of the family, Jacopo de' Pazzi, was one of the richest men in Florence, and one of his nephews, Francesco, was a wealthy banker in Rome. The Pazzi used their wealth to forge links with the enemies of the Medici. When Lorenzo de' Medici refused to lend the money that Girolamo Riario required to obtain possession of Imola, the Pazzi lent it to him. The other Florentine conspirators became involved either because of loyalty to the Pazzi family or because of personal grudges against the Medici. They included Francesco Salviati, who was related to the Pazzi and blamed Lorenzo for the Florentine government's refusal to recognize him as Archbishop of Pisa. Outside Florence they had the support of Riario and the pope, and of Ferrante of Naples. The attempt to assassinate Lorenzo and his brother Giuliano during the celebration of a mass in the cathedral on 26 April 1478 was bungled. Giuliano was killed, but Lorenzo, wounded, escaped. Francesco Salviati, meanwhile, led some armed men to the Palace of the Signoria. He asked to see the Gonfaloniere di Giustizia, the head of the Signoria, but the Gonfaloniere became suspicious, detained Salviati and repelled the attempts of the followers of the Pazzi to rescue him and take over the palace. The people of Florence rallied to the Medici, not the Pazzi. None of the leading conspirators who had been in Florence escaped. Francesco and Jacopo Pazzi and Francesco Salviati were all hanged. It was their relatives, including Lorenzo's brother-in-law, and other lesser ®gures who were exiled.52 Other Florentine exiles fall into the third major category, those who challenged the structure or opposed the policies of republican governments. Constitutional changes pushed through by the Medici party, designed to increase the regime's control over elections to important of®ces and to smooth the passage of legislation through the councils of the commune, were disliked by many Florentines. One favourite device of the Mediceans was the appointment of extraordinary commissions, BalõÁe. Before the formal approval of a new BalõÁa 52

The best sources of information on the conspiracy are the of®cial accounts produced and circulated at the time: see e. g. William Roscoe, The Life of Lorenzo de' Medici called the Magni®cent, 2 vols. (6th edn, London, 1825), vol. I, Appendices XXI ± XXVIII, and Luca Landucci, Diario ®orentino dal 1450 al 1516 (Florence, 1985), pp. 17±20.

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on 10 August 1458 around 150 citizens were ordered by the Signoria to go to their villas outside Florence, and to stay there until told they could return. Just before this order, three men were arrested. The most prominent of the three, Girolamo Machiavelli, had spoken in debates in July in favour of preserving and respecting constitutional practice. He was accused of grave offences against the government and liberty of the city, but he may have been singled out as a scapegoat so that it could be claimed the republic was in danger and a BalõÁa was needed. On 18 August he was sentenced to exile, with about sixteen others. Arrested in the summer of 1460 in the Lunigiana, he was accused of planning an attack with other exiles, and died in prison in July 1460. About twenty®ve citizens were exiled because of what Machiavelli confessed before he died.53 Some members of the Medici party such as Agnolo Acciaiuoli, Dietisalvi Neroni and NiccoloÁ Soderini, favoured a more oligarchic regime, with a privileged group being guaranteed eligibility for the higher of®ces. They were not willing to pay Piero de' Medici, who succeeded his father as head of the Mediceans in 1464, the same degree of deferential respect they had accorded to Cosimo. Critical of the close links with Francesco Sforza which had been a cornerstone of Cosimo's policy, they favoured the traditional Florentine alliance with Venice. By 1465 they were approaching Venice, and the Marquis of Ferrara, Borso d'Este, was advising them to get rid of Piero de' Medici by assassination or exile.54 At that time, there was also a strong groundswell of feeling among other, less prominent, citizens in favour of a reversion to the traditional electoral regime of Florence. Proposals that elections to the major of®ces should again be by a system of lot, with names drawn from purses, passed the councils by large majorities in September 1465. It was the lottery of the electoral purses that precipitated events the following year. The Signoria drawn on 28 August to hold of®ce for September and October was immediately recognized to be one which would be very favourable to Piero de' Medici. He had already been making preparations to face up to his opponents when the right moment should come. He had just returned to Florence from one of his villas with an armed escort, claiming that there had been an attempt to ambush him and that troops of Borso d'Este were waiting on the borders for a 53

54

Rubinstein, Government of Florence, pp. 107±17, 123, 137; Maria Augusta Morelli Timpanaro, Rosalia Marino Tolu and Paolo Viti, Consorterie politiche e mutamenti istituzionali in etaÁ Laurenziana (Florence, 1992), pp. 24±6. Rubinstein, Government of Florence, pp. 155±83; Bortolo Belotti, La vita di Bartolomeo Colleoni (Bergamo, 1932), p. 356.

30


summons from his opponents. Milanese troops were poised to come to his aid, and thousands of peasants from areas of the contado loyal to the Medici were being brought into the city. His opponents too were arming, but neither side was eager for a ®ght. Both sent to hold back the foreign troops coming to their defence. Whoever had recourse to violence, unless for urgent self-defence, would put themselves ®rmly in the wrong in the eyes of their fellow citizens. A parlamento, a public meeting of Florentine citizens in the square before the Palace of the Signoria ± a square packed with armed men in the pay of the Medici ± duly gave assent to the appointment of a BalõÁa. On 6 September the BalõÁa elected a new Eight of Ward, plainly friends of Piero, with powers over political offences and over exiles. Recognizing the inevitable outcome, Dietisalvi Neroni and Agnolo Acciaiuoli ¯ed; NiccoloÁ Soderini had already left a few days earlier. All the leaders of the opposition were exiled by the BalõÁa on 11 September, accused of summoning foreign troops and imperilling the liberty of Florence.55 Others were exiled or deprived of their political rights, but there was no witchhunt. The disorders and frequent changes of regime in Siena during the last two decades of the ®fteenth century that produced so many exiles were factional con¯icts (and will be considered later), but they had their roots in a conspiracy against the regime that came to a head in 1456. Unlike its counterparts in many other Italian cities, the Council of the People in Siena had retained a substantial role in the government of the city. All those who had served as Prior in the Signoria (which was generally known as the Concistoro) enjoyed the status of riseduti, which entitled them to a seat in the Council of the People for life. The electoral purses for the Concistoro were made up for several years at a time, and a man could only serve one two-month term as Prior during that period: of a total population of around 15,000, several hundred men would be riseduti at any one time. That so many men could have a voice in Sienese politics and government displeased a group who wanted a more oligarchic regime.56 They conspired with the aim of bringing about a

55

56

Paula Clarke, À Sienese note on 1466' in Peter Denley and Caroline Elam (eds.), Florence and Italy: Renaissance Studies in Honour of Nicolai Rubinstein (London, 1988), pp. 43±51; Mark Phillips, The Memoir of Marco Parenti: A Life in Medici Florence (London, 1990), pp. 193±204; Rubinstein, Government of Florence, pp. 183±90; A. Municchi, La fazione antimedicea detta `del Poggio' (Florence, 1911), pp. 136±9. For the background to this group see Petra Pertici, Tra politica e cultura nel primo Quattrocento senese: Le epistole di Andreoccio Petrucci (1426±1443) (Siena, 1990), and eadem, Ùna ``coniuratio'' del reggimento di Siena nel 1450', BSSP 99 (1992), 9±47.

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revolution in the government of Siena, and were prepared to look for help outside the city, even if this threatened Sienese independence. The conspiracy ®rst took shape in the 1440s. The leader was Antonio di Checco Rosso Petrucci, a prominent if anomalous ®gure in Sienese political life. He behaved and thought like the scion of a family of minor lords, and was inclined to the military life, though he did not try to make his fortune as a condottiere. Clever and eloquent, prepared to spend money freely, he was treated with respect by his peers, and deliberately sought popularity among the popolo minuto. Throughout a decade of plotting, the hopes of Antonio Petrucci and his fellow conspirators for outside assistance were centred on Alfonso, King of Naples. Exactly what they offered him in return is not known.57 In 1455 the condottiere Jacopo Piccinino decided to come to the territory of Siena. He sent an envoy to Siena, who had several discussions with one of the conspirators, Ghino Bellanti, and corresponded with other Sienese citizens. In June, Piccinino entered Sienese territory and immediately took Cetona: Ghino Bellanti had written to the commissioner there, telling him to surrender it to Piccinino when he came. But Piccinino, and the Sienese conspirators who hoped to use him to achieve their own aims, found the opposition they faced stronger and more determined than they had perhaps looked for. Both Francesco Sforza and the pope, Calixtus III, sent substantial contingents of troops to help the Sienese ®ght Piccinino, who was too great a menace to the peace of Italy to be left to do as he pleased. Defeated by these forces, Piccinino retreated with his troops to Castiglione della Pescaia, which was held for Alfonso, and then captured, again by treachery, the Sienese town of Orbetello. This became his new base, and when his supplies ran short, Alfonso replenished them by sea. In February 1456 a man who had frequently carried messages for Ghino Bellanti was arrested, and revealed a plot by Ghino and his associates to betray another Sienese fortress, Rocca Tederighi, to Piccinino. A peace agreement was concluded in Naples at the end of May 1456, but the conspirators wanted Piccinino to stay in Orbetello until they were ready to call on him to help them effect their longcontemplated coup in Siena. One of their number, Antonio di Casino Casucci, was sent to Naples to solicit Alfonso's support for their enterprise. Messages were sent to Antonio Petrucci, who was at his castle of Perignano, encouraging him to come to Siena.58 57 58

Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 140r; Orlando Malavolti, Dell'historia di Siena (Venice, 1599; 1982), Part III, f. 36r; Pertici, Tra politica e cultura, pp. 167±75. L. Fumi, `Francesco Sforza contro Jacopo Piccinino (dalla Pace di Lodi alla morte di Calisto III)', BSPU 16 (1910), pp. 525±6, 541±82; Malavolti, Dell' historia di Siena,

32


Aware of the intensi®ed plotting of the conspirators, Cristofano Gabrielli, the Captain of the People (the head of the Concistoro), began to organize their unmasking. One of them, Mariano Bargagli, was dismissed by the Council of the People from his prestigious post as head of the cathedral works. More direct action was a summons to Antonio Casucci to appear before the Concistoro. He quickly revealed the names of his fellow conspirators and the details of his journey to Naples. Soon two more, Pietro Scacco Tancredi and Tommaso Niccolucci, were arrested and interrogated too. Ghino Bellanti's son, Pietro, was also held but escaped from prison with the connivance of a gaoler. Gathering a small band of men, he tried to enter the Palace of the Signoria at night, intending to kill Cristofano Gabrielli and other members of the Concistoro, and then to try to rouse the popolo. Failing to gain an entry to the palace, he hid away until he felt it was safe to ¯ee the city. On 30 August the Concistoro laid before the Council of the People the results of the interrogations of Antonio Casucci, Tommaso Niccolucci and Pietro Scacco Tancredi. All three, it was decided, should be executed. Ghino and Pietro Bellanti were declared rebels, Mariano Bargagli and Guasparre Micheli (who had plotted with Piccinino) were to appear before the Concistoro by the following evening, or be declared rebels. They, and other conspirators, had probably already ¯ed. Others, friends and relatives of the conspirators, were exiled over the following weeks. On 13 October, Antonio Petrucci was declared a rebel too. Over the next two years, there were further exiles, and executions, of men accused of maintaining contacts with exiles and rebels, or of conspiring to betray places in the Sienese contado to them.59 Among the opponents of republican governments can be counted those banished from towns subject to republics for contesting their rule, such as those exiled from Pisa by the Florentines. While the harshness of the Florentines' dominion over Pisa has probably been exaggerated, many members of the leading Pisan families had gone into exile during the ®fteenth century, some on the orders of the Florentines, some of their own volition. Exiling groups of Pisans was one way the Floren-

59

Part III, ff. 49r±55r; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 255: Lodovico Petroni to Francesco Sforza, 2 June 1455, Siena; ibid., b. 256: Nicodemo da Pontremoli to Francesco Sforza, 5 Feb. 1456, Siena; Luciano Banchi, Ìl Piccinino nello Stato di Siena e la Lega Italica (1455±1456)', ASI 4th ser., 4 (1879), pp. 44±58, 225±36; ASS, BalõÁa 397, ff. 182r±183v. Malavolti, Dell' historia di Siena, Part III, ff. 55r±57r, 59r±v; ASS, Concistoro 539, ff. 67r±69v; BalõÁa 2, ff. 5r±6r, 8v±13v, 14v±15v, 16v±18r, 70r, 122r, 201v±207v; BalõÁa 4, ff. 28v±29r, 133v±134r; BalõÁa 6, ff. 33r±v, 35r±v, 94v±96v, 183v±185r, 200v.

into exile

33

tines sought to secure their possession of Pisa during the wars in Tuscany in the 1440s and 1450s.60 The most notable group of exiles from a Florentine subject town, apart from the Pisans, came from Volterra in the early 1470s. The immediate cause of trouble was the occupation in June 1471 by the commune of Volterra of alum deposits that had been let to a company in which the Medici bank had an interest. In September four men were exiled by the Florentine captain for their participation in the occupation of the alum workings, and his successor exiled another fourteen. After one of the Volterran partners in the Medici-backed company was killed in the town, the Volterrans, in contravention of the terms of their subjection to Florence, elected a BalõÁa, which decided on the exile of a number of Medici partisans. The Florentines acquiesced in this decision, but Florentine troops launched an attack in May which culminated in the surrender and sack of Volterra in June. According to a local chronicle, seventy-six men were expelled from the town; records in Volterra mention at least forty men from the town and its contado who were sent into exile in December 1472.61 Exiles from Venice came nearest to the category of opponents of republican governments than to any other, although Venetians were exiled not so much for opposing the government as for breaking the rules and conventions by which it operated. Among the values upon which the Venetians prided themselves, and which their system of government was supposed to embody and to foster, were devotion to the common interest and disinterested, self-effacing public service. The institutional arrangements of interlocking councils, and the complicated electoral procedures used for choosing of®cials, were intended to prevent the formation of political parties, and to give all patricians an opportunity to hold some of®ces if they were considered worthy by their peers, with the highest of®ces reserved for the most senior, respected, and competent patricians. These arrangements worked, by and large, but human nature and politics being what they are, inevitably some men tried to bend or break the rules. A great deal of lobbying and exchange of favours went on, all strictly illegal and impossible to repress. But there were occasions when attempts to manipulate or in¯uence elections were considered to have 60

61

Giuseppe Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa durante il primo dominio ®orentino: l'orrizonte cittadino e la ricerca di spazi esterni (1406±1460)' in I ceti dirigenti nella Toscana del Quattrocento (Impruneta, 1987), pp. 291±352. Enrico Fumi, L'impresa di Lorenzo de' Medici contro Volterra (1472) (Florence, 1948); Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. I, pp. 363±4, 547±53.

34


gone too far, and such misdemeanours could be punished by a term of political exile. One of the electoral conspiracies that caused the greatest scandal was the Cicogna conspiracy of 1432. Marco Cicogna was the leader of a group of patricians who plotted to ®x elections in the Great Council by ensuring that they were on the committees that nominated the candidates for of®ces. Such was the indignation when the plot was discovered that there was nearly a riot in the Council chamber, and to calm the situation down, the conspirators were allowed to escape temporarily. Their arrest was ordered by the committee responsible for state security, the Ten, in January 1433. Marco Cicogna and twenty-®ve other patricians were banished. On the day their sentences were announced, a law was passed condemning association by patricians to help one another in the councils, and stipulating a penalty of perpetual exile from all Venetian territories. In 1457, two other serious conspiracies came to light. In one, Donato Corner tried to procure the election of his father to be PodestaÁ of Ravenna by asking other patricians to give him more then one vote; those involved were sentenced to exile for life. At the centre of the second conspiracy was Bartolomeo Pisani. He organized some blatant interference, including bribing two notaries in charge of the voting urns in the Great Council, to ensure that there would be a nominating committee favourable to the election of Andrea Corner to the Senate. Andrea Corner, his brother Marco and the two notaries were exiled. Pisani, who had escaped, was sentenced to be executed if he were to be caught.62 To risk causing dissension among the patricians by proposals that could be divisive was also to risk political exile. In 1492 Gabriele Bon and Francesco Falier suggested that a proportion of the salaries of high of®cials should be withheld to supply funds for pensions or subsidies for poor patricians. Bon and Falier were accused of acting from ambition, hoping to win the favour of the Great Council, and of contravening the rule that no patrician should seek personal advancement by handing out public money. The Ten ordered their immediate arrest; they were to be shipped off to Cyprus before they could speak to anyone else about their plan. Two of®cials who had helped to devise the details of the scheme were also exiled.63 62

63

Donald Queller, The Venetian Patriciate: Reality versus Myth (Chicago, 1986), pp. 79±81, 88, 98±100; idem., `The myth of the Venetian patriciate: electoral corruption in medieval Venice' in Donald Queller and Francis Swietek, Two Studies on Venetian Government (Geneva, 1977), pp. 141±3, 147±50. Robert Finlay, Politics in Renaissance Venice (London, 1980), pp. 76±9.

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35

Of®ce-holders accused of dishonesty or incompetence which had resulted in harm to the state, or who had been disobedient, could be sentenced to political exile. After the loss of the town of Asola to the Marquis of Mantua in 1483, NiccoloÁ Querini was accused of governing badly and of abandoning the fortress when it could have been defended, and he was exiled for life. Two men, Ranuzio Cornaro and Michele Salamon, were exiled in 1485 for interfering without authorization in negotiations for the raising of a papal interdict.64 Disclosing information about the political debates and intentions of the Venetians to outsiders was also treated as an offence meriting political exile. A number of such cases came to light in the 1470s and 1480s. In 1472, Elisabetta Zeno ± sister of the late pope, Paul II, mother of one cardinal, Gianbattista Zeno and aunt of two more, Marco Barbo and Giovanni Michiel ± was discovered to have been systematically garnering news about debates in the Senate, and passing it on to these cardinals. She had held receptions at her house, attended by senators, while two clerks concealed behind a screen recorded whatever the senators let slip in conversation. Neither her sex nor her illustrious connections saved her from being sentenced to exile for life.65 Another case of systematic gathering of information to be passed on to the papal court was revealed in 1478. Lorenzo Zane, Bishop of Brescia and Patriarch of Antioch, had bribed a number of patricians to give him information about Senate business, which he was passing on to Girolamo Riario in Rome. One of those involved, Jacomo Malipiero, was exiled for life; another, Vitale Lando, for ten years. The Ten sent to arrest Lorenzo Zane, but he escaped to Mantua. He was sentenced to exile from all Venetian dominions, and was not to be given passage on any Venetian ship.66 Venetian clergy and their relations were generally treated as inherently somewhat untrustworthy, as ready to be tempted to betray their allegiance to Venice for the sake of their allegiance to ± or hopes of preferment from ± the pope. Even well-intentioned Venetian clergy could ®nd themselves in an awkward dilemma. In 1491 Ermolao Barbaro, a distinguished scholar, who had been sent to Rome to secure the appointment of the approved candidate of the Senate to the Patriarchate of Aquilea, was pressured by Pope Innocent VIII into accepting the 64

65 66

Queller, The Venetian Patriciate, pp. 164, 246; Samuele Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia (3rd edn, Venice, 1973), vol. IV, pp. 250±5; Marin Sanudo, Le vite dei Dogi (1474±1494), ed. Angela Caracciolo AricoÁ (Padua, 1989), pp. 147±8. Queller, The Venetian Patriciate, pp. 213±14. Sanudo, Vite dei Dogi, pp. 129±31.

36


bene®ce for himself. Barbaro could not go back to Venice or take possession of his see, and was forced to stay in effective exile in Rome.67 Not all the cases of unauthorized transmission of information about Venetian affairs involved ecclesiastics. In May 1486, the Ten exiled two patricians who had passed secrets to Galeotto della Mirandola, a condottiere in Venetian employment. About the same time as this affair was going on, a noblewoman, Mattea Collalto, was passing on information about the dealings of the Signoria with Roberto da Sanseverino, then in Venetian service, to her relative, Count Oderico of Arco and the Captain of Trent, to the great prejudice of Venice's war against Archduke Sigismund of Habsburg. After this became known in 1489, she and her brother and another relative were exiled for life.68 The ®nal and most numerous category of political exiles were those defeated in struggles between political factions. Sometimes they were driven out by their enemies at the conclusion of a battle in the streets; sometimes they were sentenced by of®cial bodies under the control or in¯uence of their enemies. Many went into exile of their own accord, often taking their dependants with them, to escape retribution and persecution. Some of the largest groups came not from independent states, but from subject towns or cities. The intensity of faction®ghting was not related to the degree of political autonomy of a community, or the effective power to be fought over. At Parma in the duchy of Milan, for example, there were four factions, known as squadre, who had links to leading ®gures at the Sforza court. So severe could the faction-®ghting become in Parma at times that many citizens went into voluntary exile with their families to try to escape being caught up in it.69 In the Papal States, the weakness of the temporal government of the popes gave a free rein to the rivalries of political factions. Viterbo, for example, was the seat of the papal governor of the province of the Patrimony of St Peter, but this did not prevent the town from being the scene of violent factional struggles in the 1450s. The Gatti family and faction were dominant and generally posed as friends of the papacy and allies of the papal of®cials in Viterbo, with the rival Maganzesi supplying the bulk of the political exiles. The situation was complicated by a family feud among the Gatti following the assassination of their leader, 67 68 69

Queller, The Venetian Patriciate, pp. 188±9; Margaret L. King, Venetian Humanism in an Age of Patrician Dominance (Princeton, 1986), pp. 202±5. Queller, The Venetian Patriciate, pp. 223±4. See Cronica Lombardie, passim.

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Princivalle, in an ambush organized by the Maganzesi.70 Not until the 1490s were there again serious factional disturbances in Viterbo. This time they were complicated by the Gatti, who had been Guelfs, becoming aligned with the Ghibellines of the Papal States. In June 1495, when the French army returning from Naples was in Viterbo, the Maganzesi seized the opportunity to expel the Gatti. Giovanni Gatti, the last of the main line of the family, was killed, possibly by some Maganzesi, in May 1496. His natural brother Galeotto became leader of the Gatti exiles, and in June 1497, with the help of 600 horse and many infantry provided by the Colonna party, forced his way back. After a massacre of the Maganzesi, the Gatteschi were once again dominant in Viterbo.71 The Gatteschi and Maganzesi switch of alignment between Guelf and Ghibelline was a very unusual occurrence among the urban factions of the Papal States. Allegiance of families and factions to the Guelf or Ghibelline parties was one of the few enduring factors that gave some semblance of coherence to the shifting local politics of the pope's subjects. In Umbria, above all, the unceasing feuds between Guelfs and Ghibellines frequently ¯ared up into civic strife and minor wars between neighbours. Exiles from an Umbrian town could always ®nd a welcome with neighbours of the same faction, who were often ready to go along and ®ght for the exiles when they attempted to force a return. The scale of the forces displayed in these factional battles could be magni®ed still further by the involvement of professional soldiers sent by, and often led by, members of the Roman baronial families. So closely were the Roman barons identi®ed with the urban factions of Umbria that the Guelfs of Umbria were sometimes known as the Orsini party, and the Ghibellines as the Colonna. In some towns of Umbria, by the second half of the ®fteenth century, one faction had become so dominant that their opponents could not seriously trouble them: in Spoleto, for example, it was the Guelfs, in Rieti the Ghibellines. In other towns, such as Todi, the factions were more evenly balanced, and were frequently at each other's throats. The fact that there was a major papal fortress in the centre of the town did not seem to put much restraint on the factions of Todi when their blood was up. The Guelf Catalaneschi party, led by the degli Atti family, were generally the stronger, but the Ghibelline Chiaravallesi were strong enough to be troublesome and even, on occasion, to expel 70

71

Cesare Pinzi, Storia della cittaÁ di Viterbo, 4 vols. (Viterbo, 1889±1913), vol. IV, pp. 92±169; NiccoloÁ della Tuccia, `Cronache di Viterbo' in Cronache e statuti della CittaÁ di Viterbo, ed. Ignazio Ciampi (Florence, 1872), pp. 55±83. Pinzi, Storia della cittaÁ di Viterbo, vol. IV, pp. 363, 375±6.

38


the Catalaneschi. In February 1486, the Chiaravallesi drove many of their rivals out of Todi and killed some of their leaders; but the Catalaneschi, with the assistance of Obietto Fieschi, at that time the papal governor of Todi, soon managed to return. In December 1488 the Catalaneschi, with the help of Bartolomeo d'Alviano, a young soldier of the Orsini faction who was destined to become one of the most famous condottieri of his generation, expelled the Chiaravallesi again. In late 1495, this time with the connivance of Alexander VI, the Ghibellines returned with the help of their allies from Terni, Amelia and Foligno, but the exiled Guelfs were able to impose a virtual blockade. After several months the Ghibellines were forced to ask for a safeconduct from Todi, which they were given, and back came the Guelfs.72 The factions contending for power in Perugia were rivals among the nobili, who had been dominant since 1416. The leading popolari families, known as the Raspanti, were expelled. Raspanti exiles were still troubling Perugia several decades later, and had many sympathizers in the city, but they were no longer able seriously to challenge the domination of the nobili. This did not mean that they were considered innocuous. Some were allowed to return, but they were regarded with mistrust; in August 1453, for example, some who had been allowed back were sent into exile again.73 For much of the ®fteenth century, the Baglioni were only one of the noble families, if one of the more powerful ones. By the 1480s, they were bidding to become the most powerful, and the rivalries among the nobles were becoming more virulent, polarizing around the Baglioni on one hand and the Oddi and Ranieri on the other. By late October 1488, distrust between the Baglioni and Oddi was running high. Fighting broke out on 28 October, but Guido Baglioni intervened, unarmed, to call his men off; it began again two days later, when Ridolfo Baglioni came from his estates bringing reinforcements. Seeing the preparations that the Baglioni were making to attack them, and the numbers of men they had brought in from their estates, the Oddi took fright and left the city that night together with their allies. Many partisans of these nobles went with them. Only if their enemies were kept away from Perugia, the Baglioni told the legate sent by Innocent VIII, Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini, could the armed men be sent away and 72

73

ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 33, c. 372: Piero Capponi, 19 Feb. 1485(6), Montepulciano; ibid., c. 523: Bartolomeo Ugolini, 13 Mar. 1485(6), Pitigliano; ASF, Otto di Pratica, Resp. 6, c. 201: Giovanni Lanfredini, 17 Dec. 1488, Rome; Ioan Fabrizio degli Atti, La cronaca todina, ed. Franco Mancini (Florence, 1955), pp. 128±9. Peter Partner, The Lands of St Peter (London, 1972), pp. 393±4, 398, 400; `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni', ed. O. Scalvanti, BSPU 4 (1898), 91, 311.

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peace prevail. The legate ®nally agreed to the Oddi and their allies being formally exiled in January 1489.74 Bologna was the centre of papal government for the northern Papal States. Even the Bentivoglio at the height of their power could not aspire to be de jure lords of Bologna, but their personal ascendancy had been established by 1450. This had not been accomplished without leading members of the family spending some time in exile and the assassination of three of them. The third Bentivoglio to be assassinated was Annibale, cut down in the streets by the rival Canetoli in June 1445. The Bolognese were roused to fury at his murder, and before nightfall some of the Canetoli were killed, while others managed to escape into exile. Sante Bentivoglio, who assumed the leadership of the faction, worked in cooperation with the representatives of the pope, ensuring that they would not try to use the rivals of the Bentivoglio to challenge or counterbalance them. The consolidation of the regime was greatly assisted by the attitude of Cardinal Bessarion, legate of Bologna from 1450 to 1455. He agreed to further exiles of members of the Canetoli faction, even before a violent incursion into Bologna on 7 June 1451 by the Canetoli exiles at the head of a force of 3000 men.75 The establishment of the Medici dominance in Florence was the outcome of factional struggle. Cosimo de' Medici rose to power as a faction leader, not a banker, and he only succeeded in establishing his position after spending a year in exile when he was outmanoeuvred by his rivals, a conservative group who advocated a reversion to a more oligarchical regime. The leaders of the conservatives took advantage of an opportunity provided when the Signoria drawn for September and October 1433 had a majority favourable to their views. Within days of this Signoria taking of®ce, Cosimo was summoned to see them, and when he obeyed, he was arrested. Warned of his imprisonment, his brother Lorenzo and cousin Averardo avoided detention; if they had not done so, Cosimo believed, the opponents of the Medici `would have done us harm'.76 The Signoria summoned a parlamento, which agreed to the appointment of a BalõÁa, whose ®rst act was to pass sen-

74

75

76

G. degli Azzi, Ìl tumulto del 1488 in Perugia e la politica di Lorenzo il Magni®co', BSPU 11 (1905), 407±81; `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni', BSPU 9 (1903), 298±309, 318±19. Ady, The Bentivoglio, pp. 28±9; Emilio Nasalli Rocca di Corneliano, Ìl Cardinale Bessarione, Legato Ponti®cio in Bologna (1450±1455)', AMSPPR ser. 4, 20 (1930), 28±36. Roscoe, Life of Lorenzo de' Medici, vol. I, p. 320.

40


tences of exile on eight members of the Medici family, including Cosimo. A few of their close associates were also exiled.77 Although the conservative faction had removed some names out of the electoral purses, they had not had a suf®ciently thorough purge to eliminate the possibility that the chances of the electoral procedures might produce a Signoria favourable to the exiles. Such a Signoria was drawn for September and October 1434. As the Signoria planned to call a parlamento to arrange for the recall of the Medici, on 26 September the leading conservative, Rinaldo degli Albizzi, mustered hundreds of armed men in a square near the Palace of the Signoria. Not all his political allies agreed with this tactic; and the Priors, refusing to be intimidated, prepared to repel any assault. The supporters of the Medici could rally to the defence of the palace and the Signoria in ful®lment of the duty of any good citizen, not just as the defenders of the interests of their party. The resolution of Rinaldo and his remaining supporters vanished, and they dispersed. The parlamento which met two days later agreed to the appointment of a BalõÁa to recall the exiles, and to punish those who had threatened to use force against the highest body of the state. On 29 September the BalõÁa recalled the Medici. Reprisals against those who had tried to prevent their recall began on 2 October with the banishment of some of the leaders: Rinaldo degli Albizzi and his son, and Ridolfo Peruzzi and his son and brother. Around seventy men altogether were sent into exile in late 1434.78 Siena in the middle of the 1480s became notorious for the number of her citizens that were in political exile. This was not because there were powerful faction leaders with numerous personal followers in Siena, as was the case with cities such as Perugia, but because so many Sienese were politically active. Of the 627 citizens who took the oath imposed on all members of the Council of the People at a ceremony of reconciliation in November 1482,79 225 (36 per cent) are known to have been sentenced to exile at least once between 1480 and 1500. Others, who had been members of the Council of the People, were not in Siena to take the oath, because they had been exiled between June and October 1482. The proportion of those who were members of the BalõÁa (which superseded the Concistoro as the supreme magistracy in Siena during the 1480s and 1490s) who are known to have been in political exile at 77

78 79

Dale Kent, The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence 1426±1434 (Oxford, 1978), pp. 292±302; Agenore Gelli, `L'esilio di Cosimo de' Medici', ASI ser. 4, 10 (1892), 77±9. Kent, Rise of the Medici, pp. 328±42, 355±7. Christine Shaw, `Politics and institutional innovation in Siena 1480±1498', BSSP 103 (1996), 69±71.

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least once during those two decades is even higher: 72 out of 170 (42 per cent). That at least two-®fths of the members of the supreme magistracy spent some time in exile during this period is striking testimony to the intensity of political con¯ict in Siena. But by no means all those exiled from Siena for political reasons were members of the major governing councils. Over a third (37 per cent) of the known Sienese exiles from 1456 to 1500 were never members of the Concistoro or the Council of the People. If all the exiles, including all the many selfexiles, were known, the proportion of non-riseduti among them would perhaps be higher. The more obscure the individual, the less likely that his activities in exile would be reported. Many of the Sienese exiles were the losers in factional con¯icts, but the main permanent political factions in Siena were of a peculiar type. There were ®ve factions, called monti, in Siena: the Gentiluomini, the Nove, the Dodici, the Riformatori and the Monte del Popolo. By and large, the members of the different monti were the descendants of those men who had ®rst been members of the Signoria under different regimes in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; individuals from families which had not held of®ce were usually assigned to the Monte del Popolo. For most of the ®fteenth century, the reggimento was a tripartite one, with the Nove, Riformatori and Popolo sharing the of®ces in the city and contado among themselves. The Gentiluomini had seats in the virtually powerless General Council (Consiglio Generale) and on some other magistracies, and they were allotted some seats in the Concistoro in the early years of the century and from 1459 to 1464. The Dodici were rigorously excluded from participation in of®ce from 1404 to 1480, and treated as politically suspect. After 1480, the balance of power and the shares of of®ces among the monti shifted repeatedly, but the tradition of a tripartite regime was strongly rooted and widely regarded as the desirable norm. This caused dif®culties if more than three monti were part of the reggimento. The political arithmetic for the division of of®ces among the monti, and the assignment of members of less favoured monti into the groupings (also, confusingly, called monti) among which of®ces were to be circulated, could never be worked out to satisfy everyone. It is dif®cult to discern any common interest other than the distribution of of®ce which bound all the members of a monte together and distinguished them from the others. Central as they were to the structure of Sienese government, the monti were not formal corporate institutions. They had no appointed leadership and no customary meeting places, let alone any common property or income. The factional struggles that disrupted Sienese political life during the

42


last two decades of the ®fteenth century80 began in the aftermath of the war against Florence after the failure of the Pazzi conspiracy. During the war, the Sienese were allies of Ferrante and Sixtus, and Neapolitan troops led by Alfonso, Duke of Calabria, came to Sienese territory. When it was over, Alfonso's presence in Tuscany became a threat to the regime in Siena. There were Sienese exiles, survivors of the exiles of 1456±8 and their descendants, in his camp. Most of the leading conspirators banished in 1456 had been members of the Monte dei Nove; they blamed the Monte dei Riformatori (of which Cristofano Gabrielli, who had headed the proceedings against them, was a member) for their long years of exclusion. In the spring of 1480, there were reports of plots among the exiles, coordinated with sympathizers inside the city, to revenge themselves on the Riformatori. Alfonso suggested that the best way to settle the city down was to bring back the exiles: this, some of the Nove told him, would bring Siena under his own control. Requests from Alfonso and Ferrante for the return of the exiles were debated several times in the Council of the People. The Riformatori refused to agree. To break the deadlock, Alfonso encouraged the leaders of the Popolari (that is, of the Monte del Popolo) and the Nove to lay plans to overcome the opposition of the Riformatori. They considered exiling eight or ten Riformatori, but then decided that this would not be suf®cient, and that force would be needed.81 On 21 June, Alfonso sent several hundred troops to Siena. The next day, the Campo before the Palace of the Signoria was occupied by these men, with armed Noveschi and Popolari. A deputation of Noveschi and Popolari demanded that the Concistoro should summon the Council of the People to discuss the expulsion of the Riformatori from the regime. The Council, summoned immediately, voted by 441 votes to one to exclude the Riformatori from the government in perpetuity, and for the election of a BalõÁa of ten Nove and ten Popolari.82 Alfonso and his agent Princivalle were present, and cast votes, at the meeting of the BalõÁa on 25 June when it was decided that twenty-®ve Riformatori were to be exiled to the kingdom of Naples, and eight others to the Sienese contado. On 5 July, the BalõÁa `having considered 80 81

82

For a detailed account of events in Siena from 1480 to 1498, see ibid. and the references given there. ASS, Concistoro 681, ff. 5r±7v; Malavolti, Dell' historia di Siena, Part III, ff. 76v±77r; Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 231r; Allegretto Allegretti, `Diarii delle cose sanesi del suo tempo', RIS 23 (1733), col. 801. ASMo, Carteggio Ambasciatori, Firenze, b. 2: Luigi Gian®gliazzi to Bongianni Gian®gliazzi, 24 June 1480, Siena; Allegretti, `Diarii', col. 802; ASS, Consiglio Generale 238, ff. 175v±176r.

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how many Riformatori there are, and their malignity and demerits', exiled a further forty-four of them, though the sentences imposed were generally less harsh than those pronounced on 25 June. Still more were exiled on 24 July, including the brothers, sons and nephews of Cristofano Gabrielli. Not all those exiled were Riformatori: there were also some Popolari and even some Noveschi. But the great majority were Riformatori, and they would be joined by even more in November, when around thirty-six were exiled, possibly as a consequence of a search for weapons in the houses of Riformatori that was ordered on 7 November.83 The exclusion of the Monte de' Riformatori from the regime necessitated a drastic re-ordering of the government. A third monte was to be created, the Council of the People decided; the BalõÁa and Alfonso created a composite one, the Monte degli Aggregati, including the returning exiles and those who had been deprived of political rights in the aftermath of the events of the 1450s, as well as the Gentiluomini and some individual Dodici.84 Soon after, on 7 August, Alfonso had to leave Siena after Otranto in the kingdom of Naples had fallen to an invading Turkish ¯eet. Neapolitan in¯uence in Siena, inevitably weakened by his departure, became weaker still as the Sienese came to believe that Ferrante was trying to renege on an agreement with them. Not only did they claim that Alfonso had promised them that they could keep Florentine places captured during the Pazzi War that were garrisoned by Sienese troops, but they were also convinced that the Florentine towns held by Neapolitan troops should be given to them too. When, in March 1481, Ferrante's anxiety for support from the other Italian powers against the Turks led to his returning to Florence those towns held by his troops, many Sienese felt that they had been betrayed.85 Opponents of the Neapolitan faction among the Nove exploited the popular disillusion with Ferrante and Alfonso. Dissatisfaction with the Monte degli Aggregati swelled the ranks of this group. The rather disparate band of malcontents found a leader in Cino Cinughi, who held the prestigious post of rector of the wealthy Hospital of Santa Maria della Scala. On 7 June 1482, an armed mob ®lled the Campo while the Council of the People was meeting, and demanded that the Noveschi 83

84 85

ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 9v±10v, 20v±21v, 43r±44r; BalõÁa 21, f. 19r±v; Cristoforo Cantoni, Frammento di un diario senese (1479±1483), ed. A. Lisini and F. Jacometti, RRIISS 15, vi (1939), p. 887. ASS, Concistoro 683, f. 13r±v; BalõÁa 20, f. 61v. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. V, passim; Cantoni, Diario senese, p. 893; Allegretti, `Diarii', cols. 807±8.

44


and Popolari exiles be allowed to return. Intimidated by the clamour in the Campo, the Council of the People agreed to the abolition of the Monte degli Aggregati, and the restoration to the regime of all the Popolari and Noveschi exiles.86 Seven of the returning exiles were among the thirty-six men elected members of a new BalõÁa on 10 June. The balance of power in Siena was still unsettled. On 15 June, there was a skirmish between some popolani and Noveschi, and one of the popolani was wounded by Luzio Bellanti. This incident apparently focused a mood of growing hostility to the Nove. Some leading Noveschi Neapolitan partisans, including Placido and Neri Placidi and Leonardo Gucci, were sent into exile by the BalõÁa to their houses in the contado, apparently for their own safety. On 3 July, ten men were summoned to appear before the BalõÁa for interrogation. Those who failed to obey (as most of the ten seem to have done) were to be exiled outside the contado. The BalõÁa decided that all the banished Riformatori, except for ®ve named rebels, were to be allowed back.87 The Nove were not expelled in large numbers, as the Riformatori had been. A group of a dozen men were sentenced to terms of exile on 15 July, including prominent Noveschi such as Antonio Bichi and Leonardo Bellanti. Suspicion that the exiles, with Neapolitan help, would conspire with some of the Nove in Siena was behind demands for the arrest of a prominent member of the previous regime, Antonio Bellanti. Expelled from the BalõÁa, Bellanti was held in the Palace of the Signoria for two weeks before being sent to the fortress of Montalcino. In early September, the BalõÁa decided that Bellanti should be considered to be exiled in his place of imprisonment.88 The Popolari had begun to enjoy a position of predominance in the regime. They were given an extra seat in the Concistoro, and more seats in the new BalõÁa elected on 6 August than the Nove and Riformatori. (The BalõÁa had decreed on 20 July that there were to be three government monti, Nove, Popolo and Riformatori, with some Gentiluomini included in the Nove and some Dodici in the Riformatori.) Members of the popolo minuto were to be brought into the Council of the People. At the end of October, a meeting of Popolari riseduti elected a BalõÁa of thirty Popolari to hold of®ce for two months. They also decided that the Monte del Popolo should seek to reconcile the Nove and Riformatori: hence the ceremony and the oath taken by the 86 87 88

Cantoni, Diario senese, pp. 894±6; Tommasi, Ìstorie', ff. 237r±238r; ASS, Concistoro 694, ff. 22v±24r. ASS, Concistoro 694, ff. 25r±26r; BalõÁa 26, ff. 6r, 8v, 26v, 35r±v; Cantoni, Diario senese, p. 899; Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 240r. ASS, BalõÁa 26, ff. 36v±39r, 47v±48r, 92r±93v; Cantoni, Diario senese, pp. 916, 919.

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members of the Council of the People in November. Among the measures that the BalõÁa took to calm the city was the exile for short terms of several men.89 Despite the fact that members of the popolo minuto were being given unwonted access to of®ce, not all were content with the new regime. About 150 met at San Domenico on 19 January 1483, and took an oath to stand together in demanding the return of Antonio Bellanti. The next day a number of them went to the Palace, threatening to use force to bring him back if the Concistoro would not agree. The Concistoro, after consulting a group of Popolari, did not agree: indeed, they issued a proclamation that no one should even speak about bringing back any of the exiles. Some of those who had taken part in the meeting at San Domenico were arrested and exiled by the police committee, the Ten of Ward (Dieci di Guardia); others left the city to avoid being rounded up too. A number of Nove took the precaution of leaving as well.90 On 1 February came news that Monteriggioni, a forti®ed village close to the city, had been captured by some exiles and their sympathizers. Not all of those involved were Noveschi, but the whole Monte dei Nove was blamed, and punished. Members of the Nove were attacked in the streets. Partly for their own safety, and partly to forestall any plots that might have been laid in conjunction with the exiles, all the Nove men who could be found were rounded up and held in the Sala del Consiglio in the Palace of the Signoria. Orders were sent to the contado for the Nove there to be detained. As word spread of the violence and the internments, many Nove escaped out of Sienese territory, some to await events, some to join the exiles.91 An assault by the exiles' forces on the Sienese camp at Monteriggioni on 6 February was beaten off. Meanwhile the Nove in Siena had written to the men occupying Monteriggioni, saying that they feared for their lives, and begging them to leave rather than risk the destruction of the monte. The men in Monteriggioni tried to negotiate the release of the interned Nove, as well as their own return to Siena, but the BalõÁa refused to consider this. The occupiers settled for a safeconduct for themselves, which the BalõÁa was ready to concede. Monteriggioni was surrendered on 19 February, and the occupiers were allowed to make their way to the Florentine border. The following day, a Council of the People was summoned to discuss demands that the Nove should be excluded from the government. Only as night fell, and amid some confu89 90 91

ASS, BalõÁa 26, ff. 45r, 53v±54v, 64r±65r, 143r±144r, 153r, 154v; Concistoro 697, ff. 4r±7v; Cantoni, Diario senese, pp. 923±6. Cantoni, Diario senese, p. 930; ASS, Concistoro 698, ff. 12r, 14v±15r; BalõÁa 27, f. 4r. Cantoni, Diario senese, pp. 931±2.

46


sion, was a proposal passed (or so it was claimed) that the Monte dei Nove should be abolished.92 It was two days later (the day that a papal legate, Cardinal Gianbattista Cibo, arrived in Siena) that the ®rst of the Nove detained in the Palace were released. All but three of the rest were allowed to leave over the next week or so. The three were interrogated, as were Antonio Bellanti, Placido Placidi and Leonardo Gucci, who were being held prisoner in fortresses in the contado. Cardinal CiboÁ tried to mediate, but his presence in the city could not prevent a riot on 1 April that ended with the defenestration of the three Noveschi who had been held for interrogation. Affronted and angered, he left Siena. It was to prevent another riot, the BalõÁa claimed, that they ordered the capital sentences that had been passed on the three Noveschi imprisoned in the contado to be carried out. Some Noveschi were sentenced to exile on 24 April; a few more were exiled at the end of the month.93 Fears that the exiles might receive encouragement from Florence made the leaders of the regime in Siena anxious for an alliance with their neighbours, even at the expense of returning the remaining lands taken from Florence during the Pazzi War. A league with Florence was concluded on 14 June 1483, and the next day, to the disgust of many Sienese, the lands were handed over to a Florentine commissioner. Following this, the Sienese were able to conclude an alliance with Sixtus in August 1483 without having to agree to make concessions to the exiles for whom Girolamo Riario had become the chief refuge.94 This came in time to deprive the exiles of help from the pope or Riario for an attempt to take Saturnia, another stronghold in the contado, on 15 August. That the exiles had some such scheme in mind had been known in Siena; in anticipation of it, on 6 August, some Nove had been ordered to leave the contado and to stay in Montepulciano in Florentine territory for twenty days. There was an even less successful attempt by a group of exiles to enter the fortress of Chiusi on 5 September. Another attack on the contado by the exiles in May 1485, when they attempted to take San Quirico, turned into another ®asco.95 The Council of the People had decided in March 1483 that henceforth there should be only one government monte, but the regime in Siena was not united. Quite apart from growing resentment at the 92 93 94 95

Ibid., pp. 932±4; Allegretti, `Diarii', cols. 812±13. Cantoni, Diario senese, p. 936; ASS, BalõÁa 404, ff. 61r, 66r; BalõÁa 28, ff. 29v±32v, 37r±38r. Shaw, `Politics and institutional innovation', 103 (1996), 93±8. ASS, BalõÁa 404, f.164r; Shaw, `Politics and institutional innovation' (1996), p. 98, (1997), p. 199.

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dominant position of the Popolari, there was discontent among the popolo minuto, and disagreements and rivalries among the leading Popolari. In September 1484, the prominent Popolare Francesco del Marretta was exiled with his brother Agostino and his son Andrea. Formally they were accused of acts to the detriment of the republic and the present regime, especially concerning the dissensions in the city. On 11 February 1485 a prominent Riformatore, Filippo Buoninsegni, was exiled, accused of stirring up discontent.96 On 30 November 1485, the gates of the city were kept shut until late in the day, and three men were arrested: Lodovico Tolomei, a Gentiluomo; Francesco Tancredi of the Nove; and TomeÂ di Antonio Gori, a Popolare. Reports reached Florence that, when the gates were kept closed, many men escaped by climbing over the walls, but there is no con®rmation of this report in Sienese sources. After lengthy interrogations, during which they confessed only to wishing for the return of the exiles rather than to conspiring to bring this about, Lodovico Tolomei and TomeÂ Gori were executed. Francesco Tancredi and four other men ± two Noveschi, a Riformatore and a Gentiluomo ± were exiled.97 There were two main factions among the Popolari: the more moderate Bigi, who wanted to respect the Sienese tradition of the monti sharing power and of®ce, and the Biribatti, who were more radical in their wish for the Monte del Popolo to dominate the others, if not enjoy sole power. The Biribatti seem to have been more organized and purposeful, with Cristofano Gionta their most in¯uential leader. In March 1486 they wrested approval from the Council of the People that the single monte was to be divided into two ordini. The Monte del Popolo would constitute the ®rst ordine, who would have half the seats in the Concistoro and three-®fths of all other of®ces, while all the Riformatori, Dodici and Gentiluomini were to be in the second ordine.98 Cristofano Gionta laid plans to eliminate one of his main rivals, Francesco Severini, who was accused of accepting bribes from the Florentines to facilitate the return of the disputed territories. On 18 September, Cristofano Gionta and other leading Biribatti led a mob of popolani to the Campo. Francesco Severini came to confront them with his own supporters, but retreated when he perceived how much stronger his opponents were. He hurriedly left Siena for Florentine 96 97

98

Cantoni, Diario senese, p. 936; ASS, BalõÁa 32, f. 41r±v; Concistoro 1591, ff. 51v±52r. Malavolti, Dell' istoria di Siena, Part III, ff. 91v±92r; Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 251r±v; Allegretti, `Diarii', col. 818; ASS, BalõÁa 526, 14: Tommaso Biringucci, 10 Dec. 1485, Florence; Concistoro 1591, ff. 60v±63v. Tommasi, Ìstorie', ff. 251v, 252v±253r; ASS, Consiglio Generale 240, f. 79v.

48


territory, and he and his brothers were immediately declared rebels. Four of Francesco's followers among the popolo minuto were arrested, and others were sought. Two days later, several Riformatori and Dodici were detained by a crowd of popolani, until orders went out that no one else should be held except another prominent Popolare, Lorenzo Venturini, for whose arrest a reward was offered. Under torture, Lorenzo Venturini confessed to receiving bribes from the Florentines, and to plotting with some Riformatori and Dodici, with Florentine backing, to kill Cristofano Gionta and other Biribatti. He was executed on 9 October. About ten men, all but one of them Popolari, were exiled.99 These sentences of exile not only further alienated the moderate Popolari from the regime, but also caused grave misgivings in Florence and Rome. The regime was seen as extremist and inherently unstable, and the sympathies of the pope and the Florentine government were shifting more and more to the exiles. By April 1487, the BalõÁa was forced to recognize the need to make some concessions, and the Popolari exiles, except for the Severini and the sons of Lorenzo Venturini, were given permission to come back. This was not enough to satisfy the many critics of the regime, and discussions began about allowing other exiles to return. Opinions differed widely as to who should be allowed back, with the Biribatti most reluctant to bring back any more, and quite determined that no Nove should be pardoned.100 As the debate dragged on the exiles took the matter into their own hands. Their preparations had come to the attention of the government, and on the night of 21±2 July when they made their move from their base at Staggia in Florentine territory, guards and scouts had been placed in anticipation. As the exiles were delayed, they arrived at the city as dawn was breaking, and the men who had been waiting in arms to repel them had concluded that they would not be coming after all, and had gone to bed. Among the ®rst to scale the walls, using ladders provided by three Riformatori sympathizers, was Pandolfo Petrucci, with Francesco Severini, Luzio Bellanti and Camillo Venturini, the son of Lorenzo. Overpowering the guard at the Fontebranda gate, they admitted the other exiles and the hired infantry they had brought with them. They encountered little opposition, but few rallied to them at ®rst. One group paraded through the city, crying `Popolo', `Nove', 99

100

Tommasi, Ìstorie', ff. 254r±255v; Malavolti, Dell' historia di Siena, Part III, ff. 92v±93r; Tizio, `Historiarum senensium', vol. VI, pp. 156±74; Allegretti, `Diarii', cols. 820±1. Malavolti, Dell' historia di Siena, Part III, f. 93v; Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 255v; Allegretti, `Diarii', col. 821; Tizio, `Historiarum senensium', vol. VI, pp. 176±9.

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`LibertaÁ' and `Pace'. Camillo Venturini led a second, larger group to the house of Cristofano Gionta. Tricked into leaving his house, Gionta was assassinated; Camillo Venturini struck the ®rst blow. Meeting up again at the Campo, the exiles forced their way into the Palace of the Signoria by threatening to burn the entrance gates if they were not admitted. The Popolare BalõÁa was annulled and a temporary commission appointed to take charge of affairs.101 On the whole, the treatment of the opponents of the returning exiles (one of the ®rst acts of the temporary commission had been to cancel all sentences imposed for political reasons, so all were free to return) was not severe. About thirty Popolari were penalized, eighteen of them by sentences of exile, from four months to ten years. Some men ± but, according to the of®cial record, only a few ± had already left the city on 22 July.102 There was much discussion and deliberation about the structure of the new regime, but on 5 December 1487 the Council of the People approved the establishment of a regime with a single government monte. Six weeks before, with some reluctance, the Council had approved another major change to the government of Siena, by agreeing to a list of twenty-four men who were to be members of the BalõÁa for one year and then, subject to con®rmation by the Council, for a further four years.103 Rankling grievances caused distrust among the various monti, and there were many unsettled scores that could not be wiped clean by the general amnesty. In February 1488 a plot came to light, which the BalõÁa claimed had been to expel the Nove from the regime again. At least one of those arrested, however, was a Novesco, Tommaso Fecini ± although most of those named as being involved were Riformatori, including Neruccio Buoninsegni and Maurizio and NiccoloÁ Luti, or Popolari, including two important ®gures, Crescenzio Gori and Agnolo Palmieri. These two, who had made their escape, and Neruccio Buoninsegni (after some months in prison) were sentenced to ®ve years in exile; others received lesser terms. Eighteen men were exiled altogether; a contemporary diarist noted that many Riformatori and Popolari ¯ed. A few months later, in June, another conspiracy, perhaps two conspiracies, came to light. One of those arrested, a priest named Ser Taddeo, was accused of spreading rumours to arouse unrest against the regime; 101 102 103

Malavolti, Dell' historia di Siena, Part III, ff. 94r±93bisr; Tommasi, Ìstorie', ff. 256v±257v; Allegretti, `Diarii', cols. 821±2; ASS, BalõÁa 35, f. 1r. ASS, BalõÁa 35, ff. 1r, 3v, 17v±19v; Allegretti, `Diarii', col. 822; Tommasi, Ìstorie', ff. 258r±259v. Shaw, `Politics and institutional innovation' (1997), 229±33.

50


another, a popolano, known as El Calvaia, was accused of plotting against the BalõÁa with two Riformatori, Filippo Simoni and Lodovico Luti. Two men, Lodovico Luti and Lorenzo Lanti, who had been named by Ser Taddeo, were sentenced to death, but the BalõÁa commuted these sentences to ®nes and exile. At least two other men were exiled too. El Calvaia was hanged.104 On 21 June 1489, a stronghold only a few miles from Siena, at Castelnuovo Berardenga, fell to a group of exiles, but they surrendered after only two days. Some of the exiles escaped, but six of them were detained, brought to Siena, and executed. A month later, nine men who had been named in the interrogations of the six were punished, four by exile.105 After this, although some stayed on the borders, ®nding refuge with minor lords or in Florentine territory, there were no serious incursions by the exiles for several years. By the early 1490s ®ve men, all former exiles, all members of the Monte dei Nove, had come to form the innermost circle of the regime: Antonio Bichi, NiccoloÁ Borghesi, Leonardo Bellanti and Giacoppo and Pandolfo Petrucci. The ®ve were not a very harmonious group, and were divided on some important issues. One of these was how to handle the exiles; another was how to meet growing pressure for the reform of the regime. But they did manage to have the BalõÁa reappointed for a further ®ve-year term in January 1492.106 In the heightened atmosphere of apprehension and excitement at the prospect of the arrival of the French in Tuscany in 1494, there were renewed demands for the return of the exiles and for reform. In an effort to repress these demands, in October the BalõÁa had some of their most vocal critics among the Riformatori and Popolari arrested and exiled, including several Buoninsegni; others left Siena to avoid arrest. Those already in exile were soliciting the help of Charles VIII. He declared his support for the regime in Siena, and ordered the exiles not to enter Sienese territory without the consent of the government. Nevertheless, the BalõÁa at last began to make arrangements to repatriate the exiles, appointing twenty-four men on 19 November to decide how this should be done. Charles passed through Siena in early December, without any disturbance breaking out in the city. The exiles, who had been asked to be patient until Charles left, waited on 104

105 106

Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 264r; `Diario senese', f. 63r±v; ASS, BalõÁa 408, f. 20r; BalõÁa 36, f. 54r; BalõÁa 533, 83: Crescenzio Gori and Agnolo Palmieri, 4 Mar. 1487(8), Montevarchi; BalõÁa 408, ff. 67v, 80r±v; BalõÁa 36, ff. 3r, 7r±v, 8v. Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 265r±v; Malavolti, Dell' historia di Siena, Part III, ff. 95v±96r; BalõÁa 36, ff. 143v±144v, 145v±147r, 164v±166r. Shaw, `Politics and institutional innovation' (1997), 242±8.

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the border until they were recalled. On 5 January 1495, the commission of twenty-four decided that all but half a dozen of the exiles (those considered the most obnoxious, rather than the most dangerous) could return, in groups of four, at ®fteen-day intervals.107 Though the exiles did as they were bid, and came home quietly, Siena was not at peace. After much discussion about how the regime should be re-ordered, a proposal that there should again be three government monti ± dei Nove, del Popolo and dei Gentiluomini, with the Monte dei Gentiluomini including the Dodici and 350 Riformatori, while the rest of the Riformatori were to be divided between the other two government monti ± was approved by the Council of the People on 20 March 1495. Many Riformatori, and some Popolari, were not satis®ed. The confrontation which had been threatening for months ®nally happened on 26 July, with ®ghting in the streets between the Riformatori and their Popolari allies, and the Nove, Dodici and Gentiluomini. The principal Popolari sided with the Nove, too. Some Riformatori and Popolari were sentenced to short terms of exile that same day, but they refused to leave. On 28 July, after a heated discussion at the Palace of the Signoria about who should disarm ®rst, in an attempt to defuse the situation over 400 Popolari and Noveschi left the city. Hundreds of others left too, including many of the Riformatori and Popolari who had been causing the agitation. What members of the BalõÁa remained met together and sent for the principal men who had gone; they came back the next day. On 10 August about thirty of the Riformatori and their allies were exiled, including the Popolari Giovanni and Roberto Severini, four Buoninsegni, including Neruccio, and several Luti.108 By the end of 1495, the evident ambition of Pandolfo Petrucci to win for himself a position of predominance in Siena was becoming a focal point of Sienese politics. He looked to Lodovico Sforza, who was backing the Pisans in their revolt against the Florentines, for support. For their part, the Florentines were as determined to recover Montepulciano (which had rebelled against Florence and made a pact of submission to Siena in March 1495) as the Sienese were to keep hold of it, and they had another important grievance against the Sienese, in the help they gave to Piero de' Medici's attempts to return to Florence. Pandolfo and his brother Giacoppo (before he apparently retired from active 107

108

Allegretti, `Diarii', cols. 832±4; Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 270r; ASS, BalõÁa 551, 35: Maestro Emmanuele, 19 Nov. 1494, Florence; ibid., 56: `Cives exititii senenses', 7 Dec. 1494, Colle Valdelsa; BalõÁa 259, ff. 35v±36r, 52v±55v; `Diario senese', f. 70v. Allegretti, `Diarii', cols. 836±7, 839, 851±3; ASS, Concistoro 771, ff. 18r±v, 51r±58r; `Frammento di diario senese', f. 216r; `Diario senese', ff. 54v±55v; ASS, BalõÁa 40, ff. 3v±6v.

52


participation in politics about the end of 1495) were the major champions in Siena of the exiled Medici.109 In return, the Florentines were ready to give active support to Sienese exiles, and to encourage the opponents of Pandolfo within Siena. Most active of these, until he became an exile in September 1496, was Luzio Bellanti, the brother of Leonardo Bellanti. The Florentines sent an impressive force of several thousand men, who approached the walls of Siena with the exiles on 31 January 1496. When there was no sign of a rising within the city, they withdrew. Whether Luzio Bellanti knew of this plan is not clear, but he was certainly involved in a plot in April 1496, when he and some Riformatori planned to admit the exiles and 500 infantry into Siena, and to kill Pandolfo, some Popolari and others. Continuing to conspire with the exiles, he hatched another scheme to kill Pandolfo and other principal members of the regime. When this plot was revealed in early September 1496, a week before it was to have been put into execution, Luzio decided it was best to make his escape; he was declared a rebel, and a price was put on his head.110 The Florentines continued to back the Sienese exiles. Some thought was given by the BalõÁa in August 1497 to bringing all but a dozen or so of the exiles back to Siena, to deprive the Florentines of the means of making trouble. There was still talk of doing this even after the discovery on 7 August of a conspiracy among some young Gentiluomini and Noveschi. During their interrogations, they spoke of intending to go to the BalõÁa to demand that Pandolfo should have no more power than the others, or even to kill him; but their primary intention was to kill the bargello, the police chief. Eight young men, including two Borghesi, NiccoloÁ di Buonaventura, and Pietro, and a Piccolomini, Bernardino, were sentenced on 16 August to exile, and some to spells in prison as well.111 The following month, on 18 September, for reasons which remain obscure, a group of twenty-three Riformatori and Popolari were given apparently new sentences of exile, or had changes made, generally in their favour, to existing sentences. There might have been a connection with the discussions that were under way about what should happen when the BalõÁa's term of of®ce came to an end in November. After 109 110

111

Shaw, `Politics and institutional innovation' (1997), 280±2, 292±5. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1263: Giovanni Malavolta, 2 Feb., 18 Apr. 1496, Siena; ibid.: Antonio Stanga, 7 Sept. 1496, Siena; ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 51, c. 57: Bindaccio Ricasoli, 18 Sept. 1496, Brolio; Allegretti, `Diarii', cols. 855±8. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1264: Antonio Stanga, 24 Aug. 1497, Siena; ASS, BalõÁa 41, ff. 208r, 215r±217v; N. Mengozzi, Ùn processo politico in Siena sul ®nire del secolo XV', BSSP 27 (1920), 186±241.

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considerable resistance, the Council of the People ®nally agreed, on 21 November, to a new BalõÁa to hold of®ce for ®ve years.112 Before Pandolfo could achieve the undisputed pre-eminence he wanted, he needed not only this BalõÁa but also a peace with Florence. The negotiations were prolonged and dif®cult, but a truce for ®ve years, with the Sienese keeping hold of Montepulciano for that period, was eventually concluded in September 1498. Among the conditions was that Florence should not give refuge to any rebel of Siena, nor anyone suspect to the regime. Soon afterwards, Pandolfo outlined to the Florentine ambassador his detailed plans for achieving a signoria in Siena for himself and passing it on to his descendants. If his plans included the exile of large numbers of his opponents, the ambassador did not report it, and in fact Pandolfo achieved his goal without that.113 The main opponent that Pandolfo had to deal with was his own father-in-law, NiccoloÁ Borghesi. His resentment of Pandolfo's ambitions had been evident for the past few years, but Pandolfo had managed to avoid outright confrontation with him. Eventually, though, Pandolfo decided the time had come to be rid of him, and sent assassins to set upon him in the street in July 1500; NiccoloÁ died of his wounds. Perhaps fearing to meet the same fate, Leonardo Bellanti ¯ed with his sons. At the end of November, a commission of six members of the BalõÁa, one of them Pandolfo, was given authority to make provisions for the return of all but four of the exiles. Soon afterwards Pandolfo tried and failed to make peace with Leonardo and his sons, but in February 1502 he and his four sons committed themselves to returning to Siena within a year.114 In Siena and all the other states, and among all the categories of exiles that have been considered in this chapter, political exile did not befall only the active members of political elites. When a man was exiled, members of his family ± his brothers, sons, father, nephews, his wife and children, friends, partisans, servants, anyone thought to be connected with him or sympathetic to him, could be banished as well, whatever their degree of complicity or innocence. Even if they were not formally 112 113 114

ASS, BalõÁa 41, ff. 228r±229r; Shaw, `Politics and institutional innovation' (1997), 301±3. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 58, cc. 243, 251±3, 281±2: Antonio Guidotti, 14, 15 Sept, 5 Oct. 1498, Siena; Malavolti, Dell' historia di Siena, Part III, f. 105v. Giuseppe Chironi, `Nascita della signoria e resistenze oligarchiche a Siena: l'opposizione di NiccoloÁ Borghesi a Pandolfo Petrucci (1498±1500)', in La Toscana al tempo di Lorenzo il Magni®co: Politica, Economia, Cultura, Arte, 3 vols. (Pisa, 1996), vol. III, pp. 1173±95; ASS, BalõÁa 46, ff. 145v, 155v±156v, 168v±169r, 199v.

54


sentenced, they might choose exile, either to help him or just for safety's sake. Political exile affected men and women, adults and children, princes and artisans, laymen and clergy, the politically privileged and the powerless. The following chapters will be concerned not only with the prominent and the powerful, but with all these groups, not only with the exile plotting to overthrow a government, but with the exile worrying over how to feed his children. All (except princes) can be observed among the Sienese exiles whose circumstances, experiences and exploits provide the models to which those of exiles from other states will be compared.

chapter 2

THE JUSTICE OF EX IL E

However they came to be there, many of those who found themselves in exile would have been the subject of a formal sentence. This might have been handed down before the exile left, and be the reason for his leaving. It might have been passed on someone who had already departed. Those driven out at the point of the sword by factional rivals could be sentenced later. Even those who had gone into voluntary exile to avoid trouble could be subject to penalties if they did not return when invited, or ordered, to do so. How these sentences were handed down ± who decided on them, who issued them (not necessarily the same people), what justi®cations were adduced ± bring out interesting aspects of notions of the state, and of political legitimacy in Renaissance Italy. What reason could a victorious political faction give for the expulsion of their rivals? What procedures could they adopt to give legal validation to political proscription? How far could a faction equate their interests with those of the state? The responses of the exiles to their predicament can be equally illuminating. Would they regard the sentences against them as lawful, would they regard them as justi®ed? Did they consider that they had been exiled by the government, or by their enemies? Did they accept that their exile came within the rules of the political game? What did they consider to be a legitimate reponse? The real reasons behind sentences of political exile from Siena ranged from conspiracy with foreign rulers, to being a member of a monte excluded from political of®ce, to merely being related to someone who had incurred the odium of in¯uential men in the regime of the day. This latter reason was, of course, never made explicit in the of®cial records. Some sentences would be easier to justify to non-partisans than others. Frequently, only a vaguely worded accusation, or no explanation at all, would be recorded with the sentence. Whether or not it was possible to provide evidence of wrongdoing or malign intent that constituted a threat to the security of the republic and the welfare of the city,

55

56


had a bearing on what procedure would be adopted. The better the evidence, the more convincing the case that could be made, the more formal the proceedings were likely to be and the greater the publicity given to them. However the sentence was determined, it was always essentially a political process. Sentencing was never left to the ordinary judicial of®cials. The PodestaÁ or the judges might be brought in to interrogate suspects, or to promulgate or enforce sentences, but only if there was some evidence of a conspiracy. Generally, sentences were decided by the political executive magistracies, the Concistoro or the BalõÁa. Those BalõÁe of the second half of the ®fteenth century which were not set up to administer wars were appointed to watch over the security of the regime, so dealing with exiles was one of their main responsibilities, an important element of their raison d'eÃtre. Sometimes, the task of deciding on sentences would be delegated to a small group whose names were usually kept secret. Another executive magistracy, the Of®cials of Ward, also had powers to issue sentences of political exile, subject to the supervision of the Concistoro or BalõÁa. The extraordinary circumstances of 1456 gave occasion for the most complex procedures used in Siena to determine and issue sentences of exile. Among those accused of treachery were some of the principal ®gures of the city, including the widely popular Antonio Petrucci, and one of the principal allegations against them was that they had conspired with Alfonso of Naples. Proceedings needed to be handled carefully, not only to avoid provoking unrest in Siena, but also to avoid offending the king. The driving force behind the investigations, Cristofano Gabrielli, used his term of of®ce as Captain of the People in July and August 1456 to initiate formal enquiries. Towards the end of August the Concistoro put before the Council of the People the evidence that had been discovered so far. The Council took the unusual step of giving powers to the outgoing Concistoro, rather than to the one that was to take up of®ce in September, to pursue the investigations and punish the guilty; they could coopt any citizens they chose to help them. It was these men who formed the BalõÁa which decided on the sentences of exile to be imposed on the conspirators and those found guilty of complicity with them. They were not empowered by the council to decide on capital sentences; the executions of Pietro Scacco Tancredi, Antonio Casucci and Tommaso Niccolucci were ordered by the Council, not the BalõÁa. The Council also declared on 30 August that Ghino Bellanti and his sons were rebels; after that, armed with their new powers, the BalõÁa issued the further sentences of rebellion on Mariano Bargagli and

the justice of exile

57

others. Using their delegated powers to the full on 14 September, the BalõÁa decreed that all sentences against the rebels and other exiles should be irrevocable, and that neither the BalõÁa nor the Concistoro should have the power to propose the cancellation of this ban. But when it came to sentencing Antonio Petrucci, the BalõÁa felt the need to ensure the support and invoke the authority of the Council of the People. When he did not obey a summons to appear before them, they decided to seek the endorsement of the Council, and on 13 October a meeting at which over 350 members were present decided, with full accord, that he should be a rebel, and be depicted as a traitor, head down, with the other rebels on the walls of the palace of the Captain of Justice.1 It was exceptional for the Council of the People to be so directly involved in the sentencing of exiles, but there was another instance of this in August 1480. After hearing the records of the interrogations of some men who had been detained on 27 August, the Council decided that two men, Jacomo di Mariano di Cecco and Francesco Guglielmi, both leading members of the Monte del Popolo, should be exiled in the contado at places to be assigned by the BalõÁa.2 The proceedings in 1456 did involve the judicial of®cials of Siena. Both the Captain of Justice and the PodestaÁ took part in the interrogation of suspects, though members of the Concistoro were deputed to be present, and they were charged with carrying out the executions of those condemned to death. They had no role in determining the sentences. As in many Italian cities, the PodestaÁ and Captain of Justice and their judges in Siena had to be foreigners, a measure intended to ensure that their decisions would not be in¯uenced by local partisan politics. Professional judges could be reluctant to become involved in political trials. Those called upon to interrogate Antonio Bellanti and Leonardo Gucci in 1483 refused to go, and had to be warned that continued refusal would bring dismissal from their of®ce and forfeiture of their salary. When the PodestaÁ was slow to carry out orders to proceed against several men, including Lodovico Luti and Lorenzo Lanti, accused of conspiring against the regime in August 1488, the BalõÁa took the matter into their own hands.3 The reluctance of individual members of BalõÁe to be involved with, or at least to be openly associated with, sentencing exiles could have 1

2 3

ASS, Concistoro 539, ff. 61r, 67v±69r; BalõÁa 2, ff. 8v±9r, 26r, 30r±v, 36r; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 256: Cristofano Gabrielli to Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 13 Oct. 1456, Siena. ASS, Concistoro 683, ff. 18r±v, 22r±v. ASS, Concistoro 539, ff. 64r±v, 68v; BalõÁa 27, f. 36v; BalõÁa 36, ff. 3r, 4r, 5v, 7r±8r.

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been a reason for the elaborate procedures adopted on occasion by a BalõÁa to determine sentences. They could also have been the outcome of dif®culty in coming to agreement on who should be exiled, and what penalties should be imposed. Another possible reason for them was a desire to contain or counter the in¯uence of any personal enmities or friendships of members of the BalõÁa for any of those being exiled. Whatever prompted the adoption of such procedures, they did not always work. The relatively straightforward method chosen by the BalõÁa of September 1456 did work. All the members, it was agreed, were to write on slips of paper what they thought should be done with those who had been named during the interrogations; a vote was taken on the proposals on the slips, with a two-thirds majority needed for their adoption. On this occasion there was no controversy about who should be punished, and it was only a question of deciding what the punishment should be. In August 1487, when a BalõÁa which included some men who had just returned from several years in exile and some who had been members of BalõÁe in the previous regime came to consider who should be punished and how, they found it hard to reach agreement. To begin with, on 1 August, six members of the BalõÁa, whose names were to be kept secret, were elected to draw up a list of those they thought should be singled out. When the list was read out a week later, a secret ballot was held, to draw up a short list. The next day, `so that everyone may speak his mind and cast his vote without fear', it was agreed that the members of the BalõÁa should be divided into eight groups, each of which should put in writing the punishment it thought appropriate for each individual on the list. The slips were to be placed on the altar in the chapel of the palace, and would be read out one by one and then voted on by secret ballot. This was done on 10 August, but no proposal received the requisite two-thirds majority. After a discussion, the members agreed to vote on the proposed punishments for each individual until one got two-thirds of the votes, and at last the BalõÁa was able to come to some decisions. In July 1489, there was an attempt to use a similar method to decide the fate of those detained or named in interrogations after the exiles had taken Castelnuovo Berardenga. All the members of the BalõÁa were to note their opinions on slips of paper which would all be read out and voted on. The attempt was soon abandoned, and that same day, 24 July, the Prior of the BalõÁa (the chairman for the day) was authorized to choose four members whose names were to be kept secret, to draw up proposals for sentences. Another group of four segreti were to draw up alternative pro-


59

posals. These four segreti were a powerful standing committee of the BalõÁa, and it was their provisions that were adopted.4 The involvement of such segreti in deciding sentences was not new, but the revival of an earlier practice. When groups of Dodici and Gentiluomini were exiled as a precautionary measure in 1436, 1447 and 1451,5 it was six segreti who selected who was to go and where they were to be sent. Neither the BalõÁe of 1456±8 nor those of 1480±7 are known to have had recourse to segreti to decide on sentences.6 From the surviving registers of BalõÁa deliberations for the late 1480s and 1490s, it appears that during those years the segreti generally exercised the BalõÁa's powers of sentencing to political exile. By that time, the other magistracies that had powers to pass sentence on political exiles, the Concistoro and the Of®cials of Ward, had apparently ceased to do so. These Of®cials of Ward, ®rst appointed in March 1457,7 had a watching brief over public order, which meant that their ®eld of competence inevitably overlapped that of the Concistoro and of BalõÁe. Even when there was a BalõÁa, the Of®cials could deal with matters of some gravity. In February 1485, they sentenced one of the principal Riformatori, Filippo Buoninsegni, to two years' exile in the contado for stirring up discontent by asserting (with some justice) that a clique of citizens had banded together to procure of®ces for themselves. A year later, in January 1486, it was they who ordered the exile of several men named in the trials of Lodovico Tolomei and TomeÂ Gori. It is probably signi®cant that these cases came up at times when it was dif®cult for the BalõÁe then in of®ce to assemble a quorum. After 1487, the surviving records indicate that the Of®cials of Ward did not deal with important cases, or were not left to deal with them alone. They had a role in the proceedings in 1488: Lorenzo Lanti recalled making a plea bargain with Pandolfo Petrucci, one of the of®cials at that time. The PodestaÁ, the four segreti and the full BalõÁa, and a group of members of the BalõÁa specially elected to make proposals for the punishment of those detained in this affair, all had a ®nger in this particular pie as well. In the end, the BalõÁa approved the proposals made by the elected group, with the segreti being given the `same authority' as the Of®cials of Ward to proceed against two of the accused.8 The Sienese were certainly not exceptional in using political rather than judicial procedures to determine sentences of exile. In thirteenth4 5 6 7 8

ASS, BalõÁa 2, f. 8r; BalõÁa 35, ff. 12r, 16r±17r; BalõÁa 36, ff. 161v, 162r, 164v. See below, pp. 76±7. ASS, Concistoro 421, f. 43r; Concistoro 490, ff. 44v, 46r; Concistoro 517, f. 23v. They replaced an earlier, similar, body, the Nove di Reggimento. ASS, BalõÁa 36, ff. 3r, 7r±v; Concistoro 1591, ff. 51v±52r, 60v±63r; BalõÁa 548, 94: Lorenzo Lanti, 12 Mar. 1491, Camerino.

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and fourteenth-century Italy, sentences of exile had most often been handed down by `Captains of the party in power or, more frequently, by a BalõÁa, an extraordinary magistracy or council created to watch over the ``preservation'' of this party and its government.'9 In ®fteenth-century Italy, too, sentences of political exile were rarely imposed by judicial bodies. As in Siena, where the ordinary judicial authorities were involved they operated under the orders of political authorities. Their involvement could be restricted to arresting and holding men to be exiled, and sometimes conducting interrogations, especially if torture was used. If judicial of®cials issued sentences, it would be under instruction. Thus on 8 September 1433, the Signoria of Florence ordered the Captain of the People (a judicial of®cial in that city) to exile Cosimo and Averardo de' Medici. The Pazzi conspirators were exiled in 1478 by the PodestaÁ, acting under instruction from the Eight of Ward and a BalõÁa. The PodestaÁ of Bologna and his men were involved in tracking down and interrogating those implicated in the conspiracy to kill Giovanni Bentivoglio in 1488, and those who were executed were hanged from the battlements of his palace. Proceedings began, however, with the challenge by Giovanni Bentivoglio to Giovanni Malvezzi to admit his part in the plot before the Sixteen, the political body which constituted Bentivoglio's of®cial base for his dominance in Bologna; and it was the Sixteen who decided on the sentences of exile imposed on the Malvezzi and others.10 Where sentences of political exile were decided by political councils or committees, as in Siena, there could be several with power to issue them ± some permanent bodies, others ad hoc. The Florentine exiles of 1433, 1434 and 1466 were sentenced by specially appointed BalõÁe. In 1478, there was already a BalõÁa at the time of the Pazzi conspiracy, and it was this BalõÁa and another regular magistracy, the Eight of Ward, which issued the sentences. In 1494, Piero de' Medici was exiled by the regular supreme magistracy, the Signoria, which, ironically, had lost much of its power under the Medici regime. In 1458 it was the Eight of Ward who dealt with Girolamo Machiavelli and those arrested and exiled with him, while the Signoria ordered 150 citizens to their villas. In the ®rst half of the ®fteenth century, authority to order political exile was not part of the ordinary duties of the Eight of Ward, and they needed a grant of special powers from the Signoria. Such grants were for limited 9 10

Heers, L'esilio, p. 49. Angelo Fabroni, Magni Cosmi Medicei Vita, 2 vols. (Pisa, 1788±9), vol. II, pp. 75±9, 91; Angelo Poliziano, Conjurationis Pactianae anni MCCCCLXXVIII commentarium, ed. Giovanni Adimari (Naples, 1769), pp. 139±55; Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, pp. 495±6, 505±8; Cherubini Ghirardacci, Della historia di Bologna, parte terza, ed. Albano Sorbelli, RRIISS 33, i (CittaÁ di Castello, 1915±16), pp. 250±2.


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periods, up to six months at a time, but from 1458 the Eight were granted authority over political offences for longer periods and this was regularly con®rmed and extended. These powers of the Eight and of the Signoria gave rise to some disquiet in Florence. In 1431, there was a proposal to increase the number of votes needed for the Signoria to exile a citizen. In 1465, Agnolo Acciaiuoli ± himself to be exiled the following year ± proposed that the powers of the Eight and the Signoria to pass sentences of exile by six votes should be withdrawn; others agreed with him, but some thought the `six votes' were an effective deterrent to potential evildoers. In 1495, there was prolonged debate in Florence about whether it was right that six votes in the Signoria should suf®ce to pass a sentence of exile. Those maintaining that it was not included Girolamo Savonarola, who argued that it would be better if more citizens were involved in determining such matters, and some of the principal citizens opposed to the popular tenor of the new regime. They wanted to diminish the standing of the Signoria, and make it more dif®cult for themselves or others to be exiled if they were found to be plotting to change the regime, or keeping armed men in their homes. In the end, a provision was passed allowing appeals to the Great Council against sentences of exile.11 In Venice, the Ten was the body most frequently involved in passing sentences of political exile, often acting alone, sometimes enforced by the members of other political committees. In 1492, when two men put forward a scheme for aiding impoverished nobles at the expense of of®ce-holders that did not meet the approval of the richer and more powerful patricians, it was the Ten and the College that banished them. It was the Forty who in 1475 banished Grimaldo Grimani for ten years for forging letters from the Doge.12 The Doge himself was not involved in promulgating sentences of political exile. The Doge of Genoa, who had greater powers of political initiative, could do so, as when Pietro Campofregoso issued a decree exiling many Spinola in 1453. Princes did not need to appoint special commissions, or use ordinary councils, to issue sentences of political exile. Their own will, their own command, was suf®cient, if they chose. No formal deci11

12

Kent, Rise of the Medici, pp. 247, 295±6; Rubinstein, Government of Florence, pp. 116±18, 125±7, 137±8, 144, 188, 192, 222; Fabroni, Cosmi Medicei Vita, vol. II, pp. 75±9, 91; Poliziano, Conjurationis Pactianae, p. 139; Rubinstein, `Politics and constitution in Florence', pp. 150±1; Guido Pampaloni, `Fermenti di riforme demogratiche nelle consulte della Repubblica Fiorentina (novembre±dicembre 1465),' ASI 119 (1961), 245±9; Alessandro Gherardi, Nuovi documenti e studi intorno a Girolamo Savonarola (2nd edn, Florence, 1887), pp. 112±20. Sanudo, Vite dei Dogi, pp. 16±17, 129, 147±8; Queller, The Venetian Patriciate, p. 31.

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sion of the ducal council was required to send the Sforza brothers into exile from Milan in 1477, or Ascanio to exile on his own in 1480. After the assassination of Girolamo Riario, his widow Caterina Sforza took personal charge in ForlõÁ of the interrogations of those she considered to have been disloyal to him: she sent over ®fty into exile. In Ferrara, Ercole d'Este was reported in 1474 simply to have ordered his brother Alberto to leave for Naples within three days, or be considered a rebel and lose all his property. The councils of princes, however, could be involved in ordering political exiles. The small inner circle of the Consiglio Segreto of Duchess Bona, for example, issued the order exiling several faction leaders from Parma in October 1477.13 Control from the centre over the political exile of men from subject towns and cities was the rule in the dominions of Florence and Venice, as it was in Siena. In Florence there was a statute reserving to Florentine of®cials the right to banish from Florentine territory, and sentences issued by the councils of subject towns were to be revoked. Local of®cials may have been responsible for issuing such sentences, but they would usually be acting under orders from the capital. Those exiled from Volterra in 1471 and 1472 were sentenced by the Florentine captain of Volterra, on the instructions of the Signoria of Florence. One captain, Bernardo Corbinelli, who exiled some Medici partisans in March 1472, was implementing a decision by a BalõÁa of Ten created by the Volterrans; but that decision was endorsed, albeit reluctantly, by the Florentine Signoria before he pronounced the sentences. Corbinelli was not happy about some of the sentences he was instructed to pronounce, and other Florentine of®cials could show reluctance to be as severe as the authorities back in Florence wanted them to be. We have written so many times to the captain that the best means of securing Pisa is to empty it of Pisans, that we are tired of it, the Dieci di BalõÁa of Florence wrote to Averardo de' Medici when he was a commissioner in Pisa in January 1432. You must see to it that every kind of severity and harshness is used, because any other medicine will not work. On other occasions, it was the Signoria that gave direct orders for mass exiles of Pisans.14 The Florentines had something of a reputation among their con13

14

Prandini, Ì carteggi diplomatici sforzeschi', 236; Natale Graziani and Gabriella Venturelli, Caterina Sforza (Milan, 1987), p. 119; Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, p. 439; Santoro, Gli Sforza, pp. 183±4. Lauro Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968), p. 467; Fumi, L'Impresa contro Volterra, pp. 97, 101±3, 110±11; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. I, pp. 344, 550; Fabroni, Cosmi Medicei Vita, vol. II, p. 8: Dieci di BalõÁa to Averardo Medici, 14 Jan. 1431(2), Florence; Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa', pp. 312, 315±16.


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temporaries for their oppressive attitude to their subject towns. The Venetians ¯attered themselves that their rule was so just and mild that it was welcome to their subjects, but nevertheless kept watch for indications of political dissent. In 1464, after members of the Rota family of Bergamo wrote to Venice about rumours that two-thirds of the Bergamaschi ± including Bartolomeo Colleoni, the Venetian commander ± favoured the return of their city to Milanese rule, Colleoni insisted that action be taken to clear his reputation. Two of the Rota were exiled, perhaps to appease Colleoni, whose contract was due for renewal. Less overtly political matters could also be dealt with in Venice, rather than at a local level. `Venetian councils, preferring caution to complacency . . . saw political implications within ordinary acts of violence.'15 When one patrician of Vicenza, Leonello Nievo, wounded another, Cristoforo da Barbarano, in 1473, the Ten sentenced him to exile. By the end of the century, even incipient feuds between patricians could provoke a threat of perpetual exile by the Ten. Fifteenth-century popes could not match in the Papal States the control that the Venetians exercised over their subject territories. Enforcing greater respect for their government from their subjects was one of the most consistent aims of successive popes, and sentences of exile and rebellion were an important weapon for them. The pope could simply command the exile of men from towns in the Papal States, as when Sixtus IV ordered Cardinal Ammanati, the legate of Umbria, to expel the leaders of the Chiaravallesi and Catalaneschi factions from Todi in 1471±2. Alternatively, he could add his authority to a sentence by one of his local representatives. Soon after the governor and PodestaÁ of Rieti had pronounced sentence of exile on several men from Rieti who had roused their fellow citizens to active opposition to papal of®cials, Nicholas V sent a commissioner. He summoned a solemn assembly of the people of Rieti, con®rmed the sentence passed by the governor, and declared that those who had been outlawed by the governor from the territory of Rieti would be considered outlawed from all the lands of the Church. Local papal of®cials had the authority to exile men from their jurisdiction for political reasons, without instruction or con®rmation from the pope. Thus the auditor of the governor of the Patrimony sent nine men out of Viterbo for their own safety in 1454, because he feared they would be attacked by their factional rivals. In 1459, the rector of the Patrimony declared sixteen members of the Maganzesi faction rebels.16 15 16

James S. Grubb, Firstborn of Venice: Vicenza in the Early Renaissance State (Baltimore, 1988), pp. 103±4; Belotti, Bartolomeo Colleoni, pp. 316±20. Flavio di Bernardo, Un vescovo umanista alla Corte Ponti®cia: Giannantonio Campano (1429±1477) (Rome, 1975), pp. 293±4; A. Sacchetti Sassetti, `La famiglia di Tomasso

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But the pope and his of®cials often had to take account of the claims of communal councils to powers of issuing sentences of political exile in their own right. Even when there was a representative of the pope resident in a town, the local councils could still exercise such powers. The communal council of Spoleto exiled two men accused of plotting against the regime in 1455, though initially Calixtus III had ordered the papal governor to take cognizance of the case. The Spoletans had protested, and got permission to deal with the matter themselves. On occasion, the pope could desire communal authorities to endorse a sentence, but he would not necessarily get his way. Pius II asked the Orvietans to promulgate a sentence of rebellion that he had passed on two men from the Monaldeschi family, who had raided the territory of neighbouring Bolsena, and to register it in their public records. These men belonged to the dominant Melcorini faction in Orvieto, and the Orvietan Conservatori did not comply. Instead they sent to Pius to represent to him what dishonour this would bring to the Melcorini, whom they described as devoted subjects of the Church. Appreciating that if he insisted he might stir up the factions he was trying to pacify, Pius acquiesced in their refusal.17 The role of papal of®cials in exiling the Malvezzi from Bologna in 1488 was limited to the presence of the chancellor of the vicelegate at some of the interrogations; the sentences were decided by the communal authorities, the Sixteen. At Perugia about the same time, the aftermath of the expulsion of the Oddi saw something of a contest between the Perugians and a papal legate as to who should determine the sentences on the exiles. An extraordinary body, the Dieci di Arbitrio, passed sentences condemning the Oddi as rebels, and the Perugians asked the pope to con®rm them. Innocent was inclined to query the legitimacy of the Dieci, and sent a legate, Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini, to deal with the matter. The Perugians wanted the Oddi to be considered rebels against the Church, or at least Perugia. Piccolomini agreed that the Oddi should be sentenced as exiles, but not as rebels. Eventually, after two months of negotiation, the legate con®rmed sentences of exile on the Oddi and their allies, but they were only to be considered rebels if they failed to observe the con®nes set for them.18

17

18

Moroni e le fazioni in Rieti nel secolo XV', BSPU 12 (1906), 105±6; della Tuccia, `Cronache di Viterbo', pp. 58, 77±8. Achille Sansi, Storia del comune di Spoleto dal secolo XII al XVII, 2 vols. (Foligno, 1879±84), vol. II, p. 45; L. Fumi, `Pio II (Enea Silvio Piccolomini) e la pace di Orvieto', Studi e Documenti di Storia e Diritto 6 (1885), 252±3. Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, p. 506; degli Azzi, Ìl tumulto del 1488 in Perugia', 432±4, 437±9, 454, 470±1; `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni' 9 (1903), 318±19.


65

Just as there was no standard procedure for sentencing men to political exile in Siena, so there was no standard pattern to the sentences imposed. Political exiles from Siena were not banished for offences against any speci®c laws, with set penalties. There were no rules, customs or traditions governing the length of sentences, or whether or not additional penalties would be imposed, or what these might be. (How far there was a consistent policy determining the crucial matter of where exiles would be sent is considered in the next chapter.) The occasion when exiles were sentenced ± not by which body or for what reason ± was the most important determinant of whether they would have a ®xed term to their sentence, how long the sentences would be if they were ®xed and what additional penalties would be imposed. Those sentenced at one time might all be given ®xed terms, for example, while another group exiled shortly before or afterwards were not. But even those exiled at the same time could be given different types of sentences. Over all, ®xed terms were imposed in 58 per cent of the 400 cases of Sienese exiles known to have been sentenced. Fixed terms tended to be short terms. Of the 231 cases where sentences were ®xed, the terms were of ®ve years or less in 177 cases (77 per cent); of two years or less in 102 cases (44 per cent). Those accused of conspiracy in 1456±8, or exiled during the persecution of the Noveschi in 1483, were most likely to be given long sentences. If no ®xed term was set, a minimum length of sentence was often speci®ed, but with the condition that at the end of that term the exile had to stay away until the BalõÁa or the Council of the People allowed him to come back. In view of the strict regulations forbidding the question of the return of exiles even to be put before a council,19 and the absence of any record of a petition being considered from exiles seeking leave to return at the end of their ®xed term, it may be that such permission was dif®cult to obtain. Sometimes, however, this condition was attached to a term of exile of only a few years; were such sentences in fact meant to be inde®nite? Some sentences were. The majority of those exiled in 1480, for example, were not given ®xed terms, or speci®ed minimum terms. The forty-four men exiled on 5 July 1480 were simply assigned places of exile, which they were not to leave `without the permission of the regime'.20 Some examples of how the length of sentences varied for different batches of exiles are shown in Table 2.1. Many Sienese exiles suffered additional penalties, generally ®nes or exclusion from political of®ce (ammonizione) for a speci®ed term or for 19 20

See below, pp. 207±8. `senza licentia del Reggimento': ASS, BalõÁa 20, f. 20v.

66


Table 2.1 Variations in the length of sentences of Sienese exiles Note only those exiles whose sentences are known are included; terms have been rounded up to the nearest year. 1456±8 ®xed

not ®xed

total

25 (74%)

9 (26%)

34

of those given ®xed sentences 6 2 1 5 1 4 1 5

men were sentenced to

2 years 5 6 10 16 25 30 life

1480±1 ®xed

not ®xed

total

40 (27%)

110 (73%)

150

of those given ®xed sentences 14 21 1 3 1


1 year(s) 2 3 4 life

1482 ®xed

not ®xed

total

36 (88%)

5 (12%)

41

of those given ®xed sentences 17 3 1 7 4 2 1 1


1 year(s) 2 3 4 5 6 8 10


67

1484±6 ®xed

not ®xed

total

18 (69%)

8 (31%)

26

of those given ®xed sentences 3 5 1 8 1


1 year(s) 2 3 5 6

1488±93 all were given ®xed terms 10 2 2 2 5 3 1


1 year(s) 2 3 4 5 6 15

1497±8 ®xed

not ®xed

total

18 (62%)

11 (38%)

29

of those given ®xed sentences 8 3 4 3


1 year(s) 2 3 4

life. As with the length of sentences there was considerable variation in their incidence. Some exiles were ®ned, some were ammoniti, some were both ®ned and ammoniti. Such additional penalties could be imposed some time after exiles had been sentenced, or on self-exiles, so calculations of their incidence have been made taking all the known cases into account, and not just those for which the sentences are known. When the exiles are divided into their four main cohorts, it is those sentenced in 1456±8 who appear the most likely to be ®ned and excluded from political of®ce. Half of them (50 per cent) were ®ned, and two-thirds (59 per cent) were ammoniti ± in 20 out of the 26 cases of ammonizione, for life. A third (30 per cent) of those exiled in 1480 to May 1482 were ®ned, but for the most part a little after they had been

68


sentenced, when levies were imposed on many Riformatori, some exiles, some not. The general expulsion of the Riformatori from the regime in June 1480 meant that there was no need to impose separate sentences of ammonizione on Riformatori exiles; only 6 per cent of this second cohort were ammoniti individually. Very few, only 4 per cent, of those sentenced between June 1482 and June 1487 were speci®cally ®ned, but again levies were imposed on the Nove generally to provide money for reparations for the Riformatori, and these would have fallen on many of the exiles as well as on those Noveschi who stayed in Siena. About 6 per cent of this cohort are known to have been ammoniti for ®xed periods. In July 1483 a group of over ®fty self-exiles were threatened with being ammoniti for life (as well as the con®scation of their property), if they did not return to Siena, as most of them seem not to have done.21 No exiles in this cohort are known to have been ammoniti for life at the time they were sentenced. According to Sigismondo Tizio those exiled following the execution of Lorenzo Venturini in 1486 were also ammoniti, but he did not note for how long they were to be barred from political of®ce.22 Of the known exiles from July 1487 to 1500, two-®fths (18 per cent) were ®ned, and a quarter (25 per cent) ammoniti, mostly (39 out of 45 cases) for life. There was considerable variation in the pattern of the sentences for different groups. For example, of those sentenced on 10 and 11 August 1487, all were ammoniti, mostly for life, some for a ®xed term. Some were ®ned, some were ordered to surrender without compensation property they had bought from the comune, some were both ®ned and ordered to return property, some suffered no ®nancial penalty. Of those sentenced on 29 July 1489, all were ®ned and none were ammoniti. None of those sentenced on 18 September 1497 were either ®ned or ammoniti.23 The most severe additional sanction that could be imposed on an exile was to be declared a rebel or an outlaw (bandito). Often sentences of rebellion or outlawry were imposed on men who were already in exile, as punishment for activities such as plotting against the regime or taking part in an armed foray into Sienese territory. But a man could be declared a rebel just because of guilt by association, for being in the company of those who had already been condemned as rebels. Just under a third (29 per cent) of the known Sienese exiles were declared rebels or outlaws at some stage; of these, forty-two (21 per cent) were 21 22 23

ASS, BalõÁa 29, ff. 46r±47r. Tizio, `Historiarum senensium', pp. 172±3. ASS, BalõÁa 35, ff. 17v±19v; BalõÁa 36, ff. 164v±166r; BalõÁa 41, ff. 228r±229r.


69

Table 2.2 Of®ce-holding before exile by Sienese declared rebels or outlaws at the time of their sentence

held of®ce before in Concistoro before in BalõÁa before

rebels

outlaws

(n=26) 20 (77%) 19 (73%) 5 (19%)

(n=16) 5 (31%) 5 (31%) 1 (6%)

subjected to this additional penalty from the outset of their sentences. Why they should have been singled out in this way is not always clear; it was not a punishment reserved for political leaders, or for those who had committed some act of violence. The practical effects of being declared a rebel or an outlaw were much the same: con®scation of property, liability to a capital sentence if caught in Sienese territory, stiff penalties for those Sienese who had any contacts with them. Rebels were, if anything, further beyond the pale than were outlaws; sentences as a rebel were always inde®nite, while it was possible to be outlawed for a limited term. Those who were outlawed at the time they were sentenced to exile were on the whole less prominent individuals than those who were declared rebels. They were much less likely to have held political of®ce in the Concistoro or BalõÁa, or in the Council of the People (see Table 2.2). The one man who had been a member of a BalõÁa before he was outlawed was Giovanni Severini. He and his brother Roberto, together with the brothers NiccoloÁ and Lodovico Luti, were outlawed in August 1495, after the attempts to win back a bigger share in the regime for the Riformatori. Labelling a man such as Giovanni Severini, who had been one of the principal Popolari for over a decade, as an outlaw rather than a rebel may have been a calculated insult; he and Roberto had been declared rebels when they were exiled on a previous occasion, in 1486. Apart from not being politically prominent, the other eleven men outlawed at the time of their sentence were a mixed bag. They included a barber and a shoemaker, sentenced together with many others on 24 April 1483 during the troubles following the expulsion of the Nove from the regime, and three Gentiluomini. Aldello Piccolomini was one of three men outlawed because they had gone to join the exiles occupying Monteriggioni in 1483; Giovanni Marescotti was outlawed in the same year for actions against the regime and the liberty of Siena, in company with rebels and outlaws; and in 1486 Andrea Buonsignori was

70


outlawed for contumacy and disobedience, after he was named in the trial of Lodovico Tolomei.24 Of the twenty-six men declared rebels at the beginning of their exile, fourteen incurred this penalty because they had been summoned to appear before the Concistoro or a BalõÁa in 1456 or 1480 and had not obeyed. Failure to obey such a summons could be viewed as prudence rather than disobedience, for their guilt was presumed and they could expect to be punished, perhaps severely. In 1480, another man summoned to appear before the BalõÁa (who did obey), two who were captured and another man who had been arrested were also made rebels and sent off to imprisonment in Naples. Pietro Bellanti, who had been held in 1456 but escaped, was declared a rebel after he led an assault on the Palace of the Signoria. Five Severini brothers, including Giovanni and Roberto, were made rebels in 1486 simply because one of them, Francesco, was the principal rival of the extremist Popolare leader, Cristofano Gionta. Luzio Bellanti was declared a rebel after he ¯ed the city following the discovery of his plot against Pandolfo Petrucci in 1496; Alessandro Sozzini, for associating with rebels in 1481.25 In its lack of a consistent policy or set of guidelines for determining sentences of political exile, Siena may well be typical of ®fteenthcentury Italian states. Only for Venice and Florence, however, is enough information currently available for even a tentative outline of sentencing patterns to be made. Of these two, Florence is like Siena in apparently having no set guidelines for the length of sentences, or for the imposition of additional penalties. In Florence, it appears that ®nes were only occasionally imposed as the concomitant of a sentence of exile. Neither the Medici exiled in 1433 nor Rinaldo degli Albizzi and his sons exiled the following year were ®ned, but their property was to be obligated for the payment of taxes and the observation of their sentences. Donato de' Barbadori, exiled for ten years in 1434, was ®ned 600 ¯orins. Domenicho Lamberteschi, exiled at the same time for ®ve years, was to pay 1000 ¯orins within ten days or be liable to pay 2000. Girolamo Machiavelli, sentenced to twenty-®ve years' exile in 1458, was ®ned 800 ¯orins (to be reduced by half if he paid within ten days), but as his property was also con®scated, it seems curious that he was ®ned at all. No ®nes were imposed on those exiled in 1466 or 1478. Nor was there a clear policy on the exclusion of exiles from political of®ce. The Medici were declared to be `magnates' in 1433, which 24 25

ASS, BalõÁa 40, ff. 4r±5v; Concistoro 720, f. 5r±v; BalõÁa 28, ff. 29v±32v; BalõÁa 27, f. 19r; BalõÁa 30, f. 25r; Concistoro 1591, f. 63r. ASS, BalõÁa 20, f. 44r; Concistoro 539, f. 68v; Concistoro 720, f. 5±v, BalõÁa 23, f. 60v; ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 51, c. 57: Bindaccio Ricasoli, 18 Sept. 1496, Brolio.


71

would have rendered them ineligible for political of®ce. Rinaldo degli Albizzi and his sons were initially declared to be deprived of all of®ces for eight years, but when the BalõÁa revised their sentences a month later on 3 November 1434, they were barred from of®ce in perpetuity. The Acciaiuoli, Neroni and Soderini exiled in 1466 were to be ineligible for of®ce for twenty years, the period of their term of exile. In 1478, none of those sentenced to exile was explicitly excluded from of®ce.26 Venice appears to have been unique in having a body of legislation against political offences which actually speci®ed set terms of exile. A decree of the Ten in 1494, for example, laid down a penalty of ®ve years' exile and ten years' subsequent exclusion from political of®ce for offering or receiving bribes in elections. How far these guidelines were observed when sentences were being passed on those found guilty of breaking such laws is not clear. Venice was like Siena and Florence in varying the imposition of other penalties along with sentences of exile. Grimaldo Grimani, accused of forging dogal letters, was imprisoned for one year, exiled for ten, ®ned 300 lire and forbidden to hold the of®ce of camerlengo (chamberlain) anywhere under Venetian rule. Three men found guilty of failing to reveal what they knew of an electoral conspiracy in 1457 were exiled for ®ve years and also deprived of all of®ces for ®ve; Benedetto Foscarini, convicted of threatening to arrange the defeat in elections of Paolo Barbo unless he was paid a bribe, was exiled for ®ve years and excluded from of®ce for ten years; Ranuzio Cornaro, accused of unauthorized intervention in negotiations for the raising of a papal interdict, was barred from all councils and of®ces for life, and exiled for ®ve years.27 The variations of the sentences of political exile imposed in Florence and Siena were probably due to the lack of sentencing guidelines, rather than to attempts to match the severity of the sentence to the severity of the offence. Admittedly, in many cases the exact or the true reason for an individual being banished is not known, so that it is not possible to analyse the correlation between the severity of the sentence imposed, the incidence of additional penalties and the seriousness of the offence. Nevertheless, the picture that emerges from what is known is that the groups of men who sat down to determine sentences of political exile 26

27

Fabroni, Cosmi Medicei Vita, vol. II, pp. 79±80, 92; Cesare Guasti (ed.), Commissioni di Rinaldo degli Albizzi per il Comune di Firenze, 3 vols. (Florence, 1867±73), vol. III, pp. 651±3, 655, 657±64; Timpanaro, Tolu and Viti, Consorterie politiche, p. 25; Municchi, La fazione antimedicea, pp. 138±9; Poliziano, Conjurationis Pactianae, pp. 139±55. Queller, The Venetian Patriciate, pp. 99±100, 105, 246; Sanudo, Vite dei Dogi, pp. 16±17.

72


did as they thought ®t, rather than what might be thought just by impartial observers. Inevitably, there was ample scope for enmities and friendships to in¯uence what was decided. And then the apprehension of how politically dangerous an individual might be would not be based solely on what he had done, but also on what he might do. The degree of prevailing political tension would also come into play. If the atmosphere was highly charged, innocents could easily suffer. Sentences of political exile did not always have a great deal to do with justice. So to what extent was it felt necessary to justify them? In what circumstances would a reason be given for a sentence of political exile? What kind of explanations would be given and who would they be given to? The justi®cations offered for sentences of political exile ± and indeed whether any justi®cation was felt to be desirable or necessary ± provide an interesting perspective on notions of political authority and legitimacy. Would a challenge to a regime be treated as an offence against the state? The issue was clearer in states ruled by lords or princes, where to oppose the prince was to challenge the authority of the head of state. But in republics men could more easily distinguish between the state and its legitimate government, and the regime that was governing at the time. Could the members of a regime represent the actions or words of their opponents as threats to the state? Would a threat to the regime be considered suf®cient justi®cation for exile? In Siena it was the exception, not the rule, for a sentence of political exile to be accompanied by a description of the exact offences alleged to have been committed. Of the 391 cases in which the of®cial record of the sentence is known, in only 90 (23 per cent) was a speci®c reason given. In 67 cases (17 per cent) a vague, generic reason, such as the `misdeeds' (`demerita') of the individuals concerned, was recorded. Sixtytwo (16 per cent) of the cases were part of groups for whose exile several reasons were given, without any indication of which offences applied to which individuals. In 172 (44 per cent) of the cases, no reason for the sentence was recorded at all. As Table 2.3 indicates, speci®c reasons for political exile were most likely to be given for those exiled in the 1450s, following the discovery of conspiracies with Jacomo Piccinino. The exiles of the early 1480s, when many men were expelled for no more obvious reason than that they were Riformatori, were most likely to be part of a group for whose sentences a blanket justi®cation was offered, or only a vague reason given. Exiles in the middle of the 1480s tended to have either a speci®c reason given for their sentences, or none at all. No reason was recorded for the great majority of the known sentences from 1487 to


73

Table 2.3 Justi®cation for the sentences of Sienese exiles, by cohort

1456±8 1480±May 1482 June 1482±June 1487 July 1487±1500

speci®c % (no.)

imprecise % (no.)

group % (no.)

none % (no.)

total % (no.)

76 (26) 2 (3) 41(48) 13 (13)

15 (5) 36 (50) 5 (6) 6 (6)

0 (0) 34 (47) 13 (15) 0 (0)

9 (3) 28 (39) 41 (47) 81 (83)

100 (34) 100 (139) 100 (116) 100 (102)

(90)

(67)

(62)

(172)

(391)

the end of the century ± perhaps because more sentences during that period were being decided by the segreti. The various groups of segreti did indeed tend not to provide an explanation for the sentences they passed. Their customary secretive mode of procedure, which meant that the motives for their decisions could be as mysterious as their identities, caused resentment. This surfaced in an ineffectual provision passed by 314 votes to 15 in the Council of the People on 23 June 1495, which declared that there were to be no more segreti `so that offences that are committed may be punished publicly'.28 By contrast, the sentences recorded in the special registers of the judicial decisions of the Of®cials of Ward and the Concistoro nearly all included details of the offence committed, for political transgressions as for cases of theft, blasphemy or sodomy or disrespectful behaviour to public of®cials. Antonio de' Saraceni, for example, was exiled for six months in February 1482 by the Of®cials of Ward because `he made some remarks derogatory to the present peaceful government [statui] of the magni®cent city of Siena, and which could cause some disturbance and illfeeling among the citizens, especially if they are not punished in some way'.29 BalõÁe were more inconsistent in recording explanations of their sentences of political exile. The fullest explanation of all was provided by the BalõÁa that sentenced the conspirators of 1456, while for the sentences of the succeeding BalõÁe in 1457±8 no reason was generally given, or at best, a vague one ± `his misdeeds', às a troublemaker [scandolosus]'.30 Assessing the signi®cance of whether or not justi®cations were recorded for sentences of political exile is problematic. Elaborate explanations could be constructed on no ®rmer foundation than the varying 28 29 30

ASS, Concistoro 772, ff. 20v±21r. ASS, Concistoro 1591, f. 32v. ASS, BalõÁa 4, ff. 133v±134r; BalõÁa 6, f. 200v.

74


practices of different notaries. Some notaries may have felt it appropriate to record a reason, however vague, for sentences of political exile, while others did not. Or was it the members of the body passing sentence that decided whether or not a justi®cation should be recorded? If no justi®cation was given, was it because they thought none was necessary, or because none was possible? In any case, what was the intended audience or readership for such justi®cations? There is no indication that sentences of political exile were customarily made public by proclamation, or by being read out to the Council of the People. The volumes of the deliberations of the Concistoro or the BalõÁa in which sentences were recorded would presumably not be available for just any interested citizen to consult. Members of the Concistoro and the BalõÁa were not supposed to reveal to others what had been discussed at their meetings, so as individuals they could not, overtly at least, make known the justi®cation for sentences. Leaks of information no doubt occurred, and in the case of the BalõÁa, whose members (unlike the Priors and the Captain of the People) were not resident in the Palace of the Signoria during their term of of®ce, there would have been opportunities to discuss cases with non-members before sentences were passed. Of®cially, however, little effort appears to have been made to publicize the rationale for sentences of political exile. The BalõÁa's decision in 1458 that the sentences they had passed on the Catasta brothers and Giacoppo Petrucci for plotting to betray Rocca a Tentennano to the rebels should be read out from the steps of the Palace of the PodestaÁ, was the exception, not the rule.31 Exceptional, too, was the publicity given to the sentences passed against the conspirators of 1456. Accounts of the interrogations of the detainees were read to the Council of the People, as was the incriminating evidence found in the papers of Antonio Petrucci. Because of Antonio Petrucci's popularity with many Sienese, a damning letter he had written to Jacopo Piccinino's agent, Broccardo Persico, was read aloud from the steps of the Palace of the PodestaÁ, after the bell had been rung to summon the people. Copies of the letter were sent to Milan to Francesco Sforza, and to his ambassador in Florence to show to the Florentines. A history of the actions of the conspirators, from the time of the arrival of King Alfonso in Tuscany, was commissioned from Agostino Dati.32 The conspirators' connections with Alfonso were the reason for this careful dissemination of the justi®cation for the actions 31 32

ASS, BalõÁa 6, f. 185r. ASS, Concistoro 539, ff. 61r, 67r; BalõÁa 2, ff. 36r, 71v; BalõÁa 397, f. 189r±v; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 256: BalõÁa of Siena to Nicodemo, 13 Oct. 1456.


75

that were taken against them. Reprisals by Alfonso, or by Piccinino acting with the backing of Alfonso, were feared, and the leaders of the regime wanted to be assured that Florence and Milan would come to their aid if Siena was attacked. On other occasions, when it was felt that other powers might have a special interest in men who had just been exiled, the Sienese government sent to explain what had taken place. Lorenzo Lanti, who had been appointed senator of Rome in 1482 and had served as Sienese ambassador there, had powerful friends in the curia and in the household of Innocent VIII. After Lanti was arrested in June 1488, Innocent wrote to recommend that he be treated mercifully. Wishing to preserve the goodwill of the pope, the BalõÁa sent assurances that his recommendation of clemency had in¯uenced their decision in the case, with a transcript of the sentences passed on Lanti and those accused with him.33 When the Severini brothers were exiled in September 1486, the BalõÁa wrote to Cardinal Piccolomini in Rome and to the Florentine Dieci di BalõÁa. Rumours had been spread that Francesco Severini had been one of those who received money from Florence to facilitate the surrender of the towns taken from the Florentines during the Pazzi War. The regime did not want to anger the Florentines. The BalõÁa's letter stressed that the Severini brothers had been expelled because their behaviour had provoked the Sienese people to demand that they be punished. An envoy was sent to make the case in more detail. Concern about preserving the goodwill of Cardinal Piccolomini, a valued advocate for all Sienese regimes in Rome but one who repeatedly urged the virtues of unity and reconciliation, prompted the despatch of the letters to him, so that he `could easily demonstrate to everyone that in our city we live with justice, mature counsel and full consultation in public interests and affairs'.34 Both letters from the BalõÁa stressed that the people had not been willing to lay down their arms until the exile of the Severini brothers had been con®rmed by the proper authorities;35 that to the Dieci di BalõÁa in Florence emphasized the desire of the people to `maintain this our popular regime', and how èverything was done to establish it more ®rmly'.36 When the recorded sentences of the BalõÁa or Concistoro or the Of®cials of Ward mentioned the danger that those exiled had posed, it was usually the threat to the peace of the regime, rather than that of the republic, that was uppermost in the mind of whoever drafted them. 33 34 35 36

ASS, BalõÁa 408, ff. 90r±91r. ASS, BalõÁa 406, ff. 79v±80v, 83r±v, 84r±v. In this instance, apparently, the Concistoro (ASS, Concistoro 720, ff. 5r±6v). ASS, BalõÁa 406, ff. 83r±84v.

76


As usual, the sentences passed by the BalõÁa in of®ce from September 1456 to the middle of April 1457 are exceptional in their phrasing: the danger to the republic, to the patria, takes precedence. The motive given for the sentences passed on 15 September 1456 was the many grave crimes and conspiracies, treacheries, nefarious gatherings and diabolical plots perpetrated by Bartolomeo Petrucci, Antonio del Catasta, Guido Picchiati, Bartolomeo de' Stini and Antonio di Girolamo, against the republic, `their sweet home, to disturb its peaceful government, cause dissension in the regime, rouse all the people furiously to arms, and subvert and endanger the liberty [of Siena], and disrupt the general peace of all Italy'.37 Other sentences included mention of more general public interests, but the interests of the regime were given greater prominence. Benedetto Martinozzi, Antonio Bichi, Leonardo Bellanti and others were sentenced on 15 July 1482 `because of their actions against the republic and their bad works and life, and for the greater security of the present regime'.38 Francesco del Marretta and his brother and son were exiled in September 1484 for `many actions to the detriment of our republic and the present popular regime and its citizens'.39 On other occasions, the interests of the regime were given top billing. The sons of Cristofano Gabrielli and the others exiled (and some made rebels) on 24 July 1480, were sentenced for `what they have tried to do against the peace and quiet, indeed to the disruption, of the present regime'.40 Two small groups of men were exiled in November 1482 for their actions against `the peaceful government of the present regime'.41 The accusation against those exiled by the Of®cials of Ward in January 1486 was that they had not revealed what they had learned of matters `to the detriment and prejudice of the present popular regime, and in favour of the exiles [esiliati], outlaws, rebels and con®nati of the present regime'.42 Opposition to the regime was evidently considered suf®cient justi®cation for political exile from Siena. Indeed, even potential opposition was considered suf®cient justi®cation. The rationale behind the despatch of leading Dodici and Gentiluomini to the contado when the Emperor Sigismund or the Emperor Frederick were on their way to Siena, or when King Alfonso of Naples was in Tuscany with his army in 1447, or even when an epidemic aroused fears of a coup in the depopulated city, was simply the removal from the city of those excluded from the regime who might try to exploit the situation. In April 1436, the 37 39 41 42

38 ASS, BalõÁa 26, f. 36v. ASS, BalõÁa 2, f. 12r. 40 ASS, BalõÁa 20, f. 43r. ASS, BalõÁa 32, f. 41r. ASS, BalõÁa 26, ff. 135v, 154v. ASS, Concistoro 1591, f. 60v.


77

year of the epidemic, the Council of the People instructed the Concistoro to appoint six men, whose names were to be kept secret if the Concistoro thought ®t (as it did), to exile ®fteen or more citizens òf those who are not members of the regime'.43 In October 1447, six segreti were elected by the Concistoro `to exile those citizens who have no part in the regime'.44 There was no requirement that there should be any evidence of attempted contacts with the emperor or the king, or of open expressions of discontent. Not being a member of the regime was, in certain circumstances, justi®cation enough for exile. Whether the Sienese were unusually cynical in taking this attitude can only be established when the terms used by other states to justify sentences of political exile have been investigated systematically. What justi®cation, if any, did the Signoria of Florence record for the despatch in August 1458 of 150 Florentine citizens to their villas? This measure was part of the preparations for a parlamento of Florentine citizens which was to be asked to approve the appointment of a BalõÁa: the removal of those who might be expected to oppose the measure. Could this have been acknowledged in the records of the Signoria?45 In November 1458, the Eight of Ward justi®ed the extension of the sentences on the exiles of 1434 to their sons and other descendants by declaring it to be `for the preservation of the present peaceful government [stato]'.46 For the Florentines, the fact that Pisa was `full of Pisans' was suf®cient justi®cation for the Signoria to order that the Captain of Pisa should thin their ranks by exiling some.47 Florentines could pay more attention than this to the niceties of justifying political exile from their subject towns. The ten men exiled from Volterra in November 1472 were accused of words and deeds àgainst the form of the law, both civil and canon, the statutes, edicts [riformagioni] and ordinances of the city of Volterra, and against the good, paci®c and peaceful government [statum] of the commune and people of Florence and the Guelf party and against good and laudable customs'. Comprehensive as this list of offended authorities might sound, the Florentine captain responsible for issuing the sentences did not believe them to be fair.48 When it came to the exile of prominent citizens in politically controversial circumstances, the Florentines could produce lengthy justi®ca43 44 45 46 47 48

ASS, Concistoro 421, f. 38r. ASS, Concistoro 490, f. 41r. Rubinstein, Government of Florence, p. 117. ASF, Otto di Guardia (repubblica) 224, ff. 85v±86r. Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa', pp. 315±16. Fumi, L'impresa contro Volterra, pp. 102±3.

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tions, disseminated with great care. Dissemination began with the procedures adopted in such cases. The BalõÁe that passed sentence on the exiles of 1433, 1434, 1466 and 1478 were much larger than the BalõÁe of Siena. Florentine BalõÁe had well over a hundred, even over two hundred, members; Sienese BalõÁe a few dozen. Simply by virtue of such large councils being involved in passing sentences, the justi®cations offered for them would be more widely known. Partisan instruments these assemblies might be, but the reasons put forward for the sentences they passed emphasized threats to the republic, not the regime. In 1433 Cosimo and Averardo de' Medici were accused of conspiring àgainst the government of the commune of Florence' and of `the crime of lese-majesty', by seeking to prevent a member of the Peruzzi family from becoming Gonfaloniere di Giustizia, and of fostering the war against Lucca, which was àlmost the ruin, not only of the Florentine republic, but of the whole of Italy'. They were also described as `most determined and cruel enemies of the present government [status] of the city of Florence, and disseminators of scandal between that government and the citizens', but the whole lengthy indictment presented them as dangerous enemies of the republic and the city, not just opponents of a regime.49 The records of the consulta of 2 November 1434 which discussed the punishment of Rinaldo degli Albizzi and his associates state that Ìt was an obvious error that began in 1433 in the month of September [when the Medici were exiled]; and that error gave rise to this other, of those who wanted to act against the Signoria and against the Palace.' The Palace was that of the Signoria, and though the term was sometimes used as a synonym for the government, in this case it was meant literally, for Rinaldo degli Albizzi and his allies had prepared to assault the building.50 By their actions, they had given their opponents the opportunity to present the revenge of one faction against another as just retribution for a challenge to the authority of the Signoria. The leaders of the opposition to Piero de' Medici in 1466, by their connections with Borso d'Este, also gave their enemies the chance to accuse them of threatening the liberty of Florence. To summon a foreign army, impiously to take up arms in his homeland and to endanger its liberty, was the worst crime a citizen could commit, the sentences against them declared, but although the law laid down harsh punishments for such enormities, these men would be treated more

49 50

Fabroni, Cosmi Medicei Vita, vol. II, pp. 75±8. Guasti, Commissione di Rinaldo degli Albizzi, vol. III, pp. 650±1.


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mercifully than they deserved.51 Accusations of treason could be brought against the Pazzi, too, who had conspired with a foreign power to subvert the government of Florence, àf®rming this could not be done, unless Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici were killed'. Their fellow conspirator, Archbishop Francesco Salviati, had tried to force his way into the Palace with armed men, planning, it was alleged, to kill the Signoria.52 The papal anathema that was brought down on Florence by the execution of Francesco Salviati and the temporary detention of Cardinal Raffaele Riario, who had been in the cathedral when Giuliano was murdered, not to mention the failure of the conspiracy, provoked a campaign by the Florentines to publicize their version of events. A Florentine synod issued a formal refutation of the pope's arguments; the chancellor of Florence, Bartolomeo Scala, wrote an open letter, `The Justi®cation of the Florentines', that was printed and widely circulated abroad, in which he incorporated the confession of one of the conspirators, Gianbattista da Montesecco. This confession had already been read out to the ambassadors of Milan and Venice in the Palace of the Signoria.53 When the Perugians were justifying the expulsion of the Oddi and their allies in 1488 they sent different explanations to Florence and to Rome, as the Sienese had done when explaining the exile of the Severini brothers in 1486. To the pope, they accused the Oddi of disturbing the peace, of provoking rioting even when the pope's own brother, Maurizio Cibo, had arrived in the city as its new governor. They did not characterize the actions of the Oddi as offences against the republic or the regime. They did, however, ask the pope to con®rm as rebels those who had been `made rebels by the Dieci di Arbitrio for the welfare and repose of the city, saving the authority of His Holiness . . . as otherwise this republic will not easily ®nd rest, in view of their pestilential and abominable ways'. The explanation given to the Florentine Signoria had a different emphasis. The Perugian envoy was to speak of those that had been made rebels `by this republic . . . for their grave misdeeds and their sedition and disturbance of the peaceful government [stato] of this republic of Perugia'. He was to recount their `pestilential ways' and how they had been `the origin and cause' of the recent violent events.54 Princes too could feel impelled to give quite elaborate justi®cations for the exile of important people, and to publicize them widely, inform51 52 53 54

Municchi, La fazione antimedicea, pp. 136±8. Poliziano, Conjurationis Pactianae, pp. 139±43. Roscoe, Life of Lorenzo de' Medici, vol. I, pp. 391±440; Brown, Bartolomeo Scala, p. 84. degli Azzi, Ìl tumulto del 1488 in Perugia', 437±8, 441±2.

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ing other states as well as their own people. Disloyalty, disobedience and attempts to arouse revolts were the principal accusations made against the most prominent exiles from the duchy of Milan. When the Sforza brothers agreed to go into exile after their failed attempt to oust Cicco Simonetta in 1477, and Roberto da Sanseverino ¯ed from Milan and was condemned as a rebel, Duchess Bona made a speech to explain what had been happening. Assembled to hear it were the ambassadors of Naples, Florence, Ferrara, Mantua and Monferrato, àll our councillors and magistrates and a great number of our courtiers, gentlemen and leading citizens' of Milan, so that the duchess could `make clear to all the treacheries and plots perpetrated against us and our government [stato], not without grave peril of the destruction of the peace of all Italy'. Roberto she accused of aspiring to become lord of Novara, of trying to take over the fortress of Pavia, of fomenting disaffection and riots in Parma, and of rebellion, in refusing to attend council meetings when specially summoned by the duchess. Her brothers-in-law she accused of conspiring against her husband Duke Galeazzo Maria before he was assassinated. Although she had treated them well, they had sought to take from her and her son, the young duke, not just the government, but also their lives. They had tried to rouse the people of Milan to revolt, behaving like enemies and rebels. While their actions merited severe punishment, as they were dear relations and because it was the of®ce of a worthy prince to show mercy, she had decided to send them into exile.55 Copies of the sentences passed and of the confession of Donato del Conte were sent to Venice in such haste that no clean copy was kept in Milan, so that the ambassador was instructed to return them immediately after he had read them out before às large a number of gentlemen as possible'. A similar letter was sent to the Milanese ambassador in Savoy, who was to read his copies to the Duchess of Savoy, ìn the presence of her council and as many gentlemen and courtiers as possible', before passing them on to Marco Trotti in France so he could communicate them to the king.56 After Ascanio Sforza was arrested in 1480, accused of conspiring with the Ghibellines of Milan, the duchess did not give such wide publicity to the reasons for his sentence, but on the day he was sent into exile she still summoned all the ambassadors and had her secretary read out her justi®cation. Ascanio was dear to her, but he had been badly advised, and he had caused the whole city to take up arms; he had endangered the entire duchy, as trouble in Milan would spread to other cities. He 55 56

Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, vol. II, pp. 20±4. Rosmini, Dell'istoria di Milano, vol. IV, p. 167.


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had been warned several times to cease this partisan activity, but he had refused, so that the duchess had, to her sorrow, been forced to remove him. Lodovico Sforza also took pains to publicize his reasons for declaring Roberto da Sanseverino, already in exile, a rebel in 1485 for plotting against him. Before the Duke of Milan and his council, the ambassadors of Venice, Florence, Naples and Ferrara, and some gentlemen, Sanseverino was declared a rebel and an enemy of the government [stato] by the PodestaÁ. Lodovico recounted all the bene®ts Sanseverino had received from the Sforza since the days of Francesco, and then all his treacheries and offences against them. He showed letters written by Sanseverino to the castellan of the Castello of Milan, who was involved in the plot, and an agreement that he had made with him; a Jewish doctor who had been an intermediary in the plot con®rmed the truth of what had been said. Lodovico Sforza's main concern when he formally condemned Giangiacomo Trivulzio as a rebel in April 1495 was apparently to publish the justi®cation for the sentence within the duchy of Milan. Copies of a proclamation declaring him to be a traitor for persisting in serving the enemies of the Duke of Milan, were to be read out in the cities of Pavia, Parma, Piacenza, Lodi, Cremona, Alessandria, Dertona and Como, and in the Milanese camp. It was also to be read by a Milanese herald to Trivulzio himself in the French camp, and an Italian and French text of the denunciation were to be left there. Lodovico hoped that some of his commanders would challenge Trivulzio, saying that they wished to prove the charge that he was a traitor by personal combat with him.57 Presumably, Giangiacomo Trivulzio, the Sforza brothers, the Oddi and the Florentine and Sienese exiles would regard their own behaviour in a different light. But even if they would not have agreed that their offences were as heinous as they were pictured to be, might they have been ready to concede that there was some justi®cation for their banishment? One major difference between the political exiles of ®fteenthcentury Italy and their counterparts in the thirteenth century, Randolph Starn argued, was that those of the ®fteenth century were more ready to accept the legitimacy of the government that had expelled them and to acquiesce in their exile.58 Looking at what ®fteenth-century exiles said, let alone what many of them did, it is dif®cult not to conclude that the contrast between them and their thirteenth-century predecessors has 57

58

ASMa, AGonzaga, b. 1627: Zaccaria da Pisa, 3 Mar. 1480, Milan; ASS, BalõÁa 524, 61: Tommaso Biringucci, 27 July 1485, Florence; Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, vol. II, pp. 223±6. Starn, Contrary Commonwealth, pp. 101±7.

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been too strongly drawn. While the institutions and traditions of government and the territorial identity of the states of ®fteenth-century Italy were more ®rmly founded and more clearly delineated than those of two centuries before, there was still the room, and the wish, for institutions to be challenged. Even if they did not question the legitimacy or the utility of the institutions of government, ®fteenth-century Italians were quite capable of distinguishing between the legitimate authority of the state and its claim on their loyalty and obedience, and what could be regarded as the illegitimate appropriation of the state by the members of a regime, whose authority and claims to obedience could rightfully be challenged. Sienese exiles who articulated their opinion on the justice of their exile in letters to the authorities back home usually protested that they were innocent, and their punishment undeserved. Very few admitted to any degree of error in their conduct before they were expelled. `Because I said what I should not,' wrote Francesco di Mino, one of the few to confess any fault, in December 1456, `divine justice has allowed that I should err against that for which, apart from God, man is born, before [his duty] to his father and mother.'59 Francesco's contrition may have been stimulated by the fact that he was in prison and wanted the BalõÁa to change the place of exile they had assigned to him for one where he would be better able to take care of his family. Lorenzo Lanti was asking for the same favour, or even the annulment of his exile, when he wrote in September 1489 calling on the BalõÁa to remember that ìf at a time of ¯ood, I too was carried away by that ruinous storm, you should not be surprised. Saint Peter denied Christ out of fear and later was Prince of the Apostles.' Nothing had happened to alter his goodwill towards them, he assured them.60 Bertoccio Marzi was less apologetic in May 1489 when he asked the BalõÁa to let him return `to our common homeland', and declared that he had always been disposed to obey them èven though one not very big error on my part did not seem to me to merit such severe punishment'.61 Most of the exiles who wrote could not manage even this degree of contrition. Languishing in a Neapolitan prison in 1482, Tommaso Luti, expressing hope that the Signoria would soon have its `pure, innocent and distressed citizens back in their homeland and city and amend the injustices done and the wrongful decisions', described the exile to Naples of himself and his fellow Riformatori as òur most bitter, 59 60 61

ASS, BalõÁa 491, 32: Francesco di Mino, 18 Dec. 1456, ìn prison'. ASS, BalõÁa 541, 29: Lorenzo Lanti, 2 Sept. 1489, Camerino. ASS, BalõÁa 539, 74: Bertoccio Marzi, 8 May 1489, Rome. He had been sentenced to a year's exile in the contado for insulting the bargello.


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inhuman and iniquitous expulsion'.62 Ì do not want to do penance for another's sins,' protested Lodovico Martinozzi in June 1483. Ì am very upset about being exiled, having done nothing to deserve such punishment, and I can only think of one reason, that someone is planning to make himself rich from my property.'63 As members of the Concistoro or of BalõÁe or of the Of®cials of Ward, Sienese politicians may have been ready to accept that opposition to the regime, or even suspicion of opposition to the regime, was suf®cient justi®cation for exile. As exiles, they viewed the matter rather differently. By emphasizing their innocence or by protesting their loyalty to their homeland or the `Palace', exiles could make an implicit distinction between the regime that had exiled them, and which it might be expedient for them to obey, and the Sienese state or government, to which they felt loyalty was due. He would go to `la Rocca' where he had been given con®nes, wrote Mino Tricerchi to the BalõÁa in May 1483, but `considering the danger and what has happened and that often BalõÁe have their hands forced', he would prefer to be allowed to stay out of Sienese territory. Recommending himself to them, he asked them to `bear in mind my perpetual ®delity to the Palace and to all the citizens'.64 Àlthough I have been very badly treated', Achille Petrucci protested in 1485, `nevertheless, I would not want for any reason to stray from my good intention to be obedient' to the BalõÁa, ànd to who governs, and has always governed, [in] that Magni®cent Palace'.65 Two years before, Petrucci had lectured the members of an earlier BalõÁa on the principles of good government. He could not imagine, he told them, for what offences he had been exiled. They might reply that ìt was not for superiors and lords to give reasons for what they did, either in matters of justice or in other ways; but it suf®ces that ``this is what pleases us and what we wish'', and ``what I wish and what I command''. To this I recognize and admit that I cannot ®ttingly make reply, and that I have to be patient.' He just wanted to say `that all the works of lords and superiors, according to all the writings and all the witness of worthy men, should be such, and in every way, that they conform to and are in accord with justice and mercy, imitating the supreme creator of all things and nature, that is, God, as much as possible and more'.66 `That I should be treated in this way,' Cino Cinughi 62 63 64 65 66

ASS, Concistoro 2051, 99: Tommaso Luti, [ June 1482?]. ASS, BalõÁa 511, 15: Lodovico Martinozzi, 5 June 1483, Castello della Pieve. ASS, BalõÁa 510, 7: Mino Tricerchi, 2 May 1483, Acquapendente. àd chi ghoverna et ghovernava sempre cotesto Magni®co palazzo': ASS, BalõÁa 526, 47: Achille Petrucci, 26 Jan. 1485, Foligno. ASS, BalõÁa 510, 26: Achille Petrucci, 8 May 1483, Rome.

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complained, `when you want to judge rightly, I certainly have not deserved it. And I think it would also be displeasing to God that a poor old man, and sick, should be treated in this way for no reason . . . God knows that I have never thought of doing anything but good and what would be to the welfare of all the citizens and of the city.'67 In view of his activities at the centre of the plotting of the exiles of his day, Cino's protestations have an ironic ring. In an earlier letter the irony is explained, and intensi®ed. Ìf I have done anything that was or seemed to be against the government [stato], I was forced to do it, because to the man who is away from his home (unjustly, in my opinion) it does not appear un®tting to look out for his own welfare.' He believed, he said, that when the BalõÁa wanted to judge rightly, they would perhaps ®nd more good than harm in him. But `the servant could never be in the right against his master, and therefore I, as a servant, ask pardon from all for anything I have done'.68 Such explicit criticism of the justice of their government's actions as Sienese exiles made would have run counter to the conventional response of Florentine citizens to political exile. When Averardo de' Medici was exiled in 1433, Neri Capponi advised him to obey, `remembering the experience of Messer Carlo Zene and Messer Donato Acciaiuoli and myself; we all reconciled ourselves to obedience, and indeed if one does so, all ends well; otherwise things turn out badly'. Averardo replied that all the commands of the Signoria `must be regarded as just and honourable and reasonable, and one must await pardon and restitution from them'.69 According to Vespasiano da Bisticci, Palla Strozzi `never complained of his exile or of anything that had been done to him'.70 The reaction of Filippo Strozzi to the extension in 1458 of the sentences of exile imposed on his family to those like himself, who were among the sons and descendants of the men originally exiled in 1434, was philosophical. Ì remain very patient, since it was done with the consent of those who govern, because I am sure they did it only for the good and peace of the entire city. For this reason I will not diminish the good will I feel for the principal citizens, nor the love I have for my homeland.'71 Filippo Strozzi was writing to his mother, but one cannot help but think that the letter was written with an eye to it being shown to others, perhaps to some of `the principal citizens'. Even Palla Strozzi was not 67 68 69 70 71

ASS, BalõÁa 521, 9: Cino Cinughi, 12 Dec. 1484, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 514, 69: Cino Cinughi, 12 Sept. 1483, Rome. Kent, Rise of the Medici, pp. 312±13. Vespasiano da Bisticci, Le vite, ed. Aulo Greco (Florence, 1976), p. 158. Phillips, Memoir of Marco Parenti, p. 95.


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quite so uncomplaining as da Bisticci portrayed him, referring in his will of 1447 to the losses he had suffered because of the òutrageous taxes and burdens placed upon me, and my exile'; and commenting in his will of 1462 that taxes had been imposed on him `solely to cause my ultimate ruin'.72 The Medici in exile in Padua and Venice in 1433±4 studiously avoided speaking ill of Florence, but their attitude, as ìngenuously revealed' in the letters of the youngest of their number, Francesco, the grandson of Averardo, was reminiscent of that adopted by some Sienese exiles. They àssumed the role of offended Florentine patriots, careful not to do or say anything that could be interpreted as hostile to their city (as distinct from the party of their opponents) and that might in consequence have impeded their pardon and recall, whenever their partisans succeeded in bringing about a change of government'.73 It would be interesting to know how Venetian political exiles responded to their sentences. Would the exalted notions of the dignity of the Venetian state held by Venetian patricians and citizens have helped to instil a sense that their sentences were just punishments, especially if they had been exiled for breaking explicit rules with set penalties? One would certainly not expect to ®nd exiles from the other great maritime republic, Genoa, admitting guilt and expressing contrition. The Genoese had clear ideas about what was legitimate and what was illegitimate in the conduct of public affairs, but the contests for the Dogeship and the battles between the factions constituted a separate sphere of action from the routine business of government. Plotting against their enemies, forcing their way back into the city, were clearly regarded as a challenge by the exiles to the Doge as a partisan ®gure, not as the head of state, a challenge to the dominance of their rivals, not to the legitimacy of the institutions of the republic. Attacking the dogal palace in Genoa was not seen as a treasonable act, as attacking the Palace of the Signoria in Florence was. Those expelled from cities after faction-®ghting, even if they were formally sentenced afterwards, would be unlikely to have felt compelled to express even formal acceptance of the justice of their fate. Exiles from signorial dynasties, if they had claimed at least a share of power or the right to inherit power, were evidently disinclined to regard their exile as a legitimate act. NiccoloÁ d'Este, as he pressed his 72

73

Francis William Kent, `The Making of a Renaissance Patron of the Arts', in F. W. Kent et al., Giovanni Rucellai ed il suo Zibaldone II: A Florentine Patrician and his Palace (London, 1981), p. 23. Dale Kent, Ì Medici in esilio: una vittoria di famiglia ed una disfatta personale', ASI 132 (1974), 18±19.

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claim to be the rightful duke of Ferrara, accused Ercole d'Este of holding `my state'.74 The Sforza brothers were exiled in 1477 fundamentally because they challenged Bona's right to be regent for her young son Giangaleazzo Maria; they claimed that their brother, Galeazzo Maria, had unjustly excluded them from that share of power that their father Francesco had intended them to enjoy. They regarded the duchy of Milan as a species of property, in which all Francesco's legitimate sons should have a part. In such circumstances, Lodovico Sforza could denounce his own exile as `wicked' (ìmpio'), even though he had been exiled for conspiring against the regent and her chief councillor, Cicco Simonetta.75 What exiles said or wrote about the legitimacy of their exile and of the authority of those who had expelled them has to be set beside what they did. It has to be borne in mind that compliance or non-compliance by an exile with the terms of his sentence is not a reliable guide to his acceptance or rejection of its legitimacy. Obedience cannot always be taken as a sign of acceptance of the justice of exile; it might only have seemed the expedient course to take. On the other hand, an exile who was prepared to admit the justice of his sentence might be compelled by the need to earn his bread to break the con®nes set for him; consequently, not obeying the terms of a sentence of exile cannot be assumed to be an unambiguous rejection of its legitimacy. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that exiles would have plotted and schemed and taken up arms to force their way home ± as so many did ± if they felt that they had been justly exiled. Those in power, or on the winning side, might be ready to feel that it was legitimate to exile political opponents just because they were political opponents. To those in exile, political defeat might not seem suf®cient and legitimate cause for them to have been driven from home. Political exiles in the ®fteenth century might not have constituted themselves into formal communities, with their own statutes and seals, setting themselves up as a kind of alternative state, as those of the thirteenth century sometimes did. But this did not mean that they were necessarily ready to accept the authority of those who exiled them, or quietly to reconcile themselves to their fate. 74 75

ìl mio stato': Cappelli, `NiccoloÁ d'Este', 436. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. IV, p. 209.

chapter 3

PL ACES OF EX I L E

Deciding where exiles would be ordered to go was an important matter. Those making the decision had to take into account what element of punishment (other than being banished from home) it was intended to in¯ict. Was it intended to make it possible for the exiles to have a comfortable life, to earn their living if need be, or should they be made to struggle for money, and be deprived of congenial society? And then there was the question of how dangerous they were considered to be, how likely it was that they would be obedient. Would it be safer to keep them within the jurisdiction of the state, so that they could be supervised by its own of®cials, or should they be sent well away? Might a place of exile be chosen in the expectation, perhaps the hope, that the exiles would not want to go or stay there, and would thus lay themselves open to a sentence of rebellion? Or should they be sent to a place that would suit them, where they might have property, and family and friends, and would this encourage them to be obedient? For the exiles, whether to go where they were ordered to go, and whether to stay there if they went, were also important questions. Not going to the assigned place of exile, or leaving it without permission before the sentence had expired, were grounds for condemnation as a rebel. Even those exiles bent on revenge from the start would need to consider carefully the risks they ran if they disobeyed. Those who did not want to cause trouble or to get into further trouble, but found conditions dif®cult where they had been sent, could ask for permission to move ± permission that might be granted. If it was refused, the dangers of incurring further penalties had to be weighed against present dif®culties. Those who did decide to move on for whatever reason, or those who had been allowed some discretion in choosing where to go, had to consider not only where they could settle comfortably, or make a living, or ®nd support, but whether their choice would cause suspicion back home ± and also whether they cared if it did.

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It is generally easier to work out why exiles went where they did ± because often they did not go where they were told to go, or if they went there, did not stay there ± than why they had been told to go where they were supposed to. The reasons behind the assignation of a place of exile are rarely obvious. No record of the discussions about who should be sent where has come to light for Siena, or for any other state. Given the circumstances in which those discussions would have taken place ± the political tension, the scope for the play of personal motives, of friendship and patronage, enmity and vengefulness ± it is indeed unlikely that a written record of them would have been kept. The considerations brought to bear on each individual case can only be inferred, in some instances, from what is known of that individual's career and connections, and about the reasons for his exile. Such inferences, even in the best-known cases, need to be drawn with caution in the absence of other evidence, and of course it has to be borne in mind that mistakes and miscalculations could be made. If it is so dif®cult to be sure in most cases of the reasons why individual exiles should have been ordered to go to one place rather than another, were there policies or traditions about where exiles of a particular state or city should be sent which shaped the decisions made? In Siena, there does not appear to have been any clearly de®ned tradition or policy. Different groups of exiles were disposed of in quite different ways, with the political considerations which were behind the sentence often having more in¯uence than the merits or demerits of the individuals concerned. Over all, the majority were ordered to stay in the contado, either in speci®c places or at a set distance from the city, sometimes at a set distance from the borders.1 The places to which 1

Whatever the legal distinction between relegatio (exclusion from certain places) and con®natio (con®nement to certain places) (Starn, Contrary Commonwealth, pp. 18, 81, 118), in practice in the ®fteenth century the terms seem to have been used indiscriminately, or as synonyms. An exile could be described as `con®natus et relegatus', like Salimbene Capacci, exiled to Camerino in 1481 (ASS, BalõÁa 29, f. 51r); or Domenico Lamberteschi, `con®nato, relegato' to Verona in 1434 (Guasti, Commissioni di Rinaldo degli Albizzi, vol. III, p. 661); or the Neroni, `relegati et con®nati' to Sicily; or the Acciaiuoli, `relegati et con®nati' to Barletta and beyond in the kingdom of Naples in 1466 (whereas NiccoloÁ and Gheri Soderini were just `relegati' to Provence) (Municchi, La fazione antimedicea, pp. 138±9). On one occasion, a Sienese notary did try to draw a distinction in his record of the sentences of a group of exiles, marking some in the margin `relegatio' and some `con®natio', but the grounds on which he made these distinctions do not seem to have been consistent. The entry for Benedetto Martinozzi, `con®natus et relegatus' to San Giovanni d'Asso in the Sienese contado, was annotated `relegatio'; the entry for Alessandro Petrucci, `con®natus' at least ten miles from Siena in the contado, was marked `con®natio'; that for NiccoloÁ Petrucci, `con®natus' at least ®ve miles from Siena where he pleased except for Florentine terri-

places of exile

89

Sienese exiles were ordered to go, or the bounds they were ordered to observe, are known in 385 cases. In three-®fths (59 per cent) of those 385 cases, the exiles were ordered to stay in Sienese territory; this preference became more marked in the later cohorts (see Table 3.1, p. 93). In about a tenth (11 per cent) of the 385 cases, the exiles were ordered to stay a speci®c distance from Siena or from the Sienese border. A tenth (10 per cent) were sent to the kingdom of Naples, but the great majority of these ± 36 of 39 cases ± were among those exiled from June 1480 to May 1482, by the regime established under the in¯uence of Alfonso, Duke of Calabria. Just under a tenth (8 per cent) were ordered to somewhere in the Papal States; again, the majority of these (18 of 32 cases) were among those exiled under the regime established in 1480 when the Sienese, who had been allies of the pope during the Pazzi War against Florence, still considered Sixtus IV should have a special care for their affairs. Comparatively few (4 per cent) were sent to other places in Tuscany. Only 2 per cent were sent to the duchy of Milan: over half of these ± ®ve of nine cases ± were among those exiled in 1456±8, when Francesco Sforza was regarded as the protector of Siena. None was ordered to go to Venice, and none was ordered to leave Italy. Only rarely is it possible to be reasonably sure why a particular place of exile was chosen. The effects of political considerations in determining the con®nes imposed on groups of Sienese exiles are most obvious in two groups sentenced on 25 June and 24 July 1480. There were 39 named individuals in these two groups (the second included one man's unnamed sons), of whom 32 were sent to the kingdom of Naples. The presence of the Duke of Calabria in Siena in June and July 1480 clearly in¯uenced the choice of places of exile for those who were held to be hostile to the new regime. On 25 June 25 men were sentenced to exile in the kingdom, at locations to be decided by Alfonso and his father King Ferrante. All Riformatori, these 25 men were accused of actions `displeasing to His Majesty the King of Naples'.2 All but three of them were riseduti, and could have been among those who in the Council of the People had stoutly opposed Neapolitan requests that the exiles of 1456±8 should be allowed to return. The group of exiles sentenced on 24 July 1480 were accused of attempting to disrupt `the present regime'.3 Two of them, Francesco Gabrielli and his son Giovanni, had in fact been imprisoned before the

2 3

tory, was marked `relegatio', as was the entry for Bartolomeo di Leonardo da Grosseto, `con®natus' in Grosseto (ASS, BalõÁa 26, ff. 36v±39r). ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 9v±10r, 45v. Ibid., f. 43r.

90


new regime had been installed, because they had acted àgainst the regime in the matter of the deposition of the Riformatori'.4 The diarist Allegretti gives another explanation for their arrest: that Francesco had `made himself one of the leaders of the Monte de' Riformatori, and spoke out against the duke, and against readmitting the ammoniti, and Cristofano his brother had been the one who was involved in the executions, and in making rebels in 1456'. Francesco and Giovanni were sent to Naples to be imprisoned.5 Cristofano himself was dead and out of reach, so revenge was taken on his sons. Three of them, Giovanni Felice, Antonio and Galeazzo, were sentenced to be exiled in the kingdom of Naples, there to be kept in a secure prison, as Ferrante should think best. Three other of Cristofano's sons were also exiled. Gianbattista was ordered to go to Recanati in the Marche. Girolamo was to stay at Asciano in the contado, until he reached the age of sixteen. Angelo, older than Girolamo at least, was ordered to Fano; initially, it was decided that his own sons should be exiled with him but two days later it was decided they could stay in Siena, or wherever else they wished, until the age of ten. 6 If the reasons for the Riformatori being sent to Naples in 1480 are obvious enough, is it possible to detect any logic behind decisions to order men to exile in Sienese territory, rather than outside it? Might there have been a correlation between how dangerous an exile was thought to be, and whether he was to be kept in Sienese jurisdiction or ordered to leave it? Was exile closer to home always to be regarded as a milder sentence? There are indications that sometimes exile in the contado may have been reserved for those considered less dangerous. The names of three men given lengthy sentences of sixteen to twenty-®ve years but ordered to places of exile within Sienese territory in 1456 ± Placido Placidi, Bartolomeo de' Stini, and Pietro Gionta ± do not appear in later reports of the activities of those exiles who continued to conspire. Giacoppo Petrucci and Raniero, Savino and Francesco, brothers of Antonio del Catasta, accused only of not revealing what they knew of the plots, were initially given short sentences anywhere in Sienese territory outside the city. Only when they were accused of conspiring to bring Rocca a Tentennano into the hands of the rebels was Giacoppo Petrucci sent to Pisa for thirty years, and Savino del Catasta to Bologna for thirty years. Francesco del Catasta was sentenced to ®ve years' exile 4 5 6

Ibid., f. 2v. Allegretti, `Diarii', col. 802. ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 43r±44r, 46v, 60r.

places of exile

91

in the contado, with the stipulation that he could not go to Rocca a Tentennano or the Val d'Orcia in which it was situated. His elder brother Raniero, on the other hand, was executed. In 1480, on the same day as the twenty-®ve Riformatori were sentenced to inde®nite exile in the kingdom of Naples, another group of eight men were sentenced by the BalõÁa to exile in the contado. None of them would be exiled again, or cause any trouble while they were out of Siena.7 On the other hand, whether a man was exiled within or outside Sienese territory might not be a reliable indication of whether he was considered more or less dangerous than his fellows who received different sentences, or a reliable indication of whether or not he would obey. This is illustrated by the contrasting experiences of four of a group of twelve men exiled on 15 July 1482, after the return of the Riformatori exiles. The reason for their sentences was of®cially `because of their bad actions and life and for the greater security of the present regime',8 but all of the twelve except one were ordered to the contado. The exception was NiccoloÁ Petrucci, grandson of Antonio Petrucci and a professional soldier. He was to be allowed to go anywhere at least ten miles from Siena, except into Florentine territory. Initially he tried to conform to these terms, but after they were changed in April 1483 to exile in the kingdom of Naples, he threw in his lot with the body of exiles based in Rome and was declared a rebel. Only one of the twelve, Antonio Bichi, had been a prominent member of the regime before June 1482. He had been assigned Roccalbegna as his place of exile, but he did not go there. Particularly closely associated as he was with the policy of alliance with Ferrante, it was in Naples that he would pass most of his time in exile, holding of®ces given to him by the king, but travelling to Rome from time to time for discussions with other Sienese exiles. Still more active than Antonio was Leonardo Bellanti, who was initially ordered to Campagnatico for the ®rst two years of his six-year term, but was then ordered to go to Lucca for the ®rst six months. He went to Lucca, but left to bring hundreds of infantry to support the occupiers of Monteriggioni in February 1483. Thereafter he seems to have been rarely in one place for long. Bartolomeo Sansedoni, a member of the Monte dei Gentiluomini and a lawyer of repute, was originally ordered to Vergelle for six years, but he was later allowed to live outside the 7

8

ASS, BalõÁa 2, ff. 3v±4r, 10r±13v, 15v, 26r, 30r, 53r, 204r±v, 206r±7r; BalõÁa 4, ff. 69v, 82v, 83r; BalõÁa 6, ff. 183v±185r; BalõÁa 10, f. 165r; BalõÁa 398, f. 23v; Concistoro 539, ff. 61v±62r, 66v, 67v, 69v; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 257: Nicodemo da Pontremoli to Francesco Sforza, 17 Mar. 1458, Siena; ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 10v, 18r. ASS, BalõÁa 26, f. 36v.

92


contado where he chose. He avoided the company of other exiles, and caused no concern to the regime in Siena.9 Other evidence also suggests that those sentenced to exile outside the contado were in fact not necessarily thought to be a greater threat to the regime, and that exile outside the contado was not necessarily a severer sentence. For example, Giovanni di Pietro di Maestro Jacomo, aged about eighteen, who, it was said, did not stay in Siena much `because he is wayward and quite unruly', was one of a group of Riformatori sentenced to exile in November 1480. He was ordered to go to Naples, but in his case this was not intended to be a harsh punishment. His mother believed him to be in Naples anyway, sending the of®cial noti®cation of his sentence to his elder brother Bartolomeo, who lived there. Antonio Bichi, who was away from Siena on of®cial business, wrote to the BalõÁa to suggest that `perhaps it would be better to exile him where he chooses outside the contado, because in truth he is not someone to bother about much'.10 As the case of Giovanni di Pietro shows, if an exile ordered out of the contado was assigned a speci®c place, that place could be chosen taking account of his convenience and interests. Sometimes a guarantee of security for the regime, in the form of a friendly prince or government who would keep an eye on him, did not mean that the choice of place would not suit the exile as well. The Duke of Urbino, Federico da Montefeltro, had commanded the papal troops during the Pazzi War, and was closely associated with Ferrante. But when Giorgio and Jacomo Vieri and Giovanni Buoninsegni were exiled to Urbino in 1480,11 he did not treat them as suspects and they became part of his entourage. That an increasing proportion of Sienese exiles in the 1480s and 1490s were ordered to stay in the contado (see Table 3.1) was probably due to a concern for security and was not a sign of greater leniency in their treatment. By July 1487 thousands of Sienese would have experienced exile, and would have ®rst-hand knowledge of how easily exiles could move around Italy, and how there were many ready to befriend, support and help them, or at least to turn a blind eye to what they were doing. There had been so many Sienese in exile in the middle of the 1480s that it had become embarrassing for the Popolare regime, and the members of the new regime may have been reluctant to risk arousing further adverse comment by sending out new waves of Sienese exiles. Another important consideration was that after 1487, the Sienese were 9 10 11

Ibid., ff. 36v±39r, 51v, 143v; BalõÁa 28, f. 31v. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 70: Antonio Bichi, 25 Jan. 1480(1), Gubbio; BalõÁa 21, f. 19v. BalõÁa 20, ff. 21r, 22v.

places of exile

93

Table 3.1 Proportion of Sienese exiles ordered to stay in the contado, by cohort 1456±8 1480 ± May 1482 June 1482 ± June 1487 July 1487 ± 1499 1

52% 48% 65% 71%

no.

no. in cohort1

15 68 76 68

29 143 117 96

known to have been assigned speci®c place or bounds of exile

often not too sure about who their real friends were in Italy: where could exiles be sent with some con®dence that they would be supervised and not assisted? If a high degree of security or a marked element of punishment was desired, there was always the option of imprisonment in a fortress in Sienese territory. All of the nine young men sentenced on 16 August 1497, accused of plotting against Pandolfo Petrucci, were sent to exile in the contado. Four were to begin their exile with terms of imprisonment from one month to three years. Bernardino Piccolomini, for instance, was to be imprisoned for four months, in fetters, and then exiled for two years on his farms in Valdombrone. NiccoloÁ di Buonaventura Borghesi was to be held in chains for three years in the fortress at Massa, and then stay in exile there, at the will of the Council of the People. In the event he soon died in prison, and the cause of his death was the subject of an investigation.12 Florence does not appear to have had any tradition or clear policy determining places of political exile either. The Medici and Pucci exiled in 1433 were scattered in the Venetian dominions, the Papal States and the kingdom of Naples. Cosimo de' Medici, for example, was sent to Padua, his brother Lorenzo to Venice, their cousin Averardo to Naples and his son Giuliano to Rome. Those exiled after the conspiracy against Piero di Cosimo de' Medici in 1466 were, for the most part, either ordered still further a®eld than the Medici had been, or assigned bounds at a set distance from Florence. Agnolo Acciaiuoli and his sons Neri and Jacopo were ordered to Barletta and beyond in the kingdom of Naples. NiccoloÁ di Lorenzo Soderini and his son Gheri were ordered to stay in Provence in the dominions of King ReneÂ d'Anjou, while the brothers Dietisalvi, Francesco and Angelo Neroni were ordered to stay on the island of Sicily. Three other of the Neroni brothers and the sons of Dietisalvi and of Angelo Neroni were among a group of about a dozen 12

Mengozzi, Ùn processo politico', 186±261; ASS, BalõÁa 41, ff. 215r±218v.

94


men, some with their brothers and sons, ordered to stay not less than three and not more than twenty miles from Florence.13 After the Pazzi conspiracy, those directly involved who had managed to escape were made rebels, and not assigned speci®c places of exile. Most of those exiled (whose only offence in many cases was to be related to one of the conspirators) were ordered to stay in the contado, generally within set bounds. For example, Guglielmo de' Pazzi (Lorenzo de' Medici's brother-in-law) and his sons, and the sons of Renato, Andrea and Giovanni de' Pazzi and their sons, including those not yet born, were to be con®ned for life between ®ve and twenty miles of Florence, and were forbidden to cross `the public road which leads from the city of Florence to Borgo San Lorenzo in the Mugello'. Nine men were ordered to stay out of Florentine territory, but none was assigned a speci®c place of exile, and none was a man of importance.14 Venice, on the other hand, did have something of a coherent policy. The penalties laid down by the laws against the electoral malpractices regarded in Venice as political offences included set bounds of exile. For example, the law passed following the Cicogna conspiracy of 1432 stipulated a penalty of perpetual banishment from all the dominions of Venice. By the law of 12 July 1480 two years of exile from Venice and the Veneto were in prospect for anyone failing to report a discussion on affairs of state with the citizens of other powers.15 The Venetians had a consistent policy in another way too. Those exiled were either ordered to a speci®c place on the Venetian terraferma or in her overseas possessions (often they were sent to Crete, sometimes con®ned to Candia or Canea ± the latter being à really dreadful place')16; or they were banished from her dominions, without any place or bounds being assigned. If the Venetians wanted to supervise their exiles, it seems, they preferred to do it themselves, and disdained to rely on another state to keep watch on those expelled from Venetian territory. How systematic other Italian states were in the assignment of con®nes to their exiles is not clear, but it is possible to see some common features in the sentences imposed on political exiles by states throughout Italy. The ®rst and most obvious feature is that when speci®c places of exile were being assigned to a number of individuals at the same time, 13

14 15 16

Kent, Rise of the Medici, p. 295; Gelli, `L'esilio di Cosimo de' Medici', 83±4; Municchi, La fazione antimedicea, pp. 138±9; Phillips, Memoir of Marco Parenti, pp. 202±4. Poliziano, Conjurationis Pactianae, ed. Adimari, pp. 146±55. Queller, The Venetian Patriciate, pp. 80, 105, 222±3. `terribelissima': Diario ferrarese dall'anno 1409 sino al 1502, ed. Giuseppe Pardi, RRIISS 24, vii (Bologna, 1928±33), p. 62.

places of exile

95

they were generally dispersed to various places. This was true when they were being con®ned within the territory of the state, as well as when they were being expelled from it. Two quali®cations to this rule about the dispersing of exiles constitute the other two common features of sentencing: that fathers and sons or brothers were often ordered to the same place; and that exiles from subject towns, sometimes in considerable numbers, would be ordered to go to the `capital' of the state. This is not to say that close relatives exiled at the same time were never dispersed, nor that exiles from subject towns were always sent to the `capital' of their state, but when several exiles were sent to the same place they usually came into one of these two categories. This pattern of exceptions to the rule of dispersal is perhaps less marked for Siena than for other states. The Sienese do not seem to have exiled large groups of men from towns in the contado to Siena. No record of such a practice has come to light in the deliberations or correspondence of the Concistoro or BalõÁe. It may be that this was just because they had no cause for serious concern during this period about the loyalty of any of their subject communities, and consequently felt no need either to punish disaffection or to forestall trouble by bringing the leading men of a town to Siena. Those sentenced by the Concistoro or the Of®cials of Ward for what could be described as public-order rather than political offences, such as persistent rowdy behaviour or insulting the local of®cials or the Sienese authorities, would be excluded from their place of residence in the contado or expelled from Sienese territory altogether, rather than sent to Siena. One exception to this was a man called Gabriele, living in Asciano, who in November 1477 `for certain good and weighty reasons' was exiled by the Of®cials of Ward to Siena for ten years, although he was given the option of living outside Sienese jurisdiction if he chose.17 The Florentines, by contrast, did make a practice of bringing men from subject towns to Florence, sometimes in considerable numbers, either as a punishment or as a precautionary measure. Pisans were regarded with particular suspicion, especially when there was warfare in Tuscany, for many years after the Florentines acquired Pisa in 1406. Some Pisans became rebels because they disobeyed orders to live in Florence. Nearly half a century after taking over the city, the Florentines still felt insecure about their hold over it. When King Alfonso of Naples was heading for Pisa with his army in 1447, the Florentine Signoria were very worried that it was `full of Pisans', and ordered the 17

ASS, Concistoro 1591, f. 10r.

96


captain to send èvery Pisan who even looks like a man'18 to Florence. In 1452, when Florence was once again at war with Alfonso and the Neapolitan army was on the march in Tuscany, the Signoria wanted àll the heads and principal Pisan citizens' to be sent to Florence, and `the other middling and minor' ones to be expelled from the city and contado. In response to this order, an unknown number of citizens were exiled immediately, and eighty or more were sent to Florence some days later. Further exiles were demanded by the Florentine Signoria the following year.19 If exile to Florence was the favoured method for the control of dissident Pisans, the treatment of those exiled from Volterra during the crisis of 1471±2 shows that this was only one option that could be used when dealing with men from Florence's subject towns. A total of eighteen men were exiled to Florence in September, October and November 1471. In March the next year, possibly as a precautionary measure, a dozen Medici partisans were exiled by the captain of Volterra. They were not sent to Florence, indeed they were speci®cally forbidden to go there, perhaps to avoid a confrontation with the others who were still con®ned there. Instead, they were sent to various places in Florentine territory. After the brief war which ended in the sack of Volterra by Florentine troops at least forty men were exiled, all given bounds of at least twenty miles from Volterra and ®ve from Florence.20 Principalities as well as republics used the exile of men from subject towns to the `capital' as a means of control. When the heads of the three squadre of Parma summoned to Milan in 1477 following disorder in the city were sentenced to exile, six were ordered to stay in Milan, and one was detained in the Castello. While six others were dispersed to different towns in the duchy, all but two of them were allowed to return to Milan after a while. After ®ghting between the Guelfs and Ghibellines of Cremona in March 1480, some heads of both parties were exiled to Milan. When the Marquis of Mantua was given Asola in 1483 by the Duke of Calabria (who had just taken it from the Venetians in the War of Ferrara), he attempted to secure his long-coveted possession by exiling four hundred Asolani to Mantua. As part of Ferrante's efforts to establish ®rmer royal control over one of the most independently minded cities of his kingdom, he brought the political leaders of Aquila to Naples. Intended to forestall the rebellion of Aquila as the Neapolitan barons were preparing to revolt in 1485, in the event the arrest of the 18 19 20

ògni pisano che ha viso d'uomo'. Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa', pp. 315±16. Fumi, L'impresa contro Volterra, pp. 97, 101±3, 110±11, 152.

places of exile

97

Count of Montorio and his transfer to detention in Naples helped to precipitate it. After the city had submitted to the crown again, two of the Gagliof®, who had pressed for the submission of Aquila to the papacy, were taken to Naples to be detained there, as were several of the Camponeschi family, rivals of the Gagliof®.21 Summoning unruly faction leaders to Rome and then holding them there was a tactic used by the popes to signal their displeasure at disorder or disobedience to papal of®cials. The turbulent nobles of Perugia were repeatedly ordered to present themselves in Rome for reprimands and exhortations. Generally they obeyed, and they were not kept there for long, or imprisoned. One Perugian party leader, Cesare degli Arcipreti, was arrested in 1477 (because he had been conspiring to bring the condottiere Carlo da Montone into the city, it was believed), and taken under armed escort to Rome. He was held in the Castel Sant' Angelo there until his death in 1482. Viterbese faction leaders were brought to Rome for detention in the Castel Sant' Angelo in 1456 when party rivalries and violence in Viterbo were exacerbated by a quarrel among the Gatti family. Troilo Gatti, a violent, dissolute cleric who had threatened the papal rector, and his brother Galeotto were taken ®rst to the provincial papal fortress of Soriano, and then, on the orders of Pope Calixtus, to Rome. They were released from the Castel Sant' Angelo on the orders of the College of Cardinals after the death of Calixtus in 1458, but the new pope, Pius II, would not permit them to return home until a number of Viterbese citizens agreed to stand surety for their good behaviour.22 The popes were not the only ones in the Papal States to use this method of disciplining and controlling men from their subject cities. Subject cities of the Papal States, even those under the direct dominion of the papacy, themselves could have subject communities, and this tactic could be used in handling them. Thus, in 1461, the Guelfs of the little town of Monteleone, about twelve miles from Spoleto, in a bid to defend themselves against their Ghibelline rivals who were trying to ®ght their way back in, asked to be taken under the dominion of Spoleto. The Spoletans, with the consent of the pope, agreed, banned 21

22

Cronica Lombardie, pp. 16, 66; Anonimo Veronese, Cronaca, p. 404; Ernesto Pontieri, Ìl comune dell' Aquila nella congiura dei baroni napoletani contro Ferrante I d'Aragona (1485±1486)', Atti dell'Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche 81 (1970), 198, 211; Antonio Lodovico Antinori, Raccolta di memorie istoriche delle tre provincie degli Abruzzi, 4 vols. (Naples, 1781±3), vol. IV, pp. 22±3, 79±80. `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni', passim; for Cesare degli Arcipreti, see ibid., 9 (1903), 111±12, 206; Pinzi, Storia della CittaÁ di Viterbo, vol. IV, pp. 120±5, 157; della Tuccia, `Cronache di Viterbo', pp. 59±61, 71±2, 245±7.

98


the men of the former Ghibelline lords of Monteleone, the Tiberti, from going there, and in 1462 exiled several men with their families to Spoleto.23 The practice of allotting close relatives exiled at the same time the same place or the same bounds of exile was widespread. This was a practice which the Sienese did sometimes observe. A group of men exiled on 18 September 1497, for example, included four sets of brothers and the uncle of one of the sets. The four Micheli brothers, Bartolomeo, Angelo, Pietro and Pippo, were all ordered to stay at least four miles from Siena and four miles from the borders, except the coast. Troilo and Buoninsegna Zondadori were ordered to stay within two miles of Monteliscaio for four years; Ser Antonio and Domenico di NiccoloÁ di Ser Minoccio were to remain at Castelnuovo dell' Abbate for ®ve years. Their brother Giovanni and uncle Bartolomeo were merely ordered to stay out of Siena for two months. Tommaso and Luca Docci were ordered to stay at Buonconvento for ®ve years. Even when a sentence was meant to be severe, close relatives could be allowed to stay together. When Giacoppo Petrucci was given a thirty-year sentence in 1458, he was ordered to Pisa where his father, Bartolomeo, was already in exile. On other occasions, close relatives exiled at the same time could be split up. Three sons of Cristofano Capacci were exiled on 28 July 1480 and each was assigned different bounds: Andrea was con®ned to ten miles around Abbadia San Salvadore in the contado, Salimbene was sent to Camerino in the Papal States, and Conte was simply excluded from Siena for a year (without a speci®c prohibition on his spending that year with Andrea).24 The Florentines were inclined to send close relatives exiled together to the same place. Brothers, and fathers and sons, were for the most part assigned the same places or bounds of exile after the conspiracies against the Medici in 1466 and 1478. The Medici themselves had been treated rather differently in 1433, with the father and son Averardo and Giuliano being split up between Naples and Rome, and the brothers Cosimo and Lorenzo between Padua and Venice. But at least the two brothers Bernardo and Gregorio d'Alamanno de' Medici were sent to Rimini together. The Pucci brothers, Puccio and Giovanni d'Antonio, sentenced with the Medici, were ordered by the BalõÁa to go to Aquila; initially, the Signoria had ordered Puccio to go to Foligno, and Giovanni to Viterbo.25 23 24 25

Sansi, Storia del Comune di Spoleto, vol. II, pp. 58±9. ASS, BalõÁa 41, f. 228r±v; BalõÁa 6, ff. 183v±184r; BalõÁa 20, f. 51r. See above, p. 93; Kent, Rise of the Medici, p. 295; Gelli, `L'esilio di Cosimo de' Medici', 83±4.

places of exile

99

Perhaps the general presumption was that unless there were special circumstances, close relatives should be allowed to stay together. Even when bitter feelings were running high, and factional rivals were being banished, members of the same family might be ordered to the same place. Despite the strength of Giovanni Bentivoglio's animus against the Malvezzi in 1488, most of those exiled from Bologna after the discovery of the conspiracy to kill him were not separated from their close relatives. Battista Malvezzi and at least one of his sons were sent to Rimini; the brothers Bartolomeo and Filippo di Giovanni Malvezzi were ordered to Venice, Alessandro and two sons to Turin, and Alessandro's brother Aldrovandino and his natural son to Trent. Only one Malvezzi, Giulio di Virgilio, who had been one of the conspirators, was sent off alone to Naples to be imprisoned by Ferrante at Giovanni Bentivoglio's request; he would be released only when the French arrived in Naples in 1495.26 When the Oddi who had taken ¯ight from Perugia were assigned places of exile in January 1489, close relations were ordered to the same places. Simone di Guido and his son Mariotto, and the brothers NiccoloÁ and Carlo di Sforza, were to stay at Tolentino or at Camerino, as they chose. Four sons of Lione degli Oddi were ordered to go to Monte Santa Maria in Gallo; Lionello degli Oddi, with all his sons, legitimate and natural, and his nipoti, were sent to Ascoli. Costantino degli Oddi and his sons and nipoti, legitimate and natural, and Mariotto, son of the protonotary degli Oddi and his sons, were all ordered to go to Poppi in the Casentino, in Florentine territory.27 On the other hand, Duchess Bona of Milan clearly wished to split up her brothers-inlaw in 1477. Sforza Maria was sent off to his estates in the kingdom of Naples, Lodovico to Florence or Pisa, and Ascanio to continue his studies at Perugia or Siena.28 Where an exile was ordered to go was one thing; where he went was often another matter entirely. How often, is very dif®cult to assess. Governments tried to keep track of their political exiles to some extent, but usually they relied on the vigilance of envoys or of loyal citizens or subjects living or travelling in other parts of Italy and sending reports back. They rarely sent out spies to ascertain where the exiles might be. Only one systematic record of where exiles were has come to light, that compiled by the French administrators of the duchy of Milan in 1500. Attempts to keep routine records of whether exiles were where they were supposed to be seem to have been unusual too. Very likely, more 26 27 28

Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, pp. 496, 507; Ady, The Bentivoglio, p. 109. Other groups of relatives were sent to Ancona, Civitanova and Norcia. `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni' (1903), 318±19. Santoro, Gli Sforza, p. 189; Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, vol. II, pp. 20±4.

100


information would be garnered on the movements of those who were disobedient, particularly if they were suspected of plotting, than on those who stayed quietly where they had been ordered to go. Establishing where an exile settled, as distinct from where he was sighted, can be very tricky, unless the report about him mentions that he was living there, that he had bought a house, or held an of®ce or set up in business. The best evidence that an exile had gone where he had been told to go is the formal attestations of residence that exiles were sometimes required to provide at regular intervals ± when those attestations survive.29 In only just over a third (37 per cent) of the Sienese cases is it possible to be reasonably sure where an exile settled, or spent much of his time. Information is most plentiful on those exiled between June 1480 and May 1482, who were the most assiduous in reporting on the observance of their terms of exile to the Sienese authorities. Where they stayed is known in three-quarters of the cases (76 per cent); for the other cohorts, in less than a third (20±29 per cent). All together, in about a third (31 per cent) of those cases in which it is known where Sienese exiles were ordered to go, there is evidence that they resided for at least some period of time in the place assigned to them. Of those who were subsequently assigned another place of exile a third (34 per cent) are known to have stayed in it. Given the gaps in the information available, it is safe to assume that more, perhaps substantially more, exiles were obedient. On the other hand, 7 per cent of all the Sienese exiles were made rebels explicitly for not observing their terms of exile, which generally meant not going where they had been told to go. By no means all who did not go, or stay, where they had been ordered to go would have been declared rebels. Incomplete as these statistics are, and in the absence of any comparable statistics for the exiles of other states, it is impossible to assess whether the Sienese exiles were more or less inclined to obedience than those of other states. Even Venetian exiles could slip their con®nes, despite the ferocious penalties laid down for disobedience. For example, the noblewoman Mattea Collalto, who had obstructed negotiations during the Venetian war with Archduke Sigismund of Habsburg in 1487 by passing information to Count Oderico of Arco, her kinsman, was sentenced to exile to Candia in Crete for life. Her brother Count Gianbattista and another relative, Stefano Celsi, who had known what she was doing and had failed to report it, were exiled to other places in 29

For the problems of keeping track of exiles and the requirements imposed on some exiles to report to the authorities in their place of exile, see below, pp. 143±71.

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Crete, Retimo and Canea. The two men left Crete on the same day after about a year; Count Gianbattista returned after a few weeks only to leave again, taking refuge on the Genoese Riviera. Mattea spent seven years in Crete before she left.30 The Venetians would probably have kept as tight control over their exiles in their colonies as it was feasible for a ®fteenth-century state to do. It would be surprising to ®nd the sentences of exile imposed by the government of a city like Perugia on members of powerful families like the Oddi being observed much, if at all. Those sentenced to exile, in considering whether or not to obey their sentences, would have to take into account not only how convenient it would be to go where they were ordered, but also what price they might have to pay for disobedience. They might also have to decide whether anything was to be gained by obedience at all ± could they have con®dence that obedience would earn goodwill or pardon, or was there a good chance that further penalties would be in¯icted on them whatever they did? For exiles from a state such as Siena, where sentences of exile could be the outcome of political vendetta, but where the political complexion of the regime could change quite quickly, such calculations would be hard to resolve. Exiles who did not like the places or bounds of exile assigned to them, but did not want to be overtly disobedient, could ask permission to move. Such permission might be granted; and sometimes the authorities would change the place or bounds of exile assigned in the exile's favour without being asked. In a quarter (24 per cent) of the Sienese cases, the place of exile was changed by the authorities. Half of those exiled from 1480 to June 1482 had some alteration to their place of exile. Some Sienese evidently felt that too many transfers were being made by this regime. In February 1481, among a number of restrictions placed by the Council of the People on the powers of the incoming BalõÁa was the stipulation that they were not to change the con®nes of anyone exiled in the contado, unless to send him further away from the city, and in any case, no more than two exiles were to be assigned to any one place. Nor were they to change the con®nes of anyone exiled outside Sienese territory, unless it was to send them at least thirty miles from the borders, in a set place, and not in the jurisdiction of Florence. A few months later, in early May, the Council agreed that the BalõÁa should again be free to transfer exiles as they saw ®t.31 Generally, changes to the places assigned to Sienese exiles appear to have been a concession or a relaxation of the sentence. This was so in 30 31

Queller, The Venetian Patriciate, p. 224. ASS, Concistoro 686, f. 36v; Concistoro 688, f. 3v.

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three-®fths (57 per cent) of the cases of those whose place of exile was altered, while only an eighth (12 per cent) were evidently being punished to some degree. Three of the Riformatori sent to the kingdom of Naples in July 1480, for example, Giovannata Buoninsegni and his brother Tommaso, and Antonino Andreocci, had their sentences changed in November 1480, to allow them `to sail and to go where they wish, not approaching the contado and jurisdiction of Siena within 150 miles by land and ®fteen miles by sea, and not putting into any port in Tuscany'. A month later, Giovannata was given a further easing of his con®nes, permitting him to go where he pleased within ®fty miles of the city of Siena, but not entering the territory of Siena or Florence. Both Antonino and Tommaso asked to be granted the same terms; Antonino was, but Tommaso was not, and in April 1481 he was imprisoned in the Castel dell'Ovo in Naples.32 Another man exiled to Naples, Sano di Maestro Andrea, was soon allowed to return to the contado, so that he could ply his trade as a gold-beater there. In June 1481 he was allowed to go to Castelnuovo Berardenga, provided he taught his craft to one or two pupils if they wanted to learn it; if he would not teach them, he was to go to Pari. Sano's son, Andrea, who had also been sent to the kingdom of Naples, wrote to ask permission to accompany him back to the contado, saying that his father was old and ill and needed his help. This permission was not given, and in April 1481 Andrea was declared a rebel for not observing his con®nes.33 Over half (54 per cent) of those whose con®nes were changed were ordered to or transferred within the contado, as in the case of the notary Giovanni di BarnabeÂ di Nanni. Having been sentenced `for his demerits' to two years' exile in Civitella in April 1483, Giovanni, after a report of some conversations he had had in Civitella reached the four segreti, was ordered to stay within three miles of his farm at Pille, and an extra year was added to his sentence.34 The reasons why one man would be transferred and another left where he was were very rarely spelt out in the Sienese records. Sometimes it could be a reward for good behaviour, sometimes an attempt to keep a hold on a man who it was feared was becoming involved in conspiracy and open rebellion. Recommendations from in¯uential persons from outside Siena could weigh decisively in the balance. Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini, for one, was always willing to write to Siena on 32 33 34

ASS, BalõÁa 21, ff. 27v, 76r; BalõÁa 503, 81: Achille Petrucci, 23 Feb. 1481, Naples; BalõÁa 22, f. 62v; BalõÁa 503, 16: Lorenzo Lanti, 27 Apr. 1481, Naples. ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 64v±65r; BalõÁa 502, 34: Andrea di Ansano, 9 Sept. 1480, Naples; BalõÁa 24, ff. 57r, 62r±v; BalõÁa 23, f. 60v. ASS, BalõÁa 28, f. 20r; BalõÁa 31, f. 17v.

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behalf of exiles that he thought merited favour, and his intercessions were treated with respect. In January 1485, for example, the BalõÁa noted that at the request of Cardinal Piccolomini, and despite the disobedience of NiccoloÁ Borghesi to the Of®cials of Ward and his contacts with some rebels and other outlaws of Siena, they would con®ne him to the city and territory of Milan or the city and territory of Bologna, as he chose. In 1480 the BalõÁa agreed, at the request of the Duke of Urbino, that Jacomo Vieri, who had been exiled to Urbino, could accompany the duke on campaign, provided that he did not enter the Sienese contado.35 Other states, too, were prepared to change bounds or places of exile, for a variety of reasons. Again, powerful advocates could help. Venice sent envoys to Florence in 1433 to plead for the Medici. The Venetians were unable to obtain their recall, but the opponents of the Medici were suf®ciently mindful of the importance of heeding Florence's longstanding ally to agree to Cosimo's request that his con®nes should be extended to all Venetian territory.36 When Orfeo Cenni da Ricavo, a Florentine who had long been in the service of Milan, was arrested with Cicco Simonetta in 1479, Lorenzo de' Medici heard that Òrfeo's case is not beyond cure, nor is it a matter in which intercession would be taken amiss by the government. If these conditions stand as I have been told, I would not wish for anything to refuse to intercede for Orfeo, seeing that he is, after all, a Florentine, and has a claim on my gratitude, especially for what he did in '66' (when he led the Milanese troops sent in support of Piero de' Medici).37 At last in April 1481 Lorenzo was able to secure the release of Orfeo and his exile to Arezzo in Florentine territory, rather than to Naples as Lodovico had intended, and in September 1482, he won consent for Orfeo to move to Florence.38 In 1480, the intervention of Duke Ercole d'Este brought Lodovico round to agreeing that his brother Ascanio could return to exile in Ferrara, where he enjoyed the life of the court, after Lodovico had ordered him to move to Naples. On that occasion, Ascanio only got as far as Florence before he was allowed back to Ferrara. Ascanio himself had written to complain that there was no pleasure to be found in Florence (èÁ aliena da ogni piacer'), whereas in Ferrara the duke was kind to him;39 indeed in Ferrara he was to be seen accompanying the duke at public cere35 36 37 38 39

ASS, BalõÁa 33, f. 24v; BalõÁa 526, 45: Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini, 22 Jan. 1485, Rome; BalõÁa 20, f. 68r. Kent, `Medici in esilio', 18. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. IV, pp. 206±9. Ibid., vol. V, pp. 153±9; VI, pp. 16±17. ASMo, Carteggio ambasciatori, Firenze, b. 2: copy Ascanio Sforza to Duchi, 6 Aug. 1480, Florence.

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monies and private parties. The following year, Lodovico again became concerned about Ascanio having such freedom of movement so near to the duchy of Milan, and after considering sending him to take up residence at the Roman curia, insisted that this time he must transfer to Naples.40 Con®nes could be eased without the need for intercession. According to Marco Parenti, changes to the bounds of exile of some of the Florentine conspirators of 1466 were made because Piero de' Medici did not . . . think it useful to treat them too harshly and give them reason for total desperation, because they were still men of great substance and worthy of much esteem; and for this reason they were apt to stir up great commotions. Piero thought, therefore, to ease their situation by suiting their con®nement more to their own taste. On the 30th of October he had M. Dietisalvi's con®nement changed from Sicily to Lombardy, either at Novara or Alessandria whichever pleased him better. Francesco di Nerone his brother was con®ned to the Marches at Foligno, or Todi or Orvieto as desired. With M. Agnolo [Acciaiuoli] nothing new was done because he was well placed from the beginning.41

The Venetians, too, were prepared to change the con®nes of their exiles. Jacopo, son of the Doge Francesco Foscari, was sentenced to exile in Napoli di Romania in 1445, having been found guilty of taking bribes. But Jacopo stayed on in Trieste, where he had ¯ed from Venice when the scandal ®rst broke. He fell gravely ill there, and in November 1446 the Ten decided that since it was not in their power to pit themselves against God's will, ìn the name of Jesus Christ, Jacopo Foscari's excuse should be accepted, and the reason preventing him from going into exile should be accepted as legitimate'. His place of exile was changed to Treviso and the Trevigiano. A year later, the pleas of the aged Doge that he could not concentrate on the cares of state while he was distracted by this enforced separation from his only son brought the Ten to decide that Jacopo could return to Venice, considering the needs of the present times require a prince who has his head free and clear, ®t to serve the Republic well, which at present he is prevented from doing by the knowledge that his son is sick in body and mind, and considering as well the customary humanity of this government and the merits of the Doge.42 40

41 42

Pellegrini, Àscanio Maria Sforza', pp. 263±4; Bernardino Zambotti, Diario ferrarese dall' anno 1476 sino al 1504, ed. Giuseppe Pardi, RRIISS, 24, vii (Bologna, 1937), pp. 73±95. Phillips, Memoir of Marco Parenti, pp. 208±9. The new con®nes assigned to the Neroni brothers would have split them up. Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia, vol. IV, pp. 195±9.

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The requests made by Sienese exiles for a change in their places or bounds of exile show the reasons that they thought might sway the authorities in Siena, and the con®nes they regarded as preferable. The reasons most often given were the need to make a living, the expense of the place where they had been sent, desire to be nearer to their family, and fear that where they had been ordered to go was not safe. Often they asked to be given bounds of exile, rather than be obliged to stay in a speci®c place. When they suggested a place that would be acceptable to them and, they hoped, to the Sienese authorities, they frequently nominated somewhere in the Papal States, or asked to be allowed to come to the contado. As `being a merchant is the only trade I know', Giovanni Lotti, one of the Riformatori sent to the kingdom of Naples in 1480, asked that he should not be made to stay at Sanseverino, where he could not trade. Could he not stay in the Sienese contado, or in Naples, or be allowed to go anywhere within 150 miles of Siena, as others had been? He was permitted to stay in Naples, but soon escaped from there and turned up in Rome, where he was heard to say that he `wanted to live free'.43 Another of the group exiled to the kingdom of Naples in July 1480, Andreoccio Luti, had been ordered to go to the island of Procida in the bay of Naples, but when he was preparing to move there, found it to be èven stranger than I had been told'. If he were to live there, he would have to build his own house, because there were few houses and no lodgings to be had, and he would have to bring in all his provisions from Naples. The people were miserably poor, and their only trade was ®shing, `so you can judge what it would be like for me to live there'. The Sienese ambassadors in Naples con®rmed that he had reason to complain, because Procida was `®t for beasts rather than men', and exposed to attack from pirates. He too was allowed to stay in Naples, but he would probably in the end have preferred to live among the ®shermen of Procida, because he was imprisoned in the Castel dell'Ovo a few months later.44 Giovanni Lotti's cousin Cristofano, who was exiled with him, left the kingdom shortly after his arrival there and went to Rome. He had no clear idea where he wanted to go, asking to be con®ned in Rome, or Viterbo, or CittaÁ di Castello, or Pisa or Bologna or Genoa or Venice, or the Sienese contado, or a hundred miles from the 43

44

`vuole vivere libero'. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 65: Giovanni Lotti, 18 Jan. 1480(1), Naples; BalõÁa 503, 66: Lorenzo Lanti and Achille Petrucci, 19 Jan. 1481, Naples; BalõÁa 22, f. 8v; Concistoro 2044, 39: Sinolfo da Castel Ottieri, 14 July 1482, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 503, 70: Andreoccio Luti, 27 Jan. 1481, Naples; 66, Lorenzo Lanti and Achille Petrucci, 19 Jan. 1481, Naples; BalõÁa 22, f. 64r; BalõÁa 503, 16: Lorenzo Lanti, 27 Apr. 1481, Naples.

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Sienese contado. When he was assigned a new place of exile (it is not known where this was), he was not happy with it, and was soon declared a rebel for failing to go to it. Five months afterwards, he was still pestering the Sienese envoy in Rome, saying that if the sentence of rebellion was lifted he would obey, and that he wanted to be given a place of exile, provided it was not in the kingdom, a hundred miles from Siena ± in Venice, say, or in Fano, or anywhere else the BalõÁa liked.45 If it was understandable that a Riformatore should not feel safe in the kingdom of Naples in early 1481, it was equally understandable that members of the Monte dei Nove should feel insecure in the Sienese contado in 1483. Lodovico Martinozzi, ordered to return to con®nes in Siena and the contado, wrote to the BalõÁa from Castello della Pieve to ask how they expected him to obey, when every day he heard of those exiled in the contado being arrested? If they wanted him to obey, they should grant him con®nes in Perugia or Orvieto (for which he would be very grateful), but not for anything had he any intention of going to Siena or the contado. This forthright line did him no favours. After receiving this letter, the BalõÁa declared him to be outlawed and his goods con®scate, for not returning to his place of exile.46 The notary Mino Tricerchi was somewhat more tactful. He had heard, he wrote, that he had been exiled, he did not know where: ìf it were in Sienese territory, I would be very afraid to come'. `For the love of God, if I have to be exiled, let it be outside Sienese territory, and if possible, so many miles [from Siena], so that I can manage, for you know what a family I have, and that I have been robbed by a monk.' On hearing that he had been ordered to `la Rocca', he promised to obey, but said he still would be grateful if it could be changed to a certain distance from Siena, or if that were not acceptable, Rome and thereabouts. Told to go to Bologna instead, he protested that he could not go, because there was nothing he could do in Bologna, and it was too expensive. He would rather be sent to Orvieto or Castello della Pieve, where life was cheaper and he could see his family occasionally. Nevertheless he went to Bologna, and stayed there.47 Sometimes the reasons an exile gave for being afraid to go to the 45

46 47

ASS, BalõÁa 502, 26: Francesco Petrucci, 28 Aug. 1480, Rome; 42: Achille Petrucci, 7 Oct. 1480, Rome; BalõÁa 21, f. 3r; BalõÁa 503, 1: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 28 Mar. 1481, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 511, 15: Lodovico Martinozzi, 5 June 1483, Castello della Pieve; BalõÁa 29, f. 14r±v. ASS, BalõÁa 509, 93: Mino Tricerchi, 28 Apr. 1483, Acquapendente (two letters); BalõÁa 510, 7: Mino Tricerchi, 2 May 1483, Acquapendente; BalõÁa 28, f. 44v.

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place of exile assigned to him were not connected with Sienese politics. Guglielmo Tommasi assured the BalõÁa that he was ready to obey, but thought that Todi, where he had been ordered to go, might be dangerous because of the ®ghting around there. He would prefer to be sent to Viterbo or Acquapendente. A few days later, he was outlawed for not observing his con®nes.48 Maurizio Luti claimed to have left Perugia ± which, he had told the BalõÁa, suited him well, especially as he could ®nd work there ± only because he was sure that someone there wanted to harm him. He declared he was ready to obey an order to go somewhere else, `providing it is not such a suspicious place as Perugia'. He suggested Pisa ± but Florentine territory was the last place that the BalõÁa of 1488 wanted this particular exile to be.49 Finding somewhere to stay that would not arouse suspicion back home in Siena, as well as being somewhere that suited an exile's own requirements, was important if he wanted to avoid incurring the displeasure of the regime, or wanted to minimize the damage done to his cause by leaving his place of exile without permission. Pierpaolo Mignanelli had been made a rebel in 1483 for breaking his bounds of exile in the contado and bringing support for those occupying Monteriggioni, but in May 1487 he wrote assuring the BalõÁa that he had always avoided those plotting against the regime, and claimed to have been given hopes by Sienese he had met that his good behaviour would win him clemency. If he could not return, and as he had to earn his living, would the BalõÁa rather he went to the pope or to King Ferrante, to Florence or to Genoa?50 Antonio Bichi did not go into exile in the contado, as he was ordered to do in July 1482: he went instead to the duchy of Urbino, from where he wrote to excuse himself for disobeying the orders of the BalõÁa. He had, he said, thought it best to come to some place that would not arouse suspicion until the time came for him to take up an of®ce somewhere, so he had chosen to come to the lands of the Duke of Urbino, with whom the Sienese had always been friendly. He had wanted to avoid dangers and to seek to live honourably; if the BalõÁa would take these two factors into account, they would see that he would be obedient.51 His assurance did not stop the BalõÁa declaring him a rebel, and he went to take up of®ce in the kingdom of Naples ± which would not have pleased the BalõÁa of the day. Guidantonio Buoninsegni, on the other hand, exiled by the previous 48 49 50 51

ASS, BalõÁa 511, 74: Guglielmo Tommasi, 19 June 1483, Acquapendente; BalõÁa 29, f. 24v. ASS, BalõÁa 534, 70: Maurizio Luti, 10 May 1488, Viterbo. ASS, BalõÁa 530, 36: Pierpaolo Mignanelli, 4 May 1487, Santa Fiora. ASS, BalõÁa 504, 99: Antonio Bichi, 30 July 1482, Castel Durante.

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regime, did not want to be in Naples and escaped to Rome, where he evidently desired to stay. The BalõÁa was not keen for him to do so, but it was dif®cult to take too hard a line with him because he had powerful friends in Rome, where he had served as ambassador. When he was ordered to go to Padua, he objected that he could not afford this. Girolamo Riario asked that Guidantonio should be allowed to go anywhere that would not be suspect to the BalõÁa. Since he was settled in the curia, could he not stay in Rome? The BalõÁa changed his bounds of exile again, to permission to stay where he wanted at least a hundred miles from Siena ± except for Rome and places within twenty miles of it. He argued that this would not allow him to live as be®tted his status as a doctor of law; if he would not obey them, it was because he could not obey them. Warning that he did not believe Guidantonio would obey and leave Rome, the Sienese envoy there, Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, recommended that it should be considered whether it would be better to have him as an exile, or a rebel. Although he stayed in Rome, he was not made a rebel.52 It was indeed politic for those sentencing or monitoring exiles (if they could lay aside any personal enmities or friendships which could in¯uence their judgement) not to push those who were disposed to obey into rebellion by harsh measures. Ìt would perhaps have been humane to have made some greater concession as to places', Achille Petrucci chided the BalõÁa in October 1480 after he had handed over noti®cation of new con®nes to three exiles, ànd then they would not be rebels'.53 There was no real need to worry about where peacefully inclined exiles were, even if they were technically breaking the rules. The problem was how to distinguish those who were genuinely ready to submit to their punishment, and wanted to stay out of trouble, from those who were merely biding their time until the opportunity to strike a blow against their enemies should occur, or who were open to persuasion by their more resolute fellows to join in a conspiracy or an expedition. There was a similar problem in dealing with those who had gone into exile of their own accord. In turbulent times, hundreds, even thousands, could leave a city on their own initiative, but it was not always easy to tell who had left to avoid trouble, and who had left bent on causing trouble. Initially, at least, they usually made for the same places, going either to the contado or to neighbouring states. Given the 52

53

ASS, BalõÁa 503, 4, 18: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 30 Mar, 5 May 1481, Rome; ibid., 29: Girolamo Riario, 20 May 1481, Rome; BalõÁa 23, f. 57v; BalõÁa 24, f. 58r; Concistoro 2044, 39: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 14 July 1481, Rome; ibid., 49, Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 3 Aug. 1481, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 42: Achille Petrucci, 7 Oct. 1480, Rome.

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tendency of neighbours to quarrel, and of neighbouring states to be rival states, this could be a source of additional concern to the regime: would the state in which their exiles had taken refuge help them? Generally, a regime would try to have its exiles moved away from the borders, even though there was always the risk that they might seek and ®nd support in other quarters. Finding ways of controlling exiles, trying to prevent them ending up exactly where the regime did not want them to go, was rarely easy. The next three chapters will look at some of the issues stemming from the questions examined in this one: how exiles made their living and where the search for an income took them; how regimes would try to keep track and, so far as they could, control of their exiles; and where exiles who were bent on making trouble would go, and how they set about it.

chapter 4

LIFE IN EXILE

`The man living in exile from his homeland is a dead man, and lives in a sepulchre, dying every day', declared Evangelista Salvi, expressing his relief at being given permission to return from exile, in May 1485.1 His dramatic expression of his feelings is a counterpart of the words put into the mouth of Onofri Strozzi in Francesco Filelfo's dialogue Òn Exile'. Ìs anything more desperate or more miserable than exile?'2 Filelfo was seeking to show his mettle in one of the classic genres of humanist literature, the consolatoria; in a dedicatory letter, he described this dialogue as a true test of skill, since exile was so often regarded as the supreme example of misfortune.3 Whether the circumstances of Onofri, who lived with his father Palla in Padua and shared his literary interests and studies, would have seemed so desperate and miserable to many other exiles is open to question. If poverty was one of the evils of exile discussed by Palla and Onofri in Filelfo's dialogue, their poverty was relative. Compared to the wealth he had enjoyed in Florence before his exile, where he had been one of the richest men in the city, Palla was poor in Padua. Nevertheless, he still had enough money to build a pleasant house for his family, take men of learning into his household, and live a life of cultivated ease.4 In reality, Evangelista Salvi's living grave had been a fairly comfortable one, too. He had the patronage of Lodovico Sforza, who had written on his behalf to ask Siena to recall him, and he does not in fact appear to have returned to Siena, except perhaps to visit, for some years.5 The experience of life in exile for those banished from their homes 1 2 4

5

ASS, BalõÁa 522, 42: Evangelista Salvi, 5 May 1485, Bologna. 3 Ibid. Quoted in Starn, Contrary Commonwealth, p. 141. Vespasiano da Bisticci, Le vite, vol. II, pp. 157±65; Giuseppe Fiocco, `La casa di Palla Strozzi', Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei: Memorie: Classe di scienze morali, storiche e ®lologiche, ser. 8, 5 (1954), 361±82. ASS, BalõÁa 405, f. 80r; BalõÁa 533, 93: Evangelista Salvi, 13 Mar. 1487, Alessandria.

110

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for political reasons could be as diverse as all the varieties of character, background, interest, income, ambition and fortune of the exiles could make it. If exile for many did seem desperate and miserable, it should not too readily be assumed that the strength of attachments to patria, home and family necessarily made exile a time of bitter desolation. Undoubtedly, many ®fteenth-century Italians did feel a strong attachment to their native town and were unable to put down roots anywhere else, so that if they went into exile they felt cut off from much that made life dear to them. Yet it should not be forgotten that many men who at home would be members of the political elite went away sometimes for decades, sometimes permanently, in order to make a career for themselves as merchants, soldiers, teachers, artists, judges, clerics or bureaucrats. For such men, life as exiles would not outwardly be very different from the life they had lived before, even if the knowledge that they could not go home, and that they might have suffered loss of their property, or that their families might be subject to sanctions, could made a substantial psychological difference. Some exiles applied themselves to earning a living, building a new life; others set their hearts on returning and taking revenge on their enemies. For some, life in exile was comfortable, even luxurious; for others, it was a life of struggle and hardship. Much obviously depended on the circumstances in which exiles had left ± whether they had ¯ed for their lives with only the clothes on their backs, or had had time to make preparations and sort out their affairs. Much could depend on whether or not they had their immediate family with them, and whether there was anyone left to watch over their affairs back home. Much could depend on whether they had property back home from which they could draw an income and, if they did, whether they were allowed to do so, or whether their property was sequestered or con®scated, or subject to ®nes or punitive taxation. Con®scation of all property was the usual corollary of a sentence of rebellion, and those who were not of®cially rebels might still lose many or all of their worldly goods. Houses and farms, livestock and stores of grain and wine, shops and workshops, shares in banks and merchant ®rms, credits with the public savings banks and the public debt, down to furniture and clothing, everything could be seized. Teams of of®cials, bailiffs and notaries, would search out and inventory anything they could ®nd, and anyone caught concealing the property of rebels could be penalized. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the organized destruction of the houses ± and especially of the towers which were the symbols of family pride and power ± had been a characteristic feature of the persecution of exiles and their families. By the later ®fteenth century, theatrical displays of judicial retribution against the property of

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exiles were no longer the custom. Con®scated property was generally treated as an asset, to be rented out or sold for the bene®t of the government. Great damage could still be in¯icted on the property of exiles, with houses burned and looted, but this was generally the work of partisan mobs, rather than of of®cials engaged in the ritual humiliation of the vanquished. Giovanni Bentivoglio's splendid palace in Bologna was destroyed after the family was forced into exile by Julius II in 1506, not on the orders of the pope but by the Bentivoglio's enemies among the Bolognese, determined to `destroy the nest, so that the bird of prey may never return'.6 The norm, the bureaucratic norm, for the treatment of property con®scated from exiles by civic governments in the ®fteenth century was represented by the fate of the property of an earlier group of Bolognese exiles, the Canetoli and their followers, banished after the assassination of Annibale Bentivoglio in 1445. Four notaries were appointed to act as procurators of the commune of Bologna, and given the authority to draw up a register of all the property and rights of the exiles and then to administer it, exacting the fruits and revenues, or to sell it off.7 How the of®cials of a Duke of Milan or a King of Naples or a lesser signore dealt with the property of rebels has not yet been studied. Much was presumably simply sold or granted to others. The comprehensive lists of supporters of the Sforza drawn up by the French in 1500 were principally compiled, it would seem, to record what property they had and whether it had yet been assigned to anyone.8 For property not sold or given away, incorporation into the royal or ducal demesne or the personal property of the signore seems the most likely fate. There have been some studies of how the property of Florentine exiles was handled. There was a well-established procedure, with property that had been con®scated from rebels and other exiles being kept distinct from other communal property for many years after it had been con®scated. By contrast, there do not seem to have been set procedures in Siena, and there was an air of improvisation about the way in which the disposal of con®scated property was managed. In Florence, the Parte Guelfa still retained possessions con®scated from the Ghibellines in 1267. From 1364, responsibility for keeping account of the property of rebels was given to a new magistracy, the Of®cials of the Tower. They compiled three successive registers of 6 7

8

Ady, The Bentivoglio, p. 134. Angela De Benedictis, ` ``Sendo la parte de' Bentivogli et con®rmate et unita'' ', in Cesare Mozzarelli (ed.), ``Familia'' del Principe e famiglia aristocratica, 2 vols. (Rome, 1988), vol. II, pp. 443±5. PeÂlissier, Documents pour l'histoire de la domination francËaise dans le Milanais, pp. 34±54.

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ìncorporations' from 1365 to 1509, carrying over entries from one volume to the next. The Parte Guelfa retained some authority over the property of exiles, and relatives of exiles staking a claim to con®scated possessions had to deal with the Of®cials of the Rebels of the Parte Guelfa, as well as with the Of®cials of the Tower. Neither set of of®cials were left to make decisions on such politically delicate matters on their own. Political magistracies like the Eight of Ward, which had general authority over exiles, could issue instructions or guidelines, and as in every other sphere of government, `recommendations' could be made by powerful individuals.9 There was no body of of®cials in Siena with permanent authority over property taken from exiles. Overall control of its disposal was retained by the BalõÁa; sometimes responsibilities would be assigned to other of®cials on an ad hoc basis. In November 1456, it was the Captain of the People who was asked by the BalõÁa to see to the sale of the property of rebels by nine provvisionati.10 In the early 1480s, while the BalõÁe laid down the procedures and the guidelines to be followed, the task of seeing that possessions that were forfeit were tracked down, listed and disposed of was usually delegated to a small, specially appointed group. Very soon after the ®rst sentences of rebellion in 1480 were passed, on 25 July, four men were elected to have charge òver the property of the rebels, with full and ample authority to ®nd it and bring it under the ®sc'.11 These men, together with the chamberlain and the Four of the Biccherna (of®cials who dealt with the communal ®nances and accounts) were ordered on 10 November to sell, within ten days, all the property of the rebels, `sitting in the place where such sales of communal property are usually held'. Before any goods were handed over, a list of the prices offered for them had to be put before the BalõÁa for two days, after which the transaction could be completed unless the BalõÁa decided otherwise.12 The BalõÁa of March and April, and that of May and June 1481, both appointed three of their own number to have charge of the property of rebels.13 After the change of regime in the summer of 1482, three men were appointed in August to deal with the possessions of the new crop of 9

10 13

Alison Brown, `The Guelf Party in ®fteenth-century Florence: the transition from communal to Medicean state', in eadem, The Medici in Florence: The Exercise and Language of Power (Perth and Florence, 1992), p. 113; Starn, Contrary Commonwealth, pp. 111±15; Margery Ganz, `Paying the price for political failure: Florentine women in the aftermath of 1466', Rinascimento, 34 (1994), 242±4; Susannah Foster Baxendale, Èxile in practice: the Alberti family in and out of Florence 1401±1428', Renaissance Quarterly 44 (1991), 731±4. 11 ASS, BalõÁa 20, f. 45v. 12 ASS, BalõÁa 21, f. 8r. ASS, BalõÁa 2, f. 68r. ASS, BalõÁa, 23, f. 46r; BalõÁa 24, f. 5r.

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rebels. They were given full powers to sell the property of rebels, except that they could not sell any lands or buildings without ®rst informing the BalõÁa. A register of their deliberations has survived, but it does not bear comparison with the orderly volumes kept by the notaries of the Of®cials of the Tower in Florence. It contains only some confused records of detailed enquiries into the possessions of Neri Placidi and a few others, a few lists of household goods and lists of those claiming to be creditors of exiles.14 In January 1484, as part of a general review of communal ®nances, the BalõÁa ordered that those who had charge over the property of rebels should leave of®ce.15 From then on, it appears that the BalõÁa, or perhaps the segreti who had supervision of the exiles, dealt with questions concerning the property of rebels. Dispersal by sale or by grant or by simple theft was the likely destiny of the lands, houses and other goods con®scated from exiles. Administrative convenience could have been one factor, especially in handling the goods of townsmen. Looking after their con®scated property could well have cost more than the value of the income to be derived from much of the disparate job lots of houses and shops and farms that would have accumulated, let alone the tools and furniture and household linens and pots and pans that went with them. Anything could ®nd a purchaser, like the clothes of the Sienese rebels picked over in the Campo when they were put up for sale at the sound of a trumpet, on the orders of the BalõÁa in August 1480.16 Covetous neighbours, enemies and rivals, those whose prime interest was picking up a bargain, could all be willing to buy up the property of rebels. The plums, it can be imagined, would be reserved for the inner circle of the regime ± if they, like other buyers, were prepared to run the risk of losing the property, perhaps without compensation, on the exiles' return. On the other hand, some of the purchasers, friends or relations of the exiles, could be hoping for their return, trying to salvage something from the ruin. Exiles who were not made rebels, and who did not incur the penalty of con®scation of their property, might yet suffer considerable ®nancial loss. If ritualistic destruction of a defeated enemy's property was no longer customary, looting and burning the possessions of rivals was still a feature of the factional violence that drove so many into exile. When the counts of Sterpeto who dominated Assisi raided the Perugian contado in 1494, for example, the Baglioni retaliated by raids up to the gates of Assisi, burning all the dwellings outside the walls. Inside Assisi, the houses of the exiles were put to the torch, sometimes ten a day. In 14 15

ASS, BalõÁa 25. Their powers were set out on f. 2r. 16 ASS, BalõÁa 20, f. 67v. ASS, BalõÁa 31, ff. 46v±47r.

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Viterbo in August 1459, some returning Maganzesi exiles roused the members of their party to sack the houses of the rival Gatteschi. After three days the Gatteschi regained the upper hand with the help of papal troops, and many houses of the Maganzesi were looted before the papal of®cials and leaders of the Gatteschi were able to restore order. At Parma in March 1477, the losses sustained by the members of the Rossi faction when their rivals went on the rampage were estimated at about 25,000 ducats. All the rich Rossi lost something; some houses were burned, some pulled down, others left a shell, with only the walls and roof remaining. Understandably many Rossi left with what remaining property they could carry.17 Those whose property was left intact could still be subject to punitive taxation, forced loans or ®nes, which exiles might be unable to pay without selling some of their possessions. Creditors would be free to press their real or in¯ated claims in the lawcourts, in the expectation of receiving a sympathetic hearing, with exiles unable to mount an effective defence from a distance. In such circumstances, relatives and friends back home had a vital role to play in protecting the interests of exiles, so far as they were able ± and if they were prepared to do so. Family members who had escaped banishment might not always be prepared to undertake the troublesome task of contesting tax assessments, or realizing assets to pay taxes and forced loans and ®nes in the way least damaging to the exiles' interests. In many cases, given the frequency with which brothers, fathers and sons, or uncles and nephews, were exiled together, exiles would not have close male blood relations left behind who could take on this task. Sometimes, the men of the family of origin of the women of the exiles might be ready to help. In all cases, active female relatives, alert to the protection of the family interests, ready to lobby of®cials and the politically in¯uential, and to cajole and chivvy their male relations into action, could be an invaluable asset. A third (30 per cent) of the Sienese exiles are known to have been declared to be rebels or outlawed, so that at least a third of the exiles could have had all their property within the reach of the Sienese authorities con®scated. At least another tenth (9 per cent) of the exiles had to pay a ®ne. Fines were imposed in a sixth (16 per cent) of the known cases, but some of those exiles would subsequently be outlawed or made rebels. The Riformatori sentenced in 1480 were most likely to be ®ned. On 12 to 14 July 1480 alone, around twenty Riformatori, some exiles, 17

Francesco Matarazzo, `Cronaca della cittaÁ di Perugia dal 1492 al 1503', ASI 16, ii (1851), 14; della Tuccia, `Cronache di Viterbo', pp. 73±5; Cronica Lombardie, pp. 6±7.

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some not, were ordered to pay from ®fty to 1,000 ducats by the end of September. Many of those subject to forced loans and ®nes struggled to pay, and in late November 1480 six members of the BalõÁa were deputed to give permission to Riformatori to sell property `to pay the levies that have been made, and are to be made, on them'.18 All together, a third (30 per cent) of those known to have been exiled between 1480 and May 1482 were ®ned. From 1483 to the middle of 1487, it was the turn of the Nove to be subject to special levies, such as that to meet the expenses of the campaign to recover Monteriggioni, or to pay compensation to the Riformatori who had suffered losses in 1480 to 1482.19 Noveschi exiles whose property had not been con®scated already were liable to contribute to these. In early 1485, Achille Petrucci complained that the levies imposed on him, apart from the cash paid, had cost him in property pledged or sold (perhaps forcibly), `First, a shop that Amideo Neroni has had; item, a herd of cows, that Antonio Damiani has had; item, another shop, that the Capacci have had; item, a property at Strove, the Capacci; item, a property under pledge to messer Savino; item, another property, to Francesco di Petronio.'20 Like the Riformatori under the previous regime, the Nove were all subject to restrictions on the disposal of their property, which could only have added to the problems of exiles in meeting the ®nes and other payments exacted from them. Exiles could be subject to extra restrictions, such as the prohibition noted by the three men given charge over the goods of rebels in August 1482, that no exile was to sell or otherwise alienate any ®xed property without the permission of the BalõÁa, and that any such contract they had made since 1 June was to be annulled. The same restriction on the sale of ®xed property by exiles was imposed by the BalõÁa in of®ce in August 1487.21 Instructions by the BalõÁa on the disposal of property by exiles could be quite detailed. Tommaso di TomeÁ di Onofrio, exiled to Sovana in the contado in July 1480, was given permission to sell some of his possessions on condition that half of the price would be invested in real property in Sovana, and the rest be used as capital for trading. The following February, when his place of exile was changed to the hospital at Piano, he was ordered to give his property to the hospital, at least after his death.22 Nevertheless, judging by the lack of complaints in letters from exiles 18 19 20 21 22

ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 29v±30r, 32r, 33v±34r; BalõÁa 21, f. 27r. ASS, BalõÁa 27, f. 37v; Concistoro 699, ff. 20v± 21r; BalõÁa 33, f. 18r. ASS, BalõÁa 526, 47: Achille Petrucci, 26 Jan. 1485, Foligno. ASS, BalõÁa 25, f. 2r; BalõÁa 35, f. 24r. ASS, BalõÁa 20, f. 28r; BalõÁa 22, f. 71v.

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to the government about problems in drawing on resources back home, those exiles whose property had not been con®scated, and who had some possessions yielding an income in Siena, could have money transferred to them without ordinarily encountering too much obstruction. Riformatori exiles in Naples did complain in 1480 that they could not bring from Siena goods and money to live on, because the BalõÁa had decided that they could not take anything out. Ferrante's reaction ± that if this was so, he thought they had reason to complain ± indicates that it was not considered right to deny exiles observing their con®nes the use of what remained to them. The Sienese ambassador explained that they could withdraw reasonable sums and belongings, provided that they had the permission of the BalõÁa, and Ferrante professed himself satis®ed.23 Even if it was not made deliberately dif®cult for exiles to withdraw money from Siena, it could still be dif®cult for them to manage property at a distance, unless they had agents in Siena willing and able to help them. Close male relatives would usually be the agents of choice ± if an exile had any close male relatives left in Siena. Often, however, several members of a family would be exiled together. At least two-thirds (67 per cent) of the Sienese exiles were from the same lineage as one or more men in exile at the same time. Frequently, they were precisely those closest relatives ± brothers, fathers, sons, uncles, nephews ± to whom an exile would have been most likely to turn for help. If there was no suitable, or willing, man from his own family who could help, sometimes the relatives of an exile's wife would be sympathetic. But the dearth of surviving private correspondence in Siena, and the lack of a permanent organization such as the Florentine Of®cials of the Tower and Parte Guelfa dealing with the property of exiles, mean that only occasional glimpses can be had of families taking care of the property of exiled relatives. Nothing like the wealth of information on the care with which Giovanni Rucellai in Florence looked after the interests of his father-inlaw, Palla Strozzi, has come to light in Siena, or is likely to do so. For twenty-®ve years from Palla's exile in 1434 until his death, Giovanni worked to protect the former's remaining property from punitive taxation, and tried to ensure that when something had to be sold, the transaction was not too bad a bargain for him. During the 1440s and 1450s Giovanni acquired much Strozzi property at low prices àlmost always with Palla's consent and usually on the understanding that on request it should revert to the Strozzi at the same prices'.24 Palla agreed to 23 24

ASS, BalõÁa 502, 54: Achille Petrucci, 30 Nov. 1480, Naples. Kent, `Making of a Renaissance Patron', 22±49.

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Giovanni using the income from these lands for `pious works'; Giovanni employed it in the construction of ecclesiastical buildings which helped to make him one of the major private architectural patrons of Renaissance Florence. On the whole, Palla Strozzi was satis®ed that his son-in-law was dealing honestly with his affairs, although his sons and grandsons were not so sure.25 Some Sienese exiles also believed that their relations were taking advantage of them. Cristofano Lotti complained that his brothers-in-law had robbed him and he could not support himself. Bernardino Ciani lamented that he had written `letter upon letter to our relatives and friends', asking them to sell some of his property to raise the 200 ducats he had been ordered to pay, but nothing had been done `because today men don't want to take trouble for others without something for themselves; and seeing that we can't rely on relations and friends', he asked permission to leave his place of exile in the contado for a month to sort out the matter.26 With the men of their family banished, or perhaps reluctant to help relatives in political disgrace, women had an important role to play in salvaging what they could of the family's possessions. One asset that even the women of rebels could secure was their own dowries. The opinions of the authoritative fourteenth-century jurist, Bartolo of Sassoferrato, concerning the claims of wives of outlaws or exiles against their husbands' property had become generally accepted. He had argued that the wife of a bannitus whose goods had been con®scated by public authority could take legal action to recover her dowry, on the grounds that her husband should be considered insolvent. The wife of an exile whose goods had not been con®scated, according to Bartolo, could sue to recover her dowry on the grounds that her husband had begun to mismanage his assets. `Where the ius commune favoured the interests of the wife', however, `statutory law tended to favour the interests of the governments.'27 In Florence, the wives and mothers of rebels and other exiles whose property had been con®scated or sequestered had to petition for of®cial recognition of their right to their dowry. When this was acknowledged, the property of the exile on which the dowry had been secured, or which was allocated as the equivalent of the value of the dowry, might 25 26 27

Ibid., p. 77. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 27: Francesco Petrucci, 28 Aug. [1480], Rome; ibid., 44: Bernardino di Francesco Ciani, 12 Oct. 1480, Petroio. Julius Kirshner, `Wives' claims against insolvent husbands in late medieval Italy', in Julius Kirshner and Suzanne F. Wemple (eds.), Women of the Medieval World: Essays in Honor of John H. Mundy (Oxford, 1985), p. 276.

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be handed over to the women (with restrictions on their disposal of it), but sometimes an allowance was made to them instead to cover the estimated income the property would yield. This allowance was not always paid to them in full, as claims of other creditors on the estates of an exile could be deducted from it.28 The principle that the women even of rebels were entitled to their dowries was accepted in Siena. Arrangements for settling their claims, as with arrangements for dealing with the property of rebels in general, were ad hoc. In November 1480, three members of the BalõÁa were given authority, acting with the four men with responsibility for the property of rebels, `to concede and give all the possessions' of rebels to their wives and mothers `for their dowries' ± where it was evident that nothing could be gained for the comune.29 Three members of the then BalõÁa were given similar authority in February 1482; two months later, three men elected to sell rebels' property were given authority to pay dowries, and other legitimate claims, from the proceeds.30 Occasionally, the full BalõÁa would make decisions about dowries. Sometimes the BalõÁa stepped in to decide from which source the women should be paid. The Hospital of Santa Maria della Scala was declared to owe Felice, wife of Ricco Ricchi, 510 ¯orins from her husband's property that had been given to the hospital by the comune; the money was to be put on deposit in the bank of the Mignanelli, until Felice used it to buy land in the contado.31 On 13 December 1480, it was decided that the capital of Francesco del Grissa in a trading company should be given to NiccoloÁ Ugolini and his other partners, provided they paid out a total of over 7300 ¯orins to various people, including 510 ¯orins to Francesco del Grissa's wife for her dowry, and 1,000 ¯orins to the wife of Lorenzo Venturini and 700 ¯orins to the wife of Marco di Pietro di Antonio, for theirs.32 The women appear to have been given cash or real property, but they were not allowed to alienate any property that might be assigned to them without the permission of the BalõÁa.33 The arrangements for assigning the dowries to the women of those declared rebels in 1482±3 were different. This time the four of®cials of the Biccherna and the judge of appeals were given the task, in collaboration with those appointed to supervise the property of rebels.34 It is not clear what arrangements were made after 1483. 28 29 30 32 34

Baxendale, Èxile in practice', 730±3; Ganz, `Paying the price for political failure', 242±4. ùbi viderunt quod comune Senarum nihil possit lucrari'. ASS, BalõÁa 21, f. 17r. 31 BalõÁa 23, f. 69r. ASS, BalõÁa 22, f. 44v; BalõÁa 23, f. 46r. 33 ASS, BalõÁa 24, f. 5v. ASS, BalõÁa 21, ff. 50v±51r. ASS, BalõÁa 29, f. 9v.

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Dowries, the BalõÁa were sternly reminded by the exiled Achille Petrucci, as a general rule are always kept ùnharmed and untouched'. He was protesting that the dowries of his wife, mother and daughter-inlaw were being threatened with liability for levies imposed on him.35 To BalõÁe looking to raise money or keep a hold over exiles, however, dowries were not sacrosanct. At the petition of his wife, Battista, Achille was given extra time to pay the ®ne imposed on him, on condition that if he did not pay or come to an arrangement with the Biccherna within that time, Battista was to pay 300 ducats; if she did not, it was to be con®scated from her dowry.36 A wife might be required to pledge her dowry that her husband would observe the con®nes set for him, as the wife of Giovanni Lotti was in June 1481.37 There was a decree in early 1484 that all wives of exiles who were absent from Siena should return by the end of March on pain of the con®scation of their dowries.38 In November 1488, on the other hand, it was decreed that those exiles who did not go to the con®nes allotted to them within a month were to be rebels, and their women and children were to be sent to join them, and the women's dowries would be seized, `deposited' with the comune.39 Two years later, it was decided to send all the mothers and wives of the exiles away, so that they would not be in constant correspondence with them, and so that the exiles `would have the extra trouble and expense, giving them something else to think about than scheming against this regime'.40 These contradictory edicts point to a dilemma that confronted both the exiles and those who banished them ± what to do with the exiles' dependants. If they stayed at home, they could act as hostages for the good behaviour of the exiles, but they could also act as generators of sympathy for them, like the women of the Reformatori that an anonymous Sienese diarist saw going about the city `sad and lamenting, so that it was pitiful to see them'.41 They could also be channels of information to and from the exiles, no matter how carefully they were supervised. From the point of view of the exile, it could make sense to leave his dependants behind, particularly if his sentence was comparatively short. For a man facing the prospect of prolonged exile, it might be better to leave dependants behind, at least initially, to sort out the family's affairs and to wait until he had found a suitable place for them to settle. On the 35 36 38 39 40 41

ASS, BalõÁa 511, 92: Achille Petrucci, 18 June 1483, Foligno. 37 ASS, BalõÁa 24, f. 56v. ASS, BalõÁa 30, f. 51r. ASS, BalõÁa 518, 12: Cardinal da Costa, 6 Apr. 1484, Urbino. ASS, BalõÁa 36, f. 54r±v. ASF, MAP 41, 471: Andrea da Foiano, 7 Mar. 1490(1), Siena. `Diario senese', f. 32v.

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other hand, anxiety about his loved ones, and the pain of separation from them, was an additional psychological burden that could weigh heavily on a man. Incarcerated in a Neapolitan prison (and unaware that he would soon be released and allowed to return home) Tommaso Luti urged the regime not to allow `such great and so bitter ruin of so many of their wretched citizens, of so many women deprived of their husbands, sons and daughters deprived of their fathers, all liable to run into trouble without their father's guidance and control'.42 Only scattered pieces of information have come to light about what the dependants of Sienese exiles did. Judging from what has been found and from the decrees of the BalõÁa, it appears that the usual practice was for them to stay in Siena, providing the term of exile of the head of the household was not a long one, or for life. Different regimes had varying views on what they wanted them to do. No record of efforts to keep the dependants of the exiles of 1456±8 in Siena has come to light. Nevertheless, at least one of the exiles, Antonio del Catasta, complained bitterly that his wife was being prevented from joining him, although ìt is unheard of for an exile observing his con®nes to be deprived of his wife'.43 From 1480 to 1487, when there was a prospect that the exiles would try to return, the regimes wanted dependants to stay in Siena, or at least the contado. For a man to have his wife and family with him was regarded as a favour, as a concession. Wives who had joined their husbands without permission, or had outstayed their leave, were ordered to return. Battista, wife of Petrino Bellanti, was very anxious that she might lose her dowry if she did not obey the BalõÁa's order to return from Urbino where she was staying with her husband, who did not want her to leave.44 There was a group of exiles' wives at CittaÁ della Pieve in 1483; they may have been brought there for safety, when so many Noveschi men were ¯eeing for fear of their lives.45 In the later 1480s and 1490s, there seems to have been less concern about keeping a hold on exiles' dependants; indeed, the regime considered that sending them to join their menfolk would obstruct the activities of the exiles. This change of policy may also be a corollary of the increased tendency to assign con®nes in the contado,46 and perhaps a recognition that attempts to control exiles through their dependants in Siena had not been very successful. The Florentine regulations of 1436 concerning exiles stipulated that 42 43 44 45 46

ASS, Concistoro 2051, 99: Tommaso Luti, undated [? June 1482]. ASS, BalõÁa 495, 58: Antonio di Goro del Catasta, 16 Aug. 1458, ìn con®ni' (Lodi). ASS, BalõÁa 518, 12: Cardinal da Costa, 6 Apr. 1484, Urbino. ASS, BalõÁa 513, 67: Priors of Castel della Pieve, 13 Aug. 1483. See above, p. 89.

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no mother or wife of a rebel or other exile could go to see him without permission. In 1438, the Eight of Ward decreed that none of the women of any of those made rebels or exiled by the BalõÁa in 1434 could go to them, or, if they were with them already, leave them and come to Florentine territory, without the permission of the Eight. This may not have been very hard to obtain. Alessandra Bardi visited her husband Raffaele Acciaiuoli several times in Naples after his exile in 1466 without incurring of®cial displeasure. The studies of the Alberti, Acciaiuoli and Neroni women indicate that Florentine women tended to stay behind, even when their men were in exile for many years; and that this was the result of family strategies, rather than pressure from the authorities. Some Florentine women, however, did go into exile with their menfolk. The wife and daughter-in-law of Palla Strozzi, having initially stayed in Florence, went to live with him in Padua: Alessandra, his daughter-in-law, stayed with him even after the death in exile of her husband Lorenzo. The more famous Alessandra Strozzi went with her husband Matteo into exile at Pesaro in 1434, taking her young family with her, but returned to Florence after he and three of their children died a year later. When her remaining sons were compelled to leave Florence, she stayed behind through the long years of waiting and working to bring about their return. Many Pisan exiles had their families with them. Intermarriage among the families of exiles helped to keep up contacts within the diaspora, and nourished their sense of identity as Pisans, as well as weaving valuable commercial and ®nancial networks.47 Those who left their homes for exile after being worsted in factional violence were probably more likely to take their families with them, or at least to being them out as soon as they could. When members of the Rossi faction of Parma decided that it was too dangerous to stay there in 1477±8, they moved their families as well as what goods they could transport to safer places. So many had left by February 1478 that tax revenues were suffering badly, and the governor of Parma ordered all those absent from the city to return within ®fteen days with their families, or incur the penalties of rebellion; many did come back. The Perugian exiles who stationed themselves in the Sienese contado after their expulsion from Perugia in 1488 brought their families with them. Initially, the women and girls and the boys under fourteen years of age were allowed to stay in the Sienese town of Chiusi on the border, while the 47

ASF, Otto di Guardia (repubblica), 224, f. 3r; Ganz, `Paying the price for political failure', 244; Fiocco, `La casa di Palla Strozzi', 378±81; Alessandra Macinghi negli Strozzi, Lettere di una gentildonna ®orentina del secolo XV ai ®gliuoli esuli, ed. Cesare Guasti (Florence, 1877), pp. xxi±v; Baxendale, Èxile in practice', 728±52; Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa', p. 346.

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men were repeatedly ordered to keep at least ®fteen miles away from Perugian territory. After a year or so, when it proved dif®cult to keep the men within these limits, the BalõÁa decided that their dependants should be ordered to leave the border zone as well, but it was to be done courteously and they were to be given assistance with transporting their possessions. Either this policy was not put into effect or the exiles came back, for soon they were again to be found in Chiusi. In May 1495, after the exiles had fought their way into Perugia only to be driven out again, the Dieci di Arbitrio of Perugia insisted that they did not want the exiles' women to stay in Chiusi, but said they would not object to their staying in Siena, provided they had no contact with their men. The Perugian exiles pleaded that their women should be allowed to stay, saying that houses and other property had been bought for them in Chiusi that they intended to keep even after they returned to Perugia, as a memorial of the hospitality they had received. Whether the families were forced to move on this time is not clear.48 Exiles who felt that their families would be safer out of reach of their enemies would not always be able to keep their dependants with them. Sometimes, they had to ®nd them a safe place to stay while they went off to earn a living, or to plot and ®ght to return. The Neapolitan exile Cola da Monforte left his wife and children in Mantua, where he visited them at intervals during the years he served the Angevins and the Duke of Burgundy. On one of these visits, he was said to have killed Countess Altabella di Sangro, the adulterous wife of another Neapolitan exile; her two sons joined their father in France to begin their apprenticeship in arms. During the campaign by Cesare Borgia against his former condottieri in 1503, the women of the Vitelli, Baglioni and some of the Orsini found refuge in Pitigliano, the fortress of NiccoloÁ Orsini, which afforded them the diplomatic protection of Venice, NiccoloÁ's employer. One of the most active of the Sienese exiles in the middle of the 1480s, Leonardo Bellanti, managed to get his family out of Siena, even though his wife Angelina had been speci®cally ordered not to leave the city with her two small children without the express permission of the BalõÁa. He settled them at Viterbo, where a number of other Sienese exiles made their homes at that time.49 48

49

Cronica Lombardie, pp. 15, 23; ASS, BalõÁa 409, f. 132r; BalõÁa 410, ff. 46v±47r; BalõÁa 553, 66: Dieci di Arbitrio, 10 May 1495, Perugia; ibid., 87: `Servitores exititii Perusini', 26 May 1495. Benedetto Croce, `Cola da Monforte, Conte di Campobasso', in Vite di avventure, di fede e di passione, ed. Giuseppe Galasso (Milan, 1989), pp. 100±4; Giustinian, Dispacci, I, p. 336: 13 Jan. 1503, Rome; ASS, BalõÁa 27, f. 46r; BalõÁa 522, 36: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 30 Apr. 1485, Rome.

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Whether or not they had their families with them, Sienese exiles, like all other exiles, had to take stock and review what they had to live on. Some of those exiled to their own possessions in the contado could settle down to a life of quiet retirement, living from the revenues and produce of their land. Con®ni could be set so as to allow an exile to look after his property. Daniele di Bartolomeo, exiled to Chiusdino in November 1480, was given leave to go to Stini, where he had property, and stay there às his business requires'.50 Antonio Orlandini, ordered to stay at Sinalunga in July 1482, was to be allowed to visit his properties at Liciniano and Bettolle.51 Such arrangements could make it considerably easier for exiles to take care of themselves and their families. In December 1456 Francesco di Mino pleaded to be given con®nes that would permit him to feed his `poor little children', three boys and three girls, by his trade and the produce of the farms he had at Santa Maria a Pilli.52 Here I am in Ferrara, on your orders, wrote Pierpaolo Zondadori to the BalõÁa in 1481, already old, poor, alone and without any trade or way to earn a living. He had nothing left in Ferrara, he told them, and could not have anything sent to him from home, because what was left there was not enough for the needs of his family. Please could they let him stay either on his own property, where he could make shift for himself by his own efforts, or at San Quirico, where he could have some support from his brother-in-law; in Ferrara he had no friends, no relations, no help from anyone.53 Not all of those exiled to the contado would have farms there, or even if they did, would be able to keep themselves and their family on the produce. Jacomo Buoninsegni, at the beginning of a ®ve-year term of exile at Torre a Castello, complained that such restricted con®nes would make it very dif®cult for him `to care for my poor family' of ®ve girls and two boys, the youngest ten years old, but even while knowing that they would go hungry, he said, he would obey.54 Could he please be sent to Montalcino where he could stay with his son, Nofrio Bencivenni asked, so that `we could share our bread and wine and bed and hearth and rent'. He wanted to open a wool workshop (`botegha de lana') to pay the rent and contribute towards food. His request was granted, but only after nearly a year.55 Some exiles felt that they had a better chance of making a living 50 52 53 54 55

51 ASS, BalõÁa 26, f. 37v. ASS, BalõÁa 21, ff. 19r, 36r. ASS, BalõÁa 491, 32: Francesco di Mino della ?Gargha, 18 Dec. 1456, ìn prison'. ASS, BalõÁa 503, 41: Pierpaolo Zondadori, 15 June 1481, Ferrara. ASS, BalõÁa 528, 19: Jacomo Buoninsegni, 18 Oct. 1486, Torre a Castello. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 22: Nofrio di Meo d'Agnolo di Ciano [Bencivenni], 12 Aug. 1480, Castel del Piano; BalõÁa 24, f. 84v.

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outside the contado. As he had very few resources, Francesco di Lando asked in 1487, could he be given con®nes somewhere, either in the contado or out of it, where he could support himself by some work or trade; and because he was not sure where he could go, could they possibly assign him con®nes of so many miles from the city, so that he could move around `to seek my fortune'?56 The need to earn a living was the reason most frequently given by Sienese exiles requesting a transfer or extension of their con®nes, or justifying a move without permission. Some wanted greater freedom of movement to help them trade. If he was to bring up his seven little children properly, Giacoppo Petrucci complained in 1482, Pisa and eight miles around was too restricted an area for his con®ni. He would not be able to have work done for him or trade in livestock if he could not go further a®eld.57 Could he be transferred to con®nes in the contado, Giovanni Lotti requested, or be given leave to travel by land and sea, not approaching within 150 miles of Sienese territory? He did not have enough to keep `my af¯icted wife and poor little children' and `the merchant's trade is the only one I know'.58 He had come to Naples a year ago, Carmignuola Tricerchi wrote to the BalõÁa in June 1485, where, thanks to the charity of Madonna Cassandra Spannocchi, he was living at the Spannocchi bank. He had come here `to see if I could drum up some business by sea or on land to support myself, and as yet nothing has come along', so he wanted leave to stay until something did.59 No Sienese merchant or banker in exile matched the wealth of a Cosimo de' Medici or a Filippo Strozzi. Filippo made his career in exile from Florence in a ®rm belonging to cousins of his father Matteo, before starting his own ®rm in Naples. Helped by a large inheritance from one of the cousins and the favour of King Ferrante, Filippo built up a fortune which made him one of the richest men in Florence after he returned there in 1470. Even as an exile, Filippo was one of the correspondents of the Medici bank; but while Cosimo de' Medici was in exile, the Florentine regime tried to bring the Medici bank down. Although the operations of the bank were somewhat reduced, thanks to Cosimo's personal standing offers of credits and cash came to him in Venice from many merchants and others outside Florence, and he and his brother Lorenzo came through exile with their fortunes fairly intact. (For their cousin Averardo, who may 56 57 58 59

ASS, BalõÁa 532, 23: Francesco di Lando, 28 Aug. 1487, Pian Castagnaio. ASS, BalõÁa 504, 95: Giacoppo Petrucci, 29 July 1482, Pisa. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 65: Giovanni Lotti, 18 Jan. 1480(1), Naples. ASS, BalõÁa 524, 10: Carmignuola Tricerchi, 6 June 1485, Naples.

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already have been in ®nancial trouble before being banished from Florence, exile brought ruin.)60 If no Sienese exiles had the resources or connections of the Medici to turn to, there were still individuals who were wealthy enough and suf®ciently well connected to cause anxiety to their enemies in power in Siena. Neri Placidi was one, because of his close connection with Ferrante and Alfonso of Calabria, and his tenure of the contract for the alum works belonging to Jacopo d'Appiano, the lord of Piombino. The con®nes assigned to him on 17 June 1482 ± Monterotondo and ten miles around, excluding the city of Massa, but with permission to go throughout the territory of Piombino, except the island of Elba ± would have permitted him to carry on his business, but he did not keep them. The BalõÁa ordered an inventory of all his property to be compiled, and declared null and void any contracts he had entered into since the beginning of June. They had also forbidden Madonna Cassandra and the heirs of Ambrogio Spannocchi to receive him at the branches of their bank in Naples, Rome, Valencia or elsewhere, or to lend him any money or goods; and they ordered his two young daughters to be placed in the convent at Santa Marta, pending further instructions. Writing to recommend him to the BalõÁa, the Duke of Calabria said Neri had told him that he wanted to take his family to Naples. As a favour to the duke, would they change Neri's con®nes to allow him to do so, and give him leave `to transfer all his goods safe and sound, and to be able to alienate his ®xed property, and withdraw his money, and convey it securely'.61 Neri himself, however, seemed determined to carry on his business in Piombino. Although he travelled to Naples, he returned to Tuscany and asked the BalõÁa, so that he could pursue the important deals he had in hand, to give him `con®nes of not being able to approach Siena nearer than a certain distance . . . because for this business I need to be here today and somewhere else tomorrow'.62 But still he was regarded with suspicion, and when he travelled to sell his alum, he was believed to have more sinister intentions. In December 1482, he lost the alum works contract to the Sauli, but he remained on good terms with Jacopo d'Appiano, and stayed on in Piombino, perhaps until early 1484. He continued to travel, and to trade, between Piombino, Florence, 60

61 62

Richard Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence: A Study of Four Families (Princeton, 1968), pp. 53±7; Kent, `Medici in esilio', 5, 27, 29±35, 46; Roscoe, Life of Lorenzo de' Medici, vol. I, p. 321. ASS, BalõÁa 26, ff. 8v, 21v; BalõÁa 504, 99: Alfonso, Duke of Calabria, 31 July 1482, from camp at Civita Lavinia. ASS, BalõÁa 505, 20: Neri Placidi, 12 Aug. 1482, Suvareto.

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Rome and Naples. Naples seems to have become Neri's base; in June 1487, the favour of Alfonso helped him to get an important customs of®ce there, yielding `great pro®t and revenue'.63 After his return from exile in 1487, his continuing close connections with Naples caused concern within and outside Siena. Neri's partner in the alum works, Buonaventura Pini, also appears to have gone on trading in exile on a considerable scale. He had been allowed to continue to go to the alum works when he was exiled in the contado in July 1482, and had, for the ®rst months at least, been obedient. His continued association with Neri brought him under suspicion. Ordered to return to his place of exile within ®fteen days, he replied in early May 1483 that if he did so, he would suffer a heavy loss on the sale of alum and stone worth 10,000 ducats that he had on the market.64 Like Neri, he was made a rebel, and stayed on at Piombino after their contract expired; but he did not have Neri's connections with Naples and was not considered to be as dangerous as Neri was. Other wealthy exiles seem to have suffered more losses from con®scation of their property. The funds derived from sales of the property of Filippo Buoninsegni were a boon to the regime in 1480±2. For example, when there was no money available to compensate Cristofano, the son of Pietro Bellanti, for the property con®scated in the 1450s from his father and his grandfather, Filippo Buoninsegni's houses and farms at San Pietro a Paterno, worth nearly 10,000 ¯orins, were ordered to be sold. The losses suffered by the family of Goro del Catasta since 1458 were to be compensated by the grant in June 1481 to Francesco di Goro and his nephews of the inn, houses, meadows and other possessions of Filippo at Macereto al Bagno. Filippo's bank in Siena was given to three men, to `ply their trade there in the said bank', although the building apparently belonged to another man who was to be paid the back rent when they were given the keys by the chamberlain administering the property of rebels.65 An active conspirator, Filippo was one of the last of the exiles to be allowed back in July 1482. If they were not going to let him return, he wrote to the BalõÁa two weeks before his sentence was revoked, could they at least give him permission to stay in Rome and return his property to him, ànd I shall do such trade here that it will bring honour and pro®t' to Siena. He could prove, he wrote in another letter, that he had brought into Siena, òver 30,000 ¯orins from outside 63 64 65

ASS, BalõÁa 531, 23: Alberto Aringhieri, 24 June 1487, Naples. ASS, BalõÁa 510, 6: Buonaventura Pini, 2 May 1483, San Gimignano. ASS, BalõÁa 21, ff. 23r±24r; BalõÁa 24, ff. 63r, 73v.

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in grain and other goods'.66 Despite another period of exile in 1485±7, he was able to repair his ®nances so effectively that he could be the principal partner of a group offering 128,000 lire a year for the gabelle of Siena in 1488.67 Among the Nove exiles in the middle of the 1480s, Cino Cinughi, who had been rector of the Hospital of Santa Maria della Scala, had been one of the wealthiest men in Siena. From his base at Rome, he was at the centre of the exiles' plots. In June 1483, he and some others were reported to have opened banks in Perugia, CittaÁ della Pieve and Acquapendente to facilitate paying the troops that the exiles were raising.68 He may have been dead by 1487, but until late 1485 he was one of the most prominent exiles, and appeared to have access to considerable resources. But how much of it was his money? He was certainly given money, by Girolamo Riario ± 500 ducats, on one occasion in October 1483, it was reported ± but whether this was a pension or the repayment of a loan was not clear; the BalõÁa wanted to know more. Soon after, in a ®t of depression, he told the Bishop of Sovana, who was acting as Sienese ambassador in Rome at the time, that he would rather die at home than live elsewhere. Not that he was saying this because he was desperate or for lack of means of support, he insisted, because he had enough to keep him for the rest of his life, quite apart from a pension of thirty ducats a month from the pope. On at least two other occasions, he asked to be allowed to live out his few remaining days at home, supported by `what little I have there'. Possibly Cino was acting as banker for funds collected from other sources, including Sixtus IV and Girolamo Riario.69 Had he not died less than two years after he was sentenced to exile on 10 August 1487, Mino Pannilini might have assumed the role that Cino Cinughi had ®lled for the previous cohort of exiles. At ®rst, he was only exiled for four months, but was ®ned 3000 ducats, to be paid over a year. Until the ®ne was paid, he was not to trade without the consent of the BalõÁa or the Signoria. Debts, which could have been considerable, owed to him by his brother Matteo (who was executed on 6 August) were to be cancelled. All the possessions of the Orlandini that he had bought were to be restored to them without compensation, and other property was to be returned to the comune of Siena without 66 67 68 69

ASS, BalõÁa 504, 611: Filippo Buoninsegni, 15 July 1482, Rome; ibid, 93: Filippo Buoninsegni, 29 July 1482 [no place]. ASS, BalõÁa 36, f. 42r. ASS, BalõÁa 512, 9: Francesco Massaini, 24 June 1483, Sarteano. ASS, BalõÁa 515, 93: Bishop of Sovana, 22 Nov. 1483, Rome; BalõÁa 524, 69: Cino Cinughi, 12 Sept. 1483, Rome; BalõÁa 521, 9: Cino Cinughi, 12 Dec. 1484, Rome.

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payment. Ten days later, the BalõÁa decided that his books were to be given back to him so that he could `do business and trade', but he could not `take anything from them' until he had paid the ®ne, or alienate any real property without the permission of the BalõÁa.70 This sentence would send him and his sons to the poorhouse, Mino protested; his innocent wife and children should not suffer for him. In November he left for Florence to defend his interests there against his ungrateful nephews, who had gone there armed with letters from the BalõÁa, asking that all his property in Florence should be given over to them. He received some justice there, he said, though he had not been able to get leave to come to Siena to defend himself and arrange for the payment of his ®nes. Take the money from my property in Siena, he told the BalõÁa, I have property there worth twice as much, and leave the rest for the keep of my wife and children.71 In November 1488, his place of exile was changed to Pisa and its contado; he was to provide guarantees of 1000 ducats that he would observe these con®nes. If they returned his property, he would obey, was Mino's response. It would be easy enough to do, since it had been taken `for the republic and the republic can easily ®nd a way.' But he could not ®nd anyone to pledge 1000 ducats for him, and he needed several months to sort out his affairs in CittaÁ di Castello, where he had `tied up the greater part of what little I have in various ways, and I need this time to withdraw it, because once I have left I will not be able to take it out and that would be my ®nal destruction'. Besides, it would be too arduous a journey in mid-winter for his wife and little children, and for him, old and ill and blind as he was.72 Mino died in mid-March the following year, with at least enough remaining to him for it to be suggested that it would be good to have his wife and children return to Siena `so that his property does not end up in the wrong hands'. Evidently, at least some of it did end up in the wrong hands, because Mino's widow Lucrezia was sentenced in June 1489 to lose her dowry, con®scated because she had given money to exiles, against the interests of Siena.73 How many Sienese relied on banking or wholesale or retail trade, or manufacturing or working as an artisan to support themselves in exile is impossible to say. Often, such scattered references as do indicate their 70 71 72 73

ASS, BalõÁa 35, ff. 17r, 23v. ASS, BalõÁa 532, 13: Mino Pannilini, 16 Aug. 1487; ibid., 93, Mino Pannilini, 23 Nov. 1487, ìn quelle di Firenze'. ASS, BalõÁa 536, 85: Mino Pannilini, 18 Dec. 1488, ìn Chastello'. ASS, BalõÁa 538, 86: Giovanni di Pietro di M. Giovanni, 18 Mar 1488(9), Sinalunga; BalõÁa 36, f. 147v.

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need to work give no precise indication of what they were doing. Some of the exiles in Rome in early 1485 who had some capital at their disposal àre settling down to business to earn their living', but the man who reported this gave details of only one instance. Antonio Bichi had just formed a partnership in Rome with Jacomo Bargagli to set up as retailers, `ligrittieri'.74 Four Sienese, at least three of whom were exiles, sharing a house in Viterbo in 1484 robbed a merchant's warehouse, àlthough each of them has a trade'. No doubt the duplicate key used to enter the warehouse had been made by one of the four, Domenico di Maestro Giovanni, a locksmith (`chiavaro'). Another of the four ± it is not certain that he was an exile ± was a painter (`pictore'), Michelangelo, known as èl Miccha'.75 Some Sienese exiles earned their living in the professions, rather than in business. One of the Riformatori exiled ± in fact he had been away from Siena for eleven years ± in November 1480 was a physician, NiccoloÁ di Ser Antonio di Michele. While he was grateful for being assigned Pistoia, where he had been living for six years, as his con®nes, he explained that I do not have any real property here, and so I need, by my profession and with much effort, to earn the keep of my family ± we are, including my wife, children and servants, seven in all ± I pay rent for the house and I buy, you could say, everything but the sun. Besides, Pistoia is not very well populated, and there are several doctors here. Consequently, doctors earn more outside than inside, that is, within ten miles of here, places like Prato and Pescia, where I am often called out because they are short of doctors, especially in Pescia.

Could he have leave to travel to such places, to help him feed his family? (He was not given this permission.)76 A couple found posts at universities. Bulgarino di Gheri Bulgarini, a doctor of civil and common law, self-exiled from Siena in the middle of the 1480s, settled at Pisa before taking up a post at the university of Ferrara in 1485.77 The most distinguished university teacher among the exiles was Bartolomeo Sozzini, who was under contract at the university of Pisa when he was made a rebel in 1480. Another professional career open to exiles in ®fteenth-century Italy was as limited-term judges or PodestaÁ, or holding other posts, like vicar or governor, in the administration of towns subject to the pope or other 74 75 76 77

ASS, BalõÁa 526, 29: NiccoloÁ Sabino de' Piccolomini, 5 Jan. 1485, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 517, 56: Giovan Antonio, Bishop of Modena, vicelegate of the Patrimony, 19 Mar. 1483(4), Viterbo. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 62: NiccoloÁ di Ser Antonio, 30 Dec. 1480, Pistoia. ASS, BalõÁa 525, 1: Evangelista Salvi, 1 Sept. 1485, Bologna.

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princes that were often open only to òutsiders'. Political disgrace at home was no bar to holding such posts, although exiles seeking these positions could ®nd life dif®cult, in that they would be restricted in the places they could go to ®nd work. Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini helped Urbano Santi, outlawed in perpetuity from Siena in August 1483, to the post of PodestaÁ of Anagni near Rome in 1484. It was probably his father Antonio's friendship with Federico da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino, that helped obtain for Petrino Bellanti an of®ce as a vicar of Federico's son, Guidobaldo. His own connections in Naples, where he had been ambassador, helped Antonio Bichi to be appointed captain of Capua in 1482, to the judicial of®ce of reggente in 1484, and to the of®ce della sommaria bringing in 240 ducats a year that he held in 1487, by which time he had bought a house and garden in Naples.78 The Papal States offered many opportunities, above all in Rome. The notary Rinaldo Fongaia was one who found employment in the civic administration on the Capitol, but he was ready to return to Siena as soon as his term of of®ce was over, once his exile was lifted.79 There was employment to be had at the papal curia too. Ricco Ricchi earned his living as an avvocato consistoriale, a post of considerable prestige, after he had been declared a rebel in 1480, and stayed on in that position into 1483, refusing appointment as the ambassador to Rome under the new regime on the grounds that he was too busy to look after public affairs properly, though he was, he said, happy to help in a private capacity.80 Guidantonio Buoninsegni, another doctor of law, also looked to Rome for a job when he was in exile. He served as ambassador there before his ®rst spell of exile in 1480±2, and between that and his second spell in 1486±7. Despite the disapproval of the regime in Siena, in 1481 Guidantonio wanted to stay in Rome `where he thinks he can earn something to support his family'; he wanted to be where he could not only earn his and his family's keep, but also live in a manner `be®tting the status of a doctor . . . because a doctor needs more than just bread'.81 He was given an of®ce by Sixtus. When he was exiled in October 1486, he again headed for Rome, in the hope of obtaining another of®ce. All his income, he told the BalõÁa, came from òne poor farm', he did not 78

79 80 81

ASS, BalõÁa 30, f. 9r; BalõÁa 518, 58: Ugo Bellanti, 15 May 1484, Rome; BalõÁa 521, 80: Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, 11 Mar. 1484, Rome; BalõÁa 506, 38: Antonio Bichi, `Regius Capue Capitaneus', 11 Nov. 1482, Capua; BalõÁa 520, 30: Lorenzo Lanti, 1 Oct. 1484, Rome; BalõÁa 531, 23: Alberto Aringhieri, 24 June 1487, Naples. ASS, BalõÁa 530, 28: Rinaldo Fongaia, 28 Apr. 1487, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 509, 38: Ricco Ricchi, 16 Apr. 1483, Rome. ASS, Concistoro 2044, 39: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 14 July 1481, Rome; 49, Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 3 Aug. 1481, Rome.

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own a house or any other ®xed property; he had debts amounting to hundreds of ¯orins and a grown daughter to marry off.82 Achille Petrucci also wanted to be able to go to Rome during his exile from 1483 to 1487, but never managed to get the BalõÁa's permission to do so. When he held the of®ce of PodestaÁ of Amelia in 1487, however, as he told the BalõÁa, he had to have dealings in the curia, so that if they heard that he or any other member of his family had gone to Rome it was solely on necessary business.83 One of the most experienced Sienese doctors of law to make a profession of holding of®cial posts in other states was Lorenzo Lanti. He, like his father, had been a councillor of Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, and Lorenzo was also a councillor of King Ferrante, as well as Sienese ambassador in Naples from 1478 to 1481. After a spell as chancellor of Siena, he was appointed senator of Rome in 1483, again doubling as Sienese ambassador there. In 1485 he was PodestaÁ of Bologna. During his term of of®ce there he was able to use his previous contacts with Roberto da Sanseverino, whose lands in the kingdom of Naples he used to look after, to sound out his intentions towards Siena, a matter of great concern to the Sienese at that time.84 Exiled in August 1488 for involvement in a conspiracy against the regime, he was ordered to go to the kingdom of Naples or the Marche of the Papal States.85 He went to Camerino in the Marche, where the lord, Giulio Cesare Varano, was happy to have the opportunity to have such a man in his service. Having won Varano's favour, Lanti procured a recommendation from him that he should be given wider con®nes, allowing him to go where he pleased beyond a certain distance from Siena `to earn a living for himself and his children'. His family had stayed in Siena where, according to Lanti, by September 1489 they had used up what resources were left after the expenses to which his exile had put him; he asked if he could be given con®nes which would enable him `to go to earn some bread for these wretched little children'.86 Given wider con®nes, perhaps leaving him free to go anywhere on the eastern side of the Apennines, Lanti decided that he would stay at Camerino (where the lord treated him like a brother, not a servant, he said) until a job came 82 83 84 85 86

ASS, BalõÁa 528, 36: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 12 Nov. 1486; ibid., 72, Alessandro Sermoneta, 5 Dec. 1486, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 531, 20: Achille Petrucci, 22 June 1487, Amelia. ASS, BalõÁa 525, 44, 48, 60: Lorenzo Lanti, 9, 13, 19 Oct. 1485, Bologna. Initially, he was given con®nes of Naples and forty miles beyond. (ASS, BalõÁa 36, ff. 7v, 54r.) ASS, BalõÁa 540, 52: Giulio Cesare Varano, 25 June 1489, Camerino; BalõÁa 541, 29: Lorenzo Lanti, 2 Sept. 1489, Camerino.

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up. A suitable post did not present itself quickly and Lanti was forced to accept the podestaria of Norcia ± on the wrong side of the mountains, as he apologetically informed the BalõÁa.87 Even after Lorenzo had left Camerino, Varano was willing to write to Siena on his behalf, asking that he should be allowed to go anywhere he liked outside Sienese territory, so that, `like the great expert he is, he can hold of®ce as he wants to do, choosing a tranquil and quiet life'.88 As Lanti and other Sienese exiles discovered, courts could be welcoming places for the exiles of other states ± more welcoming, in a way, than republics were. The governments of republics could be as ready as princes to shelter and use the exiles of their rivals and enemies as instruments of diplomacy and war, but it was more dif®cult for exiles to ®nd employment there. Republics such as Florence, Venice or Siena reserved most government of®ces for their own citizens. For many citizens of such republics, the income and perquisites of of®ce were a valued portion of their income, and access to them one of the main objects of their participation in public affairs. Princes had greater freedom in disposing of of®ces in their government, and might prefer to employ foreigners, free of the ties of family and friendship in their state which could divide the loyalties of one of their own subjects. Certainly all the honour of race and house is shed When once you tread unknown earth as an exile, Nor does nobility, nor the glorious lineage of your ancestors Now help you, nor a house with ancient titles,89

the soldier-poet Marullus lamented in a poem entitled Òn his exile'. He may have been disappointed by the lack of recognition accorded in Italy to his illustrious ancestry of nobles of the Byzantine Empire connected to the Imperial house, but in the intimate world of Italian politics, an exile of good family would be unfortunate if his claims to distinction outside his own state went unrecognized. He might not always receive the recognition and help he hoped for, but he would not be denied admission to a court. A train of gentlemen of distinguished lineage added lustre to the image of a prince and his household. For those exiles looking to earn their living as merchants, republics could be as good a base as the lands of a prince, if they were concerned only with trading. For those who wanted to engage in banking or taxfarming, there were probably greater opportunities at courts. Those 87 88 89

ASS, BalõÁa 541, 35: Lorenzo Lanti, 14 Sept. 1489, Camerino; BalõÁa 543, 52: Lorenzo Lanti, 20 June 1490, Camerino. ASS, BalõÁa 547, 12: Giulio Cesare Varano, 4 Apr. 1491, Camerino. Carol Kidwell, Marullus, Soldier Poet of the Renaissance (London, 1989), p. 27.

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who had resigned themselves to prolonged, even lifelong exile, and wanted to settle down somewhere else, could ®nd it easier to establish themselves and their children in positions of in¯uence in a court society than in a republic, where an immigrant might have to wait for decades before he could attain full citizenship and membership of the political elite. Among the Pisan diaspora, those exiles who were looking for employment as `gentlemen' or of®cials, and those who intended to engage in international trade, gravitated towards courts. Pisan notaries and jurists rose high in the chancery and ®nancial bureaucracy of the Emperor Sigismund; the Zacci and Lanfranchi took their place among the dynasties of of®cials serving the Visconti and Sforza of Milan, the Gonzaga of Mantua and the Montefeltro of Urbino. Other families, notably the del Lante, established themselves at the Roman curia. Mercantile families went to Valencia, Barcelona, and Montpellier, to Naples and Sicily. In Sicily, by the end of the ®fteenth century, families such as the del Tignoso, Galletti, da Caprone and Lancia had become part of the local nobility by means of municipal of®ces and legal positions within the bureaucracy of the court at Palermo.90 Both princes and republican governments were ready to hire exiles as soldiers. This was an occupation few Sienese normally took to. There were no Sienese condottieri of any note in the ®fteenth century. The nearest approach to one was Antonio di Checco Rosso Petrucci. At ®rst when he was in exile, the Sienese were worried about what he might do, and tried to have him assassinated,91 but he could not get a condotta from Naples or the pope, and Piccinino could do little to help him. Antonio's grandson NiccoloÁ Petrucci did become a professional soldier. His success in this profession can be gauged from his acceptance in May 1481 of a contract from Siena giving him command of twelve horse for two months.92 He and other Sienese exiles were among Calabria's troops during the War of Ferrara. Some found employment as infantry in the papal guard; the fact that they left to take part in the expedition against San Quirico in 1485, and were allowed to return to their posts, was one of the circumstances that raised the question of papal complicity in it. Under pressure from Siena, the pope dismissed them; some may have been among the Sienese exiles trying unsuccessfully to be taken on as infantry by the bargello of Rome, himself a subject of Siena.93 Soldiering was not a way of life that carried much appeal for Floren90 91 93

Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa', pp. 332±43. 92 ASS, BalõÁa 24, f. 3v. ASS, BalõÁa 6, f. 151r. ASS, BalõÁa 512, 62: Possa, 15 July 1483, Ferrara; BalõÁa 523, 62, 70: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 18, 21 May 1485, Rome; BalõÁa 524, 60: Antonio del Balestriere, 27 July 1485, Rome.

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tine exiles either, though some Pisan exiles took to it, either nobles reviving former family traditions or men branching out into a new career.94 If the citizens of the major Tuscan towns had long ago decided that paying other people to ®ght for you made more sense than ®ghting yourself ± although the need to ®nd an occupation in exile might make them revise their ideas ± for men from other areas of Italy ®ghting was still a normal way to earn a living, in or out of exile. Deifebo d'Anguillara spent the rest of his career serving Florence and Venice after he and his brother Francesco lost their estates to Paul II. The sons of Piermaria Rossi, in exile from the duchy of Milan, also found employment in the Venetian army; the bell of San Marco tolled for the death of Guido Rossi in October 1490. A notable group of Neapolitan barons who went into exile after the ®rst baronial revolt against Ferrante served ReneÂ d'Anjou and his son Jean. In the 1470s, the barons transferred to the army of Charles, Duke of Burgundy, who could always ®nd employment for experienced troops.95 The ranks of Milanese exiles included two of the most eminent commanders in Italy. Roberto da Sanseverino, serving Venice and the pope, was a thorn in the side of Lodovico Sforza until his death in battle ®ghting for Venice. Giangiacomo Trivulzio was not a threat while he was in the pay of Ferrante and then Alfonso of Naples, but it was a different matter when he became the commander of the French troops in Italy and was based at Asti on the borders of the duchy of Milan.96 Roberto da Sanseverino and Giangiacomo Trivulzio are prime examples of the attraction of hiring exiles as condottieri. Such were their reputations that the Venetians could well have been pleased to employ Sanseverino, and the French Trivulzio, even if they had been on perfectly amicable terms with Lodovico Sforza. But it was no mean bonus that their disaffection from him, and the many friends and partisans that they had in the duchy of Milan, gave them the potential to cause serious trouble for Lodovico. Other exiles with less distinguished military records might be given condotte primarily because of their potential ability to cause trouble back home. It is doubtful that his military prowess alone would have tempted both Venice and the league of Florence, Milan and Naples to compete for the services of the Genoese exile 96 Obietto Fieschi in 1482 (he decided in favour of the league). The Venetians offered a condotta to Alberto d'Este, the exiled brother of Ercole 94 95

Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa', p. 333. Paolo Cherubini, `Deifobo dell'Anguillara tra Roma, Firenze e Venezia', ASRSP 103 (1980), pp. 213±19, 226±7; Cronica Lombardie, pp. 118±19; Domenico Malipiero, Ànnali veneti', ASI 7 (1843), 306, 311; Croce, `Cola di Monforte', pp. 104±39. See above, p. 23.

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d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, when they were at war with the duke; his refusal of their offers earned him permission to return home in 1484.97 Exiles who might not be suitable for, or might not want to be given, of®ces or military commands but who might be useful as political instruments, could be given a pension, like the one Cino Cinughi had from the pope. Lodovico Sforza decided to give Ottaviano Manfredi a pension of 300 ducats a year to stay at Ferrara, persuaded that the young man `could serve in case of need against the Florentines', by threatening the rule in Faenza of Astorre Manfredi, a Florentine client.98 Ottaviano, however, became a pensioner of Florence, receiving 600 ducats a year, according to Lodovico. The Venetians had another Manfredi, Sigismondo, son of Taddeo the former lord of Imola, as their pensioner in Padua. In 1473 Lorenzo de' Medici agreed to give Obietto and Gianluigi Fieschi a pension of 120 ducats a year, to dissuade them from intriguing with the Florentine exiles. Antonello da Sanseverino, Prince of Salerno, received a pension from Innocent VIII before he left for France, where he was one of a number of Neapolitan exiles who were provided with an income at the French court in the years before Charles VIII's invasion of Italy in 1494. After he had gone into exile again in 1497 and settled at Senigallia, he fell into debt. In December 1498 he sent an agent to Venice to ask for a pension of 6000 ducats a year that he had been offered in the past and turned down, but by then the Venetians had lost interest in using him and would not give him anything. The Neapolitan exiles who had gone to France after the expulsion of the French from the kingdom were again given pensions, but some of them were among the victims of an economy drive by Louis XII in 1499, when he reduced the pensions amounting to 24,000 francs a year, which he divided among 130 of them, to 12,000 francs to be divided among thirty-six.99 A fortunate few were granted a pension by the state that exiled them ± fortunate, that is, provided it was actually paid. In at least one instance, the grant of a pension was a genuine token of goodwill on the part of the exiling power: Pope Nicholas V had no need to give Stefano Porcaro a pension of 300 ducats a year when he was sent into exile from 97 98 99

ASV, Senatus secreta, 30, f. 71/81ns; ASF, Signori, Missive, Minutari, 12, f. 223: Otto di Pratica to Bernardo Rucellai, 22 Apr. 1482; Diario ferrarese, p. 118. Umberto Dallari, `Carteggio tra i Bentivoglio e gli Estensi dal 1401 al 1542 esistente nell'Archivio di Stato in Modena', AMSPPR 3rd ser., 18 (1900), 318±19. Breisach, Caterina Sforza, p. 127; Guglielmo Donati, La ®ne della Signoria dei Manfredi in Faenza (Turin, 1938), pp. 197±8; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. I, p. 494; Bullard, Lorenzo il Magni®co, p. 202; Marino Sanuto, I diarii, ed. R. Ulin et al., vols. I ± II (Venice, 1879), vol. II, cols 209, 235, 324, 678±9.

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Rome to Bologna; nor did the legate in Bologna, Cardinal Bessarion, need to add a hundred more.100 Generally, those who received such pledges were members of signorial or quasi-signorial families who had lost out in the battle for power. Lodovico, Ascanio and Sforza Maria Sforza left the duchy of Milan in 1477 with the promise that the income from their lands would be paid over to them, together with the pensions of 12,500 ducats a year each that they had been granted by their sister-in-law Duchess Bona a few months before. Such generosity was, of course, intended to give them a motive for obedience; the payment of their pensions was to be dependent on their behaving themselves. This strategem worked for Ascanio, the least dangerous of the three, but not for his elder brothers. When his brothers openly rebelled against Bona in 1479, Ascanio asked Lorenzo de' Medici to intercede for him, to recommend that `his pensions and revenues should be paid to him as usual, so that he should not lose his income through no fault of his own'.101 After Ascanio was exiled in 1480, he ought to have received a pension of 5000 ducats a year. Ferrante suggested to Lodovico in 1482 that Ascanio should be given 12,000 ducats a year, to keep him content, but Lodovico refused to agree. When it was the turn of Duchess Bona to go into exile from Milan in 1480, she accepted an offer of the castle of Abbiategrasso to live in, the 25,000 ducats a year pension that had been left to her by her husband Duke Galeazzo Maria, the use of her jewels worth 50,000 ducats (useful as pledges to raise money, not just for display) and a gift of 10,000 ducats cash.102 Genoese Doges who were in a position to negotiate their way into exile could extract a high price for leaving without a ®ght. In May 1458, Pietro Campofregoso ceded Genoa to the French for 10,000 ducats to be paid before he left, with the pledge of a further 25,000 ducats to be paid to him in Avignon in September.103 When negotiating the cession of Genoa to Francesco Sforza in 1464, Pietro's brother Paolo, Archbishop of Genoa, tried to get still better terms for himself and for members of his family and some of his allies and partisans. Many of the terms he wanted concerned grants of lands and revenues to other Campofregoso, including Pietro's widow, Bartolomea and son Battista. For himself, `considering that when he leaves Genoa he will not have 100 101 102

103

Pastor, History of the Popes, vol. II, p. 222. Rosmini, Dell'istoria di Milano, vol. IV, p. 176. Rosmini, Gian-Jacopo Trivulzio, vol. I, p. 89; vol. II, pp. 22±3, 75; Pellegrini, Àscanio Maria Sforza', p. 264; ASF, MAP, LI, 118: Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo de' Medici, 12 Apr. 1482, Milan. Nunziante, Ì primi anni di Ferdinando d'Aragona' (1892), 356.

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any place where he can go and live with honour and without shame', he asked for territories in the Lunigiana; these were not at Francesco Sforza's disposal, and Paolo was offered other lands instead. As the places the archbishop asked for did not yield any revenue, in order for him to be able to redeem property pledged for loans ànd have something to live on', he also wanted 30,000 ducats, with a down payment of 6000 and the rest guaranteed where he thought best. To this, Francesco replied that he was prepared to pay him 15,000 over a certain period and agreed to the 6000 ducats down payment. He also agreed that Paolo would have all the income from his archbishopric, that he would back Paolo's candidacy for a cardinal's hat, and give him the rich abbey of Chiaravalle near Milan ± when the incumbent was dead.104 Occasionally, other Genoese in or heading for exile could bargain for cash. In August 1481, when Obietto Fieschi came to terms with Doge Battista Campofregoso, he was supposed to have a pension of 12,000 lire a year. In 1494, Obietto was reported to have been receiving 150 ducats a month from Milan, while in exile at Carpi. Even Gerolamo Gentile was able to negotiate not only an amnesty for himself and his followers, but also the payment of 700 ducats which he claimed the organization of his unsuccessful attempted revolt against the Milanese government of Genoa had cost him. Giangaleazzo Campofregoso, however, seems to have been unable to conclude successfully negotiations for a pension from Milan while he was in exile at Faenza. Lorenzo de' Medici recommended to Galeazzo Maria Sforza that Giangaleazzo should be given such a pension to separate him from the others, because he was intelligent and generous, and had retained many friends and partisans. In March 1477, Giangaleazzo was impatiently asking Galeazzo Maria's widow if she could let him know if he could still hope for some agreement concerning the pension of 1200 or 1500 ducats that he wanted.105 Members of other signorial families also negotiated pensions, as the price either of leaving, or of staying away. According to the author of the Lombard Chronicle, Carlo Manfredi left Faenza after being deposed by his brother Galeotto in 1477 with the promise of an annual pension of 4000 ducats. Such a sum would have been a considerable drain on the resources of a small state like Faenza and the report that reached the chronicler may not have been well founded. Better attested is the 104 105

Albano Sorbelli, Francesco Sforza a Genova (1458±1466): Saggi sulla politica italiana di Luigi XI (Bologna, 1901), pp. 271±5, 289±90. ASF, Otto di Pratica, Resp., b.1, cc. 420±1: T. Ridol®, 17 Aug. 1481, Milan; Allegretti, `Diarii', col. 832; Rosi, `La congiura di Gerolamo Gentile', 88; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. II, pp. 101, 335±7.

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pension of 1000 ducats a year that Galeotto was persuaded by his fatherin-law Giovanni Bentivoglio to promise Carlo in 1481. Alberto d'Este, sent into exile at the court of Naples by his brother Ercole, Duke of Ferrara in 1474, was sent a pension of 300 ducats a month by the duke. In 1478, as a reward for the loyalty he showed in refusing to become involved in a plot against Ercole, he was given a pension and a castle in Lombardy in which to live, until he gave further proof of his loyalty by turning down the Venetian offers during the War of Ferrara.106 By contrast, despite the fact that it had taken a siege by papal troops to dislodge him from CittaÁ da Castello in 1474, and despite the fact he refused to admit the error of his ways when he was reproved by Pope Sixtus in person, NiccoloÁ Vitelli still had such powerful friends that he was able to negotiate an agreement by which he would receive the full price of his considerable property in CittaÁ di Castello, to be determined by two assessors, one representing the pope, one representing NiccoloÁ, with a payment of 5000 ducats on account.107 According to Nicasi, his property was valued at 30,000 ¯orins, and was bought by sixty-four citizens of CittaÁ di Castello on the insistence of the pope, who hoped that this would encourage them to oppose NiccoloÁ's return. Egmont Lee, however, found `several formal appraisals' that àssessed his landed wealth at anywhere between 18,000 and 43,000 ¯orins' and informal estimates that ranged as high as 85,000 ¯orins. But the dubious nature of some of the transactions by which part of the property had been acquired furnished an excuse to the Camera Apostolica to suspend payment of the compensation due to NiccoloÁ.108 Probably more damaging to his cause was the unsuccessful attempt he made in 1475 to return to CittaÁ di Castello, which gave Sixtus justi®cation for saying that NiccoloÁ had broken the terms of their agreement and that consequently he was not obliged to pay him the remainder of the compensation.109 The fact was that such arrangements offered real security to neither party. There could be no guarantee that the payments agreed upon would be made on time, in full, or at all, and no guarantee that even if they were made, the exile would be obedient. If 106

107 108

109

Cronica Lombardie, p. 18; Dallari, `Carteggio tra i Bentivoglio e gli Estensi', 18 (1900), 61±2; Tuohy, Herculean Ferrara, p. 42; Zambotti, Diario ferrarese, pp. 56, 59; Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, p. 450. ASMa, AGonzaga, b. 845, c. 169: Gianpietro Arrivabene to Lodovico Gonzaga, 16 Sept. 1474, Rome. Egmont Lee, `Tyrannice vivans in Civitate Castelli: NiccoloÁ Vitelli, 1468±1474' in Giorgio Cerboni Baiardi et al. (eds.), Federico di Montefeltro: Lo stato, le arti, la cultura, 2 vols. (Rome, 1986), vol. I, p. 217; Nicasi, `La famiglia Vitelli', 144. ASMa, AGonzaga, b. 845: Gianpietro Arrivabene to Lodovico Gonzaga, 3 Nov. 1475, Rome.

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NiccoloÁ Vitelli's attempt to return to CittaÁ di Castello was the cause of Sixtus withholding the remainder of the payments for his property, then NiccoloÁ was in no position to complain. Similarly, Obietto Fieschi, in accepting a condotta from the league of Florence, Naples and Milan in 1482, would have known that he was providing the Doge of Genoa with a justi®cation for withdrawing the pension that had been promised to him. The primary intention of the condotta was to use Obietto to attack the Doge, who was aligned with the Pope and Venice, the opponents of the league in the War of Ferrara that was just getting under way. Obietto was careful to secure a promise that the league would pay him the equivalent of the pension he would forfeit.110 Lodovico Sforza needed no excuses to renege on the payments due to Bona and to Ascanio when he sent them into exile. Bona had accepted the offer of 25,000 ducats a year and the use of her jewels, but when she was at Abbiategrasso she was told she could not have her jewels, which were to stay with those of the duke, and that while Lodovico would give her the money she needed to live on, the remainder of her pension was to go towards paying the duke's debts. Failure to pay the money due to Bona brought only protests from the envoys of Louis XI, her brotherin-law, which Lodovico brushed off.111 Failure to pay the money due to Ascanio provided him with the justi®cation to leave exile in Naples. Ascanio was said to have left a message for King Ferrante saying that he had ¯ed `because he was ®nding it dif®cult to live, and so as not to die of hunger'.112 As condotte could shade into pensions, so pensions could shade into charitable relief for exiles. Money that Lorenzo de' Medici arranged to be given to some Riformatori exiles in Florence in 1480 enabled them to live `honourably and as be®tted their status', one of them, Lorenzo Buoninsegni, gratefully recalled.113 In September 1481, the exiles asked Sixtus to write to the Florentines encouraging them to continue giving them this help, but he refused to do it. Cino Cinughi, as well as receiving payment himself from Sixtus, distributed money from the pope and Girolamo Riario to other Sienese exiles in Rome ± not always fairly, some of them felt. They were still receiving subsidies in 110 111

112 113

ASMo, Carteggio Ambasciatori, Firenze, b. 2: Antonio da Montecatini, 30 May 1482, Florence. ASMa, AGonzaga, b. 1627: Zaccaria da Pisa to Federico Gonzaga, 12 Feb. 1482, Milan; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 241: Giangaleazzo Sforza to Branda da Castiglione, 7 Nov. 1482. ASMa, AGonzaga, b. 1627: Zaccaria da Pisa to Federico Gonzaga, 18 June 1482, Milan. ASF, MAP 26, 527: Andrea da Foiano to Lorenzo de' Medici, 7 Nov. 1489, Siena.

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Rome after Sixtus' death, but whether the money came from Innocent is not clear.114 When the Perugian exiles were expelled from his lands by the Duke of Urbino after the assassination of several Baglioni in Perugia in 1500, they found refuge with the lord of Camerino: `he gave them food and drink, because they were poor men, and they could not make a living; so they all made for his court'.115 Undoubtedly, many exiles could struggle simply to ®nd food and shelter, like the Sienese in Rome driven to ®nd refuge in the hospitals there in 1484. Men who had lost everything back home, or who could not get access to their funds, might not be able to ®nd a patron or turn to a trade. Not all would have had a trade to which they could turn. Those for whom plotting their return, and revenge, was their primary occupation could ®nd life dif®cult if the support they hoped for from outside sources did not materialize, as Antonio Petrucci found. He was stranded in Naples in June 1457 because he was unable to pay his bill at his inn, and King Alfonso was not willing to help him. Eventually Antonio and Mariano Bargagli made their way to join Jacopo Piccinino with the help of a Sienese innkeeper from Aquila. They persuaded the innkeeper to go with them to Piccinino's camp in the Marche, promising him that when they arrived there, he would be paid both what they owed him for their stay in his inn, and for their expenses on the road, which he covered. Piccinino made them welcome, but was short of money himself, and the hapless innkeeper stayed several days without seeing any of the forty or ®fty ¯orins he claimed. On leaving Fossombrone, Antonio was said to have ruined another innkeeper there, by eating him out of house and home and then leaving without paying his bill. After he was released in 1466 from a prison where he had been held by the Duke of Urbino, the once proud Antonio Petrucci was reduced to writing a begging letter to a friend, asking for the loan of a horse and three ducats, to help him to make his way to Rome. For men like Antonio Petrucci exile was indeed a bitter, not to say humiliating, misfortune. Even for those who had not been political leaders, heads of parties, men of power and substance back home, even if they were not destitute and friendless, exile could be hard and dispiriting. The picture of the young Pandolfo Petrucci in Santa Fiora in January 1484, disconsolate because he had been robbed of seventy ducats and a chain worth sixty ducats on the road four days before, and was now penniless, and to 114

115

ASS, Concistoro 2044, 64: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 7 Sept. 1481, Rome; BalõÁa 515, 85: Bishop of Sovana, 17 Nov. 1483, Rome; BalõÁa 516, 61: Bishop of Sovana, 23 Jan. 1483(4), Rome; BalõÁa 522, 2: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 26 Mar. 1485, Rome. Matarazzo, `Cronaca della CittaÁ di Perugia', 140±1.

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make matters worse had a sore foot and could not walk, could stand for many an exile, wondering what else could go wrong and when his luck would begin to turn.116 116

ASS, BalõÁa 519, 55: Lorenzo Lanti, 8 Aug. 1484, Rome; BalõÁa 493, 52: Luca di NiccoloÁ, 18 June 1457, Naples; BalõÁa 494, 55: Leonardo Benvoglienti, 29 Jan. 1457(8), Rome; BalõÁa 495, 27: Francesco Saraceni, 5 May 1458, P. San Casciano; Particolari Famiglie Senesi, 146: Antonio Petrucci to Goro da Lucignano, 11 Feb. 1466, Viterbo; BalõÁa 516, 57: Bartolomeo di Berto?, 22 Jan. 1483(4), Sovana.

chapter 5

K EEPI NG T R AC K

A regime's interest in its political exiles did not end when they left. It might aspire to control what they did, or at least to exert some in¯uence over them. If this was not possible, it was still desirable to know where they were and what they were doing. How much effort would be put into keeping track of them would obviously vary with the resources available to a regime, and the perceived dangerousness of the exiles. How effective attempts to monitor, even control, the activities of exiles could be, would depend to a great extent on the cooperation of other states and their of®cials. Even trusted allies could be ambivalent in their treatment of the exiles of their friends, and were sometimes unwilling to treat as suspects, let alone enemies, men who had been in power and who might return to power in the future. The behaviour of neighbouring states, allies or not, could be more unpredictable still. Governments had a variety of means at their disposal to aid them in controlling or keeping track of their exiles. There was the straightforward threat of sanctions for disobedience, either against the exile, who could be given a harsher sentence or be made a rebel, or against their property, which could be subject to ®nes or punitive taxation, or outright con®scation. Exiles might be required to report at regular intervals to the authorities of the place where they had been sent, and they might be forbidden to communicate with one another. Communication between exiles and their families and friends back home could be subject to supervision. Such sanctions could be effective, and governments could extend their authority beyond the boundaries of the state. Exiles could stay where they had been sent for many years, even when little hope of a return home remained. But often governments were not able to exert direct control over their exiles beyond the limits of their own territories. Then they could try to enlist the help of other governments in keeping an eye on them, or in moving them on, or expelling them. A willingness to help in such ways was seen as a test of a good

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neighbour or a true ally, as a touchstone of sincerity in professions of goodwill. Information on the movements and activities of exiles could reach governments from many sources. Citizens or subjects travelling abroad on business or pleasure, merchants, lawyers or clergy, might write home to report on the doings of exiled compatriots. Exiles themselves might supply intelligence, if they disapproved of what their fellows were doing, or hoped to win favour for themselves. Exiles from other states could provide information on the contacts of their own government with the exiles of an enemy or rival, as Florentine exiles kept the Sienese ambassador in Rome informed about the contacts of Sienese exiles with the Florentine government in 1481.1 Foreigners who had established connections with a state, perhaps by a period of residence there, perhaps by serving as an of®cial, might also feel it incumbent on them to pass on information. The development of diplomacy between the Italian states brought the establishment of resident envoys in the major political centres of the peninsula, Rome, Milan, Venice, Florence and Naples: men who had time to make themselves at home, and develop a network of contacts from whom they could garner intelligence. It also brought a constant to and fro of ambassadors sent for limited terms, of con®dential secretaries and other trusted agents, keeping their eyes and ears open throughout their journeys. The most impressive surviving record of the whereabouts of exiles was compiled by French of®cials after the conquest of the duchy of Milan in 1500. Hundreds of men were listed, from members of the Sforza and Visconti families, and of®cials from Lodovico Sforza's court, to obscure individuals from the towns of the duchy, like the ®ve men from Piacenza, two of them identi®ed only as `Scops' and `Gamba', described as èvil-doers wandering through Venetian lands, and who have nothing'. Some of those listed had been pardoned, and were in Milan, but many were scattered in Germany, Mantua and the Veneto. The men from Bosco were `for the most part' wandering in the regions of Monferrato, Genoa and Piedmont, while of the men from Alessandria it was noted that ìt is not known where they are, but it has been reported that they are living in the Genoese mountains'. The compilation of this list represents a considerable effort of intelligencegathering.2 Keeping track, if not control, of Sienese exiles was one of the most important functions of the BalõÁe of this period. Arguably, it was the 1 2

ASS, BalõÁa 503, 93: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 19 Mar. 1481, Rome. PeÂlissier, Documents pour l'histoire de la domination francËaise dans le Milanais, pp. 39±54.

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single most important reason for the extension of grants of authority to BalõÁe after the immediate crises that they had been appointed to deal with had passed. Had there been no threat from exiles, the establishment of the BalõÁa as the permanent supreme executive body might not have happened until later, or might not have happened at all. Sometimes the task of watching over exiles, especially over rebels, was delegated to a small number of segreti, `so that', as the decision to elect four new segreti in September 1483 stated, `there should always be someone keeping watch on rebels, outlaws, exiles, ammoniti, and others plotting against the republic of Siena and the present regime [regimen]'.3 In 1456, three segreti initially appointed to hunt down Pietro Bellanti were given the full authority of the BalõÁa to èxterminate' rebels.4 In June 1481, it was decided that the six segreti àgainst the rebels' should be con®rmed in their of®ce for six months and then six others should be elected every six months for three years.5 Whether any more were in fact elected according to this plan is doubtful, but there is evidence that three or four segreti held a watching brief over exiles for most of the 1480s. The surest way to keep track of exiles (apart from having them imprisoned) was to stipulate as part of their sentence that they should report regularly to the authorities at their place of exile, and send attestations that they had done so. Usually, the requirement was that they should send con®rmation of their arrival at their designated con®nes, and then report daily and have an attestation of their reporting sent monthly. Sending attestations so frequently could be a problem for those exiled many miles from Siena. This was recognized in April 1483, when the conditions were set that those exiled within the contado were to send attestations monthly; those exiled outside the contado, within a hundred miles, every two months; and those over a hundred miles away, every three months.6 Even that could be a problem, or so Evangelista Salvi (exiled in December 1484) argued. Writing from Venice to attest his arrival within his designated con®nes beyond the Apennines, he said that he thought he could not bear the expense of sending an attestation every three months, as he had been ordered to do, and did not know what journeys he might be called upon to make, so he asked that this requirement be dropped.7 It is impossible to tell how accurate a picture of the pattern of observance of the requirements to report and attest is provided by surviving 3 4 5 6 7

ASS, BalõÁa 30, f. 33v. ASS, BalõÁa 2, ff. 5v, 16r, 20r, 58v. ASS, BalõÁa 24, f. 68v. ASS, BalõÁa 28, f. 32v. ASS, Concistoro 2057, 28: Evangelista Salvi, 11 Jan. 1484(5), Venice.

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attestations. Orders to report did not usually specify for how long the exile should continue to do so. Those sentenced in April 1483 were told to report for two years.8 Few of the surviving attestations date from more than a year or two after the exiles' sentences; most date from within the ®rst year. Some of those exiled in 1456±8, including Bartolomeo and Giacoppo Petrucci and Savino del Catasta, sent attestations until at least 1462. Savino's brother, Antonio del Catasta, exiled to Lodi for sixteen years in September 1456, persevered in reporting and sending attestations until at least September 1466.9 This method of keeping track of exiles apparently lost favour with the Sienese in the 1490s. There are no surviving sentences which stipulate it, or surviving attestations sent on behalf of exiles. Even when the Sienese could be fairly sure that an exile was settled in a place where he could not cause them any trouble, they might be reluctant to waive the requirement to report. In August 1457 the BalõÁa refused to agree that Antonio Micheli need not report to the of®cials of the bullette in Pavia when he served a term as PodestaÁ there. Of®cials of the bullette were generally responsible for the supervision of foreigners in their cities, but it is unlikely that supervising the PodestaÁ was usually part of their duties. For a man serving as PodestaÁ, being obliged to report to them might well have been humiliating. Attestations that Antonio Micheli had reported twice a day survive from the of®cials of the bullette in Pavia, and from those in Cremona, when he moved to become PodestaÁ in that city.10 Nor would the BalõÁa free Francesco Patrizi from the need to report when he was staying with the Milanese ambassador to Florence, Nicodemo da Pontremoli, even though the Sienese frequently consulted Nicodemo at that time on important affairs, and relied on his advice and intervention to an extent that made him uncomfortable. Francesco Patrizi duly had to report to Nicodemo, while Nicodemo's son, whom Patrizi was tutoring, recorded that he had done so.11 Attestations were sent to the BalõÁa or the Concistoro. The only trace that has yet come to light of an attempt to keep a systematic record of who had reported and who had not is an order by the Concistoro in March 1459 that their notary should keep a `little book in which will be 8 9 10

11

ASS, BalõÁa 28, f. 32v. ASS, Concistoro 2003 and BalõÁa 496, passim. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 269: draft Francesco Sforza to Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 11 Aug. 1457, Milan; for attestations, see e.g. ASS, BalõÁa 495, 85: Giovanni Barzellina, 30 May 1459, Cremona; ibid., 98: Manfredo `de Asculsis', 6, 27 Feb. 1459, Pavia. ASS, BalõÁa 494, 34: Francesco Patrizi, 18 Dec. 1457, Montughi; BalõÁa 495, 3: Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 28 Mar. 1458, Montughi; BalõÁa 6, f. 175v.

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written all the con®nati and the places where they have been sent', and note all the attestations.12 If such a book was compiled it has been lost. Occasionally there are signs of checks on whether an individual exile had been reporting. In November 1482, a man was sent to Lucca to see if Leonardo Bellanti was there and had reported every day that month. Bellanti claimed to have sent an attestation every month, made by the of®cials of the bullette of Lucca; he had gone to report to them because the PodestaÁ had wanted to charge him ®ve soldi a day for recording his reporting, and a ¯orin for each attestation.13 It is unlikely that the of®cials of other states would have provided this service to the exiles ± and to Siena ± for free, although they may not all have been so grasping as the PodestaÁ of Lucca in 1482. It is possible that Sienese of®cials in the contado may have charged for it as well. The carefully drafted conditions for the exiles of April 1483 stipulated that the contado of®cials should not take any payment for the attestations14 ± a clear indication that at least some did. Sienese exiles reported to a wide variety of people. Those exiled outside the contado most frequently reported to the PodestaÁ of the place where they were con®ned, or, like Leonardo Bellanti, to the of®cials of the bullette. Sometimes they reported to the local equivalent of the Concistoro, such as the Priors of Viterbo, or to the local representative of a central power, such as the Florentine captain of Pisa. Exiles might be instructed to report to a Sienese ambassador, as were the exiles in Naples in April 1481.15 The range of authorities to whom exiles in the contado might report was even wider. If there was no Sienese vicar or PodestaÁ or castellan, they could report to local representatives, such as the mayor or chamberlain, even a local priest or bishop. Keeping exiles apart from one another by con®ning them to different places was the most frequently used means of trying to control them. Very rarely would more than one exile be sent to the same place, unless they were closely related.16 The reason behind this was explicitly declared in a decision by the BalõÁa in September 1482: Because it does not seem ®tting that our exiles should continually associate together, as they are doing, because in time this may result in some outrage or upset in [the] city, to prevent this provision should be made that speci®c places should be assigned and allocated to the exiles by the BalõÁa, where they will have to stay, and from which they should on no 12 13 14 15 16

ASS, Concistoro 555, f. 12r. ASS, BalõÁa 506, 58: Leonardo Bellanti, 27 Nov. 1482, Lucca. ASS, BalõÁa 28, f. 32v. ASS, BalõÁa 503, 14: Lorenzo Lanti, 18 Apr. 1481, Naples. See above, pp. 94±5, 98±9.

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account move during their term of exile, and thus they will be unable to associate with one another and plot together, and it will be to the bene®t and security of [the] city.17

To reinforce this imposed isolation, or to try to keep apart exiles not ordered to speci®c con®nes, they might be prohibited from communicating with each other. Such a prohibition was sometimes imposed on Sienese exiles. Those exiled on 15 September 1456 were forbidden to write to, or to have any dealings with, any rebel, exile or even ammonito of Siena.18 The sentences handed down on 15 July 1482 imposed varying conditions on each man, and some, but only some, were ordered not to talk to any other exile; but the record of the sentences ended with a general prohibition, applicable to all those exiled `since the institution of the present regime'.19 Only one of the men exiled on 10±11 August 1487, Bindo di Giovanni di Ser Minoccio, a prominent member of the deposed Popolare regime, was expressly forbidden to speak to any other Sienese exile or outlaw. He was one of the few members of this group ordered to report, twice a week, and attest, once a month. None of these controls worked, and in August 1488 he was declared a rebel.20 In the 1490s, when exiles were no longer required to report or attest, attempts to control their communications with each other might still be made. Those sentenced in August 1495 were not to àssociate with or speak to one another, or write or send messengers to one another without the permission of the Of®cials of Ward'.21 Those sentenced in September 1497 were simply ordered not to write to or have any dealings with any other exiles or outlaws.22 Reports on letters sent or received by exiles could be sent to Siena by Sienese ambassadors, commissioners or other of®cials. Those who wanted to stay on the right side of the authorities back home, but were sent letters by other exiles, might take elaborate precautions to demonstrate that the correspondence was unwelcome to them. Giovanni Landucci was commended by the Sienese ambassador in Naples, Achille Petrucci, in February 1481, for refusing even to touch an unsealed letter presented to him at the Spannocchi bank, saying that he knew the handwriting and calling on people to witness to what he was doing. The letter was from Lorenzo Venturini, a rebel; Petrucci got hold of it and sent it to Siena. When Achille Petrucci was himself self-exiled from 17 18 19 20 21 22

ASS, BalõÁa 26, f. 93v. ASS, BalõÁa 2, ff. 10r±13v. ASS, BalõÁa 26, ff. 36v±39r. ASS, BalõÁa 35, f. 17v; BalõÁa 36, f. 12v. ASS, BalõÁa 40, f. 6v. ASS, BalõÁa 41, f. 228r.

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Siena in early 1483, a messenger from Buonaventura Pini brought him a bundle of letters, including one, the messenger told him, from the rebel Neri Placidi. Refusing to receive or read the letters, Petrucci took them and their bearer to the PodestaÁ of Scarlino, and had an of®cial note drawn up, in the presence of witnesses, to the effect that he had not taken them. The PodestaÁ read a little of the letters, and then gave them back to the messenger and told him to take them back. Recalling the incident with Giovanni Landucci in Naples two years before, Petrucci said that he had seemed to see `®re or evil spirits', just as Giovanni had imagined.23 Francesco di Lando, when he received letters from Ser Giovanni and Girolamo Cecchini in 1488, merely handed them over to the vicar of Castel Piano, where he was exiled, and the vicar duly passed them on to the BalõÁa, even though he did not think they were of any importance. When a letter sent by Guidoccio Gionta to Agnolo Palmieri was given to the vicar of Montelaterone by the man who had been entrusted with it by the original bearer for the second stage of its journey, only a copy was sent to Siena. The vicar, Carlo Scotti, who was on the alert for an assault on the contado by the exiles, gave the original back to the messenger, so that he could take it to Palmieri in CittaÁ di Castello, and report back.24 Checking up on exiles was a routine duty of Sienese ambassadors and contado of®cials. Even if the exiles were not supposed to report to them, they were still expected to keep the authorities back in Siena informed about who was where, what they were doing and who their contacts were. Thus Andreoccio Ghinucci, Bishop of Sovana, and Benuccio Capacci, a Knight of Jerusalem, heading for Rome as ambassadors in October 1483, reported in detail on those exiles they met on their journey. At Monte®ascone, Tuccio Tucci and Ser Tommaso da Casole had come to pay their respects; but in the tavern, Tucci had bragged that he would return to Siena whichever way he could, and that no one would blame him for it. Between Monte®ascone and Viterbo they met Antonio di Bartolomeo Petrucci, who told them he was heading for San Lorenzo Àllegrecti' (probably the San Lorenzo on the road between Monte®ascone and Acquapendente), where (he said) he had stayed before for a long time, because he thought it à comfortable place to stay, and especially because one always heard the news there'. They listed all the exiles they saw at Viterbo, and in a later letter enclosed a list of all those they had met on the road between Viterbo and 23 24

ASS, BalõÁa 503, 74, 81: Achille Petrucci, 11, 23 Feb. 1481, Naples; BalõÁa 508, 50: Achille Petrucci, 19 Feb. 1482(3), Giuncarico. ASS, BalõÁa 533, 20: Alessandro di Riccardo, 6 Jan. 1487(8), Castel Piano; BalõÁa 547, 17: Carlo Scotti, 6 Apr. 1491, Montelaterone.

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Ronciglione. `They generally looked, in their persons and in their clothes, in bad shape, and many had changed in appearance.' Only a few of them had been to visit the ambassadors. There was some talk they would be sent away from Viterbo, because they were ùseless mouths' and not behaving well. All the coming and going of exiles they had seen on the road made the ambassadors suspicious, and they recommended that the BalõÁa should keep good watch over the fortresses in the contado.25 Spies were used to verify and augment the reports that reached Siena of what exiles were doing, particularly if there were current fears that they were planning to force their way back. Of®cials in the contado near the frontiers could easily send spies over the border to places in Florentine or papal territory, where they might know their way around and have family or business contacts who could provide information. Sometimes the of®cials were acting under orders from the Balia or Concistoro, sometimes on their own initiative. Spies might also be used by Sienese ambassadors. Rome, which was not only a gathering place for Sienese and other exiles but also the only place where Siena usually had some form of permanent representative, was the prime observation post, and sometimes the Sienese envoys there sent men to in®ltrate the exiles' circles. In May 1483, Lorenzo Lanti used a man who took service as an infantryman with a constable who had been hired by the exiles. The spy, Nino da la Rocca, only came to Lanti at night and was anxious that his name should be kept secret in Siena, `because he is with them all the time [and] is afraid they might harm him'. He provided information not just on their preparation of troops, but also on their meetings, how they planned to raise money, who they looked to for support. Lanti gave him money so that he could eat in their company and pick up further information.26 Nino da la Rocca's fear that word might get back to the Sienese exiles in Rome if his identity was not kept secret in Siena was justi®ed. The exiles had their own contacts and sources of intelligence that were very dif®cult for the Sienese authorities to block. At times, the ambassadors in Rome felt that the exiles were getting better information from Siena, and more swiftly, than they themselves were. Andreoccio Ghinucci, who had been given a letter by an exile to be sent to the BalõÁa so that they could pass it on if they saw ®t to do so, pointed out the implications of a paragraph complaining that the writer was not receiving letters or news, às the others have every day from various places in 25 26

ASS, BalõÁa 515, 26: Andreoccio Ghinucci and Benuccio Capacci, 16 Oct. 1483, Viterbo; 28, the same, 17 Oct. 1483, Ronciglione. ASS, BalõÁa 509, 96: Lorenzo Lanti, 29 Apr. 1483, Rome.

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different ways'.27 Messengers from Siena and the contado could easily mingle with other travellers on the much-frequented road to Rome that passed through Siena, like the men from the contado visiting the exiles in Rome ± and, so the ambassador believed, carrying letters ± in June 1483.28 Sienese travelling on private business, and not involved with the exiles, might still be prepared to talk to them freely. Banks were excellent places to pick up news, for exiles as for others. In 1484, some exiles in Rome supplemented their information by taking letters left by the Sienese ambassador with the Spannocchi bank to be forwarded to Siena.29 In 1485 the BalõÁa tried to prevent them being admitted to the Ghinucci and Spannocchi banks in Rome and Naples. Às we recognize how much our repute is diminished and that of our exiles is increased in everyone's eyes by their associating with and talking to our citizens, and especially their frequent visits to the bank, as we are continually hearing', the BalõÁa commanded that the Ghinucci and Spannocchi should give orders to all their employees to prevent the exiles frequenting their banks.30 Andrea Spannocchi replied that he could not forbid his bank to exiles. Banks, he reminded the BalõÁa, were `very public' places; furthermore, the exiles in Naples were engaged in trading, and he could not avoid talking to them himself.31 The BalõÁa's command to the bankers was, they claimed, based on òur laws, which contain provisions against those speaking to or associating with any exile'. This may have been an overstatement of the law. Any dealings with rebels were prohibited, unless speci®c permission was given; but there is no record of such a blanket ban on dealings with other exiles. The Popolare regime, however, became increasingly vehement in its hostility to the exiles. In early 1487, the Sienese ambassador in Rome was ordered to cut short any conversation about them, let alone with them, despite the fact that this made it more dif®cult for him to report on what the exiles were doing.32 In general, it was permissible for Sienese citizens to communicate with exiles, provided that they were not rebels, although correspondence and contacts with them might be subject to supervision and control. At times, supervision of correspondence with exiles was entrusted to the of®cials of the bullette. In November 1457, the BalõÁa ordered that no 27 28 29 30 31 32

ASS, BalõÁa 516, 61: Andreoccio Ghinucci, Bishop of Sovana, 23 Jan. 1483(4), Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 511, 78: Lorenzo Lanti et al., 16 June 1483, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 519, 50: Lorenzo Lanti, 3 Aug. 1484, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 405, f. 49r±v. ASS, BalõÁa 524, 13: Andrea Spannocchi, 8 June 1485, Naples. ASS, BalõÁa 407, f. 28r±v.

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one could write to or receive letters from exiles without them being seen by the of®cials of the bullette.33 Regulations drawn up in November 1482 stipulated that in future no one should write or send letters to any exile con®ned outside the contado or receive any letters, unless they had ®rst been `bullate' (sealed or stamped) with the customary bulletino by the of®cials of the bullette, ìf there are some, and if there are not, by the notaries of the Of®cials of Ward'.34 In April 1483, they were instructed to ensure that no letters were sent outside the city, or received within it, without being examined by them. And if they see that any of them contains anything suspect, against the city, the present regime [reggimento] or its citizens, they are to take such steps in the matter that such suspicion and cause for concern is removed, being able to make arrests, sequester property, or take other measures as the case requires, so that the truth shall be found out.35

Such a provision must have been very dif®cult to enforce. Letters would be far too easy to conceal; travellers who might carry letters would be too frequent in a city on one of the main north±south routes in Italy; men from the contado with legitimate reasons for going to and from Siena would be too numerous for each to be searched for suspicious packages. In August 1484, the of®cials and servants of the bullette were dismissed.36 Some months before, in March, the Of®cials of Ward had been charged by the BalõÁa with enquiring into `those wishing to disturb the present government [statum] of the city of Siena by word or deed, and against those who write to those outside and receive letters from them', which suggests the of®cials of the bullette had not been doing a very ef®cient job.37 Judging from the surviving correspondence of exiles, ambassadors and other of®cials in the ®les of the Concistoro and BalõÁa, in practice the exiles seem to have had little or no trouble corresponding with family and friends back home. The solution to the problem that was to be tried in March 1491 was `to send away all the women and wives of [the] exiles, and the mothers as well, so that they will not be sending and receiving letters from their husbands every day, as they have done in the past'.38 On the whole, women were regarded rather as hostages for the exiles' good behaviour than as potentially dangerous collaborators with 33 34 35 36 37 38

ASS, BalõÁa 4, f. 97r±v. ASS, BalõÁa 26, f. 146r. ASS, BalõÁa 28, f. 8r±v. ASS, BalõÁa 32, f. 31v. ASS, BalõÁa 31, f. 76v. ASF, MAP 41, 471: Andrea da Foiano to Lorenzo de' Medici, 7 Mar. 1490(1), Siena.

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them. If this was indeed the stereotype, some women confounded it. There was a report, in the midst of the crisis of the occupation of Monteriggioni in February 1483, that the wife of Pierpaolo Mignanelli, one of the exiles who brought up infantry to try to break the siege, had gone to her husband with two other women, disguised as peasants, taking with her 3000 ducats.39 In April 1483, Onesta, the wife of Placido Placidi, was accused soon after her husband's execution of having taken over 2000 ducats' worth of his goods out of the contado. She was ordered to pay a ®ne of 1000 ducats, but she did not pay the money in time, and thus became liable to the penalty of 2000 ducats, with the forcible con®scation and sale of her property to raise that sum. She went to Rome, where she enlisted the help of the pope, who spoke to the Sienese ambassador to deplore the fact that even her dowry had been withheld from her. It was just that she should be deprived of her dowry, the Sienese ambassador, Lorenzo Lanti, told the pope, because `she had herself gathered infantry together, and attempted to do a number of things that imperilled the government [stato]'.40 In those instances where speci®c permission for wives to visit their husbands in exile was recorded in the deliberations of the BalõÁa, the exiles involved were either rebels or outlaws. Special leave was needed in those cases, because the regulations governing contacts with rebels were much stricter than those governing contacts with the general run of exiles. The principle in force appears to have been that while contacts with exiles were allowed unless speci®cally forbidden, contacts with rebels were forbidden, or at least regarded as inherently suspect, unless speci®cally allowed. If this was indeed the principle governing contacts with rebels, sometimes BalõÁe felt the need to reiterate it by speci®c decrees, such as that issued as one of its ®rst acts by the BalõÁa that was appointed in September 1456. Anyone who gave àny help, counsel or favour' to any rebel, or wrote or spoke to them, or received from them any letter or message and did not immediately notify it to the BalõÁa (or to the Concistoro if there was no BalõÁa in of®ce) was to lose all his property. Anyone who had given shelter to those just declared rebels would himself be considered a rebel.41 In September 1483, four segreti decreed that no one of any `status or condition' `can or should give or send any support, help or favour to any of the rebels or outlaws of the commune of Siena, nor write to them nor cause writings to be sent to them, nor 39 40 41

ASS, BalõÁa 507, 92: Ventura di Ser Stefano, 9 Feb. 1482(3). ASS, BalõÁa 519, 54: Lorenzo Lanti, 7 Aug. 1484, Rome; Consiglio Generale 239, f. 85; BalõÁa 28, f. 22r. ASS, BalõÁa 2, ff. 3v±4v.

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talk with them, nor send nor receive messengers or letters without the permission of the BalõÁa'. Whoever contravened this decree was to incur the same penalty as those with whom he had had contact.42 Permission to speak to rebels could be granted for private business, as when a man was given permission in November 1482 to speak to Antonio Bichi, `with impunity', on the business of the Spannocchi bank in Naples.43 Those who did not have permission could be very wary of talking to them. When in June 1487 a Sienese envoy to Florence, Giovanni Paccinelli, received a message from Giovanni Severini saying that he wanted to see him, Paccinelli refused, `because of the condition [grado] he is in and knowing that, as a citizen, it is prohibited and subject to penalty for me to speak to him'.44 The Sienese ambassador in Rome in August 1480, Francesco Petrucci, tried to avoid having an interview with Ricco Ricchi who had recently been declared a rebel. When Ricchi persisted, Petrucci was careful to have Sienese witnesses present, and to keep the door of the room open so that the witnesses could observe them as they talked.45 It must have been dif®cult sometimes for Sienese travelling in Italy to know whether the fellow countrymen they met were exiles, let alone rebels. A tanner, Matteo di Marco, who ìnadvertently' spoke to Filippo Buoninsegni in February 1481 was imprisoned for a month.46 Even ambassadors could ®nd themselves unintentionally talking to a rebel, as did Fazio Benassai, who felt obliged to report that when he agreed to see Crescenzio Gori in Rome, he did not know he was a rebel.47 The penalties imposed on those found guilty of having contacts with rebels could vary, depending on the degree of culpability judged to be involved. They ranged from the tanner's one month in prison to death for those deemed guilty of plotting with them. Four men were executed in July 1457 for keeping in touch with rebels by letter and by messengers, and, it was alleged, conspiring with them against the regime. In February 1489 a man from Montalcino and his sons were ®ned 200 ducats by the four segreti for receiving letters from rebels and having dealings with them. The same day that they were sentenced, 7 February, Ugo Cavasco was condemned to death for associating with rebels and carrying their letters; he had his sentence commuted to imprisonment 42 43 44 45 46 47

ASS, BalõÁa 30, f. 28v. ASS, BalõÁa 26, f. 153v. ASS, BalõÁa 531, 33: Giovanni Paccinelli, 26 June 1487, Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 26: Francesco Petrucci, 25 Aug. 1480, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 22, f. 52v. ASS, BalõÁa 549, 53: Fazio Benassai, 7 Sept. 1492, Rome.

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for ®ve years, during which time he had to act as an executioner.48 It was the petition of Dominican and Franciscan friars, `the tears of his mother', and his declared wish to enter the religious life that caused Buonaventura Biringucci to be spared capital punishment in December 1480 for his association with rebels.49 He failed to keep his part of the bargain and became a rebel himself. Some rebels were considered such a danger, or so obnoxious to the regime, that attempts were made to have them killed. The most systematic efforts were made by the BalõÁe of 1456±7, with a price of 500 ¯orins being put on the head of each rebel, and the delegation to three segreti of the authority of the full BalõÁa to èxterminate' the rebels.50 When the three segreti failed to accomplish this task, in July 1457 all members of the BalõÁa, acting in groups of three (one from each monte), were given the same authority as the segreti to pursue to the death Antonio Petrucci, Mariano Bargagli and Pietro Bellanti. The BalõÁa of May 1485 decided that their rebels were worth between 200 ¯orins dead or 300 ¯orins alive (for men like Cino Cinughi and Neri Placidi) and 50 ¯orins dead or 100 alive for smaller fry. Occasionally, as in November 1480 and June 1489, BalõÁe attempted to encourage rebels and outlaws to do their dirty work for them, by inciting them to kill their fellows with the prospect of pardon as a reward.51 In June 1481, a report reached the exiles in Rome that a woman called Caterina and a barber, Maso, had been sent from Siena to Florence to poison some rebels there, but their plans had been discovered and they had ¯ed, leaving the poison behind them.52 A man called Piombino, executed in CittaÁ di Castello in June 1488, confessed that he had been sent there by Luzio Bellanti and Pandolfo Petrucci to assassinate Mino Pannilini and Guidoccio Gionta. According to the BalõÁa, he had only said this under torture, and Bellanti and Petrucci swore they were innocent.53 None of the schemes to have rebels murdered met with any success until Luzio Bellanti was killed in exile in Florence in 1501, unless the murder of Lodovico Luti in Florence in 1498 had also been procured by the 48

49 50 51 52 53

ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 257: Lodovico Petroni to Francesco Sforza, 6 July 1457, Siena; ibid., b. 269: Nicodemo da Pontremoli to Francesco Sforza, ? July 1457, Florence; ASS, BalõÁa 36, f. 94v, 95v. ASS, BalõÁa 21, f. 51v. ASS, BalõÁa 2, ff. 7r, 58v. ASS, BalõÁa 2, f. 73v; BalõÁa 6, f. 6r; BalõÁa 33, ff. 76r±v; BalõÁa 21, f. 32v; BalõÁa 36, f. 147r. ASS, BalõÁa 503, 44: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 21 June 1481, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 535, 41: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 19 July 1488, Rome; BalõÁa 408, ff. 77r±v.

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BalõÁa.54 The one recorded incident of an outlaw, Chigi Chigi, wounding a rebel, Neri Placidi, in Rome in early November 1484 was the outcome of a personal grudge. Chigi, who had not been outlawed for political reasons, had been wounded by some Noveschi exiles in Rome because, they said, he had helped to drive them out of Siena.55 Other Italian states took the same kind of measures as the Sienese to exert control over their exiles, and to monitor their contacts. The Florentines, for instance, might order them to certify their arrival in exile, and sometimes to report regularly to the local authorities thereafter. The Medici exiled in 1433 and the Albizzi exiled in 1434 were to certify their arrival in exile, to report regularly to the authorities where they were and to have attestations of their reporting sent to the Signoria. Careful as Cosimo de' Medici was to demonstrate his obedience, it is likely that he obeyed this injunction, and even Rinaldo degli Albizzi and his son Ormanno reported at ®rst. When the sentences of the Strozzi were extended in 1454, they were required to report weekly, as Palla Strozzi and his son Onofri did, at least from May to October 1454. The exiles of 1466 and those of 1478 were ordered to attest their arrival at their place of exile; those of 1478 were not told to report, and the 1466 exiles may not have had to do so either. Venetian exiles at the end of the century, as well as earlier, might be required to report. When the Doge's son Jacopo Foscari was exiled to Napoli di Romania in 1445, he was ordered to report every day to the Venetian rector, as was Giovanni Jacopo Bon, exiled for life to Famagusta in 1496.56 That the practice of imposing on exiles an obligation to report regularly was quite common can be inferred from the style and tone of the letters of attestation sent to Siena. Whether the authority sending in the attestations was the of®cials of bullette, or a PodestaÁ, or the priors of a small town, the procedure appears to have been a routine, familiar one. There is nothing to suggest that they found anything surprising or unusual in the regular attendance of an exile at their of®ces and his request that they should certify to his government that he had been obeying the terms of his sentence. It was treated as a routine administra54 55 56

ASS, BalõÁa 46, f. 199v; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1265: Cesare Guasco to Lodovico Sforza, 27 June 1498, Siena. ASS, BalõÁa 520, 58: Chigi Chigi, 25 Oct. 1484, Rome; ibid., 68: Sienese ambassadors in Rome, 2 Nov. 1484, Rome. Guasti, Commissioni di Rinaldo degli Albizzi, vol. III, pp. 652±7; Fabroni, Cosmi Medicei vita, vol. II, pp. 78±85; Fiocco, `La casa di Palla Strozzi', 381; Municchi, La fazione antimedicea, p. 139; Poliziano, Conjurationis Pactianae, pp. 145±55; Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia, vol. IV, p. 196; Queller, `The myth of the Venetian patriciate', pp. 149±50.

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tive matter, with no political overtones: one that they could handle without the speci®c approval or permission of their own government. Attempts by governments to control communication with exiles were not uncommon either, although, as for Siena, it may be doubted how effective they were. The Medici exiles in 1433±4 were in daily contact with Florence, not only over practical matters concerning the family property, but over political developments as well. The government must have tried to exercise some supervision or control over this correspondence: Agnolo Acciaiuoli was arrested, tortured and exiled for something he had written to Cosimo. Aware of the potential dangers of their correspondence being used as the basis for accusations of plotting against the government, whenever possible the Medici transmitted their letters with care, and important messages were sent by trusted agents.57 The famous correspondence between Alessandra Strozzi and her exiled sons shows how it was possible for families to keep in contact over many years. Political news and assessments of the prospects for the exiles' return might have to be phrased allusively and elliptically; and in the late 1450s at least, of®cial permission, which had to be renewed periodically, was supposed to be obtained for the correspondence to be carried on at all. Each time a new Eight of Ward took up of®ce, complained Francesco Strozzi in November 1459, `they always issue an edict that one cannot write to exiles without permission etc. And it is necessary to pay something to the notary for the matter.'58 It was the money, not the need for permission, that irritated Francesco ± because, he said, permission was always granted. Earlier that year, Alessandra Strozzi wrote to her son Lorenzo that she had obtained leave for them to correspond without their letters being shown to the Eight; they could write about whatever they liked, except Florentine politics. In 1461, however, she warned Lorenzo not to write to her about important matters; if she had something important to communicate to him, she would only do it when she could ®nd a trusted person to carry her letters. All his letters to her were opened, and all his letters that were to be sent on to Filippo, and Alessandra was sure that all her letters to them were opened as well.59 Contact with Florentine exiles was not generally forbidden to Florentines abroad. The Florentine community in Naples even elected an exile, Lorenzo Strozzi, to be its consul in 1465. His mother warned him not to agree to serve, because it would be unacceptable to many in Flor57 58 59

Kent, `Medici in esilio', 45; Gelli, `L'esilio di Cosimo de' Medici', 86±7. Strozzi, Lettere di una gentildonna ®orentina, p. 150: Francesco Strozzi to Filippo Stozzi, 7 Nov. 1459, Florence. Ibid., pp. 143, 231.

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ence and would harm his cause. A man in his condition should not draw attention to himself unless he was doing favours for someone, she reminded her son. Such was the standing that the Strozzi brothers had earned in Naples that even Piero de' Medici was prepared to make use of them, asking Filippo Strozzi to hand over to Ferrante a galley that Piero was giving to the king.60 Contacts with the exiled Medici after 1494 were frowned upon, however. In January 1497 a law was passed declaring that anyone found associating with the Medici would be deemed a rebel unless he returned to Florence within a month; but such a measure was dif®cult to police.61 No Florentine arrived in Rome, complained the Florentine ambassador there, Alessandro Braccesi, in March 1497, without being badgered to go to speak to Piero de' Medici and his brother Cardinal Giovanni. This was done, Braccesi maintained, to show to people in Rome that the Medici had many friends and partisans in Florence, and he suggested that it would be useful to prohibit those coming to Rome from speaking to the Medici. It would also be useful, he suggested, if something could be done about the Medici bank, where all Florentine affairs were discussed. In January 1498, Braccesi complained that everyone seemed to be able to write anything they pleased from Florence, and nothing was said or done there that the rebels in Rome did not come to know about.62 In particular, the hospitality and favour shown to Florentines in Rome by Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, the future pope Leo X was too powerful an attraction for the regime to be able effectively to prevent Florentine citizens taking advantage of it. Regimes that had even less chance than this Florentine one of enforcing their authority over their citizens and subjects beyond their boundaries nevertheless might attempt to do so ± at least, they might issue orders seeking to control communications with exiles. The Spoletans refused to allow their citizens to speak freely to Cecchino Campello, a Spoletan exile who was serving as PodestaÁ of Perugia in 1448. When Genoese exiles were assisting the Florentines in the war over Pietrasanta in 1484, the Cardinal-Doge Paolo Campofregoso issued a decree that no Genoese should go to speak to them, or have anything to do with them, on pain of death. After the Perugian exiles had made a violent, but unsuccessful, effort to return home in 1491, the priors and Dieci di 60 61 62

Ibid., pp. 412±13, 492. Humfrey Butters, Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence 1502±1519 (Oxford, 1985), p. 77. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 46, cc. 88±9, 94: Alessandro Braccesi, 14, 17 Mar. 1496(7), Rome; ibid., Resp. 53, cc. 117±8: Alessandro Braccesi, 24 January 1497(8), Rome.

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Arbitrio of Perugia ordered that anyone who spoke or wrote to any exile would be treated as a rebel.63 On the same day, another proclamation was made in their name, that anyone who killed one of the principal exiles would be given 200 ducats, or 300 ducats if they handed them over alive, in which case they could also choose another exile to be allowed to return. In June 1479, the reward offered by the previous Perugian regime for handing over a rebel alive was to procure the pardon of four outlaws, or two if the rebel was killed. Other regimes also tried to remove the exiles they feared most from circulation by encouraging their murder or capture. At ForlõÁ, the reward offered by the Ordelaf® in 1454 for killing a rebel was 400 ducats and a pension for life, while the reward for killing those exiles that Caterina Sforza held most responsible for the assassination of her husband Girolamo Riario in 1488 was 1000 ducats a head. Sometimes incitements to murder exiles had an effect. The brother of Gian Andrea da Lampugnano, one of the assassins of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, who had known of the plot and left Milan on the day of the murder, was struck down in Venice in broad daylight by a group of men in disguise. A son of Cecco Ordelaf® was killed while out hunting hares in 1481 by two Forlivesi who were after a promised reward; they had won his con®dence by pretending to be exiles themselves. Antonio Malvezzi was murdered in Cesena in 1493 by three criminals from Bologna, who hoped thus to win pardon for their own crimes; but they were pursued from Cesena and killed.64 No matter how many agents, ambassadors or assassins might be sent abroad, the extent of direct control that even the most powerful states in ®fteenth-century Italy could exert over exiles determined on disobedience was very limited. There really was not much they could do, unless they could enlist the assistance of other governments. The cooperation of other states could be invaluable, if not essential, in keeping in check exiles bent on causing trouble. It was not just a question of watching over them, providing intelligence about their movements and activities. The of®cials of the host state could be instructed to break up gatherings of exiles, to order them to move on, even to detain them. The subjects of the host governments could be ordered not to enlist in 63

64

Santi, Storia del comune di Spoleto, vol. II, pp. 9±10, 23; Carlo Bornate, `La guerra di Pietrasanta (1484±85) secondo i documenti dell'Archivio Genovese', Miscellanea di storia italiana, 3rd ser., 19 (1922), 172±3; `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni' (1903), 362. `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni' (1903), 157, 362; Cobelli, Cronache forlivesi, pp. 229, 342; Cronica Lombardie, pp. 23, 93±4; Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, p. 534.

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the service of exiles trying to raise troops, not to provide them with supplies or other support. Exiles could be forbidden by the government of the host state to stay in certain areas, or they could be expelled from the state altogether. Naturally, whether the government of one state would be prepared to lend these kinds of assistance to another against its exiles depended on how good the relations between the states were. As it was often a neighbouring state which could be most helpful, and as relations between neighbouring states were often shaped by various longstanding disputes and rivalries and bedevilled by mutual suspicion, the calculations that determined a decision as to whether one state would help another control its exiles, and if so, in what ways, could be complicated. Rather than help a neighbour take the thorn from his ¯esh, it could be to one's advantage to hold it there, even while feigning to help remove it. The Sienese relied heavily on allies and neighbours in their efforts to monitor and control what their exiles were doing. They had no qualms about asking other states to supervise their exiles, to admonish them to behave, to move them away from the Sienese borders or to detain them. They would even ask for the help of other states' troops to forestall any military action the exiles might be planning. In order to prevail upon another government to help them, they would sometimes invoke their own weakness and vulnerability ± if you do not help us against our exiles, we will be forced to turn to those who will (and who you may not want to have in¯uence over us). Containing their exiles was often the major, sometimes the only, issue that the Sienese were actively concerned about in their foreign policy. In the late 1450s, the Sienese regime turned to Milan for support and help against their exiles. They made much of the Milanese ambassador in Florence, Nicodemo da Pontremoli, on his visits to Siena and would have liked him to stay permanently. But Nicodemo did not want to be drawn into Sienese internal politics, and he was very concerned that he should not appear to be the agent through whom the duke was bringing about the exile of partisans of King Alfonso. Apart from relaying requests to Milan for advice and support, he was also asked to use his in¯uence in Florence to see to it that Giacoppo Petrucci, exiled at Pisa, could not leave if he wanted to, and to have his correspondence monitored. The Sienese made use of other Sforza diplomatic agents as well, asking an envoy Francesco Sforza was sending to Naples to ®nd out what the rebels were up to and to report back to Nicodemo, and the ambassador he was sending to Rome to speak to the pope on their behalf, to counter the insinuations of the exiles that the regime in Siena was disunited and unpopular. They asked Sforza to reinforce their own

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diplomatic efforts directly, by writing to the pope and to the king to back Sienese appeals to expel their rebels,65 and used contingents of his troops, which they paid for, to guard the Sienese contado. Another matter with which the Sienese wanted Milanese help was in forming a league with the Florentines, preferably one including Milan as well. Even after they reluctantly accepted the duke's refusal, they persisted in their wish for an alliance with Florence, partly `to satisfy, and restrain their people . . . and to frighten their rebels'. Nicodemo argued that their insistence on a written understanding would indicate to the Florentines and to the rebels that they did not trust in the friendship of Florence.66 Whatever arguments he put forward, Nicodemo found, he could not shake their determination that they would feel safer if the Florentines were bound to help them by an explicit agreement, and that this would be a great setback for the exiles.67 Perhaps with more reason, the Sienese also distrusted the intentions of Pope Calixtus. Responding to the BalõÁa's displeasure that Calixtus had received Antonio Petrucci, the Sienese ambassador in Rome, Leonardo Benvoglienti, pointed out that he could not tell the pope not to give an audience to whomever he pleased, for he was, after all, `master in his own house and the vicar of Christ'. But he could and did ask him to detain Petrucci for the good of Siena, and of the Church. Calixtus refused to arrest Petrucci, but did agree not to give him any encouragement.68 The problem was that Calixtus wanted the Sienese to be dependent on him, not on Francesco Sforza, for help and advice, saying `that when they have an understanding with him, he will get off their backs Conte Jacomo [Piccinino], Conte Aldobrandino [Orsini], their exiles, and anyone else who could attack them'.69 The `protection' of the Sienese regime in the early 1480s by Ferrante and Alfonso, Duke of Calabria, involved their giving the Sienese an unusual degree of direct help in controlling their exiles. However much trust the regime of the late 1450s had in Francesco Sforza, they did not send their exiles to Milan to be watched over by him. One, Antonio del Catasta, was sent to Lodi; another, Antonio Micheli, ordered beyond the Apennines, settled in the duchy of Milan. Far from acting as their 65

66 67 68 69

ASMi, ASforzesco: Cristofano Gabrielli to Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 13 Oct. 1456, Siena; b. 257: Prospero da Camogli, 10 May 1457, Siena; b. 256: Otto da Carretto, 12 Dec. 1456, Siena; b. 269: Francesco Sforza to Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 14 June 1457, Milan. Ibid., b. 257: Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 10 Aug. 1457, Siena. Ibid., b. 257: Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 7 Nov. 1457, Siena. ASS, BalõÁa 493, 22: Leonardo Benvoglienti, 23 Apr. 1457, Rome. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 257: Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 30 Mar. 1457, Siena.

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jailer, Francesco Sforza regarded both men sympathetically. Ferrante, by contrast, did literally act as the jailer of some of the men that the Duke of Calabria and Princivalle, his agent in Siena, had been instrumental in sending to exile in the kingdom. Some were imprisoned there from the start, others arrested some months later on the orders of Princivalle. Even so, they were not guarded as closely as some members of the Sienese regime would have wished. In January 1481, the Sienese ambassadors in Naples complained to the king that the three exiles held in the Castel dell'Ovo were being given too much licence and were able to send out letters of which the BalõÁa disapproved.70 Neither Naples nor Milan were neighbours of Siena, and it was usually securing the cooperation of neighbouring states in controlling their exiles that was the prime concern of Sienese regimes. However well disposed the duke of Milan or the king of Naples might be, it was far more useful for the Sienese to have the assistance of the Florentines, the pope and the lord of Piombino if they were to keep their exiles at bay. Small as the state of Piombino was, it could still provide a useful base for Sienese exiles, as it did for the Nove in 1482±3. To dissuade Jacopo d'Appiano from lending the exiles active support, the Sienese appealed to the principle of reciprocity. A commissioner was sent to ask d'Appiano to warn any Sienese rebels in his territory to behave themselves, as the Sienese had done with any of the rebels from Piombino who came to their jurisdiction. D'Appiano promised that he would see that the rebels in his territory would pose no threat to Siena; nevertheless, he permitted them to recruit men and leave from Piombino with a contingent of troops when Monteriggioni was taken in early 1483.71 It was Lorenzo de' Medici who helped to deprive the Sienese exiles of the use of Piombino as a base. He advised d'Appiano that it was better for him to be a friend to those Sienese who were at the head of affairs inside the city than to those `whose misdeeds had deprived them of a share in the government.'72 It was on the advice of Lorenzo that the Sienese agreed the following year to give d'Appiano a condotta, jointly with Florence. The Sienese suggested that to seal their friendship he should expel all the Sienese rebels from his territory, `so that they do not stay there, continuously plotting and causing trouble'. He replied that he had given them six days to leave, after which he would treat them as 70 71 72

ASS, BalõÁa 503, 16: Lorenzo Lanti, 27 Apr. 1482, Naples; ibid.: 66: Lorenzo Lanti and Achille Petrucci, 19 Jan. 1481, Naples. ASS, BalõÁa 403, ff. 31r±v. ASS, BalõÁa 517, 37: Tommaso Biringucci, 1 July 1483, Florence.

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though they were rebels against him. On the sixth day, d'Appiano assured the BalõÁa, the rebels left on a small boat, in foul weather.73 Lorenzo did not work to draw Piombino out of the `protection' of Naples to that of Florence, merely in order to help the Sienese block a place of refuge for their exiles. In the 1480s, as in the 1450s, the Florentines were concerned that Siena should not be governed by a regime that was closely linked with Naples. Nor did they want the internal quarrels of the Sienese or attempts by Sienese exiles to return by force, bringing war to Tuscany and inviting the intervention of other Italian powers in the region. The Florentine ambassador in Rome told Girolamo Riario that the Florentines did not get mixed up in the internal disputes of the Sienese (which was by and large true), but intended to live as good neighbours with whoever was in government there. Ànd believing that every change in that state that came about with the help of external forces would be prejudicial to them for many reasons, [and] wishing for peace in Tuscany', if the pope or anyone else gave àny backing by force' to Sienese exiles, the Florentines would be constrained `to put the backing of their state behind those governing Siena'.74 Indeed, on several occasions the Florentines did send troops, or make them available to the Sienese if they wanted, to help repel attacks by the exiles. In August 1483, for example, Florentine troops were despatched to help disperse the exiles who were attacking Saturnia, and the Florentines were ready to offer military support in May 1485 against the forces led by Giulio Orsini, and in June 1489 when the exiles had raised a considerable force in the Papal States. They were also prepared to give diplomatic assistance to the Sienese government, as during the negotiations in 1484 to end the War of Ferrara. Lorenzo assured the Sienese that the Florentines would insist that Siena's government and liberty were preserved, and that the Duke of Calabria was now inclined to leave Siena and the present government in peace, so that ànyone who thinks of bringing your enemies back home with his agreement is mistaken'.75 At times, however, other considerations overrode the Florentines' tendency to support whoever governed Siena in the interests of keeping the peace in Tuscany. The dominance of Neapolitan partisans in the regime set up in Siena with Calabria's help in 1480, coupled with the fact that the Sienese wanted to keep the towns taken from Florence in 73 74 75

ASS, BalõÁa 519, 29: Francesco Gabrielli, 16 July 1484, Massa; BalõÁa 524, 52: Jacopo d'Appiano, 23 July 1485(4), Piombino. ASS, BalõÁa 510, 13: Lorenzo Lanti and Ricco Ricchi, 3 May 1483, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 519, 41: Tommaso Biringucci, 28 July 1484, Florence.

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the Pazzi War, made the Florentines favour the exiles rather than the government. The dispute with Siena over Montepulciano, and Sienese support for the Pisans against Florence, resulted in Florentine backing for Sienese exiles in 1496 and 1497. Annoyance that the Sienese had insisted on staying neutral during the Barons' War, and distaste for the excesses of the Popolare regime in the middle of the 1480s, meant that the Florentines were at least prepared to turn a blind eye to the preparations Sienese exiles made in their territory for their successful return in July 1487. There was, in fact, often an element of ambiguity in the Florentine attitude to Sienese exiles. Time and again, the Sienese would ask the Florentines to see that the exiles were at least kept away from the border zones; time and again, the Florentines promised that they would be, only for the exiles to return within a few weeks or months, if they had ever left. `To observe the terms of our league, and because of our friendship, and to clear up all the doubts and apprehensions of our people,' the BalõÁa wrote in October 1486, `would the Florentines please send away each and every one of the Sienese rebels from their territory, and put into effect what they have promised, verbally and in letters, so that we will not have to bother them any more about this matter or complain to them?'76 Orders were given for the rebels to quit Florentine territory; but Bernardino Polito, the Sienese envoy sent to insist that the Florentines kept their word, was of the opinion that neither the rebels nor the of®cials instructed to expel them really believed them.77 Within a month, Sienese rebels, including the Severini brothers and Neri Placidi, were observed coming and going freely in the city of Florence as well as Florentine territory. The new regime established after these exiles returned in 1487 found itself putting much the same arguments to the Florentines. The Otto di Pratica and Lorenzo de' Medici, wrote the BalõÁa in January 1488, had declared their intention of observing the terms of the league with Siena, especially the provision that Sienese exiles should not be allowed to stay in Florentine territory; yet still there were reliable reports that they were to be found in the Florentine contado. Could Lorenzo please see to it that they were sent away, above all Mino Pannilini, and also Guidoccio Gionta and Francesco Migliorini, who they knew had recently been in Florence? Not that they had any suspicions about the Florentines, but it would keep the exiles from thoughts of plotting, and remove any lingering disquiet in the minds of the BalõÁa. In making these requests, the 76 77

ASS, BalõÁa 406, ff. 97v±98r. ASS, BalõÁa 528, 73: Bernardino Polito, 6 Dec. 1486, Florence.

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Sienese envoy, Andrea Buonsignori, was to be careful to convey to the Florentines that the BalõÁa were not really worried about the exiles or what they might do, but cared very much that the Florentines should be seen to be making such a gesture.78 In spite of all the arguments the Sienese could muster, Florence would continue to provide a vital refuge and base of operations for Sienese exiles. The ambiguity of the Florentine attitude to the Sienese exiles is paralleled by the attitude of the Sienese to the Perugian exiles who settled from late 1488 at Chiusi, near the Sienese border with the contado of Perugia. The Sienese regime was well disposed to them and willing to let them stay there, not least because in the late 1480s and early 1490s Perugia was a focus of conspiracy and troop recruitment for Sienese exiles. The regime was suspected of complicity in some of the Perugian exiles' raids, including their violent entry into Perugia in 1495. The activities of the exiles brought appeals from Perugia for the Sienese to behave like good neighbours and to keep them in check. In response, the BalõÁa would politely order the exiles to leave Chiusi, and to stay away from the border. In March 1489 the commissioner, Francesco Luti, was instructed to gather the Perugian exiles in Chiusi together, tell them of the letters that had been received from Cardinal Piccolomini, the legate in Perugia, and from the pope, and say that the Sienese had to make `some gesture'. The principal exiles were to be asked to leave the border areas, `so that we can show that in some way we want to satisfy the requests of the pope and the legate'.79 Bartolomeo Luti was ordered in March 1490 to see to it that all the exiles moved at least ®fteen miles from the Perugian border within two days, and that their familes followed with all their goods within ®fteen days. He was to make it clear to them `that we are very ready to show them every courtesy, but having promised to do this, and made public proclamations, we are obliged to do it'.80 If the exiles were uncooperative, a sterner tone was adopted. In June 1489, the of®cials of Chiusi were ordered to proclaim that all the Perugian exiles, `men over fourteen years of age', were to stay ®fteen miles from the border, ànd while they are in our contado they must behave well'. Concerned that there were about ®fty of the exiles' families in the area, the BalõÁa ordered that only one member of a family at a time was to be allowed in the town, for necessary errands. Those Perugians who stayed were to be warned that `they should not plot against our neigh78 79 80

ASS, BalõÁa 408, ff. 6v±7r. ASS, BalõÁa 409, ff. 72v±73r. ASS, BalõÁa 410, ff. 46v±47r.

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bours', because if they did, or the Sienese had any cause to complain of them or their families, `we shall be forced to take other decisions which will not please them'.81 On occasion, the Sienese might threaten that any Perugian exile who caused trouble in the contado or city of Perugia `would be deprived of the use of our contado and be treated as our outlaws',82 but in practice they continued to provide a refuge for them, as the Florentines did for the Sienese exiles. The Florentines were prepared to write to the Sienese asking them to help prevent the Perugian exiles causing problems, and to write asking the Perugians not to help the Sienese exiles. Before his death, Lorenzo proposed a league between Perugia and Siena to facilitate cooperation between them. Pope Innocent approved the idea, believing it would help to lessen mutual suspicion and keep the peace, but it came to nothing. Florentine mediation could also be useful in dissuading the Vitelli of CittaÁ di Castello from collaborating with the Sienese exiles. After his father's death, Piero de' Medici was ready to intercede for Siena, as his father had done, with both the Vitelli and the Baglioni when there were reports that they were plotting with the exiles.83 Naturally, the Sienese would also seek to have the pope send orders that no help was to be given to Sienese exiles conspiring and recruiting soldiers. At times of crisis, the Sienese might also ask for papal troops to be put at their disposal, or for papal of®cials to be instructed to respond to their requests for action against the exiles. They could expect a great deal of papal of®cials. In April 1488 the BalõÁa wrote to tell the lieutenant of the Patrimony of reports that Sienese exiles congregating near Acquapendente were covertly paying out money to raise men. If this proved true, they asked him to obstruct the exiles' plans in every way possible, including prohibiting the local people from furnishing them with supplies, and `with diligence and care' detaining the exiles themselves, and then inform the BalõÁa and the pope.84 The popes were prepared to issue orders that Sienese exiles who were openly recruiting soldiers in papal territory should be dispersed or moved on, and they and their of®cials could be very helpful to Sienese governments. In June 1489, for example, Innocent ordered briefs to be sent to CittaÁ di Castello and Orvieto, and to the governor of Viterbo, commanding that nothing should be left undone to impede, detain, 81 82 83

84

ASS, BalõÁa 409, ff. 132r, 132v±133r. ASS, BalõÁa 410, f. 114r. ASS, BalõÁa 512, 74: Tommaso Biringucci, 22 July 1483, Florence; BalõÁa 547, 92: Mino da Celsa, 28 July 1491, Rome; BalõÁa 549, 7: Piero de' Medici, 15 Apr. 1492, Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 408, ff. 34v±35r.

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even imprison or torture any Sienese exile or anyone following them. He wrote to Ranuccio Farnese, who had been causing the Sienese particular concern because his lands at Valentano were being used as a base by some of the most active exiles. He wrote to NiccoloÁ Orsini, his commander, ordering him to employ all his men, if need be, against the Sienese exiles and to obey the requests of the Sienese ambassador as he would those of the pope himself. He also gave letters patent to the ambassador, NiccoloÁ Borghesi, commanding all governors, PodestaÁ, of®cials and condottieri, communities and subjects of the Church to give Borghesi any help against the exiles for which he might ask.85 But all too often for the liking of successive Sienese regimes, either papal orders were not as effective as they might have hoped, or the pope's support for them against the exiles seemed less than wholehearted. Of course, popes could have problems enforcing obedience on their own subjects, let alone the exiles of another state. Sixtus might send orders that the exiles should leave the contado of Perugia in the summer of 1483, but the men of the little town on the Sienese border where the exiles had been based, CittaÁ della Pieve, had their own ideas. They held a council and decided they did not want to dismiss them, partly because of the money they were bringing to the town. Another papal brief ordering the expulsion of the exiles was obtained, and a Sienese commissioner was sent to take it personally to CittaÁ della Pieve; if the Priors there proved uncooperative, he was to take it to Perugia, to ask the Perugian government for help in bringing their subjects to heel.86 There could also be doubts about the sincerity of papal orders, whether they were in fact meant to be obeyed. Papal nipoti had a habit of casting covetous eyes on Siena, and support for Sienese exiles was one way they prepared the ground. Nor was Calixtus the only pope to be ready to use Sienese exiles as an instrument to exert pressure on a Sienese government. Sienese governments rarely found the popes as forthright in denouncing their exiles as they wanted them to be, and all too ready for their liking to listen to their petitions, to give them of®ces, to intercede for them, to recommend that individuals or whole groups should be allowed to return. Sometimes such favours to the exiles were due to the pope or powerful ®gures at the papal court seeking to make use of them, but this was not the only motive. There was also a genuine sentiment in the curia that the Papal States should provide a refuge to anyone who was not an open enemy of the pope, and that Rome especially should be a city open to all. 85 86

ASS, BalõÁa 540, 34: NiccoloÁ Borghesi, 20 June 1489, Baccano. ASS, BalõÁa 512, 51: Giovanni d'Antonio, 8 July 1483, Sarteano; BalõÁa 404, f. 215r.

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The differing principles on which the Sienese government and the papal government considered that the pope's attitude to the exiles should be based were openly debated in June 1483 by Sienese envoys negotiating a league with the pope and the commission of cardinals appointed to handle the matter. To a request that the pope and cardinals should undertake not to write on behalf of Sienese rebels to Siena or to any other power, nor to give them any succour or favour, the cardinals replied that if the recommendations of the pope and the cardinals were turned down, it would be taken in good part. But, they argued, this clause would be against the interests of the Sienese government, because it was better that the exiles should stay in the Papal States than elsewhere. The Sienese also put forward the stipulation that those who attempted anything against the city or its regime, its territory or its subjects, should be expelled from Rome and the Papal States within ten days of the Sienese notifying their names to the pope. If the pope and cardinals wished, the Sienese would make this clause reciprocal. The cardinals would have none of it. Rome, being a common homeland (`comune patria'), was not forbidden even to Jews, Turks, Saracens or other in®dels, and it was not ®tting that it should be expressly denied to Sienese exiles. The ambassadors replied that Rome could be denied to them when they behaved badly. The rest of papal territory could be forbidden to them, because their admission there, especially in the borderlands, in the light of their constant intriguing against the liberty and government of Siena, aroused such suspicions that it disturbed the quiet of the whole population of Siena. Unmoved, the cardinals said they would refer the question to the pope, but warned that even if he agreed, the College of Cardinals would not.87 Sixtus did not even want to agree to the exiles being kept twenty miles from the Sienese border, saying that this would not be to his honour, but was persuaded to consent. The prohibition was not enforced, or not enforced for long. In November 1483 the Sienese were professing surprise that some exiles were settling at places like Acquapendente and CittaÁ della Pieve which were forbidden to them by the terms of the league. Three months later the Sienese ambassador, the Bishop of Sovana, was still pressing for the exiles to be expelled. Girolamo Riario said that he would speak to his uncle, the pope, about having them moved on ± those, anyway, `who have the standing and authority to be able to cause harm and trouble'; the rest he thought

87

ASS, BalõÁa 511, 69: Lorenzo Lanti, Guidantonio Buoninsegni and Ricco Ricchi, 14 June 1483, Rome.

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should be left alone.88 Another in¯uential papal nipote, Cardinal Raffaele Riario, listened sympathetically to the exiles, and argued that `some poor artisans who have settled down in those places should be allowed to stay', and that `crude persecution of the exiles' would not be tolerated.89 Under pressure from the Florentine, Milanese and Neapolitan ambassadors, letters patent were sent ordering the exclusion of all the exiles from the border zone. How rigorously the orders were enforced is another question. In 1486, as part of the settlement after the Barons' War, Innocent agreed that no Sienese exiles were to stay within ®fteen miles of the papal border with Siena. Like Sixtus, he was reluctant to enforce the ban. Asked by the Sienese to extend the exclusion zone to twenty miles, he replied that it was better for the Sienese government if the exiles stayed where they were, rather than that they should go to Florentine territory. The Sienese should look to plots that might be hatched in places where he could not exert control.90 In 1490, he favoured the idea that those exiles who wished to stay in the Patrimony would have to settle in Viterbo, where they could be effectively supervised.91 Not only the pope and cardinals might deem it un®tting that they should exclude exiles from other states from their lands. After Roberto da Sanseverino ¯ed into exile in 1477, the Milanese government asked the Florentines not to give him a condotta or allow him to stay in Florentine territory. So many and so atrocious had been his plots and treacheries against the Milanese state, and consequently against the peace of Italy, `that not only should he not be received by any Italian power, but he deserves to be judged by all a public and capital enemy, and above all by those closely bound to us by long friendship and inviolable confederation, such as the republic of Florence'. Some of the Florentine citizens summoned by their government to consult about the reply to be given to this request, while accepting that Sanseverino could not be given a condotta, were of the opinion that to expel him would not be consonant with the liberty of Florence.92 The Florentine people thought it a serious matter to besmirch their liberty by not letting everyone come safely to their lands, the Florentine ambassador assured Sixtus in 1485.93 88 89 90 91 92 93

ASS, BalõÁa 521, 54: Andreoccio Ghinucci, Bishop of Sovana, 17 Feb. 1484, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 521, 90: Lorenzo Lanti, 14 Mar. 1484, Rome; ibid., 91: Bishop of Sovana, 19 Mar. 1484, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 529, 60: Tommaso Micheli, 3 Feb. 1487, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 543, 12: Domenico Doria, 13 Apr. 1490, Rome. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. II, p. 368. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 34, c. 117: Guidantonio Vespucci, 15 May 1485, Rome.

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The Venetians also regarded their state as one that should, like Rome, normally be open to political refugees. This tradition could be a source of embarrassment as well as pride. Having passed on to Florence a report from Ferrara of plots against Lorenzo and Giuliano de' Medici by Florentine exiles there, the Venetians were asked by Lorenzo to join in urging the Duke of Ferrara to expel them. This suggestion was unwelcome to some Venetians, who were concerned that the exiles, if expelled from Ferrara, might come to Venetian territory, thus creating a dilemma for Venice.94 The Venetians were perhaps readier than were the popes to enter into agreements that committed them to expelling at least some classes of political exiles. Pressed to arrest some of those who had been involved in the conspiracy to assassinate Galeazzo Maria Sforza, and who were reported to be near Bergamo, the Venetians were very reluctant to do so. Such a derogation from the laws of Venice would have to be agreed in the Senate, and when the proposal was put to them, the members `did not want to be the ones who would send those men to the scaffold, or burden their consciences with their deaths'.95 The Senate was prepared to agree that they should be expelled, and that any others who followed would not be permitted to stay either. Soon afterwards, in early February, the Venetian Signoria proposed to Milan a convention that each would deny refuge to the rebels and exiles of the other, but Duchess Bona would not agree. In the 1460s, Alessandra Strozzi heard that Venice and Borso d'Este of Ferrara had an agreement with Florence that her rebels could not be given asylum; if this was true, it can no longer have been in force by the late 1470s.96 The pope was not the only ruler to counter requests that exiles should be expelled with the argument that it would be better to leave them where they were, under the watchful eye of a friendly power. The outcome of the Florentine Pratica that discussed the case of Roberto da Sanseverino was a proposal (not viewed with much favour by Milan) that he should be allowed to stay in Florentine territory and kept in hopes of favour, rather than driven to desperation by being deprived of every refuge. Lodovico Sforza, trying to win over Giovanni Bentivoglio in 1494, was not willing to expel the Malvezzi exiles, but tried to 94

95 96

Vincent Ilardi, `The assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza and the reaction of Italian diplomacy', in Lauro Martines (ed.), Violence and Disorder in Italian Cities 1200±1500 (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 100±1. Pasolini, Caterina Sforza, vol. III, p. 33. Ilardi, `The assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza', p. 92; Strozzi, Lettere di una gentildonna ®orentina, pp. 345±6.

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present himself as keeping them under surveillance.97 Even princes outside Italy might take this line. Urged by his ally, King Ferrante, to dismiss the Neapolitan exiles in his service, Duke Charles of Burgundy `simply replied that he was more likely to convert the exiles to love Ferrante than they were to convert him to hate the King of Naples'.98 Ìt should be borne in mind', Giovanni Severini told his colleagues in the new Popolare regime in Siena in early 1483, `that those who are governing are always esteemed more highly than those who ®nd themselves in exile.'99 Severini expressed this maxim as if it were a truism. In practice, it was another maxim, invoked by the Duke of Calabria to explain why he and Ferrante would not be backing any attempts to return by the Noveschi exiles ± `how much more the interests of the state weighed than individual friendships'100 ± that re¯ected what happened in practice. States were prepared actively to supervise and control the exiles of other states only if it was in their interests to do so. Those interests might include the general interest of preserving peace, but there was no club of governments that would instinctively band together to suppress exiles who threatened to disturb the peace. Nor was there a clear line between supervising another state's exiles, and giving them support and encouragement. The argument that it would be better to treat exiles with some kindness, so as not to drive them to desperate measures, was always to hand. Political circumstances could change, and change quickly, and it could be prudent to keep exiles in reserve, as an instrument either to bring pressure on another government, or even to try to change it. How exiles sought and found support for their efforts to return is the subject of the next chapter. 97 98

99 100

Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. II, p. 369; G. B. Picotti, `La neutralitaÁ bolognese nella discesa di Carlo VIII', AMSPPR ser. 4, 9 (1919), 181. Richard Walsh, `Relations between Milan and Burgundy in the period 1450±1476', in Gli Sforza a Milano e in Lombardia e i loro rapporti con gli stati italiani ed europei (1450±1535) (Milan, 1982), p. 384. ASS, BalõÁa 508, 28: Giovanni Severini, 16 Feb. 1482(3), Massa. ASS, BalõÁa 520, 33: Ricco Ricchi, 3 Oct. 1484, near Bologna.

chapter 6

FI N DI NG F RIEN DS

Maxims on how any government would prefer to deal with those in power in another state rather than with their exiles, or on how those ìnside' would always be held in higher regard than those forced òutside', can have carried only limited conviction for the politicians of Renaissance Italy. They would know of too many instances when rival powers had been happy to have dealings with both a regime and its exiles, too many episodes when the exiles of a rival power formed an integral part of an enemy's assault. Exiles might be prone to nourishing unrealistic hopes not just of sympathy but of money and men to help them return, but their hopes were not always ill-founded. The exiles most to be feared by their enemies were the ones bent on return who were of suf®cient status and reputation to claim the attention of powerful men who were in a position to help them to force their way back. Princes or the members of the governing councils of republics were not the only men to be worth courting. Condottieri with a company of soldiers of their own, barons who often were condottieri but could also call on the services of their tenants, subjects and political allies, papal nipoti or cardinals with political ambitions, could all be very useful allies or patrons. The challenge for exiles was to identify which of the potential sources of support could be most useful. It was not always those who had been the closest allies of a regime that would be the readiest to help members of it who found themselves in exile. The reasons that made the government of one state the ally of the government of another might continue to be in force when the regime had changed. Exiles might do better to look to those whom, when they were at home, they had regarded with suspicion or hostility. If no government considered it to be in its interest to give active backing, then exiles, provided they could raise some money, could still procure professional military support by hiring a condottiere. Even commanders as eminent as Bartolomeo Colleoni or Roberto da Sanseverino could be prepared to

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lend their weight to the cause of exiles if the rewards offered were suf®ciently great. If no condottiere was available or willing to help, exiles might still be able to enjoy a base on the lands of a baron, perhaps a neighbour of their state with grievances of his own against it, perhaps a member of the same faction as the exiles. Exiles looking for support had to be opportunists. Sienese exiles certainly were. During the half-century from 1450 to 1500, groups of Sienese exiles enlisted the aid of the King of Naples, of the pope and papal nipoti, of the Florentines, of condottieri from the fearsome Jacopo Piccinino to the ineffectual Giulio Orsini, and of local barons like the lord of Santa Fiora and Ranuccio Farnese. No group of Sienese exiles was entirely without friends in the outside world. Not all managed, or even tried, to mount a direct attack on their enemies in Siena, but none failed to cause anxiety that they might do so. The single individual who caused the authorities back in Siena more concern than any other was Antonio Petrucci. His standing in Siena was much enhanced by the esteem in which he was believed to be held by other Italian powers. Petrucci began his exile con®dent that he would have Alfonso's support to take revenge on his enemies in Siena. The king should exact retribution for the insult done to him by the persecution of his partisans in Siena, Petrucci wrote in October 1456 to Broccardo Persico, the Milanese exile who was Jacopo Piccinino's secretary. If he were given a thousand men and 6000 ducats `to spend to do honour to His Majesty and make him my lord', he could do the job by Christmas.1 But his reputation outside Siena did not stand as high as he, or other Sienese, were inclined to believe. Francesco Sforza assured the Sienese that Alfonso and others throughout Italy knew well what sort of man Petrucci was, and would not take him seriously.2 Petrucci did get a sympathetic hearing from a couple of barons, Aldobrandino Orsini da Pitigliano and Everso d'Anguillara. Neither, however, would move unless they were assured that Petrucci had the active support of Alfonso. In the spring of 1457, he made his way to Naples in order, it was said, to obtain Alfonso's permission for the use of some of Piccinino's troops to back up Everso. In Naples he boasted of his contacts in Siena, who would open a city gate for him, and of how easily he could gain control of the city ± if Alfonso would give Everso 8000 ducats and make peace between him and the Orsini, so that he would be free to do as Petrucci directed. This time he did not promise to make Alfonso lord of Siena directly, only to give him several Sienese 1 2

ASS, BalõÁa 397, ff. 194r±195v. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 256: Francesco Sforza to Concistoro, 23 Oct. 1456, Milan.

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fortresses, including Massa and Talamone. Alfonso replied that he liked the idea, but it was not a good time to put it into effect. Disappointed by the king's response, and by his failure to respond to his appeals for money for food and clothing, Petrucci wanted to return north to Everso and to Pitigliano, but was stranded in Naples because he could not settle his bills at the inn. When he ®nally left Naples in October 1457, he was said to be desperate, lamenting that he would never have believed that he would ®nd himself abandoned by Alfonso and the Duke of Calabria, with the pope, the Duke of Milan and the Florentines all hostile to him.3 He still had one powerful friend, Jacopo Piccinino. Money he had received from Broccardo Persico in Naples had helped him to leave, and when he made his way to Piccinino's camp in the Marches of the Papal States, Piccinino paid his expenses. Throughout the winter of 1457±8 and into the spring, the Sienese feared that Piccinino, set on by Petrucci and the other exiles and backed by Alfonso, would attack them. Broccardo told the Sienese ambassador in Rome that Piccinino was only helping the exiles for old times' sake, and would be as willing to be friends with the present regime if it suited his own purposes.4 Nevertheless, only with Alfonso's death in July 1458 did the Sienese begin to feel more secure from the threat of a campaign against them provoked by the exiles, and they still considered Petrucci a dangerous man. Captured while ®ghting with Piccinino's forces by papal troops, he was imprisoned in a fortress of Federico da Montefeltro in 1462. Federico agreed to hold him for three years, and then, despite the efforts of the Sienese to persuade him to keep hold of Petrucci, released him. He died in ForlõÁ in 1471.5 Broccardo thought that the Sienese overestimated Antonio Petrucci. He rated Pietro Bellanti much more highly: `he is more courageous, more capable and a man of few words'.6 Pietro Bellanti spent most of his time in the Patrimony, where his father Ghino was settled at Corneto. In the spring of 1457 he was reported to be plotting in Castiglione della Pescaia, the stronghold on the Tuscan coast still held for Alfonso, but soon afterwards he went to Naples to ®nd Piccinino. 3

4

5 6

ASS, BalõÁa 493, 22: Leonardo Benvoglienti, 23 Apr. 1457, Rome; BalõÁa 494, 7: Luca di NiccoloÁ, 11 Oct. 1457, Naples; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 269: copy of a letter `da uno che sta in Napoli scripta ad uno del collegio di BalõÁa', 29 May 1457, Naples. ASS, BalõÁa 495, 78: Valentino, 22 Feb. 1458, Fighine; ibid., 2: Leonardo Benvoglienti, 28 Mar. 1458, Rome; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 269: Nicodemo da Pontremoli to Francesco Sforza, 30 Mar. 1458, Florence. Pertici, Le epistole di Andreoccio Petrucci, pp. 175±6. ASS, BalõÁa 495, 2: Leonardo Benvoglienti, 28 Mar. 1458, Rome.

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There he received as cold a welcome as Petrucci, so he returned to the Papal States. In December 1457 he was summoned to Piccinino's camp, where he stayed several months with Piccinino paying his expenses, but with the dissolution of the exiles' hopes for support from Naples he went back to the Papal States, and there were no reports of his seeking backing from other powers.7 Failure to win practical support from Alfonso was indeed the key to the failure of all the schemes of the exiles of 1456±8. Without the backing of Alfonso, Jacopo Piccinino could give the exiles no more than hopes and sympathy; his own position was too uncertain for him to act alone in their aid. Everso d'Anguillara and Aldobrandino Orsini were willing to help, but only if Alfonso provided the means to do so. No one else showed any serious interest in assisting the exiles to ®ght their way back to Siena. Not until 1480 were the surviving exiles and their descendants brought back by force of Neapolitan arms. When the partisans of Naples, including some who had come back to Siena in 1480, were ousted from power and exiled in 1482, it was expected that Duke Alfonso and his father Ferrante would be keen to put them back again. The man who caused the regime most concern at ®rst was Neri Placidi, who enjoyed the favour of the Duke of Calabria and of Jacopo d'Appiano of Piombino, a proteÂgeÂ of Naples. It was feared that he would be able to use Piombino as a base from which to organize an assault on Siena by the exiles, and that he could receive there aid brought on Neapolitan galleys. When the exiles seized Monteriggioni in early 1483, Placidi and other Noveschi exiles showed d'Appiano letters from Ferrante and Calabria in their favour, and asked him to provide them with troops. As d'Appiano had received no speci®c instructions from Naples, and as the letters were some months old, he did not feel obliged to risk becoming entangled in the exiles' enterprise, and merely agreed to their taking some of his infantry, with Placidi paying for them out of his own pocket. Placidi and other exiles, including Giacoppo Petrucci and Benedetto Martinozzi, went to Ferrara to ask Calabria for help but came away empty-handed. Sienese exiles who went to Naples in the middle of the 1480s were given a better reception by Ferrante than those of the 1450s had had from his father, but he had no reason to give them more active assistance. As Calabria was making his way south after the end of the War of Ferrara 7

ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 257: Nicodemo da Pontremoli, 30 Mar. 1457, Siena; ibid., Lodovico Petroni, 16 May 1457, Siena; ASS, BalõÁa 493, 25: Leonardo Benvoglienti, 5 May 1457, Rome; BalõÁa 494, 28: Leonardo Benvoglienti, 7 Dec. 1457, Rome; BalõÁa 495, 78: Valentino, 22 Feb. 1458, Fighine.

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in 1484, the regime in Siena was worried that he might take the opportunity to bring Siena under the `protection' of Naples again; but he emphasized that it suited the interests of his house better for Siena to be free, rather than to have the city in subjection to them at great expense, and incurring the enmity of all Italy.8 Cautious as they may have been in their backing for Sienese exiles, the Aragonese kings of Naples were certainly willing to give backing to the exiles of other states when it did suit their own purposes. Genoese exiles obtained considerable armed support from the Aragonese kings of Naples on more than one occasion. In practical terms it was easier for the kings to help Genoese than Sienese exiles, because they could use their ¯eet to take the exiles right up to Genoa itself, or to attack from the sea while exiles' forces attacked the city's defences on land. More importantly, there was a much stronger incentive for helping the Genoese exiles, because of the signi®cance of Genoa as a potential base for launching an attempted conquest of the kingdom of Naples by an Angevin prince or a king of France. After Pietro Campofregoso surrendered the city to the French in 1458, Ferrante sought to use the exiles to wrest Genoa from them, or at least to obstruct Jean d'Anjou from setting out to challenge him in the kingdom. As a French ¯eet which was to bear several prominent Neapolitan exiles to take part in the invasion by Charles VIII was being prepared in Genoa in 1494, Ferrante's son Alfonso II planned to thwart it by sending his own ships carrying several prominent Genoese exiles, including Cardinal Paolo Campofregoso and Obietto Fieschi, to provoke a rebellion in Genoa. Even if the enemy had time to organize resistance, Alfonso claimed, if they armed their own supporters, they would weaken their defences elsewhere and give the partisans of the exiles more scope to cause trouble; and if they armed the partisans of the exiles, these could well be of more service to the Neapolitan ¯eet, which had their leaders aboard.9 By the time Alfonso's ¯eet arrived in Ligurian waters in July, French and Milanese reinforcements had arrived at Genoa. An attempt to land the exiles at Portovenere in the middle of July failed. Obietto Fieschi and Fregosino Campofregoso were put ashore with 4000 infantry at Rapallo in early September, but they were defeated by forces from Genoa. Although the French ¯eet was to be of less consequence in the invasion than Alfonso believed it would be, the 8 9

ASS, Concistoro 2054, 68: Jacopo d'Appiano, 7 Feb. 1483, Piombino; BalõÁa 508, 47: Ventura di Ser Stefano, 19 Feb. 1482(3); BalõÁa 520, 33: Ricco Ricchi, 3 Oct. 1484. Carlo de Frede, Àlfonso II d'Aragona e la difesa del Regno di Napoli nel 1494', ASPN 99 (1981), 213, 217.

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failure of the Neapolitan ¯eet and the Genoese exiles was a grave blow to the morale of Alfonso and his men.10 The Sforza brothers and Roberto da Sanseverino also received some practical help from Naples in 1478±9, when Duchess Bona sided with Florence against Ferrante and Pope Sixtus in the Pazzi War. Apart from allowing Sforza Maria to leave the kingdom, to which he had been banished by the duchess, Ferrante wrote to Filippo Maria Sforza, urging him to join his brothers in opposition to Bona, promising that he would give them all the help and favour he could.11 He arranged for the Genoese, in revolt against Milan, to take Roberto da Sanseverino as their commander. In May 1479, Sanseverino's condotta with Ferrante and Sixtus was renewed for one year, with the express provision that because the king `has undertaken to restore and put back in Milan and in their due status' Sforza Maria and Lodovico Sforza, and Sanseverino and his sons, Sanseverino's special task would be to make war against those governing in Milan, for the restoration of the Sforza brothers and himself and the reform of the Milanese government.12 The hopes of the Sienese exiles of the 1450s were principally for assistance from Naples, but they had also felt that it was worth appealing to the pope. While they can scarcely have hoped for any military aid from Calixtus, he did not even make a diplomatic intervention on their behalf. The exiles of the 1480s found more of a welcome in Rome. Pope Sixtus was ready to give countenance to them, to provide them with ®nancial support, and to intercede for them. He declared repeatedly that he wanted as many as possible of the Noveschi exiles of 1483 to be brought back to Siena, but that he would not use force to achieve this. The Sienese reporting from Rome and the government back home were inclined to believe him. It was the attitude of his nephew Girolamo Riario that worried the Sienese government, especially in 1483±4. Riario had been approached by Jacomo Buoninsegni and other rebels in August 1480. Some show was made in Rome of intrigue with the Sienese exiles, but only to try to pressure the Sienese regime to surrender the towns taken from Florence during the Pazzi War.13 The Noveschi exiles of 1483 also attempted to enlist the help of the pope and Riario. Those who had left Siena on their own initiative sent two 10

11 12 13

Nunziante, Ì primi anni di Ferdinando d'Aragona' (1892), 753±76; (1894), 37±96, 300±16; de Frede, L'impresa di Napoli, pp. 149±52, 177±8; Senarega, De rebus Genuensibus commentaria, pp. 35±7. Rosmini, Dell' istoria di Milano, vol. IV, pp. 173±4. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. III, p. 408. ASS, BalõÁa 502, 26, 27: Francesco Petrucci, 25, 28 Aug. 1480, Rome; ibid., 97: Sinolfo da Castel' Ottieri, 20 Mar. 1480(1), Rome.

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representatives to Sixtus to justify their ¯ight and to ask for his favour. There was a report originating from Riario's con®dential agent, Lorenzo Giustini (the exile from CittaÁ di Castello), that Sixtus intended to use troops being mustered to restore the Chiaravallesi exiles to Todi to restore the Noveschi exiles to Siena afterwards.14 Giustini himself led the expedition to Todi, and two years later a Florentine diplomat recalled that after it was over, there had been a scheme for the papal troops to join up with the Sienese exiles waiting at Castello della Pieve, a scheme that had been scotched only with dif®culty.15 This lends substance to the various rumours reaching Siena at the time that the exiles were expecting to be joined by Riario's troops and to have help from Perugia, where the governor at that time was another of Riario's proteÂgeÂs, the Venetian exile Lorenzo Zane. Sixtus was not necessarily aware of what was planned ± it is quite possible that Riario was acting on his own ± and when the Sienese government protested to him, he put a stop to it.16 Sienese exiles continued to frequent the palaces of Riario and his nephew, Cardinal Raffaele Riario, in the winter of 1483±4, and not only for the handouts they were given. Talks in the spring of 1484 that promised an end to the War of Ferrara raised the exiles' hopes: ìn various places, to many people, they have said that their time has come, not doubting that they will return'.17 Riario himself said that the Sienese government had no need to worry: he had other things to do than restore the exiles to Siena.18 Nevertheless, rumours persisted that Sixtus and Riario were planning to help the exiles to return, so that the Noveschi would be his partisans during and after the life of the pope, or even to make Riario lord of Siena. A Pisan exile was involved in recruiting men in Rome in early August 1484 to accompany the Sienese exiles, who were to be carried on papal galleys to be disembarked on the coast of Tuscany. The death of Sixtus put a stop to the development of these plans.19 14 15 16

17 18 19

ASS, BalõÁa 404, ff. 67r±68r; BalõÁa 510,10: Lorenzo Lanti and Ricco Ricchi, 2 May 1483, Rome; ibid., 37: Ricco Ricchi, 12 May 1483, Rome. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 34, cc. 115±6: Guidantonio Vespucci, 14 May 1485, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 510, 79: Giovanni Spinelli, 12 May 1483, Chiusi; BalõÁa 511, 53: Francesco Massaini, 12 June 1483, Sarteano; ibid., 57: Giovanni Spinelli, 12 June 1483, Chiusi; ibid., 89: Lorenzo Lanti, Guidantonio Buoninsegni and Ricco Ricchi, 17 June 1483, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 521, 91: Bishop of Sovana, 19 Mar. 1484, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 518, 45: Lorenzo Lanti, 7 May 1484, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 519, 26: Tommaso Biringucci, 5 July 1484, Florence; ibid., 46, 62: Lorenzo Lanti, 30 July, 10 Aug. 1484, Rome; ibid., 99: Agostino di Pietro di Maestro Agostino, 25 Aug. 1484, Portercole.

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The election to the papal throne of Gianbattista Cibo, who as legate in Siena in 1483 had been affronted by the violence that disrupted his efforts to reconcile the feuding Sienese, gave the exiles hopes of support from the new pope. Seeing the exiles frequenting the Vatican and the signs of favour they were receiving from some members of the papal court, the Sienese ambassador, Lorenzo Lanti, tactfully spoke to Innocent of his con®dence that he would not follow the example of Sixtus and Riario, even though the exiles were boasting that he would. Innocent replied that he had no intention of giving the exiles any encouragement.20 When Cino Cinughi came to speak to Innocent on their behalf, asking him to help them return home, the pope was said to have responded that he intended to promote peace and concord, and if the exiles thought otherwise, they should abandon such fantasies.21 The next year, however, Innocent was suspected of complicity in the expedition for which they recruited Giulio Orsini as commander. About the same time as they had been negotiating with Giulio Orsini, the exiles had also been negotiating with Roberto da Sanseverino. They were encouraged in this by Roberto's old friend Obietto Fieschi (who had come to Rome at the invitation of the pope and was high in his favour) and by Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, considered at this period of the ponti®cate to be the power behind the throne. Told of these discussions by Roberto, Innocent did not like the notion of having such an unpredictable and ambitious man installed in Siena, and refused to give his approval;22 and Roberto was denied leave to undertake the enterprise by his employers, Venice and Milan, so the exiles settled on Giulio Orsini. Innocent consistently maintained that he was not privy to, and did not approve of, Giulio Orsini's arrangement with the exiles. Cardinal Gianbattista Orsini, Giulio's brother, said that Innocent knew of it, and was pleased by it.23 Throughout the expedition, the exiles claimed they had the pope's backing, and when they attacked San Quirico they claimed to have a papal commissioner with them. On the other hand, the exiles also claimed to have the support of Venice, Roberto da Sanseverino, Girolamo Riario and Virginio Orsini in their enterprise.24 Of all these, Virginio Orsini was considered the most credible, although in 20 21 22 23 24

ASS, BalõÁa 520, 9: Lorenzo Lanti, 5 Sept. 1484, Rome. Ibid., 58: Chigi Chigi, 25 Oct. 1484, Rome. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 34, cc. 48±52: Guidantonio Vespucci, 2 Apr. 1485, Rome. ACapitolino, AOrsini, b. 101, c. 74: Antonello Sinibaldo to Virginio Orsini, 7 May 1485, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 522, 98: Giorgio Pasquali and Bartolomeo Luti, 10 May 1485, San Quirico; ibid., 51: Rinaldo Tolomei, 7 May 1485, Piombino.

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fact he was ®rmly opposed to it. When Cardinal Piccolomini managed to make his way to Innocent's sickbed to tell him of the exiles' preparations, Innocent agreed to send orders to the Patrimony to prohibit the exiles' forces being given safe passage or supplies.25 Sienese exiles were arrested, many of the infantry they had raised were detained and disarmed, and Giulio Orsini was held at Bolsena. Most of those who had been held were soon released and Giulio Orsini escaped. According to the Neapolitan ambassador, Innocent had been prodded into allowing the releases by Cardinal Orsini and the Genoese ambassador, Lazaro Doria.26 The pope said that they had been against his will, and that he was determined to get to the bottom of the matter.27 The fact that Cino Cinughi and the other leaders of the exiles brought to Rome were held in the Castel Sant' Angelo for only a few days before being set free did not lend Innocent's protestations of ignorance more credibility for those disinclined to believe him. It is nonetheless possible that he did not know what was going on, and that it was no coincidence that the expedition took place while he was bedridden. As in the summer of 1483, when there had been some confusion as to whether the Sienese exiles had the backing of Sixtus or whether Riario was acting on his own initiative, the apparent ambiguity of papal policy might well have been due to powerful individuals at the papal court pursuing their own agenda. In 1485, those at court who clearly favoured an assault on Siena by the exiles ± Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere, Obietto Fieschi and the Genoese ambassador, Lazaro Doria ± wanted a diversion in Tuscany to distract the Florentines from the con¯ict they were engaged in with the Genoese in the Lunigiana. The Sienese exiles kept up contacts with the Genoese. In June 1485 Obietto was hinting that there could be another campaign on behalf of the exiles, with the backing of papal troops and of Robert da Sanseverino's son, Fracassa. In April 1487 there were again reports of discussions in Rome between the Sienese exiles and the Genoese ambassador, who sent four of them to Genoa for further talks.28 Innocent was not concerned with the intrigues of his Genoese compatriots with the Sienese exiles, but in the later years of his ponti®cate there were other intrigues with the new crop of exiles that he wanted to contain, not encourage. One was by his own son, Franceschetto, who 25 26 27 28

ASS, BalõÁa 522, 42: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 4 May 1485, Rome. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 34, c. 108: Giovanni Lanfredini, 11 May 1485, Naples. Ibid., cc. 115±16: Guidantonio Vespucci, 14 May 1485, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 523, 41: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 14 May 1485, Rome; ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 34, cc. 195±6: G. Vespucci, 23 June 1485, Rome; ASS, BalõÁa 530, 15: Lorenzo Lanti, 12 Apr. 1487, Rome.

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was said in September 1488 to have had lists drawn up of those who were in power in Siena and those who were in exile, and to have offered the exiles his support and troops, if they would put up the money. When informed of this, Innocent berated Franceschetto, and no more was heard of the matter.29 Later, Innocent had to deal with repeated complaints from the Sienese of the support the exiles were receiving from the Vitelli and Baglioni, and from Ranuccio Farnese.30 Innocent became weary of the exiles' plots, and, even if he was not prepared to expel the exiles, was no longer seriously suspected of supporting them. If Sienese exiles attempted to enlist the sympathy and support of Innocent's successor, Alexander VI, they had little reward for their pains. Cesare Borgia set his sights on the conquest of Siena, and had Sienese exiles with him when he was menacing the city in January 1503. He settled for the expulsion of Pandolfo Petrucci. One of the terms of the agreement reached with him by the Sienese was that he would not seek to restore any exiles.31 On the whole, the popes of the second half of the ®fteenth century preferred to use diplomacy rather than force to help the exiles of other states. As Sienese exiles found, the practical assistance available from Rome for attempts to return was to be had from papal nipoti or individual cardinals, acting on their own initiative and often without the knowledge of the pope. In the 1470s, for example, under the Savonese pope Sixtus IV, Rome was a haven for Genoese exiles. But for most of the 1470s, Sixtus was allied to the Duke of Milan, and the pope was unwilling to encourage rebellion against Milanese domination. Obietto Fieschi found patrons in two cardinals, Gianbattista Cibo, whose father had been an exile from Genoa, and Giuliano della Rovere. In early 1477, when Obietto was trying to return to Genoa, Cardinal Cibo gave him 500 ducats, but denied he was providing Obietto's brother Gianluigi with 3000 ducats, saying he did not have such a sum (he was indeed one of the poorer cardinals).32 In April, Cardinal della Rovere sent Obietto 1500 ducats, earning a public rebuke from the pope, and later in the year was reported to have sent Gianluigi 500 ducats.33 Sixtus' mode of intervening on behalf of the Genoese exiles was to en29 30 31 32 33

ASS, BalõÁa 535, 77, 82: Bernardino Bichi, 16, 23 Sept. 1488, Rome. See below, pp. 198±200. A. Lisini, `Relazioni fra Cesare Borgia e la Repubblica senese', BSSP, 7 (1900), 111, 145. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 83: Sacromoro and Ziliolo Oldoini, 1 Jan. 1477, Rome. Ibid.: draft Duchi to Sacromoro, 20 Apr. 1477, Milan; ibid., b. 84: Duchi to Sacromoro and Gianangelo Cagnola, 11 Dec. 1477.

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courage Milan to provide them with pensions or posts, to keep them quiescent. Despite the strong desire of the Milanese government that Archbishop Paolo Campofregoso should return to exile in Mantua and leave Rome, where there was all too much stimulus for intrigue, Sixtus insisted that he should stay, saying that he would give him interests to bind him to Rome and distract him from thoughts of Genoa. In 1478, however, when Sixtus was at odds with Milan over the Pazzi War, he urged Archbishop Campofregoso to go back to Genoa. He seems to have offered only verbal encouragement, and on this occasion the archbishop refused to try his luck.34 The Neapolitan barons who had rebelled against Ferrante in collaboration with Innocent VIII had even better grounds for hoping for the continued support of the pope. Some of those still in the kingdom were encouraged from Rome by Antonello da Sanseverino and by Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere to join them. According to the messages Antonello sent to Naples, when the barons and their families were safely in Rome the war against Ferrante would start up again, with the help of the Angevin claimant to the throne, ReneÂ, Duke of Lorraine. Some of those arrested and interrogated in Naples in June 1487 claimed that the Genoese, the French and the Venetians were also ready to support them, and that Innocent was to crown the Duke of Lorraine King of Naples when he arrived in Rome.35 It is very doubtful that Innocent had any such intentions. Angered though he was by Ferrante's treatment of the barons, he had no wish to go to war again. He proposed that Ferrante should free those barons he had imprisoned and send them into exile, but he did not intend to use them to launch an attack on the kingdom.36 Even the arch-intriguer Alexander VI did not make much use of exiles. In early 1500 there were reports that Alexander thought that by supporting Piero de' Medici he could get some Florentine territory to round off the duchy of Romagna that was being put together for his son Cesare. Apparently Alexander was hoping that the French would do the ®ghting to help Piero back home, and he did not pursue the matter when Louis was not prepared to take it up.37 The principal ally of the Medici in Rome was a cardinal, Federico da Sanseverino. He was a restless and ambitious individual prepared to act independently both of the 34 35 36 37

ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 83: Sacromoro, 13 June 1477, Rome; ibid., b. 86: Ziliolo Oldoini to Duchi, 12, 19 July 1478, Rome. d'Aloe (ed.), Porzio, La congiura de' baroni, clxxvi±ix, clxxxi, clxxxvi. Pontieri, `La ``Guerra dei Baroni'' napoletani' (1976), 162. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 60, cc. 239±40, 241±2: Pierfrancesco Tosinghi, 1, 2 Feb. 1500, Blois.

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pope and of Lodovico Sforza, his temporal lord, but not powerful enough on his own to provide the Medici with effective military help. The Sienese exiled in 1480 were described as Guelfs, as naturally inclined to friendship with Florence. Nevertheless, only after they realized there was little to be had from Rome, did they focus their hopes on Florence. The Florentines welcomed them. There were reports that they had even paid the expenses of some exiles for their journey from Rome and that Lorenzo de' Medici was giving them ®ve ducats a month each and had promised to restore them to Siena.38 Little effort was made by the Florentines to disguise the fact that they were favouring the exiles in order to annoy the Sienese. Fundamentally, they were supporting the Sienese exiles because Siena was hanging on to the towns taken from Florence during the Pazzi War. Well aware of this, Ferrante argued that the Sienese would be more forthcoming if Florence were not harbouring the exiles; the Florentines replied that they would expel the exiles only after the towns had been handed back. The exiles continued to be welcome in Florentine territory until they returned to Siena in the summer of 1482.39 Those exiled in 1482 were Neapolitan partisans rather than friends of Florence, but the Florentines had the same motives for supporting them as for supporting their predecessors. When the exiles seized Monteriggioni in early 1483, they approached the Florentines for help. Unfortunately for them, it served the purpose of the Florentines better to get the towns back by threatening to support the exiles, rather than actually to support them. They could not show goodwill to Siena before the towns were returned, the Dieci di BalõÁa told Bartolomeo Sozzini, the Sienese envoy. There was no reason for them to be hostile to the exiles, who were making `no small offers', and thus displease the Duke of Calabria who, they said, had the exiles' interests at heart.40 The Florentines won the trick, got their towns, and the exiles were no longer free to muster their forces on the Florentine side of the border.41 For the next few years the Florentines supported the Sienese government, but by late 1486 the instability of the Sienese regime was making it appear a greater threat to the peace of Tuscany than the exiles were. Sienese exiles appeared on the Florentine borders at Staggia, and although the Florentines agreed to send them away when the Sienese 38 39 40 41

ASS, BalõÁa 503, 9: Lorenzo Lanti, 13 Apr. 1481, Naples; 97: frate Pietro di Paolo di Nanni, 29 Apr. 1481, Lucca. Shaw, `Politics and institutional innovation' (1996), 30, 35±9. ASS, BalõÁa 507, 87: Bartolomeo Sozzini, 8 Feb. 1482(3), Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 508, 34: Tommaso Luti and Giovanni di Antonio di Neri, 17 Feb. 1482(3).

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government protested, they were soon back.42 The Sienese government would do well to ponder the subject of their rebels, Lorenzo de' Medici recommended. There were many of them, and àlthough one usually gives little credence to rebels', when so many were made, and so frequently, they could justify their cause by pointing to the shakiness of the regime, and saying there was bound to be more trouble soon.43 The Florentines gave no open help to the exiles planning the successful coup of July 1487, but Pisa was one of the centres of the plot; the exiles mustered at Staggia on the Florentine side of the border, and brought with them troops recruited in Florentine territory. Once again, though, Florence was a refuge for those exiled by the new regime. Some exiles like the Luti had long-standing friendships in Florence and could rely on a sympathetic reception there. The exiles involved in an unsuccessful conspiracy to take Buonconvento in December 1488 claimed they had Florentine support, probably without justi®cation;44 the Florentines had no strong motive for trying to restore the exiles by force. Lorenzo de' Medici, while continuing to recommend leniency for some exiles, worked to build up a personal rapport with leading ®gures of the regime. The exiles were still welcome in Florence and the principals of the regime did not like it, but they had to stomach it.45 The crop of exiles who received the most active support from Florence were those sent out of Siena in 1495. There were two major reasons for this. One was the rebellion against Florentine overlordship of the town of Montepulciano, and the willing agreement of the Sienese to extend their protection over the town. The other was the help given by the Sienese to the exiled Medici. The strongest support in Siena for backing Piero de' Medici came from the Petrucci brothers, Giacoppo and Pandolfo. Pandolfo had not always been as keen as his brother on identifying himself as a friend of the Medici, but after Giacoppo's retirement from active involvement in politics, he arranged for Piero to continue receiving assistance from Siena. The majority of the Sienese, including many in the inner circles of the regime, were not in favour of helping the Medici. Some favoured coming to terms with Florence, trading off a refusal to help the Medici against being allowed to hold on to Montepulciano and a cessation of Florentine support for the Sienese exiles. It was the Sienese who began the tit for tat contest with Florence in 42 43 44 45

ASS, BalõÁa 528, 46, 80: Bernardino Politi, 17 Nov., 9 Dec. 1486, Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 528, 30: Bernardino Politi, 6 Nov. 1486, Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 409, ff. 4v±5v: BalõÁa to Domenico Doria, Jan. 1488(9). ASF, MAP 60, 45: Andrea da Foiano to Lorenzo de' Medici, 8 July 1491, Siena.

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supporting each other's exiles, by allowing Piero de' Medici and Virginio Orsini to retire with their men into the Sienese contado in late 1495, after they had failed to penetrate the Florentine defences. In November 1495 Florentine troops, with a large contingent of Sienese exiles, were positioned on the borders. In January the way was opened for a more direct assault on Siena by the withdrawal of Virginio Orsini and Piero de' Medici. On the evening of 31 January, around 8000 Florentine infantry and twenty-two squadrons of horse approached Siena, but as there was no sign of a rising to greet the exiles, retreated before dawn.46 Some Sienese, including Luzio Bellanti, the rival of Pandolfo Petrucci, had made contacts with the Florentines in December, but it was in order to discuss the expulsion of the Florentine exiles in return for being allowed to keep Montepulciano undisturbed, not to discuss the return of the Sienese exiles.47 When Luzio's schemes against Pandolfo began to encompass the return of the exiles as well as the help of the Florentines is not clear; perhaps he could not have one without the other. In April 1496 Pietro Borghesi revealed a conspiracy, in which Bellanti was one of the principals, to admit the exiles with 500 infantry to Siena, and to assassinate Pandolfo and several others.48 The discovery of a second plot, in September 1496, brought Bellanti's downfall and he took refuge with the Florentines. Yet another plot by the exiles to enter Siena was revealed in December, by two of the exiles themselves, before they could join up with the troops of Florence and of Vitellozzo Vitelli.49 He was in the service of France, collaborating with Florence, and by February 1497 nearly all the Sienese exiles had joined him. There were reports that he was preparing to enter Siena with the exiles and the Florentines, `cut to pieces many of the principal citizens, overthrow the regime and make the city French and Florentine'.50 Despite these continued threats, and the wish of many Sienese to put an end to them by making peace with Florence, Pandolfo Petrucci contrived to organize Sienese support for another attempt to return to Florence by Piero de' Medici, with the backing of the Orsini. The BalõÁa agreed only to allow Piero to take his troops through Sienese territory, and to let him have supplies, `thinking it would be to their advantage if he entered Florence, with their help 46 47 48 49 50

Malavolti, Dell'historia di Siena, Part III, f. 103r±v; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1263: Giovanni Malavolti to Lodovico Sforza, 6 Nov. 1495, 2 Feb. 1495(6). ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 44, cc. 368±9: Braccio Martelli, 24 Dec. 1495, Poggibonsi. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1263: Giovanni Malavolti to Lodovico Sforza, 19 Apr. 1496, Siena. Ibid.: Antonio Stanga to Lodovico Sforza, 10 Dec. 1496, Siena. Ibid.: Antonio Stanga to Lodovico Sforza, 19 Feb. 1497, Siena.

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and favour, but not wishing to provide him with their troops, or anything else because of which it could be said that they had made war on Florence'.51 Pandolfo arranged for him to be accompanied by about ®fty Sienese men at arms, who the Sienese claimed were not in fact in their service because they were at the end of their contracts. Piero's expedition to Florence was short, and fruitless, and he hurried back to Siena. Soon the Florentines had once again mustered the Sienese exiles and their troops on the borders.52 Pandolfo continued to support the Medici until Piero found a new backer, Venice. Pandolfo's rivals in Siena were promoting a policy of alliance with Venice, and to counter this threat to his own position, he became more inclined to peace with Florence. For both sides, one of the most important provisions of the terms they agreed was that neither should give any support to the exiles of the other.53 In practice, Sienese exiles were still given refuge in Florence, but they were not lent any more military aid. The backing that the Florentines gave the Sienese exiles in the later 1490s was the most prolonged and consistent effort they made in actively supporting the exiles of other states in the second half of the ®fteenth century. Only occasionally did they venture on providing more than encouragement or pensions to exiles, and then only to the exiles of their neighbours. Those neighbours included Genoa, but generally the Florentines eschewed entanglement in the quarrels of the Genoese factions. An exception was made when they wanted to recover the stronghold of Sarzana in the Lunigiana. Sponsoring Genoese exiles was one of the weapons they employed in the prolonged dispute which ®nally resulted in their capture of Sarzana in 1487. They helped Battista Campofregoso and the Adorno seize the lighthouse tower of Genoa, used for communicating with the of®cials and communities on the Riviera, in November 1484, and prepared a ¯eet at Porto Pisano to back up the exiles. Genoese forces scattered the exiles at Sestri Ponente, where they were awaiting the arrival of the ¯eet; among those captured was a Florentine infantry constable. Just as the Florentine ¯eet set out for Genoa, Genoese vessels appeared at the mouth of the Arno, and the Florentines had to look to the defence of their own ports instead.54 51 52 53

54

Ibid., b. 1264: Antonio Stanga to Lodovico Sforza, 23 Apr. 1497, Siena. Ibid., Antonio Stanga to Lodovico Sforza, 27 Apr., 11 May 1497, Siena. Malavolti, Dell'historia di Siena, Part III, f. 105r±v; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1265: Cesare Guasco to Lodovico Sforza, 15 Sept. 1498, Siena; ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 58, cc. 251±3: Antonio Guidotti, 15 Sept. 1498, Siena. Bornate, `La guerra di Pietrasanta', 173±8.

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The Florentines also made a considerable effort in 1482 to restore NiccoloÁ Vitelli to CittaÁ di Castello. During the ®rst phase of the War of Ferrara, when Florence and the pope were on opposing sides, the Duke of Urbino had suggested that using Vitelli to take CittaÁ di Castello would cause great trouble to the pope at small expense.55 It only took Vitelli a day to gain control of CittaÁ di Castello on 19 June 1482, but the enterprise became an expensive one. The Florentines paid out 3400 ducats to the castellan of one of the fortresses in the city, and 1600 ducats to the castellan of the other. Most of the expense of maintaining him with several hundred infantry, fell on them; they reckoned it had cost them 50,000 ¯orins by early November.56 The enterprise turned out to be a bad bargain for the Florentines, because by the terms agreed at the Diet of Cremona in March 1483 after the pope changed sides, they found themselves committed to helping him recover control of CittaÁ di Castello. They did little to assist their allies, but they could not sabotage the papal campaign too openly, and in the spring of 1484 Vitelli was once again forced into exile.57 Interested as the Florentines were in the Romagna, they were cautious about intervening for or against exiled members of the signorial families. In the confused situation following the declaration by Carlo Manfredi in 1477 that his young son Ottaviano rather than his brother Galeotto would be his heir, Lorenzo de' Medici switched from supporting Carlo to supporting the exiled Galeotto. But the Florentines did not take an active part in bringing Galeotto back to Faenza, they merely reacted to a situation brought about by others. They were even less decisive in their response to appeals from the exiled sons of Cecco Ordelaf®. One of them arrived in Florence in May 1480 to ask for help. The Florentines turned him down, but when Antonio Maria managed to enter ForlõÁ in July, and clearly enjoyed considerable support among the townspeople, they wrote to congratulate him. The brothers needed more than congratulations if they were to keep hold of ForlõÁ; they needed money and troops. The Florentines havered, instructing their of®cials on the border to allow help from their lands to reach ForlõÁ and then contradicting the orders. More substantial support never really came onto the agenda.58 The Milanese government was just as indecisive as the Florentine in 55 56 57 58

ASF, MAP 51, 96: Pier®lippo Pandol®ni to Lorenzo de' Medici, 25 Mar. 1482. ASF, Sig., Missive, Minutari 12, ff. 384r±386r; X, Leg. e Comm. 5, ff. 22r±23v. G. Nicasi, `La famiglia Vitelli di CittaÁ di Castello e la repubblica ®orentina ®no al 1504', BSPU 15 (1909), 149±68, 222±44. See above, p. 11; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. V, pp. 29±30, 48±9; ASF, Otto di Pratica, Missive interni, 1, f. 11v, 15, 19.

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1480 as to whether or not to help the Ordelaf® brothers.59 In general, given the ambitious and unscrupulous nature of the Sforza dukes, it is surprising how infrequently they used force to intervene on behalf of exiles. They did consider it sometimes, suggesting, for example, that Perugian exiles could be used to take Perugia in 1480.60 They encouraged exiles and encouraged others to support them. Lodovico urged the Sienese to support Piero de' Medici in 1495±7, but he stopped short of making any of his own troops available to Piero. The only exiles who received substantial practical help from the Sforza were the Genoese. Francesco Sforza was reluctant to help any of the Genoese exiles until Doge Pietro Campofregoso had ceded control of the city to the French. Keeping the French out of Genoa had been his prime concern, and he had argued that the best way to achieve this was to negotiate with the Doge, not to try to use the exiles to gain control of Genoa. Once Jean d'Anjou had entered Genoa in May 1458, it was Francesco who put up much of the money needed to satisfy, if only in part, the incessant demands of the exiles. By early March 1459, he reckoned that his subsidies to the exiles and Ferrante had cost him about 50,000 ducats in all, and soon he had to pay out more. Francesco wanted his part in helping the exiles to be concealed, wishing to preserve the appearance of neutrality.61 After Genoa rose against the domination of Milan in 1477, the Milanese made three attempts to recover the city using exiles. The ®rst to return with the help of a substantial body of Milanese troops was Prospero Adorno. He severed his links with the Milanese when they tried to dismiss him from his position as governor of Genoa. Next, in August 1478, they tried Obietto Fieschi, releasing him from prison. He returned to Genoa but made no effort to help the Milanese. Then they tried Battista Campofregoso, who returned to Genoa in October 1478 and, at his second attempt, succeeded in driving out Prospero Adorno. But after he was elected Doge, Milan had no more control of the city than before.62 No report of any Sienese exile appealing for military assistance to the dukes of Milan has come to light. Only rarely did Sienese exiles appeal to the other great power of northern Italy, Venice. In May 1481, Francesco Severini spoke to the Council of Ten in Venice on behalf of Bartolomeo Sozzini, Lorenzo Venturini and other exiles, telling them of 59 60 61 62

ASF, Sig., VIII, X, 10, ff. 269v±272r: Pier Francesco Pandol®ni to Otto di Pratica, 14 July 1480, Milan. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 299: Duchi to Filippo Sacromoro, 14 June 1480. Nunziante, Ì primi anni di Ferdinando d' Aragona' (1892), 350±1, 761, 763; (1894), 90, 302. See above, pp. 14±15, 26±7.

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plans to overthrow the pro-Neapolitan regime in Siena and make the city a friend of Venice instead. The Ten replied that they were sorry about the exiles' dif®cult situation, were pleased to recognize them as friends, and would be delighted to hear they had been able to return home to a united and peaceful Siena. The Venetians were not accustomed, however, to instigate or be instrumental in stirring up trouble, and were even less inclined to do so at that moment, when the Turks were threatening.63 In October 1498, just after the truce between Florence and Siena which deprived the Sienese exiles of the active military support of the Florentines, some Sienese exiles approached the Venetian ambassador in Rome. Venice was then at war with Florence, helping the rebellious Pisans, and the exiles suggested that with Venetian help, they would be able to take a place on the Sienese coast.64 The Venetians, however, were trying to get the cooperation of the Sienese government, and were not interested in annoying them by helping the exiles. The Ten's assertion that the Venetians were not accustomed to stirring up trouble would have cut little ice with the other Italian powers. The Venetians were quite prepared to stir up trouble and to use exiles to do so. Exiles from all over Italy found a home in Venice and her dominions; more than a few were given money to live on, assigned places to live, or given condotte. The Venetians may have boasted of their city being open to all comers, but their treatment of other states' exiles was not just charity, or hospitality. The Venetians held exiles in reserve, sometimes for many years, until the moment came when they could be useful. Like other Italian states, they would use exiles when waging war. During the War of Ferrara, their main commander was Roberto da Sanseverino. They had wanted to employ him for some time, but been reluctant to take him on while he was still part of the inner circle of the regime in Milan. When he fell out of favour and was in exile in 1482, they were quick to offer him a command.65 The War of Ferrara was already brewing, and Roberto's contacts and sympathizers in Milan now made him even more attractive to the Venetians. When Roberto did bring his troops into the duchy in July 1483, he had them cry `Duca, Duca', not the Venetian rallying cry `Marco, Marco', and claimed 63 64 65

ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Misti, 20, f. 99v, 24 May 1481. Sanuto, Diarii, vol. II, col. 15. Michael Mallett, `Venice and the War of Ferrara, 1482±84' in David Chambers, Cecil Clough and Michael Mallett (eds.), War, Culture and Society in Renaissance Venice: Essays in Honour of John Hale (London, 1993), pp. 61±3.

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that he had been summoned by Duke Giangaleazzo to free him from servitude.66 For a while in 1482, the Venetians had the prospect of being able to employ another major Milanese exile, Ascanio Sforza. After Ascanio left his con®nes in Naples in June 1482, he ®rst went to Rome. The pope wanted him to join up with the Rossi of Parma to provoke a rebellion there, and then go on to Milan to bring about a change of regime; but he did not offer Ascanio any money, only agreeing to his request to be made a cardinal. The Venetians were prepared to make a better offer, and their ambassador in Rome was instructed to direct Ascanio to Venice. Lodovico heard that they planned to send him to their camp attacking Milanese territory. Arriving in Venice on 11 August, Ascanio was treated as an honoured guest, with twenty ducats a day being assigned to him for expenses, but he could not come to satisfactory terms with the Venetians, and within a month was negotiating his return to Milan. The loss of Ascanio was compensated only in part by the acquisition of the Rossi, who ¯ed from Parma after they were defeated by Lodovico, and were given condotte by Venice in early 1483.67 In 1498, the Venetians tried to recruit Giangiacomo Trivulzio to command their army.68 Had the negotiations succeeded, Trivulzio would have invaded the duchy of Milan in 1499 from the east, at the head of the Venetian troops, instead of from the west, as one of the French commanders. During the campaigns the Venetians waged in Tuscany in the late 1490s in support of the Pisan rebellion against Florence, they made use of Piero de' Medici. In August 1498 they sent him 6000 ducats to prepare troops for another assault on Florence with the Orsini. Piero claimed that he was being summoned back to Florence by his friends there, and that he had contacts in Bibbiena and other places in the Florentine contado, ready to rise in his favour. The Venetian provveditore at Bibbiena reported, however, that there was little sign of favour for the Medici; they even had to pay for the intelligence they received.69 Not having reaped the bene®ts they had hoped for, by January 1499 many Venetians were `fed up with the Medici'.70 Despite visits by Piero to Venice to plead the Medici cause in person, the Venetians did not try to use them in another campaign. While other states tended to give active military backing to exiles 66 67 68 69 70

ASMa, AGonzaga, b. 1627: Zaccaria da Pisa, 17, 24 July 1483, Milan. ASMa, AGonzaga, b. 1627: Zaccaria da Pisa, 8, 18 July 1482, Milan; Pellegrini, Àscanio Maria Sforza', p. 266; Malipiero, Ànnali veneti', 290. Sanuto, Diarii, vol. II, cols. 106±7, 121, 141. Ibid., vol. I, col. 1037, vol. II, cols. 18, 46, 145, 167±8, 179, 282±3. Ibid., vol. II, col. 345.

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only when they were at war with the target state, the Venetians were prepared to back them when there were no overt hostilities. They were, to be sure, ambivalent about whether to support the enterprise of Bartolomeo Colleoni and the Florentine exiles in 1466. One of the exiles, NiccoloÁ Soderini, had discussions with the Venetian government, and Venice was ready to back Colleoni's plan to use his formidable company to ®ght for them; but Colleoni had to wait until his condotta with Venice of®cially ended in February 1467.71 The Venetians were ready to attack Milan indirectly by using exiles to provoke rebellion in Genoa in 1466 and 1467. In early 1466, they gave money to Paolo Campofregoso, who used it to raise infantry and try to enter the Riviera di Levante; he withdrew when he learned of the defensive measures taken by the Milanese. In September 1467, they promised money to Obietto Fieschi, if he would raise rebellion in the Riviera.72 They were also prepared to use exiles to extend or consolidate Venetian in¯uence. The Venetians were executors of the will of Astorre II Manfredi, which named Galeotto as heir to his brother Carlo. They were also the employers of the exiled Galeotto, who held a condotta from them. When Ottaviano was declared to be Carlo's heir in 1477, they agreed to free Galeotto from his condotta and gave him a loan of 1000 ducats to help him make good his claim. In 1476 they had permitted NiccoloÁ d'Este to recruit men in their dominions for his attempted coup against his uncle Ercole d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, although when NiccoloÁ failed and was executed, they sent ambassadors to make excuses for the fact that so many of their subjects had been involved.73 NiccoloÁ d'Este had also appealed to the French king for support, sending a secretary to France.74 What he hoped to gain is dif®cult to see, as is why Carlo Manfredi, in exile from Faenza in 1461, felt it worth his while to make the long journey to offer his services to Louis XI. Louis had never heard of him, and had to ask the Milanese ambassador who he was. The ambassador commented to Francesco Sforza that he thought Carlo, and an obscure Malatesta who had come with him, must have been led here to do penance for some great sin, because here no one throws a piece of fat to a dog; and anyway, although gentlemen are held 71 72

73 74

Belotti, Bartolomeo Colleoni, pp. 359±86. Paul M. Kendall and Vincent Ilardi (eds.), Dispatches with Related Documents of Milanese Ambassadors in France and Burgundy 1450±1483, 3 vols. (Athens, Ohio, 1970±81), vol. III, p. 123; Belotti, Bartolomeo Colleoni, p. 400. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. II, pp. 411±12; Capelli, `NiccoloÁ d'Este', 427. Capelli, `NiccoloÁ d'Este', 423.

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in great honour here, still they want them to have presence, and be well thought of and valiant, or at least wise and of great experience, and these men do not seem to me to be the best endowed in the world with these qualities.

The Malatesta was told to go home; Carlo was given ®fty scudi and pay for ®ve horse, provided he served in person.75 Sienese exiles did not turn to the king of France for help until Charles VIII was actually on his way south to Naples in 1494. They lobbied hard to win his support, doing all they could to get his assistance in returning to Siena, engaging in ®erce debates with friends of the Sienese regime on several occasions before Charles's powerful minister, Guillaume BricËonnet. The friends of the regime won, with Charles declaring that he wanted no one governing Siena except his good friends, and did not want `fugitive, trouble-making plebeians' disturbing the republic.76 At least one of the principals of those exiled in 1495, Giovanni Severini, travelled to Lyons to solicit the king's support. Judging from a letter he wrote to the Florentines, they had helped him to obtain a hearing, and the king wanted them to help the exiles get home. No direct aid from the French was forthcoming.77 After the French conquest of the duchy of Milan in 1499, Sienese exiles went to Milan, where they were given hopes of help by Ligny, one of the French commanders. He held a grievance against the Sienese government for failing to pay him after he had been appointed their nominal captain in 1495. Ligny hinted that he would restore the exiles to Siena unless he received satisfaction for his wounded honour. Cardinal d'Amboise, the chief minister of Louis XII, told the Sienese ambassadors that the exiles had powerful advocates at court, who had told the king that they had been expelled unjustly from Siena. But Ligny and d'Amboise had no real interest in the exiles, except as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Sienese government, and they received no help from the French.78 Up until 1494, Florentine exiles did not see much point in appealing for help to the king of France either. The links of the Florentine government and the Medici family with the French court were too strong for Florentine exiles to have much hope of favour there. When 75 76 77 78

Bernard de Mandrot and Charles Samarin (eds.), DeÂpeÃches des ambassadeurs milanais en France sous Louis XI et FrancËois Sforza, 4 vols. (Paris, 1916±23), vol. I, pp. 124±5. ASS, BalõÁa 551, 35: Maestro Emmanuele, 19 Nov. 1494, Florence. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 44, 236: Giovanni Soderini, 16 Dec. 1495, Lyons. L.-G. PeÂlissier, `Documents sur l'ambassade siennoise envoyeÂe aÁ Milan en Octobre 1499', BSSP 3 (1896), 50±2; ASF, Signoria, Resp. 13, cc. 59, 60, 65±6: Antonio Guidotti, 16, 19, 20 Oct. 1499, Siena.

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Piero de' Medici incautiously chose to put the alliance with Naples before his family's traditional friendship with the French king, Charles VIII soon extended his protection to Piero's cousins, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de' Medici, when they were exiled for their support for maintaining the French alliance in 1494. They joined Charles as he made his way through Lombardy, and they and other exiles came back to Florence in his wake.79 On his journey south, Charles had with him several cardinals who had withdrawn from the court of Alexander VI, including Giuliano della Rovere, Ascanio Sforza and Federico da Sanseverino. Their formal acceptance back into Alexander's good graces and the return of their bene®ces was part of the agreement the king made with the pope, but they still did not feel they would be safe if they stayed behind, and so left Rome again with Charles.80 Neapolitan barons had been at the French court for at least ®ve years, stimulating the young king's dreams of conquering Naples. Most prominent among them was Antonello da Sanseverino. He provided not only encouragement, but knowledge of the terrain and of the defences of Naples, maps, and contacts with sympathizers still in the kingdom. He was a member of the group of advisers deputed to have charge of Italian affairs. During the expedition itself he was in command of the ¯eet that was assigned an important role in the plans for the invasion but, as it turned out, played small part in it. After Ferrandino recovered his kingdom in the summer of 1496, Neapolitan barons again made their way to the French court. Their in¯uence was diminished by the absence of the Prince of Salerno, who did not go to France this time.81 For the earlier generations of Neapolitan barons, who left the kingdom in the 1440s and the 1460s, the principal hope for support lay with the Angevin claimants to the throne. The Angevins could give employment to the exiles, but lacked the resources to press their claims to the Neapolitan throne without the backing of the French king. One of the exiled barons, Giovanni Cossa, was sent on several occasions to the French court to plead for ®nancial and military support for them.82 Under Louis XII, the most notable Italian exile in the service of the 79

80 81

82

Alison Brown, `Pierfrancesco de' Medici, 1430±1476: a radical alternative to elder Medicean supremacy?', in eadem, The Medici in Florence: The Exercise and Language of Power (Florence, 1992), pp. 94±100; de Frede, L'impresa di Napoli, pp. 128±9. Shaw, Julius II, pp. 99±100. de Frede, L'impresa di Napoli, pp. 79±80; Abel Desjardins and Giuseppe Canestrini, NeÂgociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, vol. I (Paris, 1859), pp. 224, 229, 301, 306; Sanuto, Diarii, vol. I, col. 99, vol. II, cols. 209, 235, 324. e.g., de Mandrot, DeÂpeÃches des ambassadeurs milanais en France, vol. II, pp. 21±38.

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French crown was not a Neapolitan baron but the Milanese noble, Giangiacomo Trivulzio. Usually based at Asti, as governor of that city and lieutenant general of the French king in Italy, from there he could harass and threaten the Milanese and Genoa. His favour with the French ¯uctuated, and at times he professed willingness to serve Venice and discussed reconciliation with Lodovico Sforza. Nevertheless, his best chance of an enduring return to Milan rested with the French, and it was as a commander of the French forces in Northern Italy that he went back there. After Genoa came under Milanese domination, there were occasional reports of Genoese exiles intriguing with the French. Nothing came of this until they could be used to attack Lodovico Sforza, after he had switched from ally to enemy of the French king, and to get control of the harbour and resources of Genoa. The attempt by Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere and Battista Campofregoso to take Genoa and Savona in the winter of 1496±7 had the backing of Charles ± indeed the cardinal's hopes of success were founded on the support promised by the king ± but only the half-hearted cooperation of Giangiacomo Trivulzio, and made little progress.83 For a brief period during the reign of Duke Charles the Bold, Burgundy became a focus for Italian exiles, including some from Genoa. In 1473 and again in 1476, Charles plotted with Campofregoso exiles, hoping to use them to overthrow the Milanese government of Genoa and hold the city himself. Charles also dreamed in 1476 of becoming king of Naples, trying to get himself adopted by ReneÂ d'Anjou, and promising to send the Neapolitan exiles who were in his employment. Two years before, however, the Neapolitan exiles had hoped that Charles might reconcile them to Ferrante, and help them to return to Naples that way.84 In the sixteenth century, the Emperor Charles V would be a magnet for Italian exiles, including those from Siena; but there was little point in Italian exiles looking to the emperors for help for most of the ®fteenth century. A visit to Italy by a Holy Roman Emperor always caused some apprehension, but the emperors were not in a position to impose their will on the Italians. When Lodovico Sforza and his family were pushed into exile by the French in 1499, all the treasure and effort that Lodovico had put into marrying his niece Bianca Maria to Maximilian, and 83 84

Shaw, Julius II, pp. 102±3. Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. I, pp. 493±4; vol. II, p. 101; Rosi, `Girolamo Gentile', 185, 195; Ernesto Sestan (ed.), Carteggi diplomatici fra Milano sforzesco e la Borgogna, 2 vols. (Rome, 1985±7), vol. II, pp. 202±3; Walsh, `Relations between Milan and Burgundy', p. 384.

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obtaining Maximilian's con®rmation of his title as Duke of Milan, yielded little in the way of practical help to recover his duchy. Charles V would come to dominate Italy as the heir of the monarchy of Castile and Aragon, more than as the emperor. After Alfonso of Aragon's conquest of the kingdom of Naples, the Spanish monarchs had intervened in Italian politics only diplomatically, until the beginning of the sixteenth century when Ferdinand decided to take over the kingdom of Naples for the Spanish crown. Few exiles other than Ferrandino could have thought it worthwhile to appeal to the Spanish monarchs for help. In June 1485, however, during the preliminaries to the Barons' War, Cino Cinughi, acting as `general commissioner of all the order of the Nove at present in exile' from Siena, sent an envoy, Tommaso Giffre, to ask for his help. The Nove, Giffre was instructed to tell the king, had always sought to exalt the House of Aragon, and many of them had suffered for it. Now about ®ve hundred of the principal men (òptimati') were in exile, their hopes of help from Ferrante had been deluded, and so they were turning to Ferdinand. They hoped he would aid their return by sea, `because our ports are not very far from the Sicilian ports of Your Majesty', by lending them six galleys and a ship to put 3000 ®ghting men on shore, with an experienced captain provided by Ferdinand, to serve for a month at the king's expense. All the money he spent would be paid back after the Nove returned to Siena, and they would make an alliance with him for ®fty years or more, taking part in any wars he waged in Tuscany. It is unlikely that Ferdinand found the scheme of any interest.85 Fifteenth-century exiles were far more likely to receive a favourable response if they looked for help to local lords or condottieri with time on their hands, rather than to the emperor or the King of Spain. Sienese exiles received help, or had hopes of help, from over a dozen such lords and condottieri during the second half of the ®fteenth century. The majority of these were minor ®gures but two of them, Jacopo Piccinino and Roberto da Sanseverino, were among the most notable condottieri of their day. Jacopo Piccinino was faithful to the associations he had formed with the conspirators of 1456 before their exile. He gave them refuge in his camp and some ®nancial support ± he declared on several occasions that if he had only one loaf of bread, he would share it with them86 ± but he was handicapped by a lack of resources. Alfonso of Naples was not ready to pay Piccinino to campaign on their behalf, and the exiles them85 86

ASS, A. Sergardi-Biringucci, G1c: copy of instructions to Tommaso Giffre. ASS, BalõÁa 398, f. 34v.

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selves were in no position to pay his company. Nor was the later generation of Sienese exiles in a position to pay for the services of Roberto da Sanseverino. The price for his help, as some of them told Pope Innocent, was that they should make him lord of Siena. They thought this price was too high, and would rather trust to the mercies of the regime than be instrumental in the loss of Siena's independence.87 An assault on Siena was only one of the schemes Roberto had in mind for winning a state of his own, and the plan went no further. Florentine exiles had more success than the Sienese in enlisting the aid of top-rank condottieri. Rinaldo degli Albizzi and other antiMedicean exiles of 1434 fought with NiccoloÁ Piccinino ( Jacopo's father), although this brought them down to defeat by the Florentines at the battle of Anghiari. The Florentine exiles of 1466 were able to secure the services of Bartolomeo Colleoni, and Piero de' Medici those of Virginio Orsini in 1495. The reasons for the greater success of the Florentine exiles in this respect varied. NiccoloÁ Piccinino was serving as the commander of Filippo Maria Visconti, Duke of Milan, who was at war with Florence. Ordered to leave Tuscany by the duke, he was persuaded by the Florentine exiles to try the fortune of a battle before he left, according to Machiavelli.88 The exiles of 1466 were wealthy, and their enterprise ± which also ended in defeat at a battle, that of Molinella, in July 1467 ± had the covert backing of Venice.89 In 1495, Piero de' Medici was short of funds, and Virginio Orsini had to mortgage his own estates to pay for the troops he brought to Tuscany to help Piero.90 Virginio was prepared to make sacri®ces to restore Piero to Florence because of the family connections between the Orsini and the Medici ± Piero's mother and his wife were both Orsini. After Virginio's death, Piero had the assistance of Bartolomeo d'Alviano in his approach to the walls of Florence in 1497.91 Bartolomeo was a zealous member of the Orsini faction, and was considered virtually a member of the family, so for him, as for Virginio, Piero de' Medici's cause was a personal one. In 1483, the Sienese exiles did hire several Perugian condottieri, including Ridolfo Baglioni and Carlo degli Arcipreti, who took their troops to the Sienese frontier despite papal prohibitions. They did not leave the Perugian contado, because when the strength of the Sienese 87 88 89 90 91

ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 34, cc. 48±52: Guidantonio Vespucci, ? Apr. 1485, Rome. Machiavelli, Istorie ®orentine, Book V, XXXII. See above, p. 191. Sigismondo dei Conti, Le storie de' suoi tempi dal 1475 al 1510, ed. D. Zanelli and F. Calabro, 2 vols. (Rome, 1883), vol. II, p. 158. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1264: Antonio Stanga to Lodovico Sforza, 25, 27, 30 Apr. 1497, Siena.

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defences was realized the exiles allowed them to return home.92 The principal condottiere who actually undertook a campaign with the Sienese exiles was Giulio Orsini, in 1485. They claimed that Virginio Orsini's troops would be with them. Virginio not only refused to join them, he told Giulio not to go, and sent couriers to the Sienese exiles to tell them to come and take back the 6000 ducats they had given to Giulio.93 Giulio's services came much cheaper than did those of Roberto da Sanseverino, but he was a poor substitute as a commander. Other Orsini condottieri were also reported to be involved with the Sienese exiles at various times. The exiles had claimed that the attack Sixtus IV and Girolamo Riario launched on the Colonna at the end of May 1484 had scotched arrangements that they had made with Paolo Orsini (who was involved in the campaign against the Colonna) `to come to Siena to bring them back home'.94 In 1493 there were rumours, taken seriously in Siena, that some infantry which Bartolomeo d'Alviano was raising would be brought against Siena in support of the exiles, but if plans there were, they came to nothing. The exiles of the 1450s hoped for help from Aldobrandino Orsini da Pitigliano, trying to persuade him to renounce a treaty he had with Siena, but to no avail. Everso d'Anguillara was ready to give military support, but only if King Alfonso agreed.95 The collaboration between the Sienese exiles of the late 1490s and the condottiere Vitellozzo Vitelli was potentially dangerous. He was in the pay of France, not of the exiles, and he openly said that he `wanted to put the exiles back in Siena (as they are devoted to the King of France), and that Siena should be at the disposal of the king'.96 More immediately worrying for the Sienese regime was that he was working with the Florentines. A conspiracy to admit the exiles into Siena in December 1496 might have succeeded if it had not come to light prematurely because the exiles waited for troops from Vitellozzo and some Florentine infantry.97 After Vitellozzo had raided Sienese territory in the following February, most of the exiles went to join him. The BalõÁa 92 93 94 95

96 97

`Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni' (1903), 230±2. ASS, BalõÁa 522, 38: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 3 May 1485, Rome; ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 34, cc. 82±3: Guidantonio Vespucci, 3 May 1485, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 518, 79: Lorenzo Lanti, 31 May 1484, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 549, 95: Gianbattista da Imola, 8 Mar. (1493), Acquapendente; BalõÁa 412, ff. 22v, 25r±v; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 269: Nicodemo da Pontremoli to Francesco Sforza, 6 Dec. 1457, Florence; ibid.: copy of a letter `da uno che sta in Napoli scripta ad uno del Collegio di BalõÁa', 29 May 1457, Naples. ASS, BalõÁa 414, f. 57v. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1263: Antonio Stanga to Lodovico Sforza, 10 Dec. 1496, Siena.

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heard that he had told the exiles `that he could easily launch an attack for them again with the backing of the Florentines', once the Sienese dropped their guard.98 The BalõÁa also heard that the exiles had promised Vitellozzo that immediately after they entered Siena they would give him 30,000 ducats and as much again in ®xed property, as well as a condotta for 150±200 men at arms;99 but he did not make another attack. In the late 1480s and early 1490s there were rumours and reports, which the Sienese regime took seriously, that the exiles were to receive help from the Vitelli or from Perugia.100 It is hard to tell how much credence these reports really merited. The Vitelli were often ready to give military support to their factional allies in Umbria, but Siena was not a part of that network. The Baglioni had a motive for assisting the Sienese exiles when many of those exiled from Perugia in 1488 settled in Sienese territory. (When there were rumours that the Baglioni were backing the Sienese exiles in June 1489, the Oddi exiles were quick to offer the Sienese regime their services, saying they could muster three hundred men, horse and foot, in good order.)101 In practice, the exiles appear to have had no more than the use of Perugian territory, and perhaps advice and help with recruitment from the Baglioni ± unless they hired them as condottieri, as they did in August 1483. On the other hand, the Baglioni believed that the Sienese regime was providing more than just a refuge for Perugian exiles. In March 1489, the BalõÁa denied accusations that Sienese infantry had been with exiles on one sortie into the Perugian contado. Ànd if the exiles in Pacciano shouted ``Lupa, Lupa''102 and ``Siena, Siena'', it was not with our consent, and we do not know why they did it.'103 The following year, Pandolfo Petrucci told the Oddi that they could raise some infantry in Sienese territory, not so much to help them, he claimed, as to get more information on their plans.104 The Perugians suspected the Sienese of helping their exiles again in November 1492, and were convinced that they had after the major raid launched by the exiles in March 1495, when, with the help of Sienese troops and of men of the Duke of Urbino, the exiles took many places in the contado. Hundreds of Sienese came as volunteers, hoping for booty, but there were also Sienese 98 99 100

101 102 103 104

ASS, BalõÁa 414, ff. 85v±86r. Ibid., ff. 134r±135r. ASS, BalõÁa 408, ff. 32r, 77r±v; BalõÁa 409, f. 141v; BalõÁa 411, f. 84r±v; ASF, MAP 41, 471: Andrea da Foiano to Lorenzo de' Medici, 7 Mar. 1490(1), Siena; BalõÁa 547, 92: Andrea Buonsignori, 23 July 1491, Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 540, 31: NiccoloÁ di Mariano Borghesi, 19 June 1489, Chiusi. The she-wolf, the symbol of Siena. ASS, BalõÁa 409, f. 80r±v. ASF, MAP 41, 528: Andrea da Foiano, 20 Aug. 1490, Siena.

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troops under the command of a Bellanti, probably Luzio Bellanti. The Sienese were routed at Passignano by Astorre Baglioni; many were drowned trying to ¯ee across Lake Trasimene, and Bellanti was wounded.105 Whether these soldiers under Bellanti's command were there with the agreement of the BalõÁa is not certain. Pompeo degli Oddi wrote to the BalõÁa when the expedition was already well under way, to tell of the success achieved so far and to say that àlthough we have a lot of troops, nevertheless we would like you, if you would, to send some worthy men to help us, so that our enemies will be struck with even greater terror, seeing that you are helping us'.106 When the BalõÁa sent an envoy to ask for the release of the Sienese who had been captured, they evidently claimed they had not helped the exiles. Their excuses were formally accepted, but the envoy was told that it was dif®cult to believe so many Sienese subjects had come without the knowledge of the BalõÁa.107 During the late 1480s and early 1490s, when the principal members of the Sienese regime were periodically concerned that their exiles were being actively supported by the Vitelli and Baglioni, they also had wellfounded fears that the exiles were receiving help from two minor lords, whose lands bordered Sienese territory to the south-east, Ranuccio Farnese and Guido Sforza, Conte di Santa Fiora. In 1488, it was the exiles who were staying at Santa Fiora who worried them most. It was from Santa Fiora that Giovanni Cecchini and other exiles were to have left to seize Buonconvento in December 1488, had the attempt of their accomplices to get duplicate keys to the gates made not led to the discovery of the conspiracy. In 1489, Giovanni Cecchini and other exiles, including Girolamo di Nanni di Cione and Guidoccio Gionta, were based on the lands of Ranuccio Farnese. There had been a report in April 1488 that Ranuccio had agreed to attack Siena with the exiles, and in the summer of 1489 he was said to be raising troops with them. Some of these troops claimed that they were to restore the exiles to Siena, where they would ®nd much support. The exiles were described as being in optimistic mood, sure they would soon be back in Siena, and to have agreed with Ranuccio Farnese that he would be captain of Siena.108 105 106 107 108

ASS, BalõÁa 549, 71: Fazio Benassai, 17 Nov. 1492, Rome; Matarazzo, `Cronaca della CittaÁ di Perugia', 26±9. ASS, BalõÁa 552,1: Pompeo degli Oddi, 25 Mar. 1495, Zoccho. Ibid., 87: Bernardino Politi, 12 Apr. 1495, Urbino. ASS, BalõÁa 408, ff. 117r, 149r±v; ASF, MAP 40, 271: Leonardo Bellanti, 17 Apr. 1488, Siena; ASS, BalõÁa 540, 27: Bertoldo Foscherani, 19 June 1489, Campiglia di Valdorcia; BalõÁa 541, 25: Agostino Pini, 30 Aug. 1489, Montemerano.

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Ranuccio's capacity to help the exiles was limited by the dif®culties he was experiencing himself. In October 1490 his own troops were penniless, and the exiles' spirits were low, but a report two months later that he had concluded a condotta with Venice raised their hopes again.109 Hearing that Ranuccio was visiting Santa Fiora, the Sienese vicar of Montelaterone, Carlo Scotti, went there to talk to him and the count. Ranuccio denied that his lands had been used by the exiles to assemble men for expeditions, or that any subject or soldier of his had taken part in them, or that he had any prior knowledge of what they planned to do. He was not so stupid, he said, as to become involved in such thoughtless and childish exploits. The Sienese had never asked him to send the exiles away. When the pope had done so, the exiles had gone to Rome and, by promising not to cause any trouble, had persuaded the pope and Cardinal Piccolomini to ask him to allow them back. The count told Carlo Scotti later that the Sienese could easily arrange for the exiles to be denied the use of his lands and those of Ranuccio Farnese, by taking his son and Ranuccio's son into their service.110 It was no coincidence that so many of those from whom the Sienese exiles hoped to have practical support were from the Papal States. There, quasi-independent lords and barons were accustomed to acting without reference to the pope. For many men in the Papal States, helping the exiles who were allies of their own faction was an accepted part of the normal exchange of favours between political friends. Often they would act ®rst, and worry (or not) about what the pope and his of®cials might think of it afterwards. The strength of the Guelf and Ghibelline networks of Umbria in particular, and their connections with families of Roman barons with a military tradition, meant that exiles from even small towns could ®nd backing. When the Ghibelline Chiaravallesi exiles of Todi forced their way back in August 1495, they were said to have with them men from Spoleto, Terni, Amelia and the Marches, and some Perugian exiles; when the Guelf Catalaneschi quickly expelled them again, they did so with the help of Bartolomeo d'Alviano. Earlier that year, the Baglioni and Vitelli and French troops had been involved in the faction-®ghting around Todi.111 The Sienese were not part of such a factional network, and did not have a tradition of soldiering. When they needed troops, they had to 109 110 111

ASS, BalõÁa 544, 57: Carlo Scotti, 10 Oct. 1490, Montelaterone; BalõÁa 545, 65: Carlo Scotti, 28 Dec. 1490, Montelaterone. ASS, BalõÁa 546, 70: Carlo Scotti, 28 Feb. 1491, Montelaterone. ASTodi, Fondo Alvi, Lorenzo Boselli, `Relazioni raccolte dalle croniche', f. 36r; degli Atti, La cronaca todina, p. 128; Matarazzo, `Cronaca della CittaÁ di Perugia', 20±1.

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®nd the money to hire them. To hire a condottiere of some reputation required a lot of money, or entailed the need to promise him substantial rewards if the enterprise was successful: perhaps a large condotta, perhaps even the lordship of the city. Other states might be sympathetic, providing refuge, pensions, jobs, and they might be ready to use the threat of backing the exiles of another state as a political weapon. Make much of the Sienese exiles to keep those inside Siena anxious, but do not put your full weight and that of Florence behind them, Guidantonio Vespucci advised Lorenzo de' Medici in 1481.112 Unless it was in their own interests to use force, unless it could be part of a wider strategy in a war, states were unlikely to launch a campaign whose sole purpose was the restoration of a group of exiles. There was more likelihood that less responsible political ®gures, such as papal nipoti, would do so. As Lorenzo de' Medici remarked when he was discussing with the Sienese envoy, Ricco Ricchi, whether the Duke of Calabria would try to restore the Sienese exiles when the War of Ferrara was over, considering the likely `balance of Italy' after the war he was not worried that the king and duke would undertake this, because Ì do not reckon the interest of their state calls for them to get involved.' He could believe, however, that Girolamo Riario might become involved, because he did not have to worry about prejudicing his own state by such an enterprise, as he would use the forces of the papacy.113 If the chances of exiles receiving military help that they did not pay for themselves were quite limited, why were states so concerned if their exiles were enjoying a sympathetic reception from other powers? Why could exiles, as Innocent VIII put it, make one hundred jealous for every one they made a cuckold?114 The answer probably lies in the importance of reputation outside the state for maintaining political reputation within it. If exiles were seen to enjoy respect from others, their reputation at home and the spirits of their supporters would be enhanced. Thus the Milanese ambassadors in Rome were concerned when Sixtus gave Paolo Campofregoso, the exiled Archbishop of Genoa, a position as his vicar in 1478. `We see how much reputation counts in maintaining governments', they wrote, and even though `being vicar of the Pope is not of much importance', the Genoese might persuade themselves it was, and with this illusion grow bolder, `just because of the opinion that they have favour here'.115 Conversely, if governments showed themselves to be alert, and able effectively to 112 113 114 115

ASF, MAP 38, 104: Guidantonio Vespucci to Lorenzo de' Medici, 26 Mar. 1481. ASS, BalõÁa 516, 43: Ricco Ricchi, 9 Jan. 1483(4), Florence. ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 35, cc. 76±7: Guidantonio Vespucci, 22 Oct. 1485, Rome. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 85: Sacromoro and Ziliolo Oldoini, 27 Feb. 1478, Rome.

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gather intelligence about the exiles' schemes, they would diminish the reputation of the exiles and their chances of ®nding support outside. Scotch one or two of the exiles' plots, the Florentine Dieci di BalõÁa advised the Sienese, and `they will lose so much reputation that they will not ®nd any prince who will get involved in their affairs'.116 For states, backing exiles with money and troops could be an expensive business, as the Florentines found at CittaÁ di Castello, and Francesco Sforza found at Genoa. Other powers might well disapprove of their interference, and careful calculation of the possible consequences and repercussions needed to be made. Giving active help to exiles could be a tempting proposition, but it could easily turn out to be more trouble than it was worth. 116

ASS, BalõÁa 516, 47: Ricco Ricchi, 13 Jan. 1483(4), Florence.

chapter 7

G OI NG HOM E

`The man who is in exile', Giovanni Severini warned the BalõÁa of Siena in March 1483, `thinks of nothing but returning home, just as a sick man thinks of nothing but being well again.'1 Severini may well have been speaking from personal experience: he had only returned from two years in exile nine months earlier. Many exiles were destined to die with their dreams of return unful®lled. Only the deaths of the most prominent would be noted, like that of Guido Rossi from Parma, dying in the Veneto; Palla Strozzi, dying at the age of ninety an honoured citizen of Padua; or Piero de' Medici, drowning as he tried to cross a river with French forces in the kingdom of Naples. Antonio Caldora, who had been the viceroy of ReneÂ d'Anjou in Naples, died in obscure and impoverished old age at Jesi; Antonello da Sanseverino, the most powerful of a later generation of Neapolitan barons, of disease at the age of forty-three near Senigallia, where he had gone to seek the hospitality of his brother-in-law, Giovanni della Rovere.2 Some of those who died in exile could have returned had they chosen to do so, but did not, either because of fear that they would not be safe, or dislike for the regime they would have to live under, or because they had made a new life for themselves elsewhere. Large numbers of Pisan exiles who had made careers for themselves as merchants or of®cials in places like Milan or Sicily or Barcelona, for example, did not take advantage of measures adopted by the Florentines allowing their return.3 But there were probably few exiles who did not want to have at least the option of going home, even if only for a temporary visit. 1 2

3

ASS, BalõÁa 508, 80: Giovanni Severini, 17 Mar. 1482(3), Massa. Malipiero, Ànnali veneti', 311; Kent, `The making of a Renaissance patron', p. 66; Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d'Italia, Book VI, Chap. 7; Costanzo, Istoria del Regno di Napoli, p. 266; Sanuto, Diarii, vol. II, col. 409. Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa', pp. 323±47.

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There was a wide range of ways in which exiles could come back or be allowed back, from bands of exiles forcing their way into their native city, sword in hand, seeking out their enemies to take revenge on them, to individuals making humble pleas for pardon. Sienese exiles exempli®ed most, but not all, of them. Some quietly returned at the end of their sentence; some were summoned back before their sentence ended; some reappeared after a change of regime; some self-exiles returned under threat of sanctions if they did not; some fought their way back; some came in the wake of a foreign army. It can be dif®cult to tell, even approximately, when (or whether) Sienese exiles returned, unless they were given speci®c permission to do so, or they were covered by a general amnesty (and there is no reason to believe that they would not take advantage of permission or amnesty), or if reference can be found to a man being in Siena soon after the expiration of his sentence. No record was kept in surviving of®cial sources of those who simply came back at the end of their sentences; nor would it have been a matter worthy of public note, particularly as such exiles would generally be those returning after short sentences, and not major players in Sienese politics. Only three per cent of the Sienese exiles are known to have died in exile. This proportion would perhaps be somewhat larger if better information were available, but not by too much. In 94 per cent of the cases in which it is known how long a man spent in exile and that he did not die there, the actual period in exile was ®ve years or less. General amnesties and several changes of regime in Siena in the 1480s and 1490s saw to that. Most unfortunate in this respect were those exiled in 1456±8, of whom at least a ®fth, and probably far more, died in exile, and of those who survived, at least ®ve spent over twenty years excluded from Siena. Only a handful, one per cent, of Sienese exiles ± those identi®ed as having forced their way into the city on 22 July 1487 ± returned without the agreement, explicit or implicit, of the regime. Over a third came with the explicit agreement of the regime and two®fths following a change of regime. Only a seventh, 15 per cent, are known to have had to wait until the end of their sentences before they could come back. The pattern of the return of exiles ± whether by force or by consent, after how many years, and whether before or after the term of their sentences had expired ± probably varied considerably from one state to another. For Florence, the pattern looks quite similar to that for Siena, in some respects. No Florentine exiles succeeded in forcing their way back during the ®fteenth century; they would have returned with the agreement of the regime, as did the Strozzi in 1466, or after there had

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been a change of regime, as in 1494.4 One signi®cant difference would be the period of time actually spent in exile, which would have been considerably longer for most Florentine exiles than for their Sienese counterparts. There was no change of regime in Venice, and no exile even tried to force his way back. Exiles returned to Venice with the agreement of the government or not at all. It would be interesting to know how many were allowed back before the end of their sentences. For Neapolitan barons, and Neapolitan kings, force and a change of regime was about their only hope of return. Force was perhaps the method most exiles from the Umbrian towns used, although in their case, the intervention of papal of®cials or the pope himself could also restore sometimes large groups of exiles. Few Sienese, judging by the surviving evidence, thought it worth their while to ask to be allowed to return. Pleas for concession or mercy were usually couched as requests for a change in the place or bounds of exile. One exception to this rule was Pierpaolo Mignanelli, who went to confession and `pardoned every injury ever done' to him, for the sake of God, the Virgin, all sinners and the patron saints of Siena, before writing to ask for permission to come back, promising the BalõÁa that he could give them information that would be worth more to them than the best stronghold they had.5 Cino Cinughi was another exception, although his requests for pardon were intermingled with protestations that he had done nothing wrong, or if he had done anything wrong he had been fully justi®ed, and they were made in the intervals of plotting to return by force.6 After the Popolari and Noveschi exiles were given permission to return to Siena in June 1482, a group of Riformatori who remained in exile wrote to ask to be allowed back too. We have been kept out of the city for two years for the same reasons as they were, the Riformatori wrote to the BalõÁa, so we have great hopes that you will be as merciful to us as to them. We are all equally innocent and blameless, and have borne the misery in which we ®nd ourselves patiently, and have refrained from trying to cause any disturbance. If the BalõÁa agreed, they could soon be in Siena, without perturbing any citizen and bringing no other forces with them.7 A glimpse of another mode of lobbying for permission to return is revealed by the reports of Piero de' Medici's agent in Siena, Alessandro Braccesi, in 1493. Agnolo Palmieri and Crescenzio Gori used 4 5 6 7

See below, pp. 217±18. ASS, BalõÁa 513, 32: Pierpaolo Mignanelli, 7 Aug. 1483, Modena. ASS, BalõÁa 510, 68: Cino Cinughi, 22 May 1483, Castel della Pieve; BalõÁa 514, 69: Cino Cinughi, 12 Sept. 1483, Rome; see above, pp. 83±4. ASS, BalõÁa 504, 12: `Reformatores', 19? June 1482.

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Bartolomeo Sozzini, who was teaching at the university in Pisa, as an intermediary to approach Pandolfo Petrucci, promising that if they were received into the good graces of the regime, they would behave in such a way that anyone who had helped them would not repent of what he had done. Pandolfo was in favour of bringing back at least the leading exiles, thinking it better to have them as friends than as enemies; and other leading ®gures in the regime, including Neri Placidi and NiccoloÁ Borghesi, were inclined to agree. Others, like Antonio Bichi and Leonardo Bellanti, were undecided, waiting to see which way the balance of opinion would tip. But Giacoppo, Pandolfo's brother, was ®rmly opposed. There had been some talk, Braccesi was told, of bringing back the Luti exiles, in order to weaken Crescenzio Gori and Agnolo Palmieri and others who were considered to be more of a threat because they were men who, if they were recalled, would not be satis®ed unless they regained the status they had enjoyed before. Word of these discussions got about in Siena, and when Cardinal Piccolomini ± who was at the time pressing for some major reforms in the government ± advocated repatriating the exiles, their friends and relatives were emboldened openly to press for this. Thoroughly alarmed, the leaders of the regime closed ranks, and refused to bring back any.8 The Strozzi correspondence reveals how complex and delicate a matter it could be to lobby for the return of even the most innocent of exiles. Filippo and Lorenzo Strozzi were formally exiled in 1458 solely because they were the sons of a Strozzi exiled in 1434, yet their devoted mother Alessandra proceeded very cautiously in trying to bring her sons back. Finally, in 1465, she thought the time was ripe for an attempt. Honour the Florentine ambassadors who are coming to Naples, she advised her son Filippo, and give them presents, so that they will report favourably on you. See if the king will say something to them on your behalf. Write to those men of in¯uence in Florence that you know wish you well, like Dietisalvi Neroni. (A beautiful wife might be more useful than the prayers of Ferrante, Alessandra later commented acidly, when it looked as though another exile would be allowed to return because Lorenzo de' Medici admired his wife.)9 Political rivalries in Florence complicated the matter. Dietisalvi Neroni and Luca Pitti, to whom Filippo also wrote, were opponents of Piero di Cosimo de' Medici. There was a suggestion ± whether it came from Filippo's brother-in-law Marco Parenti, who presented his letter 8 9

ASF, MAP 19, 421, 438, 439: Alessandro Braccesi to Piero de' Medici, 6 Sept., 12, 24 Oct. 1493, Siena. Strozzi, Lettere di una gentildonna ®orentina, pp. 373±7, 385±6.

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to Pitti, or from Pitti himself is not clear ± that Pitti would help to make and keep Piero de' Medici well disposed to the idea of repatriating the Strozzi, leaving the ostensible credit for their return to Piero but receiving the gratitude and service of the Strozzi as their true benefactor. Politically inexperienced, Parenti was not skilled in the delicate manoeuvring needed to win the favour of Piero de' Medici and of his rivals. He tried to enlist the help of Federico d'Aragona, Ferrante's second son, as he passed through Florence on his journey to collect his brother's bride from Milan. When Federico was in Florence on his outward journey, Parenti could not even speak with him. On his return, Federico was instructed by Ferrante to speak to Piero de' Medici on Filippo's behalf. Piero did not hold out much hope for the Strozzi exiles. It was not something he could accomplish alone, he said, others needed to take a hand, and the time was not yet ripe. On this visit Parenti did manage to see the prince, who promised to bring the matter up again with Piero. This he did just as he was taking his leave, only to receive the same reply as before.10 Soliciting pardon could be a much more straightforward matter for the subject of a prince, like the Milanese exile Giuliano da Castiglione, who had been exiled by Francesco Sforza `for wanting to know too much'. Through the Milanese ambassador in Florence, he confessed he was to blame, but said his error could not be so great that it could not be excelled by Francesco's mercy. He knew, he said, that it was easy to ask for pardon for even major faults, except the crime of lese-majesty.11 Obtaining pardon from a prince depended on the will of the prince alone. In Siena and Florence, by contrast, it was made deliberately dif®cult to solicit and obtain agreement to exiles' being pardoned. Lobbying had to be done with care and discretion, even by members of their families; too open solicitation for the repatriation of exiles could incur severe penalties. In Siena, the basic regulations governing the procedure for obtaining permission for an exile to be repatriated before his sentence was ®nished were drawn up by the BalõÁa in September 1456. A copy of these regulations, known as the `tabulella', was kept on public display in the Concistoro. Neither this nor any future BalõÁa, nor the Concistoro, nor any other body, would have the power to abrogate or diminish any sentence imposed on exiles; nor were they to accept any petition that they should do this, on pain of a ®ne of 500 ducats and ten years' exclusion 10 11

Phillips, Memoir of Marco Parenti, pp. 113±15, 118±19, 128±9, 131, 134. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 269: Nicodemo da Pontremoli to Francesco Sforza, 18 June 1457, Florence.

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from public of®ce. If, however, a future Concistoro agreed unanimously that it would clearly be in the public interest to suspend, reduce or cancel any sentences of exile or rebellion, and the exiles concerned paid a tax of 100 ducats each, a proposal to discuss the matter could be put before a Council of the People at which at least 250 members must be present. If at least three-quarters of those present at the council gave their assent, a discussion could take place. The proposal was to be put before another Council of the People, with at least 250 members present, and on payment of the same tax by those whose case was to be debated. If three-quarters of this council agreed, the proposal had then to be approved ± again by a three-quarters majority ± by a General Council, with at least four hundred members present.12 This tabulella may have been removed from public display by 1481, because in April that year the Council of the People agreed that the new BalõÁa should draw up à tabulella against rebels and exiles, as was made against the others in 1456'; the BalõÁa decided that the new one should be displayed in the Concistoro, as the old one had been.13 The new regime in November 1482 con®rmed that both this and the tabulella of 1456 should be kept in the Concistoro. Among the other provisions concerning exiles made at the same time was one that no one in future should in any way, directly or indirectly, on any pretext, propose or discuss or seek to procure the return of any rebel or exile, on pain of death and the con®scation of all his property. At times of crisis, and when an old regime was crumbling or a new one being established, the prohibitions enshrined in the tabulella were not observed. Nor, apparently, were they observed in 1494, when the BalõÁa decided that the exiles should be brought back, without consulting the Council of the People. In September and December 1496, however, when the BalõÁa decided on the absolution of some exiles, it was speci®cally stated that the tabulella had been set aside.14 It is not clear how the provisions of the tabulella affected those cases where an exile was not to return at the end of his sentence without the speci®c permission of the Council of the People. Could a proposal to grant such permission be introduced in the Council without incurring the penalties speci®ed? In any case, no instance of the Council being asked to agree that an exile could return has yet come to light. In Florence, too, obstacles were placed in the way of obtaining agreement to the premature repatriation of exiles. No one was to try to overturn the sentences imposed on the Medici in September 1433, the BalõÁa 12 13 14

ASS, Statuti di Siena 40, f. 109r±v. ASS, Concistoro 687, f. 29r±v; BalõÁa 24, f. 68v. ASS, BalõÁa 26, ff. 146v, 147v; BalõÁa 259, ff. 34v, 35v, 52v±55v; BalõÁa 41, ff. 14r, 65r.

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declared, in any governing council, on pain of a ®ne of 1000 ¯orins and loss of of®ce. The following year, when it was the turn of the opponents of the Medici to be exiled, a similar ban was put on the making of any proposal to change their sentences. When the sentences on the surviving Albizzi and their descendants were ®nally revoked in 1478, it required the approval of the Signoria, the Eight of Ward and three councils, those of the People, the Commune and the Hundred. Those exiled in 1466 were not to return to Florence even at the end of the terms ®xed for their sentences without the permission of the Signoria and the Eight of Ward, with a minimum of thirty-six votes in favour ± a vote which was only to be taken within a month of the end of their term, and then at yearly intervals.15 Other cities might also try to make it dif®cult even to bring up the subject of the return of exiles. When it became known that Cecchino Campello, a leading Spoletan exile, had made approaches to some of his fellow citizens, hoping to be allowed back, the arringa, the communal council, was assembled and it was decreed that Cecchino, denounced as the main cause of Spoleto's recent troubles, would never be permitted to return. No other exile could return without the approval of the arringa, and if any came back by some other means they could be killed by anyone.16 In Venice, after the discovery of the Cicogna conspiracy to control elections in 1432, it was decided that the sentences of exile passed on Marco Cicogna and his four principal co-conspirators could not be altered or revoked `without the approval of the Doge, all six ducal councillors, and all voting members of the Council of Ten'.17 Naturally, if the political will to revoke or mitigate sentences of exile were there, such procedural impediments could easily be overcome. In 1436, four of those sentenced for participation in the Cicogna conspiracy, including Marco Cicogna himself, were allowed to return to Venice, by the consent of the Doge, all his councillors and all the Ten.18 The sentence against the Medici was easily cancelled by a BalõÁa, despite the prohibitions against this decreed by their predecessors, once the political circumstances had changed.19 In 1465, when the Strozzi were testing the waters to ascertain if they could be repatriated, Lorenzo Strozzi sought leave to visit Florence, but one of the members of the Pratica gathered to consult about this warned that even if he had a safe15 16 17 18 19

Fabroni, Cosmi Medicei Vita, vol. II, p. 93; Guasti, Commissioni di Rinaldo degli Albizzi, vol. III, pp. 656, 682±8; ASF, Otto di Guardia (repubblica) 224, f. 13r±v. Sansi, Storia del Comune di Spoleto, vol. II, pp. 18±19. Queller, `The Myth of the Venetian Patriciate', pp. 142±3. Ibid., pp. 164±5. Fabroni, Cosmi Medicei Vita, vol. II, pp. 93±4.

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conduct from the Eight of Ward, he could still be accused of being a rebel for returning, `because the law says that no exile can come here without the consent of the councils, otherwise he will incur the sentence of rebellion'. Ferrante's favour for Lorenzo Strozzi encouraged some prominent political ®gures to help him, and one of them, Tommaso Soderini, told him that it had been decided that it would be safer if he were commanded, rather than permitted, to approach Florence by the Eight of Ward. One of the Eight objected to this scheme, however, arguing that he had been one of the Eight when they had exiled Lorenzo, and he did not want to help him return. Soderini sent to Lorenzo's mother to assure her that the `principali' wanted Lorenzo to come, and that she need not be concerned. The obstreperous member of the Eight was soon brought to heel, and they issued an order to Lorenzo to come up to the walls of Florence, but not to enter the city. He would not be considered to be in breach of the terms of his exile, `because this is all being done for the good of the regime', and he could have until the end of March to return to his place of exile.20 When Cardinal Enea Piccolomini repeatedly urged that his relation Goro Loli, exiled from Siena in February 1457, should be pardoned, or at least given con®nes in the Papal States, and arranged that the College of Cardinals and the pope should back his request, the Council of the People would not even discuss it. In early April the BalõÁa agreed to change Loli's place of exile to the Papal States, but increased the length of his sentence from 25 to 30 years.21 After Cardinal Piccolomini was elected pope and continued to press for Loli's pardon, it was decided that, just for this once, the usual penalties for bringing up the question of exiles in the councils should not apply. Nor should the requirement that there should be a Council of the People of at least 250 and a General Council of at least 400, and that there should be a majority of three-quarters in favour of the proposal, às it is virtually impossible that these councils should assemble in such numbers, and it would be dif®cult for the proposals to pass by three out of four votes'. Loli was absolved, in early October 1458, `because he is a blood relation' of the pope, ànd one of the principal men around him, so that he could do much for the public bene®t of our city'.22 But such concessions were to be regarded as exceptional in Siena. It was not a matter of exaggerating the dif®culty of meeting a request for pardon of an exile in order to magnify the favour conferred by granting 20 21 22

Strozzi, Lettere di una gentildonna ®orentina, pp. 363±4, 371±2. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 256: Lodovico Petroni to Francesco Sforza, 21 Mar. 1456(7), Siena; ASS, BalõÁa 2, ff. 248v±249r. ASS, Concistoro 552, ff. 18v±22r.

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it. The Sienese tried to discourage such requests being made at all. To speak frankly, Lodovico Petroni warned Francesco Sforza, who had written in July 1465 on behalf of Savino del Catasta, exiled in Bologna, `just thinking of this matter troubles and confuses us and all the citizens who want to live peacefully. Nor can there be anything more vexatious than to try to do such a thing, by any means. And I am quite certain that no one would dare to say even a word about it, and that is the absolute truth.'23 Some years before, in June 1458, Francesco Sforza had been advised not to write on behalf of Sienese exiles, and that his enemies might, by pretending to be his friends and prevailing on him to make such recommendations, cause trouble in Siena.24 In 1483, the Sienese wanted to ward off recommendations from Rome. They tried to have a clause inserted in the treaty negotiated with the pope in 1483, that neither the pope nor the cardinals should intercede for the exiles. Told that this was an unreasonable demand, the Sienese ambassadors in Rome justi®ed it by saying that nothing could be more unwelcome to all the Sienese people than to hear requests for the return of the exiles. The BalõÁa wanted to avoid offending the pope by being unable to comply with his requests. It would be much better for the exiles to earn repatriation by good behaviour, rather than by badgering the pope and cardinals for recommendations; and their return with the goodwill of the BalõÁa would be much more peaceful than a return procured by other means.25 One way in which exiles could win the goodwill of the regime back home and, with luck, their own return, was by giving valuable information. In December 1496 two exiles were allowed back after revealing the plans of their fellows to attack Siena with Vitellozzo Vitelli and Florentine troops.26 Even without performing speci®c services for the regime, some Sienese exiles had their sentences shortened and were allowed back early. In some cases, there were strings attached. Giovanni Vieri had barely arrived in Ancona, the place of exile assigned to him in 1480, before he received news that he could return to Siena if he paid the forced loan of 500 ducats imposed on him and that of 300 ducats imposed on his brother Daniele within twenty days, and invested an amount to be determined by Neri Placidi and Antonio Bellanti in the silk or woollen industry in Siena. These conditions he 23 24 25 26

ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 264: Lodovico Petroni to Francesco Sforza, 30 July 1465, Siena. Ibid., b. 269: Nicodemo da Pontremoli to Francesco Sforza, 5 June 1458, Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 511, 43: Sienese ambassadors in Rome, 10 June 1483, Rome. ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1263: Antonio Stanga to Lodovico Sforza, 10 Dec. 1496, Siena.

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agreed to.27 On other occasions, the permission to return was unconditional, and presumably the outcome of discreet lobbying by the relatives and friends of the exiles. Giovanni Marzi and Girolamo Donati served only ten weeks of the year of exile imposed on them for obstructing the bargello (the of®cial responsible for arresting criminals) and insulting the regime, before being absolved. Theirs was a comparatively trivial offence; a third man, Antonino Andreocci, absolved from exile on the same day, 18 March 1489, had been sentenced in August 1488, initially to ten years in exile, for involvement in a conspiracy against the regime. Perhaps he had powerful friends in Siena; his sentence had already been reduced in October to ®ve years, and in November to two years. The reduction of his sentence on 19 November had been only one of the concessions made to about thirty exiles on that day, by reductions in sentence, changes to their places of exile, or, in the case of six men, being given permission to return when they pleased.28 When the sentences of individuals or small groups of exiles were curtailed or cancelled, it was generally a concession, a favour to the exile or to his connections. When large groups of exiles were given permission to return home, it was generally because it seemed politically desirable or expedient to bring them back. This could be done as an attempt to ward off a crisis, or because it could be presented as a sign of unity and strength that the regime did not fear the exiles' in¯uence. It could be that there simply seemed to be too many exiles, particularly if they were self-exiles. Although in the most bitter factional quarrels, the triumphant party might be content to see an exodus of their vanquished rivals, to the authorities it could be unwelcome if large numbers regarded selfexile as preferable to, if not safer than, staying at home. Thousands of Sienese ¯ed into exile in 1483. Many of the popolani who had taken part in a gathering at San Domenico on 19 January, at which 150 men had sworn to demand that Antonio Bellanti be brought back to Siena, left the city when some of the ringleaders were arrested. Many others went into exile with the Noveschi who left in droves after the persecution and political proscription they suffered in the following months. So great was the number of Sienese who had chosen exile that it was an embarrassment to the regime. It was particularly embarrassing to have so many popolani preferring exile with the Nove to staying in Siena under a government dominated by the Monte del Popolo. Those who had left in January were summoned back by a decree of 28 27 28

ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 24r, 29v, 60r. ASS, BalõÁa 36, ff. 7v, 29v, 53r±54v, 77r, 78r, 109v.

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January. All those popolani who had not yet been arrested or charged after the meeting at San Domenico were to be absolved, but those who had left must return to the city within eight days, or they would be liable to whatever punishment the BalõÁa decided.29 Members of the popolo minuto who left with the Noveschi were told, by a decree of 3 April, that if no speci®c accusation had been made against them, they would not incur any penalty if they returned within ten days.30 The ¯ight of the Noveschi might not have been so unwelcome were it not that there were so many of them, some so well connected that they were damaging the reputation of the Sienese government abroad, particularly in Rome. Repeated attempts were made to draw them back to Siena. `Seeing that the greater part of the citizens of the Nove, under the pretext that they are afraid, have absented themselves', the BalõÁa declared on 30 April 1483, although the Popolari are well disposed to them and ready to make them welcome, and have written public and private letters to recall them, showing them that their return would be conducive to peace in the city, and how it had been decided to make them eligible to be part of the regime, `yet they pay little heed to this, and do not want to trust us, and few if any have come back'; so that `he who will not be moved by promises and good faith may be moved by fear of losing his property', the BalõÁa ordered that notice should be sent to all the Nove who had not been sentenced, to return to the city to stay and to live with their families by the end of May. They were to be assured that `we have decided to be good brothers and fellows to them'; and that whoever did not come back would be barred from the regime and banned in perpetuity from holding public of®ce, and all his property con®scated. So that no one could use fear as an excuse for not returning, there would be a general absolution of all the Nove who had not been speci®cally accused of anything, for any political act up to that day. Provision would be made so that those who returned would not be insulted or injured by anyone by word or deed for what had happened in the past. To stop any of them harming ùs', however, it was decided that no Novesco could carry any weapons for the next three years, by which time it was thought that the city would be paci®ed ànd we and they would be brothers once more'.31 This decree did not reassure the Nove and had little effect. On 22 May, it was decided that those Noveschi who were in the contado could stay there and did not have to come to Siena.32 About 60 named individuals were threatened on 21 July with the penalties that had been set 29 32

ASS, BalõÁa 27, f. 4r. Ibid., f. 62r.

30

ASS, BalõÁa 28, f. 3r.

31

Ibid., ff. 38v±39v.

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out in the decree of 30 April, if they did not provide proof of their return within ®fteen days; only one name on the list was crossed out with the marginal note, `he provided proof of his return within the time'.33 The great majority of the Nove who had left seem to have stayed away. Although there is no record of such a decree in the register of the deliberations of the BalõÁa, the Sienese ambassador in Florence in September 1488 af®rmed that there had been a proclamation in Siena that all those who had absented themselves, and were not rebels, could return to the city without suffering any penalty, provided that they reported at the Palace of the Signoria, confessed their error and asked for pardon. Should the absentees not return within three days of hearing of the proclamation, however, they would be accounted rebels.34 If this was an accurate report, such a proclamation would have been unlikely to inspire much con®dence in those who had felt that they were not safe in Siena. Other regimes, too, used sticks and carrots in varying measure to induce their self-exiled citizens or subjects to return. During the troubles in Viterbo in the late 1450s, considerable numbers of Viterbesi at times felt safer outside the town, and the papal of®cials wanted them back. In September 1458, a proclamation on behalf of the rector of the Patrimony ordered all those who had gone into exile, except for any who had committed murder, to come home within four days, or be liable to a ®ne of 100 ducats. All those who had left, except four accused of murder, were said to have returned. There was more ®ghting in Viterbo the following year, and many of the defeated Maganzesi faction ¯ed, but in January 1460 the papal rector brought them back, though this time they were made to pay ®nes of a few ducats each, according to their means.35 The factional troubles in Parma in the late 1470s produced plentiful crops of self-exiles as well, and there it was the duty of the governor for the Duke of Milan to bring them back, if he could. An experienced governor, Jacopo Bonarello da Ancona, was sent to restore order in Parma in August 1477, which he did so effectively that the members of the Rossi faction who had moved themselves and their families out of the city began to move back in. Their rivals, however, particularly after their leaders were sentenced to exile, began to leave in their turn. In early October, the governor was instructed by a ducal mandate to pro33 34 35

ASS, BalõÁa 29, ff. 46r±47r. ASMo, Carteggio Ambasciatori, Firenze, b. 6: Aldobrandino Guidoni, 13 Sept. 1488, Florence. della Tuccia, `Cronache di Viterbo', pp. 72,79.

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claim that all those who had left Parma for fear of punishment for their role in attacking the Rossi and their property were to return within ®fteen days, on pain of rebellion and the con®scation of their goods. If they came back and restored what they had stolen, they would be pardoned. Few returned to take advantage of this pardon. By February 1478, so many citizens had gone away that the public revenues were suffering, and the governor, again on the instructions of a ducal mandate, ordered all those absent from the city to return within ®fteen days, with their families, on pain of rebellion. This time, with penalties imposed only if they did not return, many came back.36 In late September 1471 Ercole d'Este, who had succeeded his brother Borso as Duke of Ferrara the previous month, had a proclamation made on three successive days that those who had left Ferrara to support his nephew NiccoloÁ d'Este could return to their homes freely if they were ready to acknowledge Ercole as their lord. Those who did not return within a month would be considered rebels, and all their property would be con®scate. In late October, the period of grace was prolonged for a further month. On 25 November, about ninety men were publicly declared to be rebels for failing to respond to these proclamations. The author of the `Diario ferrarese', who listed those declared rebels, noted what happened to some of them. About seventeen were later pardoned, but ®fteen were captured and executed, several after they had returned with NiccoloÁ d'Este when he attempted to oust Ercole in 1476.37 Encouraging groups of self-exiles to come home was one thing. Permitting a group of men who had all been sentenced to exile to return, cancelling the remainder of their sentences, was a different matter, and more likely to be a controversial one. There were complex political considerations to be weighed: whether the enmities and resentments on both sides had cooled suf®ciently, whether they might ¯are up again. Then there might be the dif®culties attendant on the reintegration of the exiles, their claims for restitution of or compensation for property that had been con®scated or that they had been obliged to sell, and the question of whether they should be rehabilitated politically and eligible to hold of®ce. Making the decision to send political rivals into exile would be easier than making the decision to bring them back. There was a range of reasons why that decision could be made, from the feeling that the exiles had been punished enough to the pressing fear that whatever the consequences of bringing them back might be, leaving them in exile any longer might be still more dangerous. The Riformatori exiles clustering on the Florentine border in June 1482, 36

Cronica Lombardie, pp. 13±16, 23.

37

`Diario ferrarese', pp. 74±8.

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waiting to be recalled, naturally emphasized the positive aspects. They would give back to the city of the Virgin her good citizens, they pleaded to the BalõÁa, restore their fathers to so many children, and their husbands to so many women who have been living like widows. What bene®ts it would bring to our city, they urged, reviving trades and crafts! The city's good reputation would be restored, its state and liberty saved. Look at how much good you would do, for which you would be rewarded by God, praised by the world and commended by every power.38 They would show themselves to be gracious, wise and benevolent, Achille Petrucci prompted the BalõÁa in June 1487 (while some of his fellow exiles were making preparations to enter Siena by force), and it would be more consonant with civic life (`conveniente al polytico vivere') if they brought back all their citizens who had paid for their mistakes seven times over, so that all could enjoy their homeland and help it in its needs and dangers.39 When the leaders of a Sienese regime did make up their minds to repatriate a group of their own exiles, their reasons were decidedly practical rather than idealistic. By early 1487 the extremist Popolari who dominated the government of Siena had few friends left. In late April they reluctantly agreed that all the Popolari exiles could come back, except for the Severini and the sons of Lorenzo Venturini. No one was to go out to greet those who returned, it was ordered, or accompany them through the city to celebrate.40 This action was motivated by a desire to ward off criticism and to weaken and discredit the exiles who were still to be excluded, not to bene®t those who were to return. This grudging partial concession won the regime little credit, and can only have strengthened the determination of those still excluded to get back whichever way they could. It was the prospect of the exiles being restored to Siena by Charles VIII that prompted the BalõÁa to make arrangements for their repatriation in a more controlled manner in 1494. Opponents of the regime within the city, who were calling for the abolition of the BalõÁa and a return to government by the Concistoro and the Council of the People, were also agitating for the return of the exiles, ànd that Siena should live without rebels and without suspicion, especially of the citizens themselves'.41 A commission of twenty-four was elected by the BalõÁa on 19 November to draw up regulations to govern the exiles' return, but not until 5 January 1495 did the members establish what the regulations 38 39 40 41

ASS, Concistoro 2048, 91: `Reformatores in Chianti' to the BalõÁa, 29 June 1482. ASS, BalõÁa 531, 20: Achille Petrucci, 22 June 1487, Amelia. ASS, BalõÁa 407, f. 29v; Tommasi, Ìstorie', f. 255v; Allegretti, `Diarii', col. 821. `Diario senese', f. 49r.

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should be. All the exiles, except for nine popolani against whom members of the Nove held an especially strong grudge, were to be allowed to return, but only in groups of four, at intervals of ®fteen days, in the order laid down by the commission. Each could only bring three or four followers with him.42 Perhaps the BalõÁa might not have honoured their pledge to bring back the exiles, had the widespread desire for reform not persisted. Pressure for changes in the regime and the return of exiles had been even stronger in June 1482. The proposal to allow the Popolari and Noveschi exiles back, absolving them from all penalties and restoring their political rights, was accepted by a frightened Council of the People on 7 June, as a mob ®lled the Campo demanding their return. This popular outcry had been orchestrated by some leading Noveschi and Popolari who were dissatis®ed by their own share in the regime, and had been plotting for some months to have the exiles brought back. The of®cial record of the proceedings of the Council noted that the proposal, and the reforms agreed to at the same time, were passed `because of the popular tumult', to pacify the people and bring quiet to the city, and reform and strengthen the regime.43 The Nove resisted demands from the Riformatori that their exiles should also be rehabilitated, and some Riformatori were instructed by the BalõÁa to see to it that their exiles did not approach the city.44 Only after there had been ®ghting in the streets, and the Nove had had to concede defeat, did the BalõÁa agree that all but ®ve of the Riformatori exiles could come back and have their political rights restored. Again, this concession was agreed at the same time as further radical change to the government.45 There was no parallel in Siena during the second half of the ®fteenth century to the circumstances in which the Medici were permitted to return to Florence in 1434. It was the fortuitous extraction from the electoral purses of a Signoria which had a majority favourable to the Medici which created the opportunity for the legislation recalling them to be passed.46 Government by BalõÁa in Siena prevented such a situation occurring there. Nor was there any parallel in Siena to the amnesty of 20 September 1466 for the Strozzi and other Florentine exiles. This was issued only nine days after the sentences of exile against the opponents of Piero de' Medici, and was clearly intended to counter any unfavourable impression created by them, but it did not herald any change in the regime.47 In the prologue to the amnesty, it was presented as a way of 42 44 46

43 ASS, Concistoro 694, ff. 22v±24r. ASS, BalõÁa 259, ff. 52v±55v. 45 See above, pp. 43±4. ASS, BalõÁa 26, f. 7v. 47 Rubinstein, Government of Florence, pp. 189±90. See above, p. 40.

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rendering thanks to God for saving Florence from the recent dangers, and of replacing the cares and anxieties her citizens and subjects had recently suffered by joy and comfort. Considering that there were a good number of citizens who, through the fault of others rather than their own, had been exiled because of previous troubles in the city, so that they and their families and friends had been in af¯iction for a long time, it seemed appropriate at this time to absolve them, particularly as they had been so patient and obedient.48 There was no counterpart in Siena, either, to the manoeuvre by Sante Bentivoglio, who brought back the Pepoli exiles to Bologna in 1459 to be a counterweight to the Malvezzi, who were becoming more like rivals than allies of the Bentivoglio.49 Some Noveschi did contemplate a similar scheme in 1488, when they discussed the idea of bringing back the Riformatori exiles and then joining with the Riformatori to clamp down on the Popolari.50 Those exiles not prepared patiently to wait for the end of their sentences, or until such time as they were allowed back, could try to enlist the help of others or try to ®ght their way back on their own. As was shown in the last chapter, the chances of getting effective help from others were dependent on how well the wishes of the exiles accorded with the interests and immediate plans of those from whom they hoped for it. Only factional allies would lend a hand, or a sword, just to be of assistance to friends in need. Indeed, apart from such faction-®ghting, instances of exiles being repatriated by the force of arms of another power were few in the second half of the ®fteenth century, until the French expeditions. The return of the surviving exiles of 1456±8 to Siena with the troops of the Duke of Calabria was one of the exceptions; the return of NiccoloÁ Vitelli to CittaÁ di Castello in 1482 with the backing of Florence was another. Several groups of exiles were able to return home in the wake of Charles VIII's army into Florence, Pisa, Siena (indirectly), and Naples. The conquest of the duchy of Milan by Louis XII brought exiles back to Milan and Genoa. Relying on the arms of others to return home could entail a serious drawback. It might provoke resistance to the return of the exiles not only among their opponents, but also among those who might otherwise have been neutral or even favoured them. The Sienese exiles promised the Florentines in January 1496 that the report that they were 48 49 50

Strozzi, Lettere di una gentildonna ®orentina, pp. 581±2. Raffaele Belvederi, Ì Bentivoglio e i Malvezzi a Bologna negli anni 1463±1506', Annali della FacoltaÁ di Magistero dell' UniversitaÁ di Bari 6 (1967), 46. ASMo, Carteggio Ambasciatori, Firenze b. 6: Aldobrandino Guidoni, 11 Oct. 1488, Florence.

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coming in strength would provoke an uprising in Siena, but their appearance before the walls of the city with a Florentine army had the contrary effect: ìn the face of the Florentines any disunity there might be became unity and concord against them'.51 The strategy adopted by Piero de' Medici alienated some of his own partisans, as it looked as though `he did not want to return to Florence, unless with the support of other powers; because he does not want to incur any obligation to the citizens, so that he can play the tyrant and do as he wants'.52 If exiles were to rely on their own strength to force their way back home, the chances of their success obviously depended on their numbers and resources (how many men they could raise or pay for), how accustomed they were to ®ghting, the strength of their opponents and, not least, what state they came from. Fighting their way back into Todi was a rather different proposition for the Chiaravallesi or the Catalaneschi than ®ghting their way back into Genoa or Milan or the kingdom of Naples or even Siena would be for the exiles from those states. But a direct assault on the main seat of power in the state was not the only way exiles could hope to effect a return by force of arms. Seizing a stronghold in the contado, or a weaker subject town, could provide a base for raids, encourage the exiles' supporters and demonstrate the vulnerability of the regime. Sienese exiles made several attempts to force their way home. These enterprises could involve thousands of men, but most of these men would be hired troops. Only a minority of the exiles are known to have taken part in them: a sixth (17 per cent) of the known Sienese exiles were mentioned in connection with a conspiracy against the regime, and one in fourteen (7 per cent) was reported to be involved in a military expedition. Some names cropped up only once or twice, others repeatedly, sometimes over several years. The least inclined to conspire seem to have been the exiles of 1480±2, with only 6 per cent known to have done so. Nor did they make any attempt to mount an assault on Siena, the city or the contado. The exiles most likely to take up arms against the regime were those of 1482±7: one in eight (13 per cent) of them are know to have taken part in an attack, but only one in twenty of those exiled in 1456±8, or 1487±1500. Whether certain names recur again and again in reports because these men were in fact the most active plotters or because they were the ones known or suspected to be active and consequently were closely 51 52

ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 1263: Giovanni Malavolti to Lodovico Sforza, 2 Feb. 1495(6), Siena. Sergio Bertelli, `Machiavelli e la politica estera ®orentina', in Myron P. Gilmore (ed.) Studies on Machiavelli (Florence, 1972), p. 37.

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watched, while others, equally active, escaped attention, is impossible to be sure. As some of those most frequently reported on tended to be the men who had been or were to be among the most prominent politically, they were perhaps less inclined to accept their fate as exiles, and more ready to take the initiative in trying to effect their return. Antonio Petrucci, Ghino and Pietro Bellanti and Mariano Bargagli were leading ®gures in the conspiracies for which they and others were sentenced to exile in 1456, as well as the most evident conspirators in exile. Of the group of nine men known as `quelli della impresa', those who organized the entry into Siena in July 1487, six ± Antonio Bichi, NiccoloÁ Borghesi, Leonardo Bellanti, Francesco Severini, Buonaventura Pini and Neri Placidi ± had been ®gures of especial concern to the regime while they were in exile, as well as being among the leaders of the new regime. Bichi, Borghesi, Severini and Placidi had all been prominent in politics before their exile. The acknowledged leader of the exiled Nove, Cino Cinughi, who was at the centre of political intrigue in Siena in 1480±2, probably died in exile. Those who entered the city on 22 July 1487 were the only exiles during the latter half of the ®fteenth century to return to Siena by force of arms. No Florentine exiles, not even Piero de' Medici, for all his efforts, succeeded in forcing their way back to Florence. Trivulzio fought his way back to Milan but at the head of a French army, not of a troop of exiles. The exiled Neapolitan barons could only return with the aid of foreign troops. Of the exiles from the larger states, the Genoese were the most inclined to try to ®ght their way back, with or without the help of others. The size of the major territorial states in Italy; the resources available to their governments; the intelligence networks that reached throughout the peninsula, giving forewarning of any major attack; the professionalization of warfare, which meant that many exiles would not be trained for or accustomed to ®ghting, made trying to ®ght one's way back home an option readily adopted only by those who had retained their martial traditions, like the major Genoese families or the men of those areas of the Papal States which were prime recruiting grounds for condottieri. Where these military traditions did survive, ®ghting could be ®erce, and the number of casualties high. The incursion by some Perugian exiles into Perugia in June 1491 provides a good illustration of how bitter the con¯ict could be between exiles trying to force their way back and their enemies, determined to keep them out. On the morning of 6 June, Fabrizio and Bertoldo degli Oddi, Costantino de' Ranieri and other exiles with about 150 infantry made their way through one of the city gates. After about two hours of ®ghting, the exiles were overcome,

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leaving many dead (including Fabrizio and Bertoldo degli Oddi) scattered in gardens and houses and at the entrance to the church of San Severo, which had been held against them by a few men until Simonetto Baglioni arrived to help the defenders. The city gate through which the reinforcements of the exiles were to come had been closed and barred against them, and they arrived too late to help their comrades inside Perugia. About sixty of the exiles and their men were killed and forty captured; the bodies were brought to the main square and put on display there. Costantino de' Ranieri escaped by letting himself down by a rope over the walls, but hurt his foot in the fall and was captured, interrogated, and then brought out on to the square. There he was placed in the centre of a circle of armed men, including some of his relatives and friends, who were ordered to join in killing him, each striking at him in turn `to make themselves more trusted', as the Dieci di Arbitrio put it. The Dieci justi®ed this cruel act, and the hanging of dozens of the prisoners, by alleging that the exiles had used poisoned weapons, and had come provided with ropes to hang their opponents.53 Such attempts by exiles to return by force often did end in failure, sometimes in death for the principals. NiccoloÁ d'Este was executed in 1476, after coming to Ferrara to try to depose his uncle Duke Ercole; Pietro Campofregoso was stoned to death when he became cut off from the troops he had brought to Genoa in 1459. The exiles who entered Ascoli in the Marches of the Papal States with some Neapolitan troops in September 1471 were expelled again after ®ghting that left men dead on both sides; the exiles from Cascia near Spoleto failed in their attempt to return when their infantry attacked before the arrival of the cavalry which some Savelli were bringing to their aid. Even with three thousand men at their back, the Bolognese exiles could not prevail over the Bentivoglio and their allies when they entered Bologna in June 1451.54 Examples of unsuccessful or short-lived attempts by exiles to force their way home could be multiplied. Instances of exiles coming home in this way and then being able to settle down without fear of reprisals are harder to ®nd. Indeed, the return of the exiles to Siena in July 1487 seems to have been exceptional in this respect in late ®fteenth-century Italy, certainly among the independent states. Exiles who fought their 53 54

E. Verga, `Documenti di storia perugina estratti dagli Archivi di Milano', BSPU 6 (1900), 21±2; `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni' (1903), 357±63. Zambotti, Diario ferrarese, pp. 15±19; Giustiniani, Annali, vol. II, pp. 417±18; Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium, pp. 415, 430; ACapitolino, AOrsini, b. 102, 98: Agostino Unito da Pisa to Virginio Orsini, 26 July 1489, Celle; Emilio Nasalli Rocca di Corneliano, Ìl Cardinale Bessarione, Legato Ponti®cio in Bologna (1450±1455)', AMSPPR, ser. 4, 20 (1930), 34±5.

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way back to the Umbrian towns, and succeeded in staying, could rarely rest easy for long. A direct assault on the city, as was made in July 1487, and planned several times in 1496±7, was not the only way that Sienese exiles sought to use force to secure their return to Siena. More frequently, they planned to take a stronghold in the contado ± such as Monteriggioni and Saturnia in 1483, San Quirico in 1485, and Castelnuovo Berardenga in 1489. The only two schemes to enjoy even temporary success were the seizure of Monteriggioni, which brought political disaster to the Nove, and the even shorter-lived occupation of Castelnuovo Berardenga, which ended in the capture and execution of several exiles. The thinking behind such plans was not to use the stronghold as a base from which to conquer swathes of the contado, and perhaps eventually assault Siena. It was, rather, to encourage other places in the contado to declare for the exiles, and to provoke an uprising in Siena, or at least demands for their return. Just before one such attempt in August 1483, Neri Placidi was trying to rouse support for the exiles by distributing written promises that any community or subject of Siena that rebelled in their favour would be excused all their debts to the comune.55 If it was not a strategy that proved successful for the exiles, it was one that was taken seriously by their opponents. Take care that the exiles do not seize some important place in the contado, Lorenzo de' Medici warned the Sienese in 1484. This would be shameful, and expensive to remedy; and it might not only cause trouble in Siena, but give some other power an excuse to intervene.56 The drawback for the exiles was that if their plans failed, and there was no sign of any movement in their favour, the morale and reputation of the regime was strengthened. When the exiles' forces could not take Saturnia, indeed only managed to stay in Sienese territory for a few hours, in August 1483, the captain of the Sienese troops commented that they would have done better not to have attempted the enterprise than to have brought about such an outcome, `because in truth they will have lost all credit'.57 The San Quirico ®asco `could not have been better suited for our purposes', Ricco Ricchi assured Lorenzo de' Medici, because we realized that feeling in the city and among our subjects could not be more opposed to the exiles.58 The exiles claimed to have support in Siena, wrote Giacoppo Petrucci after the Castelnuovo 55 56 57 58

ASS, BalõÁa 513, 49: Paolo di Pietro, 10 Aug. 1483, Monterotondo. ASS, BalõÁa 521, 37: Ricco Ricchi, 16 Jan. 1484, Florence; BalõÁa 519, 57: Tommaso Biringucci, 8 Aug. 1484, Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 514, 1: Cesare da Varano, 20 Aug. 1483, Abbadia San Salvatore. ASF, MAP 26, 387: Ricco Ricchi to Lorenzo de' Medici, 18 May 1485, Siena.

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Berardenga episode, and now they will know they have not, so this has been to our advantage.59 This strategy did not work well for other exiles either. When the Perugian exiles took three places in the Perugian contado they succeeded only in annoying the pope, who had been sympathetic to their cause, and in making more dif®cult the efforts of Cardinal Piccolomini, the legate in Perugia, to mitigate the sentences against them. Ùnless some other power gives them open support', the cardinal considered, `they will have lost a lot of authority by this enterprise.'60 The attempt by some Florentine exiles to provoke rebellion in Prato in 1470 was soon snuffed out.61 Roberto da Sanseverino and Lodovico Sforza had more success in 1479. Their campaign to force their way back to Milan was faltering until, after a sudden assault by Roberto, the city of Tortona submitted to them, and then other towns in the duchy began to follow suit, without being attacked. Within weeks, Roberto and Lodovico had come to terms with Duchess Bona, and were back in Milan.62 One route home not available to Sienese exiles was by the intervention of a superior. As Siena was an independent state, there was no power that had the authority to order that Sienese exiles should be allowed to return. The nominal allegiance of Siena to the Holy Roman Empire gave the emperors no authority there, unless they were present in the city with an army. For towns and cities subject to others, just as the central authority could impose sentences of exile, so it could revoke them. The Florentine policy of trying to secure Pisa by emptying it of Pisans had been too successful for the health of the Pisan economy, and in the late 1450s, the policy changed to one of encouraging the exiles to return by offering tax concessions. All those exiled from Volterra for political reasons from 1472 were permitted to return by a decision of the Florentine Signoria in February 1495 after the expulsion of the Medici.63 The popes, too, intervened to restore exiles to the towns in their dominions ± when it was in their power to do so. Sometimes it took a military expedition to impose the return of exiles, but sometimes a letter from the pope would be enough. The governor and Priors of Rieti were ordered by Nicholas V to bring back three citizens to whose exile he had agreed three years before. He had been given false infor59 60 61 62 63

ASF, MAP 41, 208: Giacoppo Petrucci to Lorenzo de' Medici, 22 June 1489. ASS, BalõÁa 542, 78: Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini, 14 Mar. 1489, Perugia. Machiavelli, Istorie ®orentine, Book VII, XXV ± XXVII. Santoro, Gli Sforza, pp. 209±14. Petralia, ` ``Crisi'' ed emigrazione dei ceti eminenti a Pisa', p. 320; Fumi, L'impresa contro Volterra, pp. 86±7.

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mation, Nicholas said, and the men should be given full restitution of their of®ces and property.64 Paul II ordered the governor of CittaÁ di Castello to bring back the exiles: their return was peaceful enough, but just over a year later their enemies, led by NiccoloÁ Vitelli, massacred nearly twenty of them and burned their homes. At times, the pope encouraged or backed up decisions by his of®cials to repatriate exiles. Pius II issued a bull to con®rm measures by his rector to restore exiles to Viterbo in 1459; on his way through Viterbo the following year, he ordered two of his cardinals to bring back as many exiles as they could; and in January 1463, another group of exiles were allowed back by the rector on the orders of the pope. In Orvieto in 1461, Pius welcomed a formal paci®cation of the Melcorini and Muffatti factions and a reorganization of the government that included the admission of the exiles into the regime, and arrangements for them to be allowed back one at a time.65 In Perugia in 1482, the initiative to reconcile former enemies and bring back some exiles came from the Perugians themselves. The Arcipreti had been exiled on the orders of the pope, accused of complicity with Carlo Fortebraccio in his attempt to enter Perugia in 1477, and so the pope's consent was needed for them to come back. The Perugian nobles held a council at which they agreed that it would be good to bring back the rebels, especially the Arcipreti, and two of them were deputed to speak to the papal governor, Lorenzo Zane, about this. He replied that he thought that if they were all agreed, the pope would give his consent. Sixtus did consent, and the Arcipreti returned to a jubilant welcome from their friends. The pope's consent had been conditional on the leading nobles giving formal promises on behalf of the exiles that they would be obedient to him, and so their return was marked by a ceremony. Carlo and Agamemnone degli Arcipreti knelt before the governor, and then shook hands with and embraced the other nobles, before making speeches thanking him and them and the pope for soliciting and permitting their repatriation. Zane read out the brief from Sixtus pardoning the exiles, and then he had representatives of the principal families and of the relatives and friends of the Arcipreti swear to stand surety for their good behaviour.66 On occasion the pope had to send troops to enforce the return of exiles. The Spoletan exiles had appealed to Sixtus IV in 1474, and he 64 65

66

Sacchetti Sassetti, `La famiglia di Tommaso Morroni', 121. `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni' (1903), 54, 60; Pinzi, Storia della cittaÁ di Viterbo, vol. IV, pp. 159±60, 169; della Tuccia, `Cronache di Viterbo', p. 87; Fumi, `Pio II . . . e la pace di Orvieto', 262±4. `Cronaca di Pietro Angelo di Giovanni' (1903), 208±13.

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had sent a brief to the Spoletans asking them to allow the exiles back, but they had refused. Urged on by cardinals and other curial prelates friendly to the exiles, Sixtus ordered Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere to make the Spoletans obey. The cardinal took a substantial force to Umbria, and sent envoys to negotiate, but the Spoletans refused to agree to the exiles' repatriation. As the negotiations continued, the troops got out of control and sacked the city, though much property had already been taken to places of safety outside the town by those who feared the exiles' return.67 Todi was a troublespot in 1485, when Innocent VIII decided to impose the return of the Canale and the Ghibelline exiles. He threatened to send troops to accomplish this, and over 200 men-at-arms were assigned to the task, but an envoy from Todi told the pope that he could put the exiles back in Todi with just a word.68 Innocent sent Obietto Fieschi, then the castellan and governor of Todi, to see if he could arrange for the peaceful return of the exiles. Obietto returned with the message that the citizens of Todi were ready to do as the pope desired, so plans for the military expedition were cancelled. Early the next year, while Obietto was away from the town, the Ghibellines massacred some of the principal Guelfs, and expelled many others. Innocent sent Obietto to restore them to Todi, saying what happened had been against his will. The Guelfs had already tried to ®ght their way back with the help of Guelfs from Narni and elsewhere, but they had been driven out again by the Ghibellines who had reinforcements from the Ghibellines of Terni and Amelia with them. With Obietto Fieschi installed in the fortress of Todi, the Guelfs launched another assault and this time were victorious.69 The manner in which the repatriation of exiles came about was only one of a host of factors that determined what their experience would be once they had come home. Their strengths and weaknesses as individuals and as a group, the strengths and weaknesses of their enemies, the attitude adopted by their fellow citizens who felt no enmity towards them, the nature and importance of any political problems currently facing the state, the attitudes of other powers ± all the variables that shaped why and how men came to be in political exile in the ®rst place 67 68 69

Sansi, Storia del comune di Spoleto, vol. II, pp. 69±70; ASMi, ASforzesco, b. 76: Sacromoro, 21 June 1474, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 405, ff. 53v±54r. ASS, BalõÁa 523, 56: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 17 May 1485, Rome: BalõÁa 524, 27: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 20 June 1485, Rome; degli Atti, La cronaca todina, pp. 126±7; ASF, X di BalõÁa, Resp. 33, c. 372: Piero Capponi, 19 Feb. 1485(6), Montepulciano; ibid., c. 523: Bartolomeo Ugolini, 13 Mar. 1485(6), Pitigliano.

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could also affect what happened to them when they came back. Exiles who came back by force might seek reconciliation rather than revenge; exiles allowed back by consent might harbour resentments which soured the political atmosphere and led to renewed con¯ict. They might be given compensation for the losses they had suffered, or be unable to recover property that had been con®scated or forcibly sold. They might be speedily reintegrated into political life, or remain excluded from effective power. The different fates of the three important exiles who came back to Milan in 1479 ± Lodovico Sforza and his brother Ascanio, and Roberto da Sanseverino ± exemplify how various and unpredictable the experience of members of the same group of exiles could be after their return. Ascanio, who had played little, if any, part in the plots of his brothers that had brought about their exile, and had tried to dissociate himself from their rebellion in 1479, was sent into exile again within a matter of months, accused of plotting against Duchess Bona and stirring up unrest among the Milanese. Lodovico continued outwardly to defer to the duchess, until he was one of the principals in the coup that ousted her from her position as regent for her young son. Sanseverino, whose military skills had done much to bring about the success of the campaign in 1479, had been less able than Lodovico to conceal his discontent with the share in government that Bona was prepared to concede to him. He was involved in the coup against Bona, and was prepared to accept Lodovico's primacy in the regime, but soon became estranged from him, dissatis®ed with his position in Milan, and in February 1482 he was in exile once more.70 What happened to Sienese exiles after they returned also illustrates how various the experience of exiles after repatriation could be. The surviving exiles of 1456±8 and their descendants came back to Siena under the aegis of the Duke of Calabria, and to please him and his father Ferrante, ànd for the peace and quiet' of the regime, those who had been riseduti had their political privileges restored. In addition, `to strengthen the present new regime further', eighteen of them, who had not been riseduti before they were exiled or had been ammoniti, including Pandolfo Petrucci, were made members of the Council of the People.71 They were not really a coherent group and constituted only one element of those who were discontented with the Monte degli Aggregati. None of them achieved any individual political prominence 70 71

See above, pp. 8±9; Pellegrini, Àscanio Maria Sforza', pp. 249±62; Lorenzo de' Medici, Lettere, vol. V, pp. 41±2, 93. ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 4v±5v.

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in 1480±2. The older generation of those who had survived to return had been young men when they were exiled, and had not had much experience of political life in Siena before they left; the younger generation had no experience at all. Only ®ve (11 per cent) of those exiled in 1456±8 sat in the Concistoro both before and after this period of exile; none were members of BalõÁe both before and after. But some of the younger men of this group would eventually make their mark as they became better known in Siena: seven (16 per cent) would become members of BalõÁe at some time before 1500. The exiles brought back in June and July 1482 were repatriated by popular demand; the return of some of the Riformatori exiles in particular was not entirely welcome to some members of the regime. Although the Riformatori, including the exiles, were given back their places in the reggimento, they had to share the third government monte with some Gentiluomini and Dodici, and did not have it to themselves as before 1480. Of those exiled between 1480 and May 1482, 25 (16 per cent) would be members of the BalõÁa at some time after their exile (and before 1500); seven of the 25 had also been members of BalõÁe before they were exiled. Another of those exiled in 1480, Francesco Luti, had been a member of BalõÁe before his exile but was not appointed to another after he returned; in 1485 he was accused by the Of®cials of Ward of stirring up trouble, because he had not had the of®ces he wanted.72 It was with considerable reluctance, and only in a bid to ward off trouble, that the leaders of the extremist Popolare regime decided to allow most of the Popolari exiles back in April 1487. They did not restore their political rights and the repatriation of these exiles did not strengthen the regime. The return of the Noveschi exiles in July 1487 brought about the fall of the Popolare regime, but there was no persecution of the Popolari such as the Nove had suffered in 1483. Two years before, the exiles in Rome had said that they would be returning soon (within a month, they claimed), and by force, but that they did not want to be vengeful, and would pursue a vendetta against fewer than twenty men. They wanted to embrace all, but they did intend to be the leaders.73 This was quite an accurate picture of what happened when they did come back. Only eighteen men were sentenced to exile, and in this new regime, though all parties were included, former exiles had a leading role. The pre-eminence of former exiles after 1487 is not revealed by the 72 73

ASS, Concistoro 710, f. 18v. ASS, BalõÁa 522, 26: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 22 Apr. 1485, Rome.

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proportion of them who became members of the BalõÁa. This was the largest cohort of exiles (44 per cent of all the known exiles between 1456 and 1500), and seats on the BalõÁa became more limited, as BalõÁe were in of®ce for ®ve-year terms rather than being re-elected every few months. Only 10 per cent of those known to be exiles between June 1482 and July 1487 became members of the BalõÁa at some time between 1487 and 1500. Half of these (sixteen of thirty-one) had also been members of BalõÁe before their exile, and a further 6 per cent were members of BalõÁe before their exile but not after. The importance of the former exiles in the regime was due to the fact that of the small number of individuals who established a position of dominance, most but not all were former exiles. `Quelli della impresa', the nine men who had organized the return of the exiles in July 1487, could still lay claim to privileges several years later. One of the proposals put before the Council of the People in June 1494 was that members of this group should always be members of any BalõÁa; in the end, the Council agreed only that they should have the castellanies of ten fortresses reserved for them for three years.74 Not all the leading men of the new regime were former exiles, however, and not all of `quelli della impresa' were equally in¯uential. The inner circle of the regime that had formed by the early 1490s included only four of them ± Antonio Bichi, NiccoloÁ Borghesi, Leonardo Bellanti and Giacoppo Petrucci ± and a ®fth former exile, Giacoppo's brother, Pandolfo. The exiles allowed back in early 1495 were given permission to return against the real wishes of some of the leading ®gures of the regime. Nevertheless, most of them seem to have avoided involvement in the con¯icts that divided the Sienese in the summer of that year. Only four of those allowed back in early 1495 were among those exiled in August, while six of them were among those rewarded for their support for the regime. Those rewarded included Crescenzio Gori and Agnolo Palmieri, who had been elected to the BalõÁa in April (together with a third recently returned exile, Conte Luti). Another recent exile to be rewarded for loyalty to the regime was one who had been explicitly excluded from the permission to return, NiccoloÁ di Madonna Lisabetta.75 All those allowed to return had had their political rights restored, except that they were not supposed to be eligible to be members of the BalõÁa, an exception obviously overridden by the

74 75

ASS, Consiglio Generale 240, f. 260v; ASF, MAP 19, 585: Alessandro Braccesi to Piero de' Medici, 10 June 1494, Siena; Allegretti, `Diarii', col. 831. ASS, BalõÁa 259, ff. 52v±55v; BalõÁa 40, ff. 14v, 24r, 25r.

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Council of the People when electing the additional members to the BalõÁa in April. For Sienese exiles, repatriation generally meant a return to full political rights, though not necessarily the achievement of political power. Attempts to limit the restitution of political rights were not successful. The exclusion from political of®ce of the Popolari exiles who were allowed to return in April 1487 prevented their repatriation from achieving its purpose of mitigating the unpopularity of the regime. While the Riformatori individually recovered their political rights after the return of the exiles in June and July 1482, the share of their monte in of®ces was diminished and this was the cause of much discontent and many future problems. Access to of®ces in the administration and in the contado was a cherished concomitant of political rights in Siena, and appointments to such of®ces could be used to compensate former exiles, or their relatives. There could be no question of restoring of®ces held in the 1450s to the exiles who returned in 1480, but of®ces were assigned as compensation. Thus in August 1480 the Council of the People agreed that Callisto Tancredi ± who had been carried from the city in swaddling clothes at the age of six months after `the cruel and atrocious death' of his father Pietro, one of those executed in 1456, and who petitioned to be given something from the property of the rebels so that he could now live in Siena ± should be given a house and òne or two of®ces'.76 A provision of the BalõÁa on 30 August 1482 decreed that exiles were to be given back of®ces that they had held in the city or contado at the time the Riformatori were deposed from the reggimento in June 1480, when they became available.77 Some individuals were promised speci®c of®ces, apparently as compensation rather than as restitution of an of®ce of which they had been deprived. On 5 September 1482, for example, Andrea and Conte Capacci, às compensation for the damages they suffered in the war against the Florentines, and when they were expelled', were to have the of®ce of PodestaÁ of Montalcino or of Grosseto, as they chose, for one year.78 Many of®ces were distributed by the BalõÁe after the return of the Noveschi exiles in 1487, as compensation to returning exiles, as rewards to those who had helped them, and as part of an extensive spoils system that came into being. The BalõÁa decreed on 13 August 1487 that anyone who had lost an of®ce for political reasons since 1480 should be given it back.79 The BalõÁa soon began handing out of®ces, some of them taken 76 78

77 BalõÁa 26, f. 87v. ASS, BalõÁa 20, ff. 70v±71v; BalõÁa 28, f. 15v. 79 ASS, BalõÁa 35, ff. 3v, 10v, 20r±v, 29r. Ibid., f. 96r.

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from prominent members of the previous regime, to favoured individuals, and it could rapidly have become dif®cult to distinguish awards of compensation and restitution to former exiles from the operation of the spoils system. After the return of the exiles in early 1495, the Council of the People was asked to consider a proposal for restitution to all those who had suffered damages for political reasons (`pro materia regiminis') since 1488. The Council agreed that compensation should be given to all those who had suffered for political reasons since 1487. (Was this difference in date a mistake by the notary in one of the entries, or a change to the proposal introduced in the Council?) Petitions were to be presented to a commission of the Concistoro, the BalõÁa and ®fteen citizens elected by the Concistoro. Half of the of®ces available in the contado were to be set aside for two years, so they could be awarded as compensation to those whose petitions were accepted. At the ®rst scrutiny on 9 April, seventytwo petitions passed; but so many had not that the commission decided they should be voted on again the following day, and in the end 101 petitions altogether were approved. Six segreti were elected to decide what of®ces the successful petitioners were to have.80 Grants of of®ces were obviously regarded not just as compensation for political persecution or loss of political rights, but as a means of providing compensation for material losses suffered during exile owing to the con®scation or enforced sale of property. Restoration to political rights was much less controversial than the restoration of property. Those who had bought houses or farms or workshops or livestock or grain con®scated from exiles by the commune considered they had good title to them, and would not be prepared to surrender them to their former owners without receiving compensation, let alone give the exile the equivalent of the income that had been drawn from them. The practice of settling the claims of returning exiles by granting them property con®scated from the current crop of exiles added further complications and bitterness to the multitude of disputes over property that arose as part of the aftermath of exile. The lack of political clout of those who returned in 1480, and the departure of the Duke of Calabria, probably account for the fact that no general provision appears to have been made for the restoration of their property, or for compensation; but some individuals did successfully petition to receive compensation. On 3 August 1480, for example, the Council of the People agreed that Cristofano Bellanti, the sole survivor 80

ASS, BalõÁa 259, ff. 79r, 82r; Concistoro 771, ff. 5v, 6v, 8v±9r, 13v±14r, 16r±17r, 23r±v.

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of his family (he claimed) who had no property in the city or contado, should be given back all that had been con®scated from his father Pietro and grandfather Ghino, and that those now holding it should be compensated from the goods of the Riformatori and the rebels. In June 1481 it was the turn of the family of Goro del Catasta to be given some compensation, when an inn, a house and other property that had belonged to the Riformatore rebel Filippo Buoninsegni were given to Goro's son Francesco (perhaps the last survivor of the brothers sentenced in 1456±8), and to his nephew.81 Arrangements were made in 1482 for the restitution of property and compensation for all the exiles. Four men were elected by the BalõÁa on 17 July 1482 with authority to mediate between former rebels and those holding property which had been taken from them. On 3 September the BalõÁa decreed that all the money and other goods that had come into the hands of the comune through con®scation or ®nes because of the events of 1480 should be restored, but they could not agree how to do it. Finally, on 12 October, the BalõÁa decided that a ®ne of 12,000 ducats should be imposed on those Nove and Gentiluomini considered culpable of offences against Popolari, with any additional money needed being taken from the communal revenues.82 This imposition caused great resentment, arousing more bad blood between the Nove and Riformatori. It did not raise enough money to meet all the claims for compensation, and in January 1484 the claims the comune had against some exiles' property, including ànything found in future of what belonged to Neri Placidi', and `three-quarters of a workshop that used to belong to Cino Cinughi', were assigned to meet them.83 The matter of compensation for the exiles' losses was addressed immediately after the return of the Nove in 1487. On 22 July the temporary commission that replaced the Popolare BalõÁa decreed that proposals would be drawn up to arrange for the restitution of property and reimbursement for those who had bought it, and forbade anyone to retake possession of anything without the permission of the BalõÁa to be appointed. A week later, the new BalõÁa ordered that all holdings of capital in the Monte that had been con®scated for political reasons (`per li facti del regimento') since 1482 were to be restored. The regulations governing the restitution of property that had been con®scated and sold were agreed by the BalõÁa on 28 August. In 1495, even before the appointment of the commission to award 81 82 83

ASS, BalõÁa 24, f. 73v. ASS, BalõÁa 26, ff. 41r, 67v, 87r, 91r, 109r, 113r, 116v±117r; Concistoro 696, ff. 4v, 13r, 16r±17v. ASS, BalõÁa 31, ff. 38v±39r.

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compensation to those who had suffered damages for political reasons returning exiles had been presenting petitions for compensation and the restitution of their property. Francesco, Guidoccio and Gentile, the sons of Cristofano Gionta, the extremist Popolare leader murdered on 22 July 1487, and their cousin Bartolomeo, presented a petition on 7 March addressed to the `citizens of the BalõÁa over the property to which those lately returned to your city make claim'. They wanted back a house in Montemassa which had been in the joint possession of their fathers until the return of the Nove in 1487, and after that had been ùnjustly occupied' by Girolamo Bichi (one of the exiles who had come back in 1487); and they wanted back rent for the period of seven years and seven months that Girolamo had had it. Among the other petitioners was the Riformatore Neruccio Buoninsegni, whose petition illustrates the complexities of con¯icting claims to property that had been subjected to forced sale or compensation. He asked for the restitution of property sold in 1480, when he had been exiled in Naples, to raise the money for the ®ne that had been imposed on him. In 1487, he said, the BalõÁa had decided that all property disposed of in this way could be recovered on payment of the price paid at the time of sale, and he claimed it had been sold for under half the just price. He also wanted the heirs of Jacomo Bichi to be made to restore some land occupied by them during his `latest exile'. He himself had bought it from those responsible for exacting a forced loan, after Jacomo Bichi's heirs had sold it to pay the levy.84 A few months after presenting this petition, Neruccio would again be exiled for ten years for his role in the con¯icts of that summer.85 It was not only in Siena that the con®scation and sale of exiles' property gave rise to some of the most enduring consequences of episodes of political exile. In Florence, property that had been kept in public hands created fewer problems than property that had been sold or granted to others. Thus the Acciaiuoli, Soderini and Neroni exiles who returned to Florence during the 1480s generally recovered their possessions that had stayed in the hands of the Of®cials of the Tower. Bernardo and Lorenzo Soderini were fortunate enough to have their property restored to them by the same order as permitted their return in June 1485. But some lands had come into the hands of the Medici, and these were not returned. Raffaele and Alessandra Acciaiuoli were able to recover one such estate, Montepaldi, by a decision of the Signoria in 1495 after the Medici had been declared rebels, but other disputes dragged on for years. When the Medici returned from exile, they had less trouble 84

ASS, Notarile ante cos. 1068.

85

ASS, BalõÁa 40, f. 5v.

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recovering their estates which had been bought by others, but there was a price to pay in intensifying opposition to the family. Many of those who had bought Medici property had been hostile to them before 1494, `but few things can give such permanence to hatred as occupancy of one's enemy's estates'.86 Men complain more of a farm that has been taken from them than of a dead brother or father, Machiavelli argued, because sometimes death is forgotten, but possessions never. Èveryone knows that by the revolution of a state he cannot resuscitate a brother, but he may easily recover a farm.'87 The desire to hold on to possessions that had been acquired, by fair means or foul, from the property of exiles, would no doubt be one factor that prompted opposition to their return. The sheer unpredictability of the consequences of the repatriation of exiles, and not just vindictiveness or enmity, could well have been another. Often the return of one group of exiles would lead, sooner or later, to the exile of another group. Even if this did not happen, the aftermath of episodes of political exile on the fortunes of individuals, and on the political life of a state, could last for many years. The homecoming of exiles could be not so much the end of one story as the beginning of another. 86 87

John Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic 1512±1530 (Oxford, 1983), pp. 27±8. See also Ganz, `Paying the price for political failure', 251±6. Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic, p. 28.

CONC LUSION

Political life in Renaissance Italy was endlessly various and rich in incident. There were so many political communities, so many outstanding personalities, so much happening, that it can seem chaotic, and hard to ®nd a thread to provide a guide through the maze. Two of the most important lines of interpretation that historians have used to aid them in trying to make sense of it all have a bearing on the question of the role of political exiles in the political life of Renaissance Italy. One concerns the internal politics of towns and cities, the other relations between states. The ®rst is the restriction in the numbers of those considered quali®ed to participate in political life, to the exclusion of the less prosperous, and the closing of access to these elites, who came to perceive themselves as nobles ± a process known rather inelegantly in Italian as àristocratizzazione'. This was a long-term development, proceeding at different speeds and different rhythms in different communities, and it was not con®ned to the second half of the ®fteenth century ± but was it contributing to the large numbers of exiles in this period? The second line of interpretation, one which has focused particularly on the second half of the ®fteenth century, raises the question of the extent to which there was a conscious effort by the Italian powers to keep the peace among themselves (and keep foreign powers out of Italy) by maintaining a balance of power that foreshadowed the `balance of power' politics among the states of Europe. This is a theme that has fallen from favour with the fall from favour of diplomatic history, but it is an important one. Italian politicians did speak and write of maintaining a balance, an equilibrium, of preventing this power or that from becoming too overweening; of containing ambitions to exercise hegemony (`be the monarch') over Italy. Alfonso of Aragon was accused of nursing such ambitions in the middle of the ®fteenth century; later, the accusations were targeted on the Venetians. The increasing instability of the alliances between the states of Italy, the mistrust prevailing among

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their governments, opened up Italy (it has been argued) to invasion and conquest by the French and the Spanish. Did exiles ± such tempting instruments always to hand to disrupt and unsettle other states ± have a signi®cant role in maintaining discord, in preventing the establishment of a stable equilibrium among the Italian powers? In Siena, there was an element of tension between social groups, leading to political exiles, in the con¯ict between some members of the popolo minuto and some of the Monte dei Nove. By no means all the popolo minuto were hostile to the Nove, nor all the Nove to the popolo minuto. Antonio di Checco Rosso Petrucci had a large following among the popolo and many popolani followed the Noveschi into exile in the mid 1480s. But the events of 1482±3 left a legacy of distrust between many leading Noveschi and popolani. The Noveschi could not forget the violence with which they had been treated ± many of those who had been interned in the council chamber in the Palace of the Signoria in February 1483 had feared for their lives ± or the destruction, theft or con®scation of much of their property. After the Nove returned to Siena, those admitted to the regime between 1483 and 1487 were treated as politically suspect, and those considered the ringleaders of the harassment of the Noveschi and of the looting of their property were punished for years afterwards. The association of the Nove with a wish to restrict the regime and exclude some of the less prosperous popolani who, in accordance with Sienese political traditions, could have aspired to at least minor political of®ce, or even a seat in the Concistoro and hence the Council of the People, continued to be a feature of Sienese political con¯ict, and a cause of exile in the sixteenth century. But Siena was unusual in the late ®fteenth century in the degree of political in¯uence of the popolani and the access to political of®ce they enjoyed. Most other towns and cities in Italy were further along the road to government by a restricted, hereditary group. Even in Siena, con¯icts within the elite were the major source of political troubles and of political exiles. The leaders of the extremist Popolare regime in the middle of the 1480s were mostly members of the popolo minuto, but included wealthy men like Mino Pannilini and men like Cristofano Gionta, whose father Guidoccio had been a prominent political ®gure for several decades. The feud that developed between leading Riformatori and Noveschi was as productive of exiles as the quarrels between Noveschi and Popolari. In other cities, the primary cause of con¯icts resulting in political exiles were rivalries and disputes within the elite, not between the elite and those who were being excluded from participation in political of®ce and political debate. In the faction-ridden towns of the Papal

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States ± Bologna, Viterbo, CittaÁ di Castello, Spoleto, Todi (and others that have not been mentioned in this book, such as Cesena) ± and in Parma, in Aquila, most political exiles were the defeated (temporarily or permanently) in struggles for power and in¯uence between families and factions of similar social and economic status (or faction leaders who had been too successful or too troublesome for the comfort of the government of the states of which the town was a part). The popolari excluded from Perugia by the regime of the gentiluomini were not their social inferiors. Florence, like Siena, was a partial exception to this generalization in the years after the exclusion of the Medici when con¯icts developed between those favouring an extension of the role of the Great Council and those who wanted the real powers of decision in government restricted to committees of carefully selected men from socially and economically prominent families. Until then, although opposition to the changes in government introduced by Mediceans had been a cause of disquiet and unrest, it was more personal opposition to the Medici family that produced important groups of exiles. In most towns and cities, the issue of whether there should be a broadly based government accessible to men from a wide range of social backgrounds, a `governo largo', or whether there should be a `governo stretto', a government restricted to a more or less closed circle of wealthier, socially exclusive families had already been decided in favour of a `governo stretto', and the con¯icts that produced political exiles were over who would be dominant within those exclusive groups. Surveying the political scene in Italy in the second half of the ®fteenth century, it becomes apparent that episodes leading to large numbers, or important individuals, going into political exile were more numerous in the 1450s and again from the later 1470s to the 1490s, with something of a lull in between. In the 1450s, exiles were a prominent feature of political life in, for example, Siena, Perugia, Milan, Pisa, Viterbo, Bologna, Genoa and Naples; from the late 1470s to the 1480s, in Florence, Aquila, Naples, Siena, Perugia, Faenza, Ferrara, Milan, Bologna, Genoa, CittaÁ di Castello, ForlõÁ and Todi and Parma; in the 1490s, in Florence, Milan, Naples, Siena, Genoa, and very generally in the Papal States, particularly in the late 1490s. These periods of increase in the numbers of major episodes of political exile, and of heightened activity by exiles, were the periods when relations between the states of Italy were dif®cult, with causes of tension and disputes between them threatening or precipitating wars that involved more than two states. What connection was there between the wars and the increase in political exiles? Were exiles causing wars, or wars causing exiles? Political exiles were not the causes of the war in northern and central

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Italy in the 1450s: that was due to the death of Filippo Maria Visconti and Francesco Sforza's bid for the succession to the duchy of Milan, and Venice's attempt to exploit the confusion in Milan to seize more lands in Lombardy. Exiles had a minor role in bringing about the war of succession in Naples after the death of Alfonso, providing encouragement to the Angevins to press their claims. They were not responsible for bringing about the Pazzi War in Tuscany in 1478±9, or the War of Ferrara of 1482±4, or the Barons' War of 1485±6. Florentine exiles did do much to bring about Bartolomeo Colleoni's campaign in 1467, but this soon ran out of steam. Charles VIII's descent into Italy to conquer the kingdom of Naples was spurred on by exiles from Naples and Rome, but their encouragement would have had no effect if Charles's dreams of glory and crusade had not provided fertile ground. Exiles could help to precipitate wars, and they could act as a means to attack or undermine or distract an enemy. They could also be used as surrogates in rivalries between states, as the exiled Manfredi and Ordelaf® were. But exiles on their own were rarely powerful enough to bring about, or to sustain, a major war. Wars could result directly in political exiles, especially for the supporters of the defeated side in a contest between rivals for a princedom, like the war in Naples in 1458±64, or the French conquest of the duchy of Milan in 1499±1500. But generally the connection between war and exile was less direct than that. A war could heighten the interest of major powers in exercising in¯uence over minor ones, and increase the incentive to interfere in their internal politics, perhaps exacerbating the tensions that resulted in political exile, or exploiting the opportunities offered by exiles, supporting them, helping them to return, perhaps precipitating a new wave of exiles. That is to say, wars intensi®ed the interest that Italian states in the second half of the ®fteenth century took in each others' affairs, and increased the temptation to interfere. The French conquests of the kingdom of Naples and the duchy of Milan, the increasing involvement of Spain and the emperor, particularly after the power of Spain and of the Empire became united in the person of Charles V, not only created and restored exiles, especially in Milan, Naples, and Florence, but also changed the environment within which Italian exiles operated. Only certain groups of Italian exiles in the ®fteenth century ± notably those from the kingdom of Naples ± had found it worth their while to appeal to the King of France or the Duke of Burgundy or the King of Spain for help. In the sixteenth century, the rulers of France and Spain appear to have become the dominant poles of attraction for exiles from throughout Italy (no systematic study of Italian political exiles in the sixteenth century has yet

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been made). But older patterns still persisted. Florence might be ruled by a Medici duke in the orbit of the emperor, but the Florentine exiles could ®nd refuge in the territory of neighbouring Lucca, as Lucchese exiles could ®nd refuge in Florence. The phenomenon of political exile in Renaissance Italy points to two apparently contradictory generalizations about Italian political life. One is the very obvious observation, of persistent political fragmentation despite the formation of the ®ve major regional states, the survival of local particularism even within these states, and the disunity of political elites. Without the coexistence of so many states and political communities within the Italian peninsula, there would not have been so many political exiles, nor would exiles have been able so often to ®nd refuge so uncomfortably close to home. Nor would there have been so many exiles without the prevalence of political factions and the intensity of political rivalries. The need for unity within political communities was not just a nostrum of abstract political theory; disunity, exiles and the threat they posed to independence ± libertaÁ ± were closely linked in men's thinking. Welcoming the return of the Noveschi exiles to Siena in 1487, Lorenzo de' Medici strongly recommended that the Sienese `should not create any exiles if they can help it and if they feel they can live in peace and quiet without having them; or at least let them be few, and necessary for peace and quiet, because it is exiles that ruin cities and keep those within always in doubt'.1 Everyone in Rome says, reported a Sienese envoy there, that when the Sienese can stay united for two years and keep some troops on hand, the exiles will never be able to force their way back.2 It is a bad thing to send citizens into exile, wrote Guicciardini, because on many occasions they bring harm to cities, and encourage princes to cause them trouble.3 Ùnited within, you will be secure from without', Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini told the Sienese in a letter in which he urged that the exiles should be allowed to return. For the sake of that Passion that was our redemption, for the sake of the Virgin, that Advocate who has saved you from pressing dangers so many times, for the sake of that libertaÁ that your forefathers have preserved with such great efforts up to now, and so that you may keep it and pass it on to your descendants, bring these sons freely and securely back to your and their common homeland, let them share in the honours of the commune, according to their ages, quality and merits as your fathers 1 2 3

ASS, BalõÁa 532, 3: Bartolomeo Sozzini, 3 Aug. 1487, Florence. ASS, BalõÁa 524, 65: Antonio del Balestriere, 30 July 1485, Rome. Francesco Guicciardini, Òratio accusatoria', in Consolatoria, Accusatoria, Defensoria. Autodifesa di un politico, ed. Ugo Dotti (Rome, 1993), p. 177.

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did. Return their property to its rightful owners. If you do this, you will be held to be just and magnanimous, and be praised throughout Italy. The exiles will be grateful, they will be obedient, they will be peaceful. You will get many of your citizens back, and the property they have outside with them, and when all suspicions are laid to rest, Siena will become herself again, and be able to breathe again.4 On the other hand, the experiences of many political exiles, the lives they could lead when forced from their home, shows how closely bound together the different political communities were within the Italian political system. For all the divisions between them, the political elites of the various states can be seen as a single, if complex, political society ± not just because of the intensive diplomatic contacts among them, but because they formed a cultural community, sharing not only a language and literature but also many political assumptions. Many Italians spent all or most of their careers away from home in any case, and it was easy for exiles to ®nd a place where they could feel settled, even if not at home ± provided they were not too obsessed with thoughts of revenge to be unable to make a life elsewhere. Exiles could be welcome not just as potential political instruments, but also for their own skills and assets ± like Ranieri de' Maschi, Senator of Rome in June 1485, and his two nephews, one of them seeking to be judge of appeals in Siena, the other a knight and in of®ce as well. `They are exiles from Rimini, looking for a new homeland; they are men of worth and rich', and it would not take much to make them settle in Siena, Guidantonio Buoninsegni alerted his government back home.5 Like the `starlings' Buoninsegni had described a few months before,6 if in a different way, these exiles, prosperous, respected, holding prestigious of®ces, were probably more representative of the reality of exile in Renaissance Italy than the solitary, friendless wanderer of the literary trope. 4 5 6

ASS, BalõÁa 509, 94: Cardinal Francesco Piccolomini, 29 Apr. 1483, Rome. ASS, BalõÁa 524, 3: Guidantonio Buoninsegni, 1 June 1485, Rome. See above, p. 1.

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I N DEX

S = place in Sienese contado Abbadia San Salvadore (S), 98 Abbiategrasso, 9, 137, 140 Acciaiuoli family, of Florence, 122, 232; Agnolo, 29±30, 61, 71, 88, 93, 104, 157; Alessandra, 232; Donato, 84; Jacopo, 71, 88, 93; Neri, 71, 88, 93; Raffaele, 122, 232 Acquapendente, 107, 128, 149, 166, 168; exiles in, 128, 166, 168 Adorno faction, of Genoa, 15, 16 Adorno family, of Genoa, 13±16, 27, 186; Agostino, 15±16; Giovanni, 15±16; Prospero, 14, 27, 188 Aggregati, Monte degli, 43, 44, 226 Alberti family, of Florence, 122 Albizzi family, of Florence, 209; Ormanno, 40, 70, 71, 156; Rinaldo, 40, 70, 71, 78, 156, 196 Alessandria, 81, 104, 144; exiles from, 144 Alexander VI, Pope (1492±1503) (Rodrigo Borgia), 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 38, 181, 182, 193 Alfonso, Duke of Calabria ± see Alfonso II, King of Naples Alfonso I, King of Naples (1442±58), 13±14, 24, 31, 56, 74, 76, 95, 96, 134, 141, 160±1, 173±5, 195, 197, 234, 237 Alfonso II, King of Naples (1494±5); before accession, Duke of Calabria, 16, 18, 23, 24±5, 42, 43, 89, 96, 126±7, 134, 135, 161, 162, 163, 171, 175±6, 183, 201, 218, 226, 230 Allegretti, Allegretto, 90 d'Alviano, Bartolomeo, 38, 196, 197, 200 d'Amboise, Georges, Cardinal (1498), 18, 192 Amelia, 38, 132, 200, 225; exiles in, 132 Ammanati, Jacopo, Cardinal, 63 ammonizione (loss of right to hold political of®ce), ammoniti, 30, 43, 65, 67±8, 70±1, 90, 145, 148, 213, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230

Anagni, 131; exiles in, 131 Ancona, 99, 211; exiles in, 211 Andrea di Sano di Maestro Andrea, 102 Andreocci, Antonino, 102, 212 Angevin claimants to kingdom of Naples, 237; and see ± d'Anjou, Jean; d'Anjou, King ReneÂ; Lorraine, ReneÂ, Duke of Anghiari, Battle of, 196 d'Anguillara, Deifebo, 20, 135; Everso, 20, 173, 174, 175, 197; Francesco, 20, 135 d'Anjou, Jean, 24, 123, 135, 176, 188, 193; King ReneÂ, 24, 93, 123, 135, 193, 194, 203 Antonio di Girolamo, 76 Ser Antonio di NiccoloÁ di Ser Minoccio, 98 d'Appiano, Jacopo, signore of Piombino, 19, 20, 126, 162, 175 Aquila, 96±7, 98, 141, 236; exiles from, 96±7, 236 Arcipreti family, of Perugia, 224; Agamemnone, 224; Carlo, 196±7, 224; Cesare, 97 Arco, Count Oderico of, 36, 100 Arezzo, 103 Asciano (S), 90, 95 Ascoli, 99, 221; exiles from, 221 Asola, 35, 96; exiles from, 96 Assisi, 114; exiles from, 114 Asti, 23, 135, 194 degli Atti family, of Todi, 37 Avignon, 137 Baglioni family, of Perugia, 19, 38, 114, 123, 141, 166, 181, 198, 199, 200; Astorre, 199; Gianpaolo, 19; Guido, 38; Ridolfo, 38, 196±7; Simonetto, 221 de' Barbadori, Donato, 70 da Barbarano, Cristoforo, 63 Barbaro, Ermolao, 35±6

247

248

index

Barbo, Marco, Cardinal, 35; Paolo, 71 Barcelona, 134, 203; exiles in, 134, 203 Bardi, Alessandra, 122 Bargagli, Jacomo, 130; Mariano, 32, 56, 141, 155, 220 Barletta, 88, 93 Barons' War (1485±6), 25, 164, 169, 195, 237 Bartolomeo di Ser Minoccio, 98 Bartolomeo di Pietro di Maestro Jacomo, 92 Bellanti, Angelina, 123; Antonio, 44, 45, 46, 57, 131, 211, 212; Battista, 121; Cristofano di Pietro, 127, 230±1; Ghino, 31, 32, 56, 127, 174, 220, 231; Leonardo, 44, 50, 52, 53, 76, 91, 123, 147, 206, 220, 228; Luzio, 44, 48, 52, 70, 155, 185, 199; Petrino, 121, 131; Pietro di Ghino, 32, 56, 70, 127, 145, 155, 174±5, 220, 231 Benassai, Fazio, 154 Bencivenni, Nofrio, 124 Bentivoglio family, of Bologna, 22±3, 39, 112, 221; Annibale, 39, 112; Giovanni II, 22±3, 60, 99, 112, 139, 170; Sante, 39, 218 Benvoglienti, Leonardo, 161 Bergamo, 63, 170; exiles from, 63 Bernardi, Andrea, 22 Bessarion, Cardinal, 39, 137 Bettolle (S), 124 Bibbiena, 190 Bichi, Antonio, 44, 50, 76, 91, 92, 107, 130, 131, 154, 206, 220, 228; Girolamo, 232; Jacomo, 232 Bindo di Giovanni di Ser Minoccio, 148 Biringucci, Buonaventura, 155 da Bisticci, Vespasiano, 84, 85 Bologna, 10, 22±3, 39, 60, 64, 90, 99, 103, 105, 106, 112, 132, 137, 159, 211, 218, 221, 236; Sixteen, 60, 64; exiles from, 23, 39, 60, 64, 99, 112, 159, 170±1, 218, 221, 236; exiles in, 137, 211 Bolsena, 64, 180 Bon, Gabriele, 34; Giovanni Jacopo, 156 Bonarello da Ancona, Jacopo, 214±15 Borghesi, NiccoloÁ, 50, 53, 103, 167, 206, 220, 228; NiccoloÁ di Buonaventura, 52, 93; Pietro, 52, 185 Borgia family, 16, 20, 21; Cesare, 16, 18±20, 21, 123, 181, 182 Bosco, 144 Braccesi, Alessandro, 158, 205±6 BricËonnet, Guillaume, Bishop of Saint Malo, 192 Bulgarini, Bulgarino di Gheri, 130 bullette, of®cials of, 146, 147, 151±2, 156±7 Buonconvento (S), 98, 184, 199 Buoninsegni family, of Siena, 50, 51; Filippo, 47, 59, 127±8, 154, 221; Giovannata, 102; Giovanni, 92; Guidantonio, 1, 107±8, 131±2, 239; Jacomo, 124, 177; Lorenzo,

140; Neruccio, 49, 51, 232; Tommaso, 102 Buonsignori, Andrea, 69, 165 Burgundy, duchy of, exiles in, 123, 135, 171, 194 Burgundy, Duke of, 5, 237; see also, Charles the Bold Caetani family, Roman barons, 20 Calabria, Duke of ± see Alfonso II, King of Naples; Ferrante, King of Naples Caldora, Antonio, 203 Calixtus III, Pope (1455±8), 31, 64, 97, 134, 160±1, 174, 177, 210 El Calvaia, 50 Camerino, 19, 88, 99, 132, 141; exiles from, 19; exiles in, 88, 132, 141 Campagna and Marittima (province of Papal States), 13 Campagnatico (S), 91 Campello, Cecchino, 158, 209 Campofregoso faction, of Genoa, 14, 15 Campofregoso family, of Genoa, 13±16, 26±7, 137, 194; Battista, 15±16, 27, 137, 138, 186, 188, 194; Fregosino, 176; Giangaleazzo, 138; Lodovico, 13±14; NiccoloÁ, 13; Paolo, Archbishop of Genoa, Cardinal (1480), 14±16, 26±7, 137, 158, 176, 182, 191, 201; Pietro, 13±14, 26, 61, 137, 176, 188, 221; Spinetta, 13; Tommasino, 14 Camponeschi family, of Aquila, 97 Canale family, of Todi, 225 Candia (Crete), 94, 100 Canea (Crete), 94, 101 Canetoli family, of Bologna, 39, 112 Capacci family, of Siena, 116; Andrea, 98, 229; Benuccio, 149; Conte, 98, 229; Cristofano, 98; Salimbene, 88, 98 Capponi, Neri, 84 da Caprone family, of Pisa, 134 Capua, 131 cardinals, 21±2, 168, 169, 172, 181, 193, 210, 211, 225 Carpi, 138; exiles in, 138 Cascia, 221; exiles from, 221 da Casole, Ser Tommaso, 149 Castello della Pieve, 106, 178 Castelnuovo (duchy of Milan), 9 Castelnuovo Berardenga (S), 50, 58, 102, 222±3 Castelnuovo dell'Abbate (S), 98 Castel' Ottieri, Sinolfo da, 108 Castel Piano (S), 149 Castiglione della Pescaia, 31, 174 da Castiglione, Giuliano, 207 Casucci, Antonio di Casino, 31±2, 56 Catalaneschi party, of Todi, 37±8, 63, 200, 219

index del Catasta, Antonio di Goro, 76, 90, 121, 146, 161; Antonio's wife, 121; Francesco di Goro, 74, 90±1, 127, 231; Goro, 127, 231; Raniero di Goro, 74, 90, 91; Savino di Goro, 74, 90, 146, 211; Simone di Goro, 74 Caterina (putative assassin), 155 Cavasco, Ugo, 154±5 Cecchini, Ser Giovanni, 149, 199; Girolamo, 149 Celsi, Stefano, 36, 100 Cenni da Ricavo, Orfeo, 103 Cesena, 159, 236; exiles in, 159 Cetona (S), 31 Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, 123, 135, 171, 194 Charles V, Emperor, 194, 195, 237 Charles VII, King of France (1422±61), 14 Charles VIII, King of France (1483±98), 2, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 50, 136, 176, 192, 193, 194, 197, 216, 237 Chiaravalle, abbey of, 138 Chiaravallesi faction, of Todi, 37±8, 63, 200, 219 Chigi, Chigi, 156 Chiusdino (S), 124 Chiusi (S), 46, 122±3, 165±6 Ciani, Bernardino, 118 Cibo, Franceschetto, 180±1; Gianbattista, Cardinal ± see Innocent VIII, Pope; Maurizio, 79 Cicogna, Marco, 34, 209 Cinughi, Cino, 43, 83±4, 128, 136, 140, 155, 179, 180, 205, 220, 231 CittaÁ della Pieve, 121, 128, 167, 168; exiles in, 121, 128, 167, 168 CittaÁ di Castello, 12±13, 19, 105, 129, 139±40, 149, 155, 166, 178, 187, 202, 218, 224, 236; exiles from, 12±13, 19, 139±40, 178, 187, 218, 224, 236; exiles in, 129, 149, 155 Civitanova, 99 Civitella (S), 102 Collalto, Gianbattista, 36, 100; Mattea, 36, 100 Colleoni, Bartolomeo, 63, 172, 191, 196, 237 Colonna family, Roman barons, 20, 21, 197; Fabrizio, 21; Giovanni, Cardinal, 21; Prospero, 21 Colonna party, Papal States, 37 Como, 81 del Conte, Donato, 8, 80 Corbinelli, Bernardo, 62 Cornaro, Ranuzio, 35, 71 Corner, Andrea, 34; Donato, 34; Marco, 34 Corneto, 174; exiles in, 174 Cossa, Giovanni, 24, 193 Cremona, 15, 81, 96, 146; exiles in, 146 Cremona, Diet of, 187

249

Crete, 94, 100±1 Cyprus, exiles in, 34 Damiani, Antonio, 116 Daniele di Bartolomeo, 124 Dati, Agostino, 74 Dertona, 81 Docci, Luca, 98; Tommaso, 98 Dodici, Monte dei, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51, 59, 76, 227 Domenico di Maestro Giovanni, 130 Domenico di NiccoloÁ di Ser Minoccio, 98 Donati, Girolamo, 212 Doria family, of Genoa, 26; Lazaro, 180 Edward IV, King of England, 5 Elba, 126 Emperor, Holy Roman, 194, 223, 237, 238; see also Charles V; Frederick III; Maximilian; Sigismund Empire, Holy Roman, 5±6, 223, 237 England, 5 d'Este family, 9±10; Alberto, 10, 62, 135±6, 139; Borso, Marquis, then Duke, of Ferrara, 9±10, 29±30, 78, 170, 215; Ercole, Duke of Ferrara, 9±10, 62, 86, 103, 135±6, 139, 170, 191, 215, 221; Lionello, Marquis of Ferrara, 9; NiccoloÁ, 9±10, 85±6, 191, 215, 221 exile as literary topos, 1±2, 110, 133, 239 exile, reasons and justi®cations for, 6±86, 89±90, 91, 93, 94, 95±8, 99, 100, 102, 104, 115, 132, 157, 212, 224, 225, 226, 234±8; exiles' views on justice of their exile, 81±6; self-exile, 21±2, 23, 32, 36, 38, 45, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 67, 99, 108, 115, 121, 122, 130, 148, 159, 204, 212±15 exile, sentences: determination of, 13, 30, 32, 33, 34±6, 39±40, 42±3, 44, 46, 49, 50, 52, 55±81, 85, 87±99, 104, 108, 121, 147±8; changes to, 87, 90±2, 98, 100, 101±8, 124±5, 129, 210, 212 exiles, additional penalties imposed on: 65±71, 93; imprisonment, 15, 18, 19, 26, 27, 44, 52, 70, 71, 90, 93, 96, 97, 99, 102, 105, 121, 162; ®nes, 50, 65, 67±8, 70, 71, 115±16, 120, 128±9, 211, 231, 232; con®scation of property, 20, 26, 68, 69, 70, 106, 111, 112±16, 118±20, 127, 213, 215, 230±3; see also - ammonizione; exiles, property and income of; outlaws; rebels exiles, judicial of®cials and, 55, 56, 57, 59±60, 73±4, 81, 112, 119, 146, 147, 156±7 exiles, dependants of, 2, 53±4, 90, 94, 98, 105, 106, 110±11, 113, 115, 117, 118±25, 126, 129, 130, 132, 134, 152±3, 165±6, 216, 229

250

index

exiles, property and income of, making a living, 11, 13, 20, 23, 25, 26, 62, 67±8, 69, 70, 83, 85, 87, 91, 99, 100, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110±42, 144, 150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 169, 171, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 181, 183, 189, 190, 191, 192, 203, 211, 215, 219, 224, 226, 229±33, 235, 239 exiles receiving outside help (from other states, factional allies, condottieri etc), 10, 12, 14±15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 38, 42, 46, 51±2, 92, 103±4, 108, 109, 110, 123, 125±7, 128, 130±6, 137, 138±9, 140±1, 163, 164±6, 167±9, 171±202, 206±7, 210, 211, 218, 219, 221, 223, 225, 237 exiles, supervision of: by exiling state, 70, 87, 95±8, 99±101, 108, 109, 120, 121, 123±7, 129, 134, 143±71; by authorities of other states, 89±90, 92, 94, 105, 122±3, 143±4, 145±7, 150, 156±7, 159±71, 200; see also bullette, of®cials of, exiles, conspiracies involving, 1, 8, 10, 15±16, 22, 26±7, 29, 37, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 68, 69, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, 100, 102, 107, 108, 120, 128, 136, 141, 145, 148, 150, 153, 154, 157, 165, 166, 168, 173±4, 175, 176, 177±91, 193, 194, 195, 196±200, 205, 219±20; attempts to force return, successful and unsuccessful, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14±16, 17±18, 23, 24, 25, 26±7, 37±8, 39, 45, 46, 48±9, 50, 51±2, 134, 139±40, 150, 153, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176±7, 178, 179±80, 183, 184±91, 193, 194, 196±200, 204, 211, 216, 218, 219, 220±3, 225 exiles, return of, 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17±18, 19±20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43±4, 48±9, 50±1, 55, 65, 89, 91, 104, 110, 114, 115, 121, 123, 125, 136, 139, 164, 175, 177, 183, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193, 200, 203±33, 235, 238±9 exiles, women, 9, 11, 19, 35, 36, 53±4 exiles from outside Italy, 5, 133; for exiles from places in Italy, see under place names Faenza, 10, 19, 136, 138±9, 187, 236; exiles from, 10, 19, 136, 138±9, 187, 191, 236; exiles in, 138 Falier, Francesco, 34 Famagusta, 157 Fano, 10, 90, 106 Farnese, Ranuccio, 167, 173, 181, 199±200 Fecini, Tommaso, 49 Federico, King of Naples (1496±1501), 16, 17, 19, 20, 25, 207 Ferdinand II, King of Aragon ( joint ruler of Spain with his wife Isabella, Queen of Castille), 17, 195

Ferrandino (Ferrante II), King of Naples (1495±6), 16±17, 23, 25, 193, 195 Ferrante, King of Naples (1458±94), before accession, Duke of Calabria, 10, 11, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, 42, 43, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 99, 107, 117, 125, 126, 132, 135, 137, 140, 158, 161, 162, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 182, 183, 188, 194, 201, 206, 207, 210, 226 Ferrara, 9±10, 62, 80, 81, 103±4, 124, 130, 136, 170, 175, 191, 215, 221, 236; exiles from, 9±10, 62, 85±6, 135±6, 139, 191, 215, 221, 236; exiles in, 10, 103±4, 124, 130, 170 Ferrara, Duke of - see d'Este, Borso; d'Este, Ercole Ferrara, War of, 21, 96, 134, 139, 140, 163, 175, 178, 187, 189±90, 201, 237 Fieschi family, of Genoa, 14±16, 26±7; Gian®lippo, 26; Gianluigi, 15, 136, 181; Obietto, 15±16, 26±7, 38, 135, 136, 138, 140, 176, 179, 180, 181, 188, 191, 225 Filelfo, Francesco, 110 Florence, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 28±30, 32±3, 39±40, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 60±1, 62, 70±1, 74, 75, 77±9, 80, 81, 84±5, 89, 91, 93±4, 95, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 110, 112±13, 114, 117±19, 121±2, 125±6, 129, 133, 135, 136, 140, 144, 146, 154, 155, 156, 157±8, 160, 161, 162, 163±5, 166, 169, 170, 173, 174, 177, 180, 182, 183±7, 189, 190, 192±3, 196, 197±8, 201, 202, 203, 204±5, 206±7, 208±10, 211, 214, 217, 218±19, 220, 223, 232±3, 236, 237, 238 Florence, government: BalõÁa, 28±9, 30, 39±40, 60, 71, 77, 77, 78, 98, 122, 209; consulta, 78; Council of the Commune, 209; Council of the Hundred, 209; Council of the People, 209; Dieci di BalõÁa, 62, 75, 183, 202; Eight of Ward, 30, 60±1, 77, 113, 122, 157, 209, 210; Great Council, 61, 236; Of®cials of the Tower, 112±13, 114, 117, 232; Otto di Pratica, 164; parlamento, 30, 39, 40, 77; Parte Guelfa, 112±13, 117; Pratica, 170, 209; Signoria, 28, 29, 39, 40, 60±1, 62, 77, 78, 79, 84, 95, 96, 98, 156, 209, 217, 223, 232 Florence, exiles from, 3, 16, 18, 28±30, 39±40, 60±1, 62, 70±1, 77±9, 81, 84±5, 93±4, 95, 98, 103, 104, 112±13, 117±19, 121±2, 125±6, 134±5, 136, 144, 156, 157±8, 170, 182±3, 184±6, 188, 190±1, 192±3, 196, 203, 204±5, 206±7, 208±10, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 232±3, 236, 237, 238; exiles in, 47±8, 50, 95±6, 103, 140, 146, 155, 164±5, 183±6, 215±16, 238 Foligno, 38, 98, 104 Fongaia, Rinaldo, 131

index ForlõÁ, 11, 16, 19, 21, 22, 62, 159, 174, 187±8, 236; exiles from, 11, 16, 19, 22, 62, 159, 187±8, 236; exiles in, 174 Fortebraccio, Carlo, 97, 224 Foscari, Doge Francesco, 104; Jacopo, 104, 156 Foscarini, Benedetto, 71 Fossombrone, 141; exiles in, 141 France, 5, 7, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 80, 123, 136, 191±3; exiles in, 7, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 123, 136, 191±3; see also, French power in Italy Francesco di Lando, 125, 149 Francesco di Mino, 82, 124 Francesco di Petronio, 116 Frederick III, Emperor, 76 French power in Italy, 2, 7, 14, 16±19, 23, 25, 26, 37, 50, 81, 99, 112, 135, 136, 137, 140, 144, 176, 182, 185, 188, 190, 192±4, 197, 200, 203, 218, 220, 235, 237; see also, Charles VII; Charles VIII; Louis XI; Louis XII Fucci family, of CittaÁ di Castello, 12 Gabrielli, Angelo, 76, 90; Antonio, 76, 90; Cristofano, 32, 42, 43, 56, 76, 90; Francesco, 89±90; Galeazzo, 76, 90; Gianbattista, 76, 90; Giovanni, 89±90; Giovanni Felice, 76, 90; Girolamo, 76, 90 Gagliof® family, of Aquila, 97 Galletti family, of Pisa, 134 Gamba, 144 Gatteschi faction, of Viterbo, 115 Gatti family, of Viterbo, 36±7, 97; Galeotto, 97; Galeotto, 37; Giovanni, 37; Princivalle, 37; Troilo, 97 Genoa, 13±16, 26±7, 61, 85, 105, 107, 137±8, 144, 158, 176±7, 180, 181±2, 186, 188, 191, 194, 201, 202, 218, 219, 221; Doge of, 7, 13±16, 26±7, 61, 85, 137±8, 140; exiles from, 3, 13±16, 26±7, 61, 85, 135, 136, 137±8, 140, 158, 176±7, 179, 181±2, 186, 188, 191, 194, 201, 218, 219, 220, 221, 236; exiles in,144 Gentile, Gerolamo, 27, 138 Gentiluomini, Monte dei, 41, 43, 44, 47, 51, 52, 59, 69, 76, 91, 227, 231 Germany, 5±6, 17, 144; exiles in, 17, 144 Ghibellines, 8, 37, 38, 80, 96, 97±8, 112, 200, 225 Ghinucci, Andreoccio, Bishop of Sovana, 128, 149±50, 168 Ghinucci bank, 151 Giffre, Tommaso, 195 Gionta, Bartolomeo, 232; Cristofano, 47, 48, 49, 70, 232, 235; Francesco, 232; Gentile, 232; Guidoccio di Bartolomeo, 149, 155, 164, 199; Guidoccio di Cristofano, 232; Guidoccio di Gionta, 235; Pietro, 90

251

Giovanni di BarnabeÂ di Nanni, 102 Giovanni di NiccoloÁ di Ser Minoccio, 98 Giovanni di Pietro di Maestro Jacomo, 92 Girolamo di Nanni di Cione, 199 Giustini family, of CittaÁ di Castello, 12; Amadeo, 12; Lorenzo, 12±13, 178 Gonzaga family, of Mantua, 9±10, 134; Francesco, Marquis of Mantua, 35, 96 Gori, Crescenzio, 49, 154, 205, 206, 228; TomeÁ di Antonio, 47, 59 Granada, Treaty of (1500), 17 Grimani, Grimaldo, 61, 71 del Grissa, Francesco, 119; wife of, 119 Grosseto, 89, 229 da Grosseto, Bartolomeo di Leonardo, 89 Gucci, Leonardo, 44, 46, 57 Guelfs, 23, 37, 38, 77, 96, 97, 112, 113, 183, 200, 225 Guglielmi, Francesco, 57 Guicciardini, Francesco, 238 Gutenberg, Johann, 5±6 Habsburg, Archduke Sigismund of, 36, 100 Heers, Jacques, 3±4 Henry IV, King of England, 5 Henry VI, King of England, 5 Henry VII, King of England, 5 Imola, 11, 16, 19, 21, 22, 28, 136; exiles from, 10±11, 16, 19, 136; exiles in, 22 Innocent VIII, Pope (1484±92), Gianbattista Cibo, 13, 25, 35, 38, 46, 48, 64, 75, 79, 107, 134, 135, 136, 141, 165, 166±7, 169, 179±81, 182, 196, 200, 201, 223, 225 Isabella, Queen of Castille, wife of Ferdinand of Aragon, 17 Jacomo di Mariano di Cecco, 57 Jesi, 203 Julius II, Pope (1503±13), Giuliano della Rovere, 12, 21±2, 24±5, 112, 179, 180, 181, 182, 193, 194, 225 Lamberteschi, Domenicho, 70, 88 da Lampugnano, Gian Andrea, 159; his brother, 159 Lancia family, of Pisa, 134 Lando, Vitale, 35 Landucci, Giovanni 148, 149 Lanfranchi family, of Pisa, 134 del Lante family, of Pisa, 134 Lanti, Lorenzo, 50, 57, 59, 75, 82, 132±3, 150, 153, 179 Lee, Egmont, 139 Leo X, Pope (1513±21), Giovanni de' Medici, 18, 158 Liciniano (S), 124 Ligny, comte de, Louis de Luxembourg, 192

252

index

Lodi, 81, 146, 161; exiles in, 146, 161 Lodi, Peace of (1454), 2 Loli, Goro, 210 Lorraine, ReneÂ, Duke of, 182 Lotti, Cristofano, 105±6, 118; Giovanni, 105, 120, 125; wife of Giovanni, 120 Louis XI, King of France (1461±83), 5, 14, 140, 191 Louis XII, King of France (1498±1515), 2, 17, 18, 19, 23, 136, 182, 192, 193, 218 Low Countries, 5 Lucca, 78, 91, 147, 238; exiles from, 238; exiles in, 91, 147, 238 Luti family, of Siena, 51, 184, 206; Andreoccio, 105; Bartolomeo, 165; Conte, 228; Francesco, 165, 227; Lodovico, 50, 57, 69, 155; Maurizio, 49, 107; NiccoloÁ, 49, 69; Tommaso, 82, 121 Lyons, 192 Macereto al Bagno (S), 127 Machiavelli, Girolamo, 29, 60, 70; NiccoloÁ, 196, 233 Maganzesi family and faction, of Viterbo, 36±7, 63, 115, 214 Mainz, 6 Malatesta, Pandolfo, 19 Malipiero, Jacomo, 35 Malvezzi family, of Bologna, 22±3, 60, 64, 99, 170, 218; Aldrovandino, 99; Alessandro, 99; Antonio, 159; Bartolomeo di Giovanni, 99; Battista, 23, 99; Filippo di Battista, 23; Filippo di Giovanni, 99; Giovanni di Battista, 60; Girolamo, 23; Giulio di Virgilio, 23, 99 Manfredi family, of Faenza and Imola, 10±11, 19, 237; Astorre, 136; Astorre, 191; Carlo, 10, 138±9, 187, 191; Federico, Bishop of Faenza, 10; Francesco (Astorre), 19; Galeotto, 10, 138±9, 187, 191; Guidaccio, 11; Lanzalotto, 10; Ottaviano, 10, 136, 187, 191; Sigismondo, 136; Taddeo, 11, 136 Mantua, 35, 80, 123, 144, 182; exiles in, 9±10, 35, 123, 144, 182 Mantua, Marquis of ± see Gonzaga, Francesco Marco di Pietro di Antonio, 119; wife of, 119 Marescotti, Giovanni, 69 del Marretta, Agostino, 47, 76; Andrea, 47, 76; Francesco, 47, 76 Martinozzi, Benedetto, 76, 88, 175; Lodovico, 106 Marullus, 133 Marzi, Bertoccio, 82; Giovanni, 212 de' Maschi, Ranieri, and his nephews, 239 Maso (putative assassin), 155 Massa (S), 93, 126, 174 Matteo di Marco, 154 Maximilian, Emperor, 194±5

Medici bank, 125, 158 Medici family, of Florence, 12, 16, 18, 28±30, 33, 39±40, 52, 70±1, 93, 98, 103, 156, 157, 182±3, 184, 190, 192, 196, 209, 217, 223, 232±3, 236, 238; Averardo, 39, 60, 62, 70, 78, 84, 85, 93, 98, 125±6; Bernardo d'Alamanno, 98; Bianca, 28; Cosimo, 29, 39±40, 60, 70, 78, 85, 93, 98, 103, 125, 156, 157; Francesco, 85; Giovanni di Lorenzo, Cardinal ± see Leo X, Pope; Giovanni di Pierfrancesco, 193; Giuliano di Averardo, 93, 98; Giuliano di Lorenzo, 18; Giuliano di Piero di Cosimo, 28, 79, 170; Gregorio d'Alamanno, 98; Lorenzo di Giovanni, 39, 93, 98, 125; Lorenzo di Piero, 18, 28, 79, 94, 103, 136, 137, 138, 140, 162, 163, 164, 166, 170, 183, 184, 187, 201, 206, 222, 238; Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco, 193; Piero di Cosimo, 29±30, 93, 103, 104, 158, 206±7; Piero di Lorenzo, 18, 51, 60, 78, 158, 166, 182, 184±6, 188, 190, 193, 196, 203, 205, 217, 219, 220 Melcorini faction, of Orvieto, 64, 224 Michelangelo ('el Miccha'), 130 Micheli, Angelo, 98; Antonio, 146, 161; Bartolomeo, 98; Guasparre, 32; Pietro, 98; Pippo, 98 Michiel, Giovanni, Cardinal, 35 Migliorini, Francesco, 164 Mignanelli bank, 119 Mignanelli, Pierpaolo, 107, 153, 205; his wife, 153 Milan, duchy of, 7±9, 10, 11, 12, 14±16, 17±18, 19, 23, 26±7, 36, 74, 79, 80±1, 86, 89, 96, 99, 103, 104, 135, 137, 138, 140, 144, 159, 160±2, 169, 170, 176, 177, 179, 181, 182, 187±8, 189±90, 191, 192, 194, 203, 207, 218, 219, 220, 223, 226, 236, 237; exiles from 7±9, 16, 17±18, 23, 61±2, 80±1, 86, 99, 103±4, 135, 137, 140, 144, 159, 169, 170, 173, 177, 179, 189±90, 194, 196, 218, 219, 220, 223, 226, 236, 237; exiles in, 11, 15, 27, 89, 96, 161±2, 203 Milan, Dukes of, 7, 23, 112, 181, 188, 214 ± see also, Sforza, Francesco; Sforza, Galeazzo Maria; Sforza, Giangaleazzo Maria; Sforza, Lodovico della Mirandola, Galeotto, 36 Molinella, Battle of, 196 Monaldeschi family, of Orvieto, 64 Monferrato, 80, 144; exiles in, 144 da Monforte, Cola, Conte di Campobasso, 123 Montalcino (S), 44, 124, 154, 229 da Montefeltro family, of Urbino, 134; Costanza, 24; Federico, Count, then Duke (1474), of Urbino, 11, 24, 92, 103, 131, 141, 174, 187; Guidobaldo, Duke of Urbino, 19, 20, 131, 141, 198

index Monte®ascone, 149 Montelaterone (S), 149, 200 Monteleone, 97±8; exiles from, 97±8 Monteliscaio (S), 98 Montemassa (S), 232 Montepaldi, 232 Montepulciano, 46, 51, 53, 164, 184, 185 Monteriggioni (S), 45, 69, 91, 107, 116, 153, 162, 175, 183, 222 Monterotondo (S), 126 Monte Santa Maria in Gallo, 99 da Montesecco, Gianbattista, 79 da Montone, Carlo ± see Fortebraccio, Carlo Montorio, Count of, 97 Montpellier, 134; exiles in, 134 Muffatti faction, of Orvieto, 224 Naples, King of, 7, 24, 112, 173, 176; see also Alfonso I; Alfonso II; Ferrandino; Ferrante; Federico Naples, kingdom of, 6, 10, 12, 16±17, 19, 23, 24±6, 31, 32, 37, 42, 43, 62, 70, 80, 81, 82, 88, 89±91, 92, 93, 96±7, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 117, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 134, 139, 140, 141, 144, 147, 148, 151, 154, 157±8, 160, 162, 163, 173±7, 182, 190, 192, 193, 195, 203, 206, 218, 219, 237; exiles from, 16±17, 22, 24±6, 96±7, 123, 135, 136, 171, 176, 182, 193, 194, 203, 205, 218, 219, 220, 236, 237; exiles in, 10, 23, 62, 70, 82, 88, 89±90, 93, 97, 99, 102, 105, 107, 117, 121, 122, 125, 127, 131, 134, 139, 140, 141, 147, 148, 151, 157±8, 162, 169, 173±4, 175, 190, 206, 232 Napoli di Romania, 104, 156 Narni, 225 Neroni family, of Florence, 71, 93, 122, 232; Amideo, 116; Angelo, 88, 93; Dietisalvi, 29±30, 71, 88, 93, 104, 206; Francesco, 88, 93, 104 Nicasi, G., 139 NiccoloÁ di Ser Antonio di Michele, 130 NiccoloÁ di Madonna Lisabetta, 228 Niccolucci, Tommaso, 32, 56 Nicholas V, Pope (1447±55), 22, 63, 136, 223 Nievo, Leonello, 63 Norcia, 99, 133; exiles in, 133 Novara, 80, 104 Nove, Monte dei, 41, 42, 43, 4, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 65, 68, 69, 106, 116, 121, 156, 162, 171, 175, 177, 178, 195, 205, 212, 213, 217, 218, 220, 222, 227, 229, 231, 232, 235, 238 Noveschi ± see Nove, Monte dei Oddi family, of Perugia, 38±9, 64, 79, 81, 99, 101, 198; Bertoldo, 220±1; Carlo di Sforza, 99;

253

Costantino, 99; Fabrizio, 220±1; Lione, 99; Lionello, 99; Mariotto, 99; Mariotto di Simone, 99; NiccoloÁ di Sforza, 99; Pompeo, 199; Simone di Guido, 99 Orbetello (S), 31 Ordelaf® family, of ForlõÁ, 10±11, 22, 159, 237; Antonio Maria, 11, 187; Cecco, 11, 159, 187; Cecco's son, killed 1481, 159; Francesco, 11; Pino, 10, 11; Sinibaldo, 11 Orlandini family, of Siena, 128; Antonio, 124 Orsi family, of ForlõÁ, 22; Andrea, 22; Checco, 22; Lodovico, 22 Orsini family, Roman barons, 19, 20, 123, 173, 185, 190, 196; Aldobrandino, 161, 173, 175, 197; Gianbattista, Cardinal, 179, 180; Giulio, 163, 173, 179±80, 197; NiccoloÁ, 123, 167; Paolo, 197; Virginio, 179±80, 185, 196, 197 Orsini party, Papal States, 37, 38, 196 Orvieto, 64, 104, 106, 166, 224; exiles from, 64, 224 Ostia, 22 Otranto, 43 outlaws (banditi, sbanditi), 21, 22, 63, 68±70, 103, 106, 107, 115, 118, 131, 145, 148, 153±4, 156, 159, 166 Pacciano, 198 Paccinelli, Giovanni, 154 Padua, 85, 93, 98, 108, 110, 136, 203; exiles in, 85, 93, 110, 136, 203 Palermo, 134; exiles in, 134 Palmieri, Agnolo, 49, 149, 205, 206, 228 Pannilini, Lucrezia, 129; Matteo, 128; Mino, 128±9, 155, 164, 235 papal nipoti, 172, 173, 181, 201; see also, Borgia, Cesare; Cibo, Franceschetto; della Rovere, Giuliano, Cardinal; Riario, Girolamo; Riario, Raffaele, Cardinal Papal States, exiles from towns in, 10±13, 16, 18±20, 22±3, 36±9, 63±4, 79, 97±8, 99, 101, 112, 114±5, 122±3, 136±7, 138±40, 141, 158±9, 165±6, 170±1, 178, 187±8, 191±2, 198±9, 200, 205, 209, 214, 220±22, 223±5, 236; exiles in, 89, 93, 105, 163, 167±8, 174, 175, 199±200, 203; see also, Acquapendente, Amelia, Anagni, Ancona, Ascoli, Assisi, Bologna, Camerino, Cascia, CittaÁ della Pieve, CittaÁ di Castello, Faenza, ForlõÁ, Fossombrone, Imola, Monteleone, Norcia, Orvieto, Perugia, Pesaro, Rieti, Rimini, Rome, Spoleto, Todi, Viterbo Parenti, Marco, 104, 206±7 Pari (S), 102 Parma, 36, 62, 80, 81, 96, 115, 122, 190, 214±15, 236; exiles from, 36, 62, 96, 122, 190, 203, 214±15, 236

254

index

Passignano, 199 Patrimony of St Peter (province of Papal States), 36, 63, 166, 169, 174, 180, 214 Patrizi, Francesco, 146 Paul II, Pope (1464±71), 12, 20, 35, 135, 224 Pavia, 80, 81, 146; exiles in, 146 Pazzi family, of Florence, 28, 60, 79, 94; Andrea, 94; Francesco, 28; Giovanni, 94; Guglielmo, 28, 94; Jacopo, 28; Renato, 94 Pazzi War, 42, 43, 46, 75, 89, 92, 164, 177, 182, 183, 237 Pepoli family, of Bologna, 218 Perignano (S), 31 Persico, Broccardo, 74, 173, 174 Perugia, 19, 38±9, 40, 64, 79, 97, 99, 101, 106, 107, 114, 122±3, 128, 141, 158±9, 165±6, 167, 178, 188, 196±7, 198±9, 220±1, 223, 224, 236; Dieci di Arbitrio, 64, 79, 123, 158±9, 221; exiles from, 19, 38±9, 64, 79, 97, 99, 101, 122±3, 141, 158±9, 165±6, 188, 198±9, 200, 220±1, 223, 224, 236; exiles in, 128, 158, 165, 166, 167, 178, 198 Peruzzi family, of Florence, 78; Ridolfo, 40 Pesaro, 19, 122; exiles from, 19; exiles in, 122 Pescia, 130 Petroni, Lodovico, 211 Petrucci, Achille, 83, 108, 116, 120, 132, 148±9, 216; Alessandro, 88; Antonio di Bartolomeo, 149; Antonio di Checco Rosso, 31, 42, 56, 57, 74, 91, 134, 141, 155, 161, 173±5, 220, 235; Bartolomeo, 76, 98, 146; Battista, 120; Francesco, 154; Giacoppo, 50, 51, 74, 90, 98, 125, 146, 160, 175, 184, 206, 222, 228; NiccoloÁ, 88±9, 91, 134; Pandolfo, 19, 48, 50, 51±2, 53, 59, 70, 93, 141±2, 155, 181, 184, 185±6, 198, 206, 226, 228 Piacenza, 81, 144; exiles from, 144 Piano (S), 116 Picchiati, Guido, 76 Piccinino, Jacopo, 31, 32, 72, 74, 134, 141, 161, 173, 174±5, 195±6; NiccoloÁ, 196 Piccolomini, Aldello, 69; Bernardino, 52, 93; Enea, Cardinal ± see Pius II, Pope; Francesco, Cardinal, 38±9, 64, 75, 102±3, 131, 165, 180, 200, 206, 223, 238±9 Piedmont, 144; exiles in, 144 Pietrasanta, 158 Pille (S), 102 Pini, Buonaventura, 127, 149, 220 'Piombino' (putative assassin), 155 Piombino, 19, 126±7, 162±3, 175; exiles from, 19, 162; exiles in, 126±7, 162±3, 175; see also ± d'Appiano, Jacopo Pisa, 32±3, 51, 62, 77, 90, 95±6, 98, 99, 105, 107, 125, 129, 130, 147, 160, 164, 184, 189, 190, 206, 218, 223, 236; exiles from, 32, 62, 77, 95±6, 122, 134, 135, 178, 203,

218, 223, 236; exiles in, 90, 98, 125, 130, 147, 160, 184 Pisani, Bartolomeo, 34 Pistoia, 130; exiles in, 130 Pitigliano, 123, 173, 174 Pitti, Luca, 206±7 Pius II, Pope (1458±64), Enea Piccolomini, 64, 97, 210, 224 Placidi, Neri, 44, 114, 126±7, 149, 155, 156, 164, 175, 206, 211, 220, 222, 231; Onesta, 153; Placido di Aldello, 44, 46, 153; Placido di Domenico, 90 Polito, Bernardino, 164 da Pontremoli, Nicodemo, 146, 160, 161 pope, 11, 12±13, 17, 20±2, 63±4, 97, 162, 163, 166±9, 170, 173, 181, 200, 205, 223±5; see also ± Alexander VI; Calixtus III; Innocent VIII; Julius II; Nicholas V; Paul II; Pius II; Sixtus IV popolani (here, members of the popolo minuto), 32, 44, 45, 47, 48, 212±13, 217, 235 popolari (members of the political category, the popolo), 13, 15, 26, 38, 236 Popolari ± see Popolo, Monte del popolo minuto (common people) ± see popolani Popolo, Monte del, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 69, 70, 92, 148, 151, 164, 171, 205, 212, 213±14, 216, 217, 227, 229, 231, 235 Poppi, 99 Porcaro, Stefano, 22, 136 Porto Pisano, 186 Portovenere, 176 Prato, 130, 223 Princivalle, 42, 162 Procida, 105 Provence, 88, 93 Pucci family, of Florence, 93; Giovanni di Antonio, 98; Puccio di Antonio, 98 Querini, NiccoloÁ, 35 Ranieri family, of Perugia, 38; Costantino, 220 Rapallo, 176 Raspanti faction, Perugia, 38 Ravenna, 34 rebels, 8, 18, 32, 44, 52, 53, 56±7, 62, 63, 64, 68±70, 87, 90, 91, 95, 100, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113±14, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 127, 130, 131, 145, 148, 149, 151, 153±6, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 170, 177, 184, 208, 210, 214, 215, 216, 229, 231 Recanati, 90 Retimo (Crete), 101 Riario family, 16, 19; Girolamo, 10±12, 19, 21, 22, 28, 35, 36, 63, 108, 128, 140, 159, 163, 168, 177±8, 179, 180, 197, 201; Raffaele,

index Cardinal, 21, 79, 169, 178; see also ± Sforza Riario, Caterina Ricchi, Felice, 119; Ricco, 119, 131, 154, 201, 222 Rieti, 37, 63, 223±4; exiles from, 63, 223±4 Riformatori, Monte dei, 41, 42±3, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 59, 68, 69, 72, 82, 90, 91, 92, 102, 105, 106, 115±16, 117, 120, 130, 140, 205, 215±6, 217, 218, 227, 229, 231, 232, 235 Rimini, 19, 98, 99; exiles from 19, 239 riseduti ± see Siena, government la Rocca (S), 83, 106 da la Rocca, Nino, 150 Roccalbegna (S), 91 Rocca Tederighi (S), 31 Rocca a Tentennano (S), 74, 90, 91 Rome, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20±2, 25, 27, 28, 35, 36, 48, 75, 79, 91, 97, 98, 104, 105, 106, 108, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131±2, 134, 137, 140±1, 144, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 160, 161, 163, 167±8, 170, 174, 177, 178±83, 189, 190, 193, 201, 211, 213, 227, 237, 238, 239; exiles from, 13, 20±2, 135, 136±7, 193, 237; exiles in, 1, 12±13, 16, 19, 25, 26±7, 36, 91, 105, 108, 127, 128, 130, 131±2, 134, 140±1, 144, 150, 151, 154, 156, 158, 161, 167±8, 177, 178±83, 189, 190, 201, 227 Ronciglione, 149±50 Rossi family, of Parma, 190; Guido, 135, 203; Piermaria, 135 Rossi squadra (faction), of Parma, 115, 122, 214±15 Rota family, of Bergamo, 63 della Rovere, Francesco Maria, 19, 20; Giovanni, 24, 203; Giuliano, Cardinal ± see Julius II, Pope Rucellai, Giovanni, 117±8 Salamon, Michele, 35 Salvi, Evangelista, 110, 145 Salviati, Francesco, 28, 79 di Sangro, Countess Altabella, 123 San Giovanni d'Asso (S), 88 San Pietro a Paterno (S), 127 San Lorenzo Àllegrecti', 149 San Quirico (S), 46, 124, 134, 179, 222 Sano di Maestro Andrea, 102 Sansedoni, Bartolomeo, 91±2 Sanseverino, 105 da Sanseverino family, of Naples, 24; Antonello, Prince of Salerno, 24±6, 136, 182, 193, 203; Federico, Cardinal, 182±3, 193; Fracassa, 180; Roberto, 8, 9, 23, 27, 36, 80, 81, 132, 135, 169, 170, 172, 177, 179, 180, 189, 195, 196, 197, 223, 226

255

Santa Fiora, 141±2, 199, 200; Count of, see Sforza, Guido Santa Maria della Scala, Hospital of (Siena), 119, 128 Santa Maria a Pilli (S), 124 Santi, Urbano, 131 de' Saraceni, Antonio, 73 Sarzana, 186 Sassoferrato, Bartolo of, 118 Saturnia (S), 46, 163, 222 Savelli family, Roman barons, 20, 221 Messer Savino, 116 Savona, 194 Savonarola, Girolamo, 61 Savoy, duchy of, 9, 80; duchess of, 80 Scala, Bartolomeo, 79 Scarlino (S), 149 Scops, 144 Scotti, Carlo, 149, 200 Senigallia, 19, 136, 203; exiles from, 19; exiles in, 136, 203 Sestri Ponente, 186 Severini, Conte, 70, 75, 79, 216; Francesco, 47±8, 70, 75, 79, 164, 188, 216, 220; Giovanni, 48, 51, 69, 70, 75, 79, 154, 164, 171, 192, 203, 216; Roberto, 48, 51, 69, 70, 75, 79, 216; Sozzino, 70, 75, 79, 216 Sforza family, of Milan, 7±9, 16, 17±18, 19, 23, 62, 112, 134, 144; Ascanio, Cardinal, 8±9, 17±18, 23, 62, 80±1, 86, 99, 103±4, 137, 140, 190, 193, 226; Bianca Maria, 194; Bona, 7±9, 62, 80±1, 86, 99, 137, 138, 140, 170, 177, 223, 226; Filippo Maria, 177; Francesco, Duke of Milan (1450±66), 7±8, 14, 23, 29, 31, 74, 81, 86, 89, 132, 137±8, 160±2, 173, 174, 188, 191, 202, 207, 211, 237; Galeazzo Maria, Duke of Milan (1466±76), 7±8, 10±11, 14, 26, 27, 80, 86, 137, 138, 159, 170; Giangaleazzo Maria, Duke of Milan (1476±94), 7±9, 17, 80, 81, 86, 140, 190, 226; Lodovico, Duke of Milan (1494±99;1500), 7±9, 15, 16, 17±18, 23, 51, 62, 80, 81, 86, 99, 103, 104, 110, 135, 136, 137, 140, 144, 170, 177, 183, 188, 190, 194±5, 223, 226; Ottaviano, 8, 86; Sforza Maria, 7±8, 62, 80, 81, 86, 99, 137, 177 Sforza, Giovanni, signore of Pesaro, 19±20 Sforza, Guido, Count of Santa Fiora, 173, 199, 200 Sforza Riario, Caterina, 11, 19, 22, 62, 159 Sicily, 16, 17, 21, 88, 93, 104, 134, 195, 203; exiles in, 16, 17, 21, 134, 203 Siena, 1, 2, 19, 30±2, 40±60, 62, 65±70, 71, 72±7, 79, 82±4, 88±93, 95, 98, 99, 100, 101±3, 105±8, 110, 113±14, 115±17, 118, 119±21, 123±5, 126±43, 144±56, 157,

256

index

Siena (cont.) 160±9, 171, 173±6, 177±9, 181, 183±6, 188, 189, 192, 195, 196±202, 203, 204, 205±6, 207±8, 210±14, 215±20, 221, 222±3, 226±32, 235, 236, 238±9 Siena, government: BalõÁa, 40±1, 42±3, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52±3, 56±9, 65, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 82, 83, 84, 91, 92, 95, 101, 103, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114, 116±21, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 144±5, 146, 147±8, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153±4, 155, 156, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 185, 198, 199, 203, 205, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 216, 217, 227, 228±30, 231, 232; Biccherna, 113, 119, 120; Captain of the People, 32, 56, 74, 113; Concistoro, 30, 32, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 56, 57, 59, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 77, 83, 95, 128, 146±7, 150, 152, 153, 207±8, 216, 227, 230, 235; Council of the People, 30, 32, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 51, 53, 56, 57, 65, 69, 73, 74, 77, 89, 93, 101, 208, 210, 216, 217, 226, 228, 229, 230, 235; General Council, 41, 208, 210; Of®cials of Ward, 45, 56, 59, 73, 75, 76, 83, 95, 103, 148, 152, 227; riseduti, 30, 40±1, 44, 89, 226; segreti, 58±9, 73, 77, 102, 114, 145, 153, 154, 155, 230; Signoria ± see Concistoro; Ten of Ward ± see Of®cials of Ward Siena, exiles from, 1, 2±3, 19, 32, 40±54, 62, 65±70, 72±7, 81, 82±4, 85, 88±93, 95, 98, 100, 101±3, 105±8, 110, 113±4, 115±17, 118, 119±21, 123±5, 126±34, 136, 140±2, 144±56, 160±9, 173±6, 177±81, 183±6, 188±9, 192, 194, 195±8, 199±201, 203, 204, 205±6, 207±8, 210±14, 215±20, 221, 222±3, 226±32, 235, 236, 238±9; contado, exiles in, 42, 44, 46, 50, 57, 59, 76±7, 82, 83, 88±9, 90±3, 98, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 116, 118, 121, 122±3, 124, 125, 126, 127, 145, 148±9, 165±6, 175, 185±6, 198, 213, 222±3 Siena, monti, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 51, 55, 155, 227, 229; see also Aggregati, Monte degli; Dodici, Monte dei; Gentiluomini, Monte dei; Nove, Monte dei; Popolo, Monte del; Riformatori, Monte dei Siena, Bigi and Biribatti factions, 47, 48 Sigismund, Emperor, 76, 134 Simonetta, Cicco, 7±8, 27, 80, 86, 103 Simoni, Filippo, 50 Sinalunga (S), 124 Sixtus IV, Pope (1471±84), 11, 12±13, 21, 28, 42, 46, 63, 79, 89, 128, 131, 136, 139±41, 153, 167, 168, 169, 177±8, 179, 180, 181±2, 187, 190, 197, 201, 211, 224±5 Soderini family, of Florence, 232; Bernardo,

232; Gheri, 71, 88, 93; Lorenzo, 232; NiccoloÁ, 29±30, 71, 88, 93, 191; Tommaso, 210 Soriano, 97 Sovana (S), 116 Sovana, Bishop of ± see Ghinucci, Andreoccio Sozzini, Alessandro, 70; Bartolomeo, 130, 183, 188, 205±6 Spain, 5, 195, 235, 237 Spannocchi bank (heirs of Ambrogio Spannocchi), 125, 126, 148, 151, 154 Spannocchi, Andrea, 151; Cassandra, 125, 126 Spanish intervention in Italy, 16, 17, 237 Spinola family, of Genoa, 26, 27, 61 Spoleto, 37, 64, 97±8, 158, 200, 209, 224±5, 236; exiles from, 64, 158, 209, 224±5; exiles in, 98 Staggia, 48, 183±4 Starn, Randolph, 3±4, 81 Sterpeto, counts of, 114 Stini (S), 124 de' Stini, Bartolomeo, 76, 90 Strozzi family, of Florence, 156, 204, 206±7, 209±10, 217; Alessandra, 122, 157±8, 170, 206, 210; Alessandra (wife of Lorenzo di Palla), 122; Filippo, 84, 125, 157, 158, 206±7; Francesco, 157; Lorenzo di Matteo, 157±8, 206, 209±10; Lorenzo di Palla, 122; Matteo, 122, 125, 206; Onofri, 110, 156; Palla, 84±5, 110, 117±8, 122, 156, 203; Palla's wife, 122 Taddeo, Ser, 49±50 Talamone (S), 174 Tancredi, Callisto, 229; Francesco, 47; Pietro Scacco, 32, 56, 229 Tassini, Antonio, 8±9 Terni, 38, 200, 225 Tiberti family, of Monteleone, 98 del Tignoso family, of Pisa, 134 Tizio, Sigismondo, 68 Todi, 37±8, 104, 107, 178, 200, 219, 225, 236; exiles from, 37±8, 178, 200, 219, 225, 236 Tolentino, 99 Tolomei, Lodovico, 47, 59, 70 Tommasi, Guglielmo, 107 Tommaso di TomeÁ di Onofrio, 116 Torre a Castello (S), 124 Tortona, 223 Trent, 99 Treviso, 104 Tricerchi, Carmignuola, 125; Mino, 83, 106 Trieste, 104 Trivulzio, Giangiacomo, 17, 23, 81, 135, 190, 194 Trotti, Marco, 80 Tucci, Tuccio, 149

index Turin, 99 Turks, 43, 168, 189 Ugolini, NiccoloÁ, 119 Ulm, 5 Urbino, duchy of, 19, 92, 103, 107, 121; exiles from, 19; exiles in, 92, 103, 107, 121, 131, 141 Urbino, Duke of ± see da Montefeltro, Federico; da Montefeltro, Guidobaldo Valdombrone (S), 93 Val d'Orcia (S), 91 Valencia, 126, 134 Valentano, 167 Varano family, of Camerino, 19 Varano, Giulio Cesare, signore of Camerino, 19, 132±3, 141 Venice, 6, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, 23, 29, 33±6, 61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 79, 80, 81, 85, 89, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100±1, 103, 104, 105, 106, 123, 133, 135, 136, 139, 140, 144, 145, 156, 159, 170, 179, 182, 186, 188±91, 194, 196, 200, 203, 209, 234, 237; College, 61, 209; Doge, 61, 104, 209; Forty, 61; Great Council, 34; Senate, 34, 35, 170; Signoria, 170; Ten 34, 61, 63, 71, 104, 188±9, 209; exiles from, 33±6, 61, 62, 63, 71, 85, 94, 100±1, 104, 156, 170, 178, 205, 209; exiles in, 19, 85, 93, 103, 125, 135, 136, 144, 159, 170, 189±90, 203 Venturini, Camillo, 48±9, 216; Lorenzo, 48,

257

68, 199, 148, 188, 216; Lorenzo's wife, 119 Vergelle (S), 91 Verona, 88; exiles in, 88 Vespucci, Guidantonio, 201 Vicenza, 63; exiles from, 63 Vieri, Daniele, 211; Giorgio, 92; Giovanni, 211±12; Jacomo, 92, 103 Vimercate, Ettore da, 8 Visconti family, of Milan, 134, 144; Filippo Maria, Duke of Milan, 23, 196, 237; Valentina, 17 Vitelli family, of CittaÁ di Castello, 12±13, 19, 123, 166, 181, 198, 199, 200; Camillo, 13; Giovanni, 12; NiccoloÁ, 12±13, 139±40, 187, 218, 224; Paolo, 13; Vitellozzo, 19, 185, 197±8, 211 Viterbo, 36±7, 63, 97, 98, 105, 107, 115, 123, 130, 147, 149, 150, 166, 169, 214, 224, 236; exiles from, 36±7, 63, 97, 115, 214, 224, 236; exiles in, 123, 130, 147, 149, 150, 169 Volterra, 33, 62, 77, 96, 223; BalõÁa, 33, 62; exiles from, 33, 62, 77, 96, 223 Zacci family, of Pisa, 134 Zane, Lorenzo, Patriarch of Antioch, 35, 178, 224 Zene, Carlo, 84 Zeno, Elisabetta, 35; Gianbattista, Cardinal, 35 Zondadori, Buoninsegna, 98; Pierpaolo, 124; Troilo, 98

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