Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization

Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution Miloševic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization Nebojša Vladisavljev...

Author: Nebojsa Vladisavljevic

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Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution Miloševic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization

Nebojša Vladisavljevic

Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution

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Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization Nebojša Vladisavljević

© Nebojˇsa Vladisavljević 2008 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 9780230205215 hardback ISBN-10: 0230205216 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vladisavljević, Neboj–a, 1969 Serbia’s antibureaucratic revolution:Milo–ević, the fall of communism and nationalist mobilization/Neboj–a Vladisavljević.“ 1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0230205216 (alk. paper) 1. Yugoslavia“Politics and government“19801992. 2. Milošević, Slobodan, 19412006. I. Title. DR1309.V56 2008 949.702 4“dc22 2008016162 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

To Milena


Contents

Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction: The Significance of the Antibureaucratic Revolution Images of the antibureaucratic revolution The antibureaucratic revolution and the Yugoslav conflicts after Tito The state-centred approach to popular protest Protest politics and political change under authoritarianism The politics of nationalist mobilization Sources The plan of the book

5 9 13 17 20 23

1

Yugoslavia’s Peculiar Authoritarianism The making of the party-state, multi-national federalism and limited pluralism Shifting elite alignments and state–society relations The radical decentralization of socialist Yugoslavia Dissent and popular protest under the party-state Political instability after Tito Late Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism and its unintended consequences

25

The Rise of Milošević The change of political generations The ascendancy of Ivan Stambolić and the circular flow of power Divisions in the younger generation Why Milošević won Late Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism, the rise of Milošević and Kosovo

51 53

The Grass-Roots Protest of Kosovo Serbs Serb–Albanian antagonisms Building protest at the grass roots

78 79 88

2

3

vii

1 1

26 31 35 39 43 48

59 64 69 74

viii

Contents

Milošević and the spread of mobilization Kosovo Serbs’ protests, their protest strategies and patterns of mobilization in socialist Yugoslavia 4

5

6

Yugoslavia’s Political Class and Popular Unrest in the Summer of 1988 The ruling class on the streets The Novi Sad demonstration of the Kosovo Serbs Yugoslavia’s political class and the early summer mobilization The July and August protest campaign of Kosovo Serbs and their allies The summer mobilization and its consequences The Antibureaucratic Revolution and its Enemies Milošević’s populism and the wave of mobilization Demonstrations and the collapse of the old political establishment The rally of solidarity Framing the antibureaucratic revolution The complexity of the antibureaucratic revolution The Popular Protests of Kosovo Albanians and the Serb–Slovene Conflict The popular protests of Kosovo Albanians The escalation of the Serb–Slovene conflict Constitutional reform, the resurgence of the Kosovo Albanian protests and state repression Road to confrontation

Conclusion: Protest Politics, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Conflict Explaining the antibureaucratic revolution and related protest campaigns The fall of communism, Serbian style Protest politics and Yugoslavia’s nationalist conflicts

99 104

109 110 119 125 134 143 145 146 151 166 170 177

179 179 189 192 194

195 195 202 207

Notes

212

Bibliography

221

Index

229

Acknowledgements During my work on this book I have benefited greatly from the advice of a number of scholars. My principal thanks are due to my friends and colleagues Vesselin Dimitrov, who fully supported my work and offered insightful criticism on the whole project over several years of research and writing, and Sumantra Bose, for frequent discussions on this and related topics, and his detailed comments on the manuscript. I am also indebted to several scholars who made very helpful comments at various stages of the preparation of the book: Dominic Lieven, Solomon Karmel, Richard Crampton, Spyros Economides, Melissa Bokovoy, Chun Lin, Chris Binns, Florian Bieber, Erik Ringmar and Bill Kissane. None of them can be held responsible for any mistakes that still remain in the text. In addition, I am grateful to my interviewees—high officials of the former Yugoslavia and leaders of popular protests—for sharing information and their opinions with me, which greatly improved the quality of the book. They cannot be held responsible for my conclusions, not least because they themselves strongly disagree about various issues discussed in this book.

ix


Introduction: The Significance of the Antibureaucratic Revolution

In the 1980s, Yugoslavia was in turmoil. The death of Tito and the change of political generations had left a large power vacuum, and economic and political crises now further undermined the communist regime and the loose multi-national federation. The power gap and ensuing elite conflict resulted in the rise of Slobodan Milošević and massive popular unrest in Serbia, the country’s largest republic. In 1988–89 the popular unrest peaked in the ‘antibureaucratic revolution’—a series of large rallies and demonstrations of industrial workers, Kosovo Serbs, their allies and other groups, which were strongly backed by Milošević—and in a counter-mobilization of Kosovo Albanians. The events came to be called the antibureaucratic revolution, at times sarcastically, because large demonstrations turned dramatic and resulted in major political change. Scores of high Yugoslav officials and regional governments, labelled ‘bureaucrats’ by the protesters, left office in disgrace amidst popular upheaval, which ended with violence and repression. The wave of popular unrest was the most crucial episode of Yugoslav conflicts after Tito and contributed to the fall of communism and the rise of a new form of authoritarianism, competing nationalisms and the break-up of Yugoslavia. It also played an important role in the ascent to power of Milošević and in the making of the contemporary Serb–Albanian nationalist conflict in and over Kosovo. And yet, these events and their implications remain shrouded in mystery.

Images of the antibureaucratic revolution Throughout Eastern Europe ordinary people took part in political struggles that surrounded the fall of communism. In some countries, the growing restiveness of the working class, other groups and non-political 1

2


associations put pressure on high party-state officials to enter into negotiations with dissident elites on power sharing and the transition to democracy, or to initiate reforms. The image of Solidarity, the massive social movement from the early 1980s, lurking behind the growing wave of strikes, convinced Poland’s communist leaders to enter into talks with dissidents. In Hungary, the stirrings of civil society, expressed through various small protests and strikes, together with the action of reformist high officials, triggered far-reaching political reforms. In those countries that found the floodgates of the Soviet bloc already partly open, such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia, ordinary people took part in massive demonstrations that triggered the collapse of the old regime. In Romania they even participated in its direct removal through violent confrontation with the remnants of the regime, in alliance with other parts of the former establishment. Unsurprisingly, the lasting image of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe is that of people power prevailing over the repressive communist party-state in the struggle for democracy. The level of parallel mobilization of ordinary people in Yugoslavia, namely of industrial workers and Kosovo Serbs, various groups during the antibureaucratic revolution and Kosovo Albanians, surpassed those in most other East European states, if judged by the numbers of participants, the variety of groups involved and the temporal and geographical extension of mobilization. Popular protests ranged from small and orderly events to large and highly disruptive protest marches and demonstrations, which led to considerable changes in the personal composition and policies of Yugoslavia’s political elites, as well as in the structure and operation of the authoritarian regime. However, the images of this wave of mobilization that dominate published accounts sharply contrast with those of the people power associated with political struggles in other East European states, and sketch authoritarian, even totalitarian mobilization, and the dark forces of nationalism. Two somewhat overlapping arguments about this wave of mobilization dominate the scholarly and popular literature on the region. According to one view, the main agents of mobilization in Serbia, including its autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and in Montenegro, Yugoslavia’s smallest republic, were the elites. Ordinary people involved in the struggles, such as Kosovo Serb activists and their non-elite allies outside Kosovo, industrial workers, students and other protesters, as well as Kosovo Albanian activists, for the most part passively adopted the attitudes and actions of high officials or dissident intellectuals. The scholars of socialist Yugoslavia claim that the events were orchestrated by opportunistic Leninist leaders, who embraced nationalism in search of

Introduction

3

new legitimation formula at the time of communism’s collapse. Some authors saw in the wave of mobilization little more than a crowd that unleashed its destructive capacity and yearning for its leaders, especially for Milošević.1 Following the Leninist conception of collective action, the elite argument implies that ordinary people are incapable of coherent political action unless led by elites. The other lingering view of those popular struggles is that of purposive nationalist mobilization. According to this view, mobilization symbolized the peak of Serb nationalist revival, which in turn triggered the nationalist mobilization of Kosovo Albanians. Some authors have argued that primordial sentiments came to the surface with the relaxation of repression and loosening of other controls imposed by the communists after the Second World War, thus leading to the vicious circle of nationalist mobilization and counter-mobilization (Kaplan 1994: 29–48). For most scholars, the wave of mobilization was an indicator of much more complex forces at work, namely the diffusion of nationalist ideas from narrow circles of dissident intellectuals to the masses, amplified with the sudden availability of the organizational resources of the party-state, as its officials adopted nationalist strategies in search of new sources of legitimation.2 In any case, mobilization directly flowed from political actors’ embrace of nationalist strategies, primordialist or instrumentalist, with the aim to bring about particular nationalist outcomes. Little evidence exists to support these views about the antibureaucratic revolution and related protest campaigns. Rather, they pass as self-evident in the light of subsequent political developments, namely the nationalist conflicts surrounding the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars of its succession, in which elites, especially Milošević, played a prominent role. The assumption is that the main actors and ideas from the latter period must also have played a key role in the preceding events. Those few brief accounts published on the mass mobilization in the 1980s, mainly as parts of books on the break-up of Yugoslavia and subsequent wars, rely on the testimonies of high officials, almost exclusively Milošević’s rivals purged from Serbia’s leadership in 1987–88 and his subsequent opponents from other regional leaderships, which many took for granted in the light of the subsequent conflicts. Milošević, his supporters and dissident intellectuals hardly bothered to contest the testimonies because they had a vested interest in keeping alive the theory that credited them with a much greater role in the events than they had actually played at the time. They in fact claimed a leading role in initiating the Serb nationalist revival, which was a highly rewarding electoral and public relations strategy in the context of the

4


nationalist conflicts surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars. These images of the antibureaucratic revolution and related popular protests became widely accepted in part because they built upon prevailing views in the literatures on related issues. Indeed, the elite and purposive nationalist mobilization arguments merit closer investigation principally because they reflect broader debates among specialists on Yugoslavia and its successor states and the scholars of nationalism, communism and modern authoritarian regimes. The two arguments draw extensively on the literature on the Yugoslav controversies of the 1980s and 1990s, which has largely been elite-centred, with a particular focus on high politics, dissident intellectuals and personalities, especially on Milošević, as well as on the attitudes and strategies of political actors, and the formal and informal institutions that regulated relations between Yugoslavia’s republics and nations.3 The elite argument about the antibureaucratic revolution reflects the view, reinforced during the third wave of democratization, that modern non-democratic regimes are invariably closed, exclusive and repressive and, barring an exceptionally favorable international context, an extremely unfavorable political context for the collective action of ordinary people. Communist party-states are considered to have normally been more repressive than other types of modern non-democratic regime so that one could hardly expect ordinary people to initiate and sustain collective action in this political environment. Thus, the antibureaucratic revolution must have been orchestrated by either high officials or dissident intellectuals. Likewise, the purposive nationalist mobilization view mirrors the prevailing focus in nationalism studies on discourse rather than action or, alternatively, a narrow focus on action as arising from the self-interest of political actors. The assumption is generally that nationalist outcomes logically flow from the ideas, identities or interests of political actors. Accordingly, the eruption of nationalist conflicts in 1989, such as the Serb–Albanian conflict and the growing confrontation between Serbia and Slovenia at both elite and mass levels, could not but have resulted from the strategies of various actors devised long before the onset of their action. Another reason for the widespread acceptance of these two images of the antibureaucratic revolution involves common obstacles to research on popular protest, especially under authoritarianism. The difficulty in gathering information about specific episodes of mobilization is widely acknowledged in research on popular protest and social movements. Since protest groups rarely produce and store documents, and are on the

Introduction

5

margins of political life, scholars often focus on documents produced by intellectuals who support a social movement. The outlook of local observers, who in repressive political settings serve as the gate keepers, that is, the main interpreters of political struggles to journalists and academics from other countries, shapes their perceptions on mobilization as well (Laba 1991: 7). The antibureaucratic mobilization unfolded during liberalization, after decades of strict controls over public life, and it is hardly surprising that increasingly open political debates, mounting conflict in the higher echelons of the party-state and the arrival of former dissident intellectuals to the political stage overwhelmed local journalists and scholars. As a result, they considered episodes of mobilization to be the reflection of battles fought between and within Yugoslavia’s regional leaderships, and between high officials and dissident intellectuals, and thus largely irrelevant. We know little about some episodes of mobilization due to highly restricted access to information in some parts of socialist Yugoslavia. Before 1988 there was little information about the protests of the Kosovo Serbs and political developments in Kosovo. At the time, Serb–Albanian relations were still a taboo topic outside of official organizations, and the peripheral position of Kosovo and its highly conservative leadership were important obstacles in this respect. In fact, few observers actually met Kosovo Serb protesters before 1988. There were few credible reports about their protests and even those available related to isolated events and were scattered in the local press. As a result, the reports were easily lost among those that focused on developments on the central political stage and among the countless statements of high officials and official organizations.

The antibureaucratic revolution and the Yugoslav conflicts after Tito This book shows that the elite and purposive nationalist mobilization arguments are misleading, and questions the prevailing views in the literatures on the Yugoslav controversies, communism, authoritarianism and nationalist mobilization, which lend them credibility. Drawing partly on previously unavailable sources, I show that the agency of ordinary people in Kosovo, Vojvodina, Montenegro and central Serbia was central to the rise and expansion of protest politics. Only in its later stages did the protest wave involve both bottom-up and top-down mobilization features, especially when Milošević employed the logistical resources of the party-state to boost participation at the rallies. Even then the

6


involvement of the political elite remained largely restricted to central Serbia. I also show that the mobilization involved various themes and demands and only in its late stages turned decisively nationalist and exclusionary. This outcome was not the consequence of primordialist or instrumentalist nationalist strategies of various elite actors, as the purposive nationalist mobilization thesis claims. Rather, nationalism became a dominant political force largely as an unintended outcome of high levels of mobilization and spiraling social, economic and political conflicts in a complex, authoritarian multi-national state which experienced a severe economic crisis and rapid liberalization. These arguments have important implications for the interpretation of the fall of Yugoslav communism and federation, as well as for research on mobilization and political change in authoritarian and multi-national states. The main implication of the argument about the complexity of the antibureaucratic revolution, in terms of its bottom-up and top-down, as well as its nationalist and non-nationalist features, is that the mobilizational wave was the focal point of the Yugoslav conflicts in the 1980s. First, the wave was at the centre of political struggles surrounding the fall of Yugoslav liberal communism and the rise of populist authoritarianism. The unlikely outcome of sustained popular protest in a non-democratic context was an unintended consequence of Yugoslavia’s late authoritarianism and political change after the death of Tito. Growing elite conflict, driven by leadership succession and generational change in the most liberal and decentralized East European communist state, paralysed Yugoslavia’s collective leadership and impeded attempts at the suppression of popular challenges. Observers erroneously consider various instances of mobilization in this period to be isolated protest or mobilizational campaigns with little impact on the political process. I show that protests of various groups in the second half of the 1980s formed one and the same wave of mobilization, in terms of clustering together temporally and spatially, aiming at the same targets—party-state officials—borrowing protest strategies from each other, exploiting political opportunities opened by their predecessors and forming temporary alliances. For this reason the wave of mobilization strongly affected power relations in Yugoslavia’s political class, namely the relations within and between regional leaderships and between higher and lower-level officials, as well as relations between the party-state and society, and thus set the stage for the fall of communism and the rise of populist authoritarianism. Secondly, this wave of mobilization was at the centre of political struggles in the course of which nationalist issues overshadowed

Introduction

7

other, often unrelated ones. The antibureaucratic revolution involved a blend of nationalist and unrelated themes and there was significant regional and temporal variation in their occurrences. The year of 1988 was the year of conflict—social, economic and political—at the local, regional and federal levels. Protest groups and their opponents struggled over Serb–Albanian relations and constitutional reform, but also socio-economic issues, industrial relations and the accountability of high officials and political participation, just like in other East European party-states. High levels of conflict during the peak of the mobilizational wave, at a time when the communist power structure was rapidly disintegrating, increased the salience of the main underlying structural divisions in Yugoslavia, namely between its republics and nations, and triggered a major attitudinal shift from broad support for the state’s survival at both the elite and mass levels to an increasingly widespread belief that the state was standing in the way of the interests of particular republics and nations. While the break-up of the federation had hardly been inevitable despite its radically decentralized institutional framework, this attitudinal shift sealed the fate of Yugoslavia. In other words, the study of this mobilizational wave is central to understanding key Yugoslav controversies. This book aims to make a contribution to the scholarly literature on the former Yugoslavia, the fall of communism, regime change and nationalist mobilization. Where much of the literature has viewed the Yugoslav conflicts as unique, I present a theoretically informed and comparatively framed study of the fall of communism and nationalist mobilization. In contrast to many scholars of Yugoslavia, nationalism and political regimes who focus principally on elites, I also provide a bottom-up perspective and draw on social movement research to explain the complex interaction between regime elites and non-state actors during episodes of contention. Where scholars of communism and political regimes are sceptical about the capacity of ordinary people to initiate and sustain popular protests under authoritarianism, I show that such protest is not only possible, but may also produce major political change. Where social movement scholars focus largely on Western democracies, and often take for granted many features of this relatively open political context, I draw insights from comparative regime analysis to specify conditions under which popular protests emerge under authoritarianism and to explain their consequences. Where nationalism studies have seen the rise of nationalism as a result of deliberate efforts to construct and implement nationalist projects, I provide an interactive perspective, drawing on recent research on nationalist contention.

8


The theme of regime change has rarely appeared in the literature on the break-up of Yugoslavia, except in a highly descriptive form or restricted to the analysis of electoral politics in 1990 (Cohen 1995; Woodward 1995a; but see Bokovoy et al. 1997; Bunce 1999). This is partly because of the widely accepted view of so-called Yugoslav exceptionalism, which puts emphasis on the differences between Yugoslavia and its counterparts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, rather than on the similarities between them. However, Yugoslavia was first and foremost a party-state that shared important features with its communist cousins, in terms of its formal and informal institutions and state–society relations. Insights about the decline and fall of communism illuminate issues such as the rise of nationalism and the break-up of Yugoslavia, which would otherwise remain shrouded in mystery. The focus on the origins, dynamics and outcomes of the antibureaucratic revolution also sheds light on the role of Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006) in the political struggles in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Many questions remain unanswered about the prime indictee of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. How did he rise to power in Serbia? Was this because of his political programme, personal appeal, weak rivals, powerful political mentors or the rules of the game in a communist party-state? Was Milošević a wholehearted believer in the nationalist cause or just an opportunist who exploited old conflicts and created new ones in the relentless pursuit of power? What were the sources of the enormous power he wielded in the late 1980s and the exceptional autonomy from other high officials of Serbia and Yugoslavia, unrivalled at the time in communist party-states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Why was Milošević so popular with officials of the younger generation, especially in the middle and lower echelons of the party-state, party members and with the population at large? What was his role in the nationalist mobilization and spiraling conflict in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s? Was Milošević the architect of great changes in the structure and policies of the regime and state in the late 1980s or just a first-class swimmer in the rapidly shifting tides triggered by the decline of communism toward the end of the Cold War? How did a formative period of his rule in Serbia shape the power structure and political conflicts of Serbia in the 1990s? This book will aim to provide answers to these questions. In the remainder of this chapter I set out the book’s theoretical foundations in various scholarly debates and discuss the evidence and sources in detail. Since the discussion is largely theoretical and abstract, and specialized, particularly in the section on sources, some readers may wish to

Introduction

9

skip to the more empirical chapters on Yugoslavia’s late authoritarianism and the political conflicts of the 1980s.

The state-centred approach to popular protest Since the elite and purposive nationalist mobilization arguments about the antibureaucratic revolution build upon the prevailing scholarly views on nationalism, communism and modern authoritarian regimes, I will discuss the validity of these views using insights from social movement research. But before setting out on this discussion, I will outline some basic concepts developed by social movement scholars. Social movements may be thought of as ‘collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities’ (Tarrow 1998: 4). Social movements challenge their opponents through disruptive action, rather then through routine political activity, because they often find the institutional avenues closed to them and because they lack control over other power resources. They make visible and dramatic claims against their opponents to attract new supporters, consolidate the solidarity of activists and gain the attention of authorities. Ordinary people do not engage in protest and risk repression for irrational reasons, as early theorists and much popular writing suggest, but because they act upon their common interests (McPhail 1991). In the process, they mobilize consensus partly by drawing on deeply rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. Only those instances of popular protest that are sustained over time may be called social movements (Tarrow 1998: 5–7). The main concepts in social movement research are political opportunities, or more broadly the political context, repertoires and frames of collective action and mobilizing structures (McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1998). By the political context I mean the stable and changing dimensions of the political environment that encourage people to engage in protest or discourage them from doing so (Goodwin 2001). The concept of repertoire of collective action denotes the range of actual forms of action and their development over time. Repertoires emerge from struggle, that is, interaction among various sets of actors rather than as a result of a strategic choice of a single actor, individual or collective (Tilly 1995: 26–7, 30). Collective action frames are interpretive themes that encourage people to engage in popular protest and frame grievances in a way that dignifies them and has meaning for allies and opponents. Social movements identify grievances, relate them to one another and develop broader frames of meaning that will resonate with a population’s

10


cultural predispositions and communicate a uniform message to their opponents. Finally, mobilizing structures are ‘collective vehicles’, formal and informal, through which people mobilize and take part in popular protest (McAdam et al. 1996: 3). These may include various grass-roots settings, such as work units and neighborhoods, informal friendship networks and voluntary associations, but also formal social movement organizations and regime and state structures. Contentious politics, or non-routine politics that unfolds partly outside institutions, is rarely clearly separated from institutional politics. The same actors may in one period try to achieve their goals through institutional avenues and lobbying, and in democracies also through electoral campaigning and party building, and at other times they may resort to petitioning, street demonstrations and violent confrontations with authorities and other opponents, even opting for rebellion and war. The collective action of ordinary people often erupts in waves in which social movements and unorganized participation cluster temporally and spatially. Cycles of contention, or phases of intensive conflict throughout a society, include diffusion of collective action, invention of new forms of contention, a combination of organized and unorganized participation, the creation of new action frames and intensive interaction between authorities and challengers (Tarrow 1998: 142; see also Tarrow 1989; Traugott 1995). The state-centred approach has left a major imprint on social and political research (see Evans et al. 1985; Krasner 1984). It stresses a set of causal mechanisms, that is, ‘those processes whereby states (foreign as well as domestic) shape, enable, or constrain economic, associational, cultural, and even social-psychological phenomena’. While other factors also matter, they are, for some purposes, less important causal processes and are often strongly mediated by the political context (Goodwin 2001: 36). The statist tradition has strongly shaped research on the collective action of ordinary people. Previously, research in the field focused largely on non-political factors, including grievances responsible for mobilization (Smelser 1962), organizational resources and leadership of challenger groups (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and the sources of consensus in social movements (Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1988; Snow et al. 1986). Social movement scholars conceptualize the political context in the form of political opportunities, or the political opportunity structure. By political opportunities they mean elements of the political environment that encourage people to engage in protest. These authors, however, neither tackle the same research questions nor employ the

Introduction

11

same research strategies. The political-process theorists employ the casestudy strategy to trace the role of shifts in informal power relations and strategic interaction in the origins, dynamics and forms of collective action (McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978). Others focus on the static aspects of the political environment and look into the ways in which cross-national variation in institutional arrangements and state practices affect levels of mobilization, strategies and outcomes of protest (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; Rucht 1996). This creates confusion about the way political opportunities really work. While some shifts in the political context may open space for various groups to engage in protest, stable structures both enable and constrain collective action and should be viewed as institutional avenues that channel protest in some ways rather than others (Goodwin and Jasper 1999: 37). I therefore employ the term political opportunities in the narrow sense to denote changes in the political context that provide incentives for people to engage in popular protest, and discuss the ways in which the stable aspects of the political environment channel protest without reference to this concept. The idea behind the concept of political opportunities is that in most periods ordinary people lack power to seriously contest the power of authorities, political parties, various organizations and interest groups. They lack regular access to the political process, information, organizational and financial resources, and access to the media. Certain changes in the political context reduce this imbalance of power resources between challengers and political elites and open up space for collective action. Political opportunities appear in various forms. The breakdown of long-standing coalitions of political elites and interest groups and elite conflicts bring about uncertainty and encourage potential challengers to initiate protest and push parts of the elite to look for allies outside the polity (Brocket 1991: 264; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Tarrow 1998: 78–9). The emergence of influential allies empowers marginal groups, since the allies can provide organizational expertise or offer protection from repression, which is essential in non-democratic states where challengers have access to few power resources (Brocket 1991: 258). Other incentives for the initiation of collective action include the introduction of partial access to participation for some groups, which raises political expectations that cannot be satisfied, and the relaxation of repression that reduces the costs of collective action (Tarrow 1998: 76–80). That political opportunities have expanded in a political system as a whole may not be apparent to all potential challenger groups. One of

12


the advantages of the concept is that it clarifies the way in which mobilization spreads from groups with deep grievances and strong resources to those with fewer grievances and weaker resources (Tarrow 1998: 77). Once under way, collective action initiated on behalf of a particular group creates opportunities for other, similar and unrelated groups and their various claims. Initial protests often reveal the vulnerability of the authorities, demonstrate the advantages of protest to other groups, provide examples that can be emulated, identify possible allies, alter the existing relationships of challengers and power holders and activate other political actors who have stakes in the status quo by threatening their interests (Beissinger 2007; McAdam et al. 1997: 164; Tarrow 1998: 87–8). Before the rise of popular protest, political elites often give the impression of being unified and dignified political formations, backed by a capable and alert repressive apparatus and a measure of respectability, if not support, from the population. Popular protest, however, often exposes their vulnerability, including elite divisions, a low capacity for repression and lack of popular support, thus signaling to potential challenger groups that their claims may be successful. Mild or uneven responses of political elites to popular protest may also invite further mobilization (Goldstone 1998). Ultimately, when elites consolidate, political opportunities close and discourage people from taking part in protest. The stable dimensions of the political context shape the ways in which challenger groups organize, their protest strategies and levels of mobilization by providing incentives for challengers to take some routes rather than others (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995). The actual organization of a state, the power structure and the prevailing strategy toward collective challenges reflect the degree of openness of a particular political context to challenger groups. The territorial decentralization of a state and dispersion of power in a regime imply a multiplication of points of access for challenger groups, while the state’s prevailing strategy toward popular protest in turn may be inclusive or exclusive (Kriesi 1995: 171, 174); the general strategy may also differ from that regarding particular issues (Tarrow 1998: 83). Consequently, decentralized states, such as federal and devolved states and those with broad local autonomy and complex power structure, are more likely to invite popular protest. Decentralized states and those with inclusive strategies provide various channels through which movements may affect the political process and thus invite moderate protest strategies. They also encourage a decentralized organization of social movements by providing multiple targets for challenger groups. By contrast, centralized states

Introduction

13

and those with exclusive strategies invite disruptive and confrontational strategies, and provide incentives for the formation of centralized movement organizations. When pushed to the extreme, exclusive and repressive strategies encourage the formation of revolutionary movements (Goodwin 2001).

Protest politics and political change under authoritarianism Scholars who employ the state-centred approach to the study of the collective action of ordinary people have employed several concepts to identify specific dimensions of the political context they found essential, including the concepts of the state, the political process and the political regime. Those who study long-term processes of historical change and the mutually dependent rise of consolidated national states and social movements focus on the structural dimensions of the political environment. Since they study the impact of the very construction of administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive organizations on the emergence of collective action of ordinary people at the national level, it is appropriate to employ the term state (Tilly 1984). Others, who study contemporary social movements, are more sensitive to the ways in which the more immediate aspects of the political context, such as the operation of the political process and specific institutions, practices and alignments, affect social movements. As these authors principally study social movements and popular protest in contemporary Western democracies, and at times take for granted many features of this relatively open political context, their findings are not always relevant to the study of protest politics in modern non-democratic settings. The concept of a regime helps to identify similarities and differences in the ways in which political context and collective action interact in various modern political settings. A regime, or political regime, is ‘the formal and informal organization of the centre of political power, and of its relations with the broader society’ and ‘determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not’ (Fishman 1990: 428). The state therefore is the ‘locus of political power’, while a regime refers to the way in which power is used. A regime ‘determines how and under what conditions and limitations the power of the state is exercised’ and is thus ‘concerned with the form of rule’ (Lawson 1993: 187). States are normally more permanent than regimes. A regime may change without thoroughly affecting the territory as well as the condition and shape of coercive and administrative

14


apparatus. In turn, regimes are normally more permanent than specific governments (Fishman 1990: 428). Scholars of revolutions have already looked into the ways in which some types of states and regimes encourage the formation of revolutionary movements, that is, social movements aimed at seizing control of the state, and shape their trajectories and prospects of success (Goodwin 2001; Wickham-Crowley 1992). With respect to a state, or the ‘locus of political power’, Goodwin focuses on its infrastructural power and administrative organization and effectiveness. Regarding a political regime, or the way in which power is used, he puts an emphasis on their inclusiveness or exclusivity from society, distinguishing between democracy, authoritarianism and sultanism, or the extreme version of authoritarian regime. Revolutionary movements, however, are relatively rare and emerge in exclusive non-democratic states that are characterized by weak infrastructural power, that is, those that do not fully control their territory. As states nowadays hold more infrastructural power than in earlier periods, and thus more capacity to implement existing laws and government projects on their territory, the space for revolutionary movements is decreasing (Goodwin 2001). The focus of attention in state-centred research on collective action should therefore shift to non-revolutionary movements and protest politics in the grey zone between democracy and exclusive and weak dictatorships. In these modern non-democratic and hybrid regimes, popular protest is either strongly discouraged or unregulated. Many of these states exclude sizeable parts of their population from the political process but are more or less inclusive in terms of taking into account some social, economic and other interests of various social groups. This incorporation of some interests of non-ruling groups makes revolutionary action unattractive, while the absence of indiscriminate repression of political demands leaves hope that moderate strategies may be effective. Moreover, these states are often strong with respect to the infrastructural power they control, which renders revolutionary action a very risky business with a low probability of success. Some studies of non-violence relate to this political context but focus mostly on the strategic aspects of non-violent collective action, with the aim of providing expertise to pro-democracy activists in non-democratic states (Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Schock 2005). Despite a wide variation among democracies in terms of their institutional configuration and strategies toward challenger groups, they

Introduction

15

are by definition more decentralized and inclusive than modern nondemocratic regimes and largely permit popular protest. There are only limited restrictions to the organization of challenger groups, their recruitment of activists, the use of formal organizations and media to mobilize popular support, and various repertoires of action are available to protesters. The very access to power and recognition of political actors regularly pass through effective use of those repertoires (Tilly 2006: 76). Exclusive strategy toward challengers in democracies only in some cases, and only with respect to some political issues, translates into sustained repression of protest. It often means little more than that challengers are encouraged to use some institutional routes and protest strategies rather than others. As a result of decades of interaction between the state and various challenger groups, popular protest in mature democracies has become institutionalized and the institutionalization of protest is an important indicator that a new democracy has become consolidated (Ekiert and Kubik 1999). The exclusive strategy of a non-democratic regime is of a different order and normally serves as a powerful deterrent to potential challenger groups. Participation in protest in non-democratic settings often involves great risks, as those who openly defy rulers, and thus threaten their power, are likely to face repression. That popular protest is less likely in these regimes is therefore hardly a surprise. This does not imply that sustained protest in non-democratic regimes is impossible, but that it follows a different logic and dynamics than in democracies. There is a wide variation among modern nondemocratic regimes in terms of the limits they set to economic, social and political pluralism, the structure of leadership and the role of ideology and mobilization (Linz 2000; Linz and Stepan 1996). Those non-democratic regimes that are less centralized and exclusive, namely authoritarian rather then totalitarian and post-totalitarian, in periods when political alignments become unstable and elite conflicts emerge, may open space for non-state actors and provide important institutional and other resources to them to sustain mobilization. In these circumstances, various institutions, organizations and associations that normally operate as the instruments of political control may easily turn into the vehicles of mobilization. Challengers may exploit the sensitivity of political elites to some groups and their demands and employ moderate protest strategies to reduce the likelihood of a violent confrontation with the authorities. They may also exploit divisions within and among elites and gain influential allies from the political establishment.

16


Once political opportunities appear and initial protests break the ground, the impact of popular protest on the political process in nondemocratic regimes is likely to be more explosive than in democratic ones. First, the outbreak of popular protest is likely to affect relations among non-democratic rulers. Often conflict between hardliners and softliners from within the authoritarian regime emerges over the ways to deal with protest groups (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Second, due to the absence of regular channels for the expression of discontent, the dissatisfaction of the population accumulates to high levels over time. Third, while in democracies there is a relatively clear distinction between the system of government and sets of politicians competing for power, the public in non-democratic regimes tends to identify particular leaders and their policies with the polity as such. Clashes over personalities and policies that inevitably arise during popular protest may therefore undermine the stability of the political regime as a whole. Therefore, even popular protests that are not openly and self-consciously democratic may lead to regime change, that is, a shift from authoritarianism to democracy or from one to another form of authoritarianism. Fourth, risks associated with popular protest are much higher in non-democratic regimes then in democracies. Consequently, once initial protests demonstrate the vulnerability of authorities, divisions in the leadership or a low capacity for repression, and thus signal that the risks have been reduced, discontent from various sources, which in democracies is normally channelled through institutions, erupts in the form of non-institutional pressure on the regime. Unless protests are faced with credible force, they may lead to a major political or institutional change, such as regime change or state breakdown. Comparative regime analysis is essential to explaining the potential for popular protest in non-democratic regimes. The elite argument about the antibureaucratic revolution and related protest campaigns builds upon the view, which has prevailed since the end of the Cold War, that modern non-democratic regimes are invariably closed, exclusive and repressive, and thus a political setting exceptionally hostile to popular protest. Communist party-states, considered to have normally been more repressive than other types of modern non-democratic regime, are thus allegedly particularly inhospitable to any, and especially, sustained collective action of ordinary people. Thus, the antibureaucratic revolution and related popular protests could not but have been orchestrated by either high officials or dissident intellectuals. However, a detailed study of authoritarianism along the lines presented above reveals that these

Introduction

17

regimes in some periods may provide a less unfavorable environment in this respect.

The politics of nationalist mobilization The purposive nationalist mobilization argument about the antibureaucratic revolution and related popular protests draws on prevailing approaches in nationalism studies, such as that which focuses on discourse rather than action and another that narrowly considers action as arising from the self-interest of political actors. The assumption is that nationalist outcomes logically flow from the ideas, identities or interests of political actors formed prior to action. As a result, the eruption of nationalist conflicts in 1989, such as the Serb–Albanian conflict and the growing confrontation between Serbia and Slovenia at both elite and mass levels, could not but have resulted from strategies of the various actors devised long before the beginning of their action. Early theorists explored nationalism mainly from the perspective of ideology and the history of ideas (Kedourie 1993; Kohn 1967). The modernists combined the study of ideology, sentiments and myths, and stressed that identities are constructed largely through texts or cultural work (Anderson 1991). Few theorists of nationalism explicitly write about nationalist mobilization, but even they consider nationalist action, such as the rise of nationalist movements, as little more than the externalization of nationalist ways of thinking which long precede the action (Hroch 2000: 22–4). The process that results in nationalist outcomes is also obscured because important traditions in nationalism studies suffer from structural determinism. Primordialism, which considers identities as arising from primordial sentiments, and instrumentalism, which treats identities as reflecting expressions of self-interest, assume that action arises directly from structurally determined identities and interests. Constructivists, by contrast, reveal that identities are constructed and show how representations of nationhood, principally through texts, shape the ways in which this construction occurs. On the other hand, students of politics tend to focus on the role of political institutions, such as federalism and consociationalism, in shaping identities of ethnonational groups (Lijphart 1977). What is missing, however, is a focus on the ways in which collective action is constitutive of nationhood. Nationalism is not only a cause of action, but also its product (Beissinger 2002: 10–11).

18


Apart from structural conditions and institutions, action is influenced by ‘events’, that is, the influence of the action itself on subsequent action. Events are ‘contentious and potentially subversive acts that challenge normalized practices, modes of causation, or systems of authority’ (Beissinger 2002: 14). Events hold a transformative power; they do not simply occur between challengers and their opponents, but also invite observers to take part in the action and thus highlight ‘the complex issues of compliance, loyalty and identity that underlie any order, but which, in the absence of event, are not ordinarily subject to contemplation’ (Beissinger 2002: 16). Events are clustered temporally and spatially and linked sequentially to one another in narratives of struggle that accompany them; in the altered expectations that they generate about subsequent possibilities to contest; in the changes that they evoke in the behaviour of those forces that uphold a given order; and in the transformed landscape of meaning that events at times fashion . . . The linkage and clustering of events are central to an explanation of the contingencies that events introduce, for what begins as a challenging act induced and heavily constrained by structure contains the potential to become itself a causal variable in a subsequent chain of actions. (Beissinger 2002: 17) There are two varieties of nationalist politics. In the first, which is largely channelled through political institutions, challenges to the dominant national order occur only at the margins of the political process. The second is characterized by major challenges to the political order, including the dominant national order, and its institutions. In these relatively rare periods of nationalist mobilization ‘individuals in large numbers are confronted with the necessity of having to choose between competing cultural allegiances, and this choice usually presents itself within a relatively compressed and tumultuous period of time’. In the periods of ‘thickened history’ the speed with which events follow one another triggers confusion in government and policy process and affects the population by creating uncertainty and fostering imitation (Beissinger 2002: 25–7). The similarity with the cycle of contention (Tarrow 1998) is obvious; nationalist mobilizations often occur as parts of such a broader wave of mobilization, which features various, similar and unrelated themes and claims. Nationalism must be seen in relation to politics, contentious or institutional, not least because the majority of nationalist outcomes result from the interaction of claims and conflicts that are not self-consciously

Introduction

19

nationalist (McAdam et al. 2001: 238). One example of the complex character of mobilization in this respect is the wave of mobilization in the Soviet Union, initiated with Glasnost’, which was not initially nationalist, but ultimately ended as such. ‘The first major eruption of nationalism did not take place until almost a year and a half after glasnost’ had begun . . . and had nothing to do with the secessionist issues that ultimately pulled apart the Soviet state’ (Beissinger 2002: 47–8). Moving beyond mobilization to include the political process as a whole, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly stress the highly interactive character of contention in their explanation of parts of the process of Italian unification: Like many nationalist episodes all over the world, the Sicilian revolution was no homogeneous imagining of a national revolution. It was a wave of contentious politics that included many actors whose goals were far from nationalist and others who became nationalist in the course of contention . . . What had begun as a home-grown popular insurrection and democrat-led guerrilla warfare ended, via an episode of contention, as a royal conquest supported by the island’s social elite under the guise of a well-managed plebiscite. (McAdam et al. 2001: 240–1) As the concept of political opportunities suggests, nationalist mobilization starts with protest by members of groups that hold deep grievances. Perceiving the rights or interests of their group to be under threat or its institutional position to be inadequate, they are often prepared to take greater risks than members of other groups and to initiate protest at a time when the prospects of success appear slim. As a result, the appeal of nationalist frames is initially greater for members of those groups than in the society as a whole, where nationalist frames compete with various non-nationalist ones. Once the mobilization of a group, or a part of it, is under way, the strategic choices of members of other groups in a multi-national society may alter significantly. Although having fewer grievances initially, they may also engage in popular protest either to further their interests in the same way or to protect the status quo if they believe their interests are under threat. The waves of mobilization, of which nationalist mobilization is often only a part, intensify conflicts throughout society and the political system and trigger changes in power relations between and among elites and between elites and challenger groups, and also bring about radicalization of various political actors. As a result, challenges to the dominant

20


national order are likely to intensify and individuals come under pressure to choose among cultural loyalties that they had thought of as fully compatible. Many individuals in the course of intensive mobilization embrace views and goals that were previously unthinkable. Even if nationalist mobilization of some ethnic or national group does not succeed, that is, nationalist frames fail to bring their members to the streets in the periods of spiraling nationalist conflict, nationalist goals are likely to be pursued because their political elites adopt nationalist strategies for strategic reasons.

Sources I have used a combination of primary sources, including lengthy interviews with high officials of the former Yugoslavia and leading protesters, the memoirs of other high officials, official documents and the local press. The main source of information about the internal workings of the party-state, relations within the political class, the officials’ views on important political issues and their relations with protest groups were the testimonies of high officials. I conducted more than 20 in-depth interviews with high officials of Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo, principally aiming to complement the personal accounts of high officials that had already been published in Serbo-Croatian. I interviewed Dragoslav Draža Marković and Boško Krunić, members of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and its Presidents (1983–84 and 1987–88, respectively); Špiro Galović, Vaso Milinˇcević and Milenko Marković, members of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of ´ Serbia (LCS); Radmilo Bogdanović, Danilo Marković, Dragoljub Cosi´ c and Dragan Šaponjić, ministers in Serbia’s Executive Council (government); Slobodan Jovanović, a high official in Belgrade’s City Committee and editor of a popular Belgrade daily; Miša Sekulović, a member of Kosovo’s leadership in the late 1960s and early 1970s and Director of Kosovo’s Development Agency, 1989–91; and Ljubiša Stanković and Redžep Hodža, Presidents of Montenegro’s and Kosovo’s official youth organizations in the late 1980s, respectively. A number of high officials I interviewed wanted to remain anonymous, including a prominent member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCS and, subsequently, a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY; a prominent member of the state Presidency of Montenegro, before January 1989; a prominent member of the Presidency of Vojvodina’s Province Committee, before October

Introduction

21

1988; a prominent member of the leadership of Vojvodina, after October 1988; a prominent member of Belgrade’s City Committee; a member of the state Presidency of Serbia in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s; a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCS in the first half of the 1980s; a chairman of important committees in the Assembly of Serbia and, subsequently, a minister in Serbia’s government; and an influential member of the Constitutional Commission, the Assembly of Serbia and, subsequently, an advisor to the state Presidency of Yugoslavia. In addition to interviews with high officials, I talked to Jovo Radoš, Secretary of the Municipal Committee of Baˇcka Palanka, Vojvodina, in 1989 and subsequently Executive Secretary of the Presidency of Vojvodina’s Province Committee in 1990, and to an advisor to the state Presidency of Yugoslavia and Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY, 1985–91, who wanted to remain anonymous. My interviewees cannot be held responsible for any of my conclusions since they themselves hold rather different views on the various issues that are at the centre of this book. I also consulted the personal accounts of high officials that had already been published in Serbo-Croatian, including memoirs and numerous interviews that appeared in the local press. As a result, I was able to draw on the testimonies of representatives of all key groups in the leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro, including various political generations, personalist factions, institutional interests and territorial parts of Serbia’s leadership, that is, those of central Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo, and testimonies of many high officials from Yugoslavia’s other republics. I took into account only information based on the direct knowledge and experience of these high officials, and cross-checked sensitive issues or those with which they might try to discredit their opponents. I also checked the evidence from the testimonies against published and, where available, unpublished minutes of key meetings of the leadership and reports in the local press, which were highly informative with regard to the internal workings of the regime from early 1988. The personal accounts of prominent activists in the wave of mobilization, including Kosovo Serbs, their non-elite allies outside Kosovo, activists from Vojvodina and Montenegro, and Kosovo Albanians, provide essential information about their goals, the formation and spread of protest networks, their choice of protest strategies and links with high and other party and state officials. I conducted several lengthy interviews with leading Kosovo Serb activists and those from Vojvodina and Belgrade, with the aim of supplementing testimonies of other prominent activists that had already been published. I interviewed Boško

22


Budimirović, Miroslav Šolević and Bogdan Kecman, members of the Kosovo Polje group and leading Kosovo Serb activists; Milica Grković, ˇ cak and a prominent activist from Novi Sad, Vojvodina; and Ranka Ciˇ Milena Milovanović, activists from Belgrade, who took part in popular protests in Vojvodina. I used full, unedited transcripts of interviews with activists from Vojvodina and Kosovo, especially with regard to their rallies in Vojvodina, published in Kerˇcov, Radoš and Raiˇc (1990), interviews with Kosovo Serb and Albanian activists, published in Hudelist (1989), and numerous interviews of activists from the local press. I considered only information based on their direct knowledge and checked the evidence against reports in the local press. I also used archival material that was either publicly available or accessible through private sources. I consulted the most important document that sheds light on the rise of Milošević, ‘Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SK Srbije’ (Belgrade, 18–19 September 1987, unauthorized transcript, CK SKS, Predsedništvo, 0300, highly confidential, 290/1, Vols 1 and 2), which is still unavailable to the public.4 Two books published in SerboCroatian also provided a valuable selection of archival material about events at the centre of the antibureaucratic revolution (Kerˇcov et al. 1990; Strugar 1990). Although archival material related to the wave of mobilization is still not available to researchers, authors of the latter two books were granted privileged access to archives just after the fall of the leaderships of Vojvodina and Montenegro. The local press was an important source concerning political affairs in general and protest events in particular. I relied largely on the Belgrade daily Borba and weeklies Danas and NIN, published in Zagreb and Belgrade, respectively, and consulted other press sources with respect to important protests or other political events.5 In the late 1980s the Belgrade daily Borba provided unrivalled coverage of specific protest events and current political affairs in terms of its informative value and unbiased reporting on contentious issues. Unlike its main competitors in Belgrade and Zagreb, Borba was independent from regional leaderships and relatively open because the federal organs, which provided financial backing for the newspaper, were increasingly powerless and unwilling to enforce compliance with the official line. Borba was especially informative on the protests of Kosovo Serbs, featuring eye-witness reports and occasional analytical articles on the topic by experienced reporters with a detailed knowledge of the local political context. Its reports on the Kosovo Albanian protests from late 1988 and early 1989, however, are less useful because it joined other Belgrade media in an openly hostile reporting of the events.

Introduction

23

Danas and NIN also featured highly informative reports and analytical articles on current political affairs, especially the regime’s policies, activities of high officials, their manoeuvrings and shifting political alliances within and between regional leaderships. I consulted both weeklies because their perspective on the same events often diverged. For example, useful information about political struggles in Serbia, especially after the rise of Milošević to power in September 1987, appeared more readily in Danas than in NIN, since the latter, together with much of the Belgrade press, came under control of Serbia’s new leader and often simply delivered, and built upon, his messages. By contrast, for the events surrounding the mounting conflict between high officials of the republics and provinces in 1988–89 I consulted various sources simultaneously because Danas increasingly reflected the views prevailing in official and unofficial circles in Zagreb. Articles from the local press sometimes originated from rumors rather than first-hand, detailed knowledge of the events, especially regarding relations among high officials, so that double-checking and cross-checking of the information on important events with that from other sources was essential.

The plan of the book Chapter 1 sets the stage for the analysis of political conflicts in the second half of the 1980s. It explores the legacy of Yugoslavia’s unusual authoritarianism and the ways in which the death of Tito and the change of political generations undermined Yugoslavia’s political stability in the 1980s, and opened space for elite conflict and popular mobilization. Chapter 2 examines the prolonged leadership struggles in Serbia in the 1980s and the ascent of Milošević, in the light of leaders’ views on policy and the power struggle between their personalistic networks. Chapter 3 explores the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs from the perspective of Serb– Albanian antagonisms and political change in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. It looks into the protest networks, demands and the protest strategies of Kosovo Serbs and their links with the dissident intellectuals, other confidants and high officials of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo. Chapter 4 traces the autonomous mobilization of industrial workers and Kosovo Serbs in the summer of 1988, and their interaction with the party-state. It explores the way the growing gap between high officials and the population at large, and the elite conflict, opened space for the antibureaucratic revolution. Chapter 5 focuses on the peak of the mobilizational wave, including the large demonstrations that triggered the resignations of scores of high

24


Yugoslav officials and regional governments. It explores the complexity of the antibureaucratic revolution, including the mixture of bottomup and top-down mobilization, the blend of nationalist and unrelated themes, and the considerable regional and temporal variation in their occurrences. Chapter 6 traces growing national confrontation at both the elite and mass levels. It starts by exploring the escalation of the Kosovo conflict, namely the protests of Kosovo Albanians and their repression by high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia, and subsequently traces the spiraling confrontation between Serbia and Slovenia. The conclusion draws together all of these threads. It explains how my argument sheds light on the fall of communism, the rise of populist authoritarianism and the break-up of Yugoslavia, and on the contemporary Serb–Albanian nationalist conflict in and over Kosovo.

1 Yugoslavia’s Peculiar Authoritarianism

During the greater part of the Cold War Yugoslavia stood out from its East European communist counterparts in terms of having a foreign policy independent from the Soviet bloc and a relatively liberal form of communism and complex multi-national federalism. These aspects of so-called ‘Yugoslav exceptionalism’ feature prominently in the literature on Yugoslavia.1 Similarities between these states have received less attention, apart from during the early stages of Yugoslavia’s political development, and research on late Titoist Yugoslavia increasingly focused on multi-national features of the state (but see Bokovoy et al. 1997). Still, the communist character of the regime remains essential in explaining Yugoslavia’s uneven political development, including both periods of political stability and periods of conflict. The regime’s changing formal and informal institutions, and relations with society, strongly shaped the potential for popular mobilization, its timing and expansion, as well as forms of popular protest and its implications. Yugoslavia was principally a communist state, even if its authoritarianism in the last two decades of the Cold War was of a peculiar nature—highly decentralized, both functionally and territorially. The main feature of socialist Yugoslavia, especially since the early 1970s, was the sheer complexity of its political structure, including its radically decentralized institutions of federal and local government, and of self-management. This complexity, boosted by highly complex informal elite practices and elite alignments, provided the political context in which political change in the years after the death of Tito set off the disintegration of regime and state. In the first part of this chapter I trace the political development of socialist Yugoslavia from a highly centralized party-state, nominal or façade federalism, and fully united communist leadership in the wake of the Second World War to a relaxed 25

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authoritarianism, highly decentralized political structure and increasingly unstable elite alignments. Later, I outline the main features of the strategy of the communist leadership toward challenger groups and discuss the limited potential for dissent and popular protest under Tito. Finally, I look into the ways in which the death of Tito and change of political generations undermined Yugoslavia’s political stability in the 1980s.

The making of the party-state, multi-national federalism and limited pluralism Communist parties took power across Eastern Europe from 1946 to 1948, principally with the backing of Stalin’s Soviet Union. The Yugoslav communists, by contrast, had already come to power largely on their own during the last stages of the Second World War. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), small and divided since its formation in 1919, had gradually consolidated after the Comintern’s adoption of the ‘popular front’ policy and the post-1937 bolshevization of the party by the newly selected general secretary, Josip Broz Tito, but became an important political group only during the war. Armed with their interwar experience of illegal work and growing appeal as the only multi-national political force, the communists had successfully led a mass-based movement for liberation from foreign occupiers and had simultaneously fought their local competitors in civil war. The uniqueness of their war effort and indigenous communist revolution had important consequences for Yugoslavia’s political development. In the foreign policy realm, the self-confidence of the Yugoslav leadership, backed by a large, experienced army and security apparatus, granted them substantial autonomy from external political factors, although the leadership initially chose to follow Soviet foreign policy. Internally, this unique experience resulted in the replication and adaptation of a Soviet-style party-state and command economy earlier than in other East European countries, and in the creation of strong leadership which survived in various forms in the following decades. After a brief interlude of restricted political pluralism between the end of the war and the deeply flawed November 1945 elections to a constitutional assembly, the Yugoslav communists abolished the monarchy, declared a people’s republic, and suppressed the remnants of pre-war political parties and of dissent in general. Part of their efforts went into the rapid construction of a large and highly centralized state apparatus. The CPY also restricted space for economic and social pluralism.

Yugoslavia’s Peculiar Authoritarianism 27

Following the confiscation of around 80 percent of Yugoslav industry from foreign occupiers and their alleged local collaborators after the war, the 1946 and 1948 nationalization laws transferred control over the remaining parts of industry and services to the party-state. The party now started building a command economy, based on the April 1947 Five Year Plan with a focus on heavy industry, and subsequently initiated a graduated policy of collectivization in agriculture. The newly created administrative structures of the state and economy now closely resembled a highly centralized party organization. At the same time, policies in education and culture systematically vilified the pre-war elite and political system and glorified the Soviet Union, Stalin, Tito, and the role of Yugoslav communists in the war and revolution (see Lilly 2001). After the war, the top leadership consisted of a small and cohesive group of men recruited among communist revolutionaries by Tito in the late 1930s, most of whom were still in their thirties. Their close relationship was based on the shared experiences of pre-war illegal party work and the war effort in rather hostile conditions. As a result, the decision-making process long retained an informal character of continual consensus building among colleagues and friends, who were located in a closed, secretive and all-powerful Politburo. While Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Ranković and Milovan D ¯ ilas stood out as key party leaders, Tito retained the role of ultimate arbiter being the eldest and most respected member of the group, the war leader and general secretary of the CPY. The leadership presided over a broad and cohesive echelon of motivated middle- and low-level party-state officials, most of whom were still in their twenties and thirties, and who had come out of underground work and guerilla warfare to take over the government and economy. The CPY remained concealed behind the People’s Front of Yugoslavia, a mass organization created to preserve the façade of political pluralism in the immediate aftermath of the war and subsequently employed explicitly for purposes of mass mobilization to further the party’s aims. The Central Committee of the CPY elected in 1940 had never met and it was not even clear who were the permanent and the ad hoc members of the Politburo (Rusinow 1977: 28, 49–50). The communists also refashioned the internal state structure in a way that radically departed from its earlier design. Between the formation of Yugoslavia in December 1918 and the invasion of the Axis powers in April 1941, historical and cultural boundaries had not been taken into account due to attempts to forge the Yugoslav, or South Slav, nation through the integration of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and other national and ethnic groups in a unitary state. The lack of formal recognition of

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identity and territorial autonomy for these groups, under parliamentary democracy and royal dictatorship alike, had created tensions and remained one of the main sources of political instability and of rapid dissolution of the state in April 1941. Tensions between various national groups strongly intensified with the genocidal policies of the Croatian ˇ fascist Ustaša regime against Serbs and ensuing atrocities by Serb Cetnik forces over Croats and Muslims. The popular appeal of the communists during the war was at least partly based on the multi-national composition of the CPY and the partisan fighting force and its determination to rebuild the multi-national state. After the war the CPY remodelled Yugoslavia on the basis of collective rights and the territorial autonomy of its newly proclaimed constituent nations with the right to self-determination—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and later, Muslims—and insisted on national tolerance and the ‘brotherhood and unity’ of the nations and national minorities. The Yugoslav Constitution of 1946 introduced a Soviet-style federalism, some aspects of which the party had already anticipated in the decentralized structure of its pre-war organization and the partisan liberation movement. Yugoslavia now consisted of six republics—Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro—constitutionally designated as homelands of the constituent nations, and with a party cadre and a number of social and cultural institutions based on the constituent nation. However, the republics were largely multi-national in composition. Internal boundaries now corresponded more closely to pre-1918 historical boundaries than to patterns of national settlement and, apart from Slovenia, the republics contained large groups not belonging to the republic’s constituent nation. Bosnia-Hercegovina was constituted as the multi-national republic of Serbs, Croats and (later) Muslims and in some areas of this and other republics the population was fully intermixed. The Yugoslav constitution guaranteed the same level of rights to members of the constituent nations regardless of whether they resided in ‘their’ republic or not, especially to those living in nationally highly intermixed areas. National minorities also enjoyed extensive collective rights and autonomy, except for the right of self-determination. Serbia’s autonomous province of Vojvodina, with a large minority of Hungarians, and its autonomous region of Kosovo, with an Albanian majority, were created partly for this purpose. The Yugoslav Communists therefore developed a complex web of collective rights and territorial autonomy to accommodate conflicting claims to self-determination of constituent nations and republics and to guarantee the protection of identity and


interests of all national groups. Yugoslavia’s federalism, however, was initially of a nominal or façade type. The effective powers of regional leaderships remained limited due to the supremacy of the highly centralized party organization and the concentration of power in the hands of high-ranking party officials. Despite growing authoritarianism and centralization, a substantial part of the population saw the rule of the CPY as legitimate. Not only did the party have a leading role in the successful mass-based war of liberation, which was an exception in the region. The population also largely accepted the claim of party leaders that they had united the Yugoslav nations to fight the foreign occupiers and local ‘enemies’ and then transformed the common state in a way that put an end to civil war, even solved the highly divisive national question which had undermined the stability of the interwar state. The communists also introduced agrarian reform and colonization in the wake of the war that benefited over 300 000 peasant families and administered a rapid and successful rebuilding of the war-ravaged infrastructure and industry. Moreover, the leadership by and large permitted decentralized local initiative in immediate post-war reconstruction and economic development, which in turn produced a feeling of participation and involvement among important segments of the population as well as signs of economic recovery in 1946, with the help of substantial aid channelled through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. While the membership of the CPY largely remained limited to loyal and committed cadres, its associated mass organizations of the People’s Front of Yugoslavia, the League of Trade Unions, the People’s Youth and the Anti-fascist Front of Women involved a substantial part of their target populations. The June 1948 split between Tito and Stalin forced Yugoslavia’s leadership to reconsider the main features of their domestic and foreign policy and the shape of the party-state. The immediate response of the CPY was to purge its ranks, which may have involved one-fifth of the party’s members, at least 14 000 of whom were imprisoned as alleged Cominformist agents (Banac 1988: 148–9), and to tighten up control over society, not least by intensifying the collectivization programme in agriculture. Strong leadership and popular acceptance of the regime, supported by highly centralized institutions, were essential to the successful confrontation with the Soviet Union and East European ‘people’s democracies’. This success, combined with the harsh realities of being an isolated country with increasing dependence on Western aid in the following years, contributed to a gradual shift in priorities and in the ideological focus of the regime. They first relaxed their attempts at collectivization and

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later fully retreated from this policy, largely because of widespread resistance by the peasantry (Bokovoy 1998). Feeling the need to broaden the regime’s base and aware of growing popular disillusionment with their restrictive policies on the eve of the Soviet–Yugoslav split, party leaders pledged to build a novel version of socialism. The party ideologues and propagandists, especially Kardelj and D ¯ ilas, now condemned the étatisme and bureaucratization of Soviet-style socialism and insisted, turning back from Stalin, even from Lenin to Marx, that the socialist state should ‘wither away’. The CPY initiated decentralization in 1950. One part of the new policy involved the introduction of workers’ self-management, used to denote the workers’ participation in the management of enterprises and the autonomy of enterprises in relation to the state. Another included setting up local self-government institutions. Throughout the 1950s, Yugoslavia’s institution-builders put an emphasis on these aspects of decentralization rather than federalism. The constitutional reform of 1953 introduced an integrated pyramidal system of functional and communal representation from enterprises and municipalities up to the federation, to complement the hierarchical structure of the party and associated mass organizations. In the context of the confrontation with Stalin and efforts to forge an independent foreign policy, self-management and decentralization became the cornerstone of the regime’s claim to distinction and in turn provided legitimation to demands for political and economic reforms. The decentralizing reforms opened some, though limited, space for participation, which had been increasingly stifled on the eve of the Soviet–Yugoslav split, and created conditions for the emergence of new political actors, such as regional and local party and state officials, and managerial-technocratic elites. The party became less secretive and decision-making became increasingly institutionalized, due to its June 1950 decision to draw a clear boundary between the activity of state organs and those of the CPY and the People’s Front. At the 1952 Congress, the CPY leaders declared that the party would withdraw from the day-to-day running of the country and act through ideological persuasion and political guidance, and even renamed it the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) to reflect this new line. Subsequently, they announced a reform of the People’s Front of Yugoslavia and renamed it the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY). The party also relaxed censorship laws somewhat as well as its control over the press and permitted a greater degree of pluralism in cultural life (Lilly 2001). Before long, however, party leaders reneged on some of their


pledges. The LCY remained highly centralized and its secretaries retained a decisive role in organizational and personnel matters throughout the organization. Limited decentralization and promises of further political and economic reforms were significant signs of political change, but for the time being the same group of men, with the exception of the excommunicated D ¯ ilas, retained a firm grip on all levers of power, including the party and its mass organizations, the state bureaucracy, the military, security services, and the bulk of the economy.

Shifting elite alignments and state–society relations By the mid-1960s a rapid modernization drive, fuelled by the economic boom of the 1950s, fundamentally transformed Yugoslav society and for the most part brought it in line with those in Western Europe. Between 1953 and 1961 industrial production grew 12.7 percent and exports rose 11 percent on average annually, while the proportion of finished manufactures increased significantly. Simultaneously, there were attempts to move away from the pattern of extensive, heavy industry-focused growth, typical of communist economies, and increase consumption and agricultural investment. Urbanization kept pace with industrial development and the proportion of agricultural population dropped from 67 percent in 1948 to 50 percent in 1961 and continued to fall sharply. Access to university education expanded considerably as well as the exchange of students and academics with Western Europe and the United States. Living standards initially lagged behind, but improved considerably in the 1960s, partly through larger and higher-quality domestic production and partly through growing Western imports. An observer remarked in the mid-1960s that Belgrade was the only communist capital with a parking problem (Rusinow 1977: 139). Such major socio-economic change was partly made possible by a major shift in the country’s international position. Within only a few years of Stalin’s death Yugoslavia had come a long way from isolation to having extensive links with the West, especially the United States which continued to provide significant economic aid in return for Tito’s independence from the Soviet Union, as well as with the Soviet bloc and many newly created states of the Third World (see Rajak in press). The mix of socio-economic change and the decentralizing reforms of the 1950s produced growing pressure on high-ranking party officials from below and ultimately resulted in divisions in the leadership. Regional and local officials and the managerial-technocratic elite, empowered by earlier reforms, demanded more influence over

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government policy, while there was also a growing desire in society for personal freedom and greater social and economic pluralism. Simultaneously, the rapid economic growth of the 1950s had an uneven impact on more and less developed regions, widening the gap between a relatively well off Slovenia, Croatia and parts of Serbia, and the remaining poorer part of Yugoslavia. As a result, high party officials now increasingly took positions based on the interests of their respective republics in the formulation of federal policy. The advocates of decentralization within the leadership were more numerous. This group included supporters of various causes, ranging from the extension of market reforms and relaxation of the party’s role in the state and society to the empowerment of republics. By contrast, the centralists, with a base in the powerful central party and state organs, saw the central apparatus as the key instrument of economic development and political stability. Conflict between the two groups escalated in the first half of the 1960s, partly because of the looming issue of leadership succession. Tito (born 1892) had already reached retirement age and the main contenders for succession were Aleksandar Ranković, a Vice President of Yugoslavia and a symbol of post-war centralism and the police state, and Edvard Kardelj, a chief party ideologue and the main sponsor of decentralization. The anti-centralists, who had by the mid-1960s established control over the formulation of policy, gained the support of Tito and removed Ranković from power in July 1966. Already in the early 1960s, the rising influence of the anti-centralist coalition resulted in freer intra-party debates on the formulation of policy, further economic reforms and more vigorous parliamentary life. In the wake of the purge of the centralist faction, the ruling coalition relaxed the firm grip of the party over the state and society and reduced the role of the secret police in political and social life. The party gradually became more tolerant of non-party associations and social forces in general which, together with free foreign travel and the search for employment in the West, resulted in an atmosphere of considerable freedom in private and social life. Relaxed intra-party debates now found their expression in political debates in the media, which in turn expanded considerably. In the 1967 and 1969 assembly elections, several anti-establishment candidates, blacklisted by the party, were elected. Simultaneously, the economic reform of 1965 left more space for market forces and granted more economic and political influence to managers of large banks and enterprises. Victory of the anti-centralists also resulted in radical federalization so that republics and provinces now turned into


centres of political power at the expense of increasingly feeble federal institutions. The political shifts of the 1960s had a dramatic impact on the structure of political leadership and the decision-making process. First, the simultaneous drive toward economic and political liberalization, and radical devolution of power to regional leaderships, legitimized by the ideology of self-management and encapsulated in the slogan of de-étatization, decisively weakened the federal centre. The unanimous decision-making of regional representatives in the federal organs was employed in both the formulation of substantive policies and constitutional and party reforms in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Burg 1983: 188–9). Secondly, following the removal of the centralist faction, the anti-centralist coalition lacked a common denominator and its members, themselves supporters of various causes, pushed in diverging directions, largely following the interests of their respective republics and provinces. Third, a partial generational change in the higher echelons of the party-state, which had already started in the early 1960s, accelerated as the anti-centralists looked for allies among younger, well-educated cadres, some of whom took leading positions in regional leaderships (Rusinow 1977: 143–4). As a result, close personal ties that ensured elite unity and supportive institutional and organizational arrangements, which provided much of the political stability in the post-war period, weakened. Already in the late 1960s Tito remained the only independent centre of power in the federation. As he increasingly promoted a bilateral approach in dealing with regional leaders and considered the remaining federal powers, defence and foreign policy, to be his private domain ( Jović 2003), the role of central state and party organs shrank even further, and central leadership all but disintegrated. The parallel liberalization and radical federalization also proved to be an explosive combination. The conflict over the formulation of federal policy, especially with respect to economic issues, had already existed due to a long-standing cleavage between more and less developed regions. With the onset of liberalization, regional leaders lost full control over their constituencies and in response aimed to build support for their policies among the middle- and lower-level officials as well as among the population at large by radicalizing demands directed at the centre. Since republics were generally seen as national homelands, this strategy resulted in a growing national sentiment within federal units and increasingly emotional conflict between regional leaders (Burg 1983). In the early 1970s the political system became increasingly unstable due to the growing resonance of national sentiments and the greater role of non-state

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actors in the context of a weak centre and mounting inter-regional conflict. In response, Tito purged the leading sponsors of confederalization and liberalization, and their followers from republican elites, especially the radical decentralizers in Croatia and the liberals in Serbia in 1971–72. The consequence was yet another major shift in elite alignments and state–society relations. Tito blamed the political instability and the rise of the nationality factor on failure of political leadership rather than on radical federalization. Institutions and procedures that regulated federal decision-making, such as the effective regional veto over federal policy and the extensive power of regional representatives, therefore remained, but a number of steps were taken in an attempt to rebuild the cohesiveness of the central leadership. The aim was to restore mutual trust and confidence among the regional leaderships and their representatives in the central party organs and thus set the stage for their effective co-operation. Already in 1969 Tito had placed regional leaders into the federal party Presidency in Belgrade in an attempt to make them more responsible for federal policy by physically separating them from their constituencies. Subsequently, a collective state Presidency of Yugoslavia was created and the membership of the two organs overlapped. The new measures now ensured that the bargaining of regional leaderships would unfold far from the general public in order to avoid a radicalization of their demands. Modest reassertion of central party organs in relation to regional leaderships and Tito’s direct involvement in decision-making now ensured the smooth formulation and implementation of federal policy (Burg 1983: 164). The purge opened space for the creation of a new alliance between parts of the political elite. It included old guard and anti-reformist politicians, party ideologues, the young cadre concerned with increasing social inequality and all who feared the rise of nationalism. The quality of leadership, however, declined as most reform-minded and independent individuals were purged from important posts in the party-state and the economy. Tito, previously focusing largely on foreign policy, reasserted his position as final arbiter in internal political affairs and became regularly involved in personnel policy. The return to the Leninist conception of the party and ‘class’ dimension of policy in practice meant a shift in state–society relations, including tighter control of the media, universities and professional and other associations (see Popov 1983: 225–44). The purge in the media and cultural institutions, the renewed emphasis on ideological work and the tighter control over personnel in many areas unfolded simultaneously with a broad campaign against big business, banks and the managerial-technocratic elite. The return to the


class and self-management perspective was therefore directed against all those who were seen as undermining the power of the party in the preceding years. The campaign, however, was limited to the level of elites and citizens retained considerable freedoms at the personal level, much more extensive than in other East European states.

The radical decentralization of socialist Yugoslavia The political changes of the 1960s and early 1970s left a legacy of unusually decentralized institutions, which set the stage for political change in the 1980s. Federations generally involve autonomy for their territorially defined regions (republics, states, provinces), with some statutory, legislative and fiscal elements, and a shared rule of the regions at the centre, institutionalized principally through their representation in the upper chamber of the federal assembly. In short, federalism equals ‘self-rule plus shared rule’ (Elazar 1987). The Yugoslav Constitution of February 1974, which concluded the constitutional reform that unfolded between 1967 and 1971, involved radical federalization, even confederalization. Jurisdiction over a number of political, economic and cultural issues was devolved to the republics and provinces, and the independent powers of federal organs shrank considerably. The locus of sovereignty therefore decisively shifted from the centre to the republics. The central organs were further weakened in a variety of ways. The regional leaderships gained full control over personnel appointments at the federal level and members of the federal organs came to be considered merely as regional representatives. The formulation of policy in the remaining areas of federal jurisdiction now required the unanimous agreement of regional representatives, who effectively held a veto over federal policy. Even the execution of federal policy, that is, the implementation of inter-regional agreements, remained outside the reach of federal organs. Party reforms unfolded alongside constitutional ones and the radical decentralization of the party’s organization strongly contributed to the empowerment of federal units. Until the mid-1960s the party had been a highly centralized organization run by the Politburo (called the Executive Committee) and controlled by powerful party secretaries. The reforms transferred decisive powers to regional party leaderships and the party organization now mirrored the highly decentralized structure of the state. In sharp contrast to earlier practice, since 1964 the regional party Congresses were to convene before the federal party Congress and set the guidelines for the latter as well as for the newly selected members of the central party organs. The increasing control of regional party leaderships

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over the federal party apparatus and the replacement of proportional by equal representation of regional representatives further entrenched the consensual character of decision-making in central party and state organs. The independent power of federal organs was further reduced through a reduction in the size of the central party apparatus and, from the late 1970s, frequent rotation of party and state officials by way of one-year mandates. Yugoslavia now exhibited all elements of consociation, or a powersharing system. Mono-national or nation-building federations, such as Germany and the United States, arose from the desire to integrate people who shared language and culture, but lived in different territorial units. By contrast, multi-national federations, such as Belgium, Canada, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, seek to ‘express, institutionalise and protect at least two national or ethnic cultures, often on a permanent basis’. As a result, multi-national federations, especially more successful ones, often employ consociational, or power-sharing arrangements, to achieve mutually guaranteed protection of identity and equal opportunities for the members of all nations (O’Leary 2004). Consociational arrangements were therefore appropriate for Yugoslavia and involved a grand coalition in the collective state and party Presidencies and federal government, parity or proportionality throughout the state sector, segmental autonomy through federalism and effective veto over federal policy by regional officials (see Lijphart 1977). The consociational arrangements, however, remained largely limited to the federal level, though they were also badly needed in republics, due to their multi-national composition (Stanovˇcić 1992: 374–5). Unlike most contemporary consociations, which are democracies, Yugoslavia remained an authoritarian state. The institutional structure of Serbia, Yugoslavia’s largest republic, and its party organization now replicated the highly decentralized structure of Yugoslavia. In sharp contrast with earlier arrangements, Vojvodina and Kosovo, earlier little more than Serbia’s administrative regions, now acquired a status similar to that of the republics. Although they formally remained parts of Serbia, the provinces were granted their own constitutions, legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction and party control almost identical to that of republics, as well as direct representation in all federal state and party organs, and effective veto power over federal policy. While Serbia’s state and party organs effectively lost control over parts of the territory of the republic, members of these organs from the autonomous provinces continued to take part in decision-making that affected central Serbia only. Formally, organs of the republic and


autonomous provinces were to negotiate policies that would be implemented in Serbia as a whole. In reality, the veto that Vojvodina and Kosovo held over policy formulation and implementation in the republic effectively prevented this outcome. Although Serbia was formally a sovereign state, like Yugoslavia’s other republics, its highly decentralized structure now sharply contrasted with the unitary character of the other republics and adversely affected its standing in the federation. The 1974 Constitution and the Law on Associated Labor of November 1976, the so-called ‘little constitution’, transformed self-management from workers’ participation in the management of enterprises, and the autonomy of enterprises in relation to the state, into a comprehensive system of social, economic and political organization. While communist leaders had largely introduced the concept for pragmatic reasons in the wake of the break with Stalin, and ever since employed it for purposes of external and internal legitimation, some thought that it could also bring political liberalization and aid economic development through decentralization, market reforms and the release of workers’ energies (see Sekelj 1990: 9–20). Drawing on the Marxist and socialist tradition, especially Marx’s interpretation of the 1871 Paris Commune, party ideologues and their chief Kardelj now saw the main feature of socialist development in the ‘withering away’ of the state ( Jović 2003). In industry, self-management started at the ‘shop’ level in small protoorganizations, several of which would associate on a contractual basis to form an enterprise, though they could also co-operate with their counterparts in other enterprises. The enterprises further established contractual relations with one another. Workers took part in decisions over the disposal of net income and the formulation of business plans through their delegates in management organs at all levels. A parallel structure was built in social services in which ‘producers’ in this area and ‘consumers’ were encouraged to establish contractual relations through enterprises and local communities and directly negotiate funding and the level of services, without the involvement of state organs. Political institutions conformed to the model and so an elaborate, interconnected and pyramidal system of institutions of indirect functional, territorial and political representation emerged. Political representation remained restricted to official organizations. The system had a base at the ‘shop’ level, in precincts and local branches of the party and other official political organizations, and a top in the assemblies of republics, while only republics and provinces were represented at the federal level, stressing further the reduction of common federal functions. Substantial municipal autonomy was a spin-off of the decentralization drive

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based on the ideology of self-management and, especially, Marx’s Paris Commune model. In reality, poorer municipalities lacked funding for their extremely expanded services and, as a result, municipalities increasingly functioned as proto-states, aiming at autarky and providing very different levels of services (see Marinković 1990). The leadership even created institutional mechanisms for direct democracy at the local level, such as the institution of the public gathering of citizens (zbor grad¯ana), probably aiming to use it to mobilize the population for its goals. The decentralized structure of the system, combined with indirect but frequent rotation of ‘self-managers’ in a remarkably large number of elective posts in economic, social and political organizations, provided ample opportunities for participation. Nearly one in five adult workers actively took part in the process of self-management; bearing in mind the frequent rotation of delegates and the barring of consecutive terms, the majority of workers acquired some experience of the system (see Wilson 1978: 255). The effects of the system in terms of the influence of ordinary people on economic and political decision-making were hardly significant, except at a very low level, due to the need for technical and managerial expertise in the economy and the fact that the highly decentralized system could function only with the guidance of party leaderships at all levels. However, many people gained some experience of participation and, especially, experience of the way in which the system operated. In terms of political representation, the system not only failed to open space for effective participation, but also operated in practice as a system of co-optation, which removed even the semblance of a link between members of the legislature and their constituencies (Goati 1989: 152). The decentralization drive ultimately resulted in the fragmentation of Yugoslavia’s society, its economy and government structures. The consequence was a growing need for economic and political co-ordination and an increasing role for the party. The costs of fragmentation in the economy were not initially apparent but the unproductive use of resources, which the system encouraged, contributed to the emergence of economic crisis once foreign loans dried up. In theory, the so-called ‘de-étatization’ and self-management were to reduce bureaucracy at all levels and ‘socialize’ state functions. In reality, the main target was the federal state and its apparatus and the main consequence was the radical federalization and a sharp increase of bureaucracy in the republics, provinces and municipalities, and in political, economic and social life. Between 1972 and 1978 the number of employees in the administration rose by 44.3 percent. Worse, the number of functionaries within the


administration, who drew larger salaries and enjoyed various privileges, rose substantially and by far exceeded their proportion in the administration in other states. Parallel developments unfolded in the economy as well (Goati 1989: 42–4). These trends combined to produce the shift from the managerial-technocratic culture of the 1960s to ‘professional politicians’ of the 1970s and 1980s (Cohen 1989: 158, Chapter 4). The weak effects of this novel road to socialism in terms of participation were hardly surprising. In many respects it resembled the corporatist structures of non-communist authoritarian regimes of the day, which were created to complement the hierarchal structures of the state and the single party in order to provide a veneer of legitimacy to such regimes. The corporatist structures became an element in the limited pluralism of an authoritarian regime, but simultaneously set some limits to the power of political elites (see Linz 2000: 208–16). On the whole, Yugoslavia ended up with a highly decentralized political structure, including a weak centre, powerful republics and provinces, a high level of local autonomy, a large number of minuscule organizations and proto-bureaucracies in the economy and social services and many official political organizations, as well as an increasingly feeble federal leadership.

Dissent and popular protest under the party-state While being more inclusive toward social forces and less repressive than their East European cousins, Yugoslavia’s communist leadership did not normally tolerate challenges to the state, the regime or their policies. After the war party leaders were in their most repressive stage and did not leave much space for such challenges. The influence of social forces on political life did not appear in the form of open protest but was indirect and largely expressed through non-political conflict and everyday forms of resistance, such as a massive pattern of evasion, like in other East European states and other repressive social and political settings (see Ekiert and Kubik 1999: 22–3; Scott 1990: 136). This form of protest often proved to be effective. Resistance of the peasants to compulsory collections and deliveries, principally through black-marketing, as well as to collectivization by way of violence and intimidation targeted at local authorities were important reasons for the termination of these policies (Bokovoy 1998). The communists repeatedly adjusted their ambitious rhetoric and policies aimed at social and cultural transformation in response to reactions from below, in the form of either ‘excessive’ enthusiasm and vigour or withdrawal from activism and dissent. There

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is some evidence to suggest that the relaxation of cultural controls from 1950 was motivated less by the implications of the Soviet–Yugoslav split and more by negative responses to the party’s previous rhetoric and policies (Lilly 2001: 2–9). The growing space for social forces in the wake of decentralization and economic and political reforms resulted in various forms of dissent as well as local attempts at popular protest, even highly visible episodes of mobilization. The party’s strategy toward challengers varied and was more exclusive toward some groups than others. It targeted ideological dissidence and set strong limits on attempts to bring its claim to power into question and on attempts to probe the official line on the national question. Nonetheless, the Yugoslav leadership had a more relaxed position toward dissident intellectuals than its East European counterparts. The relaxed attitude partly originated from long-standing links between some high officials and dissident intellectuals, forged in the war or in its wake when some of the intellectuals served in various party and state posts. The personal ties and the absence of systematic and organized censorship resulted in a somewhat arbitrary treatment of intellectuals. Since the early 1970s, the treatment of intellectuals in various republics diverged, with the leaderships of Bosnia and Croatia being rigid and those of Serbia and Slovenia more tolerant (Dragović-Soso 2002: 14–15). Yugoslavia’s leadership was considerably more responsive to discontent when it came from the working class, students and grass-roots groups with national grievances, due to their strategic position in the officially sanctioned and systematically glorified heritage of the liberation war and indigenous revolution. The working class occupied the central ideological space in all communist states mainly because Leninist parties came to power and governed formally in its name. The official endorsement of a new attitude toward labor, as a way to enrich the community and to fulfil one’s own most noble function, soon turned into the cult of labor in Yugoslavia, just like in other East European states. Aiming to increase industrial production rapidly and to instil new values into the population, the Yugoslav communists promoted shockwork, or intensive and overtime work. They modelled their efforts on the tradition of Soviet Stakhanovism of the 1930s and widely celebrated shockworkers in the press, especially in 1946–47 and in 1949, even if the impact on productivity levels remained unclear (Lilly 2001: 79, 118, 173). The adoption of workers’ self-management and its subsequent expansion, with a somewhat less intrusive official glorification of labor, further amplified the sensitivity of the political class and the population at large toward industrial workers and the working people in general.


While the working class occupied a strategic position in the official ideology, the miners enjoyed such a position within the working class. The miners served as the symbols of Yugoslavia’s industrialization drive and were, according to Tito, ‘special workers’ (Kuzmanić 1988). The picture of Alija Sirotanović, a miner and shockworker from Breza who was hailed as the Yugoslav Stakhanov, remained on Yugoslav banknotes long after he had retired. The implication of the central position of the working class in communist ideology and the cult of labor was that workers’ strikes and, especially, miners’, deserved a special, gentler treatment by the authorities than protests by other groups. While the LCY claimed strikes to be superfluous in a workers’ self-management system, they occurred more frequently than in other East European states and their number grew in the 1960s. Between 1958 and 1969 there were nearly 2000 ‘work stoppages’, more in developed and less in other regions. The strikes were generally short because authorities dealt with the workers’ demands quickly, largely by satisfying their demands. The strikes’ organizers were often targeted, but the repression, if it occurred at all, was highly selective ( Jovanov 1979: 77, 186; Sekulić 1987: 25, 32). This sensitivity of party leaders extended to demands coming from students and grass-roots groups harboring national grievances. Youth and its communist-led mass organization played an important role during the war and in the communist takeover, not least because the majority of leading cadres were under the age of 26 and the overwhelming number of the martyred People’s Heroes was under 23. Party leaders also depended considerably on youth in their post-war reconstruction effort, their political and economic consolidation after the Soviet–Yugoslav split and in attempts at socialist transformation of society, expressed partly through extensive mobilization of youth volunteer labor brigades (Lilly 2001: 52, 120–4, 173–4). Students were especially important since they represented the key link between the youth and intelligentsia and were the key carriers of the new values. The strategic position of the students secured them special treatment by the party-state. The most important and visible episodes of mobilization were the protests of Belgrade University students in 1968 and the street demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians in 1968 and 1981. On the evening of 2 June 1968, the excessive use of force by the police against a group of Belgrade students at a local entertainment event triggered student demonstrations of several thousand and two attempts to march toward the city’s centre. The security forces deployed force against the protesters, leaving more than a hundred injured. On 3 June, Belgrade University declared a seven-day strike and police forces blocked the buildings of its various

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faculties. Students and their professors demanded the resignation of officials responsible for the violence, the release of imprisoned protesters, the unblocking of the faculties’ buildings and the formal acceptance of the right to popular protest. Subsequently they stated more programmatic demands, disapproved of growing social inequalities, unemployment and demanded an extension of the self-management system. Students especially objected to a system that set obstacles to the career advancement of well-educated young people and favored middle-aged and often poorly qualified cadres of the revolution. The protests triggered stirrings at other universities, especially in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana (Popov 1983: 15–56). Although the protest was hardly anti-systemic, this was the first major eruption of discontent in the post-war period. Students built upon their already tested potential for protest, during demonstrations against US military action in Vietnam in 1966 when the police force had to intervene to maintain order. They swiftly developed new organizational forms in addition to existing ones and fully developed an already relaxed student press. While students repeatedly stressed their commitment to the party’s programme and insisted on its full implementation, their independent collective action directly threatened the authoritarian regime. Tito personally took part in the pacification of the protest and delivered a televised speech to appease the students on 9 June. The regime subsequently incorporated some of the demands into its policies, especially those related to the living standards of students and the working class, and simultaneously engaged in the suppression of dissent. The student press, student leaders and their prominent supporters among professors, and their new organizational forms, all became targets of the regime’s repression in the following months and years (Popov 1983). In the autumn of 1968, hundreds of Albanians demonstrated across Kosovo and northwest Macedonia with a demand for a republic of Kosovo, even union with Albania (see D ¯ aković 1984: 287–92). While rejecting these demands and restoring order, the party gradually boosted the autonomy of Kosovo and introduced a range of policies to meet the aspirations of Kosovo Albanians. By contrast, the federal communist leadership fully suppressed the 1981 Albanian demonstrations and initiated a major change in policy toward Kosovo (see Chapter 4). In short, the party forcefully brought the protests of Belgrade students and Kosovo Albanians in 1968 to a halt but granted important concessions to their demands. This was partly because an important legitimizing claim of the party was its strong connection to the masses, rooted in the popularbased war of liberation and independent development in the post-war


period and partly because the protests did not openly target the regime but only some of its policies. Likewise, the emancipation of all ethnic groups featured high on the list of the regime’s priorities in the post-war period and that of Kosovo Albanians was deemed especially important in the wake of the fall of Ranković. The 1981 protests of Kosovo Albanians, by contrast, were perceived as a threat to the state’s territorial integrity and were thus swiftly suppressed. The forceful treatment of the most visible episodes of mobilization sent a strong signal to potential challenger groups that mobilization had its costs and thus discouraged open popular protest. On the whole, the regime’s strategy toward challenger groups was based on the predictability of response and the provision of some institutional channels for participation.

Political instability after Tito In the last years of Tito’s rule Yugoslavia enjoyed political stability and there was little popular discontent. The leadership was able to claim credit for the successful protection of the country’s independence in the hostile international environment of the Cold War and to play on the population’s fear of Soviet domination. Yugoslavia’s international prestige, which Tito achieved by skilfully balancing between East and West and by playing a leading role among non-aligned countries, rose to its heights. The political instability of the late 1960s and early 1970s appeared to be a problem of the past and the newly expanded system of self-management was praised as a recipe for success in terms of boosting economic growth and participation. It was widely acknowledged that Yugoslavia compared favorably with other East European socialist states in terms of relative economic prosperity and high living standards, consumerist culture, private initiative in some sectors of the economy, relaxed cultural policies, considerable personal freedoms and foreign travel, and even highly selective repression. By the mid-1980s, however, the circumstances had changed radically and Yugoslavia faced mounting economic crisis and political instability. The signs of growing economic crisis had appeared in the late 1970s as soon as the investment drive, financed by extensive foreign borrowing, ended. Gradually the crisis broadened and reached dramatic levels in the late 1980s, largely due to the inadequate response of the leadership. Growing political instability appeared in the form of elite conflict, including intra-regional power struggles and conflict between regional leaderships, and in the widening of the gap between high officials and the population at large. The conflicts intensified in debates over policies,

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principally those aimed at tackling the economic crisis; over proposals for constitutional reform and the gradual relaxation of repression. The shift from political stability in the 1970s to an increasingly volatile political stage in the mid-1980s occurred despite the fact that the institutional framework and many policies of the party-state remained roughly the same. This suggests that other factors were also at work. Tito died in May 1980. The party-state leadership staged a show of unity for the world as well as for its population, and succession proceeded in orderly fashion and without any disturbances. The post of President of Yugoslavia, reserved by the 1974 Constitution for Tito for life, automatically ceased to exist and the state Presidency of Yugoslavia, a collective body at the helm of which regional representatives rotated annually, assumed power. However, the long-term consequences of the leadership succession for the political process were considerable due to the critical role that Tito had played in the political process and in the preservation of political stability. Tito’s authority drew from several sources. First, he was revered as a unifier of the multi-national state, founder of the communist regime and the protector of Yugoslavia’s independence throughout the post-war period. Second, Tito personally controlled key levers of power and held the most powerful offices of General Secretary (later renamed President of the LCY) and President of Yugoslavia for decades. By the late 1960s, only Kardelj among the small group of the regime’s founders survived Tito’s purges and he took pains not to present himself as a contender for power. Third, favorable comparisons with other East European socialist states, which were directly associated with his personality, endeared him to new generations. Fourth, Yugoslavia’s citizens had a high regard for Tito’s prominent role on the international political stage because it boosted the country’s prestige. From the very beginning, the communist leadership worked hard to transform popular support for Tito into a personality cult and thus contribute to political stability, and in the last decade of Tito’s rule this effort reached absurd levels (see Pavlowitch 1992). In short, the fate of the regime and state in the 1970s appeared to have been connected to Tito’s personality more than ever before. Leadership succession in the 1980s opened space for political change throughout Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union (see Bunce 1999: 58–9). However, while Brezhnev’s death in 1982 and Gorbachev’s ascent in 1985 triggered reforms in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia ended up without a clear successor to Tito and with a deadlock at the federal level. Previously, regional elites had often obstructed economic decision-making in federal organs. Due to different levels of economic


development, the economic interests of the republics and provinces diverged and the threat of the veto each of them effectively held over federal policy was always present. Key decisions were ultimately taken with the help of the central party organs that retained a measure of unity. After the death of Tito this was no longer possible because the absence of a supreme authority and arbiter undermined this unity (Burg 1986: 180). The change of political generations also had adverse consequences for political stability and yet this part of the leadership succession has received little attention in the literature on late socialist Yugoslavia. Members of Tito’s old guard, such as the pre-war communists and war veterans, increasingly took to retirement and in their place came politicians of the post-war generations. The trend had already started in the 1960s but members of the older generation, still in their fifties at the time, were eager to stay in power (Rusinow 1977: 143–4). The partial return to repression in the early 1970s only strengthened their resolve. Now, within only a few years most of the elders left the political stage. Kardelj, a chief party ideologue, originally from Slovenia, died in 1979 and Vladimir Bakarić, Croatia’s strongman, in 1983. Miloš Minić, a high official from Serbia, retired in 1982 and a number of highly influential politicians, such as Petar Stambolić from Serbia, Lazar Koliševski from Macedonia, Cvijetin Mijatović from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Fadil Hoxha from Kosovo and Stevan Doronjski from Vojvodina, retired in 1984, once their mandates in the federal state Presidency expired. Politicians of postwar generations, most of them in their forties and fifties, now assumed key posts in party and state organs. The main implication of generational change was that close personal ties among representatives of republics and provinces in the highest federal party and state organs, which had been forged before, during and after the war and reinforced in the wake of the purge of 1971–72, broke down. Personal ties in the leadership played an important role in preserving political stability ever since the decentralizing reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s, so that their absence now contributed to elite conflict at the federal level. Elite conflict also erupted within republics and provinces and at times turned into a power struggle on the public stage. The most important and visible conflict unfolded in the leadership of Serbia between 1985 and 1987 when Ivan Stambolić removed Draža Marković from power and then suffered the same fate at the hands of his former protégé Slobodan Milošević (see Chapter 2). Members of the younger generation had very different formative experiences, values and skills from the old guard, which inevitably

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affected the general direction of policy, relations within the political class and state–society relations. Unlike members of the old guard, most were well educated, with a background in administration, business or local politics. While there were few ideological differences between members of the old and new political generations, largely because the elders carefully selected their successors, priorities gradually shifted toward economic reform, more open intra-party debates, the relaxation of repression and more autonomy for low- and middle-ranking party and state officials. The economic reforms appeared urgent since by the early 1980s Yugoslavia faced a growing economic crisis. The rate of economic growth, which had long remained above 5 percent, now crashed and hovered around zero. Since 1975 Yugoslavia, or more precisely its republics and provinces, had borrowed around $10 billion so that foreign debt reached $18 billion by 1980. Both unemployment and inflation gradually increased; the aggregate figure for the latter exceeded 1000 percent, or 20 times the European average between 1979 and 1985. By the end of this period registered unemployment rose to over 16.3 percent, though this figure concealed a great discrepancy between full employment in Slovenia and unemployment of around 50 percent in Kosovo and over 20 percent in many parts of the country. Living standards fell by one-quarter between 1979 and 1985 and by full one-third by 1988. The government introduced rationing for petrol, electricity, sugar and flour. While rationing had been common in nearly all states of the Soviet Bloc, the citizens of Yugoslavia had become used to a higher standard of living (see Korošić 1988; Lydall 1989; Woodward 1995b). The leadership responded timidly to the growing crisis. The highpowered Kraigher Commission, which developed policy proposals to tackle the crisis in 1982–83, firmly stuck to the basic tenets of the selfmanagement economy. Although the policy prescriptions were hardly radical, the party leadership strongly resisted the proposal for limited market reforms, backed by the hard-line 1985 report of a high party commission led by Josip Vrhovec. Local liberal economists had already pointed to the adverse implications of the party-state’s continuing grip over the economy and of the excessive fragmentation of the state, government and economic structures. Their advice coincided with IMF proposals, but remained unanswered because it required major changes in state–society relations, and between the federal centre and the republics and provinces. The debate on economic reform in the first half of the 1980s triggered an ideological rift between conservatives and economic reformers, and between the supporters of further decentralization


and the advocates of greater control of the federal centre over policy, especially since the economic crisis brought into the open regional grievances and disparities that had remained concealed during the period of economic growth. Serbia’s rejuvenated leadership, headed by Ivan Stambolić, outlined proposals for economic reform in November 1984, such as favoring market mechanisms within the self-management system, strengthening the control of the federal centre over economic policy and reintegration of Yugoslavia’s market. Slovenia’s high officials, supported by their counterparts from Croatia, strongly opposed the proposals and insisted that economic reforms could work within the existing institutional arrangements. These disputes now reinforced the stalemate at the federal level and heated debates, earlier confined to narrow leadership circles, gradually found their way into the mass media. The loosening of controls in the authoritarian regime, which was partly a consequence of generational change, took the form of pragmatic relaxation of repressive practices rather than a programmatic drive toward liberalization or democratization. While the relaxation was felt across the country, its extent varied widely from one republic to another. The least repressive atmosphere, in terms of the freedom of the press and publishing, and the most lively activity of dissident intellectuals was in Ljubljana and Belgrade, partly because of their concentration in the two cities and partly due to the relaxed policies of Slovenia’s and Serbia’s new leaders. High officials from other parts of Yugoslavia repeatedly complained about the so-called ‘political opposition’ in the capital and the lack of repressive measures to deal with it, most visibly in the May 1984 report of Croatia’s party ideologues.2 The exception to this trend was the suppression of the 1981 protests of Kosovo Albanians and repression in Kosovo over the following years (see Chapter 3). Like Tito’s old guard, the younger generation politicians considered the mobilization of Kosovo Albanians to be a serious threat to Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. Even in this case they aimed at less repressive solutions than their predecessors, but were fortunate to have faced the problem only after it peaked in the early 1980s, so that their commitment to a softer approach was not fully tested. The mid-1980s witnessed a gradual pluralization of political life, mainly through the activity of existing non-political and professional associations, and growing conflict in the higher echelons of the partystate, including that between and within regional leaderships. The younger generation politicians, many with a technocratic background, were much less ready to employ repressive measures than their predecessors and the state capacity for repression declined. Some members

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of the younger generation, especially in Slovenia and Serbia, tolerated both cultural and political dissent and engaged in informal alliances with protest groups and dissident intellectuals in the second half of the 1980s. Due to the peculiar nature of Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism, the main consequence of partial liberalization was that boundaries between the political class and society became increasingly blurred. Moreover, the pressure of the party-state over society eased partly because no politician after Tito could provide a common purpose to the partystate leadership and apparatus, underpinned by a highly decentralized institutional framework. While acts of repression against individuals or groups seen as threatening to the regime did occur, as in the case of the show trials in the first half of the 1980s, a more extensive policy of repression was unlikely due to the same obstacles that prevented the emergence of effective economic decision-making. Finally, the introduction of one-year mandates for party and state posts forced political leaders to focus increasingly on the struggle for office rather than on dissident intellectuals.

Late Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism and its unintended consequences Yugoslavia enjoyed political stability for the greater part of the post-war period. In foreign policy, its leadership successfully exploited the position between East and West during the Cold War and its international prestige rose beyond its real weight and resources. In the domestic arena, authoritarianism provided a stable political context for rapid industrialization and the overall modernization of society, at least until the late 1960s, while the rates of economic growth and living standards of its citizens were favorable in comparison to other East European communist states. The party also provided political stability in a diverse multi-national society and a degree of personal freedom unrivalled under communism, despite frequent oscillations and adaptations to changing social, economic and political circumstances. However, the country lived beyond its means, especially in the 1970s, and high standards of living were financed through extensive foreign borrowing. The political system that emerged from the reforms and purges of the 1960s and early 1970s excessively depended for its normal functioning on the personality of Tito, its ageing leader, and close personal ties among members of the old guard in the leadership. Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism was of a peculiar sort. Yugoslavia shared important features with its East European communist counterparts, such


as the internal workings of the party-state and the aim to control large parts of the economy and society, though in somewhat more indirect ways. The centralized party organization, the leader selection mechanism and the domination of the leadership by members of the old guard closely reflected the practice of other communist states, though power was increasingly concentrated at the level of the republics and provinces rather than at the federal centre. Other features of the political context, such as corporatist structures, limited pluralism, relaxed cultural policies, a measure of charismatic leadership and highly selective repression, likened it to non-communist authoritarianism, prevalent in Southern Europe and Latin America during the greater part of the Cold War. While pluralism in communist states was restricted to institutional pluralism, non-communist authoritarianism featured extensive social, economic, even political pluralism, though the latter was limited and irresponsible (Linz 2000). As a result, these regimes provided more space for dissent and popular protest than communist regimes. Unsurprisingly, the potential for popular protest was higher in Yugoslavia than in most East European states. Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism in its later stages also became highly decentralized in its territorial dimension, involving a power-sharing federalism and a very high level of municipal autonomy. Radically decentralized federalism is a rarity under modern authoritarianism. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the other two communist national federations, involved some, though a considerably lesser degree of, autonomy for their federal units. Yugoslavia’s was also a consociational regime, based on the sharing of power among regional leaders, who were seen as also representing their respective nations. Unlike most contemporary consociations, which operate in the context of liberal democracy, Yugoslavia remained authoritarian. Authoritarianism only amplified an important drawback of all consociations, that is, excessive dependence on leaders of the plural society’s segments for its normal operation, thus leaving the fate of the multi-national state squarely at the mercy of unaccountable regional leaders. This unusual mix of power sharing and authoritarianism was characteristic of some premodern polities. In a way, late Titoist Yugoslavia resembled the composite structure of empires and other polities that preceded modern, integrated national states, which featured indirect rule of the centre over the periphery largely through regional intermediaries and cultural brokers. Nonetheless, despite similarities with communist and non-communist authoritarianism of the Cold War period and some premodern polities, Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism was unique because of the simultaneous operation of these

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features. Ultimately, they had a cumulative effect in undermining the regime and state. In the 1970s and 1980s Yugoslavia featured a highly decentralized structure, with a weak centre, powerful federal units, a high level of local autonomy and a large number of official organizations and associations. Although the party’s prevailing strategy toward challenger groups was normally exclusive and repressive, the focus was on ideological dissidence rather than on grass roots expression of discontent. Due to the party’s historically shaped sensitivity to the national question and its highly decentralized political structure, largely along national lines, the expression of grievances of minority groups potentially involved less risk than that of others. Nonetheless, the potential for popular protest in the last decade of Tito’s rule remained unfulfilled. The authority of the ageing president, stable political alignments and elite unity effectively discouraged potential challenger groups. Growing political instability after Tito, including shifts in political alignments because of leadership succession and generational change, the rise of elite conflict and partial liberalization, increased the salience of a highly decentralized political structure and opened up space for popular mobilization. By and large, the emergence and diffusion of popular protest in the second half of the 1980s was an unintended consequence of Yugoslavia’s highly decentralized political structure and political change that started after Tito’s death. Despite growing elite conflict, regional leaderships, especially regional representatives in the federal party and state organs, generally retained a united front against potential challengers while more extreme cases of elite conflict remained visible only to professional observers. This image of a unified elite was ultimately broken in 1988 and resulted in the rapid spread of mobilization, the fall of Yugoslav communism and spiraling nationalist conflict.

2 The Rise of Milošević

Scholars of socialist Yugoslavia and supporters of Slobodan Milošević share the view that he rose personally as a leader due to the broad appeal of his political programme.1 According to one version of this view, Milošević overwhelmed his initially more powerful rivals in 1987 by obtaining majority support in the higher ranks of the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS) for his nationalist programme, namely the reduction of the autonomy of Kosovo. The other version of the thesis says that he extended nationalist appeal to the population at large and established control over party and state organs in the largest of Yugoslavia’s republics mainly by bringing pressure from society on the political elite. In any case, Milošević allegedly emerged from the leadership struggle as a very powerful leader and was thus able to purge his rivals from the regional leadership and embark upon the implementation of a nationalist programme.2 The supporters of Milošević have largely agreed with scholars. Borisav Jović, his right-hand man, claimed ‘the removal of the bureaucratic leadership of Serbia, which had subserviently accepted the division of Serbia into three parts’ to be one of their main achievements (Duga, 7 June 1991). The argument about the centrality of the political programme in Milošević’s ascent deserves careful scrutiny not only because it has long served as the dominant interpretation of these historical events, but also because it reflects a dominant view of the structure of power in late Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism, especially after Tito’s death. According to this view, Yugoslavia featured collective leadership at the federal and regional levels, that is, in republics and provinces, as a direct consequence of the constitutional and party reforms and elite settlement which had been cemented in the first half of the 1970s (Burg 1983). The assumption is that sudden personality shifts at the top were unlikely to 51

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occur, at least when there was no profound conflict over policy. Consequently, without a new programme persuasive to high party officials or the population at large, Milošević would not have been able to change power relations in the higher party echelons and purge powerful rivals from leadership. And yet, few observers saw the events as a major political change at the time, nationalist or otherwise. The New Year’s poll of Serbia’s leading weekly NIN revealed that only 5 percent of respondents referred to Milošević as someone who attracted their attention in 1987, and the LCS’s September 1987 session in which the conflict between Milošević and his rivals unfolded was not even mentioned as a memorable event in that year3 (NIN, 10 January 1988: 14). Moreover, even a casual reading of the Belgrade and Zagreb press of the period reveals that the first half of 1988 was rather uneventful, which hardly fits into the view that major political change was unfolding at the time. The rise of Milošević came to be seen as a turning point in the history of the region only in subsequent interpretations, during the heat of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The political programme thesis is largely based on the testimonies of Milošević’s rivals purged from the leadership. While providing a welcome balance to Milošević’s propaganda, the testimonies came to be widely but uncritically accepted in the light of subsequent nationalist conflicts in which Milošević did play an important role (D ¯ ekić 1990; Pavlović 1988; Stambolić 1995). Milošević and his supporters did not object, claiming their place in initiating the so-called Serb national revival. Drawing on previously unavailable sources, including the personal accounts of participants in the power struggle and minutes of decisive meetings of the leadership, I found that the rise of Milošević was little more than an episode in communist power politics. The change of political generations set the stage for leadership struggle. While the younger generation politicians shared views on key issues of policy, including the Kosovo problem, minor disagreements over policy implementation were exaggerated in the heat of the power struggle between factions based on personalist networks of Milošević and his rival, Ivan Stambolić. The appeal of Milošević to party officials was based on his personal qualities, while the outcome of the power struggle was largely decided by institutional power, on the model of the earlier ascent of Ivan Stambolić. The strategic position of President of the regional party Presidency granted Milošević an opportunity to build up political support in high party organs and exploit the party’s organizational resources to challenge successfully his former political protector. The whole episode was

The Rise of Milošević

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essentially about who would be the leader, an internal party affair that unfolded according to the rules of the game in communist states, with little influence from society.

The change of political generations Slobodan Milošević was born in Požarevac, in central Serbia, in 1941. His parents, who were originally from Montenegro, settled in the town on the eve of the war. His father, a catechist and teacher of Russian and Serbo-Croatian, later separated from his wife and returned to Montenegro. Slobodan and his elder brother therefore grew up with their mother, a schoolteacher and devoted communist. Their childhood passed without much disturbance and excitement and Slobodan was a quiet and diligent pupil.4 Milošević belonged to the generation that benefited greatly from rapid social, economic and political change in socialist Yugoslavia. His peers experienced the hardships of war and the immediate post-war period only as children and grew up and attended school partly during the rapid economic development of the 1950s. Many entered university at the time of the increasingly liberal atmosphere of the early 1960s and started administrative careers at a time of increasing focus on meritocratic recruitment at all levels. As a result, they were able to advance rapidly up the social and political hierarchy and join the higher ranks of the party-state in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when members of the older generation had already started considering retirement. Milošević engaged in party work at the University of Belgrade and served as a junior secretary of the Law School’s party committee and, subsequently, as one of the secretaries of the University Committee. After graduation, Milošević worked at various posts in the Belgrade city administration before entering a business career upon the invitation of Ivan Stambolić, Director General of a medium-sized Belgrade company, whom he had befriended at university. Milošević served as Deputy Director for three years and, when Ivan Stambolić assumed the chairmanship of Belgrade’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, replaced him as Director General. Subsequently, the two mates advanced rapidly up the political hierarchy. After a short stint as Executive Secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS), Ivan Stambolić was selected for President of Serbia’s Executive Council (or Serbia’s government) and Milošević came to preside over Beogradska banka, the largest bank in Yugoslavia, simultaneously chairing the party committee of the central Belgrade municipality Stari Grad, one of the largest local party

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branches in the country. Since regional governments were involved in little more than economic management, the influence of Ivan Stambolić grew when he was selected President of Belgrade’s City Committee in 1982. Simultaneously, Milošević entered the Presidency of the LCS’ Central Committee. In 1982 the leadership of Serbia was a highly heterogeneous group in terms of age. The members of the older generation were still in control of the political stage, as in other of Yugoslavia’s republics and East European states. Although few in number, they set the direction of policy and held the top political posts in Serbia and those reserved for its representatives in federal party and state organs. Most had joined the party in the late 1930s and engaged in illegal work under the old regime and were fully shaped by the Comintern tradition of orthodox communism. The illegal work and war interrupted their university studies and, as they assumed administrative and political posts in the wake of the partisan war, damaged their education. All of the elders had taken part in the war effort from the very beginning and some occupied prominent positions in the partisan fighting force. In the post-war period, they had spent a large part of their careers in federal organs. In 1982 they were in their 60s apart from Petar Stambolić who was 70. Petar Stambolić (1912–2007), an uncle of Ivan Stambolić, held high offices in Serbia and Yugoslavia since the war, and served as Serbia’s representative on the federal collective party and state Presidencies in the 1970s and early 1980s.5 Draža Marković (1920–2005) entered high political circles in the late 1960s and subsequently presided over the collective state Presidency of Serbia. Following a four-year mandate as President of the Federal Assembly, Marković served as member of the federal party Presidency, including a year as its President in 1983–84. The two politicians helped construct Tito’s coalition of regional leaders that ruled Yugoslavia since the purges of 1971–72 by removing from power the so-called liberals, a group of well-educated politicians from Serbia who had initiated moderate political and economic reforms (see D ¯ ukić 1990). Dobrivoje Vidić (1918–91), who had made a successful career in diplomacy, was co-opted into the regional leadership in the wake of the 1972 purge and presided over the state Presidency of Serbia after Marković. The last member of the older generation, Nikola Ljubiˇcić (1916–2005), Tito’s longest serving defence minister, replaced Vidić as President of Serbia’s state Presidency in 1982, as Petar Stambolić and Marković aimed to draw on his good standing in the eyes of the leaders of other republics to facilitate bargaining over various issues at the federal level.


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Another two of Serbia’s influential politicians, Tihomir Vlaškalić and ˇ Dušan Ckrebi´ c, were of a different generation. Nearly a decade younger on average than the members of the older generation, they joined the party after the war and never acquired as strong a commitment to the ideology as their predecessors. Their university education was not interrupted by the war and they benefited in their early careers from rapid industrialization and economic development. Top political posts were less open to this generation because the members of older generation were in the 1960s still in their 50s and eager to remain in political life (Rusinow 1977: 143–4). In a way they were transitional figures, linking the older and younger generations. Tihomir Vlaškalić (1923–93) presided over the Central Committee of the LCS as a compromise candidate since 1972. Aiming to preserve his personal power against increasingly assertive regional leaders, Tito had created a rift in the previously cohesive leadership of Serbia. While backing Petar Stambolić and Marković in the purge of the liberals, he prevented either politician from assuming the newly vacated highest regional party office so that they eventually ˇ appointed Vlaškalić (D ¯ ukić 1990: 105–262). In 1982 Dušan Ckrebić (born 1927), who had occupied a series of high-ranking posts in Serbia since late 1960s, replaced Vlaškalić as President of the Central Committee of Serbia without becoming Serbia’s most influential politician. Nearing retirement and aiming to reassure the younger generation that their values would be reflected in policy, Petar Stambolić and Draža Marković gradually introduced younger politicians into the highest party and state offices in the early 1980s, as Marković told me in an interview. The most influential politician in this group was Ivan Stambolić (1936– 2000), the nephew of Petar Stambolić. He was an atypical member of his political generation. While most of his peers entered university education directly after high school, he entered the workforce as a metal worker and only in his mid-20s enrolled in part-time study at university. The successful completion of his studies despite adverse conditions, followed by a very successful career in business and politics, had great resonance under a regime which praised the working class and also brought the younger Stambolić personal respect within his political generation. He was a fine administrator and gifted politician, though it was apparent that his fast-track political career benefited from the reputation of his uncle. Following Ivan Stambolić, a number of politicians from his generation, born between mid-1930s and early 1940s, entered the establishment just below the top level and served in junior executive and other influential posts in the Central Committee of the LCS. In 1982 members of this generation already had a strong base in the higher

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echelons of the party-state and their political influence grew. The balance of power gradually shifted toward the younger generation in the course of 1984 and 1985. At the time, Petar Stambolić had already retired and Marković, Vidić and Ljubiˇcić represented Serbia in federal party and state organs. Ivan Stambolić, now President of LCS’ Central Committee (subsequently renamed President of the Presidency of LCS’ Central Committee), and Slobodan Milošević, his replacement at the helm of Belgrade’s City Committee, still occasionally sought advice from the elders but fully dominated regional organs and gradually introduced their associates to influential positions. They were now increasingly able to develop policies of their own, within the constraints of Yugoslav communism.6 This heterogeneous composition of the leadership in terms of age groups produced disagreements in some policy areas, but not in others. All high party and state officials supported the main aspects of Yugoslavia’s state and regime, as expressed in the post-1972 elite settlement and the Constitution of 1974. The main concern of all was the fragmented political structure of Serbia, including the Kosovo problem, despite the charges of Milošević and his supporters after September 1987 that only they took these issues seriously. There is ample evidence of the initiatives of Petar Stambolić, Draža Marković, Ivan Stambolić and others for constitutional and party reforms in the federal and regional party and state organs. Serbia’s high officials considered the fragmentation of the republic’s political structure to be the consequence of inadequate implementation of the 1974 constitution. The constitutional and party reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s granted the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, previously little more than Serbia’s administrative regions, nearly full legislative, executive and judicial autonomy, direct representation in all federal state and party organs based on the parity formula, as well as an effective veto over policy in Serbia and the federation. Representatives of the provinces continued to take part in the decision-making that affected central Serbia only, while the central leadership of the republic did not have a say over the policies of the provinces’ organs. The constitution prescribed a degree of policy co-ordination for the whole territory of the republic, but provinces’ high officials obstructed even minimalist attempts to achieve the co-ordination. As a result, provinces effectively functioned as separate republics. Their economic policies aimed at autarky, and cultural policies increasingly diverged from those of central Serbia, especially regarding educational programmes. The cultural autonomy of national minorities was not at


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stake in the dispute, because it had already been constitutionally guaranteed, regardless of the specific relations between the provinces’ and Serbia’s central organs. For example, there were comical attempts by the province’s officials to invent a Vojvodina literary tradition, as distinct from and opposed to the Serb national tradition. The constitutional designation of Serbia as a sovereign state remained unfulfilled, in sharp contrast to the practice in other republics. Moreover, the provinces’ high officials repeatedly voted against proposals of Serbia’s representatives in federal party and state organs. This demonstration of veto power, even over policy issues that had nothing to do with the autonomy of the provinces, negatively affected Serbia’s standing in the federation and embittered relations with the central leadership of Serbia. Soon after the constitutional reform, the leadership of Serbia launched an initiative, expressed in the 1977 report, the so-called Blue Book, which insisted that co-ordination in a range of policy areas was mandatory according to the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia. The move faced strong opposition from leaders of the autonomous provinces and, as the latter appeared to have quiet support from Tito, the initiative died (Stambolić 1995: 66–7). In the wake of protests by Kosovo Albanians in 1981, Draža Marković and Petar Stambolić put the issue back on the agenda in federal and Serbia’s party organs. The demonstrations, triggered by student protest but overwhelmed by nationalist demands, such as for the upgrading of Kosovo to the status of a republic, increased awareness in federal organs about the depth and scale of nationalist tensions in Kosovo (see Chapter 3). Marković and Petar Stambolić now insisted that the eruption of nationalist protest directly resulted from the unconstitutional extension of the autonomy of the provinces, but had little success in persuading high officials from the other republics to support their initiative. In the November 1984 party platform, designed principally by Serbia’s younger generation politicians, this position was reaffirmed and extended to include economic issues and demands that Kosovo’s officials put an end to ethnonational inequalities and tackle other causes of the emigration of Serbs (Osamnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije 1984). The leadership of Vojvodina, most of who were Serbs, was at the forefront of the conflict while Kosovo’s high officials, mainly Kosovo Albanians, only supported their platform. For one thing, the 1981 purge had weakened Kosovo’s leadership in relation to both federal and Serbia’s high officials; for another, these high officials lacked the capacity and education to engage in the rather complex debates and negotiations on constitutional reform, as Boško Krunić, a leading high official from

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Vojvodina and President of the federal party Presidency in 1987–88, told me in an interview. For the leadership of Vojvodina the principal issues were their province’s autonomy and their relationship with high officials of Serbia. They saw themselves as fully equal partners in Yugoslavia’s party and state leadership and saw any initiative for policy co-ordination in Serbia as an attempt to reduce Vojvodina’s autonomy and to limit their power base. They believed that any, even minimal changes in this respect would create a slippery slope that would ultimately lead to the centralization of Serbia. As Krunić explained: ‘if you give them a finger, they will demand a whole arm’. There were some differences in Vojvodina’s leadership regarding whether they should discuss concessions to the central leadership of Serbia to conform to the constitutional arrangements. Several high officials of Serbia told me that they considered some of the province’s high officials, like Krunić, more flexible than others (see also Orlandić 1997). However, as soon as the conflict with Serbia’s leadership escalated, they united against the common threat. The constitutional status of the autonomous provinces was somewhat ambiguous and thus partly depended on informal power relations and alliances in federal party and state organs. What frustrated Serbia’s high officials most was that these alliances backed an extreme interpretation of the 1974 constitution to the disadvantage of their republic. High officials of Slovenia and Croatia, mostly implicitly but at times also explicitly, backed the position of the provinces against that of Serbia’s leadership and made any changes in either the implementation or reform of the relevant arrangements impossible.7 With the exception of the issue of the fragmentation of their republic, policy differences in the leadership of Serbia gradually came to the surface as a reflection of the different outlooks of political generations. Unlike the elders, who still fought battles of the past by privileging the issues of ideology over economic development and political liberalization, members of the younger generation were more pragmatic. Facing inconclusive debates within federal organs on reforms, they advocated moderate changes to the system of self-management to favor the market, and a larger role for federal organs in economic management to alleviate problems arising from Yugoslavia’s fragmented market and decision-making mechanism. They also demanded changes to the way key officials were selected favoring competition among two or more candidates for each post (Osamnaesta sednica CK SK Srbije, 1984). The ascent of this generation was associated with increasingly relaxed intraparty debates and relaxation of pressure on the press and dissident


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intellectuals. Remarkably open debates on key political and policy issues in Belgrade’s City Committee were extensively relayed by media, which provided hope that reforms would follow. While there was no commitment to political reforms beyond the boundaries of the Yugoslav road to socialism, the advances, considerable keeping in mind the domination of conservative communists in all other republics except Slovenia, caused growing concern among some of their leaders. Stipe Šuvar, Croatia’s chief party ideologue and a member of the younger generation, initiated a sweeping attack on the partial liberalization of Serbia in April 1984. A report compiled under his guidance, the so-called White Book, singled out dozens of allegedly anti-socialist and anti-Titoist intellectuals who thrived under the noses of Serbia’s high officials, meaning essentially Ivan Stambolić.8 Others responded quietly, but with greater effect by unanimously rejecting the nomination of Ivan Stambolić for President of the Federal Executive Council (or federal government). Only Ljubiˇcić, a representative of Serbia in Yugoslavia’s collective state Presidency, voted for Stambolić (see Stambolić 1995: 114–15).

The ascendancy of Ivan Stambolić and the circular flow of power By March 1986 Ivan Stambolić had established control over the main levers of power in Serbia. While the change of political generations had set the stage for the power shift, Ivan Stambolić owed his ascendancy largely to his strategic position in the highest regional party office. In communist states ultimate power resided in high party organs. The power of the established leader was not only extensive in range but also selfsustaining, as party rules of cadre selection enabled the leader to build the political machine that would dominate the Central Committee and Politburo (party Presidency in official Yugoslav parlance). According to the rules, the general secretary played a decisive role in the appointment of regional party secretaries, who in turn selected delegates for the party Congress and controlled the selection of candidates for the Central Committee. As regional secretaries directly depended on the general secretary, they had strong incentive to favor the selection of Central Committee members who would become his strong supporters and thus build the political machine that would prevent potential contenders from the Politburo from challenging the general secretary (Daniels 1971: 20; Hough 1997: 80–6). This is not to say that the leader exerted total control over members of the Politburo and the Central Committee and that the ‘circular flow

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of power’ prevented broad debate and conflict over policy, or even an ebbing of support for the general secretary. Rather, it meant only that the established leader was protected against potential attacks by his rivals, except in the case of a major policy change that adversely affected large segments of the elite or society. In normal circumstances, the leader could always turn to his political machine in the Central Committee for support, even against a majority in Politburo, so that open power struggles erupted only during periods of leadership succession. In these periods the former leader’s deputy in charge of personnel selection stood best chances of being selected for the leader due to his being in a position to exploit his predecessor’s political machine (Hough 1997: 80–6; Hough and Fansoid 1979: 260–1). The theory of the ‘circular flow of power’ applied in a modified way to socialist Yugoslavia due to its increasingly complex power structure since the party reforms of the 1960s. Earlier the central party organs had exerted ultimate control. Although the republics had their own Central Committees and related party organs, Tito had controlled the cadre selection process through Aleksandar Ranković, the party’s powerful organizational secretary. Still, state organs acquired more autonomy from the party than in other communist states, starting with the campaign for a limited role of the party following the break with Stalin. The offices of the party’s General Secretary (later called President of the party Presidency) and President of the Republic were formally separated. As Tito occupied both offices until his death in 1980, the separation of the highest party and state offices had initially more implications for the power structure at the regional level, that is, in the republics and provinces, and grew in importance at the federal centre only after his death. Following the removal of Ranković in 1966, the mix of political liberalization and radical federalization of the party and state transformed the cadre selection process and decision-making at the federal centre. The central party organs lost the privilege to appoint regional leaders, who were now granted the opportunity to build their own political machines through the district party secretaries. The parallel processes of radical federalization and liberalization, however, threatened political stability by amplifying inter-regional conflict and obstructing federal decisionmaking. In response, Tito purged leading sponsors of confederalization and liberalization in 1971–72. Since he blamed political instability on the failure of political leadership, a highly decentralized constitutional structure remained in place, while power partly returned to the central party organs. With respect to the cadre selection process, Tito regained


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the right to remove regional leaders from office, but not to appoint his candidates. As a result, the power of regional leaders now depended partly on their independent power base and partly on the endorsement of Yugoslavia’s ultimate arbiter (Burg 1983: 186–7). These institutional and informal power shifts, in addition to Tito’s inclination to quietly support rival politicians within regional leaderships in order to safeguard his personal power, set the foundation for collective leadership, or the sharing of power among powerful politicians, at both the federal and regional levels. Assertive politicians were further disadvantaged by the collective leadership campaign, initiated by Tito in late 1978, which aimed to prevent the rise of a powerful leader after his death. The campaign introduced rules against simultaneous control of party and state positions and mandated frequent rotation of cadre at all levels. In contrast to other communist states, the most powerful regional politicians were not necessarily to be found at the helm of the Central Committees in republics, and some influential political players often remained outside regional party Presidencies. For example, Draža Marković retained a key role in the leadership of Serbia for more than a decade despite shifting between the posts of President of Serbia’s Assembly, President of Serbia’s state Presidency, President of the Federal Assembly and membership in the federal party Presidency. Since the power of the leader was not directly linked to the highest party office and was to be shared with others, observers erroneously concluded that collective leadership fully replaced the mechanism of the ‘circular flow of power’ not only at the federal level, but also within the republics. In fact, the foundations of collective leadership in republics had already been undermined in the early 1980s. It has been acknowledged that the death of Tito in 1980 and the subsequent erosion of party unity at the federal level triggered conflict among regional elites (Burg 1986). However, the impact of these developments on regional politics was no less important. The threat of veto by the central party organs to the selection of regional leaders faded away and the latter now fully depended on their independent power bases. In addition, the change of political generations in the first half of the 1980s disturbed political alliances, which had been cemented in the wake of the purges of 1971–72, and opened space for leadership struggles within republics. Established regional leaders now suddenly became vulnerable to attacks from potential rivals because, unlike leaders in other communist states, they often did not occupy the highest regional party offices. The power struggles in Serbia between Ivan Stambolić and Draža Marković in 1985–86 and between Slobodan Milošević and Ivan Stambolić in 1987

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demonstrated that ultimate power returned to the highest regional party office. Due to the rules about frequent rotation of cadre, the President of the regional party Presidency who aimed at becoming an established regional leader did not have much time to build a political machine in the Central Committee through the normal process of cadre selection. The challenger had to rely not only on the networks of other politicians, but also to actively employ the power of his office to change power relations in high party organs. Nearing the end of his second and therefore last one-year mandate at the helm of Serbia’s party Presidency, Ivan Stambolić prepared to assume the post of President of the state Presidency of this republic. This post was considered to be a major step toward membership in the state Presidency of Yugoslavia, which gained influence at the time of the erosion of party unity at the federal level. His nomination was not contested, but conflict erupted over the selection of his successor at the helm of the regional party Presidency and of Serbia’s two representatives in the federal party Presidency. The stakes were high as Ivan Stambolić intended to place his associates in key positions and quietly remove Marković from power. Ivan fully exploited the extensive political networks of his uncle. Although retired since 1984, Petar Stambolić retained political influence and played an important role in turning older politicians against Marković, his former ally. The first cracks among the elders had ˇ emerged in 1983–84 when Marković and Ckrebi´ c had quietly opposed the nomination of Ivan Stambolić for President of Serbia’s party Presidency, as Marković told me in an interview, but relented under the ˇ pressure of his uncle Petar. Also, Petar Stambolić, Ckrebi´ c and Vidić supported the selection of Ljubiˇcić for membership in the federal state ˇ Presidency over Marković (Ckrebi´ c 1995: 278, 302–3). In 1986 Ljubiˇcić returned the favor and supported the nephew of Petar in a conflict with Marković. During the years spent at the helm of Belgrade’s City Committee and LCS’ Central Committee, Ivan Stambolić had developed a broad political network. Many members of the party Presidency and the Central Committee owed him their career advancement, which assured him solid support in key institutional arenas in which the leadership struggle would subsequently play out, as Marković told me in an interview. Ivan Stambolić also exploited his strategic position as President of the regional party Presidency to build alliances against Marković. He gained the supˇ port of Ckrebi´ c, who never thought much of Stambolić, by nominating him for membership in the federal party Presidency. Members of the regional party Presidency of the younger generation were glad to see


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at least some of the elders out of office and realized that this would improve their career prospects. ‘We are now setting up the leadership of Serbia for the next twenty years’, Ivan Stambolić stressed repeatedly in private meetings with prominent party-state officials of the younger generation, as a prominent member of Serbia’s party Presidency told me in an interview. Ivan Stambolić ignored the informal practice of broad consultation in the leadership about nominations for key posts and, more importantly, directly contradicted the shared view of the younger generation that competition among several candidates for the post should be introduced. Instead, he formally invited local party organizations to propose a nominee for each of the key posts, supposedly to render the consultation process more open and democratic. A member of Serbia’s party Presidency who was in charge of the cadre selection process told me that Ivan Stambolić simultaneously made sure, through district party secretaries he directly supervised, that his nominees appeared at the top of all local candidate lists. He also employed his influence over the capital’s powerful media to promote his nominees. These moves in turn signalled a major power shift in the leadership so that the Central Committee members were careful to stay out of his way. The struggle for leadership played out over the selection of the new President of Serbia’s party Presidency, that is, Serbia’s party leader, at the session of a narrow circle of high party and state officials from Serbia on 25–26 January 1986. Ivan Stambolić had already nominated Slobodan Milošević, at the time hardly a popular candidate for the post. Milošević had previously come into conflict with both the supporters of Marković and several politicians of the younger generation and now faced opposition from the majority of high officials present at the session. Nevertheless, Ivan Stambolić obtained formal approval for his nominee without difficulty since only members of Serbia’s party Presidency were eligible to vote on the matter.9 Had Ivan Stambolić accepted the demand of Milošević’s opponents that LCS’ Central Committee be presented with two competing candidates, Milošević might have easily lost the vote. The last attempt by Marković to prevent Ivan Stambolić from taking full control over the leadership, which occurred at the session of the Central Committee on 26 February 1986, ended with his total defeat and he subsequently retired. The outcome was mainly due to Ivan Stambolić’s supervisory powers over district party secretaries. Two prominent members of the party Presidency told me that the secretaries were instructed to secure the votes of the Central Committee members from their districts for the only candidate, Milošević.

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Divisions in the younger generation In the wake of the power struggle Ivan Stambolić became the undisputed leader of Serbia. It was widely expected that he would remain in this position for the foreseeable future, as he was only 50 years old and faced no opposition in the leadership of Yugoslavia’s largest republic. At the time, in sociological and political terms, members of the leadership fell broadly into two major groups. The remaining members of the older generations, who still wielded influence in party and state organs, took a back seat in the formulation of policy and were not considered to be potential contenders for power. The last two members of Tito’s old guard, Ljubiˇcić and Vidić, were expected to retire once their mandates expired in the federal state Presidency and the Central Committee of the League ˇ of Communists of Yugoslavia, respectively. Ckrebi´ c, a member of the federal party Presidency, who was 59, lacked an independent power base to seriously contest the power of Ivan Stambolić. Among the most influential members of the younger generation there were differences in terms of political status and reputation. Radiša Gaˇcić and Špiro Galović had risen to high party posts with little help from Ivan Stambolić and supported him over the years because they considered him to be the natural leader of their political generation. Gaˇcić, a moderate politician, had risen to high party ranks through local politics and served as member and Secretary (not President) of Serbia’s party Presidency between 1982 and 1986, before assuming the same posts in the federal party Presidency. Galović had been a member of the regional party Presidency between 1978 and 1986 and its Secretary between 1978 and 1982. In charge of the sector of ideology, he was partly responsible for the partial liberalization, but his influence declined after growing disputes within the younger generation in 1984–85. In contrast to relatively independent reputation of Gaˇcić and Galović, the holders of the highest party offices were known as intimate friends and loyal associates of Ivan Stambolić. Despite their good education, career achievements and personalities which recommended them for high office, Milošević, the new President of Serbia’s party Presidency, and Dragiša Pavlović, his successor at the helm of Belgrade’s City Committee, essentially owed their fast-track political careers to Ivan Stambolić. High officials I interviewed, regardless of their age and loyalties to either Stambolić or Milošević, repeated this to me time and again. Pavlović served as Secretary of the Belgrade’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry when Ivan Stambolić presided over the organization and became his chief of staff in Serbia’s Executive Council. In 1982 Pavlović moved to the post


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of chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and four years later succeeded Milošević in the City Committee. He stood out in the leadership in terms of education, holding two university degrees and a doctorate in social science, and was considered to be tolerant and of moderate views, but lacked political experience for such a high office.10 The composition of the leadership in mid-1986 therefore reflected not only the dominance of Ivan Stambolić, but also his intention to establish full personal control over the main levers of power. He had violated unspoken rules in the narrow leadership circle guarding against the selection of intimate friends for key party offices, even against the background of majority opposition to the selection of Milošević and the lack of experience of Pavlović in high politics. As Draža Marković told me in an interview, ‘Ivan Stambolić created a clan in the leadership’. Moreover, he fully disregarded the commitment of many members of the younger generation to reforms in the cadre selection process, as two prominent members of the party Presidency confirmed to me in interviews. Despite promises about competition among two or more candidates for key party offices, which dated back to 1984, and a newly introduced multi-candidate selection process in the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia for example, Serbia’s Central Committee was presented with only one candidate in 1986. Finally, Milošević and Pavlović were not eager to work with each other, as Milošević quietly and without success tried to prevent Pavlović from being appointed as his successor in the City Committee (Stambolić 1995: 141–2). It is likely that Ivan Stambolić aimed at exploiting their rivalry to prevent either from becoming a threat to his personal power. Unsurprisingly, his rule came to be seen among members of the younger generation as increasingly personalistic. High party and state officials of the younger generation shared not only the values and outlook of their generation, but also views on specific issues of policy. They built policy consensus early and put considerable effort into building alliances for economic and political reforms at the federal level. And yet, there was little progress. Most reforms required changes to the system of self-management and the 1974 Constitution, and some affected the existing relations between federal organs and those of the republics and provinces. Although Yugoslavia faced mounting economic crisis, the reform proposals that overlapped with those of liberal economists and the IMF were ignored, as many high officials from other republics believed that even minor changes might undermine the system of self-management and shift the balance of power from regional to federal organs.

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Likewise, Ivan Stambolić’s minimalist proposals for policy-coordination between the central government of Serbia and those of Vojvodina and Kosovo fell flat in the face of obstruction from the provinces’ leaders. From the time he took over the formulation of policy in Serbia, Ivan Stambolić tried to negotiate a number of laws that would be applied to Serbia as a whole. A series of informal meetings of high officials and experts from Serbia and Vojvodina, held in mid-1980s, ended with little success. Simultaneously, Serbia’s high officials insisted on the full application of democratic centralism in the party organization of Serbia and insisted that the provinces’ party organizations remained its constituent parts. There was little support in this respect from high officials of other republics, apart from Macedonia and Montenegro. The exception was the endorsement of slightly closer links between the central and provinces’ party organs in Serbia by the Presidency and the Central Committee of the LCY in 1985, which made little difference in practice. The deadlock at the federal level caused dissatisfaction in the leadership of Serbia, but also determination to extend pragmatic efforts in this direction.11 This fully pragmatic approach contrasted with the somewhat emotional reactions of Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals (see Dragović-Soso 2002). The first disagreements among the members of the younger generation appeared in late 1984 and resurfaced occasionally over the following three years. By no means considered serious before the September 1987 showdown, the disputes resulted from the officials’ clashes over political influence in the wake of generational change, from different priorities arising from their different institutional bases, as well as from their different reputations among Yugoslavia’s political class. This strategic positioning, however, revealed that they were not fully committed to political reforms. The cautious political liberalization they had initiated increasingly depended upon power relations within the leadership and relations with leaders of other republics. When Milošević succeeded Ivan Stambolić at the helm of Belgrade’s City Committee, he saw the lingering influence of Galović in the capital’s political affairs as a major constraint to his power. Milošević gradually sidelined his rival and partly reversed Galović’s relaxed approach to relations with civil society thanks to support from an increasingly influential group from the University Committee and some of the elders as well as the indifference of Ivan Stambolić.12 In September 1986 excerpts from a working paper, the so-called Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts suddenly appeared in a Belgrade daily. The main contention was that socialist Yugoslavia had been set up in a way that left Serbia economically


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and politically disadvantaged and that Serbs faced open discrimination in Kosovo and a diminution of rights in Croatia (see Mihailović and Krestić 1995: 99–147). As party organs across Yugoslavia denounced the Memorandum as highly damaging to the cause of Yugoslavia’s state and regime, the leadership of Serbia orchestrated a broad campaign against the Academy. The leadership threatened to undermine the autonomy of the Academy and the tone and scale of the campaign was reminiscent of previous decades. As a result, many felt that the leadership went too far and many intellectuals, even Belgrade-based western diplomats, felt it necessary to back the Academy. Ivan Stambolić and Pavlović, who led the campaign, implied in their memoirs that, by denouncing the Memorandum at closed party sessions but not in public speeches, Milošević deliberately set the stage for subsequent co-operation with nationalist intellectuals (Pavlović 1988: 51; Stambolić 1995: 131). This is unlikely, as this co-operation partly materialized in the very different political context of the second half of 1988 and in 1989, following the eruption of conflict among regional leaders and massive popular mobilization. The behavior of Ivan Stambolić, Pavlović and Milošević depended principally upon their institutional bases and priorities, as well as their reputations, which led them to play to different audiences. Ivan Stambolić had always refrained from any move that might alienate high officials of the other republics, as his constitutional and policy proposals required their endorsement. By leading the campaign against the Academy, he demonstrated that he was a responsible partner who took their interests seriously. Milošević, who held a back seat in discussions over constitutional reform, was much less constrained by these considerations. In contrast to Ivan Stambolić, who had at times been criticized for not being hard enough on nationalists, he had early earned the sympathies of leaders of the other republics for working hard to preserve the Titoist legacy, as Stipe Šuvar clarified later (RFE/RL South Slavic Service 3 December 1999). By 1987 the aspirations of Milošević’s loyal supporters, gathered around the University Committee, had risen sharply. They now targeted Pavlović through the proxy of a student magazine, which had recently mocked both the group and the leftovers of Tito’s personality cult. Since one associate of Pavlović and Ivan Stambolić publicly opposed the campaign, members of this highly conservative group demanded that party organs sanction officials who tolerate anti-Titoist excesses. The first public display of disagreement in the leadership was partly a consequence of sudden disputes over another matter. After meeting representatives of Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo Polje in April 1987, Milošević

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suddenly showed interest in the policy on Kosovo and pulled all strings to call a session of LCY’s Central Committee to discuss the policy (see Chapter 3). The Kosovo crisis had repeatedly returned to the agenda of federal organs since the 1981 protests of Kosovo Albanians, framed as counter-revolution. Milošević now demanded that the Central Committee set specific targets for the performance of party and state organs at all levels in this area. As his intervention related only to the implementation of previous jointly approved policies, and was seen as firmly remaining on the Titoist course, Milošević gained support from other regional leaders without difficulty. Ivan Stambolić and Pavlović disagreed with the move, but did not publicly oppose Milošević. They believed, with good reason, that any hasty action might in the long run alienate leaders of other republics from supporting their efforts to forge closer links with Vojvodina and Kosovo and might simultaneously radicalize Kosovo Serbs (Pavlović 1988: 52; Stambolić 1995: 167–70). Perhaps more importantly, Ivan Stambolić was baffled by his former protégé’s refusal to listen to his advice, as Vaso Milinˇcević, Milenko Marković and another member of the party Presidency told me in interviews. This was the first success of Milošević on the federal political stage. It greatly increased his self-confidence and he subsequently took political initiatives regularly without consulting Ivan Stambolić. The showdown between the two now increasingly consolidated factions in the leadership took place in late summer. In early September a Kosovo Albanian recruit murdered four recruits of other nationalities in a military barracks in Paraćin, a small town in central Serbia. Subsequently, parts of the Belgrade press, considered to be close to Milošević, launched a hysterical campaign against Kosovo’s officials for their alleged failure to stave off nationalist hysteria that produced such excesses. In a surprising move Pavlović summoned media directors from the capital and warned that such reporting would only inflame the crisis. More importantly, he stressed that there were no easy solutions for the Kosovo crisis, by which he alluded to earlier public statements of Milošević that swift action was required, as in other policy areas (Pavlović 1988: 94–9). In turn Milošević invoked the anti-faction rule against Pavlović and demanded his removal from the Presidency of LCS’ Central Committee, which would make his position at the helm of powerful Belgrade’s City Committee untenable. Milošević and his supporters claimed that Pavlović obstructed the implementation of the party’s policy by challenging decisions of higher party organs (Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SK Srbije 1987, vol. 1; Osma sednica CK SK Srbije 1987: 155–64). Pavlović fought back and secured support from the City Committee, not


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least because he had, prior to the session, shown to prominent members of the Committee a letter of support from Ivan Stambolić. According to the unpublished transcript from the session of Serbia’s high party and state officials on 18–19 September that I examined, Pavlović narrowly lost the battle despite repeated attempts by Ivan Stambolić to appease Milošević. Only 11 out of 20 members of the regional party Presidency voted to remove Pavlović from membership of the body. Other participants, members of federal party organs and high state officials, did not have voting rights. Although Ivan Stambolić was not the main target, his reputation suffered a big blow, as it became apparent that the power balance had tipped toward his former protégé. At the televised session of the Central Committee on 23–24 September, the battle won with a small margin turned into a far-reaching victory for the Milošević’s faction. As a result, Ivan Stambolić effectively lost control over the main levers of power despite his position as President of Serbia’s state Presidency. Stripped of influence and facing growing smear campaign in the press, Ivan Stambolić ultimately resigned in December leaving Milošević alone at the pinnacle of power.

Why Milošević won The impasse at the federal level, which blocked attempts at political and economic reform, caused dissatisfaction in the leadership of Serbia. Most high party and state officials from the younger generation fully supported the reformist course initiated under the leadership of Ivan Stambolić and by no means blamed him for the slow progress. However, at a time when sound leadership seemed essential, many in the establishment found aspects of his leadership style increasingly incongruent with the values of their generation. They were disappointed when, after much talk about opportunities for reforms opened by generational change, Ivan Stambolić aimed principally at strengthening his personal power by preventing multi-candidate elections for key posts, by employing the party apparatus extensively against his opponents, especially Marković, and by promoting intimate friends to high office. Many believed that there was still too much continuity with the elders’ way of doing politics, which looked archaic and distasteful. Rumors about large drinking parties and accompanying entertainment at public expense, in the infamous manner of some members of the older generation, only made things worse. Ivan Stambolić was thus losing support in the higher echelons of the party-state when he needed it most.

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Simultaneously, the appeal of Milošević grew despite the fact that he was the main beneficiary of Ivan Stambolić’s attempts to strengthen personal power. His appeal to members of the younger generation, mostly well-educated and experienced administrators who dominated high party and state organs in the second half of the 1980s, was based on his personal qualities. Milošević’s educational background, career achievements and personality suggested that he was ready for high office. The reputation of an economic modernizer, with a background in banking and foreign debt restructuring, and with personal experience of the West and its business practices, reflected key policy aspirations of his generation and provided a special appeal at a time of mounting economic crisis. Milošević was expected to infuse efficiency and flexibility into a rigid and lethargic party apparatus and bring it in line with changes that had already occurred in society. His outspoken manner, insistence on meritocratic recruitment and frequent encouragement of low and middle-ranking officials to demand accountability from high officials sharply contrasted with the oligarchic and clientelistic behavior of the older generations. Not least, Milošević was known as a rather modest personality, who steered clear of undisguised hedonism of Tito and his associates in Serbia and of the out-of-work excesses increasingly associated with his former protector, as a number of high officials from the younger generation told me in interviews. While this view of Milošević may appear naïve today, his personality did reflect the values and concerns of the younger political generation in Serbia better than that of his opponents at the time. However, the personality of Milošević provides only a small part of the explanation. Like Ivan Stambolić beforehand, Milošević emerged personally as leader largely relying on his strategic position as President of the regional party Presidency, which granted him power to build up political support in the Central Committee and change power relations in high party organs. In 1986 Milošević found himself in a position similar to ˇ that of Vlaškalić and Ckrebi´ c before 1984, as he occupied the highest regional party office without running the show. Unlike the other two, however, Milošević had an ambition to play a major role in the leadership and worked hard to build up political support. Soon after the selection of Milošević as the new President of the regional party Presidency, but before the party Congress that verified the selection, Ivan Stambolić and Milošević jointly selected new members of the Presidency and holders of executive posts in the LCS’ Central Committee. Špiro Galović and an elder member of the Presidency who assisted Stambolić and Milošević in the cadre selection process told me that they were astonished to find the


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two friends bitterly arguing over nominations. Stambolić turned down some Milošević’s nominations, but the episode shows that the latter was already focused on extending his personal network in high party organs and ready to test the commitment of his political protector. At the time the political machine of Milošević was limited to an influential group in the City Committee, his former institutional base. The group was in turn associated with another group in the University Committee, formed around his wife Mira Marković. Doctrinaire Marxists and self-professed Titoists, the members of the University Committee group, challenged a relaxed approach to ideology. They skilfully, but misleadingly, presented their views as those prevailing at the university, which at the time of the growing influence of the younger generation granted them influence beyond their institutional base, as Špiro Galović, Draža Marković and three other high party officials told me in interviews. While their commitment to ideology and revolution appealed to the elders, their views on cadre renewal were shared by members of their generation. Their radical posturing, rooted in a doctrinaire approach to politics, made the group an unpredictable and unreliable political ally for all. This narrow power base of Milošević’s was not initially a problem because he could fully rely upon cadres selected by Ivan Stambolić, as they came from the same political generation and considered him to be Ivan’s right-hand man. Milošević, however, preferred to have loyal cadres in high party organs and appointed his associates to vacant posts in the LCS’ Central Committee, including chairmanships of various standing groups and junior executive secretaryships.13 Milošević regularly invited loyal associates to address Serbia’s party Presidency and the Central Committee in spite of their not being members of the bodies. While this was not unusual at a time when high party officials wanted to leave the impression of openness and flexibility, Milošević made use of the practice to promote his loyal cadre and create an impression of dominance in high party organs. Roughly a third of the speakers at the sessions of the Central Committee in April and September 1987 came from outside its membership and many were closely associated with Milošević (Pavlović 1988: 48, 59, 188; Stambolić 1995: 162). Milošević early became aware of the power of media, as several of his appointees in the City Committee and the LCS’ Central Committee were influential media directors. High party officials had exercised control over the capital’s powerful media through the appointments of media directors and supervision by career party officials from Belgrade’s City Committee. In contrast, Milošević, by granting the media principals an

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important role to play in high party organs, simultaneously extended personal influence over the most influential media and shifted their supervision from the City to the Central Committee, and thus away from Pavlović. The press under his control extensively reported on the activities of his loyal associates, especially in the standing groups of the Central Committee they now controlled. The group set the agenda for the party Presidency and the Central Committee in this way and communicated the image of its supremacy in party organs to party and state officials, and most importantly to the Central Committee members. During the press campaign against Pavlović in September, the Belgrade dailies Politika and Politika Ekspres went so far as to present the majority support he received from the City Committee as a full-blown defeat. This was a major innovation in the role of the press in the politics of socialist Yugoslavia. Previously, the winning side in a leadership conflict used to carry out smear campaigns in the press against its opponents only to justify their purge from office. Now the press came to play an important role in deciding the very outcome of the power struggle. It is likely that the September showdown between the two factions in the leadership was an unintended consequence of the limited struggle over control over parts of the Belgrade press. The main targets of Pavlović’s speech on 11 September were the media bosses, especially the editor-in-chief of Politika, who had already been undermined by recent scandals. According to an unpublished transcript of the session of the narrow leadership circle on 18–19 September that I was able to examine, large parts of the discussion related to the role of the press. The opponents of Milošević criticized the editorial policy of Politika, while his supporters targeted NIN and Student, which were considered to be supportive of Ivan Stambolić and Pavlović. It is revealing that, once it became apparent that the power balance had already tipped toward his former protégé, Ivan Stambolić tried to appease Milošević by surrendering control over parts of the press. He offered to officially endorse the shift in supervising authority over the press from the City Committee to the Central Committee, provided that this supervising role returned from media directors to career party officials. The power of the office that Milošević occupied was essential in building alliances on his road to power, especially with the remaining elders in the leadership. While not being viable contenders for power, they retained significant influence in party organs. From mid-1986 they grew increasingly restless, feeling threatened by the concentration of power in


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the hands of Ivan Stambolić. Rumors that Stambolić intended to replace Ljubiˇcić in the federal state Presidency before the end of his mandate hardly helped. Nor did a few newspaper articles about the alleged corruption and nepotism of Ljubiˇcić and other articles aimed at making fun ˇ of Ckrebi´ c (Pavlović 1988: 75–6; Stambolić 1995: 111–12, 171–2). In an attempt to safeguard their position against a potential threat and prevent the concentration of power in the leadership, they backed Milošević, the new President of the regional party Presidency, whose great political ambition and powerful institutional base could provide a counterbalance to the personal power of Ivan Stambolić.14 The elders also liked Milošević. They respected his commitment to the Titoist course and energetic style of leadership as well as his tough stance toward dissident intellectuals ˇ (Stambolić 1995: 147–8). Finally, ‘Ljubiˇcić and Ckrebi´ c were fed up with the Stambolićs’, as Špiro Galović explained to me in an interview. Ultimately, the elders’ backing of Milošević was rooted in self-interest and their role in the events was similar to that which they had played in sidelining Marković in 1985–86. Support from the elders turned out to be important, as a number of members of the party Presidency and the Central Committee stressed the elders’ opposition to Pavlović as the reason why they voted for his removal from office (Trideseta sednica Predsedništva CK SK Srbije 1987; Osma sednica CK SK Srbije 1987). Milošević also exploited the strategic position of a party leader to choose the institutional arenas in which the leadership struggle would play out and to assemble majority support in these organs. He initiated proceedings against Pavlović in the regional party Presidency because his rival enjoyed majority support in the City Committee. Then Milošević instructed district party secretaries under his supervision to degrade his opponent’s reputation. According to the unpublished transcript of the session of the narrow leadership circle on 18–19 September, nearly all of the secretaries demanded the removal of Pavlović from the leadership. Moreover, they subsequently played a major part in making members of the Central Committee from their districts support the Milošević faction. A prominent member of the party Presidency from the younger generation described the process to me: ‘you call a district committee and present a directive with the opinion of the Presidency, they call the members of the Central Committee from their district and “get them ready’’ for the session of the Central Committee’. In short, Yugoslavia’s authoritarian institutions were critical in the rapid ascent to power of Milošević.

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Late Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism, the rise of Milošević and Kosovo The argument about the primacy of the political programme in Milošević’s ascent erroneously assumes that the outcome of the leadership struggle between Milošević and Ivan Stambolić signalled a major change in the structure of power. The rise of Milošević personally as leader in 1986–87 did not reflect a shift to a different form of authoritarianism in terms of either the internal dynamics of the party-state or state–society relations. Collective leadership, the underlying assumption of the political programme thesis, had already been undermined at the regional level. The erosion of party unity at the federal centre after Tito’s death and the change of political generations disturbed political alliances that had been fortified in the aftermath of the purges of 1971–72, which opened space for leadership struggle within the republics. The ascent of Ivan Stambolić demonstrated that ultimate power at the regional level had returned to the highest regional party office and the subsequent rise of Milošević brought little change in this respect. The formal and informal organization of the centre of political power and its relations with society remained the same and the power and popularity of the new leader was no greater than that of his predecessor. The rise of Milošević personally as leader should not be conflated with the transformation of authoritarianism and nationalist mobilization in 1988–89, which unfolded principally due to pressures from below. That Ivan Stambolić in 1986 and Milošević a year later managed to successfully confront initially more powerful rivals was due to differences in the power structure of Yugoslavia from other communist states. In the Soviet model, an established leader held the highest party office and was therefore protected against potential challengers, except in the event of major conflict over policy that harmed the interests of large parts of the elite or society. As a result, leadership struggle normally occurred only after the top post had already become vacant, when the former leader’s deputy in charge of the cadre policy had an advantage over his rivals due to his being able to use his predecessor’s political machine. By contrast, due to the constitutional and party reforms of late socialist Yugoslavia that created the institutional foundation for collective leadership, the most influential regional politicians in Yugoslavia did not necessarily hold the highest regional party office. After Tito’s death and the change of political generations undermined collective leadership, the regional party leader could employ the power of his office, especially its direct supervision over district party secretaries, to remove the


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established leader and restore the primacy of the highest regional party office. Simultaneously, radically decentralized federal and consociational institutions kept collective leadership at the federal centre intact and prevented the emergence of a powerful successor to Tito. The misleading impression of a major change in the nature of authoritarianism in Serbia in 1987 was the result of the different political styles of Stambolić and Milošević and their perceptions about the power of their opponents. Due to Stambolić’s restrained political style and short-lived ascendancy, only officials in the higher echelons of the party-state and professional observers were fully aware of his extensive personal control over political life in Serbia in 1986. In contrast, Milošević came to be perceived early on as an exceptionally powerful leader due to his highly confrontational political style and tendency to employ the media to display his power. The broad and widely publicized purge of Milošević’s rivals after the September 1987 showdown was partly a consequence of this confrontational, at times even hysterical, political style. Without doubt, Milošević and his associates also wanted to settle old scores and get rid of the remnants of their opponent’s influence in government, party organs and the Belgrade-based media. In any case, some of them, especially the University Committee group, had never supported partial liberalization, the consequences of which lingered on in the capital. Still, the purge is not an indicator that the power of Milošević was now greater than that of Ivan Stambolić in early 1986. In fact, Milošević and his associates felt highly insecure in the wake of the removal of Pavlović and feared a counter-attack from Ivan Stambolić, who was still President of Serbia’s state Presidency while his actual and potential supporters still occupied key posts in government, state bureaucracy, large state-controlled businesses and the capital’s media. High party and state officials from Milošević’s faction repeatedly stressed to me the seriousness of the threat, though this fear seems to have lacked a rational foundation.15 The media campaign against Stambolić and his supporters subsided only after his resignation in December 1987. In contrast, Ivan Stambolić had been fully confident in his control over the main levers of power following the conflict with Marković in 1986 and had no reason to use such extreme measures. Nor would such measures have gone down well with his moderate and restrained political style. In any case, Milošević removed Ivan Stambolić from power and, like his predecessor earlier, swiftly established personal control over the key levers of power. The rise of Milošević personally as leader had little to do with a nationalist programme, contrary to the assertion of scholars of Yugoslavia and

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supporters of Milošević. The continuing institutional struggles over relations between Serbia and its autonomous provinces were on the agenda of the leadership, but there was little change in this respect during the struggle between Milošević and Ivan Stambolić. They came into conflict partly over policy toward Kosovo, but the policy was little more than a trigger for the looming power struggle between factions based on the leaders’ personalistic networks. Minor disagreements over the implementation of the Kosovo policy in the months preceding the showdown were inflated during the power struggle, and especially in the following years. The appeal of Milošević was based on his personal merits and the fact that, in the aftermath of generational change, he reflected the values and concerns of his generation better than his rivals. Nevertheless, the outcome of the power struggle was largely decided by the institutions of Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism, as Milošević exploited the power of his office to build up support in high party organs and to outmanoeuvre his rivals. The political programme thesis can hardly explain why all three of Kosovo’s representatives in Serbia’s party Presidency, and one from Vojvodina out of the two present at the session, voted for Milošević as the sole candidate for President of the Presidency in January 1986 and why all the provinces’ representatives in the Presidency failed to vote against Milošević’s proposal for the purge of Pavlović in September 1987. True, the provinces’ representatives normally refrained from direct involvement in leadership struggles within party and state organs of central Serbia so that they could credibly reject any interference in their own affairs. However, had they believed that Milošević was about to embark upon a nationalist programme, it is highly unlikely that they would have missed a great opportunity to confront it early on, when it could still be thwarted. Indeed, many officials from other republics and provinces shared Šuvar’s view that Milošević protected the Titoist legacy better than Stambolić. Several of Serbia’s high officials, including fierce Milošević’s opponents, told me that they suspected that many of their counterparts from other republics and provinces also calculated that Stambolić’s successor was bound to be more flexible in regular and constitutional dealings at the federal centre, at least during the prolonged period of his consolidation of power. My critique of the political programme thesis by no means suggests that the leadership struggle, and especially the September 1987 showdown, had no effect on subsequent debates and policies over Kosovo among Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s high officials and the public. From the point when Milošević and Pavlović, and then also Stambolić, came into


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open conflict, and especially during and after the purge of the Stambolić faction, both sides hugely exaggerated their programmatic differences in an attempt to occupy the moral high ground and thus justify their role in the power struggle. Milošević also tried to justify the subsequent purge of his rivals. In this way, former friends and close collaborators, who shared the values of their generation and fully agreed on the direction of policy in key areas, including Kosovo, became promoters of diverging causes. Milošević and his faction became key sponsors of party unity and constitutional reform that would bring Serbia’s autonomous provinces back under the jurisdiction of its central organs, while Pavlović, Stambolić and their supporters became synonymous with the struggle against Serb nationalism. The leadership struggle and its consequences shaped the political identities of both the winners and the losers in important ways. Even so, there was little change over the following months with regard to the Kosovo policy of Serbia’s leadership, which they had developed together on the foundation set by the older political generations, especially Petar Stambolić and Draža Marković. The first half of 1988 was uneventful in this respect and the prime movers anyway were the activists of a fully autonomous social movement of Kosovo Serbs.

3 The Grass-Roots Protest of Kosovo Serbs

The mobilization of Kosovo Serbs,1 barely noticeable from the capital initially but highly visible on the central political stage between 1986 and 1988, played an important part in the political struggles of late socialist Yugoslavia.2 The prevailing view in scholarly and popular literature on Yugoslavia is that Kosovo Serbs were little more than passive recipients of the attitudes and actions of high officials and dissident intellectuals. According to this view, Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals initiated and guided the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs with an aim to undermine the party’s approach to Yugoslavia’s national question and to initiate reassessment of the official policy on Kosovo and Serb–Albanian relations. Milošević then took over and orchestrated the actions of various groups of Kosovo Serbs in order to make the case for the removal of Kosovo’s autonomy.3 The intellectuals and Milošević have generally supported this interpretation, claiming their role in the events leading to the constitutional change of 1989–90, which included the reduction of the autonomy of Kosovo. The prevailing view on the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s rests on an implicit theory of mobilization, and unintentionally reflects influential arguments in social movement research and studies of communism. One assumption, which implicitly reflects the grievance theory of mobilization, is that an increase in nationalist grievances, which originates from a deterioration of the position of a group in relation to other groups, triggers the mobilization of its members. Another assumption, which draws much on studies of communism, is that the prospect of a sustained autonomous mobilization of non-elite actors in a communist state was hardly realistic and that only dissident intellectuals would have had the resources required to make this happen, or high officials who mobilized the masses for their own purposes. With this implicit 78

The Grass-Roots Protest of Kosovo Serbs

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theory of mobilization in mind, it is by no means a surprise that many scholars and observers concluded that elite manipulation was decisive in the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs. Indeed, this mobilization took place only after the position of Serbs in relation to Albanians in Kosovo had stopped deteriorating and there is little doubt that the scale of mobilization and nationalist-related incidents that triggered some popular protests were repeatedly exaggerated. It also unfolded in the peripheral region of Kosovo in which many personal freedoms enjoyed by other citizens of the most liberal communist state did not apply. This view is based largely on the testimonies of Milošević’s opponents in Serbia’s leadership, which few scholars bothered to reassess in the context of Serbia’s political oppression of Kosovo Albanians and the grave human rights violations of the 1990s. Ivan Stambolić, for example, claimed that the protests, though rooted in the legitimate concerns of Kosovo Serbs, were orchestrated by the Belgrade-based ‘nationalist direct´ orate’, meaning dissident intellectuals and Dobrica Cosi´ c, a well-known dissident novelist who had been purged from higher party ranks in 1968 for his disapproval of the party’s Kosovo policy, and amplified by Milošević (Stambolić 1995: 165–80). However, there is little evidence to support this view. Apart from targeting Stambolić’s former political opponents, this view reflects a general lack of information about the collective action of Kosovo Serbs before 1988 at a time when the Serb–Albanian relations were still a taboo topic outside official organizations. Drawing partly on previously unavailable sources, I found that various grass-roots groups played a decisive role in the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs. The mobilization originated from the consequences of the post-1966 shift in the politics of inequality to the disadvantage of Kosovo Serbs and their rapid demographic decline and was fuelled by the historical memory of Serb–Albanian conflict. I show that their mobilization was autonomous through a close look into their protest networks, their demands and protest strategies as well as their links with dissident intellectuals, other confidants and high officials of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo.

Serb–Albanian antagonisms For the greater part of its modern history Kosovo4 has been a deeply divided society, polarized by conflict between Albanians and Serbs, the two largest among several groups continually present in this area. At the local level Albanians and Serbs have largely lived separate lives, in settlements in which one or the other group dominated. In some periods, polarization turned into open confrontation and violence, which further

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exacerbated inter-group tensions. Yet, conflict normally alternated, and coexisted, with a degree of mutual tolerance, and economic, cultural and other forms of contact between the groups. In addition to a dominant division in the region, initially based on linguistic, religious and ethnic loyalties and subsequently on national identity, other cleavages in the population mattered, such as those between urban and rural populations, between various clans and tribes, between religious groups (especially among the Albanians), as well as between political and ideological groups or factions (see Duijzings 2000: 12–13). Without doubt, these divisions have considerably amplified the complexity of Kosovo’s political problems. However, their effect was principally to divide the Albanian and Serb communities internally rather than to serve as a foundation for the development of stable affiliations that would cut across the main line of cleavage and thus effectively alleviate Serb–Albanian antagonisms. The antagonisms had stem from the Middle Ages, when Slavs settled in the Balkans leaving earlier inhabitants unassimilated in the less accessible parts of modern Albania. Kosovo was incorporated into the expanding medieval Serbian polity in the twelfth century and, being comparatively rich and densely populated, it soon became its administrative and cultural centre. The battles of Marica in 1371 and Kosovo in 1389 signalled the decline of the Serbian polity and the coming era of Ottoman rule. While conquest in the fifteenth century triggered some population movements, an overwhelming majority of the population was still Slavic (mostly Serb). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, large parts of the Serb population emigrated northwards, fearing reprisals after siding with the Habsburgs against the Ottomans. Albanians, who continually migrated from the overpopulated highlands of northern Albania, were gradually filling the empty space and the trend accelerated as they converted to Islam and thus acquired privileges over the Serb Orthodox community. In the second half of the nineteenth century there was growing conflict between Serb and Albanian nationalist aspirations. The Ottoman Empire was slowly losing ground in the Balkans against newly proclaimed Balkan independent states, not least Serbia, which focused their energies to unite their ethnic brethren within their expanding borders. Albanians simultaneously responded against these irredentist plans and attempts at centralization by Ottoman officials through periodic revolts and general disorder. Albanian leaders aimed to thwart the attempts of the new Balkan states to expand into Albanian-inhabited territories and demanded administrative and cultural autonomy from the Ottoman authorities. In the last decades of Ottoman rule disorder reigned


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in Kosovo. Partly encouraged by the increasing attitude of religious intolerance of Ottoman officials and partly exploiting weak administrative controls from the centre, Albanian warlords continually terrorized the Christian minority population, and especially Orthodox Serbs, thus accelerating their emigration. After the victory of the Balkan states over the Ottomans in the First Balkan War in 1912, Kosovo was incorporated into the modern Serbian state. An important source of inter-group antagonism was that Kosovo remained central to the nationalist ideologies of both Serbs and Albanians; the former based largely on the myth of the 1389 battle of Kosovo, the latter drawing on the formation of the Albanian national movement in Kosovo, the League of Prizren of 1878. The politics of inequality The Serbian, and subsequently Yugoslav governments, which faced the open antagonism of Kosovo Albanians, reversed the direction of inequalities. Their education policies were skewed to the disadvantage of the majority group whose members were also discouraged from public service employment. Nationalization and land reform, designed to destroy the inherited feudal and tribal social order, were at least in part directed against the Albanians. The government initiated colonization of the sparsely populated region, but Serb settlers sometimes gained land at the expense of the local Albanians, especially during the second colonization wave in the 1930s. The government also at times encouraged emigration of Albanians and other Muslims to Turkey and Albania. In 1941, Italian-controlled Albania annexed a large part of Kosovo. During the war thousands of Serbs were killed and tens of thousands expelled, while attempts to challenge the German and Italian occupiers, such as by the Communists, faced the hostility of the Kosovo Albanian majority. In 1944, the Communist-led partisan fighting force took control of Kosovo and subsequently suppressed a large Albanian uprising against the new regime. The policy of the CPY on Kosovo, as part of its broader approach to Yugoslavia’s national question, aimed but proved unable to prevent the continuation of the pre-1945 politics of inequality and mistreatment targeted against either Albanians or Serbs. Before the war, the party had strongly contested the official policy of centralization and denial of minority rights, and had occasionally, under the influence of the Comintern, supported full self-determination of Yugoslavia’s national and ethnic groups (D ¯ ilas 1991). Aware of the hostility of Kosovo Albanians, the CPY sought their co-operation. The new government granted Kosovo the status of an autonomous region within Serbia (under the name of

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Kosovo-Metohia), opened Albanian-language schools and encouraged national emancipation of the Albanians, financed modernization of this poor and peripheral region and banned the return of post-1918 Serb settlers following their expulsion from Kosovo during the war. The context mattered because during this same period the authorities brutally and systematically expelled from the country other minorities that had collaborated with the occupying forces during the war, such as the German and Italian minorities ( Janjić 1994: 134). Various administrative restrictions on the rights of Kosovo Albanians remained in place for security reasons, especially because Albania backed the other side after the Soviet–Yugoslav split in 1948. Albanians remained under-represented in Kosovo’s party and state organs, not least because of the party’s policy to staff the party-state apparatus with its long-serving members, most of whom in Kosovo were Serbs at the time. In 1941 only 8 percent of the party membership in the region were Albanians, while this proportion rose to around 30 percent in 1945. An extreme example of this under-representation is the share of Albanians in the police and security services of only 31.3 and 13.3 percent, respectively, in 1966, although they constituted over two-thirds of the population of the province (Cohen 2001: 26; Popović et al. 1990: 18–19). A major political change in Kosovo occurred after the 1966 removal from office of Aleksandar Ranković, the Vice-president of Yugoslavia who had long been in charge of the security apparatus. Since most excesses of the security services had occurred in Kosovo, which had at least something to do with the disproportionate representation of Serbs in the region’s respective organs, the LCY introduced preferential policies to increase the representation of Albanians in party and state organs and in the public sector. Simultaneously, the authorities created a number of Albanian cultural and educational institutions and stepped up their support for the promotion of Albanian national identity in Kosovo. In November 1968 protests by Albanians broke out in Kosovo and western Macedonia, with demands for a republic of Kosovo, and even for union with Albania. The status of republic mattered because republics were designated as homelands of the constituent nations and the federal constitution granted the right to self-determination to these nations only, even if their secession was inconceivable. While rejecting the demands and restoring order, the LCY also developed a range of policies designed to meet the growing demands of Kosovo Albanians. Between 1967 and 1974, Yugoslavia’s leadership granted Kosovo and Vojvodina, earlier little more than Serbia’s administrative regions, status similar to that of the republics while Serbia effectively lost jurisdiction over these parts of


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its territory. The party also removed the name Metohia, associated with the Orthodox Serb heritage, from the official name of the province. The policy of Albanization, promoted by Kosovo’s now predominantly Albanian political leadership and authorized by the LCY, gradually overshadowed other policy areas. The newly formed University of Pristina specialized in Albanian and non-technical studies and few students were encouraged to study for technical careers, essential for the economic modernization of this underdeveloped region (Kostovicova 2005: 42–3). The bulk of Kosovo’s budget and investments continued to arrive from federal sources. While there were some successes in economic development, the rate of growth remained below Yugoslavia’s average and the gap between Kosovo and other parts of the country progressively widened. Kosovo remained by far the poorest region, with the highest rate of unemployment, not least due to inadequate investment policies, misuse of funds on a large scale and extraordinary population growth among Albanians. Simultaneous political change in several important areas, such as the broadening of Kosovo’s autonomy, the new ethnic composition of party and state organs and the public sector, and relaxation of the policy that suppressed the politicization of ethnicity, transformed the political landscape in the region. Gradually preferential policies aimed at improving the representation of Kosovo Albanians evolved into political domination by the majority group over the minorities. This mattered not least because state-controlled enterprises comprised an overwhelming part of the economy, except in agriculture, and because in the political context of Kosovo authorities enjoyed much greater control over the public and private lives of their citizens than in other parts of Yugoslavia. There were growing inequalities in the use of language, access to jobs in the vast state-controlled sector of the economy, allocation of public housing and, most importantly, inadequate protection for the rights and property of non-Albanians, and especially Kosovo Serbs, by the courts and law enforcement agencies. Lawsuits in which Serbs claimed that they and their property were targets of nationalist violence tended to be disregarded in a variety of ways. The police officers repeatedly avoided bringing charges against Albanians, especially in areas where Serbs were a small minority, or the cases remained unresolved in the courts of law for years. Alternatively, law enforcement agencies failed to implement court decisions. Local authorities frequently turned down requests by Serbs for various licences and permits. It is hard to establish the scale of inequalities between 1966 and 1981, since this was an official taboo. After 1981, however, credible

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evidence from the official reports emerged that provided insight into the forms and pervasiveness of inequality.5 This should be clearly distinguished from Milošević’s propaganda after 1988, for which there is ample evidence (see Nenadović 1996; Popović et al. 1990). In short, Serb–Albanian antagonisms were hardly the result of ancient ethnic hatreds. The major source of antagonisms were religious differences, in the context of the policy of discrimination against the Christian population that Ottoman officials increasingly amplified in the strategically important western fringes of the Empire, and mutually exclusive nationalist goals during the second half of the nineteenth century. The antagonisms were exacerbated in interwar Yugoslavia, where Albanians were discriminated against, and during the Second World War, when Kosovo Serbs suffered at the hands of Italian- and Germansponsored militant Albanian groups. While the party aimed to eradicate antagonisms through progressively broader minority rights, preferential policies and territorial autonomy, changes in informal political alignments in the party-state ultimately resulted in shifts in hegemonic influence from one group to the other, which is not an uncommon consequence of one-party systems in deeply divided societies (see Horowitz 1985: 433–7). Demographic decline of Serbs and their migration out of Kosovo From the 1960s Kosovo Serbs faced a rapid demographic decline, a part of which was due to their steady migration out of the province. While the proportion of Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo’s population remained relatively stable during the period between 1948 and 1961 (68.5–67.1 and 27.5 percent, respectively), the proportion of the former increased from 67.1 to 77.4 percent and that of the latter decreased from 27.5 to 14.9 percent over the following two decades,6 and continued to decline in the 1980s. Critical to the demographic decline was the much higher rate of population growth of Albanians than Serbs. This was a result of the very high birth rate of the former, by far the highest in Europe, and a constantly decreasing death rate caused by improving health care services and the increasing proportion of young people among Kosovo Albanians. In turn, the main causes of the very high birth rate were underdevelopment and the traditional character of this community, especially the subordinate position of women.7 A steady migration of Serbs out of the province contributed to their demographic decline, in terms of their decreasing absolute numbers and shrinking territorial dispersion (Petrović and Blagojević 1992: 82–5). The 1981 census listed around 110 000 Serbs from Kosovo living in other parts of Yugoslavia, of whom 85 000 had left the province between 1961 and


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1981 (Bogosavljević 1994: 23). In the 1980s, out-migration continued. In other words, nearly a third of Kosovo Serbs had moved out of the autonomous province since 1961. The issue of the relationship between the shifting population balance between Albanians and Serbs and the nationalist conflict in and over Kosovo has been controversial to say the least. One dimension of the problem is the linkage between demographic change, regardless of its specific causes, and Serb–Albanian relations. Scholars of Yugoslavia have for the most part glossed over the role of this general aspect of demographic change in the conflict. There is ample evidence from comparable cases in other world regions that changes in the population balance between groups strongly shape nationalist and related types of conflict. In Northern Ireland, the higher birth rate in the Catholic, mainly pro-Irish, community gradually eroded the Protestant, mainly pro-British, majority having consequences for confidence of the former and insecurities of the latter in the conflict since the 1960s (O’Leary and McGarry 1996: 158). In Palestine, growing settlement of Jews between two world wars triggered conflict with the local Arab population, which subsequently resulted in large-scale expulsions of the latter, wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors and conflict in and over the West Bank and Gaza. More recently, the considerably higher birth rate of Palestinians than Jews, especially in the occupied territories, has strongly influenced Israeli leaders and population to gradually abandon their strategy of colonization of the occupied territories and start building a security wall between Israel and the territories (Wasserstein 2004: 5–30). In the light of comparative experience it is hardly surprising that the acute sense of insecurity among Kosovo Serbs resulted principally from their rapid demographic decline rather than from elite manipulation. Another dimension of the relationship between shifts in the population balance and Serb–Albanian conflict in Kosovo relates to the causes of the emigration of Serbs. One explanation for the emigration is that Kosovo was a typical emigration area, overpopulated and underdeveloped, with a predominantly agrarian economy and high rate of unemployment. Simultaneously, a general trend in Yugoslavia from 1971 to 1981 was migration from mixed areas to the territorial cores of Yugoslavia’s nations so that Croats from Bosnia were moving to Croatia, Serbs from Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo to central Serbia and Albanians from Montenegro and Macedonia to Kosovo. While Serbs emigrated from Kosovo to central Serbia due to economic and cultural reasons, Albanians remained in the province mainly because traditional and cultural factors outweighed economic incentives to leave the province. One of the implications of this explanation is that the grievances of Kosovo

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Serbs were hugely exaggerated by political entrepreneurs and that the deterioration in Serb–Albanian relations and the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs occurred principally because of elite manipulation (Popović et al. 1990: 6–7, 13–14). However, the findings of a large survey conducted by independent specialists in 1985–86 among Serbs who had already left Kosovo suggest that more than three-quarters of the emigration originated from noneconomic factors. They left both urbanized areas with high incomes and high employment and those with the opposite characteristics. While only a small proportion worked in agriculture, they remained tied to the land, enjoyed the advantages of a mixed economy and their overall economic situation was not unfavorable. The vast majority were deeply rooted in Kosovo and visibly integrated in a multi-national environment: more than 40 percent of adults spoke or understood Albanian. Unemployment ranked high on the list of causes but had this been the only factor, only the younger members of households would have migrated and not whole families, which was largely the case (Petrović and Blagojević 1992: 48–53, 92–100). According to the survey, most migrants left due to nationalist pressures and intimidation. This included verbal pressure, damages to property or seizure of crops and land, violence—assaults, fights, stoning, attacks on children and women, serious injury, attempted and committed rape— trouble at work and inequalities in the public sector. The survey also revealed a clear territorial pattern of emigration largely resulting from the level of pressure and inequality. The latter was inversely related to the proportion of Serbs in a settlement, and the critical point for a major increase in pressure was if their numbers dropped below 20–30 percent. This finding was compatible with evidence from the official census that there was a strong trend toward emigration of Serbs from settlements where they accounted for less than 30 percent of the population (Petrović and Blagojević 1992: 85–92, 100–4, 111–73). Thus, while Serbs from some parts of Kosovo had no problems whatsoever with their Albanian neighbors, their decreasing proportion in a settlement led to an increase in pressure and inequality, which in turn resulted in emigration. The findings of the survey were compatible with reports about low-level pressure on Serbs as a minority group in some parts of Kosovo since the Second World War. Apart from threats, personal injury and damage to property, there was some evidence of damage to religious and cultural monuments, and desecration of graves.8 Some authors remain sceptical about the intimidation of Kosovo Serbs by some members of the majority group. They focus on Serb–Albanian


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relations in Kosovo in the 1980s, largely because of a lack of information about the earlier period. They note the change in the party’s policy after the suppression of the 1981 Kosovo Albanian demonstrations, the rate of crime being lower than in other parts of Yugoslavia and the small number of nationalist-related murders and rapes officially recorded between 1981 and 1987 and conclude that high officials, dissident intellectuals and the local press exaggerated the whole case. Without doubt, the level of pressure on Kosovo Serbs was exaggerated, especially in 1988–89. However, those few nationalist-related murders and rapes occurred in the context of growing Serb–Albanian antagonism and the accumulated grievances of Kosovo Serbs from the earlier period. In Belgrade and Zagreb incidents of violence were seen as crime, while in Kosovo they were regarded as an expression of ethnic tensions and occurred despite painstaking precautions of Serbs in some areas to avoid trouble. Serb farmers from some parts of Kosovo claimed that they had already been unable to farm the land for fear of intimidation and injury. Many respondents claimed that in some areas it had not been safe for women and female children to go to work or school without male escorts even during daylight (Petrović and Blagojević 1992: 113–20). When incidents occurred against this background, and in a traditionalist society, without appropriate follow-up by the courts and law enforcement agencies, the reaction was bound to be stronger then it would otherwise have been. These findings point to the relative weight of various factors in causing emigration. Low-level intimidation of Serbs as a minority group had occurred in some parts of Kosovo since the Second World War. That the number of complaints about intimidation sharply increased after the mid to late 1960s, coinciding with a major political change in Kosovo, indicates at least an indirect role of the province’s and local authorities. Most cases of intimidation and discrimination occurred because of the absence of protection for Kosovo Serbs by the courts and law enforcement agencies in some parts of the province. This in turn triggered a sharp increase in low-level pressure on the ground. The latter was fostered, in addition to demographic pressure, by the consequences of the partial modernization of Kosovo Albanian society. The firm grip of traditional moral codes loosened under the pressure of modernization, while rising national romanticism within this context brought about growing intolerance toward the minority population (Janjić 1994). Migrations are normally explained by the mix of repulsion from the old region and attraction to the new one. In this case, it appears that the push factor was considerably more important than the pull. The mixture of the politics of inequality, the rapid demographic decline of Kosovo Serbs and their

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steady migration out of the province, fuelled by historical antagonisms, resulted in the mounting grievances of Kosovo Serbs in the 1970s and 1980s.

Building protest at the grass roots In the early 1970s a number of Serb officials in Kosovo’s party organs raised the issue of the growing Albanization of the province and the problems this caused to the non-Albanian population. Miloš Sekulović and Jovo Šotra pointed to growing pressure on Serbs, especially those living in the countryside, to emigrate from the province as well as their inadequate protection by law enforcement agencies, their problems in education and obstacles to finding employment. Kadri Reufi, an ethnic Turk, demanded that the leadership investigate the causes of the deteriorating position of this minority and claimed that the number of Turks in Kosovo was significantly reduced in the 1971 census because they were labelled as Albanians. All three were removed from the Province’s Committee and from public life, the effect of which was to silence other non-Albanian politicians, as Sekulović told me in an interview. The appeals of Serb party members and of ordinary Serbs to local authorities and to the province’s leadership were either ignored or rejected and the appellants harassed (see also ¯Daković 1984: 317–18, 449–50; Zejneli 1988: 74–105). The grievances of Kosovo Serbs could not translate into collective action in political context hostile to any reference to their concerns, but accumulated over time and eventually resulted in the high level of politicization of Kosovo Serbs. As a local observer put it, ‘in the southern socialist autonomous province each and every head of a Serb household who takes himself seriously keeps a library of petitions, appeals, pamphlets and newspaper clips’ (Tijanić 1988: 130–1). Political change ultimately opened space for the collective action of various groups of Kosovo Serbs. While many Kosovo Serbs felt aggrieved by their position since the mid-1960s, large parts of the Kosovo Albanian population also saw their position as wanting. While introducing broad territorial autonomy and extending progressively the collective rights of Albanians, the LCY stopped short of granting Kosovo the status of a republic. The economic crisis and unemployment grew, boosted by economic mismanagement and very high rates of population growth. In 1981 protests swept the autonomous province and this time more people showed up on the streets than in 1968. Minor student protests over socio-economic issues swiftly turned into nationalist demonstrations demanding a republic


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of Kosovo, even union with Albania. Protests repeatedly erupted across the autonomous province from March to May and involved violence, including serious clashes with the police and assaults on Serbs and their property. The government declared a state of emergency, deployed tanks and security forces, closed schools and factories and suppressed demonstrations.9 According to official sources, 11 people lost their lives; in unofficial estimates this figure was much higher. Following the events, around 1700 people were sentenced for participation in the demonstrations, while public expression of Albanian nationalism became a serious offence. Relations with Albania sharply deteriorated following its repeated demands that Kosovo be granted the status of a republic.10 The scale of protests and the readiness of protesters to confront security forces apparently surprised federal authorities, raising fears of the rise of a major separatist movement. The LCY therefore initiated a re-evaluation of its policy on Kosovo and the role of the security apparatus in the region increased considerably. The first response was to purge Kosovo’s leadership of politicians, such as Kosovo’s party leader Mahmut Bakalli, now considered incapable of delivering political stability to the region. Officials were also blamed for condoning Albanian nationalism and irredentism and for artificially separating the province from Serbia and Yugoslavia. While those deemed to be supporting the radicals were purged from the party-state and public sector, replacements normally came from the Kosovo Albanian cadre and had no effect on their ethnic composition. For the most part Albanian judges and policemen conducted trials and detention of protesters and ‘counter-revolutionaries’. Kosovo’s officials came under the much closer scrutiny of the federal party and state organs, and Serb–Albanian relations within Kosovo ceased to be in their exclusive domain. High officials now increasingly acknowledged the inequalities facing the non-Albanian population, in terms of the use of language, access to jobs in the state-controlled part of the economy, allocation of public housing and inadequate protection of their rights and property by the courts and law enforcement agencies. The prevention of out-migration of Serbs and the tackling of their concerns now became a part of the party’s policy. Emerging local networks and their protests The 1981 protests of Kosovo Albanians and the subsequent political change opened the way for the collective action of various groups of Kosovo Serbs. While the protests exacerbated feelings of insecurity among Serbs in the province, the party’s new policy raised their expectations that the authorities would fully address their grievances. However,

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many Kosovo Serbs gradually came to believe that the policy was only partly put into practice and the emigration continued. Some believed that high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia were not aware of the full scale of the problem and thus arranged a number of private meetings, at times involving large delegations, with officials and other people they thought to be influential. They met Nikola Ljubiˇcić, the President of Serbia’s state Presidency (1982–84), high party officials in Montenegro, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, a retired member of Tito’s old guard, and Branko Pešić, Belgrade’s mayor, among others. Draža Marković left an account of one of the meetings in his diary (D ¯ ekić 1990: 209–10). In most cases the delegations were given a sympathetic hearing and assurances that the party’s policy, including policies aimed at halting the emigration of Serbs, would be implemented. Simultaneously, a growing number of ordinary people, mainly in predominantly Serb settlements, attended local meetings of official political organizations, mostly those of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SAWP), to raise their concerns. In Kosovo Polje, a suburb of Pristina with a dominant Serb population, roughly 30 political outsiders, some of whom were party members, regularly debated various issues at the local SAWP meetings and forwarded the meetings’ minutes to high officials at all levels, from Pristina and Kosovo to Serbia and the federation. Although remaining within the boundaries of officially permitted dissent, they increasingly laid the blame for the inequalities on Kosovo’s officials, both Albanian and Serb. Early on the core of this group, namely Kosta Bulatović, Boško Budimirović and Miroslav Šolević, jointly prepared the meetings and gradually shifted the agenda from local problems to issues of broader political significance, as the latter two told me in interviews. Parallel developments unfolded in other predominantly Serb settlements. Despite some successes, such as the fact that Pristina’s and Kosovo’s officials periodically attended the SAWP meetings in Kosovo Polje, the debaters felt that the authorities would not take their problems seriously unless they gained broader support among Kosovo Serbs. Bulatović, Budimirović and Šolević therefore extended their activities beyond the official organizations and started mobilizing support at the grass roots. In 1985 they extended the core group to include as informal advisors Zoran Grujić, a professor of economics at the University of Pristina, and Dušan Ristić, a former Kosovo’s high official who had been removed from power in the purge following the 1981 demonstrations. They agreed that the party’s post-1981 line was adequate and that they should only press the authorities to implement the policy. Fearing repression, they did not


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create a formal organization but met regularly to co-ordinate activities, as Ristić claimed (Borba, 11 February 1993: 13) and Budimirović and Šolević confirmed to me in interviews. In late October 1985 the Kosovo Polje group sent a petition to all top state and party organs of Yugoslavia and Serbia as well as to related official organizations. They protested against discrimination aimed at Kosovo Serbs, asked for the protection of their rights and the establishment of law and order. They pointed out that Kosovo was becoming increasingly ‘ethnically clean’ of Serbs, accused Kosovo’s officials of tacit approval of the forced migration of Serbs out of the region and demanded that high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia bring that trend to a halt.11 The petitioners also insisted on their demands immediately being put on the agenda of the Federal and Serbia’s Assemblies under the scrutiny of the mass media (Književne novine, 15 December 1985: 2). The petition was a success. About 2000 people signed the petition within ten days and by April 1986 the number of signatories multiplied several times, which was considerably more than the initiators of the petition had expected. The authorities responded with a campaign of abuse against prominent activists. For weeks they were the main target in the local press and featured high on the agenda of official organizations. Despite a rejection of the demands and threats to the activists, however, there was no immediate persecution, which encouraged them to proceed with protest initiatives. On the morning of 26 February 1986, a group of 95 people, many of whom were in peasant garb, turned up outside the Federal Assembly in Belgrade. Informally selected representatives of Kosovo Serbs from 42 towns and villages from all parts of the province demanded to speak to the federal leadership. In the meeting with high officials that followed they spoke at length about their concerns and cited examples of mistreatment and inequalities. Due to frequent loud approvals by other participants, the meeting at times resembled a small demonstration. At the end, the high officials agreed to form a working group to investigate the validity of the complaints and suggest solutions.12 The authorities took the threat seriously and arrested Bulatović on 2 April 1986, but the tactics backfired. The arrest only alarmed Kosovo Serb activists and brought them together in defiance of the authorities. They promptly organized protests outside the house of their arrested co-conspirator and by 5 April the number of protesters, coming from various parts of the autonomous province, rose to a few thousand. Small delegations of activists met Köle Shiroka, Kosovo’s party leader, and Dušan ˇ Ckrebi´ c, President of Serbia’s state Presidency, and demanded the immediate release of Bulatović from prison, as Budimirović, a participant in

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the meetings, told me in an interview. The protesters outside the house of Bulatović demanded that Ivan Stambolić, Serbia’s party leader, address Kosovo Serbs. There were also rumors that hundreds of people were ready to leave for another protest in Belgrade. In order to prevent the protest and pacify Kosovo Serbs, Stambolić visited Kosovo Polje on 6 April. He delivered two speeches, one in the hall to local party members and the other outside the building, standing on a school desk, pleading that Serbs should remain in Kosovo and insisting that the authorities would address the concerns of Kosovo Serbs but that they should not listen to Serb nationalists, meaning prominent activists.13 Stambolić failed to calm the protesters. Although Bulatović had already been released from prison, about 550 Kosovo Serbs, led by an 80-year-old farmer Boža Marković from Batusi, the village near Kosovo Polje, showed up at the Belgrade railway station the following morning. The column of protesters, swollen by numerous earlier Serb migrants from Kosovo now living in central Serbia, guided by the police, crossed the bridge on the way to a nearby congress centre, causing a traffic jam in the busy streets of the capital and leaving a strong impression on bystanders. At the meeting with high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia many activists took the floor to voice their concerns about inequalities and the lack of protection for Kosovo Serbs by the courts and law enforcement agencies. Some demanded that a number of Kosovo’s officials resign while others insisted that constitutional changes were necessary to bring Kosovo back under the jurisdiction of Serbia’s authorities (Borba, 8 April 1986: 1, 4). In 1986 Kosovo Serb activists initiated several highly visible protests and a series of small, local protest events. The key event occurred on 20 June, a few days before the Congress of the LCY, when several hundred Serbs set off for central Serbia in tractors and cars. Feeling under pressure from their Kosovo Albanian neighbors and provoked by recent nationalist-related incidents, Serb farmers from Batusi initiated a protest march. Some Serbs living in Metohia, a western part of the province, promptly joined the protest. Since the police had already blocked most roads between the western and central parts of Kosovo, many people, including some 70 and 80 year olds and children, proceeded on foot through woods and meadows. They reached Kosovo Polje after a long march where local protesters joined the group. Just outside Kosovo Polje Azem Vllasi, President of Kosovo’s Province’s Committee, and Petar Graˇcanin, a member of Serbia’s party Presidency, tried to persuade protesters to return to their homes with little success. When the police issued an order that people get out of their cars and off of their tractors, they proceeded on foot. In the end, the police cordon blocked the road and


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did not let the protesters go any further. After several hours protesters gave up and quietly returned to their homes (Politika Ekspres, 22 June 1986). Budimirović told me that the police stopped his group of activists at checkpoints in central Serbia, since they had set off from Kosovo Polje early, and sent them back home. Highly visible protests also occurred later that year. On 3 November more than a hundred Serbs from Pristina and the surrounding areas came to Belgrade to protest in response to nationalist-related indecent attacks on a ten-year-old Serb girl and a young woman. They briefly marched along the streets of the capital and ended up outside the Federal Assembly. In talks with high party-state officials they demanded a special session of the Federal Assembly on Kosovo, and again stressed the relationship between the situation on the ground in the province and its constitutional status (Politika, 4 November 1986: 1, 5–6). On 19 November another protest occurred in Babin Most, a village near Pristina, when around 300 Serbs set off for Belgrade after their fellow villager was sentenced to 30 days in prison, apparently though not formally because he had delivered a speech at a local protest of Kosovo Serbs a few days earlier. The protesters marched a few miles to the nearest railway station but, after boarding the local train, were stopped in Kosovo Polje by local officials and brought to a large public meeting. After receiving assurances that the authorities would look into the case again they returned to their homes (NIN, 23 November 1986: 12–13). In addition, there was a series of small local protests of Kosovo Serbs across the autonomous province, mostly in the form of public meetings or outdoor public gatherings, organized in response to specific cases of nationalist-related violence. As people became aware of the advantages of non-institutional action, they started petitioning local authorities, and sometimes managers of large state enterprises, to protest against discrimination at work. In April 1987, 47 engineers of a mine in Dobro Selo sent such a petition to the company’s headquarters and the local and Kosovo’s high officials; another one was prepared by 98 Serb railway workers.14 The main consequence of the post-1981 initiatives, institutional and otherwise, was the incipient and unconnected networks of activists and supporters in towns and villages inhabited by Serbs. Throughout 1986 the Kosovo Polje group, including new arrival Bogdan Kecman, worked to link up the emerging local networks into a more powerful political force. Each of them took responsibility for a specific area of Kosovo and worked to strengthen links between existing activists in the area, recruit new ones and inform potential supporters about their initiatives. In the end, the Kosovo Polje group could mobilize small groups of activists from

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various parts of Kosovo for protest events in and outside the province within short notice.15 The activists’ demands, initially focused on the lack of protection by law enforcement agencies and courts and inequalities in the public sector, were largely stated in terms of the official discourse. The activists pointed to the mistreatment of Serbs, including killings, attacks, destroyed crops, seized property and various forms of discrimination. Since they believed that the local and Kosovo’s officials deliberately avoided enforcing the law when it came to the rights of Serbs, they demanded their resignations and threatened collectively to leave Kosovo in protest. As divisions within and among officials of the federation, Serbia and Kosovo grew, the demands gradually evolved toward constitutional issues. The protesters asserted that if the province’s officials were unable to guarantee protection of the rights and property of Serbs then Kosovo should be brought back under the jurisdiction of Serbia’s authorities.16 In addition to demands that largely fit within the evolving official discourse, there were few radical ones, mostly on the margins of the protest. The party-state and the grass-roots protest The high officials of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo tolerated this mobilization for a variety of reasons. First, the highly decentralized political structure of socialist Yugoslavia, based largely on national rights and identities, encouraged groups to mobilize along nationalist lines and Kosovo Serbs were no exception. After 1981 the high officials had already acknowledged their grievances and put emphasis on prevention of their emigration. Unlike Kosovo Albanian protesters in 1981 who aimed for important institutional change, Kosovo Serbs demanded little more than the implementation of the existing party’s policy, which was much less likely to trigger repression. Nonetheless, there were some differences in emphasis between the high officials of Kosovo, Serbia and Yugoslavia when it came to the mobilization. Kosovo’s officials, predominantly Albanians, were largely hostile to the protests of Kosovo Serbs. For one thing, the officials were impatient with any collective action outside official organizations as the consequence of their role in the post-1981 suppression of Kosovo Albanian protest groups; for another, they realized that the issue was potentially explosive and that it might affect the constitutional status of Kosovo. High officials of Serbia saw the grievances of Kosovo Serbs and their mobilization as a logical consequence of the fragmented political structure of Serbia after the 1967–74 constitutional reforms, which fostered


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nationalist action of both Albanians and Serbs. They repeatedly referred to the discontent of Kosovo Serbs while unsuccessfully trying to get support from the leaders of other republics for constitutional reform. Simultaneously, they aimed to sideline prominent Kosovo Serb activists and guide others toward the official organizations (see Stambolić 1988: 106–12, 157–9, 166–8). The position of federal organs regarding the mobilization mattered most, since Serb–Albanian relations in Kosovo were largely outside the domain of Kosovo’s officials after 1981 and still not under the jurisdiction of Serbia’s leadership. That Serbs, though a minority group in Kosovo, constituted a majority in Serbia as a whole and a plurality in Yugoslavia, rendered their concerns important for federal high officials so that they could not simply suppress the protests. Simultaneously, some high officials of other republics saw the prospect of constitutional reform as damaging to the balance of power cemented in the 1974 Constitution and thus ignored the demands of Serbia’s leadership. Other political changes also mattered in terms of the relative absence of repression against the mobilization. The change of political generations in the first half of the 1980s brought younger politicians into the highest party-state offices. Members of the younger generation in Serbia now dominated its political stage, and younger Kosovo Albanian politicians, led by Azem Vllasi, took control of the previously highly conservative Kosovo leadership in 1986. For one thing, the generational change resulted in the relaxation of repressive rules and regulations and increased space for political debates in general; for another, many younger politicians felt that repression against ordinary people would go against the values of their generation. The exception to the trend was the hostile attitude toward the non-institutional action of Kosovo Albanians, which after 1981 was considered to be a serious threat to Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. Last but not least, growing elite disunity, rooted in the decentralized political structure and intensified during the leadership succession, had already prevented high officials from different republics from reaching a compromise on urgently needed economic and political reform resulting in a deadlock at the federal level. The same obstacles now thwarted attempts to reach a common position on the mobilization of the Kosovo Serbs, especially on whether to prevent specific protest events of Kosovo Serbs in 1986 and 1987 (see Stambolić 1995: 165–80). Secondly, the small scale of mobilization and its limited potential for expansion, which sharply distinguished it from the 1981 mobilization of Kosovo Albanians, were also important. The movement of a minority group in a peripheral region hardly posed a threat to the regime.

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High officials were mainly concerned about the potential implications of the mobilization for political stability at the centre, since the protesters’ demands were potentially highly resonant with Serbs outside Kosovo. Attempts by Kosovo Serb activists to stage dramatic protests in the capital, as in the case of the May 1986 march, were therefore prevented. High officials were hardly lenient toward prominent activists, especially after the October 1985 petition. They often issued public campaigns of abuse against the activists in the local press and Bulatović was briefly jailed in early April 1986. High officials by no means accepted that popular protest was a legitimate form of political action and publicly presented various delegations of Kosovo Serb activists as concerned with their personal problems, rather than the grievances of the whole community. Thirdly, the grass-roots composition and the absence of formal or secretive anti-regime organizations in the growing social movement also mattered. Owing to its roots in the mass-based partisan fighting force, the regime tolerated a degree of discontent if it came from ordinary people, but set strong limits on ideological dissidence and largely co-opted the managerial elite, intellectuals and professionals. Apart from harassment, the participation in protests could seriously harm the career prospects of those aiming at managerial positions in the huge public sector. To form an underground organization was not an option for activists. Any hint of such an organization, and the commitment this would imply from its members, would severely limit the chances for the spread of mobilization. Fearing repression, most people initially avoided any connection with the Kosovo Polje group. Although few questioned their demands, people normally preferred to choose whether to take part in each separate protest event or not. When it became clear that the costs of collective action were not as high as many had expected, the number of activists and supporters steadily expanded. As Budimirović told the author, Whenever we arranged a protest, only a hundred or so of the most courageous activists would initially show up. Once a public meeting or demonstration started, another few hundreds, or thousands, would suddenly turn up. They would come out of nowhere, like worms. Fourth, activists opted for moderate protest strategies and repeatedly stressed that their protest was not anti-systemic. They focused on the official organizations partly because high officials rarely tolerated openly non-institutional initiatives and partly because the minority constituency of the movement ruled out large-scale discontent. The highly decentralized political structure of socialist Yugoslavia, especially the


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self-management system, a high level of local autonomy and some highly decentralized official organizations, provided space for activists to organize, recruit new supporters and appeal for support. Their protests often unfolded under the auspices of the SAWP because activists could easily join the precinct branches of the organization and, provided that debates remained within the boundaries of officially permitted dissent, operate with little control from above. They also exploited the institution of the public gathering of citizens (zbor grad¯ana). While Yugoslavia’s leaders had created this provision as a showpiece of self-management and direct democracy in local communities and exploited it to mobilize the population for various goals of the party-state, Kosovo Serb activists made use of it as a cover for their meetings and rallies. The symbolism surrounding the mobilization, such as the singing of Yugoslavia’s hymn and songs associated with the regime’s roots in the Second World War partisan fighting force, demonstrated the loyalty of activists to the regime and celebrated Yugoslavia’s party-state. The activists took the policies and claims of the regime seriously, which made it hard for high officials to suppress mobilization and write off protesters’ demands (see Stambolić 1988: 173). While the social movement set no restrictions on its supporters in terms of ideological affiliation, prominent activists took pains to make sure that highly visible activists remained acceptable to the authorities. For example, activists from families previˇ ously associated with Cominformists or anti-communist Cetniks could take part in the preparations for and implementation of various protest events, but could not lead any protests (Hudelist 1989: 313). Activists and their allies From the early 1980s various groups of Kosovo Serbs sought contacts with influential people. Budimirović and Šolević told me that activists from various parts of the province kept in touch with Kosovo-based reporters of the Belgrade media and some earlier Kosovo Serb emigrants, such as the managers of state enterprises and middle-rank officials in the capital. The confidants initially helped by identifying targets for appeal outside Kosovo, since the activists knew little about the institutional structure and informal political alliances in the leadership. Later, with the shift to non-institutional action, the allies commented on protest strategies. The reporters, sympathetic to the cause of political outsiders aiming at the powerful political establishment, reported more frequently on the problems facing Kosovo Serbs, which had previously been considered an official taboo. After the change of political generations in Serbia there was a gradual relaxation of pressure on the mass media and reporters

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faced fewer restrictions in following up on a good story. Less frequently, activists sought advice from local priests, monks and a Kosovo bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The activists also established contact with Belgrade-based dissident ´ intellectuals, including Dobrica Cosi´ c. Budimirović and Šolević told me ´ that Cosić supported their cause and suggested that they make use of all legal options of appeal while some other intellectuals urged radical action early on and claimed that protests of Kosovo Serbs in the cap´ ital would trigger demonstrations in the hundreds of thousands. Cosi´ c claims to have initiated the October 1985 petition at a meeting with a number of Kosovo Serbs, but that a Belgrade journalist, an earlier ´ Serb emigrant from Kosovo, actually wrote the first draft (Cosi´ c 2002: 169–70). This is probably true. Although Bulatović claimed that he initiated and drafted the petition, Budimirović and Šolević told me that this journalist, a friend of Bulatović, wrote the text. In January 1986 around 200 Belgrade-based intellectuals signed a petition supporting the cause of Kosovo Serbs, while the writers union subsequently held a number of protest meetings. A number of dissident intellectuals had already initiated a debate on Kosovo a year before, partly from the perspective of a revisionist history of Serb–Albanian relations and partly focusing on the current grievances of Kosovo Serbs (Dragović-Soso 2002: 115–61). The discourse and action of dissident intellectuals, principally focused on symbolic issues, should not be confused with the grievances of Kosovo Serbs and their mobilization. The case that triggered the strongest reaction from the intellectuals was that of ¯Dord¯e Martinović, a Kosovo Serb farmer who was impaled with a bottle in 1985. While the authorities provided contradictory versions of the event, stating initially that two Kosovo Albanians attacked Martinović but later that he committed this himself, the intellectuals insisted that the case symbolized the rape of Serbia and ongoing genocide against Kosovo Serbs. In contrast, Kosovo Serb activists’ demands related to their everyday problems that arose from local intimidation and the politics of inequality and subsequently to the constitutional status of Kosovo. Neither of the prominent activists who I interviewed referred to the case of Martinović until I specifically asked about it. Kecman then claimed that the case was irrelevant, while Šolević and Budimirović stated that it was one in a series of nationalist-related incidents that triggered mobilization. Without doubt the action of dissident intellectuals alerted the general public in central Serbia to the concerns of Kosovo Serbs and made a strong impression on high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia. However,


99

this was only a part of the intellectuals’ sweeping critique of the partystate, important partly because it resonated well with the population at large and thus hurt the political establishment most, and had little to do with either the emergence or consolidation of the local protest ´ networks. The significance of the activists’ contacts with Cosi´ c and his initiation of the October 1985 petition should not be exaggerated either. There was little difference between the few meetings between activists ´ and Cosi´ c and their contacts with a range of influential people over previous years, as the activists had initiated nearly all of them. The significance of the October 1985 petition, drafted by the intellectuals, did not lie in its content, since the same demands had featured prominently in the activists’ discussions through official organizations. Šolević told me that the Kosovo Polje group had even drafted a similar petition two years before but collected only around 70 signatures. The 1985 petition became important because around 2000 Kosovo Serbs signed the text within ten days and thus demonstrated strong commitment to their cause despite a widespread fear of job loss or imprisonment. Nor were the dissident intellectuals the only group that helped publicize the cause of the emerging movement, since Kosovo Serb war veterans occasionally supported some activists’ demands and demanded the resignations of various Kosovo’s officials, both Albanian and Serb. Kosovo Serb activists also enjoyed support from two outsider delegates in the Federal Assembly, namely Batrić Jovanović and Zarija Martinović, who had already demanded an official debate on the politics of inequality in Kosovo. Before initiating any major protest event, prominent activists tested their ideas before at least some of the above-mentioned confidants to find out whether the chosen targets and timing were appropriate. While seeking contact with, and advice from, various quarters, the activists made decisions on protest strategies on their own. They firmly believed that people at the grass roots understood their problems best and could make appropriate decisions. More importantly, they were painfully aware that they, and not their confidants, would have to suffer the consequences of any wrong moves, as Šolević explained to me in an interview.

Milošević and the spread of mobilization By late 1986 the previously partly connected local networks of activists and supporters had turned into a social movement, that is, a sustained mobilization. Networks were now at least partly developed in the majority of Serb-inhabited settlements in Kosovo and, judging on the basis of

100 Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution

participation in local initiatives, including debates in the official organizations and non-institutional action, support for their initiatives was growing steadily. Before the June 1986 march, the public reactions of high officials of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo were all alike, but this event and the subsequent protests apparently made a strong impression on high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia. Disputes between the leaderships of Serbia and Kosovo grew more frequent and the activists’ demands and protests received greater attention. Before 1988 political alliances in Kosovo’s leadership had rarely openly developed along national lines and the position of most Albanian and Serb high officials on Serb–Albanian relations shifted over time along with changes to the official party’s policy. This was reflected in the demands by Kosovo Serb activists for the resignations of some Albanian and Serb officials and their occasional support for other officials, both Serbs and Albanians. Budimirović told me that the activists had generally been cautious about Serbs in Kosovo’s political establishment feeling that their loyalty lay with the party’s policy of the day. After 1981 a number of Serb high officials originally from Kosovo, who had occupied posts in federal organs, were sent back to influential positions in Kosovo’s leadership. The so-called weekend or traveling politicians, whose families stayed in Belgrade, had little connection with Kosovo Serb realities and were generally despised by ordinary people.17 The remaining Kosovo Serb high officials largely steered clear of controversial issues that could lead to their being purged from leadership or worse, just like their colleagues the Kosovo Albanians. The activists therefore continually sought allies among the leadership of Serbia, but with little success. This changed after the first official visit of Milošević, Serbia’s new party leader, to Kosovo in April 1987. The visit to Kosovo Polje was not originally planned. Kosovo’s officials designed Milošević’s itinerary in such a way that he would not visit predominantly Serb settlements and thus would not have to face protesters. The Kosovo Polje group then staged a protest over a fake incident to attract the attention of Serbia’s leadership. On 17 April the activists spread the word that Zoran Grujić, a university professor and their co-conspirator, had decided to emigrate from Kosovo. Apparently Grujić had been repeatedly interrogated by the police because of his links with the Kosovo Polje group and claimed to have experienced problems at the University of Pristina due to his Serb background. Within hours around 300 people gathered outside of his house in protest. Of course, Grujić did not leave the province, but the activists exploited the incident to invite Milošević to drop by on his Kosovo tour. Three days later Milošević, accompanied by Azem Vllasi,


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Kosovo’s party leader, came to deliver a speech before 3000 Serbs outside the primary school in Kosovo Polje. At the end, the activists insisted that he come again, this time not just to talk, but also to listen to their complaints. Milošević accepted the invitation and approved their plea to choose their own representatives for the meeting. Milošević and Vllasi arrived in Kosovo Polje again in the afternoon of 24 April. By the time cars with the politicians approached the building, a crowd of several thousand protesters had already been waiting. They passionately chanted: ‘We Want Freedom, We Want Freedom!’ Police literally carried Milošević into the building, while the protesters struggled to enter as well. It turned out that local party officials had drafted their own list of speakers and, when the police tried to stop others from entering the building, the chaos began. The police responded by beating protesters with truncheons while they threw stones at the policemen and the building. Milošević was then asked to speak to the protesters to try to calm them down. Speaking from the window of the first floor Milošević asked the protesters to choose their own representatives, ordered the police not to beat people and asked the protesters to maintain order themselves. The latter accepted this with ovations and the meeting continued until early morning. The representatives, in most cases farmers, skilled workers and teachers, spoke emotionally about inequalities and the lack of protection afforded to Serbs by Kosovo’s authorities. At the end, Milošević delivered, for the most part, a typical speech of a high official.18 Milošević became instantly popular among Kosovo Serbs after the event. His description of the Kosovo problem and the need to address it, though uttered in the bureaucratic jargon of party-state officials, was somewhat more direct than one would expect from a high official. More importantly, his stance stood out, namely his public disapproval of the use of force by the police. The significance of the event, however, has been hugely exaggerated in subsequent accounts, especially during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. Several members of Serbia’s party Presidency told me that Milošević subsequently pulled all the strings to call the session of the Central Committee of LCY and demanded that specific targets be set for the performance of party and state organs in relation to the Kosovo problem. Milošević also demanded that a number of former Kosovo high officials, including Fadil Hoxha, a retired member of Tito’s old guard and an undisputed authority among Kosovo Albanians, be held accountable before the party for their alleged support for the Kosovo Albanian nationalists. Hoxha had already retired and his removal from the party would not have important immediate consequences for the


personal composition and policies of Kosovo’s leadership. However, by calling into question Hoxha’s credibility Milošević implicitly questioned the policy of the federal leadership since the late 1960s and Kosovo’s highly autonomous status, which had been achieved under Hoxha’s leadership. As the intervention of Milošević related largely to the implementation of previously jointly approved policies and remained firmly on the Titoist course, Milošević gained support from high officials from other republics without difficulty. However, these developments amplified disagreements in the leadership of Serbia, which eventually resulted in the removal of Ivan Stambolić and the ascendancy of Milošević (see Chapter 2). The change in the leadership of Serbia turned the fortunes of the expanding social movement. The public recognition of the urgency of the concerns of Kosovo Serbs by Serbia’s party leader increased the visibility of the social movement and prominent activists now felt a degree of protection from the federal and Kosovo’s officials. While Stambolić had kept pressure on Kosovo’s officials to address the problems of Kosovo Serbs and ignored protest networks, Milošević aimed to establish control over the mobilization by co-opting prominent activists. The change partly originated from the spread of mobilization such that it now had to be dealt with either through suppression or co-optation. Budimirović, Šolević and Kecman told me that they gradually established contact with Milošević’s emissaries over the following months and provided suggestions on how their concerns should be addressed. However, they were under strong pressure to channel their initiatives toward the official organizations and use their authority in local networks to halt non-institutional action. Milošević exploited the grass-roots mobilization for his own ends and at times indirectly provoked activists to publicly denounce his opponents. A small wave of protests erupted in October 1987, involving repeated street demonstrations of up to 4000 Serb women and children in Pristina and Kosovo Polje, large public meetings and, on one occasion, the refusal of Serb schoolchildren to attend classes at school. The protests broke out after well-publicized reports that Fadil Hoxha made an insulting joke about Serb women at a semi-formal dinner. Since the incident had occurred nearly a year before and the party enquiry over Hoxha’s role started in June, the timing of the leak suggests that Milošević wanted to discredit Hoxha and his former associates in order to weaken Kosovo’s current leadership and thus set the stage for constitutional reform. The reports came out just after the nationalist-related incidents involving Serb schoolchildren and thus triggered an unusually strong response by


103

Kosovo Serbs (Danas, 20 October 1987: 20–1; 27 October: 7–8). Budimirović and Šolević confirmed to me that they initiated the protests and not, as was presented at the time, Serb women from Kosovo Polje. They insisted that they had no contact with Milošević over the matter but merely exploited an opportunity that presented itself in the form of the leak about Hoxha and nationalist-related incidents. The wave of protests created an atmosphere in which the public vilification of former Kosovo politicians became inevitable and they were subsequently expelled from the party. Ironically, Kosovo’s leadership exploited the affair to undermine the Kosovo Polje group. Ristić, formerly a high Kosovo official, was now also blamed for the deterioration of Serb–Albanian relations before 1981 and thus purged from the party and forced to retire from his job as a company director. Kosovo’s leadership initiated party proceedings against Budimirović and Šolević demanding that they be expelled from the party as well, but their local party constituency in Kosovo Polje rejected the initiative. Milenko Marković, a member of Serbia’s party Presidency who took part in some of the debates over the matter, told me that the initiative gradually died largely thanks to indirect but firm backing from Milošević’s loyal associates. The consolidation of support for the social movement among Kosovo Serbs and the first serious attempt by Milošević to break the resistance of Kosovo’s officials to constitutional reform gradually affected political alliances in the province’s leadership, which had rarely openly followed national cleavages. The case of Hoxha and that of Budimirović and Šolević now triggered the first open divisions. In early 1988 three Serb party officials from Pristina’s Municipal Committee resigned from their executive posts criticizing the Committee’s cadre policy dominated by Kosovo Albanians (Danas, 19 April 1988: 15–16). The influence of Milošević on prominent activists grew but often failed to translate into action on the ground partly because they intended to proceed with the protests until their demands had been fully addressed. Budimirović, Šolević and Kecman told me that they were not convinced that Milošević would be able to shape a debate on Kosovo at the June 1987 session of the Central Committee of the LCY and started mobilizing supporters for a demonstration in Belgrade during the session. Milošević insisted in vain that they cancel the demonstration, since the Kosovo Polje group voted to proceed with preparations. In the end, Milošević managed to persuade Grujić from the Kosovo Polje group to campaign against the protest initiative so that only five to eight hundred people, mostly from other parts of Kosovo, turned up at the protest in Belgrade. Their very presence in the capital during the session of the


Central Committee was an indicator that the movement could not be easily controlled. Those who failed to observe the majority decision but rather listened to Milošević were temporarily excluded from all protest initiatives.19 Highly decentralized character of the protest networks also undermined attempts to establish control over the movement. Although influential, the Kosovo Polje group by no means presided over the networks. Around 30–40 prominent activists from various parts of Kosovo, who gathered occasionally, commanded sufficient influence to prevent any initiatives they disapproved of or to start new ones. There was a group of radical activists, who at times would not listen to anybody’s advice and would proceed with action, supported by a hundred or two supporters. Even in Kosovo Polje, Šolević, Budimirović and Kecman were sometimes outvoted, or just ignored, by other activists in loose public meetings. Therefore, despite Milošević’s degree of influence over prominent activists, the local networks proceeded with protests across Kosovo. To placate Serbia’s party leader they now wrapped all protests, even large outdoor gatherings, in the form of meetings of official organizations. There was a growing number of cases in which local and Kosovo officials who attended the meetings were booed, prevented from speaking or where the audience left the meetings altogether.

Kosovo Serbs’ protests, their protest strategies and patterns of mobilization in socialist Yugoslavia The exacerbation of Serb–Albanian antagonisms in the nineteenth century set the stage for the politics of inequality in the following century. While winners and losers changed over time, the hegemonic position of either one or the other group remained an important feature of political life in Kosovo. From the perspective of the disadvantaged group, the only way to escape a subordinate position was political action, which over the history meant wars and uprisings, parliamentary initiatives and party building, struggles within the CPY/LCY and popular protest. The grievances of Kosovo Serbs originated from the post-1966 shift in the politics of inequality and were compounded by their rapid demographic decline, part of which was due to their steady out-migration from the province. Kosovo Serbs rarely voiced their grievances in the 1970s because Kosovo’s leadership prevented attempts to contest the official position on the Albanian–Serb relations. These grievances therefore resulted in the growing politicization of Kosovo Serbs but not in collective action.


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The changing political context strongly shaped the timing, forms and dynamics of the mobilization. Changes to the party’s policy on Kosovo after 1981 resulted in the softer approach of high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia to Kosovo Serbs and their informal exclusion from the authority of Kosovo’s leadership. These developments raised the expectations of Kosovo Serbs and opened space for various groups to lobby high officials outside of the province and to initiate debates about their concerns in official organizations at the local level. The slow response of the authorities to growing complaints shifted the efforts of some of the debaters to non-institutional action and to the building up of local protest networks. The relatively small scale and grass-roots character of protest and moderate protest strategies, including mobilization partly within the official organizations, shielded activists from repression. In short, it was the political context, rather than the intensity of the grievances, that decisively shaped this episode of mobilization. In this respect, the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs differed little from patterns of mobilization of other groups in socialist Yugoslavia, such as those of Belgrade University students in 1968 and of Kosovo Albanians in 1968 and 1981. All erupted after a rise in the political expectations of the respective group. The 1966 removal of Ranković, a symbol of the post-war police state, raised expectations in society that political and economic reforms would follow. University students were among the groups that were most interested in reforms and apparently took the political change seriously. The fall of Ranković also initiated change in the party’s policy over Kosovo, as many saw him as responsible for the excesses of the police state in Kosovo, especially toward Albanians. The change of the party’s policy in turn raised the expectations of Kosovo Albanians. In both cases the rise of political expectations was followed by a partial relaxation of repression and the two factors combined to trigger protest in the respective groups. Likewise, in 1981 the leadership succession and the increase in political instability in Yugoslavia triggered expectations among groups of Kosovo Albanians that in the newly emerging balance of power in Yugoslavia Kosovo might get the status of a republic. None of the episodes of mobilization from 1968 and 1981 was preceded by a deterioration of the relative position of the group or a sudden increase in its internal resources that might explain the timing of mobilization. In contrast, the political opportunities of the respective groups expanded and opened space for collective action. The failure to transform the three waves of protest in socialist Yugoslavia into sustained mobilizations, that is, social movements, resulted partly from the political context being unfavorable to sustained popular protest and partly


from the high levels of mobilization and great potential for political instability. In contrast to the small mobilization of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s, the authorities were concerned that large 1968 and 1981 protest waves might undermine Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism and its territorial integrity. The evidence on Kosovo Serb protests and other relevant episodes of mobilization in socialist Yugoslavia supports the state-centred approach in research on the collective action of ordinary people, which states that shifts in the political context favorable to a group, rather than an increase in grievances caused by a deterioration of its relative position or an increase in its internal resources, are most likely to trigger mobilization. The views stressing the key role of elite manipulation in the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs partly rest on failure to distinguish between the sources of mobilization and the political context that makes it possible. Popular protests, however, may occur not only after the relaxation of repression or in a relatively permissive context, but also in response to an immediate and direct threat to the interests of a group, as the protests of Kosovo Albanians in November 1988 and February–March 1989 suggest (see Chapter 6). The elite manipulation argument also fails to distinguish between the sources of mobilization and strategies of Kosovo Serb activists. The frequent exaggeration of nationalist-related incidents, considered a prime example of elite involvement, was often little more than the consequence of recruitment and protest strategies on the part of Kosovo Serb activists. Lacking the advantages of formal organization and stable membership, activists often exaggerated the scale of these incidents to trigger stronger reaction among Kosovo Serbs and to attract the attention of high officials and the local press. They often framed indecent attacks by Kosovo Albanian men on Serb women as rape (see Tijanić 1988: 128). Partly as the consequence of these protest strategies, the level of mobilization increased despite the fact that the rate of nationalist-related violence declined. Likewise, there were many more protests in predominantly Serb settlements than in those in which Serbs constituted a small minority. While Serbs in the latter settlements held stronger grievances, they found it more difficult to organize protests in such an environment. Another aspect of the activists’ protest strategy was the campaign of rumors that vastly exaggerated their strength among Kosovo Serbs and support outside of the province. The 1985 petition, signed by roughly 2000 people, was thus rumored to be supported by many more thousands in the following months, the wildest exaggeration being about a 100 000 people. In the aftermath of the May 1986 march of several


107

hundred people that unfolded under the banner of collective emigration, the rumor spread that thousands of people were involved. Repeatedly, activists and their allies outside Kosovo stressed that thousands, even tens of thousands, were ready for collective emigration and that they would leave if federal organs failed to swiftly address their demands. The intensity of the rumor campaign would sharply increase on the eve of important party events, such as the LCY Congress, Conference or sessions of the Central Committee of the LCY or Kosovo’s Province’s Committee. Their allies from Belgrade would spread rumors that they expected tens of thousands of locals to join the Kosovo Serb protesters. Before the summer of 1988 these allies’ wild expectations were partly a protest strategy and partly arose from wishful thinking, which members of the Kosovo Polje group readily acknowledged to me in interviews. By collective emigration the activists meant a large protest march from various parts of Kosovo toward Belgrade, followed by a days-long demonstration and encampment of thousands of people, including the elderly and children, somewhere near the capital, until the authorities reacted in some way. They never really believed that they would be able to carry out such a large protest but repeatedly referred to collective emigration in order to send important messages to different audiences. The call to collective emigration was primarily aimed at mobilizing support for the activists’ cause, since it established a direct link between the current grievances of Kosovo Serbs and the Great Migration from Kosovo of 1689–90, an historical event that had strongly shaped the national identity of the Serbs. As a result, the call was useful in terms of recruiting activists and support among Kosovo Serbs and potentially highly resonant among Serbs outside Kosovo. The message was also aimed at high officials, as another protest strategy to press the authorities to take their demands seriously. It invited parallels with the open-air encampments of ordinary people during the Second World War, triggered by repression and expulsions by the German and Italian occupiers, as well as previously under Ottoman rule, and dramatically undermined the party’s claim to have solved the national question. The rumor campaigns waged by the protest organizers and their allies owed their success to the very nature of Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism. The Kosovo problem, including the claims and action of Kosovo Serbs, was politically sensitive and could not be freely reported on and debated in the press. As late as 1985–86 high party officials of Serbia reported to the federal party Presidency on their success in keeping access to information about Kosovo restricted in central Serbia (Stambolić 1988: 106–12, 158), although the restrictions were relaxed over the following two years.


The mix between this information shortage on an important political issue and the lack of experience of the activists, their supporters, high officials and the population at large about the real limits to the collective action of ordinary people became a hotbed for wild guesses, wishful thinking and deliberate rumor campaigns. This is a common outcome in repressive social and political settings (Scott 1990) and had little to do with elite manipulation before 1988. It was hardly an exception in Eastern Europe where many important episodes of resistance to communist authorities benefited from the spread of rumors (Ekiert and Kubik 1999). Without doubt, the support of dissident intellectuals and Milošević boosted Kosovo Serb activists’ prospects for success, in terms of publicizing their cause and bringing urgency to their demands of high officials. The support nonetheless mattered little in the creation and consolidation of the local protest networks, not least because the mobilization pre-dated the rise to power of Milošević. While activists engaged in contacts with a range of influential people and opted for specific protest strategies with an eye to the broader political context, they remained an autonomous political factor and took decisions on their own. The social movement of Kosovo Serbs had a disproportionate impact on the political process at the centre. Partly under the impact of the movement’s activities long-standing divisions within and among political elites, including those between high officials of Serbia and Kosovo and within Serbia’s leadership, turned into open conflict. Although the Kosovo problem had already featured high on the party’s agenda, the movement’s constant pressure kept it at the centre of the attention of both high officials and the general public.

4 Yugoslavia’s Political Class and Popular Unrest in the Summer of 1988

The mid-1980s witnessed the rise of popular protest in socialist Yugoslavia, and not only among Kosovo Serbs. Following a relative quiescence of the working class after Tito’s death, the rate of strikes increased sharply between 1985 and 1987, participation in the protests grew and workers’ demands turned more radical. The May 1988 austerity measures of the Federal Executive Council (federal government) triggered a series of strikes throughout the country, as well as a number of highly visible protest marches and demonstrations of industrial workers in the capital and regional centres. Simultaneously, Kosovo Serb activists launched another protest campaign, this time with more radical demands and protest strategies. After the unexpected success of their July protest in Novi Sad, the administrative centre of Vojvodina, protest organizers and their allies outside Kosovo launched a series of large protests in this autonomous province of Serbia and in Montenegro in July and August. The summer protests of industrial workers, Kosovo Serbs and their allies amplified a long-standing conflict in the higher echelons of the partystate, triggered rifts between higher- and lower-ranking officials, as well as an important shift in state–society relations. These consequences in turn set the stage for the spread of mobilization in September and October, that is, for the antibureaucratic revolution. The workers’ protests and their important consequences have largely been overlooked in the literature and claims that elite manipulation was crucial with regard to the summer protests of Kosovo Serbs and their allies taken for granted. These claims originated from high officials of Vojvodina, who were the main target of Kosovo Serb activists, and resurfaced later in the summer among some high officials from other republics in the heat of elite conflict. For example, Boško Krunić, a member of the federal party Presidency from Vojvodina and its President in 1987–88, 109


told me in an interview that Milošević and his associates orchestrated the summer protests in Vojvodina and Montenegro. Raif Dizdarević, President of the federal state Presidency in 1988–89, agreed with this view (2000: 192–3, 202). This elite-centred interpretation of the events highlights a question essential to understanding the early stages of mobilization, regarding limits to the agency of non-elite actors under communist authoritarianism. Indeed, how could relatively small groups of industrial workers, Kosovo Serbs and others initiate and spread mobilization in the context of a repressive party-state? Why didn’t the authorities simply suppress the protests since it was apparent that their impact on the stability of the regime, in terms of growing elite conflict and increasingly restive social forces, was highly damaging? Early protests did not involve many participants, and broad public support for non-institutional action became apparent only in late August. Hence the suppression of protests probably would not have required major resources. Was the very lack of repression not a clear sign that elite manipulation must have prevailed? Moreover, how could relatively small protest groups organize, recruit new activists, appeal for popular support and cast major demands to high officials in the restrictive environment of the party-state? Were not the elites, namely high party-state officials and, to a smaller extent, dissident intellectuals, the sole actors who possessed the resources required to make this happen? The answers to these puzzles lie in both Yugoslavia’s peculiar authoritarianism, within which the mobilization originated and developed, and the way protest groups went about their protests, in terms of their demands and claims, networks and protest strategies. Drawing on personal accounts of high officials and prominent activists, reports from the local press and available archival material, I found that non-elite actors, namely industrial workers, Kosovo Serb activists and their non-elite allies in Vojvodina, Montenegro and central Serbia, played a key role in initiating and spreading mobilization between May and August 1988. I now trace the mobilization of industrial workers and Kosovo Serbs over the summer of 1988, in terms of origins, demands, networks, protest strategies and interaction with authorities.

The ruling class on the streets Yugoslavia of the mid-1980s was an industrialized country. Statemanaged industrialization according to the Soviet model, which had been pursued vigorously before the mid-1960s and more cautiously

Yugoslavia’s Political Class and Popular Unrest 111

afterwards, thoroughly transformed the social landscape of the country. Between 1953 and 1981 the proportion of the agricultural population dropped from 60.9 to 19.9 percent (Woodward 1995b: 385). This model of industrialization produced initially high rates of economic growth, but growth eventually slowed despite high levels of investment to support the model (Korošić 1988: 90). In the mid-1980s industrial workers constituted a sizeable part of the working population, though smaller than in the big steel economies of the Soviet bloc. The economic crisis of the 1980s drew attention to this underlying problem. Moreover, living standards fell roughly by one-third between 1979 and 1988. The working class fared badly because workers’ salaries had not been high in the first place. The position of workers varied significantly depending on several factors, such as type of industry, whether their enterprise produced for the domestic or export markets and whether it was based in richer or poorer parts of the country. Overall, the future appeared bleak for many. Suddenly Yugoslavia’s workers started fearing poverty and hunger. Despite sharply deteriorating living standards, the working class was surprisingly quiescent in the early 1980s. The number of strikes and participants in strikes remained relatively small and protests normally lasted only a few hours. By 1984, however, the number of strikes and strikers was clearly on the increase. A sudden rise in strike activity occurred over the following two years and by 1987 the authorities saw the situation as alarming. In that year there were 1685 registered strikes and roughly 4.3 percent of all employees in the huge state-controlled sector of the economy took part in strikes as opposed to less than 1 percent in previous years. The workers’ protests now lasted longer than a day on average and, significantly, the number of strikes in large state enterprises, with more than 500 workers, was sharply on the increase. Roughly half of the strikers came from heavy industries and mining, but strikes in other sectors of the economy, as well as in health services and education, became increasingly frequent. In 1988 the number of strikes and strikers further increased, especially in large enterprises, and strikes became longer on average. While the number of strikes was higher in Slovenia and Croatia, the most economically developed parts of the country, in the early 1980s, differences in the level of strike activity between the workers of Yugoslavia’s republics largely disappeared by 1987–88 (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).1 Without doubt the economic crisis had generated grievances that underpinned the strikes in general, which is revealed in the range of demands cast by industrial workers. The demands centred on higher pay and subsidies for their deteriorating enterprises, the removal of

112 Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution Table 4.1 Number of strikes in Yugoslavia’s republics, 1980–88 Republic/province

Number of strikes 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

BosniaHercegovina Croatia Macedonia Montenegro Serbia Central Serbia Kosovo Vojvodina Sloveniab Total

4

6

19

14

28

57

83

50 52 0 85 52 5 28 62 253

70 22a 6 65 35 8 22 47 216

65 9 4 59 40 8 11 18 174

64 73 4 85 65 11 9 96 336

84 90 7 84 66 8 10 100 393

134 150 19 187 150 24 13 149 696

190 140 34 241 203 16 22 163 851

251

307

421 490 191 178 50 54 545 604 418 423 62 82 65 99 227 218 1685 1851

Source: Adapted from ‘Appendix’, Sociološki pregled, 21, 3 (1987): 77–8 and Foˇco (1989: 127). a Data from first seven months. b Not all strikes in Slovenia were counted in this category.

Table 4.2 Number of strikes and participants in Yugoslavia, 1980–88 Year

Number of strikes

Number of participants

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

253 216 174 336 393 696 851 1685 1851

13 504 13 507 10 997 21 776 29 031 60 062 88 860 288 686 386 123

Source: Adapted from Foˇco (1989: 62).

unsuccessful or corrupt enterprise directors and a sharp reduction in bureaucracy and administration within and outside enterprises. The relatively small number of strikes in the first half of the 1980s, however, suggests that various factors mediated the impact of the grievances on the timing and levels of workers’ mobilization. One explanation for the relatively small number of strikes despite a sharp deterioration in living standards was that industrial workers in Yugoslavia still had higher living standards than their counterparts in neighboring states, that they highly valued Yugoslavia’s independence during the Cold War


and obtained work in the growing grey economy (Goati 1989: 28). The implication is that the number of strikes and strikers grew as these advantages faded away. However, evidence reveals that the working class engaged in protest from the very beginning of the economic crisis, but that protest unfolded largely through everyday forms of resistance, rather than strikes. Specifically, the first half of the 1980s witnessed a sharp increase in absenteeism and sick leave (Korošić 1988: 63). The shift to strikes, a more visible and dramatic form of protest, occurred simultaneously with the emergence and spread of popular protests of Kosovo Serbs, which suggests that the main reason for the sudden mobilization of the working class was the gradual loosening of controls in the socialist party-state. The same pattern of workers’ mobilization had already occurred in socialist Yugoslavia. A strong relationship between the loosening of the repressive policies of the regime toward social forces and the rising level of strikes had already been observed in the 1960s, at the time of partial liberalization ( Jovanov 1979: 75). While the relaxation of repression created space for mobilization, specific policies of the federal and regional governments mattered with respect to the timing of workers’ protests. The main trigger for nearly a third of the strikes in 1987 was the austerity measures adopted by the Federal Assembly and an even higher proportion of the strikes in the first half of 1988 directly resulted from related policies introduced by the federal government (Foˇco 1989: 83). On 15 May 1988 the Federal Executive Council introduced a pay freeze in the large, state-controlled sector of the economy, tightening its austerity programme with an aim to reign in hyperinflation. Since salaries were frozen near the level achieved in 1987, workers from enterprises that had fared badly in that year found their wages frozen at a very low level, even in enterprises in which production and earnings rose sharply during the first months of 1988. These workers even had to compensate for the higher pay they had received in the first half of 1988 through lower wages in the following months, regardless of their productivity and their company’s earnings (Borba, 16 May 1988: 4). The protests of industrial workers: May–July 1988 The introduction of the pay freeze at a time of growing inflation and decreasing living standards turned out to be the last straw for sections of the working class. On 24 May about 400 miners from D ¯ urd¯evik, a mine in Živinice in north-east Bosnia, set out on a march to Belgrade. The five-day strike in the mine and protests outside the town hall had made


little difference because the mine managers, who were willing to pay higher wages, could not do so due to the pay freeze. The miners therefore decided to put pressure on federal officials. In the course of their 70 km-long march to Zvornik, a town near the Serbian border, many dropped out due to exhaustion. The remaining 300 miners boarded a train to the capital, specially arranged for them by federal authorities. The subsequent talks with the highest officials of the Federal Assembly and the state-controlled federation of trade unions lasted for hours and ended with acceptance of the miners’ demands. Unlike earlier visits to the Federal Assembly by various protest groups, this event attracted wide publicity in state-controlled media across the country. The images of exhausted miners wearing shabby uniforms and helmets, carrying Tito’s pictures and Yugoslavia’s and party flags made a strong impression on the general public (Danas, 31 May 1988: 22–3; NIN, 5 June 1988: 18–19). This event was only the most visible in a series of miners’ protests, which were triggered by the pay freeze. In May and June strikes occurred in a number of mines, sometimes involving marches to regional administrative centres. The miners from Magura, a small mine near Lipljan in Kosovo, organized a strike and then marched 30 km to Pristina to protest before the province’s high officials. Another strike, organized by the miners of Soko, a mine not far from Niš in central Serbia, ended up in Belgrade, in Serbia’s Assembly. The miners from Breza near Sarajevo set out for Bosnia’s largest city on foot and then, dissatisfied with the response from the republics’ high officials, left the talks. The miners of Kreka, Kakanj and Lipnica, mines in Bosnia, also organized strikes over pay. While the pay freeze was the immediate trigger of the miners’ protests, the underlying causes were long-standing problems in the mining industry as a whole and its bleak future prospects (NIN, 5 June 1988: 18–19). Along with the hard conditions of work in this industry, the pay freeze proved to be too much to bear. The most serious protest event occurred in Belgrade on 17 June, when about 3000 metalworkers from Zmaj, a tractor manufacturer based on the outskirts of Belgrade, marched along the streets of the capital and then held a demonstration outside the Federal Assembly building. Like the Živinice miners, the marchers held pictures of Tito and Yugoslavia’s and party flags and sang the Yugoslav hymn. However, they also chanted slogans, such as ‘Thieves’, ‘We Want Change’, ‘We Want Bread’, ‘Our Children are Hungry’, ‘Down with the Red Bourgeoisie’, ‘Down with the Federal Government’ and ‘You Sold Tito’. Bystanders applauded the marchers along the way and some joined the column. Many later joined


the demonstration despite attempts by police forces to separate them from the workers. Once outside the Federal Assembly building, the workers refused to send a delegation for talks with high federal officials and demanded that they address the demonstration instead. The crowd then jeered and mocked the speakers, including the President of the Federal Assembly and the Deputy President of the Federal Executive Council. Ultimately, the workers withdrew from the square, having received guarantees of higher pay and subsidies for their factory. A similar protest unfolded outside the town hall of Maribor, an industrial centre in northeast Slovenia, where thousands of workers from TAM, an automobile manufacturer, demonstrated demanding higher pay and jeered at the ‘red bourgeoisie’. Both the Zmaj and TAM workers directly blamed the Federal Executive Council for their travails (Borba, 18–19 June 1988: 1, 7; Danas, 28 June 1988: 18–19; NIN, 26 June 1988: 14–17). On 6 July roughly 5000 workers from Borovo, a large shoe manufacturer named after their small town in Croatia near the Serbian border, took protests a step further. Following a strike and unsatisfactory talks with company directors and municipal officials, they set off for Belgrade in buses and trucks covered with pictures of Tito and flags of the state and the LCY. They demanded higher wages, subsidies for their factory, a reduction in the bureaucracy and the removal of their company director. Dissatisfied with initial talks with high-ranking federal officials, they protested outside the Federal Assembly building. Their chants echoed those heard only three weeks earlier: ‘Thieves’, ‘Out’, ‘We Want Bread’. Having waited in vain for high officials to address the demonstration, workers overwhelmed the small police cordon and broke into the Federal Assembly building. The police forces refrained from using force against the workers who, somewhat confused with the turn of events, withdrew peacefully from the building. Like the Zmaj workers beforehand, they ended the protest after their demands had been accepted (Borba, 7 July 1988: 1, 4; Danas, 12 July 1988: 7–8; NIN, 10 July 1988: 17). Only ten days later one and a half thousand workers from Agrokomerc, a large agricultural firm from northwest Bosnia, the centre of a huge embezzlement scandal that had shaken the political class in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1987 (see Andjelic 2003), arrived in the capital to stage another protest. Apart from higher wages, they demanded that the federal government sort out the mess left after the scandal (Borba, 16–17 July 1988: 2). The novelty of the workers’ protest wave The wave of protests from May to July 1988 built upon the steadily rising discontent of the working class and population in general. After a


slow start in the early 1980s, strike activity picked up between 1984 and 1986 and reached high levels over the following two years, while the protests of Kosovo Serbs and numerous local groups that pursued various causes grew simultaneously. However, all of these protests remained limited to the local or company level. The protest groups of Kosovo Serbs largely focused on protests within Kosovo, and a small demonstration in Belgrade in June 1987 was little more than an exception to the trend. Other popular protests involved mainly local groups that protested against local officials’ attempts to carry out construction or infrastructure projects that were not to their liking. The most visible protests in this category were those in Vevˇcane and Moševac, villages near Struga in south-west Macedonia and near Maglaj in north-central Bosnia, respectively, mainly because irresponsible local officials deployed police forces to quell peaceful protests by force. The events surrounding the protests in these two villages in 1987 generated a great media interest and references to the events lingered on the pages of both the serious and popular press for months. While holding protest events against local officials and company directors, protest groups also complained to federal authorities about mistreatment at local level and appealed for protection. Between 1982 and 1986 citizens of Yugoslavia sent roughly 60 000 letters of complaint and petitions to federal authorities and 71 000 to those in the republics (Danas, 31 May 1988: 22). Ever since the large delegation of Kosovo Serbs had ‘opened’ the Federal Assembly for other protest groups in February 1986, numerous delegations visited the federal parliament and demanded justice for their various causes. Apart from visits by Kosovo Serbs, there were other groups with national grievances, such as Albanian villagers from north-west Macedonia, who complained about discrimination at the hands of local Macedonian officials. Then there were delegations of workers from failing companies, farmers complaining over the illegal seizure of their land by local officials and malpractice in the ongoing small-scale land reform, plus various local groups and even neighborhood associations with grievances. Protest groups from Vevˇcane and Moševac added to their original complaints a demand for the punishment of local officials who employed force to suppress non-violent protests (Danas, 31 May 1988: 22; NIN, 26 June 1988: 15). Three protests staged by the working class in 1987, however, suggested that a change in protest strategy was in the pipeline. The single most important strike during the whole post-war period in socialist Yugoslavia unfolded for just over a month in Labin, a mine on the Istrian peninsula of north-west Croatia, in April and May (see Kuzmanić 1987a,b; Simić


1987). That the strike lasted so long demonstrated both the determination and strength of the Labin miners and growing restraint on the side of high officials in dealing with industrial action. In November steel workers from Skopje marched along the streets of the city and held a demonstration outside the Assembly of Macedonia. While the workers’ wages remained above their republic’s average wage, they protested against a recent drop in wage levels. As word about the protest spread quickly, workers from other large factories based in and around the city joined the protest and the crowd rose to about 8000. They jeered the ‘red bourgeoisie’ and demanded the resignation of the Executive Council (government) of Macedonia. In December nearly 4500 metalworkers from Litostroj, an industrial works from Ljubljana, staged a similar demonstration outside the Assembly of Slovenia. They demanded a 50 percent pay rise and the removal of their trade union officials and most company managers. Participants later suggested that the Skopje protest provided the inspiration for the demonstration (Danas, 24 November 1987: 17; 15 December 1987: 22–3). The demonstrations of miners and industrial workers in Belgrade from May to July 1988 revealed a new protest strategy, which built upon the previous protests. While demands still centred on higher wages and subsidies for their failing companies, these were now cast at the central political stage and before the whole of Yugoslavia’s public. Slogans, such as ‘We Want Bread’ and ‘Our Children are Hungry’, suggested that a growing part of the population could not satisfy their most basic material needs and drew the attention of the public to grave problems facing whole industries. While years of economic crisis had prepared the population for bad news, these dramatic images of destitution and hunger suddenly appeared vividly before the public. The targets of protests now shifted from local to federal authorities. This time protest groups did not simply complain about mistreatment at the hands of company directors or local officials but openly blamed federal officials, mainly the federal government, for their hardship. High ranking federal officials, who had used to present themselves as protectors of the weak against local despots, suddenly became deeply involved. True, the pay freeze of 15 May was the main trigger of the wave of workers’ protests and the target simply followed the source of grievances from the local level to the federal government which devised and implemented the policy. Nonetheless, the shift reflected the radicalization of the protests. The workers now aimed at what they perceived to be the very centre of political power in Yugoslavia’s party-state. The slogans that appeared at the workers’ protests, such as ‘Thieves’, ‘Down with the


Red Bourgeoisie’, ‘You Sold Tito’, ‘We Want Change’, ‘Where Are Your Limousines’ and ‘Down with the Federal Government’, were hardly new and had already flavored workers’ strikes and local protests, but were now cast before the very symbols of the party-state. The extent to which the federal centre had been weakened by radical federalization between 1967 and 1974 and the growing elite conflict after Tito’s death was apparent only to professional observers. Ordinary people across Yugoslavia still had an impression of powerful central institutions and a unified political elite, based in imposing federal buildings in the capital. This is revealed by the fact that the number of letters of complaint and petitions received by federal organs between 1982 and 1986, largely about various local issues, was only slightly smaller than those directed at regional ones, despite the fact that the issues were clearly outside the former organs’ jurisdiction. The shift in the targets of protest from the local to the federal level and the replacement of strikes by large demonstrations in the capital as the main form of action was amplified by the fact that the working class, the ruling class in official Soviet and Yugoslav parlance, now led the popular protests. The working class occupied a strategic ideological position in communist states because the party formally took power and ruled in the name of the proletariat. Yugoslavia’s communist leaders promoted the cult of labor after the war and subsequently claimed to have further empowered the working population through self-management, or the direct involvement of workers in the management of their enterprises and social services. The rising wave of protests by industrial workers therefore undermined the very foundation upon which the political class legitimated its rule, making it increasingly vulnerable. The protests attracted wide media attention and the images of defiance of the authorities spread widely across the country. The Belgrade protests from May to July 1988 therefore revealed that industrial and socio-economic struggles had now been transformed into a political conflict. Although increasingly deploying confrontational forms of action, the protesting groups of workers took pains to show that theirs was not an anti-systemic protest. This was partly a consequence of their belief that the regime was ultimately legitimate and partly reflected a strategy to avoid repression. From the very beginning regime symbolism fully permeated workers’ protests. Pictures of Tito always appeared at the helm of protest marches and featured prominently in workers’ demonstrations, as did flags of the state and the LCY. Workers repeatedly sang the hymn of Yugoslavia and ‘Druže Tito, mi ti se kunemo’, a song symbolizing


loyalty to the Titoist legacy. Often the Belgrade protests ended with visits to Tito’s grave (Borba, 16–17 July 1988: 2; Danas, 31 May 1988: 23). In contrast to their Polish counterparts, workers in socialist Yugoslavia never seriously considered the creation of independent trade unions. They perceived the institutions of regime and state as essentially legitimate and ultimately their own. Instead, workers demanded a change in particular policies and practices of the regime as well as accountability of party-state officials and company managers. In fact they took party-state officials at their word. The wave of workers’ protests from May to July 1988 at times surpassed the boundaries of officially permitted dissent and repeated displays of loyalty to the party-state cannot fully explain why high officials did not at least in part respond with repression. What mattered during this early stage of mobilization was the dominant participation of the miners, who occupied a strategic position in the working class. For years after the war the miners were officially considered a symbol of Yugoslavia’s industrialization drive and found themselves at the centre of the party’s promotion of the cult of labor. Against this ideological and historical background, the suppression of the miners’ protests was highly unlikely. The gradual relaxation of political controls over society also mattered. Earlier, company managers or party-state officials had followed up on strikes by searching for ‘inspirators’. This practice had nearly disappeared by 1988 (Foˇco 1989: 91–2). The wave of protests initiated by the working class in May, especially their demonstrations in the capital, set the stage for the spread of mobilization. The lack of repression by authorities, despite increasingly confrontational protest strategies of the workers, and the signs of growing popular discontent shaped the protest strategies of Kosovo Serb activists and partly affected their choice of more confrontational forms of action over the following months.

The Novi Sad demonstration of the Kosovo Serbs In retrospect, the demonstration in Novi Sad, Vojvodina’s administrative centre, on 9 July marked an important turning point in the early stages of mobilization. This was the first in a series of protests by the Kosovo Serbs outside of their province in the summer of 1988, which together with the workers’ protests resulted in the antibureaucratic revolution. The protests of the Kosovo Serbs and their allies partly shifted the focus of popular discontent, which had erupted via industrial workers’ protests, from the federal government to high officials of Vojvodina and set the stage for the spread of protest and the subsequent demise of the province’s


leadership. In the light of subsequent events many came to believe that the protests originated from Milošević’s efforts to weaken his opponents in Vojvodina or, alternatively, from a grand plan of prominent Kosovo Serb activists and Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals to trigger Serb nationalist mobilization outside Kosovo. The reality was more prosaic and the aims of protest organizers were initially modest. I discuss the events that surrounded the Novi Sad demonstration in detail, since these events not only expose the dominant role played by non-elite actors in the early stages of mobilization, but also reveal the complexity of relations between them and the representatives of the party-state at various levels.2 By the spring of 1988 the movement, loosely co-ordinated by prominent activists from Kosovo Polje and other parts of the province, consolidated support among Kosovo Serbs. Its increasingly self-confident leading activists supported Milošević’s position on the implementation of the party’s policy on Kosovo, which had been refurbished by the Central Committee of the LCY a year before, but were sceptical over his claims about the approaching reform of Kosovo’s constitutional status. Convinced that pressure from the grass roots was essential to political change, they launched another petition in May 1988, addressed to the highest party and state organs of Yugoslavia and Serbia and soon boasted of having nearly 50 600 signatures on it. The reason that nearly a quarter of all Kosovo Serbs found themselves as signatories to the petition was that many activists signed up their entire families. Despite this wild exaggeration, the petition did exhibit elements of a plebiscite of Kosovo Serbs. The extent to which most Kosovo Serbs were openly hostile to Kosovo’s high officials, both Albanian and Serb, now became apparent, while prominent activists, especially those from the Kosovo Polje group, increasingly came to be seen as the informal representatives of Kosovo Serbs. The petition claimed that, despite much talk about improvements in the protection of the rights and property of Serbs by the courts and law enforcement agencies, federal organs had achieved little in this respect since early 1980s. The continuing emigration of Serbs from Kosovo had therefore nearly turned the province into an ‘ethnically clean territory’, that is, cleansed of Serbs. The petitioners demanded that federal authorities temporarily introduce direct rule in the province in order to establish protection for Serbs and crush Kosovo Albanian ‘separatist groups’. They also requested changes to the constitutions of Yugoslavia and Serbia that would provide Serbia’s central government with the means of controlling its whole territory, including its autonomous provinces, and that would establish formal power-sharing arrangements between Albanians and


Serbs in Kosovo. Alternatively, the petitioners demanded recognition of their right to self-defence and threatened that they might collectively emigrate from the province in the last resort.3 A delegation of more than a hundred activists delivered the petition to the Federal Assembly’s and the Assembly of Serbia’s speakers just a few days before the Conference of the LCY, the so-called small party Congress, which was to be held at the end of May (Borba, 20 May 1988: 3). Although aware of the limits to the protest groups’ organizational resources, high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia were concerned that any activities under the label of collective emigration might trigger public unrest on a large scale, not least due to the broad support of Kosovo Serbs for the latest petition. Soon Milošević demanded to meet with two groups of activists from various parts of Kosovo in Belgrade. Milošević appealed that they halt any activities that might be associated with ‘collective emigration’ and warned that the party would not tolerate this. He insisted that constitutional change, aimed at empowering the central government of Serbia, was likely and that if the leadership of Serbia failed to implement the party’s policy on Kosovo they would resign. The activists present at the meeting relented and agreed not to exploit the collective emigration theme because they did not want to alienate their influential ally. On that day, 17 June, Milošević had good reason to worry about popular protests. During the meeting his aids interrupted proceedings and informed their boss about the ongoing protest of the Zmaj metalworkers outside the Federal Assembly.4 Some Kosovo Serbs, however, took the call for collective emigration seriously, especially in Metohia, the western part of the province (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 243). The protest organizers were now under pressure from the grass roots to continue the protest campaign and feared that any hesitation could result in a decline in participation. They fretted that their years-long effort aimed at the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs might flop at the time when they were nearing success. To provide an alternative target they now called for a demonstration in Novi Sad, though they had not seriously considered organizing protests in Vojvodina. The reason was that the resistance to constitutional reform came principally from the predominantly Serb leadership of Vojvodina, and not from Kosovo’s high officials, who kept a low profile for the greater part of the decade. At the June meeting with Milošević an activist from Pristina hinted that they could send a delegation to meet Vojvodina’s leaders and clarify their demands. Milošević refused to comment but warned that they might be arrested in Novi Sad. Leading activists later testified that the most they had hoped for was to attract the attention of the mass media to their


demands and expose the lack of popular support in Vojvodina for the province’s high officials. They thought that if the province’s authorities overreacted that might further undermine their position and ultimately lead to the removal of their veto to constitutional reform.5 Prominent activists announced their plans at a large public meeting in Kosovo Polje on 24 June, held simultaneously with Kosovo’s party Conference. Milošević’s emissaries at the meeting, members of the Central Committee of the LCS’ working group for Kosovo, opposed the move. They appealed to activists to leave space for high officials from Belgrade to address their demands, but were scoffed at and ridiculed by the audience. The activists created a Committee for the preparation of the Novi Sad demonstration, which included representatives from various parts of Kosovo, and selected Mićo Šparavalo, a veteran of the partisan war and long-retired police colonel from Urosevac, as its chairman.6 The activists also demanded that the authorities bring criminal charges against Draža Marković and Ivan Stambolić, Serbia’s former high officials, for their alleged role in ‘dividing’ the republic (Borba, 2–3 July 1988: 5, Danas, 28 June 1988: 24, Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 238–40). After the Kosovo Polje meeting the high officials of Vojvodina initiated a campaign of abuse against the activists in the province’s media and warned that they might prevent the protest by force. They claimed that the nationalist demands of the Kosovo Serbs and their protests might damage cordial relations between Vojvodina’s multiple ethnonational groups and undermine its autonomy. According to the 1981 census, Serbs and Montenegrins comprised a majority of 56.6 percent in the province, while ethnic Hungarians remained the largest among a variety of national minorities, with a 18.9 percent proportion of Vojvodina’s population.7 Transcripts from closed sessions of the province’s party Presidency on 5, 6 and 8 July 1988, published after the fall of the leadership, reveal that they demanded of the federal party Presidency that they prevent the demonstration and issued instructions to local party committees and police forces, including details on how to prevent the citizens of Novi Sad and Vojvodina, especially students, industrial workers and nationalist groups, from joining the demonstration (Borba, 27 September 1989: 7; 11 October 1989: 7). A leading official from the province’s party Presidency told me in an interview that the preparations were underway, including the surveillance of activists, but asserted that the police orders did not involve the use of force. Facing a credible threat from the leadership of Vojvodina and appeals from Milošević, leading activists from the Kosovo Polje group hesitated. Apart from fearing persecution, they worried that only a few of the most


committed activists would show up in Novi Sad under the circumstances and in the middle of the harvest season. Several activists later revealed that only after persistent demands from a group of prominent activists outside the Kosovo Polje group was a date for the protest set. Unsurprisingly, they chose Stevan Marinković, a member of the Committee outside the Kosovo Polje group, to co-ordinate activities surrounding the event.8 Although Milošević opposed their plans, the activists were aware that he would not denounce their action in public. More importantly, the federal party Presidency did not follow up on threats by the province’s leadership, which signalled that the risks were somewhat reduced. The activists now carefully prepared for the protest. For the first time they arranged banners and flags and pledged not to let the police forces block them outside the city centre and away from the locals, even at the cost of a violent encounter, as Marinković later testified (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 226–7). In the late morning of 9 July, several hundred protesters turned up at the Novi Sad railway station. Roughly half were Kosovo Serbs while the other half was comprised of their allies, small groups of supporters from Vojvodina and Belgrade and Serb migrants from Kosovo who now resided in central Serbia. Tension was in the air since the police forces had orders to block protesters in a nearby park and keep them away from the citizens of Novi Sad. Determined protesters gradually pushed the police cordons from the street and moved toward the city’s centre while singing the Yugoslav hymn. Two cordons then formed on both sides of the street to prevent a growing crowd of locals from joining the protest. The protesters carried various banners, such as ‘VojvodinaSerbia’, ‘We Want One Constitution’ [for Serbia], ‘You Are Also from Kosovo’, ‘We Trust the LCY’, and chanted ‘United Serbia’, ‘We Want Freedom’, ‘You are Our Brothers’.9 As the column neared the city centre the protesters sat down on the street. The police cordons then withdrew from the scene leaving the new arrivals and locals to mingle outside the building of the province’s Executive Council. Mikloš Ember, a police commander at the demonstration and an ethnic Hungarian, later revealed that he had disregarded his superiors’ orders to block the crowd from the city centre in order to avoid a violent encounter with protesters. The locals then installed loudspeakers and Kosovo Serb activists made speeches until the power supply was switched off and the police commander suspended. The protesters then plugged their loudspeakers in at a nearby flat and continued with the speeches. Before long the power supply in the whole neighborhood was cut off. The protest continued nonetheless and hundreds


of people marched and jeered outside the nearby homes of the province’s high officials. Several thousand locals joined the protest and chanted slogans against their leadership, providing support that few had expected. The demonstration turned out to be a public relations disaster for the province’s high officials. The view regarding Milošević’s key role behind the Novi Sad demonstration remains widely accepted. Boško Krunić, a member of the federal party Presidency from Vojvodina, and a leading member of the province’s party Presidency told me in interviews that Milošević initiated and co-ordinated efforts over the protest. More cautiously, Dušan Ristić, a secretive member of the Kosovo Polje group, argued that high officials of Serbia could have easily prevented the demonstration because they were aware of the activists’ preparations. By choosing not to act they supported the activists’ plan (Borba, 11 February 1993: 13). Still, the sudden reluctance of the Kosovo Polje group to begin preparations for the protest soon after they announced it on 24 June, even against the majority view among the movement’s core activists, can be explained only by pressure from Milošević. The Committee chairman Šparavalo revealed that—after hearing about the movement leadership’s majority decision to proceed with the protest—Serbia’s party officials repeatedly demanded that it should be cancelled, allowing perhaps that they could send a small delegation instead (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 244). Moreover, the influence of the Kosovo Polje group over 30–40 key activists and the movement’s supporters from various parts of Kosovo was limited and they were careful not to swim against the tide even for the sake of Milošević. Once it had become clear that the overwhelming majority of prominent activists supported plans for the Novi Sad demonstration, the Kosovo Polje group changed their position and joined the preparations for the event. Without doubt Milošević could have prevented the demonstration by issuing a public appeal to Kosovo Serbs, as he did later over their plans for a demonstration in Belgrade during the July Central Committee session of the LCY. Still, Milošević was aware of the limits to his influence over the activists. He had just made them halt their protest campaign on the collective emigration theme and probably wanted to avoid alienating the activists further. He was aware that otherwise he might soon have to deal with their protests in Belgrade. A number of Kosovo Serbs had already signalled their disappointment with Milošević. The participants of the June meeting testified that they presented him with a tape they had recorded of ordinary people, some of whom already blamed Milošević for not addressing their demands (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 244). The cause of the activists became increasingly popular in


central Serbia and there was little reason for Milošević to oppose public opinion. It is likely that, having failed to convince prominent activists to change their minds, he just let them take their chances in Novi Sad.

Yugoslavia’s political class and the early summer mobilization The federal party Presidency, with presidents of regional party Presidencies in attendance, deliberated repeatedly about the popular protests of industrial workers and Kosovo Serbs in the summer of 1988. A member of the federal party Presidency told me that most of his colleagues saw the summer mobilization as not unlike a natural disaster: they didn’t like it, but thought there was little they could do about it. The prevailing view among high officials was that the suppression of popular protests by force was neither appropriate nor feasible (see also Orlandić 1997: 238–9). ‘Who among ourselves would be able to forgive himself if he had to order the use of force against the workers? Who?’ Raif Dizdarević, President of Yugoslavia’s state Presidency, asked rhetorically his colleagues in the Presidency after one of the protests (2000: 188). Throughout the wave of industrial workers’ protest from May to July the police forces refrained from using force, even in the extreme case when the Borovo workers broke into the Federal Assembly building on 6 July. A leading high official from Belgrade’s City Committee told me that he had instructed local security chiefs prior to the 17 June protest not to take any action against the Zmaj metalworkers, even if they engaged in large-scale vandalism and looting in the city’s centre, which was unlikely.10 Without doubt the protest strategies of industrial workers and Kosovo Serbs left the political class slightly confused. The protest groups repeatedly stressed their loyalty to the regime while protesting against some of its policies and practices. For the most part they cast moderate demands, wrapped protests in regime symbolism and carefully targeted particular officials rather than the party-state as such, even when deploying confrontational forms of action, and made use of the official organizations to organize and spread protest. More importantly, high officials were aware that the suppression of these protests would de-legitimize their rule because the working class and minority groups enjoyed a strategic position in Yugoslavia’s legacy of liberation war and indigenous revolution. The consequence was that in no other communist country did the authorities take so much trouble to please protest groups. At times they even arranged buses and trains to transport exhausted marchers to the capital, as in the case of the D ¯ urd¯evik miners,


and then bussed them home, as with various protests of industrial workers in Belgrade and the Novi Sad demonstration.

Elite conflict and early protests Throughout the 1980s elite disunity, rooted in a highly decentralized political structure and amplified by the change of political generations, had blocked attempts to reach a compromise on economic and political reform. In December 1987, the Federal Assembly failed to approve the proposal of the Federal Executive Council (government) for the federal budget for the coming year, which had previously been unthinkable. Slovenia’s veto thus undermined the federal government and created anxiety among high party-state officials (Dizdarević 2000: 185–6). The same obstacles now thwarted attempts to reach a common position on popular protests. Old and new divisions in the political class came to the fore, such as between promoters of greater control of Serbia’s central government over its autonomous provinces and their foes; between advocates of a stronger federal centre and protectors of the status quo; between proponents of change in the party’s Kosovo policy and their opponents; between conservative and liberally minded politicians; between members of various political generations; and between high- and low-ranking officials. Since the divisions often cut across one another and high officials engaged in complex political manoeuvring, relations within the political class became rather complicated. The opposing views on popular protests between the high officials of Vojvodina and Serbia originated largely from their long-standing row over constitutional reform. Following numerous meetings of high officials and working groups over the question of policy co-ordination in the republic as a whole, the most determined attempt to reach a compromise occurred at a confidential meeting of the narrow circle of the ˇ two leaderships in Cortanovci, a village near Novi Sad, in the first half of 1987. A leading high official of Vojvodina who was present at the meeting told me that, while the leaderships had previously anticipated some form of compromise, on that occasion it dawned on everybody that they could hardly agree on anything. A number of Serbia’s high officials who heard details of the meeting from Ivan Stambolić, Slobodan Milošević, Bogdan Trifunović, the President of Serbia’s SAWP, and Brana Ikonić, President of Serbia’s Executive Council, confirmed this account to me in ˇ interviews. The Cortanovci meeting therefore only amplified the divide and little had changed in relations between the two leaderships by the summer of 1988. The drafting of amendments to Serbia’s constitution,


as part of the constitutional reform of the federation, had formally started in the summer of 1987 despite lack of agreement on key issues. The position of Serbia, stated by Milošević, remained on the course set by Ivan Stambolić and his predecessors. In the summer of 1988 the leaders of Vojvodina demanded a halt to the popular protests of Kosovo Serbs, worried that freely expressed popular discontent might undermine their opposition to any but minor changes to the constitution of Serbia. During consultations over the initial draft of the constitutional amendments in early January, Milošević appeared to have given up on some of his demands, which was considered an important achievement of the leaders of Vojvodina (Danas, 19 January 1988: 7–9). The concessions, however, turned out to be only temporary and the June draft by Serbia’s Constitutional Commission returned to the course set by Milošević’s predecessors. In these circumstances the announcement that Kosovo Serb activists planned a demonstration in Novi Sad raised an alarm in the leadership of Vojvodina. They now accused Serbia’s high officials of organizing the protest to weaken their opposition to constitutional reform and spiced the charge by drawing parallels between the present course of Serbia’s high officials with the Serb bourgeoisie’s pre-war and dissident intellectuals’ contemporary nationalism. Although cast at closed party sessions, the charges found their way into the local press. The most passionate critics turned out to be those negotiators who felt let down by what they saw as a last-minute shift in the position of Serbia’s leadership, a local observer noted (Danas, 12 July 1988: 19–21). Disputes in narrow party circles that had existed since the mid-1970s now turned into conflict on the public stage. Milošević retorted that the provinces ultimately aimed at secession from Serbia (NIN, 3 July 1988: 12–3). Serbia’s high officials took a sympathetic view of popular protests because the unexpected outburst of popular discontent against Vojvodina’s leadership damaged their credibility and undermined their negotiating position. The media under their control were more powerful than those at the disposal of the province’s leaders and provided extensive coverage of the demonstration in Novi Sad and greatly exploited popular discontent in Vojvodina. In turn, the province’s leadership demanded protection by the federal party Presidency and, feeling under continuing pressure from Serbia’s leadership, released a transcript of their previous, initially closed session, which was bursting with condemnation of Serbia’s leadership and Milošević personally (Danas, 26 July 1988: 7–8). This full-blown public assault by Vojvodina’s leaders, launched in the volatile atmosphere surrounding the 15 July protest of workers from the


Agrokomerc in Belgrade, triggered a series of small protest meetings in central Serbia, often in large state enterprises, as well as panoply of statements by local party committees and local branches of other official organizations. They demanded the resignations of the most outspoken high officials from Vojvodina and backed the leadership of Serbia (Danas, 26 July 1988: 8–9; NIN, 24 July 1988: 8). Without doubt the bulk of letters of support for Milošević and Serbia’s leadership, which conspicuously filled the pages of Belgrade dailies, originated from aspiring local officials, who saw the events as an opportunity to advance in the hierarchy of the party-state. That managers in some large state enterprises did not object to the disruption of work, and even delivered speeches at the rallies, also indicates the implicit or explicit role of party-state officials in this series of protest meetings. Nevertheless, the protests reflected genuine popular discontent with the leadership of Vojvodina and with Yugoslavia’s political class. Leaders of metalworkers from Belgrade’s industrial belt, many of who had led strikes and other protests in previous months, warned that they might initiate large demonstrations over both socio-economic and political demands. The initial reaction of the federal party Presidency to the Novi Sad demonstration and to the growing conflict between high officials from Vojvodina and Belgrade was that these events were highly damaging to the LCY and the country, and that any further action in this direction had to be halted immediately. A statement from the 18–19 July session of the Presidency further specified that, while the Kosovo Serb protesters had the right to demand the protection of their rights, any non-institutional action, including preceding small protest meetings in central Serbia, remained unacceptable. The Presidency reproached the leadership of Vojvodina for their undignified reaction to the Novi Sad demonstration and for the publication of the controversial transcript, and criticized attempts to introduce constitutional reform without consensus, vaguely aiming at the leadership of Serbia (Borba, 21 July 1988: 1–3). This carefully balanced statement, however, concealed a range of views in the federal party organs on the growing mobilization and on the clash between high party officials from Vojvodina and Belgrade. High party officials from Montenegro and Macedonia manifestly failed to support Vojvodina’s leaders in the wake of the Novi Sad demonstration. They had long supported constitutional reform in Serbia and the active involvement of federal organs to keep a lid on the Kosovo ˇ crisis, as Marko Orlandić and Dušan Ckrebi´ c, members of the federal party Presidency from Montenegro and Serbia, respectively, testified in


ˇ their memoirs (Ckrebi´ c 1995: 158; Orlandić 1997: 200, 206–7). This position on the part of the high officials of Montenegro and Macedonia mainly originated from their connection to the Kosovo problem through their own Albanian minorities (19.8 percent of the population of Macedonia and 6.5 percent of Montenegro’s citizens in 1981).11 They apparently associated the potential for political instability in Kosovo with that of their own republics. The latter republic’s high officials also felt responsible for Kosovo’s Montenegrins. The Central Committee of the LCY had reviewed the policy on Kosovo in June 1987, but there were still disagreements over its implementation, and high officials from Montenegro and Macedonia generally supported the views of their counterparts from Serbia, often in the face of opposition from other republics. In party proceedings against Fadil Hoxha, the former Kosovo Albanian leader, members of the federal party Presidency from Montenegro, Marko Orlandić and Vidoje Žarković and their colleague from Macedonia, Milan Panˇcevski, led the charge (NIN, 13 December 1987: 8–10). Orlandić and Žarković, who subsequently became strong opponents of Serbia’s party leader, were close friends with Milošević at the time. A member of the federal party Presidency and an advisor to the Presidency, the latter originally from Montenegro, told me that the two high officials seemed to be impressed by Milošević’s Montenegrin origins and felt obliged to support him. A leading member of Montenegro’s state Presidency told me that their relations with Serbia’s leadership had been excellent ever since the ascent of Ivan Stambolić, not least because many came from the same generation. Macedonia’s representatives in the federal party Presidency refrained from taking a clear position on the popular protests over the summer. Panˇcevski was generally considered a supporter of Milošević, while Vasil Tupurkovski kept a low profile and spent much time traveling abroad. High officials from Montenegro were divided on the issue. Žarković, a conservative politician who had joined Tito’s ruling elite in the early 1970s, was determined to fight off any popular challenges to the LCY’s monopoly of power and strongly opposed popular mobilization. While declining to support the province’s leadership, Žarković insisted that if protest groups could openly denounce the leaders of Vojvodina, then no high official in Yugoslavia could be safe from such outbursts of popular discontent. His position on the growing mobilization partly explains why his initially warm relations with Milošević and other high officials of Serbia turned increasingly cold over the summer. By contrast, Orlandić played both sides. He insisted that mobilization was undesired, but that high officials must address the issues and take part in the rallies.12


Unlike their counterparts from Macedonia and Montenegro, high officials of Croatia and Slovenia generally supported the leadership of Vojvodina. They had long opposed changes to the constitutional position of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, mainly because they felt that the changes would undermine the balance of power in the federation and weaken their opposition to the changes in the federal constitution. By the summer of 1988 the opponents of constitutional reform yielded some ground. Hard pressed by spiraling inflation and an increasingly restive working class, high regional officials reached an agreement on amendments to the federal constitution required to implement limited economic reforms, but failed to settle the question of the relations between the federal centre and the republics and provinces. Advocates of a stronger centre and their opponents therefore increasingly clashed over procedural issues. The former endeavored to overcome the deadlock by calling for an early party Congress, which could pass decisions by a simple majority or, alternatively, by state-wide and Serbia-wide referenda on constitutional reform (Danas, 7 June 1988: 9; 16 August 1988: 11). The opponents to changes in relations between the federal centre and the republics and provinces could therefore hardly welcome the growing mobilization that threatened to undermine the high officials of Vojvodina and thus shift the balance of power in the federation. The most exposed politician in this group was Stipe Šuvar, formerly Croatia’s party ideologue and the new President of the federal party Presidency. Many high officials were puzzled with the developments, since Šuvar had previously supported Milošević and it was widely known that Milošević in turn supported the selection of Šuvar for President of the federal party Presidency over Ivica Raˇcan, the other member of the Presidency from Croatia. Šuvar, a prominent doctrinaire Marxist of the younger generation, also enjoyed the respect of the influential group in Belgrade’s University Committee, at the centre of which was Milošević’s wife Mirjana Marković (Dizdarević 2000: 304; Marković 1993: 116; Stambolić 1995: 163). Liberal-minded leaders of Slovenia, though opposing the demands of protest groups, took a softer line. They had already experienced various protests in their prosperous republic and aimed at keeping important political issues outside the domain of the federal centre, in line with their focus on the preservation, and possibly extension of the prerogatives of the republics and provinces. Milan Kuˇcan, Slovenia’s party leader, demanded that regional leaderships debate the issue first (Orlandić 1997: 240). These were the early days of mobilization and many believed that


this would turn out to be little more than a short-lived outburst of popular discontent. Many high officials still carefully weighed the pros and cons of popular protests. The conservatives generally sided with Žarković, fearing freely expressed popular discontent, while the liberal-minded and the majority of the younger generation felt that the mobilization reflected a natural and refreshing shift in state–society relations. These views, which often cut across regional divisions, made relations in the higher echelons of the party-state highly complex. Rebellion in the lower echelons of the party-state The mid-1980s witnessed a growing gap between the political class and the population, including party members. A report on the partywide debate ahead of the LCY Central Committee session in June 1984 revealed that a large number of party members insisted that high officials should be brought to account for the failure to address growing economic and political crises. Polls conducted among party members in parts of the country registered the same demand as high on their list of priorities. In a similar vein, a series of polls conducted by independent researchers among citizens of Yugoslavia in 1986–87 revealed growing dissatisfaction with high officials and a general belief that they were incapable of dealing with the crises. There was little difference in this respect between the views of party members, former party members and other citizens (Goati 1989: 31, 81–2). The mounting popular discontent with high officials, detected in the polls, spilled over into the political arena in the form of the rising wave of strikes in 1986–87. These developments, not least the discontent of party members, gradually led to a shift in power relations between high officials and low-ranking party officials, local officials and managers of large state enterprises. Previously unimportant political actors now became increasingly assertive, especially when they joined forces with protest groups. The wave of strikes over the pay freeze and the miners’ protest in the capital brought the growing gap between higher and lower-ranking officials to the public stage at the Conference of the LCY, or the small party Congress, at the end of May 1988. High officials could not but acknowledge the need for urgent reforms impressed upon the public by the miners’ protests, and ordinary party delegates made sure that the reforms remained at the forefront of the Conference. The delegates repeatedly stressed that the interests of the working people, not those of the political class, should be taken seriously in what was supposedly the working class’ state. Scores of delegates now demanded the resignations of members of the federal party Presidency.


They called for radical economic reforms, the dismantling of the party’s monopoly in the cadre policy, especially in the economy, and a transparent multi-candidate selection procedure for high offices. The mass media dutifully communicated the demands to the general public, thus entrenching a widespread sentiment about the inevitability of political change. The Conference ultimately accepted the proposals and left six months to the Presidency for their implementation (Danas, 7 June 1988: 7–11; NIN, 5 June 1988: 7–12). Boško Krunić, the outgoing President of the federal party Presidency, explained that failure to meet the deadline was to trigger an early party Congress and the replacement of all members of the Presidency and a sizeable portion of the Central Committee of the LCY (NIN, 5 June 1988: 12). The summer of 1988 also witnessed the rising influence of local authorities and managers of large state enterprises. The institutional resources for this shift originated from the territorial decentralization and selfmanagement drive of the 1970s, which widely extended the jurisdiction of local authorities and backed it with some financial resources. The parallel improvement in educational levels of local elites further empowered local officials and company managers, who became increasingly assertive at a time of mounting elite conflict and growing public discontent with high officials. The main source of the quiet opposition of a number of local authorities and managers of large state enterprises to high officials of Vojvodina, and their subsequent revolt, was their discontent over constitutional reform in Serbia. Already in the initial stages of constitutional debate in 1987 officials from several municipalities voiced disagreement with the province’s leadership, the most vocal being from Odžaci, Crvenka and Panˇcevo. Local officials from Odžaci confronted Vojvodina’s leadership in 1987. Following a number of inconclusive meetings, the local council unanimously rejected the directives of the province’s high officials and backed constitutional amendments proposed by the leadership of Serbia in October 1987. Despite a campaign aimed to overturn the decision, the council reiterated its support for the constitutional reform a month later. The mayor of Odžaci later testified about unrelenting pressure, at times intimidation, from the province’s high officials, even the security apparatus. In March 1988, a large group of participants at a large public meeting on constitutional reform in Crvenka strongly opposed the status quo regarding the status of Vojvodina and backed constitutional reform (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 60, 209–11). The Novi Sad demonstration further exposed the weakness of Vojvodina’s leadership. A number of party committees and trade unions based


in state enterprises from all over Vojvodina publicly rejected their views after the event (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 60, 129–30, 133). Among the most vocal opponents were the management and workers of Jugoalat and the trade union of Majevica, large state enterprises from Novi Sad and Baˇcka Palanka, respectively. A leading member of the province’s party Presidency told me that he took part in two meetings with the management of Jugoalat over the summer and claimed that they worked for Milošević. It appears, however, that the director of Jugoalat, who had been blacklisted by the province’s leadership for years and occasionally faced problems keeping his job, only exploited the protests to get even with Vojvodina’s officials (see Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 218–19). While the resistance of local authorities, junior party officials and trade unions to the province’s leaders in the early stages of mobilization should not be exaggerated, these early institutional opponents did encourage others to join the tide. Many of them subsequently became influential political actors. While the change of political generations brought fresh air to many parts of Yugoslavia, some of the most exposed of Vojvodina’s high officials still came from the old guard. By no means were the province’s leaders as conservative as those of Bosnia-Hercegovina or Montenegro since Vojvodina remained a relatively prosperous and relaxed part of Yugoslavia. However, whereas nearby Belgrade was the centre of liberal cultural and political developments, some of the province’s high officials left the impression that Vojvodina remained a conservative zone. The leadership had long legitimated the province’s autonomy in part through self-management, contrasting it with the so-called étatisme of Serbia’s leadership. While working well in the 1970s and early 1980s, this strategy looked increasingly outdated over the following years and the province’s leadership, even those of the younger generation with a technocratic background, found this ever more unpopular label stuck to their reputation. In August and September the alliance between protest groups and a number of local authorities in Vojvodina and Montenegro demonstrated the extent to which their high officials had lost control over the lower echelons of the party-state and society. On the whole, various divisions in the political class prevented a joint response to popular protests. Long-standing divisions in the higher echelons of the party-state involved those over constitutional reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia, the Kosovo problem, the values of the different political generations, economic reform and political liberalization. The political manoeuvring of high officials only made the situation more complex. The conflict between the leaderships of Vojvodina and Serbia over constitutional reform was only the most visible conflict


at the time. The protests of industrial workers between May and July and the Novi Sad demonstration of Kosovo Serbs intensified the conflicts and triggered a shift in power relations between high officials and those at the lower levels of the party-state and state enterprise managers. Ultimately, the weakening of the political class’ cohesion had a major impact on subsequent developments. Not only did it undermine attempts at compromise on constitutional and economic reform, but also affected the day-to-day running of the country. It also produced a relaxation of controls over society and thus provided space for the spread of mobilization.

The July and August protest campaign of Kosovo Serbs and their allies While the credibility of the high officials of Vojvodina had suffered from the events surrounding the Novi Sad demonstration, Kosovo Serb activists were aware that they were not winning the battle. The leadership of Serbia supported their demands but the federal party Presidency effectively denounced their protest. Defying the Presidency, they organized a demonstration in Kosovo Polje on 17 July. About 3000 participants from various parts of Kosovo protested against the leadership of Vojvodina, pledged support to Milošević and demanded that federal party organs take their demands seriously. Afterwards, the activists’ Committee started sending out telegrams demanding support from various party organs, such as the federal party Presidency, the Central Committees of the League of Communists of Montenegro and Macedonia, and local party committees and trade unions of large state enterprises in central Serbia. The activists wanted to press officials to reveal their views on the demands of the social movement and thus identify potential supporters and opponents. In a rerun of the events of June, leading activists organized a large public meeting in Kosovo Polje on 24 July and declared that they would start preparations for a demonstration in Belgrade during the coming session of the Central Committee of the LCY. Serbia’s and Kosovo’s party officials present at the meeting pleaded that the activists reconsider their decision but to no avail (Borba, 26 July 1988). After the meeting, activists stepped up their campaign sending out hundreds of letters and telegrams to the trade unions of large state enterprises in central Serbia inviting them to join the protest. In response, Serbia’s party Presidency issued a public appeal to Kosovo Serb activists to cancel the demonstration and direct their demands toward the party forums. Fearing confrontation with


Milošević, prominent activists reluctantly cancelled the demonstration, but publicly declared that this was a wrong move on the part of Serbia’s leadership (Borba, 28 July 1988: 1; 29 July 1988: 2). Roughly 300 radical activists nevertheless showed up in Belgrade on 29 July but were firmly, without violence, removed from the streets of the capital (Borba, 30–31 July 1988: 5). In the meantime, another two protests revealed a growing local mobilization in Vojvodina, simultaneous with that of the Kosovo Serbs. On 23 July around 10 000 people from Panˇcevo, a town near Belgrade, and other parts of Vojvodina marched around the town in protest against the province’s leadership, jeering local party officials who tried to shield their superiors. While shouting the regime’s slogans, such as ‘We Believe in the Party’ and ‘Long Live Fraternity and Unity’, they backed the demands of the Kosovo Serbs and constitutional reform by chanting ‘Freedom to Kosovo’, ‘Vojvodina is Serbia’ and ‘Serbia without Borders’ (Borba, 25 July 1988: 1, 3). On 12 August locals assembled a rally in Nova Pazova, a small town in south Vojvodina. About 5000 people took to the streets to hear a myriad of speakers, some from Nova Pazova and others from other parts of Vojvodina (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 43). In fact, the Kosovo Polje group had set the date for the former protest, but later withdrew partly aiming to encourage local mobilization and demonstrate that popular discontent in Vojvodina was home grown and partly fearing suppression after the July statement of the federal party Presidency and resolute demands from Milošević’s emissaries.13 In contrast, the rally in Nova Pazova was fully organized by the locals, under the aegis of the SAWP. The strategy of prominent Kosovo Serb activists, a mix of pressure on high officials and co-operation with them, had long been key to the successful mobilization of their community. The activists proceeded with their campaign but took pains not to alienate Milošević, their main ally in the higher echelons of the party-state, and avoided confrontation with the federal party Presidency. This delicate strategy, however, was hardly apparent to the majority of Kosovo Serb activists and supporters and became increasingly unpopular over the summer of 1988. The Kosovo Polje group often became a target for discontent, together with high officials from Vojvodina and Kosovo. At a large public meeting in Kosovo Polje on 15 August, it became clear that the mood in the social movement had shifted considerably. Fewer people showed up than usual and several speakers denounced the so-called politics of compromise, the results of which they considered to be disappointing. While previously demanding the resignation of several of Kosovo’s high officials, both Albanians and Serbs, the protesters now directly named prominent high party officials


outside Kosovo as allegedly responsible for not meeting their demands (Hudelist 1989: 197–200, 210–11). In the meantime, more than a hundred remaining Serbs in Prekale, a village near Istok in the western part of the province, announced their preparations for collective emigration. Having recurrent trouble with some of their Kosovo Albanian neighbors, not least regarding the safety of their children, the villagers claimed to have given up on promises by high officials from Pristina and Belgrade. Dragoljub ´ Cosi´ c, Serbia’s minister without portfolio and a member of the party’s working group for Kosovo, told me that the villagers had pressing safety concerns and at times even guarded their houses overnight with arms to resist intimidation. Under pressure from the events in Prekale, prominent activists reconsidered their strategy. While previously hiding behind official organizations, they now demonstrated their position as authoritative representatives of Kosovo Serbs. On 16 August, the Committee announced new initiatives at its press conference in Istok and subsequently held a meeting with the Prekale villagers. In the backyard of a farmhouse and in the presence of journalists, they listened to the complaints of the villagers and promised to demand that the authorities urgently address their problems and improve their safety. In return, the Committee insisted that the villagers should not embark on major protest actions alone (Hudelist 1989). As Šolević explained at the meeting: You should not leave now. Otherwise, another village would leave tomorrow and another one on the day after tomorrow. That is exactly what the separatists want. The Kosovo Albanian separatist movement would like us to leave in small groups. Our only strength is in collective resistance . . . If you cannot live peacefully in your homes then we cannot live in ours either. We will leave the province, but collectively, understand, only collectively. Everybody in this country must understand that, if necessary, we would collectively move out of Kosovo regardless of the cost. We are not interested in the consequences of the move any more. Eight years of waiting [meaning since the 1981 Kosovo Albanian demonstrations] is enough. (Borba, 20–21 August 1988: 5) The Committee voiced new demands, echoing the radicalization of their supporters. They now demanded that the federal party-state organs shut down the province’s and municipal party committees, the courts of law and law enforcement agencies, and take over the levers of power in


Kosovo until they restored the protection of the rights and property of Serbs (Borba, 20–21 August 1988: 5). At the Istok news conference, the Committee also announced that preparations for two rallies of solidarity with Kosovo Serbs in Montenegro and Vojvodina were underway. This amounted to a radical shift in the strategy of protest, since they had seen the Novi Sad demonstration as a one-off event. Šolević, Budimirović and Kecman told me that they had long believed in broad support for their demands in Vojvodina. Having in mind the success of their protest in Novi Sad, the parallel local mobilization in Vojvodina and growing elite conflict, they now became convinced that further protests in northern Serbia’s autonomous province could force its leadership to give in to constitutional reform. The reasoning behind plans to spread mobilization to Montenegro was less obvious. High officials from Yugoslavia’s smallest republic supported constitutional reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia as well as Milošević’s position on the party’s line on Kosovo. Nonetheless, leading Kosovo Serb activists were furious that some high officials of Montenegro, especially the most influential, Vidoje Žarković, fervently demanded a halt to noninstitutional action. Members of the Kosovo Polje group thought that this stance of the leadership did not reflect the views of the general public in Montenegro. They told me that many activists kept in touch with their extended families and friends in Montenegro and were aware of enthusiastic popular backing for their demands and protest strategies. Drago Samardžić, their fellow activist from Pristina, however, claimed that Šolević wanted little more than a political spectacle because he expected a strong outpouring of popular support in Montenegro (Hudelist 1989: 156, 217). Montenegro’s high officials were baffled with the turn of events. Orlandić later testified that there was a general feeling of confusion over their future course of action (Orlandić 1997: 252). In public, the leadership reiterated their support for the main demands of Kosovo Serb protesters, but expressed concerns about the rally in Titograd, the republic’s administrative centre (the original name of Podgorica was later restored). In private, they instructed the city’s officials to press the Kosovo Polje group to abandon their plans and appealed to the federal and Serbia’s party Presidencies to do the same. Fearing a rerun of the public relations disaster over the Novi Sad demonstration, the leadership authorized local officials to provide logistics for the rally if they failed to deter the activists.14 Orlandić claims to have insisted that high officials of Montenegro address the rally and prevent radicals from hijacking the event. Apparently, they first agreed to send a member of Montenegro’s


party Presidency, but later changed their mind and replaced him with a low-profile speaker (Orlandić 1997: 253–4). Montenegro’s leadership had good reasons to be concerned about the rally. A member of the federal party Presidency told me that Žarković and Orlandić were considered by their colleagues in the Presidency to be leading opponents of economic and political reform (see also ˇ Ckrebi´ c 1995: 158). Unsurprisingly, they rejected popular protest as a vehicle for the legitimation of new political actors, which was incompatible with the party’s control over state and society. More importantly, the rallies implicitly questioned the nationality strategy of the LCY in Montenegro. The republic’s officials claimed that they feared the rally would promote Greater Serbian nationalism in their republic (Orlandić 1997). Ever since the war, the party had strongly promoted the creation of a distinct Montenegrin identity, based on historic regional identity, and largely detached from the Serb one, which the bulk of Montenegro’s population had long shared with the population of Serbia. It seems likely that Montenegro’s high officials feared the very display of Kosovo Serb activists and the reaction of their population. The rallies blurred the boundaries between the Serb and Montenegrin identities by default because the majority of Kosovo Montenegrins, who played a disproportionate role in the social movement, had long embraced both. On 20 August the locals, many of who held banners, greeted the arriving Kosovo Serbs along the road to Titograd, while many taxi drivers drove the arrivals free of charge. Later that day a large crowd, including 2000 Kosovo Serbs and hundreds of their allies from various parts of Montenegro, Hercegovina and Serbia, marched through the city centre carrying the flags of Yugoslavia and singing the regime’s songs before settling down for a rally of roughly 30 000 people. Then they sang the Yugoslav hymn, booed the speakers sent by the small republic’s establishment, applauded the Kosovo Serb speakers and chanted slogans in support of Kosovo Serbs. After the rally, a crowd gathered outside of a nearby hotel to hear fiery speakers denounce Montenegro’s high officials. On their way home in the late afternoon a large group of Kosovo Serb protesters paused in Kolašin, a small town in northern Montenegro, to hold another rally before 2500 people.15 A protest in Titov Vrbas, a town in north-west Vojvodina, was arranged for the following weekend. Šolević, Budimirović and Kecman told me that activists opted for this town because a large proportion of its residents were post-Second World War Serb settlers from Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina and their descendants. While also expecting support from the autochthonous population, they counted on the historically


rebellious Montenegrins to light the fuse of popular protest. Many activists were aware of a broadly supportive attitude toward their protests in Titov Vrbas since their extended families resided in the area. Moreover, the multi-national composition of the town reflected the multi-national character of Vojvodina and the activists wanted to demonstrate that their rallies would not damage cordial inter-group relations, contrary to the claims of the province’s leadership (see also Hudelist 1989: 156–60). On 27 August several hundred Kosovo Serbs and hundreds of their allies from Vojvodina turned up in Titov Vrbas. Few people greeted the visitors and only after their two-hour-long march around the town with the flags of Yugoslavia and Serbia did the locals join the protest in large numbers. The crowd chanted the regime’s slogans, such as ‘Long Live Yugoslavia’ and ‘Long Live the Central Committees of Yugoslavia and Serbia’, but also slogans outside the official discourse, such as ‘One Constitution’ [for Serbia], ‘Vojvodina—Serbia’, ‘Montenegro and Serbia—One Family’ and ‘We Don’t Want Krunić’. In the end, more than 10 000 people attended the rally. Šolević told me that some local officials helped by volunteering information about local affairs and relations with the province’s leadership. On the same day locals arranged a rally under the veil of the SAWP in Srpski Miletić, a small town in Baˇcka near Odžaci, before 2000 supporters. Local speakers, including the mayor of Odžaci, and Kosovo Serb activists were highly critical of high officials from Novi Sad (Borba, 29 August 1988: 1, 3; Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 44). The novelty of the protest campaign The Novi Sad demonstration and the July and August protests represented in many ways a new stage of mobilization. The protest groups of Kosovo Serbs and their new allies from Vojvodina, Montenegro and central Serbia cast increasingly radical demands and targeted ever more powerful opponents. Unlike their earlier focus on protection for the Serbs by the courts and law enforcement agencies and the politics of inequality in Kosovo, they now principally demanded constitutional change in Serbia and a temporary shutting down of Kosovo’s party and state organs. Instead of targeting Kosovo’s high officials, they demanded the resignations of high officials of Vojvodina and their other opponents in the party Presidency and the Central Committee of the LCY, and denounced the leadership of Montenegro. The geographic focus of their protest campaign shifted from Kosovo to Vojvodina and Montenegro. Excited by the success of their early protests, the Kosovo Polje group even hinted that they might hold rallies in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.


The mobilization spread from the social movement of Kosovo Serbs to small, initially unconnected networks of activists and unorganized participation in Vojvodina and Montenegro. In Vojvodina the networks included various supporters of Kosovo Serb activists, such as earlier Serb migrants from Kosovo, members of their extended families and friends, and post-war settlers from Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina and their descendants. They also attracted all sorts of opponents of the province’s leadership, various individuals committed to the cause of constitutional reform in Serbia and often local rogues who now posed as Serb nationalists. Milica Grković, a university professor and activist from Novi Sad, told me that local activists met at the Novi Sad demonstration and then joined forces over other protests. The networks, which consisted of hundreds of enthusiastic activists determined to take part in protests and provide support in terms of their time, money and influence on their local communities, were effective in spreading mobilization in July and August, when the province’s and federal high officials became increasingly hostile to popular protests and suppression remained a distinct possibility. These activists were the first locals to deliver speeches against the province’s high officials and often set the tone at protests by shouting slogans and carrying banners.16 The Serb settlers, roughly 13–14 percent of Vojvodina’s population in the wake of the 1945–48 settlement wave, and their descendants were important allies to the Kosovo Serbs. Since many originated from ethnonationally highly intermixed areas often with bitter memories of nationalist conflict, they found claims of discrimination against Kosovo Serbs highly plausible. Moreover, some settlers and their descendants had repeatedly complained about their underrepresentation in the political and economic establishment in parts of Vojvodina. Popular protests against the province’s leadership now provided an opportunity to voice those concerns as well, as a prominent member of the post-October 1988 leadership of Vojvodina told me in an interview. There were also claims that this section of Vojvodina’s population was historically rebellious due to its origins in areas with a strong military and rebellious tradition, which made it more receptive to calls for non-institutional action than the autochthonous population (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 63). As a result, prominent activists targeted early protests in Vojvodina at settlements with a high concentration of these groups. Kosovo Serb and local activists were also eager to join forces with local opponents of the high officials of Vojvodina and Montenegro who offered to assist their protests, such as disgruntled local officials, managers of state-controlled enterprises and industrial workers and


trade unionists. The recruitment of activists and supporters spread from these core groups through neighborhood, workplace and friendship networks, replicating the pattern characteristic of other social movements. There was also an increasing unorganized involvement in popular protests, which drew from various sectors of Vojvodina’s population harboring various, often unrelated, grievances against the province’s leadership. This participation depended more on the province’s leaders’ opponents from institutions, such as trade unionists, professionals, managers of state enterprises and local officials. The Kosovo Serb activists gradually shifted to more confrontational protest strategies. They still petitioned the authorities and sent delegations to meet high officials, but only to supplement demonstrations and protest rallies. They often launched highly visible protests during important party events, such as the LCY Congress, Conference or a session of the Province’s or Central Committee. While intended as a one-off event, the Novi Sad demonstration turned out to be a watershed in this respect. Kosovo Serb activists later testified that they had principally wanted to the draw the attention of the media and the citizens of Novi Sad and were strongly emboldened with their success (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 226–7). Šolević told me that they afterwards came to the conclusion that the main obstacle to wide participation in popular protests was the fear of state repression. Being experienced practitioners of popular protest, they therefore focused on large street gatherings outside Kosovo to demonstrate that the threat was more apparent than real. Simultaneously, the protest groups took every opportunity to show that their protests, though at times confrontational, were not antisystemic. Speeches delivered by Kosovo Serb activists were always moderate while their rallies were full of regime symbolism, from the banners and chants stressing their loyalty to the regime and state to Yugoslavia’s and party flags and large pictures of Tito. Only at the margins of the early protests were there a few pictures of Petar Petrović Njegoš, a nineteenth century Montenegrin bishop, ruler and gifted poet, celebrating the identity of the participants. Kosovo Serb and local activists from Vojvodina publicly denounced any potentially anti-systemic behavior. They disbanded the rally in Panˇcevo after what even their harshest critics could hardly call an incident. By liaising with the local authorities, the activists left the impression that they played by the rules. They would normally send a small delegation, often comprised of decorated war veterans, to arrange the details with local authorities, and at times tricked the latter into believing that the locals had invited them in the first place (Hudelist 1989: 157–8; Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 256).


Rumor campaigns remained one of their strategies. Rumors circulated widely on the eve of the July and August protests. The protest organizers would announce the arrival of several thousand Kosovo Serbs and thousands of their allies from all over Serbia and Montenegro. The rumors pressed local officials to consider carefully their position and career prospects, and encouraged potential local supporters to take part in the protests. At times the activists hinted that they might launch rallies in Ljubljana, Zagreb and Bosnia-Hercegovina’s towns of Jajce and Titov Drvar, symbols of the partisan war resistance and the post-war regime and state. Excited by the outbreak of elite conflict, they wrongly concluded that the threat might lead high officials of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina to support their demands. Instead, the threat only triggered hostility to their mobilization, even from those high officials who had initially been indifferent or even sympathetic to their protests. In the aftermath of several highly visible initiatives by the activists’ Committee, both their supporters and opponents increasingly acknowledged that the Committee now had the credibility to represent Kosovo Serbs (Borba, 20–21 August 1988: 5; Danas, 30 August 1988: 11–12). The Committee played a vital role in the planning and execution of a number of important protest events, most notably the Novi Sad demonstration. Its chairman Šparavalo, a decorated war veteran and retired police colonel, enjoyed respect among Kosovo Serbs and served as a shield from anxious party-state officials. Nonetheless, the image of the all-powerful Committee misrepresented power relations within the growing social movement. The Kosovo Polje group retained a prevailing influence over the protest campaign, and its initiatives were often publicized as those of the Committee, mainly thanks to Šolević, a highly visible and active member of the Committee from Kosovo Polje. The Committee, comprised of activists from different parts of Kosovo, met irregularly and often served as a cover for the Kosovo Polje group. Whenever high officials of Serbia demanded the cancellation of a particular event they would call Šparavalo, which left space for the Kosovo Polje group members, who often simply ignored the Committee chairman, to proceed with their initiative. In turn, around 30–40 prominent Serb activists from various parts of Kosovo could veto any decision of the Kosovo Polje group, while radical activists would at times ignore all three circles of power from within the social movement. The highly complex character of the decision-making process within the movement partly explains the flexibility with which they managed to keep contact with Milošević and simultaneously proceed with their campaign.


The summer mobilization and its consequences The popular protests that unfolded between May and August 1988 set the stage for the antibureaucratic revolution. The protests originated from popular discontent with the economic and political crises of the 1980s, especially from the grievances of the working class and Kosovo Serbs, and built upon the wave of workers’ strikes and the protests of Kosovo Serb activists starting from the mid-1980s. The shift of protesters’ targets from company managers and local authorities to high officials reflected the radicalization of their demands and protest strategies. Although popular protests increasingly undermined political stability, high officials refrained from deploying force against challenger groups. Multiple long-standing cleavages in the political class prevented the emergence of consensus over popular protests, while many younger politicians felt that repression would be incompatible with the values of their generation. The protest groups exploited the strategic ideological position of the working class and minority groups in Yugoslavia’s legacy of liberation war and indigenous revolution, repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty to the regime and worked partly within the official organizations. The demands of protest groups, their networks and protest strategies, as well as their interaction with high officials reveal that it was the agency of the protest groups, including industrial workers, Kosovo Serbs and their nonelite allies outside the province, that principally lay behind the summer protest campaign. The pressure from the summer protest campaign triggered considerable changes in the internal political dynamics of the party-state. The protests of the industrial workers and rising popular discontent with high officials set off a revolt in the lower ranks of the party-state, which started at the May Conference of the LCY and left high officials increasingly vulnerable. The Novi Sad demonstration and the July and August protest campaign of Kosovo Serbs and their allies then turned long-standing cleavages in the higher echelons of the party-state over constitutional reform in Yugoslavia and Serbia, the Kosovo problem, economic reform and political liberalization into a conflict on the public stage. The popular protests and elite conflict gradually weakened high officials of Vojvodina and strengthened their rivals from Belgrade, while creating further obstacles to decision-making at the federal level. The summer protest campaign and growing conflict in the political class in turn set the stage for the spread of mobilization. The summer protests left behind networks of activists throughout Vojvodina, central Serbia and Montenegro, as well as multiple protest strategies that


other protest groups, similar or unrelated, could freely draw upon, and created solidarity among the activists. The rallies held in late August signalled that protest groups had become an important political force, which made the decision-making centres behind them, such as the Kosovo Polje group, the Committee of Kosovo Serb activists and the various leaders of the industrial workers, desirable allies for ambitious political actors, such as parts of the political establishment and dissident intellectuals. The summer protests shattered a systematically built and preserved image of a unified and dignified political establishment, which had long inhibited popular protest. Since the purges of 1971–72 the political class had sustained the public image of unity through staged public appearances and control over the media. Unlike professional observers, large parts of the population were therefore largely unaware of elite disunity after Tito’s death. The exception was the televised session of the power struggle at the Central Committee of the LCS in September 1987. What ultimately destroyed the image of a monolithic political elite were the confrontation between high officials from Novi Sad and Belgrade in June and July 1988, nervous exchanges during the televised July session of the Central Committee of the LCY and revolt in the lower ranks of the party-state. Before the summer of 1988, the general view was that the political class enjoyed the full backing of the repressive apparatus and was ready to employ force to quell popular protests. However, high officials of Vojvodina and Montenegro failed to back their rhetoric with credible force. Half-measures, such as the powerful presence of police forces without orders to break up rallies, left an impression of weakness and further emboldened protesters. Simultaneously, the displays made by police forces, seen as a disproportionate response to non-violent protests, outraged bystanders and convinced many to join protests, even if they did not share the grievances of the industrial workers and Kosovo Serbs. Undignified moves, such as switching off the power supply to prevent the Novi Sad demonstration, did not help either. Many high officials apparently remained in power only because their credentials had not been tested earlier.

5 The Antibureaucratic Revolution and its Enemies

Between September 1988 and March 1989 the eastern part of socialist Yugoslavia experienced high levels of mobilization, which rarely occur under authoritarianism. Public meetings, large street rallies, strikes, marches and demonstrations abounded, with a few hunger strikes, and even violence by the end of March. Only in December were there no major non-institutional events. The antibureaucratic revolution started in September and ended in January, while the parallel mobilization of Kosovo Albanians and protests over the Serb–Slovene conflict unfolded between November and March (see Chapter 6). The antibureaucratic revolution featured the protests of Kosovo Serb activists and their supporters, industrial workers, students and other groups, but also included broad unorganized popular participation. The participants insisted on changes to the constitutional status of Serbia’s autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, demanded higher wages and subsidies for their failing state enterprises, called for the accountability of high officials and demanded the official recognition of popular participation in politics. Facing large demonstrations and mounting disorder, high officials of Vojvodina and Montenegro resigned, as did hundreds of local officials across Serbia and Montenegro who either opposed the tide or lacked enthusiasm when supporting it. Scholars of socialist Yugoslavia by and large accepted the views of Milošević’s opponents from other republics and the self-serving claims of Serbia’s party leader and his associates according to which Milošević had inspired and co-ordinated the demonstrations that led to the downfall of the leaderships of Vojvodina and Montenegro. They saw in the antibureaucratic revolution a purposefully orchestrated Serb nationalist mobilization and Milošević’s populism. They stressed that the origins of the mobilizational wave were in the Kosovo crisis and pointed to 145


related demands, especially over constitutional reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia, as well as the performances of various participants involving Serb national symbolism.1 This view draws attention to the central question of why industrial workers, Kosovo Serbs and their allies, other groups and various individuals joined forces in the mobilization between September 1988 and January 1989. Indeed, they shared few grievances and their demands were often unrelated. While industrial workers for the most part stressed the socio-economic dimension of their protest, various other groups were mainly interested in constitutional reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia and the public display of their national identity. The sole link between them appeared to be Milošević, whose personal appeal, nationalist goals and the organizational resources of the partystate that he presided over in Yugoslavia’s largest republic, seemed to be driving the events. However, new evidence and interpretation of the events, grounded in an analysis of the institutions of, and power relations in, late Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism, suggest that the reality was considerably more complex. The antibureaucratic revolution involved a mixture of bottom-up and top-down mobilization, as well as a blend of nationalist and unrelated themes. Neither of these factors was spread evenly, and significant regional and temporal variations in their occurrences evaded observers. The complexity of the mobilization was reflected in the repertoires of action deployed by various non-elite groups and mobilization entrepreneurs from the elite, and in the ways in which both sides framed the events. The decisive shift toward nationalist themes and a more exclusive version of political identities occurred only in February and March 1989 (see Chapter 6).

Milošević’s populism and the wave of mobilization Until early September 1988 the high officials of Serbia partially complied with the July guidelines of the federal party Presidency according to which the rallies, while triggered by the genuine problems of Kosovo Serbs, were deemed damaging to the regime and state and should be brought to a halt. On the one hand, Serbia’s officials shared some of the demands of the Kosovo Serb activists, such as the demands for constitutional reform and for greater pressure on Kosovo’s officials, and authorized the mass media under their control to report sympathetically on the rallies. On the other hand, they openly rejected the activists’ more radical demands and reiterated that demands for political change should be cast within party and state organs, and not by way of popular protest.

The Antibureaucratic Revolution and its Enemies 147

Serbia’s officials at times publicly requested the protest organizers not to initiate further protests outside Kosovo and openly took it upon themselves to represent some of their demands before the Presidency and the Central Committee of the LCY. Like Milošević’s links with Kosovo Serb activists before the summer of 1988, this partial compliance with the July guidelines of the federal party Presidency triggered surprisingly few complaints from the high officials of other republics before late August 1988. Their subsequent claim that Milošević had orchestrated mobilization all along arose within the different, highly charged context of the autumn and winter of 1988 and, especially, during the conflicts that surrounded the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Apart from high officials of Vojvodina and Kosovo who were directly targeted by Kosovo Serb protest groups, the high officials of republics other than Serbia apparently saw the informal arrangement as a convenient way of keeping a lid on mobilization at the time when few high officials were ready to demand its suppression by force. This was a part of a broader strategy of politicians from the younger generation for dealing with social forces, and reflected the blurring of lines between party-state and society. Šuvar, the new President of the federal party Presidency, and a number of its members, as well as Raif Dizdarević, President of the federal state Presidency, repeatedly asked Milošević to discourage prominent Kosovo Serb activists from organizing specific protest events (see Dizdarević 2000: 199–200). In some cases the strategy worked, but in others it failed. The failures had a lot to do with the determination of the activists to proceed with protests until their demands had been addressed, as well as with difficulties associated with exerting control over a decentralized structure and the competing decision-making centres within the social movement. The August surge in mobilization changed this attitude in the federal party Presidency, which now officially demanded that the leadership of Serbia fully implement the official policy and prevent further rallies without delay.2 Put on the spot, the party Presidency and state Presidency of Serbia, with the exception of their members from Vojvodina and Kosovo, resisted the federal party Presidency in their joint session on 5–6 September and now openly encouraged mobilization. What mattered, they claimed, were the demands from the rallies, which were generally in line with the party’s policy, and not the protest strategies of discontented workers and other citizens. They insisted that the problems faced by Kosovo Serbs had grown and that the victims of discrimination should not be equated with counter-revolutionaries, by which they meant Kosovo Albanian ‘separatist groups’. Besides, they continued, not only did the


rallies not contradict the legacy of the Yugoslav revolution and the road to socialism, but were deeply rooted in the Titoist tradition of large public gatherings and the federal constitution. This implied that the communists should not defy the will of the working class and the citizens which was expressed by the rallies. Concluding the joint session, Milošević added that the will of the people, which had been at the root of the selfmanagement project since 1950, would guide the leadership of Serbia as the supreme governing principle, while high officials who failed to implement the party’s policy on Kosovo should resign. Simultaneously, the high officials of Serbia backed the view of their counterparts from Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina that rallies in their republics could be potentially damaging to cordial relations between Yugoslavia’s various nations (Borba, 6 September 1988: 1, 3–4; 7 September 1988: 1–3). This was hardly the first time that Milošević publicly demonstrated his interest in and support for the views of non-elite groups and their protest strategies. In April 1987 he had attended a public meeting in Kosovo Polje and subsequently stayed in contact with Kosovo Serb activists. While most observers interpreted the stance of Milošević toward Kosovo Serb activists according to his views on Kosovo and Serb–Albanian antagonisms, his position on the demands and protest strategies of the industrial workers was little different. Early on, Serbia’s officials provided public support for demands made at workers’ strikes and demonstrations, while simultaneously trying to co-opt their newly emerging leaders. It was by no means a surprise to see a Belgrade mayor and Belgrade’s City Committee President, having failed to halt the Zmaj metalworkers protest on 17 June 1988, join their march. This pattern continued over the following months. This populist attitude originated from several sources. First, Serbia’s high officials’ take on constitutional reform clearly benefited from mobilization, especially since the Novi Sad demonstration visibly undermined Vojvodina’s leadership. Milošević encouraged small protests in central Serbia in his defence following the July campaign by high officials of Vojvodina. The rally in Smederevo on 3 September, the first rally of Kosovo Serb activists in central Serbia, held before about 60 000 participants, signalled the increasing involvement of high officials from Belgrade. While a high concentration of earlier Kosovo Serb emigrants in and around Smederevo, around 20 000 people, had effectively guaranteed that the rally would be successful, local authorities conspicuously provided extensive logistical support to Kosovo Serb activists, not least by arranging transport for 2000 Serb activists from Kosovo (Borba, 5 September 1988: 3). Belgrade’s City Committee President paid a highly


publicized visit to Smederevo a day before, while the governmentcontrolled media widely advertized the rally. It appears that the August surge in mobilization and the success of the Smederevo rally convinced Milošević and his associates to come out in the open and back the mobilization. Secondly, Serbia’s high officials apparently believed that the part of Yugoslavia’s officially glorified legacy of the liberation war and the indigenous revolution which celebrated the role of ordinary people, such as the mass-based war liberation effort, the strategic position of the working class in the system, as well as the participation features of the selfmanagement project, remained vital to the party’s political identity and Yugoslavia’s political and economic development. Milošević had long stressed these parts of the Titoist legacy, while glossing over others, such as the highly decentralized structure of the party-state and the Yugoslav federation, and power sharing (see Milošević 1989). Third, Milošević’s interest in popular protest had at least something to do with his personality. He had already embraced the populist style on several occasions (see also Šuvar, RFE/RL interview, 3 December 1999), posing as the protector of ordinary people, and apparently came to like both the style and the resulting image of the people’s politician, which was very helpful at a time when high officials had grown unpopular. Many specialists erroneously interpret Milošević’s now famous command to the police not to use force against protesters at the public meeting in Kosovo Polje in April 1987 solely as reflecting his support for Kosovo Serbs. In fact, the general public then saw Milošević as the first high official who took the interests of ordinary people seriously, not just those of the political establishment. The rejection of the federal party Presidency’s demand to denounce and halt rallies could potentially have fully isolated Serbia’s high officials from their counterparts of the other republics. However, full compliance was hardly appealing either. Any attempt to halt the mobilization would have removed their increasingly influential non-elite allies from the political stage and thus delay, and reduce the scope of constitutional reform, and strengthen their opponents in the leadership of Vojvodina. Moreover, a break with Kosovo Serb activists would probably have led to their protesting in the capital, which Milošević anxiously wanted to avoid at a time of their growing popularity in central Serbia. The federal party Presidency and regional party Presidencies, including the embattled leadership of Vojvodina, did not insist on repression but on halting the mobilization by persuasion, which was unrealistic. The growing mobilization could have hardly been brought to a halt without a degree of repression and few high officials were ready to deploy


force against ordinary people, either Kosovo Serbs or industrial workers. Milošević, who had partly built his reputation on populist messages, certainly was not. Milošević insisted that citizens had a constitutional right to express their discontent on the streets within the boundaries of public order and other high officials reluctantly agreed. The party Presidency of Slovenia early set the tone for this shift, Stipe Šuvar agreed and, ultimately, Yugoslavia’s state Presidency endorsed the position.3 Yet, Milošević’s insistence on human rights and proper procedure lacked credibility, to say the least. His purge of Ivan Stambolić and his associates and supporters from Serbia’s leadership and from various state enterprises recalled Tito’s purges of the early 1970s. Although many had expected a further relaxation of controls in the party-state, Milošević arranged the quick removal of the more independent editors of key Belgrade newspapers and magazines. He had long evaded a multi-candidate selection process for high party offices, despite the post-1986 practice in the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia and some other republics and resisted even the very clear decisions of the May 1988 federal party Conference in this respect (see Danas, 28 June 1988: 23). This was hardly a novelty. Ivan Stambolić testified that Milošević had insisted on being the sole candidate for President of Serbia’s party Presidency in 1986, while simultaneously demanding several candidates for the parallel post of Belgrade’s City Committee in order to prevent the selection of his rival, Pavlović (Stambolić 1995: 141–2). Milošević was hardly an exception in Yugoslavia’s political class in this respect, but was certainly as bad as most others despite posturing to the contrary. At any rate, the September announcement effectively altered the political stage and had a major influence on subsequent political developments. High officials of Serbia now effectively certified specific protest groups and their demands and claims as fully legitimate. They openly embraced popular participation in politics, albeit on populist terms. The officials fully acknowledged the changes in state–society relations that had occurred over the summer and now boosted further changes in this direction. The old power structure, under pressure ever since the rebellion in the lower echelons of the party-state and the eruption of conflict in the Presidency and Central Committee of the LCY, now fell apart and parts of the establishment now openly brokered alliances with protest groups. Serbia’s leadership’s new line intensified elite conflict and broke any remaining obstacles to the spread of mobilization. Rallies subsequently unfolded all over Vojvodina, central Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro.


Demonstrations and the collapse of the old political establishment The rallies of early September revealed that mobilization had become a major political force. On 3 September Kosovo Serb activists arranged their first rally in central Serbia and their last one in Vojvodina. The rally in Smederevo, a city with a high concentration of Kosovo Serb emigrants, was the largest to date, with about 60 000 participants. In the afternoon Kosovo Serb activists staged another rally in Kovin, a small town in Vojvodina just across the Danube, with 10 000 participants. Local activists in Vojvodina also organized two rallies, which revealed the accelerating rate of parallel local mobilization. On 3 September the trade union of a factory in Sombor, a town in northwest Vojvodina, organized a large public meeting, backed by several local officials. Around 2000 participants, mainly workers, gathered in the local industrial zone to protest against the growing poverty of the working class and rising corruption and to demand constitutional reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia. On the following day 10 000 people showed up at a rally in Crvenka, a small town not far from Sombor. This was the first truly multinational rally thus far, judging by the speakers, participants and banners, including some in the Hungarian, Russian and Slovak languages (Borba, 5 September 1988: 5). While around a 100 Kosovo Serbs took part in the event, the local organizers invited them only as guests. In September Kosovo Serb activists organized protests throughout Kosovo. The protests ranged from small public meetings and rallies, to protest marches and street demonstrations, and often involved several thousand participants. Some of the protests were highly emotionally charged, since they were organized in response to small inter-ethnic incidents;4 others largely replicated the structure and demands of the rallies held outside Kosovo.5 Even minor inter-ethnic incidents now triggered demands for a strong reaction by the authorities and the rhetoric of activists was ever more radical. There were demands that various schools and public institutions bearing the names of Kosovo Albanians, suddenly declared to be ‘counter-revolutionaries’, be renamed. The activists now established full co-operation with local Serb intellectuals since they needed well-educated people to deliver speeches at the growing number of rallies, especially in Vojvodina, central Serbia and Montenegro.6 Kosovo Serb intellectuals had supported the demands of the social movement, but very few had actually taken part in popular protests. The main independent initiative of the intellectuals had occurred on 22 May 1987 when about 60 of them met Milanko Renovica,


then President of the federal party Presidency, to complain about the politics of inequality in Kosovo. By mid-September signs of popular discontent in Vojvodina abounded, but participants in protest events still numbered in the thousands rather than the tens of thousands. Growing popular discontent had no impact on either the personal composition of the province’s leadership or its policies. The stalemate between the high officials of Vojvodina and their non-elite opponents ultimately broke down in the second half of September. Trying to turn the rising tide of mobilization to their advantage, the province’s leadership called for a rally in support of their policies in Sremska Mitrovica, a town in south-west Vojvodina, on 15 September. Aiming to put off Kosovo Serb activists and their allies outside Kosovo from arriving at the rally, the leadership arranged the event on a working day rather than a weekend. In contrast to the makeshift equipment of the locals at previous rallies in Vojvodina, technical support for this rally was considerable. Powerful amplifiers were brought in and employed to neutralize chanting against Vojvodina’s leaders. It turned out that there were many police officers in plain clothes at the protest. During a brief spell of rain many participants put on identical raincoats, obviously provided by the state.7 Aware that this was a turning point in the mobilization, both the province’s officials and Kosovo Serb activists and their allies struggled to bring as many of their supporters as possible. In the end, around 30 000 people turned up. Kosovo Serb activists now for the first time drew on the organizational resources of Serbia’s party-state leadership for their protests in Vojvodina. Šparavalo later testified that he had appealed to local party officials in central Serbia to send a dozen buses for the transport of Kosovo Serb protesters to Sremska Mitrovica (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 246, 257). Predictably, the experienced practitioners of collective action proved to be the better organizers than Vojvodina’s officials. They jeered speakers sent by the province’s leadership, obstructed the event and ultimately left in protest to hold a separate rally nearby. As the media closely reported the events, the news about the failure of the Vojvodina officials’ counter-rally spread quickly and, along with rallies held over the following days, opened the way for their eventual downfall. Another major event was a rally in Novi Sad on 25 September. Local activists, backed by a supporting petition bearing 200 signatures of citizens of Novi Sad, now boldly demanded that the local authorities provide logistical support for the rally (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 185–6). The latter responded by putting the petitioners under surveillance by the security services and even tried to intimidate those who were most active,


as two activists later testified (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 195, 295). The rally was ultimately organized with logistical support from Jugoalat, a large local state enterprise, the management and trade union of which had long opposed the province’s leadership. Roughly 50 000 people turned up to demand the resignation of the province’s leadership (Borba, 26 September 1988: 1, 3). Boško Krunić, a member of the federal party Presidency and formerly its President, along with a leading member of the province’s party Presidency both told me that the province’s leadership at the time already felt helpless in the face of growing mobilization. In Montenegro, support for the Kosovo Serb activists was running high early on, as reflected in the high level of participation in the August rally in Titograd and the highly emotionally charged atmosphere surrounding the event. The high officials of Montenegro took a less hostile position toward the rallies than their counterparts in Vojvodina, but still put pressure on local authorities to prevent the rallies. The leadership also made sure that the rallies received negative coverage in the local press and on state television. This policy, however, neither stopped nor slowed down local mobilization. Contradictory official statements about the rallies only amplified popular discontent and triggered realignment within the political class. A number of local and middle-ranking officials now started questioning the policy. Local officials in Cetinje refused to prevent or postpone the rally called for 18 September and, subsequently, several officials in Montenegro’s SAWP demanded official recognition of rallies as a legitimate form of political action.8 Local authorities effectively organized the rallies under the auspices of the SAWP and local officials openly delivered speeches in support of the Kosovo Serb activists. The rallies in Nikšić, with 50 000 participants, and Cetinje, with 30 000, on 18 September featured a few more radical slogans and banners. The crowd chanted ‘Let’s Go to Kosovo’ and ‘We Want Arms’, as well as slogans stressing the close links between Serbs and Montenegrins. Protesters chanted slogans in support of Milošević and some of Montenegro’s high officials, such as Orlandić and Radonjić, but against others, including Žarković and D ¯ uranović (Borba, 19 September 1989: 1, 3; Danas, 27 September 1988: 7–8). Another rally, of around 30 000 participants, occurred in Andrijevica a week later. A leading member of Montenegro’s state Presidency told me that at that point they lost political control. On the whole, the high levels of participation at the rallies early on, keeping in mind Montenegro’s population of roughly 600 000, and the growing opposition of local and middle-ranking officials to their superiors, revealed that the small republic’s political stage had become highly unstable.


Unlike the protests in Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo, parallel developments in central Serbia involved a large measure of top-down mobilization. The high officials of Serbia authorized local authorities to provide broad logistical support for the rallies and encouraged popular participation through comprehensive and sympathetic media coverage of the events. The Belgrade SAWP’s announcement from 11 August about the rally of solidarity in the capital was an important signal for protest groups and local officials to press further with the rallies. Initially announced for the second half of September and then October, the rally ultimately occurred on 19 November. Yet, Kosovo Serb activists played an important role even in central Serbia, which is shown in the geographical distribution of the rallies held in September. It seems sensible to assume that those rallies fully orchestrated by Serbia’s leadership would be randomly spread across the territory under their full jurisdiction. Their power was fully consolidated and the media, under their control, shaped public opinion in the same way throughout central Serbia. However, the rallies before 22 September were held almost exclusively in towns and cities less than a 100 km away from Kosovo.9 Since Kosovo Serb activists always carefully planned their events, they focused on areas in which the local population was highly sensitive to the Kosovo crisis, meaning those adjacent to Kosovo, and also Smederevo, which had a very high concentration of earlier Kosovo Serb emigrants. Proximity to Kosovo also mattered because many Kosovo Serb activists arrived to boost numbers at the rallies. The only exception to the pattern was the rally in Majdanpek, a mining town in eastern Serbia, on 14 September, which was organized exclusively by the miners. The miners, many of who came from various nations and from all parts of Yugoslavia in search of good pay, wanted to show ‘brotherhood and unity’ at work. Two of the speakers were Kosovo Albanians, who worked in the town’s copper and gold mines with around 200 other Kosovo Albanians (Danas, 27 September 1988: 10). Subsequent rallies, however, had little to do with Kosovo Serb activists and revealed a top-down mobilization pattern. The logistics for huge rallies in several cities between 22 and 29 September, along with a number of smaller events, were reminiscent of old Titoist rallies, as was the organized participation of workers from large state enterprises. In September it became apparent that Milošević had become by far the most popular high official in Serbia and Montenegro. His appeal to party-state officials, technocrats, the working class and the population at large originated from his personal qualities, including his educational credentials, career achievements and personality. His reputation


as a modernizer and his recurring insistence on economic and market reforms, as well as on the need to bring educated people to the centre of the decision-making process (see Milošević 1989) enhanced his appeal to many at a time of mounting economic and political crisis. His personality also mattered, especially his outspoken manner, which sharply contrasted with the secretive culture of Yugoslavia’s political class. As Ljubiša Stanković, the President of Montenegro’s Youth Organization, one of the main opponents of Montenegro’s leadership and subsequently an outspoken critic of Milošević, told the author: ‘he was an interesting personality, who acted and thought differently; the man who brought his proposals into the public domain and appealed for support for his policies, atypical in the communist system’. According to Milo D ¯ ukanović, at the time a youthful supporter of Milošević, subsequently Prime Minister and President of Montenegro and Milošević’s rival since 1996: All, and especially the younger generation, anxiously awaited a credible attempt, an impressive effort on the political stage of the former Yugoslavia that would move things away from a dead end. Then Milošević turned up, who differed from other of Yugoslavia’s politicians in that he introduced a new rhetoric, with a crystal clear position about the inevitability of change and commitment to implement it. This is something that was widely admired, although many would now [in retrospect] prefer to deny their responsibility for providing support to Milošević’s effort. (RFE/RL interview, 19 October 1999) In Montenegro Milošević was also considered as one of their own because of his family background. As his supporters put it: ‘He is ours, from Ljeva Reka’ (his father’s home region). Many felt proud of him, partly because he now ruled Serbia and partly because of his populist and confrontational posturing, in line with the rebellious tradition of parts of Montenegro. The Belgrade demonstrations of industrial workers, 4–5 October On 4 October around 5000 workers of the large industrial works from Rakovica, on the outskirts of Belgrade, staged a demonstration outside the Federal Assembly building in the city centre.10 Three weeks earlier, the workers put forward their demands to high party and state officials and warned that these should be addressed by 1 October. They also called on their fellow workers from other industrial centres of Yugoslavia to unite against high officials who ignored the demands of the working


class. Having received no satisfactory response from high party and state organs, the workers now demanded that the Federal Assembly throw the federal government out of office and that leading officials in the statecontrolled federation of trade unions should resign. They also requested a 60 percent pay rise and the immediate relaxation of taxation and other pressures on the economy and chanted: ‘Out’, ‘Thieves’, ‘We Want Wages’, ‘We Want Bread’, ‘Mikulić, Out’,11 ‘Down with Armchair Politicians’. The police forces managed to prevent the workers from breaking into the building only with the greatest of efforts. The President of the Federal Assembly, a member of the Federal Executive Council and a top trade union official addressed the demonstration but were jeered and heckled by the crowd. The workers chanted ‘We Want Sloba’12 and vowed to remain outside the Federal Assembly building until Milošević had addressed the demonstration. Ultimately, Milošević arrived, cheered by the workers, and delivered a short speech, demonstrating his skills as a populist demagogue. He fully backed the workers’ demands and pledged that Serbia’s leadership would treat them as a priority. Milošević claimed that quick fixes for Yugoslavia’s crises were essential. ‘We’ll carry out economic reform, right now! . . . We’ll stop counter-revolution in Kosovo and carry out constitutional reform in Serbia’. He denounced the so-called bureaucrats, who as he put it ‘spread discord dividing the people along national, republican and provincial lines to further their own selfish interests’. Milošević deliberately conflated socio-economic with political issues, principally with regard to constitutional reform in Serbia. ‘And now, everyone back to their work!’ was how Milošević ended his speech. The workers, previously fuming and puffing about high officials, quietly returned to their factories. The next morning, however, another group of industrial workers from Rakovica turned up to demonstrate outside the Federal Assembly. They had not joined their comrades on the previous day as their company managers had apparently locked them in the factory. They now broke into the Federal Assembly building. The police did not react and the workers refused to leave one of the Assembly’s chambers unless Milošević came to address them. After a number of Serbia’s high officials had failed to reassure the angry workers, Milošević arrived and, speaking from the floor of the chamber, repeated that his pledge from the day before applied to them as well. The October demonstrations in Belgrade were only the most visible and publicized outbreak of discontent of industrial workers within their growing wave of protest in the autumn of 1988. The number of strikes per


month in Serbia between September and November more than doubled in comparison with previous months and the number of participants in strikes grew disproportionately as well (NIN, 25 December 1988: 9). The Belgrade demonstrations picked up where the workers’ demonstrations between May and July had left off, in terms of demands, as well as with confrontational protest strategies. What had changed in the meantime was that they now would not listen to any high official but Milošević. The October Belgrade demonstrations in fact signalled the rise of populist leadership. Its roots were in the populist leadership style of Milošević, his personal appeal and the populist policies of Serbia’s leadership at a time of economic crisis and the growing unpopularity of high officials. Now Milošević was also acting as a populist leader: he delivered effective speeches before large audiences, issued commands to the crowd and achieved full compliance. The Yoghurt Revolution in Vojvodina, 5–6 October On the same day industrial workers broke into the Federal Assembly building, large demonstrations erupted in Novi Sad, with the sole demand that the high officials of Vojvodina resign. Widely publicized demonstrations in Belgrade on the previous day had created an atmosphere of uncertainty that aided mobilization throughout Serbia. The demonstrations in Novi Sad, however, originated from the conflict between the province’s leadership and local officials. The most daring attack on the province’s leadership thus far occurred at a rally in Baˇcka Palanka, a town in western Vojvodina not far from Novi Sad, on 2 October. Radovan Pankov, a mayor, and Mihalj Kertes, a local party chief and an ethnic Hungarian, now openly demanded their resignations. In response the province’s party Presidency invoked the anti-faction rule against the two local officials on 4 October. As word of the developments spread on the following morning, the workers of Majevica, a factory in Baˇcka Palanka, organized a local protest against the province’s leadership after which several thousand people set off on a protest march to Novi Sad. Once in Novi Sad the crowd from Baˇcka Palanka and thousands of workers arriving from the large state enterprises of Novi Sad initially gathered outside the sport arena in the city’s centre, and their representatives, mainly trade unionists, demanded the resignations of the province’s high officials. Milovan Šogorov, President of the province’s party Presidency, tried to address the demonstration but protesters jeered and turned their backs on him. The growing crowd subsequently surrounded the Province Committee building and threatened to break in


unless their demands were fulfilled. By late evening there were roughly 50 000 participants. In a last bid to remain in power Vojvodina’s leaders demanded that the party Presidency and state Presidency of Yugoslavia take action against the demonstrators but the demand was turned down.13 On the following day, Novi Sad was brought to a halt. Around a 100 000 people from all parts of Vojvodina and their supporters from central Serbia, and even small groups from Montenegro, gathered on the streets to demand the resignations of the province’s leadership. After prolonged negotiations with protesters’ representatives, lacking support from the party Presidency and state Presidency of Yugoslavia, Vojvodina’s high officials resigned.14 Since protesters repeatedly threw packs of yoghurt at the Province Committee building, along with a few bottles, the demonstrations later came to be called, often sarcastically, the Yoghurt Revolution. Subsequently, Pankov and Kertes came to be seen, erroneously, as leading entrepreneurs of the antibureaucratic revolution in Vojvodina by both their supporters and opponents. For one thing, Pankov and Kertes themselves repeatedly and self-servingly exaggerated their role in the events; for another, they were subsequently co-opted into the province’s leadership and remained loyal to Milošević for years so that many erroneously claimed that their links originated from the period before the October demonstrations. In fact, Pankov and Kertes had opposed local initiatives to hold a rally against the province’s leadership in Baˇcka Palanka for weeks. Workers from Majevica, a local factory, organized in their trade union, had already taken part in rallies in other towns in Vojvodina, including those in Ratkovo and Karavukovo on 17 September. Local trade unionists later testified that local officials had obstructed their action by declining to lease them the buses of the local transport company for the transfer of workers to these protests. Only after repeated meetings with local trade union leaders did Pankov and Kertes finally agree to organize the rally (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 206–8). The local officials were also under pressure from other locals. On the night of 21 September a small group from Gajdobra, a nearby village, glued posters all over Baˇcka Palanka inviting citizens to a rally of solidarity with Kosovo Serbs in two days time. The police removed the posters on the following day but many people had already heard about the action (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 196–8). Jovo Radoš, a principal aide to Kertes in the local party branch, told me that the pressure from the protest groups had been essential to the organization of the rally on 2 October since Pankov and Kertes had waited for a clear outcome to the ongoing political conflicts in Vojvodina before they came out in the open. Likewise, it was


the trade union of Majevica that organized the protest outside the city hall of Baˇcka Palanka on the morning of 5 October in response to the action of the province’s leadership against Pankov and Kertes. The two officials initially aimed to keep the protest within municipal boundaries but trade union leaders nevertheless called workers to set off for Novi Sad. In the meantime, the trade union leaders established contacts with other opponents of the province’s leadership, including the management and the trade union of Jugoalat and other large state enterprises in Novi Sad, and jointly organized a large demonstration in the city centre.15 More importantly, the significance of the October demonstrations in Novi Sad to the prospect of constitutional reform in Serbia is often exaggerated. Already by the time of the second rally in Novi Sad, on 25 September, the province’s leadership had lost political control in Vojvodina. Boško Krunić, a member of the federal party Presidency and formerly its President, told me that the province’s leadership had already proven unable to prevent local authorities and the management and trade unions of state enterprises from providing support to protest groups and passively expected the federal party and state Presidencies to halt the growing mobilization. Krunić had resigned from the federal party Presidency on 30 September, that is, before the rally in Baˇcka Palanka. On the same day the federal party Presidency supported the draft of constitutional amendments adopted by the Assembly of Serbia on 25 July, which the high officials of Vojvodina and Kosovo had strongly opposed earlier (Danas, 4 October 1988: 13–4). Moreover, a narrow circle of high officials in Serbia and Vojvodina had reached a detailed agreement on constitutional reform on the basis of this draft before the rally in Baˇcka Palanka, as a leading member of the province’s party Presidency confirmed to the author. The agreement was to be officially confirmed by the province’s leadership in the following days but the events in Baˇcka Palanka and Novi Sad rendered this agreement irrelevant. Despite generally deteriorating relations between the high officials of Vojvodina and Serbia, and in contrast to prevailing views of the elite conflict, informal lines of communication between the high officials remained wide open. A member of the province’s party Presidency told me that Šogorov, the President of the Presidency, and Nandor Major, the President of Vojvodina’s Presidency, had frequent meetings with Milošević and his associates over constitutional reform throughout the summer, not least due to a good personal rapport between Šogorov and Milošević that dated back to the early 1980s. The stage for constitutional reform was therefore set before the October events, largely under the growing pressure of mobilization and the


resulting political realignment at the federal level. The significance of the October demonstrations in Novi Sad lay elsewhere, that is, in the extent of political change. Instead of a negotiated agreement that would keep the personal composition of the province’s leadership largely intact, the demonstrations brought about a collapse of the power structure in Vojvodina at both the provincial and local levels. Within ten days of the Novi Sad demonstrations local officials in many cities and towns of Vojvodina resigned, including Novi Sad, Sremska Mitrovica, Panˇcevo, Ind¯ija, Šid, Kula, Ruma, Zrenjanin, Alibunar, Temerin, Titov Vrbas, Vršac, Sombor, Stara Pazova and Nova Crnja (Borba, 10 October, 1988: 4; 17 October 1988: 6). The rallies continued after 6 October, organized either by local protest groups with the aim of removing local officials from office or by the latter in a bid to keep their positions. A caretaker leadership called for a Conference, that is, the province’s highest party organ, to devise new policies and choose a new leadership, to be held early the following year. The purge of the old cadre was so comprehensive that it created new animosities and political problems in subsequent years, as a prominent member of the new leadership of Vojvodina told the author. The political change in Vojvodina therefore not only opened space for constitutional reform, but also enabled Milošević to establish personal control over the province’s new high officials. Political upheaval in Montenegro, 7–10 October and 10–11 January A day after the Novi Sad demonstrations and the fall of the province’s leadership, large demonstrations of industrial workers, students and citizens broke out in Titograd. The workers of Radoje Dakić, the largest enterprise in Titograd, had already set the date for their protest at 12 October with the aim of expressing solidarity with the September demands of their comrades in Rakovica and to demand a pay rise and further subsidies for their failing company. Excited by the well-publicized events in Belgrade and Novi Sad of the previous three days, they decided to hold a protest in Radoje Dakić at once. Before around 2000 workers, the leaders of the factory’s trade union demanded that workers’ wages be doubled, insisted that those responsible for the mismanagement of their factory be punished and demanded the relaxation of taxation and other pressures on the economy. A 100 or so students from the University of Titograd joined the protest, bringing the situation to the boil.16 Dissatisfied with the offer of a 30 percent pay rise, the workers set off to the city’s centre, carrying the flag of Yugoslavia and pictures of


Tito, and called on employees of other large state enterprises to join the protest. The crowd then flocked to the square outside the buildings of the Assembly and state Presidency of Montenegro. The protesters demanded the resignations of several high officials of Montenegro, a new economic policy, an enquiry into rumored embezzlements by high officials, the reduction of bureaucracy across-the-board and fair reporting of theirs and other protests in the local press and on state television. Industrial workers insisted on a pay rise of at least 50 percent, while students demanded improvements to student standards. The crowd booed the republic’s President of the Executive Council (prime minister) and demanded that Radovan Radonjić, Nenad Bućin and Marko Orlandić, prominent Montenegro high officials, address the demonstration instead. The three high officials turned up later, cheered by the crowd, and pledged that party and state organs would urgently address their demands and come up with solutions to the declining economic output and rising social inequalities in the republic. They insisted, however, that the protest be ended. The protesters did not listen and pledged to remain in the square until their demands had been addressed. Thousands of people were arriving from other parts of Montenegro to join the demonstration and there were already around 25 000 participants in the square that evening. After midnight, most participants left the demonstration pledging to return the next morning, while a crowd of two to three thousand remained in the square. The party Presidency and the state Presidency of Montenegro held a long session overnight and, projecting that there would be a significant broadening of protests the following day, likely causing a standstill in the republic as a whole, decided to break up the demonstration. After receiving authorization from the party Presidency and the state Presidency of Yugoslavia, Montenegro’s leadership declared a state of emergency in Titograd and ordered security forces to break up the crowd in the early morning of 8 October.17 Later that day, security forces used tear gas to stop around 300 workers from the Nikšić Steelworks on their way to the Titograd demonstration at the ridge of Žuta Greda and forced them back to Nikšić. As a result of this confrontation, eight workers and a policeman ended up in hospital, most with minor injuries. The police also forced protesters from Cetinje who were just leaving for Titograd to return to the town and prevented workers from state enterprises in Titograd from leaving their factories. Throughout the week there was a substantial presence of security forces on the streets of Titograd and other larger towns. On 9 October a series of protests broke out in Nikšić. Workers from the local steelworks marched


around the town protesting the use of force against their comrades; students of the local university announced a hunger strike. Both groups later joined a large crowd outside the town hall and stayed there until late in the evening. On the same day students held protests in Titograd and Kotor. On 10 October workers demonstrated in Titograd, Nikšić and Ivangrad, but by that evening the protests had died down.18 While the demonstration effect of the Belgrade and Novi Sad protests of previous three days was apparent, the demonstrations in Titograd and other parts of the small republic originated largely from local sources. Montenegro was ripe for a major outburst of popular discontent in the second half of 1988. While prolonged economic crisis destabilized Yugoslavia’s economy as a whole, Montenegro’s economy was literally nearing collapse. There had been recent layoffs in large state enterprises and a large proportion of industrial workers received only a minimal wage, widely seen as insufficient to cover the living costs of a family. Radoje Dakić and the Nikšić Steelworks, large state enterprises whose workers played a major role in the demonstrations, had long been in trouble and suffered great financial losses despite heavy state subsidies. The rallies in August and September, though initiated over a different matter, provided an opportunity for the expression of deep-seated popular discontent that originated from various, mainly socio-economic sources. The suppression of the October demonstrations then turned against the leadership even those who had earlier remained indifferent. In the largely traditionalist society that prevailed in some parts of Montenegro, which prided itself on the bravery and courage of its rebel ancestors, the use of force against ordinary people was seen as a sign of the moral deficiency of the high officials and of their great disrespect toward the population. The suppression of protests and the two-week-long state of emergency provided some space for the temporary consolidation of the republic’s leadership. Montenegro’s high officials now pledged to defend the institutions and ‘legally selected’ officials at all cost and repeatedly stressed the danger from ‘Greater Serbian nationalism’. Simultaneously, high officials stressed that most demands from the Titograd demonstrations originated in the economic crisis and solidarity with Kosovo Serbs and were thus fully acceptable, including demands for cadre renewal. Local party officials in Titograd resigned as did, subsequently, the republic’s Executive Council (the government) as well. The leadership swiftly introduced subsidies for failing enterprises, halted further increases in the price of food and electricity and demanded financial support from the federation. The federal party Presidency and regional Presidencies, with the exception of those of Serbia and Macedonia, strongly supported


the decision of Montenegro’s leadership to suppress the demonstrations (Dizdarević 2000: 224; Orlandić 1997: 254–5). There were even promises of extensive financial backing for the new policy of the leadership. The suppression of the demonstrations, however, shifted political conflict from the streets to the institutions of the small republic. Existing divisions within the political class intensified and new ones came to the surface. Local officials in several municipalities had already demonstrated their disagreement with the policy of the republic’s leadership over the rallies of solidarity in August and September. Now precinct party branches all over Montenegro, especially in the largest cities and towns of Nikšić, Titograd, Budva and Bar, refused to support the line of Montenegro’s leadership toward the October demonstrations and a growing number of local official openly distanced themselves from the high officials.19 Journalists of state radio and television demanded that their editors, deemed responsible for misreporting the October events, resign. Individuals in the official organizations and state organs called for those responsible for injuries to the workers of the Nikšić Steelworks on 8 October to be brought to account, including the Minister of the Interior. A leading member of Montenegro’s state Presidency told me that managers of large state enterprises, including those of the Railways, Nikšić Steelworks and Radoje Dakić, also quietly resisted the leadership and supported its opponents. Officials of the Youth Organization and Titograd’s University Committee strongly resisted the republic’s leadership. As early as 8 October Ljubiša Stanković, President of the Youth Organization and a promising academic, publicly deplored the leadership for the use of force against peaceful demonstrators and for the declaration of the state of emergency in a directly televised joint session of Montenegro’s party Presidency and state Presidency. A few days later the University Committee demanded an immediate and thorough cadre renewal in the republic’s leadership. Both organizations insisted that those who ordered the use of force at Žuta Greda be called to account and reinstated the demands of the Titograd demonstration. By December Montenegro’s political class was completely divided and institutional conflict escalated. Institutional opponents of the leadership now openly demanded the resignations of all high officials and the media dutifully communicated the conflict to the discontented population. Orlandić claims in his memoirs that on 6 December, following talks with key officials in Montenegro, he told Stipe Šuvar, Štefan Korošec and Vidoje Žarković, his colleagues in the federal party Presidency, that he felt that the small republic’s leadership had fully lost control over the situation (1997: 341–2).


The division between Montenegro’s leadership, on the one side, and officials of the University Committee and the Youth Organization, supported by a growing number of local officials and individuals from other official organizations, on the other side, partly overlapped with the generational divide within the political class. Many opponents of Montenegro’s leaders were youthful, well-educated and spotless officials and the confrontation inevitably, though perhaps unfairly, came to be seen as unfolding between the old guard, that is, an old-fashioned, clannish and ineffective party leadership, with little authority over the population, and those who represented the future of Montenegro. Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo, a retired but still respected member of Tito’s old guard, who had long been in conflict with Montenegro’s leadership, also provided his support to their opponents, as well as to Milošević. Ultimately, large demonstrations in Titograd on 10 and 11 January 1989 forced the republic’s leadership to resign. Ljubiša Stanković told me that the day before he had agreed that officials of the youth organization would take part in the protesters’ committee previously created by trade unionists from Radoje Dakić and officials of Titograd’s University Committee. On the early morning of 10 January a thousand workers of Radoje Dakić set off to protest in the city centre, with the sole demand of the resignation of the high officials of Montenegro, including the republic’s representatives in the federal party and state organs. Students and citizens joined the demonstration and the number of protesters in the central square rapidly swelled to 10 000. Despite freezing weather, thousands of workers from large state enterprises and citizens from all parts of the republic joined the demonstration throughout the day and evening. The number of participants rose to over 60 000. On the following day Montenegro was brought to a halt—effectively, though not officially, there was a general strike. After prolonged deliberation, the high officials resigned.20 At the time, there were nearly a 100 000 protesters on the streets of Titograd. Over the following days, a large number of local officials who had provided support to the leadership also resigned, including those in Pljevlja, Ivangrad, Kotor, Bar, Danilovgrad and Mojkovac. In the aftermath of the October demonstrations and their suppression, Montenegro’s leadership hinted that the events had been organized by groups from outside the republic. After the fall of the leadership in January, many former high officials openly claimed that Milošević had orchestrated the events in order to remove them from power. A prominent official from Montenegro’s state Presidency told me that the role of


Kosovo Serb activists, especially the Kosovo Polje group, and of the workers of Rakovica, who allegedly manipulated their comrades from Radoje Dakić to initiate protests against Montenegro’s leadership, was decisive in the mobilization of this republic (see also Orlandić 1997). Indeed, Kosovo Serb activists initiated the rallies in August and September and some even joined the October and January demonstrations. Still, popular support in Montenegro for their protests was very high from the very beginning, much higher than in Vojvodina and central Serbia, judging by the levels of participation at the rallies in August and September relative to the sizes of their populations, and by the highly charged atmosphere surrounding the events. Likewise, some local authorities openly confronted Montenegro’s leadership on their own early on. The October demonstrations in Montenegro centred on socioeconomic demands and workers from large state enterprises played a key role in the events. In this respect, the events resembled the Belgrade demonstrations of 4–5 October more than those in Novi Sad. The workers from Rakovica had been in contact with their counterparts from Radoje Dakić during their campaign for a general strike aimed at the trade unions of large state enterprises across Yugoslavia, but few saw in this anything more than an expression of solidarity among industrial workers. At the closed joint session of the party Presidency and state Presidency of Montenegro on the night of 7–8 October, Orlandić, Veselin D ¯ uranović, a member of the federal state Presidency from Montenegro, and Lazar D ¯ od¯ić, Montenegro’s Interior Minister, stated that there had been no information from the security services whatsoever about any covert activities aimed at the fall of the leadership prior to these events.21 In fact, the stage had been set for a major outburst of discontent by economic collapse and by the rallies of August and September. Ljubiša Stanković, subsequently a leading opponent of Milošević, told me that on hearing the news of the fall of Vojvodina’s leadership, a day before the Titograd demonstration, he and his colleagues from the Youth Organization leadership predicted that similar events could be expected soon in their republic due to great popular discontent.22 The search for covert external agents of mobilization started only after the October demonstrations in the light of political realignment at the federal level and growing conflict between Montenegro’s and Serbia’s high officials. Without doubt Milošević and other high officials of Serbia strongly supported the institutional and other opponents of Montenegro’s leadership in the aftermath of the suppression of the October demonstrations. This support was reflected in sympathetic reporting on the opposition to Montenegro’s leadership in the media under his control and in the


disapproval of the leadership, especially as the conflict between Milošević and Montenegro’s officials grew. This support was important because the majority of citizens of the small republic relied more on the Belgrade press and state television than on their local media. However, the opposition to Montenegro’s leadership was home grown and rooted in both the political institutions and the population at large. The very high levels of mobilization between August and October and again in January reveal that external agents were hardly necessary. A demonstration of nearly a 100 000 on 10–11 January 1989 in a republic with a population of only 600 000 was an unprecedented demonstration of popular discontent with its leadership.

The rally of solidarity The repertoires and themes of protest of the various groups reveal the complexity of the antibureaucratic revolution. The hallmark of the antibureaucratic revolution was the so-called rally of solidarity with Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins. The rally acquired a startlingly fixed form from early September, in contrast to the spontaneous and flexible protest strategies of industrial workers between May and July and those of Kosovo Serb activists and their allies in July and early August. The rally started with the Yugoslav hymn, followed by three or four speeches, including one by a prominent Kosovo Serb activist, and ended with the reading of a letter to be sent to the high officials of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Vojvodina or Montenegro. Speakers from official organizations, such as the SAWP, the war veterans’ association and the youth organization, were also included. The symbols of the regime and state featured prominently in the rallies, including flags, banners, slogans, especially those related to the war of liberation, and large pictures of Tito and Milošević. The rallies recalled the staged official performances of previous decades. The rigid form of the rally of solidarity, however, concealed the extent to which this form of action was forged in struggle. It emerged and evolved through the interaction of protest groups and authorities in July and August, that is, before the 6 September announcement by Serbia’s leadership of support for the rallies. Kosovo Serb activists clearly preferred a demonstration, a protest strategy they could shape to their liking within the boundaries of public order. By contrast, high officials, especially those of Vojvodina and Montenegro, wanted to prevent further protests. Following workers’ protests in the capital and the Novi Sad demonstration in July, the federal party Presidency repeatedly deliberated on how to deal with growing mobilization. Stalemate in the federal party


Presidency prevented the immediate suppression of popular protests, but the prospect of the continuing lenience of the authorities remained highly uncertain until early September. Ultimately, the deadlock in the higher echelons of the party-state, the unwillingness of high officials to deploy force against ordinary people and growing popular discontent resulted in a tacit compromise between old and new political actors in the form of the rally of solidarity. According to this unspoken arrangement, protests could continue as protest groups acquired the right to express their views on the public stage relieved from the imminent threat of repression. Simultaneously, the authorities gained power of veto over the choice of speakers at the rallies, a firm guarantee from prominent activists that there would be no excesses, such as slogans and banners against the regime and state, nor violations of public order and, as it turned out, a false sense of control over mobilization. The rally of solidarity was effectively a mixture of two contrasting repertoires, which had repeatedly been deployed in postwar Yugoslavia, namely demonstrations and official public gatherings. Groups that protested against specific high party-state officials or policies of the regime repeatedly opted for demonstrations, which reflected the agency of the protest groups. By contrast, a public gathering, or zbor grad¯ana, partly originated as an extension of the self-management project from industrial relations and workers’ participation to social services and government in the 1970s. As such it fully reflected a top-down direction of mobilization. The Janus-faced nature of the rally of solidarity, concealed by its frozen form and crude regime symbolism, was reflected in the major shifts in the direction of agency in mobilization that occurred between August and November. Initially the grass-roots groups and their allies in the lower ranks of the official organizations, especially in Vojvodina and Montenegro, played a central role in the events, whereas a top-down mobilization drive characterized the later part of the antibureaucratic revolution. In August, September and early October, the rigid form of the rally did not prevent protesters from expressing discontent with the policies of the party-state, and especially with various high party-state officials. Banners and slogans calling for specific high party-state officials to resign occupied a prominent place in the rallies. If high officials publicly disapproved of the rallies or of specific demands, or came into conflict with Milošević on the public stage, their names appeared quickly on these makeshift banners with negative connotations. As the local press and state television dutifully registered these nuances, even when disapproving of this practice, the messages were communicated to a large


audience. Early on protesters learned how to stretch the limits set by the rally’s frozen structure. As Milić Maslovarić, a pensioner from Ðurakovac and Kosovo Serb activist, explained: When we enter, we enter by driving a wedge into the mass. Once we are inside, we spread to drive everybody from the stage. When a speaker is ours, we applaud, shout slogans. When a speaker is theirs, from the local government, if he speaks well, we applaud. If he speaks against us, we raise hell so that journalists and others do not hear a thing . . . We had to fight and act carefully. (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 236) Similarly, Mićo Šparavalo, a chairman of the Kosovo Serb protest Committee, said: I noticed that the rallies that we took part in were larger, more dynamic and better organised. We knew exactly when and to whom we should applaud, when and whom to jeer, when to throw a slogan, when to turn our backs, and so on . . . All this came spontaneously, naturally, as our need, as our food. We simply felt that it should be that way. (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 247) The negotiated nature of the rally of solidarity strongly contributed to the growing levels of mobilization. In the early stage of mobilization the sole practitioners of the rally of solidarity were Kosovo Serb activists and their local allies in Vojvodina and Montenegro. As it became apparent that the rally reduced the risks of protest in an authoritarian context, many other groups with unrelated grievances used it to fight their local struggles, such as corruption, entrenched patronage networks and local construction and infrastructure projects of which they disapproved. While taking part in a demonstration was still an unacceptable risk for all but the most highly committed individuals, participation in a rally of solidarity was much less threatening. The high levels of mobilization in September and October arguably resulted as much from the significantly reduced risks of free expression of popular discontent from various sources, as it did from popular support for the dominant themes of the rallies of solidarity, such as the cause of Kosovo Serbs. That the rally of solidarity was less confrontational than a demonstration also helped unleash considerable organizational resources at the disposal of previously unimportant political actors, such as local partystate officials, managers of state enterprises and trade union officials, who sympathized with protest groups or simply shared their enemies.


The highly decentralized institutions of the regime and state, which had long served as the means of political control, now increasingly turned into vehicles of mobilization, especially in Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo. Protest groups made use of the same official channels to overcome their own organizational deficits, that is, to spread their networks and mobilize popular support. They were able to exploit the advantages of highly decentralized institutions because the self-management system, for all its shortcomings, provided experience of various aspects of the political system to a large section of the population. They now used this experience to further their own goals. In central Serbia, the rally of solidarity served largely as a vehicle for top-down mobilization, with the partial exception of the rallies before 22 September in which Kosovo Serb activists played an important role. Political entrepreneurs from within local authorities and large state enterprises often took the initiative and opportunity to advance up the ladder of the party-state. Local authorities made their resources readily available for the organization of the rallies and managers of large state enterprises often tolerated disruption of work. These rallies stood out in terms of resources, from state-of-the-art stage and amplifying equipment to industrially produced banners, and in some cases organized transport and lunch-packages for the participants, even paid leave from work. The atmosphere created in central Serbia in October was such that some local officials found it sensible to check with high officials whether they were supposed to organize a rally in their town, a leading official of Belgrade’s City Committee told me in an interview. The prime example of the top-down mobilization drive was the rally in Belgrade on 19 November, labelled the ‘rally of brotherhood and unity’ and organized under the auspices of the local SAWP. Following days of propaganda, at least 700 000 people turned up, although some of Milošević’s associates subsequently fantasized that there were over million and a half participants. The rally of solidarity therefore travelled full circle from an innovative protest strategy practiced by grass-roots groups in an inclusive but crumbling authoritarian regime to a staged performance by Serbia’s consolidated political establishment. One indicator of the direction of agency in the antibureaucratic revolution was whether a weekday or weekend was chosen for the rally. Non-elite actors initiated and arranged the vast majority of the rallies that were held on weekends; by contrast, the authorities chose to hold most rallies on weekdays. The reason was that attending rallies during the week was not an option for many participants, who were employed and worked normal working hours. The disruption of work was permitted only when local or


high officials explicitly or implicitly authorized managers of large state enterprises not to make a fuss over it. By mid-September the rallies organized by Kosovo Serb activists and their non-elite allies outside Kosovo, except for industrial workers, were almost exclusively held on weekends, mainly Saturdays. The counter-rally of the province’s leadership on 15 September was the first large rally called for a weekday. That the rallies in central Serbia were later mostly held on weekdays reveals the increasing involvement of party-state officials. Parallel developments occurred in Vojvodina after the fall of its leadership. The exceptions to this trend were the strikes and other protests of industrial workers and the large-scale demonstrations in Vojvodina and Montenegro between 5 and 7 October. The logic behind strikes and other protests by the working class was the disruption of work; so the protests always unfolded, or at least began, in the workplace. The large October demonstrations were protests of a different type and the normal logic behind their organization did not apply. As the cities had already been brought to a halt, the disruption of work hardly mattered. Large and protracted demonstrations marked nearly all of the turning points in the wave of mobilization. These included the Belgrade demonstrations of industrial workers between May and July, the Novi Sad demonstration in July and the demonstrations in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Montenegro between 4 and 10 October and again in Titograd on 10–11 January. These protests had a powerful demonstration effect. Although each event had its distinct local causes, it is hard to miss the link between the Belgrade demonstrations of industrial workers on 4–5 October, demonstrations against the leadership of Vojvodina in Novi Sad on 5–6 October and demonstrations in Montenegro over the following few days. Due to the highly dramatic nature and consequences of these demonstrations, both supporters and opponents of the antibureaucratic revolution tend to exaggerate their importance. The demonstrations, however, were little more than the peaks of the wave of mobilization that spread principally through the rallies of solidarity.

Framing the antibureaucratic revolution The demands and claims put forward at the rallies, and their symbolism, revealed the main themes, or collective action frames, of the antibureaucratic revolution. Although the main frames overlapped to some extent, the solidarity with Kosovo Serbs frame dominated the mobilization in August and early September, while the frame of antibureaucratic struggle subsequently prevailed as being broader and more resonant with the


population. The solidarity with Kosovo Serbs frame originated from the efforts of Kosovo Serb activists in August and early September to trigger mobilization outside Kosovo and reflected their demands for constitutional reform in Serbia, for greater protection of their rights and property, for greater involvement of federal organs in the province and for the resignations of various high officials of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Banners and slogans at the rallies reflected these demands: ‘Kosovo is Serbia’, ‘Down with the Separatists’, ‘We Want a United Serbia’, ‘Vojvodina is Serbia’, ‘Provinces Yes, States No’, ‘Long Live United Serbia’, ‘We Won’t Give Kosovo’, ‘That All Children Go to School Without Fear’, ‘We Are All from Kosovo’.23 The broad popular appeal of the frame of solidarity with Kosovo Serbs, reflected partly in the expansion of protest politics in late August and early September, originated from several sources. Kosovo had a central position in the formation of Serb national identity and thus retained a strong emotional appeal among Serbs. Moreover, Yugoslavia’s political institutions were largely built around national rights and identities and thus encouraged nationalist over other forms of mobilization. The LCY and dominant media framed the Kosovo crisis principally as a counterrevolution, but also as a grave violation of the rights of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. While the focus on the latter was greater in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, it was hardly insignificant in other republics. Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals offered a more radical interpretation along the lines set out in the draft Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Mihailović and Krestić 1995: 99–147). They claimed that Titoist Yugoslavia had been set up in a way that left Serbia economically and politically disadvantaged and that Serbs faced ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and discrimination in Croatia. Although rejected by the LCY, their version gradually spread through literature, fiction and non-fiction, and through the press (see Dragović-Soso 2002; Popov 1993). In this context, gradual rapprochement between Milošević and Belgrade’s dissident intellectuals, which started in the last few months of 1988, created an atmosphere that was favorable to nationalist mobilization, not least because Serbia’s print and electronic media now increasingly publicized the intellectuals’ views on the Yugoslav conflicts. Thus the solidarity with Kosovo Serbs frame also reflected nationalist themes that went beyond demands of Kosovo Serbs and facilitated broader Serb mobilization along nationalist lines. Former dissidents and other novelists, writers and scholars, and even a few Orthodox clerics, now enthusiastically took part in debates on current affairs, constitutional


reform and the national question and thus partly shaped public opinion. They also strongly supported and romanticized various protest campaigns and staged performances, defended their initiators and participants from their opponents and, on rare occasions, even delivered speeches at the rallies (see Popov 1993: 16–23). From September the broader frame of antibureaucratic struggle dominated mobilization. The theme reduced a number of largely unrelated phenomena to the struggle of ordinary people against detested high officials, the so-called bureaucrats. The grievances of Kosovo Serbs, the constitutional reform of Serbia and Yugoslavia, the political deadlock at the federal level, the lack of genuine political participation, the economic crisis and falling living standards, the structural problems and low pay in particular industries, corruption, as well as the alleged unfair treatment Serbs suffered in socialist Yugoslavia, all now came to be seen as the product of incompetent and irresponsible high officials. There is ample evidence that Milošević and his associates engaged in populist scapegoating to weaken their opponents, which greatly influenced public opinion. However, the gradual reduction of such disparate phenomena to the demand for resignations did not simply result from elite manipulation. The way the antibureaucratic frame developed differed little from the way action frames develop in other social movements. The reduction of complex conflicts to a simple set of demands partly originates from the logic of coalition building, or an attempt to find the lowest common denominator between the demands of unrelated protest groups. While aiming to show that their discontent with high officials now went far beyond the Kosovo crisis and constitutional reform, the activists from Vojvodina and Montenegro also employed the antibureaucratic theme to strategically broaden the popular appeal of their protests. By focusing more on a specific target—the high officials—and less on the substance of their demands, they opened space for alliances with groups that did not share these demands. The theme therefore accommodated old demands, previously cast under the label of solidarity with Kosovo Serbs, and new ones, such as the socio-economic and political demands of industrial workers and students, as well as the discontent of the intellectuals and parts of the establishment. An important facilitator in this respect was the workers’ strikes in Serbia, which more than doubled between September and November in comparison with preceding months (NIN, 25 December 1988: 9). Moreover, social movement research suggests that various types of struggle are often interpreted and classified in the light of the society’s


dominant frame of conflict, especially in turbulent periods. For example, various movements in Italy in the early 1970s, such as those championing the demands of industrial workers, youth, students and women, interpreted their struggle through the lens of class conflict. Likewise, disparate conflicts in the United States often take the form of the struggle for rights (della Porta and Diani 1999: 77–8). Struggles unfolding under the umbrella of the antibureaucratic revolution were no exception. The antibureaucratic struggle was a dominant theme of conflict in socialist Yugoslavia and the framing of specific conflicts in terms of the struggle against bureaucrats by various protest groups, such as students, industrial workers and groups with nationalist claims, was hardly a novelty. In the 1968 protests students employed the regime’s slogans to demonstrate how far these were from reality. The working class had also employed elements of this frame in their strikes. For the workers, bureaucrats were mainly administrative workers and lower-level managers in their enterprises and social services, strata that had grown significantly since the early 1970s. In the 1980s the workers increasingly targeted partystate officials under the same label, initially local officials but later high officials as well. The roots of antibureaucratic struggle as a dominant theme of conflict in socialist Yugoslavia were in the main tenets of the official ideology, such as the relentless struggle for the so-called socialization of political and economic life against bureaucrats, who symbolized centralization and étatisme. The term bureaucrat was broadly conceived, quite conveniently, and could denote any of the following: those occupying managerial and administrative positions in the state-controlled part of the economy and in social services, members of the political class, from local and low-ranking officials to those in the higher echelons of the party-state and administrative workers in the official organizations and state administration. During the whole post-war period the political class, in line with the ideology of self-management, conducted periodic campaigns against so-called bureaucratization tendencies, either to reduce excessive administration or to purge political opponents. There had been several campaigns since the Second World War regarding the reduction of the excessive number of administrative workers. As late as 1987–88 leaderships of several republics, especially Serbia and Croatia, conducted such campaigns. On this occasion Serbia’s leadership conducted the campaign with great publicity (Danas, 29 December 1987: 18–19; NIN, 31 January 1988: 10–13). Political opponents to be purged were also often labelled bureaucrats. Milošević and his supporters linked the campaign against excessive administration with the


removal of supporters of Stambolić who remained in the leadership after September 1987. The antibureaucratic frame resonated well with the population because of the growing gap between party officials, on the one side, and party members and citizens, on the other side (see Goati 1989: 31, 81–2). Popular discontent with high officials was widely reflected in public life. The press took advantage of the generally liberal cultural life of Yugoslavia and of further relaxation of controls in the 1980s to highlight the failings of the political class. As early as 1982 Dobrivoje Vidić, Serbia’s high official, complained: Having in mind how functionaries are scorned, the notion of functionary is almost a dirty notion; you don’t dare be a functionary anymore. This must be a pig, a scum, a thief, who sits on the back of the working class, always delivers speeches and holds a microphone. Look how many sketches about microphones there are. All these people who because of their position and responsibilities must speak in public—-all are laughed at. Look how they write about armchairs. What should we do now, go and sit below the [river] Sava bridge, sit on a tripod or what? (Duga, 26 March 1982) Over the following years the increasingly liberalized press went further. Well-publicized corruption scandals in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1987–88 had a major impact on how people across Yugoslavia perceived the political class. A huge embezzlement scandal surrounding the Agrokomerc, a large agricultural company from north-west BosniaHercegovina, revealed misconduct on a large scale in which many high officials, bankers, company managers and media bosses were involved. The scandal shook the republic’s political stage and triggered major changes in the personal composition of its political elite. Hamdija Pozderac, the republic’s representative in the federal state Presidency and its Vice-President, resigned along with a series of high officials, bankers and managers of large state enterprises. Another scandal erupted in 1988 when investigative journalists revealed that over 200 high- and middleranking officials had bought luxury villas in Neum, the only town of Bosnia-Hercegovina on the Adriatic coast, at great discount. The scandals left the republic’s political class in tatters (Andjelic 2003: 56–75). The frame of antibureaucratic struggle was broad enough to accommodate various demands and claims that went beyond the group-specific demands of Kosovo Serb activists, industrial workers, students and other groups, and corresponded with the claims by the intellectuals and parts


of the political establishment. These demands and claims focused on constitutional reform in Yugoslavia, or the strengthening of the highly decentralized federation and greater powers for its central organs, on the alleged unfair treatment Serbs suffered in socialist Yugoslavia and the celebration of Serb national identity. Banners and slogans read: ‘Strong Serbia, Even Stronger Yugoslavia’, ‘We Don’t Want Borders’, ‘Down with the 1974 Constitution.’ While symbols related to Yugoslavia’s legacy of the liberation war and the indigenous revolution dominated the rallies, there were also examples of Serb national symbolism, such as pictures of Njegoš and Karad¯ord¯e, the nineteenth-century rulers of Montenegro and Serbia. The nationalist demands of the antibureaucratic revolution were initially moderate and only in February and March did they turn exclusionary. It is by no means an accident, nor simply manipulation, that many non-Serbs and non-Montenegrins took part in the rallies in Vojvodina, and not infrequently as speakers. Independent local analysts provided some evidence that members of nearly all, that is, more than 20 minority groups from Vojvodina took part in the rallies, roughly in proportion to their share in the population of the province. The only significant deviation in this respect occurred in the case of Montenegrin colonists and their descendants and ethnic Hungarians. The proportion of the former was considerably higher than their share of the population and that of the latter significantly lower. The proportion of non-Serb and non-Montenegrin speakers at the rallies, such as ethnic Hungarians, Romanians and Croats, was roughly 13 percent, that is, much lower than the proportion of these groups in the province’s population but still not insignificant (Kerˇcov et al. 1990: 54, 57, 83–4). One explanation for the rallies’ multi-national character is the inclusiveness of the frame of antibureaucratic struggle; another is that its national solidarity themes were resonant with some members of national minorities in Vojvodina, and not just with Serbs and Montenegrins. From the perspective of the LCY’s national question strategy, solidarity with Kosovo Serbs was also interpreted as solidarity with all of those who were denied rights officially granted to Yugoslavia’s nations and national minorities. Many apparently felt that the main safeguard for their rights would be the protection of the equivalent rights of others. In addition, the official legacy of the liberation war and the indigenous revolution celebrated the role of ordinary people, the masses, in the war and the construction of a novel road to socialism. This made grass roots’ appeals for fair treatment highly resonant, especially keeping in mind the post1981 framing of the Kosovo crisis by the LCY, which put emphasis on


ordinary Serbs and their problems at the hands of local bureaucrats in the province. The prevailing image in the popular and scholarly literature of the antibureaucratic revolution as a purely nationalist mobilization, not least with chauvinist features, partly originated from media reporting on the rallies. While the media under the control of Milošević reported sympathetically on the rallies, those controlled by his rivals in Vojvodina and Montenegro, and subsequently the press in Slovenia and Croatia, featured increasingly hostile coverage of the events. Tiny groups of radˇ icals, with their symbolism modelled on the Cetniks—Serb nationalists and anti-communists from the Second World War—were frequently, but misleadingly, presented as typical participants in the rallies. This was in part due to the nature of the media, which tend to focus on the dramatic aspects of protest events, and in part resulted from attempts by Milošević’s rivals to present the events as damaging to both the LCY and the Yugoslav state in order to trigger their suppression. This view partly originated from the interpretation of the symbolism of the antibureaucratic revolution as exclusively nationalist. In fact, many symbols related to national identity were taken from the nationalist tradition and employed to build consensus and mobilize support on the basis of the tradition of resistance. A similar use of national symbolism had featured in the rise of Solidarity in Poland in the early 1980s (Laba 1991: Chapter 7). The pictures of Karad¯ord¯e and Njegoš were not simply employed to publicly display the Serb or Montenegrin identities of the participants who held the pictures at the rallies, but also to demonstrate the determination of protesters to fight the high officials to the very end. For this reason, pictures of Tito and Che Guevara could easily go together with those of Karad¯ord¯e and Njegoš, since they served the same purpose, as symbols of resistance. The embeddedness of the antibureaucratic theme in Yugoslavia’s political and cultural life explains why it resonated so well with its citizens in the autumn of 1988. The frame was aligned with both the rhetoric of party-state officials and the mood of the general public. It also reflected the trends in other communist states that Gorbachev had initiated and which were well known to the educated part of the population. Overall, the rise of the antibureaucratic theme signalled the ascendancy of a broad social movement, that is, a strategic alliance of protest groups, the intellectuals, individual rebels from official organizations and parts of the old political establishment, which came together to fight common opponents.


The complexity of the antibureaucratic revolution There was a broad support in Vojvodina and Montenegro for the rallies of solidarity and demonstrations against their high officials. A survey of Yugoslavia’s party members conducted by independent analysts in June– July 1989 revealed strong support for new leaderships and their policies (Šiber 1989). In Vojvodina 76 percent of party members thought that rallies were the most adequate form of political action, 74 percent felt that the autonomous provinces should be represented at the federal level through the delegation of Serbia and not separately from it (in contrast to the 1974 Constitution) and between 63 and 77 percent supported the programme of political, party and economic reforms of Serbia’s leadership. In Montenegro 72 percent of party members were in favor of the rallies, while 61–68 percent supported the programme of political and party reforms of Montenegro’s new leadership. Support for the representation of the autonomous provinces in the federation through Serbia extended to Macedonia, 68 percent, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, 51 percent, and for the rallies 56 and 37 percent, respectively (Šiber 1989: 22, 31, 51). Keeping in mind that the survey was conducted after intense conflicts between Milošević and high officials of the other republics, it is likely that support for the rallies among party members of Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina had been even higher in the second half of 1988. Since the political distance between party members (excluding party officials) and other citizens in Yugoslavia in the 1980s was not significant (Goati 1989: 81–2), the findings of the survey reflect the mood of the population as well. Finally, this chapter has provided evidence that the protests in Vojvodina and Montenegro not only enjoyed broad local support, but also largely originated from local conflicts and were initiated and organized mostly by non-elite actors and parts of the local establishment. The antibureaucratic revolution was a complex affair. It involved considerable regional and temporal variation in terms of the relative importance of the agency of elite and non-elite actors and of the prevailing themes of mobilization. The main agents behind the spread of mobilization were non-state and non-elite actors, including Kosovo Serb activists and their allies, and individuals from institutions in Vojvodina, Montenegro and central Serbia. Once underway, mobilization reached its peak with logistical support from Serbia’s party-state officials. Their role was critical in central Serbia, indirect and limited in Vojvodina and marginal in Montenegro. Local observers and scholars have excessively


focused on the large demonstrations in Novi Sad and Titograd that led to the political demise of the high officials of Vojvodina and Montenegro. These demonstrations, which partly resulted from the demonstration effect, were only the peak of a wave of mobilization that spread principally through the rallies of solidarity. The rallies’ frozen form and regime symbolism concealed a major temporal shift in agency from non-elite groups to elites. The mobilization spread from Kosovo Serb activists to other groups and the focus of their attention ranged from constitutional reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia to socio-economic issues, industrial relations, the accountability of high officials and greater popular participation in politics. Many local groups may have sympathized with Kosovo Serbs but took part in protests principally because they felt excluded from the political process. Small nationalist groups dreamt of Serb national revival, while industrial workers were principally interested in higher wages, problems faced by their enterprises and the structural problems of particular industries. The spread of mobilization therefore included not only the diffusion of protest to groups with similar demands, but also the diffusion of the propensity for protest to unrelated groups. Nationalist frames mattered early on, but the protest wave reached its peak only with the shift to the more resonant antibureaucratic theme, which reflected the dominant vision of conflict in socialist Yugoslavia. Many observers took the symbolism of the antibureaucratic revolution at face value. They saw the extensive regime symbolism from the rallies as a reflection of top-down mobilization. In fact, it partly reflected participants’ political identities and their genuine embrace of the legacy of the liberation war and indigenous revolution, on the one hand, and the protest leaders’ desire to avoid repression by high officials, on the other. The symbols related to Serb national identity also did not merely reflect a return to the pre-communist nationalist tradition, but were transformed at the rallies and employed to build consensus for action drawing on a tradition of resistance. The shift to more exclusionary nationalist frames occurred only in February and March 1989.

6 The Popular Protests of Kosovo Albanians and the Serb–Slovene Conflict

The success of the antibureaucratic revolution, revealed in the high levels of mobilization and its far-reaching political consequences, raised the alarm among Kosovo Albanians. As the support in some republics for the opposition of Kosovo’s high officials to constitutional reform faded away, the most powerful reaction came from the grass roots. The protest march by the miners from Stari Trg triggered massive demonstrations in Pristina in November. As authorities continued to ignore the protesters’ demands, the miners started a hunger strike and thus set off another wave of protests, including a general strike, in February. In response, the federal state Presidency declared a state of emergency in Kosovo. The events served as a trigger for wider confrontation between Serbia and Slovenia on both the elite and mass levels, the real source of which was their conflicting views about constitutional reform in Yugoslavia. The mobilizational wave ultimately ended in state repression in late March, following violent exchanges between security forces and groups of Kosovo Albanian protesters. Overall, the high levels of conflict at elite and mass levels surrounding the peak of the antibureaucratic revolution and Kosovo Albanian protests, that is, between September 1988 and March 1989, had important implications. The salience of national identity in relation to other forms of political identity sharply increased, and the former was shaped in an increasingly exclusionary fashion in the course of the events.

The popular protests of Kosovo Albanians The October turmoil in Vojvodina and Montenegro triggered political realignment at the federal level. Aware of the great popularity of Milošević in their republic, the high officials of Montenegro felt 179


threatened when he manifestly failed to back their forceful handling of the demonstrations. They now demanded support from the high officials of other republics. Yugoslavia’s party and state Presidencies strongly backed the new line of Montenegro’s leadership.1 The exception was the representatives of Macedonia who remained quiet.2 The responses of the republics’ high officials depended partly on their attitude toward popular participation in politics and partly on their views on the relationship between the mobilization, constitutional reform and the national question. From the former perspective, the position of the normally conservative high officials of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina was hardly unexpected. In contrast, the support of Slovenia’s leadership for the suppression of popular protests came as somewhat of a surprise since they had long insisted on the primacy of rights, promoted liberalization and fully tolerated popular protests in their republic. Slovenia’s former dissidents disagreed. Some claimed that demonstrations against, as they put it, the Stalinist leadership of Montenegro were legitimate ( Jović 2003: 420). The hostile attitude of the high officials of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia toward the demonstrations in Montenegro partly originated from their concern that the mobilization could easily spread to their republics and create tension in their multi-national populations. BosniaHercegovina was constituted as a multi-national republic of Muslims, Serbs and Croats, while Croatia included a sizeable minority of Serbs. Croatia’s high officials had another cause for alarm, having observed a strong resemblance between the antibureaucratic revolution’s nationalist features and the so-called Croatian mass movement that Tito had suppressed in the early 1970s. They had built their careers and reputation fighting the legacy of that movement in Croatia and now strongly opposed what they saw as similar developments in Serbia. Most importantly, the leaders of Slovenia and Croatia, most of who had previously considered Montenegro’s high officials as Milošević’s mates, supported the repression as a way to prevent further power shifts at the federal level against their interests. The resignation of Vojvodina’s leadership boosted the power of Serbia’s high officials and undermined Kosovo’s leaders. The fall of Montenegro’s high officials, which was bound to empower Milošević further, was hardly a promising prospect for Slovenia’s and Croatia’s high officials during vital talks over the reform of the federal constitution. A prominent member of Montenegro’s state Presidency told me that rumors about the pledge by the leaders of Slovenia and Croatia to provide financial support for the failing economy of Montenegro, denied at the time due to their being highly unpopular in the small republic,

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were in fact true. Slovenia’s high officials went further and blamed Serbia’s leadership for the October events in Vojvodina and Montenegro. Aiming to fully isolate Serbia’s leadership from their long-standing allies in Montenegro and Macedonia, they hinted that the events potentially undermined official recognition of Montenegrin and Macedonian identities and their territorial autonomy in Yugoslavia’s federation.3 Serbia’s leadership responded in kind. The conflict culminated in an attempt to arrange a vote of no confidence against Milošević, as an ex-officio member of the federal party Presidency, in the Central Committee of the LCY on 19 October. The attempt did not succeed for procedural reasons, but one of Serbia’s other two full representatives in the Presidency did fail to get majority support from the Committee, which Milošević subsequently ignored on the grounds of the dubious legality of the move. These events revealed that elite conflict had turned increasingly serious.

The November demonstrations The purge after the 1981 demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians weakened Kosovo’s leadership in relation to both federal and Serbia’s high officials and they kept a low profile for the greater part of the decade. They mainly provided support for the predominantly Serb leadership of Vojvodina who led the opposition to constitutional reform in Serbia. The backing of the federal party Presidency for constitutional reform on 30 September and the subsequent fall of Vojvodina’s leadership further undermined the capacity of Kosovo’s high officials to oppose changes to Kosovo’s constitutional status. Milošević now increased the pressure on the province’s leadership despite the fact that Serbia’s leadership faced a totally different set of circumstances in Kosovo. They could credibly demand reform of the constitutional status of Vojvodina, which clearly enjoyed broad popular support in the province. In Kosovo, however, the majority of Kosovo Albanians were strongly opposed to constitutional reform, which left the support for Serbia’s leadership’s demands squarely among the Kosovo Serb minority and in the ambiguously worded and totally unrealistic Kosovo programme of the LCY. Nonetheless, Milošević demanded a purge of Kosovo’s leading officials, allegedly for abetting the spread of Albanian nationalism. The main target was the most influential among them, Azem Vllasi, formerly the President of Kosovo’s party Presidency and now its prominent member. The move hardly made sense. Vllasi was a leading pro-Yugoslav politician among Kosovo Albanians and the main adversary to the old guard of highly conservative Kosovo politicians. Vllasi had dropped their policy


of isolating Kosovo and promoted co-operation in the Yugoslav federation. As a result, many Albanian nationalists considered him a traitor. Vllasi was also the leader of a younger generation of Kosovo Albanian politicians that included Kaqusha Jashari, Remzi Kolgeci, Ekrem Arifi and Rrahman Morina. The Vllasi group aimed to modernize the highly conservative Kosovo political stage, previously dominated by competing patronage networks from various parts of the province and from the Albanian-inhabited territories of Macedonia and Montenegro. However, Vllasi came into conflict with Milošević in October 1987 over his quiet opposition to the removal from the party of several retired Kosovo politicians. While the move against the old guard had no immediate consequences for the personal composition and policies of Kosovo’s leadership, their purge from the party implicitly called into question the policy of the federal leadership since the late 1960s as well as Kosovo’s highly autonomous status, which had been achieved under their leadership. The conflict then escalated over the issue of constitutional reform in Serbia and the position of autonomous provinces. Vllasi and his associates also had a row with high officials of Macedonia on some occasions over the treatment of their Albanian minority (Danas, 1 March 1988: 7–9; 6 September 1988: 22). His gentle criticism of the way some Macedonia’s officials dealt with sensitive inter-group relations at the local level may have been somewhat unusual at the time, but was hardly illegitimate since there was nobody else who could publicly speak about it. Milošević principally wanted to establish full control over the personal composition of Kosovo’s leadership. First, despite earlier agreement that the draft of constitutional amendments, adopted by the Assembly of Serbia in July and supported by the federal party Presidency in late September, should serve as the basis for constitutional debate, Kosovo’s leadership quietly reintroduced its previous draft. Milošević apparently also considered a somewhat different version of the amendments from that which had been jointly accepted earlier. Secondly, Serbia’s party leader now aimed to take control over the vote reserved for Kosovo in the federal party and state organs and thus strengthen Serbia’s position at the federal level. The demand for the removal of Vllasi from the leadership considerably raised the stakes in the conflict, not least because his popularity among Kosovo Albanians naturally grew as he confronted Serbia’s leadership. Since the federal party Presidency supported the demand of Serbia’s high officials, the session of the Province Committee, where Vllasi and other officials were to resign from the province’s party Presidency and Kaqusha Jashari from the position of its President, was called for 17 November.


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In the early morning of that day miners from Stari Trg near Titova Mitrovica, most of them Kosovo Albanians, gathered to demand that Vllasi and Jashari remain in their posts. They also demanded that the main features of Kosovo’s constitutional status remain unchanged and that Šuvar and Milošević address them in person. Then, around 2000 miners set off on a long protest march to Pristina, carrying the flags of Yugoslavia, the LCY, Serbia and the official flags of Yugoslavia’s Albanians and Turks, as well as pictures of Tito. Despite repeated pleas by Kosovo’s high officials for their return to Titova Mitrovica, the exhausted miners reached Pristina after a seven-hour-long march. As word of their protest spread, their fellow miners from Kisnica and Novo Brdo and workers from various large state enterprises joined their gathering in Pristina’s central sport arena. The protesters cheered Vllasi and Jashari, who pleaded for the workers’ return to their enterprises. Roughly 10 000 people took part in protests on that day.4 The events marked the beginning of a five-day-long protest by Kosovo Albanians. Tens of thousands of protesters, including industrial workers, miners, university students and schoolchildren, arrived in Pristina in buses, tractors and cars from all parts of Kosovo and marched along the streets for hours, braving snowfall and freezing winter temperatures. The peak of the demonstrations occurred on 18 November when more than 50 000 people showed up at the local football stadium to cheer Vllasi and Jashari, while tens of thousands remained on the streets. Protesters demonstrated loyalty to the regime and state by chanting slogans, such as ‘Tito, Party’, ‘Long Live the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’, ‘Long Live Brotherhood and Unity’, ‘Yu-go-sla-via, Yu-go-sla-via’, and by carrying pictures of Tito and flags of the LCY, as well as those of Yugoslavia and Serbia, in addition to the flag of Yugoslavia’s Albanians. They expressed their demands by chanting ‘Long Live Azem Vllasi’, ‘Long Live Kaqusha Jashari’, ‘We Don’t Want Resignations’. There were no violent incidents. Hundreds of telegrams arrived from all parts of Kosovo in support of the province’s leadership. However, pressed by the federal party Presidency, the Province’s Committee proceeded with the purge. Fearing the suppression of protests, Vllasi and Jashari repeatedly addressed the protesters and pleaded that they return to their homes. So the protests died down by 21 November. The February protests and the general strike After the November demonstrations elite conflict escalated. Serbia’s and the federal party Presidencies denounced the protests as opposed to the party’s policy, as did the new province’s leadership, under strong


pressure. Long-standing divisions in Kosovo’s political class also came to the surface. A break between Serbs and Albanians in the Province Committee had already occurred partly because of the consolidation of the support of Kosovo Serbs behind their social movement and partly due to the persistent efforts of Milošević to break the resistance of Kosovo’s officials to constitutional reform and to purge their leadership. The November events now amplified the split. Various divisions among Kosovo Albanian officials also turned into open power struggles. The remaining members of the Vllasi group now faced competition not only from their old guard opponent, Ali Shukrija, onetime President of the federal party Presidency and still a member of the Central Committee of the LCY, but also from their former ally, Rrahman Morina, now in charge of Kosovo’s security apparatus, and Husamedin Azemi, President of Pristina’s Municipal Committee and a member of the LCY’s Central Committee. All three now enjoyed support from Milošević. That Kosovo Albanian politicians fought their power struggles relying on support from Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s high officials was hardly a novelty. Vllasi had built up his political career at least in part with their tacit support against Fadil Hoxha and at times employed his connections in political circles and the media in the capital against his opponents, including Shukrija and Bajram Selani (Hudelist 1989: 145–7). Morina recommended himself for high office by criticizing the Vllasi group in September and ultimately gained support from Serbia’s leadership by publicly denouncing the November protests (Danas, 31 January 1988: 16–17). On 1 February 1989 the Central Committee of the LCY purged Vllasi from its membership, effectively ending his political career. While Serbia’s officials and Vllasi’s Kosovo Albanian adversaries led the charge, the decision was passed by a majority vote. Two days later around 400 miners from Stari Trg held a public meeting in protest and thus triggered a wave of small protests in large state enterprises throughout the province. On 20 February around 1300 miners from Stari Trg pledged to remain in the pits, several hundred metres below the surface. They rejected all but minor changes to the 1974 Constitution and demanded that Morina, the new President of the province’s party Presidency, as well as Shukrija and Azemi resign. The miners also demanded that Šuvar and Milošević address them in the pits.5 On the following day, the strike spread to other mines and large state enterprises across Kosovo, while students initiated protests in Pristina. The Stari Trg miners then started a hunger strike. On 23 February Kosovo was brought to a standstill. Effectively, there was a general strike.


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The miners remained at the centre of attention because Stari Trg now symbolized the opposition to constitutional reform and to Kosovo’s new leadership. Yugoslavia’s state Presidency called on the workers and citizens of Kosovo to call off their protests and warned that otherwise it would act decisively to establish public order and protect the Constitution. Raif Dizdarević, the President of the federal state Presidency, and Stipe Šuvar, the President of the federal party Presidency, visited Kosovo and talked to the miners. Šuvar addressed them in the Stari Trg pits, but the protest continued. On 27 February, when it became clear that the miners would not leave the pits until their demands had been fulfilled, Morina, Shukrija and Azemi resigned. This turned out to be little more than a tactical move. As soon as the miners left the pits, the federal state Presidency declared a state of emergency in Kosovo, and Morina and Shukrija were reinstated to their posts. The novelty of the protest campaigns The November and February protests were both a reaction to the antibureaucratic revolution and an expression of the deep-seated grievances of the Kosovo Albanian community. The protesters reacted both to Serb nationalist demands from the antibureaucratic rallies and to their political consequences, and strongly opposed the impending constitutional reform that was to reduce Kosovo’s autonomy. By matching the levels of mobilization from Vojvodina, Montenegro and central Serbia in the previous two months, they signalled a great commitment to their cause and determination not to yield to mounting pressure for constitutional reform. The high resonance among Kosovo Albanians of the call for resistance to constitutional reform originated partly from the widespread feeling that the federal and especially Serbia’s high officials treated their community unfairly. While the involvement of federal organs had begun to increase in 1981, the pressure on the high officials of Kosovo and on the wider Kosovo Albanian community had increased further since Milošević came to power in Serbia. The calls for the purge of Kosovo’s high officials, the approaching reduction of the province’s autonomy, and hostile reporting on Kosovo’s current affairs by Belgrade’s media, all created anxiety among Kosovo Albanians which erupted on to the public stage in November 1988. These were the first popular protests of Kosovo Albanians since the suppression of the 1981 demonstrations. The legacy of the 1981 events was that the party-state strongly discouraged any political action by Albanians in Kosovo outside of official organizations, to a much greater degree than by other groups and in other parts of Yugoslavia. Such action


became unattractive and impractical, partly because of the immediate suppression of rather vaguely defined dissident activity, and partly due to the variety of official channels for political action which remained open, even if supervision over Kosovo’s institutions by the federal party and state organs had grown after 1981. The explosion of protest politics in November 1988, however, signalled that the risks associated with non-institutional action were somewhat reduced, though by no means as low as they had become for the participants in the antibureaucratic revolution. Small protests by Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo foreshadowed the events. In 1987 and 1988, a series of events raised the concerns of Albanians in Macedonia, including a broad official campaign for the demolition of high fences traditionally built by members of this community and some administrative restrictions on high school education in their native language. Albanian pupils and their teachers protested against the new schooling arrangements by boycotting classes on several occasions, especially in Kumanovo and Gostivar. Macedonia’s authorities in turn arranged the dismissals of a number of teachers and pupils, and many affected pupils left Macedonia to continue their education in Kosovo. In early September 1988, high school pupils and teachers who had been previously dismissed, along with their supporters, organized demonstrations of a few hundred people in Kumanovo and clashed with the police. Several policemen were lightly injured and a number of protesters ended up in jail (Danas, 24 November 1987: 18; 26 January 1988: 20–1; 6 September 1988: 22). Also, during the summer, nearly 200 Albanians from Kosovo Polje, a suburb of Pristina well known as the centre of Kosovo Serb activists, arranged a petition to the authorities to protest the demands of their neighbors for constitutional reform and the suppression of ‘Albanian nationalism’ (Danas, 9 August 1988: 33; Hudelist 1989: 212–16). In the events of November 1988 and February 1989, the miners from Stari Trg, who symbolized the values promoted by the communists in the post-war period, played a vital role. Their leadership in the mobilization reduced the risks of state repression and encouraged the participation of Kosovo Albanians, most of whom had previously been unwilling to take part in non-institutional action. Like their comrades in other parts of Yugoslavia, the Stari Trg miners benefited from the strategic position of miners within the working class and the resulting lenient attitude of high officials. Moreover, Trepca, a large mining and industrial corporation that included the Stari Trg mine, had long played a vital role in the legitimation of the LCY in Kosovo. Not only was Trepca the birthplace


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of Kosovo’s working class and later its centre. It also symbolized the opposition to the German occupiers in the Second World War, thanks to a small, clandestine group of miners-cum-insurgents in a region in which the majority of the population acquiesced to, or actively supported the occupation. It was by no means a surprise that the miners from Stari Trg refused to join Kosovo Albanian demonstrations in 1981. Thus, high officials could now hardly accuse the Stari Trg miners of counterrevolution or separatism. Indeed, the miners considered themselves the leaders of the working class and the guardians of the Titoist legacy in Kosovo.6 The change of protest strategies of Kosovo Albanians in February 1989, that is, the choice of strikes over demonstrations, originated from their determination to comply with a previously introduced ban on street demonstrations. The protesters took pains to highlight that their protests should not be likened to those of 1981 and thus suppressed by force. Unlike the protests in November and early February, the strike in Stari Trg was well organized. For the first time in socialist Yugoslavia nonstate actors launched an effective public relations campaign to win the sympathies of the public across the country and abroad. The strike organizers tightly controlled the entrance and exits from the pits and carefully arranged photo opportunities for foreign journalists and those from Slovenia. Other reporters were normally denied access to the pits. Rumors about the possible ignition of explosives in the mine and the rapidly deteriorating health of the miners abounded and only their spokesmen talked to journalists. The province’s media reported extensively and empathetically on the strike in Stari Trg, just as Belgrade’s media told stories about the rallies of solidarity. Simultaneously with the strike in Stari Trg, around 200 Kosovo Albanian intellectuals launched a petition to protest against the approaching change in the constitutional status of Kosovo. Theirs was an interesting proposal that suggested asymmetric levels of autonomy for Vojvodina and Kosovo, lower for the former and higher for the latter. The proposal deserved a serious debate against the background of strong popular backing for constitutional reform in Vojvodina along with the compelling opposition of most Kosovo Albanians to anything but minor change to the constitutional status of Kosovo. Such asymmetric levels of autonomy for Serbia’s autonomous provinces had in fact existed before 1963; the higher for Vojvodina and the lower for Kosovo. The new proposal, however, did not stand a chance of being taken seriously at a time of such heightened conflict at elite and mass levels and with Kosovo’s leadership dramatically weakened.


Comparison between the November and February protests of Kosovo Albanians and the 1981 demonstrations in the province reveals not only the contrast between the two mobilizational waves, but also the extent to which the political context had changed in the meantime. The scale of the 1981 protests seems miniscule set against the 1988–89 mobilization, which involved repeated demonstrations of tens of thousands and a general strike. The social composition of participants also differed markedly. In 1981 students and high school pupils dominated the protest events, while the 1988–89 protests involved participants from all the main sections of the Kosovo Albanian community, with the miners and other workers at the helm of the protests. The main demand of the protesters in 1981 was that Kosovo be granted the status of a republic, in addition to demands related to student standards, while the November and February protests remained limited to resistance to constitutional reform (see also Kola 2003: 182). The former protesters readily engaged in violent encounters with security forces, while the latter took pains to show moderation and avoid violence. These differences partly originated from the relative influence of one or the other main political streams within the Kosovo Albanian community, the so-called Enverists and the Titoists. The Enverists, who were influenced by the fundamentally Stalinist regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania and by small Marxist-Leninist and radical nationalist groups in the Albanian diaspora in the West, had some influence on the leading activists of the 1981 demonstrations. By contrast, the Titoists, who for the most part accepted the legitimacy of the LCY and the Yugoslav federation and fought for the rights and territorial autonomy of their group through official channels, which was the dominant position among Kosovo Albanians in the 1970s and the 1980s, commanded influence in the latter protests (see Judah 2000: 104–8; Maliqi 1996: 140–1; 1998). Under the growing political pressure on Kosovo Albanians, in the form of approaching constitutional reform and the purge of Kosovo’s high officials, the salience of the division decreased and a united front against Serbia’s government gradually emerged. The manner in which high officials of Serbia and Yugoslavia framed the November and February protests of Kosovo Albanians replicated the framing of the summer protests of Kosovo Serbs and their allies, and especially the October political upheaval, by the high officials of Vojvodina, Montenegro and Slovenia. According to these Leninist interpretations, secretive and criminal groups initiated popular protests, while prominent nationalists and/or high officials manipulated the masses. The hostile reporting on the Kosovo Albanian protests, and not only by Belgrade’s


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media, largely mirrored the unsympathetic coverage of the antibureaucratic events by the media under the control of Vojvodina’s leaders, and in Slovenia and Croatia. Belgrade-based print and electronic media now featured copious stories about allegedly secret meetings between Vllasi and other Kosovo’s officials and the Stari Trg miners; sought ulterior motives in any statement of the remaining members of the Vllasi group in the province’s leadership regardless of its content; presented isolated incidents as the main features of this mobilization; ignored the main thrust of the protests’ demands and symbolism and highlighted their marginal aspects, all in order to frame the protests as illegitimate and thus ripe for suppression.

The escalation of the Serb–Slovene conflict In late February, the confrontation shifted from Kosovo to the central political stage. Relations between Serbia and Slovenia, at both elite and mass levels, suddenly took a sharp turn for the worse. These events contradicted the by and large cordial relations between their political and cultural elites, even their population at large, in both interwar and socialist Yugoslavia. The Serbs were the largest and the Slovenes the most economically developed nation in Yugoslavia, which led their elites to treat each other with respect. In the inter-war period Slovene politicians co-operated more with their Serb than with their Croat counterparts. During the Second World War, many families exiled from Slovenia resided in Serbia. In the post-war period, high officials of Serbia and Slovenia cultivated good relations, and this practice continued well into the 1980s. There were rumors in Zagreb at the time that Croatia’s leadership feared their potential alliance ( Jović 2003: 420). The first half of the 1980s witnessed partial liberalization in Serbia and Slovenia, in contrast to the restrictive practices in Croatia and other republics, and the country’s dissident scene was largely limited to Belgrade and Ljubljana. Dissident writers and academics from the two republics had cordial relations and at times supported each other in opposition to the party-state. Within only a few years, however, the dissident intellectuals passed a long way from mutual respect and co-operation to confrontation. The attempts of Belgrade-based dissident intellectuals to forge a united front with their colleagues from Slovenia against Yugoslavia’s authoritarian regime in the mid-1980s fell flat in the face of the latter’s now virtually exclusive concentration on affairs within Slovenia. Ultimately, increasingly bitter disputes over the dissidents’


new, incompatible nationalist agendas ended in a war of words, which filled the pages of the press in both republics (Dragović-Soso 2002: Chapter 4). The row between the high officials of Slovenia and Serbia erupted in October, when Slovenia’s high officials, most prominently Milan Kuˇcan, the President of Slovenia’s party Presidency, publicly accused Milošević and other of Serbia’s high officials of orchestrating the political upheaval in Montenegro. Subsequently, mutual recriminations over the growing political conflict in the Yugoslav federation increased and the elite conflict spilled over into the media. Although disputes progressively grew, the extent of their confrontation in late February came somewhat as a surprise, as did the high resonance of the conflict at the mass level. Against the background of the miners’ strike in Stari Trg and the declaration of the state of emergency by the federal state Presidency, various groups from Slovenia, largely former dissident intellectuals, held a large, well-publicized public meeting in Ljubljana on 27 February. The participants at the meeting staged a show of solidarity with the Stari Trg miners and denounced Serbia’s Kosovo policy, especially the demands for the suppression of the protests, and also deplored the Serbs in general for their anti-Albanianism. Moreover, they rejected constitutional reform in Serbia and warned that it would trigger the break-up of Yugoslavia. While unfolding under the auspices of various unofficial organizations, the meeting and its demands enjoyed the full support of Slovenia’s political leadership and Kuˇcan also delivered a speech. This condemnation of Serbia’s leadership and population at large, as well as the parallels drawn by some speakers between Serbia’s treatment of Albanians with that of the Jews by Nazi Germany, were unprecedented in socialist Yugoslavia and profoundly offended the political and cultural elite in Serbia, as well as the general public, not least because of the suffering experienced by the Serbs (and Yugoslavia’s Jews) at the hands of Nazi Germany and its local allies. Without doubt, Serbia’s high officials had demanded repression in Kosovo, especially after the November demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians, and there were numerous examples of anti-Albanian feelings in Serbia, not least in the Belgrade press. However, Serbia was hardly an exception in this respect. Support for the policy of Yugoslavia’s state Presidency on Kosovo and popular attitudes toward Albanians were widely shared in many parts of Yugoslavia. An independently conducted survey of LCY members from June to July 1989 revealed that 81 percent supported the state of emergency, though only 28 percent in Slovenia and 40 percent in Kosovo. There was overwhelming support for the measures among party members in Croatia (72 percent), Bosnia-Hercegovina (82),


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Macedonia (92), Montenegro (93), Vojvodina (94) and central Serbia (97). Moreover, just over 60 percent of members of the LCY felt that the autonomous provinces should be represented at the federal level through the delegation of Serbia and not separately from it (in contrast to the 1974 Constitution), which was the proxy question for the support of the 1989 constitutional reform in Serbia. In central Serbia this proportion was 88 percent, in Montenegro 76 percent, in Vojvodina 74 percent, in Macedonia 68 percent, in Bosnia-Hercegovina 51 percent, while 71 percent of party members in Kosovo and 67 percent in Slovenia supported the opposite view (Šiber 1989: 22–3). These views were representative of the population at large due to the small difference between the positions and views of ordinary citizens and party members, excluding party officials (Goati 1989: 81–2). The Ljubljana meeting, directly televised in Serbia, triggered a strong reaction. Already that evening groups of students from Belgrade University gathered outside their halls of residence and formed a protest committee. After midnight, several thousand students, led by the committee and chanting ‘Slovenia Lies’, arrived at the Federal Assembly building. They demanded the immediate change of Serbia’s constitution, guarantees for the protection of the rights and property of Kosovo Serbs and insisted that ‘those responsible for the difficult situation in Kosovo’ be put behind bars. Supported by thousands of citizens they ignored the plea of the rector of Belgrade University and high officials, including Borisav Jović, the President of Serbia’s Assembly and a close Milošević collaborator, who addressed the demonstration, to call off their protest. The crowd chanted ‘We’ll Wait for Sloba’, ‘We Want Raif’7 and ‘Students-Workers’, calling on industrial workers to join the demonstration. Throughout the night several hundred taxi drivers drove people to the protest free of charge. From early morning the number of participants grew quickly, partly because people spontaneously joined the protest and partly because workers from numerous large state enterprises arrived in large groups. That the disruption of work occurred simultaneously in so many state enterprises suggests that authorities implicitly or explicitly authorized their managers to permit their participation in the demonstrations. It appears that once the high officials realized they could not prevent the protest they decided to take advantage of it. The crowd, already several hundred thousand strong, chanted ‘Yugoslavia’, ‘United Serbia’, but also ‘Sloba, the Serb, Serbia is with You’ and ‘Jail Vllasi’. Raif Dizdarević addressed the demonstration, often interrupted by chants of ‘Yugoslavia’, ‘Slovenia Lies’. The angry crowd refused


to leave until Milošević addressed the demonstration. In a show of power, he waited until late in the evening before delivering a short speech. As protesters insisted that Vllasi be jailed Milošević said that he vouched before Serbia’s leadership that ‘those responsible’, as he put it, would be punished. At the end, he called for participants to return to their homes. Large demonstrations were simultaneously held in Novi Sad and Titograd as well as smaller protests in a number of other cities and towns across Serbia and Montenegro. It was apparent that the Ljubljana meeting and the following demonstrations in Serbia reflected the mood of the majority of people in the two republics. On the following day the authorities imprisoned Vllasi and a number of other Kosovo Albanians, some of whom were not even formally charged.8

Constitutional reform, the resurgence of the Kosovo Albanian protests and state repression In March, it was still unclear whether the Assembly of Kosovo would pass the proposed amendments to the Constitution of Serbia in spite of the support of the federal leadership for constitutional reform, the purge of Kosovo’s high officials and the atmosphere of state emergency. Borisav Jović, the President of Serbia’s Assembly, later testified that Milošević had already given up on the key amendment, which required the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo to abandon their veto power over future constitutional reform in Serbia. Apparently, some Serbs among Kosovo’s high officials had convinced Milošević that had he not given up on this amendment, the whole package that circumscribed the province’s jurisdiction in several policy areas would have been rejected by Kosovo’s Assembly. The amendment no. 47 remained on the table only because Jović warned that he would otherwise resign and draw the attention of Serbia’s general public, which passionately supported constitutional reform, to the reasons behind his resignation (Jović 2001: 10–2). Another of Serbia’s high officials who worked closely on the constitutional reform confirmed Jović’s account to me in an interview. The declaration of a state of emergency by the federal state Presidency in late February closed the opportunity for non-violent protests to Kosovo Albanians. There were a number of strikes in large state enterprises over the following days, with the same demands as in the February events, but the protests soon subsided. Protests erupted again on 23 March, just before the session of Kosovo’s Assembly that was to vote on the amendments to Serbia’s constitution. A group of Kosovo Albanian women from a village near Urosevac embarked on a protest march to the


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town, along with their children. Local officials persuaded them to return to their homes but a similar protest occurred in the same town only a few hours later. Soon there were around 7000 protesters on the streets, some of whom threw stones at the police forces deployed to break up the demonstration. In sharp contrast to the protests of November and February, the protesters now turned more radical and chanted ‘Kosovo, Republic’. As delegates of the Assembly of Kosovo reluctantly passed the constitutional amendments, bound by the Central Committee of the LCY directive and pressed by the atmosphere of the state of emergency, demonstrations spread all over Kosovo in the following days. Since the security forces had received orders to break up protests, the interaction between forces and protesters turned violent and the former deployed batons and tear gas. On 27 March the police commander in Podujevo, an Albanian, was shot and his colleague, a Serb, seriously wounded. In Titova Mitrovica another policeman was killed. In a suburb of Pristina there was a gun battle between police and protesters in which five protesters were killed. In response, Kosovo’s government banned public gatherings, closed schools and universities and announced a curfew.9 On 28 March, when the Assembly of Serbia ultimately passed the constitutional amendments, demonstrations turned into a street war with security forces. Protesters built barricades, threw stones at the police and demolished public buildings, as well as nearby cars and buses. There were shootings directed at the police and even armed attacks on police stations. Armored vehicles were now on the streets, while helicopters and fighter planes flew over Pristina and other cities and towns in a show of force. Radmilo Bogdanović, then Serbia’s Minister of the Interior, told me in an interview that the security forces received orders to shoot at those who opened fire at them. Soon after the radicals stopped shooting at the security forces. By the end of March, the protests had died down. According to official sources, 22 protesters and two policemen lost their lives and many more were wounded or injured. Unofficially, this was a fraction of the true casualties. Another wave of Kosovo Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo did not start until late October 1989. The protest strategy that evolved between November 1988 and February 1989 was the precursor to the non-violent resistance of Kosovo Albanians and the emergence of their parallel state in Kosovo in response to wide-ranging repression by Milošević’s government in the 1990s.10 The political realignment at the federal level, the re-centralization of Serbia, growing repression against Kosovo Albanians and the emergence of new political actors within this community,


all contributed to their subsequent shift toward more radical demands, including that of secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia.

Road to confrontation The events that unfolded between September 1988 and March 1989 signalled the escalation of nationalist conflict in Yugoslavia. Various demands and claims that appeared at protest events in the summer and autumn of 1988 gradually converged on the set of issues that reflected the main underlying structural divisions in Yugoslavia, those separating its various republics and nations. While other conflicts that had played an important role in the earlier part of the mobilizational wave remained unresolved, such as socio-economic and non-nationalist political conflicts, the national question once again came to fully absorb the attention and energies of Yugoslavia’s political class and population. The high levels of conflict during the mobilizational wave were the main channel through which this shift in the salience of various socio-economic and political sets of issues took place. The nationalist claims, demands and performances of the summer mobilization became ever more radical and exclusionary. The agenda of the protest groups came a long way from the focus on one’s own rights and displays of national symbolism to confrontational claims, which at least in part targeted other groups, or even to demands for the denial of rights to others. The shift was not simply the outcome of the cultural and political elites’ particular framing of the conflicts, as most scholars of Yugoslavia suggest, but resulted from a prolonged, complex struggle between non-elite actors and the political class, as well as elite conflicts. Parallel shifts, at least partly driven by liberalization and the expansion of protest politics, occurred in the political class, and various conflicts in the higher echelons of the party-state and between high- and lowerranked officials transformed into nationalist conflict. In late March 1989, Yugoslavia was set firmly on the road to confrontation.

Conclusion: Protest Politics, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Conflict

The late 1980s witnessed a mobilization of ordinary people across Eastern Europe that played an important part in the conflicts that triggered the fall of communism. The levels of mobilization in the eastern part of socialist Yugoslavia exceeded those in most other parts of the region, and their immediate consequences were no less dramatic. And yet, images from popular and scholarly writing associated with this wave of mobilization stand out for different reasons. The generally accepted image of protest politics that unfolded across Eastern Europe is that of people power employed to bring about democratization of communist partystates. By contrast, the literature that touches on the antibureaucratic revolution and the episodes of mobilization that surrounded it conveys exclusively images of top-down, authoritarian mobilization and virulent, chauvinistic nationalism. The evidence I presented in this book suggests that most published accounts provide a misleading interpretation of this wave of mobilization. Below I sharpen my argument about the mobilizational wave in the light of this evidence, and show how it sheds light on the fall of Yugoslav communism and the rise of a new populist authoritarianism, as well as on the break-up of Yugoslavia and the contemporary Serb–Albanian nationalist conflict in and over Kosovo.

Explaining the antibureaucratic revolution and related protest campaigns According to the popular and scholarly literature, the mobilization of ordinary people in socialist Yugoslavia in the 1980s is an emblematic case of elite-driven and purposive nationalist mobilization. The key players were political and cultural elites, while ordinary people were little more than passive participants in the events. With the decline 195


of communism, opportunistic high party-state officials engineered the mass mobilization in search of new ways to preserve their political power. The events principally reflected the Serb nationalist revival, which provoked a reactive mobilization of Kosovo Albanians. Nationalist themes spread from small groups of dissident intellectuals to the general public, and the developments were boosted by the support of Leninist officials who aimed to protect their power by embracing nationalism. According to this view, these and subsequent nationalist outcomes mainly originated from the nationalist strategies of the political and cultural elites.1 Ordinary people or elites The elite thesis is misleading because non-state and non-elite actors played a vital role both in the early stages of mobilization and in the expansion of protest politics. Driven by different causes, aiming at different goals, and working independently from each other, the grass-roots groups of Kosovo Serbs and industrial workers across Yugoslavia initiated popular protests in the mid-1980s and over time became influential political actors. Most observers failed to identify the main agents in these events largely due to an erroneous assumption that non-state and non-elite actors could not initiate and sustain protests under communist authoritarianism. Since high officials did not suppress the protests and since the protest groups managed to organize, recruit activists, appeal for popular support and make major demands on the party-state, observers came to believe that Milošević or dissident intellectuals, or both, had orchestrated the events. This assumption originates from the view that modern non-democratic regimes are invariably closed, exclusive and repressive and thus an extremely hostile political context for the collective action of ordinary people at all times. And yet, modern non-democratic regimes vary considerably in their institutional design, informal relations among their various power centres and strategies toward challenger groups. Economic decline, political instability, political realignments and elite conflicts often create political opportunities for previously powerless and disadvantaged groups to engage in popular protest. Indeed, the rise and expansion of protest politics in Yugoslavia in the 1980s was an unintended consequence of its peculiar communist authoritarianism, that is, a largely relaxed and tolerant non-democratic regime with radically decentralized federal, local and self-management institutions, and of political change which began after the death of Tito. The communist leadership mainly targeted ideological dissidence and was considerably more

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responsive to discontent when it came from the working class, students and grass-roots groups with national grievances, due to their strategic position in the officially sanctioned legacy of the liberation war and indigenous revolution. Industrial workers and Kosovo Serb activists repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty to the party-state and the Yugoslav federation, and worked partly within official channels, thus exploiting the institutional resources of this most liberal and decentralized East European communist state. Growing elite conflict, driven by leadership succession, generational change and by disputes between the republics and autonomous provinces, paralysed Yugoslavia’s collective leadership and further impeded attempts at the suppression of popular challenges. While pursuing separate goals, industrial workers and Kosovo Serb activists exploited a long-standing popular discontent with the political class that had overseen a sharp decline in the previously successful economy and the rise of nationalist tensions in Kosovo. The open defiance of the previously unassailable party-state further undermined its legitimacy and invited other popular challenges. The rapid expansion of protest politics accelerated conflicts in Yugoslavia’s political class, that is, between and within regional elites and between higher and lower-level officials, and set the stage for an alliance between a variety of non-state actors and Milošević against an increasingly old-fashioned and dispirited Titoist establishment. The broad alliance, sparked off by the sudden and far-reaching success of protest politics and Milošević’s populist appeals, and cemented by their struggle against common foes, signalled the fall of the Yugoslav version of communism and the formation of a new populist consensus, which became the bedrock of Milošević’s authoritarian rule in the early 1990s. The antibureaucratic revolution involved the agency of elite and nonelite actors, in roughly equal measures. The extent to which one or the other prevailed in specific events varied temporally and spatially. The antibureaucratic movement rested largely on the breakthroughs achieved by industrial workers and Kosovo Serb activists in previous years, especially their strategies and action frames, well-established networks, and the destruction of a dominant but misleading image of unified and dignified elites. In the late summer and autumn of 1988, however, the social movement became a strategic alliance of protest groups, intellectuals, individual rebels from official organizations and parts of the old political establishment. In Vojvodina and Montenegro, where mobilization originated largely from local sources, non-state actors and opponents of high officials from the official organizations


organized rallies and demonstrations on their own, with the support of Belgrade’s powerful media. In central Serbia, the role of Milošević and party-state officials was critical. The Kosovo Albanian protests followed a similar route. The November 1988 and March 1989 protests appear to have been a spontaneous counter-mobilization, without much input from elites, while the February 1989 protests reveal an important role played by elites, who launched an effective public relations campaign during the Stari Trg protest and the general strike, backed by much of the province’s media. In short, in the light of the evidence presented in this book, the argument that ordinary people are incapable of coherent political action without the involvement of elites is deeply flawed. On the other hand, it would be unwise to exaggerate the power of ordinary people. Only under very specific circumstances can they challenge authorities and elites with success, that is, exert substantial political influence. In most cases, under both authoritarianism and democracy, authorities can easily confront and weather out popular challenges. In the case of Yugoslavia, the extraordinary period of the 1980s undermined the communist regime and thus made it vulnerable to the mobilization of ordinary people. Even when popular unrest undermines established regimes and protest groups achieve recognition for some of their demands, consolidated elites and their priorities principally shape the ways in which the polity and its policies are reconstituted.

The politics of nationalist mobilization or nationalist strategies The purposive nationalist mobilization thesis also provides a highly distorted view of this wave of mobilization. The wave involved a variety of themes and demands and only in its late stages became exclusively nationalist. True, the protests of Kosovo Serb and Albanian activists developed around their nationalist strategies all along. This was hardly surprising and originated partly from the fact that Kosovo had long been a deeply divided society, polarized by conflict between Albanians and Serbs, and partly from Yugoslavia’s institutional structure that favored mobilization along nationalist lines. Nonetheless, important parts of the mobilization wave, which featured high levels of participation, involved socio-economic and non-nationalist political demands and claims. The strikes of industrial workers since the mid-1980s, and their protests in the summer of 1988 had little to do with nationalism. Similarly, the antibureaucratic revolution involved a blend of nationalist and unrelated themes.

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As mobilization spread from Kosovo Serbs to other groups, the focus of their attention ranged from the constitutional status of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Serb–Albanian relations to socio-economic issues, industrial relations, the accountability of high officials and popular participation in politics. The wave of mobilization reached its peak only with the rise of the highly resonant antibureaucratic frame, which reflected the dominant vision of the conflict in socialist Yugoslavia. While featuring nationalist demands and symbolism, the antibureaucratic revolution was simultaneously a social movement with an important socio-economic focus and one aimed at the extension of political participation and the accountability of political elites, just like the social movements that developed throughout Eastern Europe on the eve of the fall of communism. The dominance of exclusionary and confrontational nationalist themes in late February and March 1989 reflected a major attitudinal shift among political actors, high officials and non-elite groups alike. This outcome did not result principally from the nationalist strategies of the various actors. Rather, it was largely an unintended consequence of the high levels of mobilization and spiraling of conflicts of all varieties at both elite and mass levels in a highly decentralized, authoritarian multi-national state, which was going through an acute economic crisis and rapid liberalization. Protest politics highlighted old and triggered new conflicts across various sectors of society and the political system, including industrial and socio-economic conflicts, struggles related to political participation, the accountability of political elites and relations between the republics and nations. The resulting widespread conflict in an increasingly dysfunctional institutional context, and at a time when the power structure was changing rapidly, became the vehicle which transformed all of these struggles into exclusionary conflict, which now reflected the main underlying structural divisions in Yugoslavia between its republics and nations. Protest politics highlighted and amplified pre-existing conflicts within the political class and initiated changes in the power relations between regional elites, thereby altering their strategic choices. Before the summer of 1988, several lines of division were present within Yugoslavia’s political class, such as over constitutional reform in Serbia and Yugoslavia, over the Kosovo policy, over economic reforms and political liberalization, as well as between different political generations. The cleavages often intersected, which complicated relations in the political class. The summer 1988 mobilization undermined the leadership of Vojvodina, affecting the balance of power in the federation during a highly sensitive


period of constitutional debate, and thus amplified conflict between the high officials of the republics and of the autonomous provinces. The antibureaucratic revolution led to the escalation of conflict by triggering not only important changes in the personal composition of the political elites of Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo, but also a major re-distribution of power among the leaderships of Yugoslavia’s republics. As a result, constitutional reform that would empower the central organs of Serbia and Yugoslavia, which had long been considered extremely unlikely, now seemed increasingly feasible. With rising stakes in the conflict, the salience of other pre-existing cleavages within elites in the republics, such as between different political generations, over economic reforms and political liberalization, or newly important divisions such as between high officials on the one side, and lower-ranking officials, local officials and company managers on the other, faded away. The leaders of the republics now forsook any qualms they might have had about extending exclusive nationalist appeals to their national constituencies. Since the major re-distribution of power among the republics’ elites now unfolded on the public stage, these events also brought about an attitudinal shift among the population. The growing prospect of the constitutional restructuring of the Yugoslav federation, perceived as threatening to the interests of some republics and their constituent nations, overshadowed other, previously important political concerns. Thus, the high officials’ nationalist appeals resonated well among their national constituencies. By bringing conflicts over constitutional reform and the Kosovo policy onto the public stage, the mobilization wave also set off the radicalization of most political actors. Earlier, heated elite conflicts over these issues had been apparent only to professional observers. Although prolonged negotiations over constitutional reform had remained inconclusive, the lack of popular pressure left hopes that representatives of the republics and autonomous provinces would ultimately reach a compromise. The summer 1988 mobilization shifted passionate conflicts from narrow leadership circles to the televised sessions of the Central Committee of the LCY. The republics’ leaders were now under intense pressure not to offer any concessions to their counterparts from other republics because their constituencies might consider these to be a sign of weakness. Since popular support had become a major power resource in the course of the mobilizational wave, growing competition among regional leaders for the support of their national constituencies resulted in nationalist outbidding, even among high officials who had not previously been considered nationalists.

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The explosion of conflict in early 1989 brought increasing pressure on individuals to choose between competing political loyalties, which had previously coexisted largely in harmony with one another. Struggles over constitutional reform and the explosive conflict between Serbia and Slovenia at both elite and mass levels encouraged people to embrace more exclusive political identities. These pressures grew as high levels of mobilization brought uncertainty to large parts of the population. While Serb and Yugoslav, Croat and Yugoslav, Slovene and Yugoslav, and to a lesser degree, Albanian and Yugoslav identities had previously been considered compatible, the supra-national Yugoslav identity gradually lost out in competition with more exclusive national ones. In short, the conflicts turned overwhelmingly nationalist only in the late stages of the mobilizational wave. While Kosovo Serb and Albanian activists initiated protests under nationalist themes early on, most other groups, who engaged in protest with other demands and goals, embraced more exclusive identities only in the course of mobilization and at the time of heightened conflict. Even nationalist themes were initially cast in a less than exclusionary fashion. In short, the evidence from this book suggests that nationalist outcomes result from politics, rather than the pre-existing nationalist strategies of political actors. Changes in power relations within the political elite, and between the elite and the masses, often drive the process of identity change in multi-national states. It may well be that non-violent popular protest is not always the best way to promote political change in complex multi-national societies. Popular protests tend to raise unrealistic expectations on one side and unnecessary and exaggerated fears on the other, thus leading to polarization. Unless there is an external source of cohesion for challenger groups from different segments of a divided society, such as a common external foe, non-violent protests may unintentionally reinforce divisions, even lead to the escalation of conflict and violence. The relationship between non-violent action and the use of force is complex, and shifts from one to the other do occur. Non-violence is rarely principled, that is, fully based on the moral rejection of the use of force. In fact, most practitioners of non-violence in the twentieth century employed it for pragmatic reasons, as the most effective tool to bring about political or social change within a particular context (see Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 5). At least some actors involved in non-violence may change their mind in the face of a changing political context, in which violence may appear as a more efficacious means to achieve their goals. Thus, genuine non-violent popular protests need not inevitably result in democracy and peace.


The fall of communism, Serbian style The expansion of protest politics brought about considerable shifts in power relations in Serbia and the Yugoslav federation. Some of these power shifts were only temporary, while others had a lasting influence on the politics of Yugoslavia’s successor states. Regarding the short-term impact, protest politics altered power relations within Yugoslavia’s political class, namely by triggering the rebellion of previously unimportant political actors, such as lower-ranking and local officials and company managers, and by strengthening Milošević against his opponents from other republics. At a time when popularity became an important power resource, Milošević was the only one among Yugoslavia’s regional leaders who enjoyed broad popular support from his constituency. Moreover, some protest groups and their allies temporarily developed into important centres of power. The Kosovo Polje group, a number of managers and trade union leaders of large state enterprises, as well as individual local officials, suddenly commanded more political influence than many party committees and high officials. These power shifts were most visible at the peak of mobilization in October–November 1988 and January–February 1989, but faded away with demobilization and the consolidation of political elites. The high levels of mobilization brought about exhaustion among participants, while the satisfaction of important demands, such as the resignations of the high officials of Vojvodina and Montenegro and the shift toward constitutional reform, removed important reasons for further participation. Those mobilization entrepreneurs from official organizations, such as managers of large state enterprises and local officials, even trade union leaders from large enterprises, encouraged demobilization and directed popular demands to the official channels. After the political demise of the leaders of Vojvodina and Montenegro and of hundreds of local officials across Serbia and Montenegro, they were eager to switch to routine political action. Many had long harbored mixed feelings about popular protest and considered it legitimate only as a means of activating formal decision-making centres. Now co-opted into the political elite, they were keen to exploit the advantages of institutional political action, as well as the perks associated with their new status. Gradually, a new, radically different power structure emerged, partly as a consequence of political change that had begun with the death of Tito, and partly as a result of condensed and intensive political conflicts and mobilization since the summer of 1988. This political

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change occurred before the rise of multi-party, electoral politics and in many respects survived its arrival in early 1990, thus decisively shaping Milošević’s authoritarian rule over the following years. Changes in the power structure related to both the internal workings of the party-state and to state–society relations. The party-state structures at the regional and federal levels, such as the party and state Presidencies, the Central Committees, governments and Assemblies, as well as the ideology, rules and procedures of the party-state, had previously heavily constrained the power of regional party leaders. With onset of the antibureaucratic revolution, Milošević’s popularity soared across Serbia and Montenegro while his rivals became increasingly unpopular, thus lifting many constrains to his behavior. The main sources of power before and after the antibureaucratic revolution differed considerably. Earlier, the power of high officials originated from their office, from the unified party-state leadership and from their control over society. Now popularity became the main power resource of the leader, squarely in populist terms. The regime’s rules that regulated access to high office changed considerably. Before, party-state officials developed their careers by advancing gradually up the official hierarchy, for the most part in the party and state bureaucracy. Now some of the lower-ranking party and local officials, who played an important part in the antibureaucratic revolution, suddenly made a great leap into the higher ranks of the regime. For example, Momir Bulatović, from Titograd’s University Committee suddenly became the President of Montenegro’s party Presidency, while Mihalj Kertes, a local party chief from Baˇcka Palanka was later co-opted into Serbia’s state Presidency. Likewise, many party-state officials in Vojvodina and Montenegro enjoyed fast-track careers. Party membership effectively ceased to be the main criterion for holding high office. Milošević co-opted a large number of the antibureaucratic revolution’s entrepreneurs, including managers and trade union leaders of large state enterprises, and even dissident intellectuals. Thus, power shifted decisively from the party committees to the offices of the state. Tellingly, Milošević left the highest regional party office to become the President of Serbia’s state Presidency in late 1989. The wave of mobilization also brought about important changes in state–society relations. One involved the expansion of pluralism in social, economic and political life. Ever since the break with Stalin, Yugoslavia had enjoyed greater pluralism than other East European states. In political life, pluralism had existed only within the partystate as ‘institutional’, not political pluralism, created and sustained by the regime (see Hough 1977). Nonetheless, boundaries between the


party-state and society became increasingly blurred in the years after the death of Tito, and this pluralism, not least in the form of writers’ and professional associations, had increasing political implications. Liberalization accompanied the summer 1988 mobilization and the antibureaucratic revolution. There was a sudden relaxation of controls in cultural life and tolerance for the seeds of future political opposition. Censorship vanished and former dissident intellectuals gained access to the media and publishing houses, often to the dismay of the high officials of other republics, such as those from Croatia (see Danas, 16 August 1988: 24). While many former dissident intellectuals temporarily backed Milošević, partly due to the liberalization and partly because of his nationalist appeal, these former dissident circles became the breeding ground for future political parties. The leadership of Serbia failed to officially embrace political pluralism, but tolerated it in practice. Groups and proto-parties operated freely, vied for media attention and lobbied government and businesses for support. Partly drawing on the legacy of the antibureaucratic revolution and partly feeling pressure from political reforms that unfolded in Slovenia and in other East European states, Milošević and his associates hailed so-called non-party pluralism as the formula that would supposedly bring together the advantages of communism and liberal democracy. This new formula included the broadening of the officially sanctioned repertoire of participation. Multi-candidate, but not multi-party elections were now introduced for state and local government offices. In addition to the legalization of the industrial strike across Yugoslavia, Serbia’s leadership aimed to institutionalize popular protest by staging massive rallies, modelled on those of the antibureaucratic revolution. The November 1988 rally in Belgrade was the first such rally in which around 700 000 people took part, bussed in from all parts of Serbia and supplied with flags and industrially produced banners. Seven months later, an even larger event was arranged in Gazimestan, in central Kosovo, to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the medieval battle of Kosovo. Careful staging and logistics replaced the spontaneity of early mobilization, but numbers grew as all party-state resources were now employed to ensure a large turnout. The new institutions created to increase popular participation in politics had little power, but provided a feeling of participation and involvement to many. The leading role of the party remained constitutionally sanctioned over the following months, and Yugoslavia’s version of communist ideology retained some, though a sharply diminishing social presence, but the internal workings of the party-state and state–society relations had

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altered so much that the emerging power structure only superficially resembled communism. Shortly afterward, the communist façade, with its oppressively omnipresent symbolism of the party-state and its straitjacketed ways, collapsed as well, thus bringing some relief to many people who had considered such developments inconceivable in their own lifetimes. Nonetheless, while moving decisively away from the old regime, Serbia and Yugoslavia’s other republics, with the exception of Slovenia, did not get any closer to democracy. In this respect, Yugoslavia’s transition from communism diverged from that unfolding simultaneously in much of Eastern Europe and ended in the rise and consolidation of a new authoritarianism. In some important respects, the mobilization of ordinary people in Serbia facilitated the rise of this new authoritarianism. The antibureaucratic movement lacked cohesion, both programmatic and organizational. The various groups involved had highly dissimilar grievances and goals, few of which had any but indirect relevance to democracy. While the broad antibureaucratic theme was successful in mobilizing opposition to some high officials and their policies, it did not provide much guidance about what should be done once the officials resigned. The focus was on the reform of Yugoslavia’s authoritarianism and state, rather than on democratization. The peak of the mobilization wave was also short-lived and there was not enough time for more stable collective identities to emerge and for protest leaders and activists to build lasting autonomous organizations, which could potentially turn them into promoters of democratization in the later period. Moreover, although various challenger groups were initially autonomous of cultural and political elites, many forfeited this status when they supported the rise and consolidation of charismatic leadership. The antibureaucratic revolution therefore did not live up to its name and could not be considered a revolution, that is, an irregular, extraconstitutional and/or violent overthrow of a state or political regime by a popular movement (Goodwin 2001: 9). The change in the personal composition of the regime and some of its policies under popular pressure prior to the end of communism only rejuvenated and reenergized the authoritarian regime and thus improved its life-prospects, albeit in a very different form. The failure of a democratic opposition in Serbia to successfully confront the authoritarian regime was only partly due to its oscillation between the promotion of nationalism and democracy. There had been strong opposition currents in Belgrade (and Ljubljana) throughout the 1980s, which outshined the dissident intellectuals of most East European states; even their nationalism hardly went much


beyond that of other places. However, the rise and successes of a broad anti-establishment movement, supported by an energetic and unconventional high official, rendered dissident intellectuals’ anti-regime appeals much less resonant with the population than would otherwise have been the case. That is probably why some former dissident intellectuals initially opted to support, rather than oppose Milošević. The important features of the mobilization wave and greater ambivalence toward democracy of elites and important sections of Yugoslavia’s population than that of their East European counterparts originated from the historical, structural and institutional legacy of Yugoslav communism and the state. In both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the simple polarization between the communist regime and pro-democratic opposition forces on the model of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which would result in clear victory for the democratic opposition, was unlikely. Transition from communism in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union involved not only regime change, but also the restructuring of complex multi-national states. Scholars of democratization recognize that post-communist transitions differed from transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and Latin America in that they were triple transitions (counting also the transition to a market economy) (Offe 1991), but this proposition applied to a much greater extent to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union than to other East European states. As a result, political actors in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union often faced priorities that had little to do with democracy, especially as inter-regional and nationalist conflicts grew. Moreover, the communist regimes of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union enjoyed genetic legitimacy among important sections of their population, unlike those across Eastern Europe, as they originated from indigenous revolution and played an important part in national liberation during the Second World War. One implication of this was a relatively independent geopolitical position and internal policy relieved from excessive external constraints, whereas most East European states from the Soviet bloc remained largely dependent on their senior partner. Although many people in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union harbored great discontent with, and were highly critical of, the policies and personal composition of the regime, they rarely questioned its basic legitimacy, in contrast to the populations of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, for example. As a result, there was no polarization between regime and society and the lines between different actors became increasingly blurred. Demands for democratization in most East European states strongly benefited from a fear of Russia/the Soviet Union. Desire to ‘join’

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the West made it necessary for both elites and the masses to opt for democracy, even if many had hardly thought of themselves as democrats. Political actors in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had no such external constraints and could also consider other possibilities.

Protest politics and Yugoslavia’s nationalist conflicts The rise and expansion of protest politics in the second half of the 1980s was hardly the only factor behind the nationalist conflicts that led to the break-up of the Yugoslav federation. With or without mobilization, the collapse of communism was bound to make the survival of Yugoslavia difficult. Like the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the other two communist multi-national federations, Yugoslavia encouraged its republics to develop a party cadre based on titular nationality, as well as a range of political, economic, social and cultural institutions. Created to expand the control of the party over the politicization of ethnicity, these institutions over time turned republics into proto-states and provided the main resources for republican elites to pursue nationalist strategies and thus trigger the dissolution of the state at a time of growing malleability of international and domestic factors (Roeder 1991; Bunce 1999). And yet, there was nothing intrinsic to multi-national federalism that caused political instability. This constitutional arrangement had long served as a source of stability in these complex multi-national states, rather than a source of conflict. True, Yugoslavia stood out among communist multi-national federations in terms of the extent to which the power of federal units grew at the expense of the federal centre. Since the radical federalization of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Yugoslavia was a highly decentralized state in which political and economic life was structured largely along the borders of its six republics and Serbia’s two autonomous provinces. Not only did the independent powers of federal organs shrink considerably, but also policy formulation in the remaining areas of federal jurisdiction now required the consensus of regional representatives. Regional representation in the federal organs was based on the parity formula, despite a huge regional disparity in terms of size, population and economic power. The federal organs were further weakened as regional leaderships gained control over personnel appointments at the federal level and over the execution of federal policy. Judging formal institutional framework, Yugoslavia almost resembled a confederation. While the institutionalist accounts rightly stress that communism’s collapse was bound to create great challenges to the survival of this most


decentralized communist multi-national federation (Bunce 1999), the break-up of Yugoslavia was hardly inevitable. Surveys conducted by independent research analysts in the 1980s still registered very low levels of rejection of other nationalities (Pantić 1987; Kuzmanović 1994) and the behavior of high officials did not suggest that they intended to split up the state. What sealed the state’s fate, in addition to its potentially dysfunctional institutions, was the attitudinal shift from broad support for the state’s survival at both elite and mass levels to a widespread belief that the state was standing in the way of the interests of particular republics and nations. This book reveals that the attitudinal shift was largely the consequence of high levels of conflict during the peak of the mobilizational wave, at a time when the communist power structure was rapidly disintegrating. The break-up of Yugoslavia, previously almost unimaginable for both the political class and the population at large, now came to be seen as a distinct possibility. True, some actors, especially dissident intellectuals, had long championed nationalist claims, articulating various nationalist arguments that would subsequently be adopted by high officials (Dragović-Soso 2002; Wachtel 1998). However, their influence in the political process was negligible before the autumn of 1988, and the popular appeal of their nationalist demands and claims grew only with the explosion of elite conflict and conflicts between high officials and the population at large. The wave of mobilization served as the vehicle which transformed various socio-economic and political, nationalist and non-nationalist struggles into nationalist conflicts, and which turned inclusive nationalist themes increasingly exclusionary. Like in the Soviet Union, the critical actors that brought about its break-up were themselves transformed by the spread of nationalism (see Beissinger 2002: 441). Indeed, the argument that the communist leaders of Serbia and Slovenia, Milošević and Kuˇcan, had long secretly harbored plans to drastically re-shape the state or trigger its break-up, or had opted for exclusive nationalist strategies purely for opportunistic reasons, to remain in power at a time of major political change, is misleading. The leaders in fact gradually embraced nationalist strategies under the pressure of the spiraling conflicts, which had been triggered or amplified in the course of the mobilizational wave. Even so, the mix of the potentially dysfunctional institutions of the Yugoslav federation and the politics of nationalist mobilization did not lead inexorably to the collapse of the federation and, more importantly, did not have to result in large-scale violence. Failure of leadership also played an important role in these events. The Yugoslav conflicts in the second half of the 1980s revealed a very low quality of leadership, all over

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socialist Yugoslavia. The vast majority of Yugoslavia’s high officials failed to respond to the growing economic and political crises and wasted their energies on petty conflicts. Once elite conflict and mass mobilization had expanded, they engaged in nationalist outbidding. At a time when they should have cooled passions, high officials fanned the flames of conflict. The role that Milošević played in these events was destructive and deplorable, to say the least, and has been well documented. However, most of Yugoslavia’s other high officials, his predecessors and contemporaries, fare hardly better in the light of the evidence presented in this book. This book’s focus on the origins, dynamics and consequences of the antibureaucratic revolution has also provided a unique insight into the role that Milošević played in the political struggles in Yugoslavia of the 1980s. Challenging a widely accepted view that he rose personally as leader in 1986–87 principally because of the broad appeal of his nationalist programme, I have argued that his ascent had little to do with nationalism and was an internal party affair that unfolded according to the rules of the game in communist party-states, without much influence from society. His rise to the position of Serbia’s communist leader should not be confused with the subsequent changes to the power structure and the spread of nationalism, which unfolded under strong pressures from below during the peak of mobilization. Milošević’s consolidation in power in Serbia and the important role he played during the break-up of Yugoslavia were possible only at a time of rapid disintegration of the old power structure and the rise of popular mobilization, developments unintentionally produced by the peculiar features of Yugoslavia’s late authoritarianism, and initiated by autonomous non-state and non-elite actors. The wave of mobilization and parallel political struggles in and over Kosovo led to a major political change in the autonomous province. The rejection of demands originating from the protests of November 1988 and February 1989, and growing state repression, facilitated the radicalization of the demands of Kosovo Albanians. The constitutional reform of March 1989 and, especially, the new constitution of Serbia of July 1990 reduced considerably the autonomy of Kosovo, while Milošević acquired full control over its political life and public sector. Serbia’s government responded to the resistance of Kosovo Albanians to the constitutional reforms by introducing a range of decrees that amounted to gross violations of their rights. It disbanded Kosovo’s Assembly, fired thousands of Kosovo Albanians from the public sector and replaced them with Serbs (see Kostovicova 2005). Milošević filled political offices in the province with local Serb apparatchiks, mainly those with little connection to


earlier grass-roots mobilization. Unsurprisingly, these officials were little more than Milošević’s proxies. The initial disorientation of Kosovo Albanians after the crackdown gave way to non-violent resistance. By rejecting Serbia’s political authority over Kosovo and through the creation of parallel institutions, especially in education, Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), now widely accepted as the voice of the Kosovo Albanian community, aimed at the secession of Kosovo. This book suggests that an exclusive focus on broadly conceived Serb– Albanian relations, centred on the issue of the status of Kosovo and relations between Belgrade and Pristina (or Pristina/Tirana), is misleading. Another, equally important dimension of the Kosovo conflict is the Albanian–Serb conflict within the province. Over the last two decades there had been little interest in the grievances and behavior of local actors, especially Kosovo Serbs, and little understanding of the changing political context within which they struggled and of the important consequences of their political action. The failure of local and external political actors—before, during and after the rule of Milošević, including representatives of the international organizations involved in reconstruction and institution building after the 1999 Kosovo war—to take both dimensions of the conflict seriously, strongly contributed to the intractability of the conflict. ∗ In late 1989 Yugoslavia looked very different than only a year and a half before. The political conflicts surrounding the wave of mobilization had transformed the internal dynamics of the party-state and of state– society relations to such an extent that the political system now only superficially resembled communism. While other East European states largely opted for democracy, Serbia and Yugoslavia’s other republics, except for Slovenia, faced the rise of a new authoritarianism. Various struggles, socio-economic and political, at both elite and mass levels were transformed into an intense nationalist conflict, which later resulted in the break-up of Yugoslavia, prolonged civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia and the intensification of the Serb—Albanian nationalist conflict in and over Kosovo. The end of the mobilizational wave in March 1989 was by no means the end of popular protests. Another series of protests erupted in the autumn of that year with the resurgence of mobilization of Kosovo Albanians, while various other protests subsequently occurred across Yugoslavia. However, these protests reflected different battles. Struggles over the emergence and shape of electoral, multi-party

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politics replaced earlier, somewhat naïve attempts to bring about greater popular participation within the old political system. Nationalist mobilization, earlier largely restricted to the battles over a relatively limited constitutional reform, became increasingly radical, featuring maximalist demands for national self-determination.

Notes

Introduction: The significance of the antibureaucratic revolution 1. For the most sophisticated and nuanced exposition of the former view see Cohen (2001: 62–78) and Popov (1993: 20–3); for the latter see Silber and Little (1995: 34–8, 58–63) and Banac (1992: 176–8), as well as the statements of high officials targeted by protest groups of Kosovo Serbs and participants in the antibureaucratic revolution or, alternatively, the views of Serbia’s and the other republics’ high officials who condemned the protests of Kosovo Albanians. 2. Cohen (2001: 57–88), Popov (1993: 16–23), Pavlowitch (2002: 184–98), Pavković (2000: 89–90, 103–7) and Ðilas (1993). 3. There are dozens of books and articles on the conflicts surrounding nationalist mobilization and Yugoslavia’s disintegration. For reviews of the literature see Ramet (2005) and Jović (2001). For elite-centred research see, for example, Gagnon (2004), Jović (2003) and Cohen (1995), and for focus on the personalities of political leaders see Sell (2002) and Silber and Little (1995). For the attitudinal approach, that looks principally into the attitudes of main actors, ideologies, culture and religion, see Wachtel (1998), Pavković (2000), Perica (2002), Dragović-Soso (2002), D ¯ okić (2003) and Miller (1999). For focus on the role of the institutions of multi-national federalism in the rise of nationalism and nationalist conflict see Ramet (1992), Hayden (1999), Vujaˇcić (1996), Bunce (1999) and Woodward (1995a). 4. I am grateful to a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, whom I interviewed for the book, for the permission to read his personal copy of the document. 5. Dnevnik (Novi Sad), Duga (Belgrade), Intervju (Belgrade), Jedinstvo (Pristina), Književne novine (Belgrade), Pobjeda (Titograd – Podgorica), Politika Ekspres (Belgrade), Politika (Belgrade), Start (Zagreb), Veˇcernje novosti (Belgrade), Vjesnik (Zagreb).

1

Yugoslavia’s peculiar authoritarianism 1. For an overview of the history of Yugoslavia, see Lampe (2000). Yugoslavia’s highly decentralized multi-national federalism and the national question are explained in detail in Burg (1983), Ramet (1992), Rusinow (1988), Stanovˇcić (1992), Ðilas (1991), Shoup (1968) and Banac (1984). For details on selfmanagement, see Sekelj (1990), Allcock (2000) and Lydall (1989), and for liberalization in the 1960s, see Carter (1982). 2. The report was published in Intervju, special edition no. 11, ‘Dokumenti vremena: Šuvarova Bela knjiga’, 10 May 1989. 212

Notes

2

213

The rise of Milošević

1. An earlier version of this chapter was published in Vladisavljević (2004a). 2. For the most sophisticated exposition of the former view see Cohen (2001: 43–74); for a most detailed and informed attempt to substantiate the latter view see Silber and Little (1995: 37–47). 3. I am grateful to Jasna Dragović-Soso for directing my attention to this poll. 4. D ¯ ukić (1994): 13–17. Slavoljub D ¯ ukić, a prominent Belgrade journalist, is by far the most prolific and cited author on Milošević. His books provide ample detail about Milošević’s family background, childhood and schooling, business career, rise to power and his rule in Serbia in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, with a focus on personalities and not on the historical and political context. Many accounts of the ascent of Milošević and his rule in the late 1980s that appear in scholarly and other literature on Yugoslav controversies, in both English and Serbo-Croatian, draw heavily on D ¯ ukić (1994, 2001). 5. For balanced and highly informative portraits of leading members of the ˇ older generation in Serbia see the account of Ckrebi´ c, their younger long-term associate (1995: 271–340). 6. Draža Marković, Špiro Galović, Vaso Milinˇcević and two anonymous members of Serbia’s party Presidency, interviews with the author. 7. Among my interviewees, Draža Marković articulated this, at the time widely shared view in the leadership of Serbia, most passionately. 8. The report was published in Intervju, special edition no. 11, ‘Dokumenti vremena: Šuvarova Bela knjiga’, 10 May 1989. 9. Draža Marković, Boško Krunić, Špiro Galović and two anonymous high party officials, all present at the meeting, interviews with the author. 10. Several of my interviewees from different political generations and factions put emphasis on this point. 11. Špiro Galović, Vaso Milinˇcević, Milenko Marković and another member of Serbia’s party Presidency, interviews with the author. 12. Draža Marković, Špiro Galović and two influential members of Serbia’s party Presidency, who wanted to remain anonymous, interviews with the author. 13. Špiro Galović, Vaso Milinˇcević, Milenko Marković and two anonymous high party officials, interviews with the author. 14. Špiro Galović and an anonymous member of Serbia’s party Presidency, interviews with the author. 15. Another episode, probably the most gruesome removal of a political opponent by state officials in Serbia in recent times, fully reveals the extent to which many from the Milošević group feared Ivan Stambolić, even many years after he had retired from political life. In August 2000, a month before the presidential election that set in motion the demise of Milošević, there were rumors that Ivan Stambolić might enter presidential race. This should not have been a reason for concern for either Milošević or a democratic opposition candidate since Stambolić had been outside political life since the end of 1987 and did not enjoy popular support. Realistically, he could not expect to win but a small fraction of the vote. Nonetheless, key regime officials apparently believed that he had become a serious threat again. Stambolić was promptly abducted and murdered. His body was found two and a

214 Notes half years later, during the police investigation following the assassination of Zoran D ¯ ind¯ić, the Prime Minister of Serbia, in 2003. Two years later, Belgrade’s Dictrict Court found that Milošević had issued the order for the murder of Stambolić and Serbia’s Supreme Court confimed the verdict in March 2007. For details see Popov (2007).

3

The grass-roots protest of Kosovo Serbs

1. In statistical yearbooks of socialist Yugoslavia this part of Kosovo’s population was listed under the categories of Serbs and Montenegrins. However, Serb and Montenegrin identities were not considered as mutually exclusive in Kosovo, unlike in parts of Montenegro. The considerable majority of Kosovo Montenegrins, who comprised less than 15 percent of this section of Kosovo’s population, embraced both identities, especially when the issues at stake were Serb–Albanian relations and the status of Kosovo. There was little difference in attitudes and political behavior between Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo throughout the twentieth century and in its aftermath. 2. An earlier, short version of this chapter was published in Vladisavljević (2004b). 3. See, for example, Silber and Little (1995: 34–47, 58–9), Judah (2000: 47–55) and Malcolm (1998: 339–43). 4. The term Kosovo (Kosova in Albanian) is widely accepted in the West and I use it throughout the book. Serbs normally use the term Kosovo-Metohia. I also use the anglicized version of geographical names in the autonomous province, while personal names appear in their Serbo-Croatian and Albanian spellings. 5. See, for example, the report on the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo jointly drafted by Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s governments in Politika, 30 and 31 September, and 1, 2, 3 and 4 October 1982, and excerpts from the report of the working group of the Federal Assembly, created to investigate complaints of Kosovo Serbs from the meeting with federal and Serbia’s leaders in Belgrade on 26 February 1986, in Intervju, 11 April 1986: 38–45 and its conclusions in NIN, 13 April 1986. 6. I calculated the share of the two groups in Kosovo’s population from the figures from post-war censuses. See Miljković (1989: 48). 7. For more information see Bogosavljević (1994: 20–2), Blagojević (1996: 235– 42), Islami (1994: 31–2) and Popović et al. (1990: 12–14). 8. See the report on emigration of Serbs from Kosovo jointly drafted by Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s governments in Politika, 30, 31 September, 1, 2, 3 and 4 October 1982 and excerpts from the Archive of the Holy Bishop’s Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church (1945–86) in Jevtić (1987: 793–838). 9. For a detailed chronology of the events see Vjesnik, 16 May and 6 June 1981. 10. For more details about the protests see Kola (2003: 157–8) and Ðaković (1984: 293–9). Although the protests obviously originated from local sources, several informed observers hinted that the Sigurimi, Albania’s intelligence service, had probably played some role initially. See, for example, Marmullaku (2003: 304–5) and Kola (2003: 159).

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11. The expression ‘ethnically clean’ comes from the petition. 12. See a transcript of the speeches of Kosovo Serbs at the meeting in NIN, 23 and 30 March, and 6 and 13 April 1986. 13. For eyewitness accounts of the events see Borba, 5–6 April 1986: 6; 7 April 1986: 1, 4; 12 April 1986: 3; Intervju, 11 April 1986: 35–7; Tijanić (1988: 174); and Vojo Vuˇcinić, a Kosovo Serb activist, in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 253). 14. For more information on the petitions see NIN, 26 April 1987: 12, and the transcript of the meeting of representatives of Kosovo Serbs with Slobodan Milošević in Kosovo Polje on 24–25 April 1987, published in Borba, 8, 9–10 and 11 May 1987: 17. 15. Budimirović, Šolević and Kecman, interviews with the author. 16. See transcripts of the speeches of Kosovo Serbs at the meeting with federal officials in Federal Assembly in Belgrade on 26 February 1986 in NIN, 23 and 30 March, 6 and 13 April 1986, and those at the meeting with Slobodan Milošević and Kosovo officials in Kosovo Polje on 24–25 April 1987 in Borba, 8, 9–10 and 11 May 1987. 17. See also Ivan Stambolić about the lack of support for Kosovo Serb high officials within their community (1988: 171–2). 18. Based on detailed eyewitness accounts of the events in Nedeljna Borba, 25–26 April 1987: 9, Borba, 19 January 1993: 15, Borba, 20 January 1993: 15 and interviews of Budimirović, Šolević and Kecman with the author. For all 78 speeches see the full transcript from the meeting, published in Borba, 8, 9–10 and 11 May 1987. In contrast, Azem Vllasi claims that Milošević and his associates organized the event to the very last detail (Borba, 8 February 1993: 12). 19. Šolević, interview with the author. See also interview with Bucko Stefanović, a teacher and activist from Urosevac, in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 253).

4 Yugoslavia’s political class and popular unrest in the summer of 1988 1. For more information about the strikes, the context in which they occurred and parallels with earlier strikes see Sekulić (1987), Mohar (1987), Foˇco (1989) and Pavlović (1988). 2. The reconstruction of the events that follows is based on information from my interviews with prominent Kosovo Serb activists, Boško Budimirović, Miroslav Šolević and Bogdan Kecman, and activists outside Kosovo, Milica ˇ cak and Milena Milovanović, then full, unedited tranGrković, Ranka Ciˇ scripts of interviews with Kosovo Serb activists published in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 225–70), excerpts from interviews with various activists published in Hudelist (1989) and reports from the local press. 3. The author’s copy of the petition. See excerpts from the petition in Danas (5 July 1988: 23). A working group formed by the federal Ministry of the Interior to assess the effectiveness of the protection of the rights and property of Kosovo Serbs by Kosovo’s police forces between 1986 and mid-1988 concluded that the number of human rights violations significantly increased in 1987 and especially in 1988. See excerpts from the working group’s report in NIN (2 October 1988: 14–15).

216 Notes 4. Milić Maslovarić and Mićo Šparavalo, prominent Kosovo Serb activists, interviews in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 235, 243–4) and Drago Samardžić, interview in Hudelist (1989: 171). 5. Budimirović, Šolević and Kecman, interviews with the author, and interview with other activists in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 25–6, 237–40, 243–4, 263–4) and Hudelist (1989: 171–3, 189–90). 6. For colorful portraits of the Committee members see Hudelist (1989). 7. I calculated the share of these groups in Vojvodina’s population from figures from the 1981 census. See Miljković (1989: 49). 8. Milić Maslovarić, Mićo Šparavalo, Vojo Vuˇcinić and Drago Samardžić, prominent Kosovo Serb activists, interviews in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 25–6, 237–40, 243–4, 263–4) and Hudelist (1989: 174–6). 9. Borba, 11 July 1988: 3, NIN, 17 July 1988: 19–21 and Milica Grković, a prominent activist from Novi Sad, interview with author. See also interviews with participants in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 232–3, 255, 259–60, 272–4) and Hudelist (1989: 178–9). 10. Raif Dizdarević claims, by contrast, that high officials from Serbia told him (and other members of the federal state Presidency) after this event that had any of the workers tried to leave the space marked for protesters, they would have deployed all resources necessary to prevent it (2000: 187). While it is certainly possible that some high officials consoled and reassured each other of their readiness to face popular challenges in this way once the highly charged workers’ demonstration had already ended, there is little evidence that high officials of Serbia demanded the suppression of the protests of industrial workers or that the police under their control took any action against the workers between May and July 1988, even in cases where the workers quite clearly crossed the boundaries of non-violent protest. In fact, a Belgrade mayor and Belgrade’s City Committee President, having failed to halt the Zmaj metalworkers protest on 17 June 1988, joined their march. 11. I calculated the share of Albanian minorities in the population of Macedonia and Montenegro from the figures from the post-war censuses. See Miljković (1989: 45–6). 12. A member of the federal party Presidency, a leading member of party Presidency of Vojvodina and a leading member of Montenegro’s state Presidency, interviews with the author. 13. For conflicting claims see interviews with activists in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 200, 227, 245, 256, 261). 14. Informacija (sa ocjenama i stavovima) Predsjedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Crne Gore o mitinzima u Titogradu i Kolašinu održanim 20. avgusta 1988, Predsjedništvo CK SK Crne Gore, Arhivsko odjeljenje, Spisi 1988, Titograd, 25 August 1988. Published in Strugar (1990: 233–50). 15. Informacija (sa ocjenama i stavovima) Predsjedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Crne Gore o mitinzima u Titogradu i Kolašinu održanim 20. avgusta 1988. 16. Protest networks formed initially in Vršac, Nova Pazova, Lovćenac, Gajdobra, Crvenka, Karad¯ord¯evo and Novi Sad. See full, unedited transcripts of interviews with prominent activists from Vojvodina in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 195–224).

Notes

5

217

The antibureaucratic revolution and its enemies

1. See, for example, Sell (2002: 57–60), Pavlowitch (2002: 194–5), Cohen (2001: 74–8), Pavković (2000: 103–7), Gagnon (2004: 69–71), Milosavljević (2004), Woodward (1995a: 90–7), Ramet (1992: 231–3), LeBor (2002: 104–9), Thomas (1999: 44–6) and Silber and Little (1995: 58–63). 2. See Šuvar’s speech at the session of the federal party Presidency on 29 August 1988 (1989: 33–7). 3. Danas (13 September 1988: 10; 20 September 1988: 11; 27 September 1988: 9). 4. Protests in Pristina on 31 August and 20 September, Gracanica on 1 September, Decani and Ljubizda, a village near Prizren, two days later, Pec on 8 and 13 September, Vucitrn and Pasjane, a village near Gnjilane, on 12 September fall into this group. 5. For example, protests in Ostojan, near Istok, on 3 September, Istok and Gornje Dobrevo three days later, Leposavic on 13 September, Gnjilane on 21 September, Pristina over the following two days and Prizren on 25 September. 6. Interviews of Stevan Marinković and Migo Samardžić, prominent Kosovo Serb activists, in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 229–30, 240–1). 7. For details about the event, see NIN, 25 September 1988: 14–15, 18, Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 45) and Ilija Živković, a prominent activist from Vojvodina, interview in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 200–2). 8. ‘Zabilješka o razgovoru izmed¯u predstavnika društvenopolitiˇckih organizacija (DPO) i društvenopolitiˇcke zajednice (DPZ) Crne Gore i predstavnika DPO i DPZ Cetinje 13. septembra 1988’, ‘Rijeˇc Dragana Vukˇcevića na sjednici Predsjedništva RK SSRN Crne Gore 3. oktobra 1988’ and ‘Rijeˇc profesora dr Branislava Kovaˇcevića na sjednici Predsjedništva RK SSRN Crne Gore 3. oktobra 1988.’ Republiˇcka konferencija SSRN Crne Gore, Kabinet Predsjedništva, Titograd, ‘Spisi 1988’. Published in Strugar (1990: 250–3, 276–84). 9. Medved¯a and Lebane on 10 September, Peˇcenjevac two days later, Tešica on 17 September and Kraljevo on 22 September. 10. For details about the events, see Borba (5 October 1988: 1, 3; 6 October 1988: 5); Danas (11 October 1988: 22–3); NIN (9 October 1988: 11–12). 11. Branko Mikulić, President of the Federal Executive Council (Prime Minister). 12. The nickname of Slobodan Milošević. 13. Telegram to the party Presidencies and state Presidencies of Yugoslavia and Serbia was read out at the session of Serbia’s party Presidency on the following morning (see excerpts from the session’s transcript in Borba, 7 October 1988: 2–4, 5). A leading member of the province’s party Presidency insisted in an interview with the author that they did not explicitly demand the use of force but that it was up to the top federal organs to decide how they would respond. This is true, though it is clear from the telegram that they expected a decisive action against protesters, not least because Šogorov signed the telegram as President of the province’s Committee for Defence and Security (ONO i DSZ), a shadowy body that was in charge of top security issues, and not in his role as President of the province’s party Presidency. 14. For details about the event see Borba (6 October 1988: 1, 3; 7 October 1988: 1, 5); Danas (11 October 1988: 7–9). See also excerpts from interviews with Duško Rad¯enović, Ljubomir Novaković and Milun Tasić, trade unionists from

218 Notes

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

ˇ Baˇcka Palanka and Celarevo, negotiators on the side of protesters, in Politika (18 December 1988: 8). Interviews with Duško Rad¯enović, a leader of the trade union, and D ¯ ord¯e Šćepanˇcević, a managing director of Jugoalat in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 206–9, 218–23). For details about the events from 7 to 10 October in Montenegro see Borba (8–9 October 1988: 7; 10 October 1988: 1–3 and 11 October 1988: 1, 3). See excerpts from the transcript of closed joint session of the party Presidency and state Presidency of Montenegro on 7–8 October 1988, released after the fall of leadership, in Borba (1–2 July 1989: 15) and Politika (22 June 1989: 11; 23 June 1989: 10; 24 June 1989: 10; 25 June 1988: 10). Also, see ‘Zapisnik sa zajedniˇcke sjednice Predsjedništva SR Crne Gore i Predsjedništva CK SK Crne Gore, održane 7. i 8. oktobra 1988.’ Predsjedništvo SR Crne Gore, Kabinet Predsjednika, Titograd, ‘Spisi 1988’. Published in Strugar (1990: 305– 10). Ljubiša Stanković, President of the Youth Organization, reflected on the events in an interview with the author: ‘distressing circumstances, armed people positioned on roofs, dreadful. Podgorica (Titograd) looked strange, something that you see for the first time, that was previously only seen on film.’ For details about the use of force by the police see the statement by the Minister of Interior, ‘Saopštenje Lazara D ¯ od¯ića, Republiˇckog sekretara za unutrašnje poslove, na Zajedniˇckoj sjednici Predsjedništva SR Crne Gore i Predsjedništva CK SK Crne Gore 10. oktobra 1988.’ Predsjedništvo CK SK Crne Gore, Arhivsko odjeljenje, Titograd, ‘Spisi 1988’, in Strugar (1990: 315–18) and a personal account of the commander of the special police unit in Borba, 15 August 1989. ‘Informacija Predsjedništva CK SK Crne Gore o toku i rezultatima aktivnosti na realizaciji zakljuˇcaka 17. sjednice CK SK Crne Gore, održane 14. i 15. oktobra 1988, a pripremljene informacije za raspravu na 18. sjednici CK SK Crne Gore’, Predsjedništvo CK SK Crne Gore, Arhivsko odjeljenje, Titograd, ‘Spisi 1988’. Published in Strugar (1990: 394–412). Borba (11 January 1989: 1, 3; 12 January 1989: 1, 3–4). See also excerpts from the transcript of the closed joint session of the party Presidency and state Presidency of Montenegro on 10–11 January 1989, released after the fall of the leadership, in Borba (5 July 1989: 4; 6 July 1989: 4; 7 July 1989: 5 and 8–9 July 1989: 10). Borba (1–2 July 1989: 15); Politika (22 June 1989: 11); Vijesti (18 January 2004). Blažo Orlandić, a member of the state Presidency of Montenegro, also reflected that the October demonstrations erupted unexpectedly despite the fact that party-state officials had paid close attention to political and other developments in Montenegro, especially in a number of state enterprises (Vijesti, 18 January 2004). However, Stanković also told me that, in retrospect, after having some time to reflect on these events, he had come to believe that there must have been some involvement of outside forces. While he had little contact with Kosovo Serb activists and their allies from Montenegro and with workers’ leaders from Radoje Dakić and the University Committee officials, Stanković suspected that

Notes

219

their success in triggering large demonstrations must have also originated from other sources, probably from Belgrade. 23. For an exhaustive list of all banners and slogans from the rallies and demonstrations in Vojvodina see Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 276–80).

6 The popular protests of Kosovo Albanians and the Serb–Slovene conflict 1. See, for example, Stipe Šuvar, President of the federal party Presidency (1989: 129) and Raif Dizdarević, President of the federal state Presidency (2000: 220–4). 2. See memoirs of Marko Orlandić (1997: 254–5), a member of the federal party Presidency from Montenegro, and Raif Dizdarević (2000: 224). A leading member of Montenegro’s state Presidency confirmed this to me in an interview. 3. Borba (10 October 1988: 3). A prominent member of Montenegro’s state Presidency, an outspoken opponent of Milošević after the October events, told me in an interview that ever since the first rally in Titograd in August 1988 he felt that the leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia were indirectly pushing the high officials of Montenegro toward confrontation with Serbia’s leadership, which he and his colleagues desperately wanted to avoid, partly due to the highly disproportionate size and power of the two republics and partly because of the dual, Montenegrin and Serb, identities of most of Montenegro’s citizens. 4. For details about the protests of Kosovo Albanians between 17 and 21 November see Danas (22 November 1988: 14–15, 29 November 1988: 14–15), Borba (18 November 1988: 1, 4; 19–20 November 1988: 1, 6; 21 November 1988: 1, 3; 22 November 1988: 1–2). 5. For details about the events in Kosovo between 20 and 27 February, over which journalists of various Yugoslav media waged a war of interpretation, see the balanced account of a Zagreb journalist, Srd¯an Španović (1989: 253–9). For less dispassionate and radically different interpretations of the events see Shala (1990) and Jevtić (1995). 6. Esat Jusufi and Tahir Salihi, miners from Stari Trg who delivered speeches at the November protests before Vllasi and Jashari, and their colleague Julijana Gašić, interviews in Hudelist (1989: 274–86). 7. Raif Dizdarević, the President of the state Presidency of Yugoslavia, 1988–89. 8. Borba (1 March 1989). For more details on the Belgrade demonstration, collected from a variety of sources, see Belić and Bilbija (1989: 42–63). For more information on the widespread practice of interment without trial of Kosovo Albanian protesters and dissident intellectuals see Vuˇcetić (1990). 9. For details about the March protests see the balanced account of Zagreb journalist, Srd¯an Španović (1989: 271–2). 10. For more details on the non-violent resistance of Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s see Kostovicova (2005), Maliqi (1996; 1998), Clark (2000) and Pula (2004).

220 Notes

Conclusion: Protest politics, the fall of communism and nationalist conflict 1. Cohen (2001: 62–78) and Popov (1993: 20–3) offer the most sophisticated version of the elite argument. The purposive nationalist mobilization argument can be found in Cohen (2001: 57–88), Pavlowitch (2002: 184–98), Popov (1993: 16–23), Pavković (2000: 89–90), D ¯ ilas (1993) and Crnobrnja (1994).

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Index

Agrokomerc corruption scandal, 115, 174 Albania, 80, 81, 82, 89, 188, 214 n.10 antibureaucratic revolution, 1, 5–7, 177–8, 196–201 consequences of, 179–81, 185, 199–206, 207–10 elite argument about, 2–3, 4, 5, 16, 109–10, 145–6, 195–6 and nationalist mobilization, 6–7, 177–8, 194, 198–201 purposive nationalist mobilization view of, 3, 4, 5, 17, 145–6, 195–6 themes of, 170–8, 194, 198–9 see also intellectuals (dissident); Milošević, Slobodan; rallies of solidarity; Yoghurt revolution authoritarianism, 4, 7, 11, 14–17, 25, 39, 48–50, 110, 145, 169, 196, 198 breakdown of, 2, 3, 16, 205 Serbian, 197, 202–7 transformation of, 1, 2, 6, 16, 202–7 Yugoslavia’s late, 6, 25, 39, 47, 48–50, 51, 74–6, 107 Yugoslavia’s late: unintended consequences of, 6, 48–50, 107, 196, 209 see also communism; elite conflict Azemi, Husamedin, 184, 185

Beissinger, Mark R., 12, 17, 18, 19, 208 Blue book (the 1977 report), 57 Bosnia-Hercegovina, 28, 40, 42, 85, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 133, 138, 142, 148, 174, 177, 180, 190, 191, 210

Budimirović, Boško, 22, 90, 91, 93, 96, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 137, 138 Bulatović, Kosta, 90, 91, 92, 96, 98 Bulatović, Momir, 203 bureaucracy, 38–9, 173–4 censorship, 30, 40, 204 ˇ Cetniks, 28, 97, 176 circular flow of power, 59–62, 74–5 and the rise of Ivan Stambolić, 62–3 and the rise of Milošević, 70–1, 73 ˇ Ckrebi´ c, Dušan, 55, 62, 64, 70, 73, 91, 128 collective emigration, 107 collective leadership, 34, 36, 44, 51–2, 61, 74–5, 197 communism, 4, 8, 16, 25, 48–9, 54, 59–61, 78, 110, 118, 186, 196, 205, 206 East European, 25, 48–9 fall of, 1–2, 3, 6, 7, 50, 195, 197, 199, 202–7 ideology and workers, 40–1, 118–19, 125, 143, 149, 186–7 Soviet, 59–61, 74, 206 see also authoritarianism; circular flow of power; collective leadership; leadership succession; self-management; Yugoslavia Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), see League of Communists of Yugoslavia conflict, see cycle of contention; elite conflict; nationalist conflict; popular protests consociationalism, 17 authoritarian, 36, 49 Yugoslav, 36, 75, 149 229

230 Index constitutional reform in Serbia, 57–8, 67, 77, 94–5, 102, 103, 121–2, 126–8, 130, 132, 148, 159, 181, 182, 185, 187, 190, 191, 192–3, 209 in Yugoslavia, 30, 35–7, 130, 199, 200 ´ Cosi´ c, Dobrica, 79, 98, 99 Croatia, 28, 32, 34, 40, 42, 47, 58, 59, 65, 67, 85, 111, 112, 115, 116, 130, 142, 171, 173, 176, 180, 189, 190, 204, 210 cult of labor, 40, 41, 118, 119 cycle of contention, 10 and nationalist mobilization, 18–20, 199–201, 208–9 and regime transformation, 202–7 Czechoslovakia, 2, 49, 206, 207 decentralization, 12–13, 30, 37–8, 132 see also federalism democracy, 13, 14–16, 28, 198, 201, 205, 206–7 democratization, 2, 195, 205, 206–7 demonstrations, see students; workers discontent, popular, 16, 40, 131, 143, 174, 197 dissent, see intellectuals; state-society relations Dizdarević, Raif, 110, 125, 147, 185, 191, 216 n. 10 Dukanovi´ c, Milo, 155 Duranovi´ c, Veselin, 153, 165 Eastern Europe, 1–2, 26, 44, 108, 195, 205, 206 see also under individual countries East Germany, 2 economic issues in Montenegro, 162, 165, 180–1 in Yugoslavia, 27, 29, 31–2, 38, 43, 46–7, 58, 110–11, 113, 130, 155 Eight Session of the Central Committee of the LCS (September 1987), 68–9, 72–3 elite conflict, 1, 6, 11, 15–16, 19 high officials vs. other party-state officials and managers of state

enterprises, 131–4, 143, 150, 202 in Montenegro, 163–4 in Serbia, 51–77, 108, 126–8, 143–4, 159, 182, 183–4 in Yugoslavia, 32–3, 43–4, 45, 50, 118, 143–4, 147, 165–6, 179–81, 190, 197, 199–200, 209 elites, see antibureaucratic revolutionl; elite conflict; intellectuals; generations; League of Communists; managers event, 18 everyday resistance, 39–40, 113 see also rumors federalism and federations, 12–13, 17, 35 mono-national (nation-building), 36 multi-national, 36, 49, 207 Yugoslav, 1, 25, 28–9, 30, 32–4, 35–6, 37, 44–5, 56, 57, 196, 207–8 frames of collective action and framing, 9–10, 19–20, 68, 97, 106, 170–6, 178, 188–9, 194, 197, 199 generations (political), 21, 126, 164, 199, 200 change of, 1, 6, 33, 45–6, 47, 50, 52, 59, 61, 74, 95, 197 old guard, 45–6, 54, 72–3, 133, 213 n. 5 younger generation, 8, 45–6, 47–8, 52, 53, 55–6, 57, 58, 59, 62–3, 64–6, 69–70, 71, 95, 129, 131, 133, 147, 155, 182 Goodwin, Jeff, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 205 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 44, 176 grass roots groups, 41, 79, 88, 90, 96, 105, 167, 169, 179, 196–7 see also Kosovo Albanians; Kosovo Serbs’ movement; mobilization Hoxha, Enver, 188 Hoxha, Fadil, 45, 101, 102, 103, 129, 184

Index Hungary, 2, 206 hunger strike, 162, 184–5 hybrid regimes, see regimes identity change, 17–20, 179, 199–201, 208 identity (collective), 9, 17, 18, 28, 36, 80, 82, 107, 138, 141, 146, 171, 175, 176, 178 institutions, see authoritarianism; circular flow of power; communism; consociationalism; democracy; federalism intellectuals (dissident), 5, 40, 47, 48, 59, 171, 187, 205, 208 and antibureaucratic revolution, 2–3, 4, 5, 16, 110, 144, 174, 176, 195–6, 197, 203 and democratization, 205–6 and Kosovo, 66, 78–9, 98–9, 108, 120 and Milošević, 67, 73, 171–2, 203–4, 206 intellectuals, Serb and Slovene, 189–90 interviews, author’s, 20–2 Jashari, Kaqusha, 182, 183 Jović, Borisav, 51, 191, 192 Kardelj, Edvard, 27, 30, 32, 37, 44, 45 Kecman, Bogdan, 22, 93, 98, 102, 103, 104, 137, 138 Kertes, Mihalj, 157, 158, 159, 203 Kosovo Albanian protests 1968 demonstrations, 42–3, 105–6 1981 demonstrations, 42–3, 88–9, 105–6, 185–6, 188 protests in 1988–1999, 145, 179, 183–5, 186–9, 192–4, 198 see also Stari Trg Kosovo (autonomous province of), 1, 2, 5, 28, 36–7, 51, 56–7, 67–8, 76–7, 112, 114, 129, 179–94, 204, 209–10, 214 n. 1, n. 4 demographic change, 84–8 economy, 46, 83, 85, 88 Serb-Albanian relations, 79–84, 210 see also collective emigration; emigration of Kosovo Serbs;

231

nationalism; repression; Stari Trg; state of emergency Kosovo Serbs, emigration of, 84–8 Kosovo Serbs’ movement, 89–108, 109–10, 116, 119–25, 134–9, 141–2, 143–4, 151–2, 154, 166, 168, 177, 196–7 demands, 91, 92, 94, 98, 120–1, 136–7 elite manipulation view of, 78–9, 106 see also collective emigration; Milošević Kraigher Commission, 46 Krunić, Boško, 20, 57, 58, 109, 124, 132, 139, 153, 159 Kuˇcan, Milan, 130, 190, 208 leadership succession, 6, 32, 44–6, 50, 60, 95, 105, 197 League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY; before 1952 called the Communist Party of Yugoslavia), 26, 27, 29, 30–1, 44, 115, 118, 121, 123, 128, 129, 131–2, 143, 144, 176, 181, 183, 184, 186, 188, 190–1, 193, 200 the ‘national question’ strategy, 27–9, 81–3, 89, 138, 171, 175, 181 Lenin, Vladimir, 30 liberalization (political), 5, 6, 33–4, 47–8, 50, 59, 66, 180, 189, 199, 200, 204 Linz, Juan J., 15, 39, 49 Ljubiˇcić, Nikola, 54, 56, 59, 62, 64, 73, 90 Macedonia, 28, 85, 112, 116, 117, 128–9, 134, 162, 171, 177, 180, 181, 182, 191 protests of Albanians, 42, 186 managers (of state enterprises), 30, 31, 32, 34, 39, 96, 97, 114, 117, 119, 173, 174 and antibureaucratic revolution, 128, 131, 132, 140, 141, 163, 168, 169, 170, 191, 202, 203

232 Index Marković, Dragoslav Draža, 20, 45, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 65, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 90, 122 Marković, Mira, 71, 130 Marx, Karl, 30, 37, 38 McAdam Doug, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19 media, 5, 11, 15, 21–3, 30, 32, 34, 40, 42, 47, 52, 58, 59, 63, 68, 69, 71–2, 75, 84, 87, 91, 96, 97, 106, 107, 114, 116, 118, 121, 122, 127, 132, 146, 149, 150, 153, 154, 165–6, 167, 169, 171, 174, 176, 184, 187–90, 198, 204 Milošević, Slobodan, 1, 4, 8, 61, 99, 126, 127, 128, 133, 153, 167, 177, 208–9, 213 n. 4, n. 15 and the antibureaucratic revolution, 3, 5, 145–6, 158–60, 164–6, 169, 177–8, 191–2, 196–8, 206 April 1987 meeting in Kosovo Polje, 100–1, 148, 149, 215 n. 18 conflict with Ivan Stambolić, 67–77, 102, 173–4 early career, 53–4, 56 and Kosovo, 51–2, 56, 68, 74–7, 78, 84, 101–3, 121, 147–8, 181–2, 184–5, 192, 193, 209–10 and Kosovo Serb activists, 78–9, 100–4, 108, 110, 120–5, 134–5, 142, 146–50 and media, 67–8, 69, 71–2, 75, 84, 150, 165–6, 176 and nationalist mobilization, 3, 67, 74–7, 145–6, 171, 191–2, 208–9 personal appeal, 70, 76, 101, 154–5 populist style, 75, 101, 148–50, 172, 192, 197 rise of, 22, 51–3, 63–77 and the transformation of authoritarianism, 74–5, 197, 202–4, 209 and workers, 121, 125, 147–50, 156–7 and Yugoslavia’s high officials, 67, 68, 76, 101–2, 127, 129, 130, 137, 146–50, 159, 165–6, 179–82, 184–5, 190 miners, 116–17 see also Stari Trg; strikes

mobilization, 1–3, 5–7, 195–9 consequences, 6–7, 16, 108, 143–4, 199–206, 208, 209–10 spread of, 11–12, 143–4, 196 see also antibureaucratic revolution; cycle of contention; Kosovo Albanians; Kosovo Serbs’ movement; miners; nationalist mobilization; political context; social movements; workers mobilizing structures, 10, 15, 16, 21, 42, 90–1, 93–4, 96–7, 99, 104, 105, 135, 139, 140–1, 141, 143, 152, 153, 168–9 Montenegro, 2, 28, 53, 85, 90, 109–10, 112, 128–9, 134, 137–8, 139, 140, 143–4, 145, 153, 154, 155, 160–6, 169, 170, 171, 175, 176, 177–8, 179–81, 182, 189–90, 191, 192, 197, 200, 203, 214 n. 1, 218 n. 21 n. 22, 219 n. 3 economic crisis, 162 the ‘national question’, 138, 162 see also elite conflict; state of emergency Morina, Rrahman, 182, 184, 185 nationalism, 4, 6, 18–19, 195, 205, 208, 209 studies of, 17–19 see also Kosovo; Milošević; nationalist mobilization; nationalist conflict; SANU Memorandum nationalist conflict, 17, 20, 207–10 nationalist mobilization, 6–7, 17–20, 171, 198–201 see also Kosovo Albanians; Kosovo Serbs’ movement; Milošević non-democratic regimes, see authoritarianism; communism non-violence, 14, 116, 144, 192, 193, 201, 210 opposition, 204, 205, 206 see also intellectuals Orlandić, Marko, 128, 129, 137, 138, 153, 161, 163, 165

Index Pankov, Radovan, 157, 158, 159 Paraćin’s massacre, 68 Partisans, 28, 54, 81, 96, 97, 122, 142 party-state, see authoritarianism; communism Pavlović, Dragiša, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 150 peasants, 29, 91 and collectivization, 29–30, 39 see also everyday resistance People’s Front, see Socialist Alliance of the Working People personality cult, 44, 67 petitions, 10, 88, 91, 93, 96, 98, 99, 106, 116, 118, 120–1, 141, 152, 186, 187 Poland, 2, 176, 206 political context definition, 9 and mobilization, 9, 10–17, 105, see also authoritarianism; communism; federalism; self-management mobilization and the legacy of liberation war and indigenous revolution, 40–1, 125–6, 143, 148–9, 175, 178, 197, 206–7 political opportunities, 6, 10–12, 15–16, 19–20, 105, 196 elite allies, 11, 15, 107, 108 see also authoritarianism; elite conflict; generational change; leadership succession; repression popular protests, see Kosovo Albanians; Kosovo Serbs’ movement; miners; mobilization; petitions; strikes; workers power sharing, see consociationalism protest strategies, 116–19, 125, 135–7 see also frames of collective action and framing; repertoires of collective action purges, 29, 32, 34, 44, 51–2, 54, 57, 60, 72, 75, 77, 79, 89, 144, 150, 160, 173, 181–4

233

radicalization, 19, 117, 136, 143, 200, 209 rallies of solidarity, 137, 138–9, 141, 148–9, 151, 152–4, 157, 158, 162, 163, 166–70, 171, 175, 177–8, 204 Ranković, Aleksandar, 27, 32, 43, 60, 82, 105 regime change, 7, 8, 16, 206–7 see also authoritarianism; communism; democratization regimes (political), 13–17 comparative analysis, 7, 14, 16 hybrid, 14 see also authoritarianism; communism; democracy; democratization repertoires of collective action, 6, 9–10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 21, 96–7, 99, 104–8, 109, 110, 113, 116–19, 141, 143, 146, 157, 166–70, 187, 193, 197 repression, 1, 14, 15, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 95, 96, 119, 141, 143, 149, 178, 179, 180, 186, 190, 192–3, 209 capacity for, 12, 16, 47 relaxation of, 3, 11, 46, 47, 105, 106, 113 see also state of emergency revolutionary movements, 13, 14 Ristić, Dušan, 90, 91, 103, 124 Romania, 2 Rugova, Ibrahim, 210 rumors, 23, 69, 73, 92, 106–8, 142, 180, 187, 189 SANU (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts) Memorandum, 66–7, 171 self-management, 25, 30, 33, 35, 37–9, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 65, 118, 133, 173 and potential for mobilization, 97, 169, 196 shockwork, 40, 41 Shukrija, Ali, 184, 185 Sirotanović, Alija, 41

234 Index Slovenia, 28, 32, 40, 42, 46, 47, 58, 111, 112, 115, 117, 126, 130, 142, 148, 150, 176, 179, 180–1, 187, 188, 189–92, 201, 204, 205, 208, 210 Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SAWP; earlier called the People’s Front), 26, 30, 90, 97, 135, 139, 153, 154, 166, 169 social movements, 4–5, 9, 96, 97, 99, 102, 105, 108, 134, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 147, 151, 172, 176, 184, 197, 199 research on, 4, 7, 9–13, 78–9, 106 see also Kosovo Serbs’ movement; mobilization Šogorov, Milovan, 157, 159, 217 n. 13 Šolević, Miroslav, 22, 90, 91, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142 Solidarity, 2, 176 Soviet Union, 8, 19, 25, 26, 27, 29, 44, 49, 206, 207, 208 Šparavalo, Mićo, 122, 124, 142, 152, 168 Stalin, Josef, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 37, 60, 203 Stambolić, Ivan, 45, 52, 57, 59, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 79, 92, 95, 97, 102, 107, 122, 126, 127, 129, 150, 174, 213 n. 15, 215 n. 17 ascendancy, 59, 61–9, 75 early career, 53, 54, 55, 56 political machine, 62–3 reforms, 47, 56, 58–9, 65–6, 69 Stambolić, Petar, 45, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 77 Stanković, Ljubiša, 20, 155, 163, 164, 165, 218 n. 17 n. 22 Stari Trg, 179, 183–5, 186–7, 189, 190, 198 state, 13–14 state-centred approach, 10–17, 106 state of emergency, 89, 161–2, 163, 179, 185, 190, 192–3 state-society relations, 8, 26–7, 33–4, 39–43, 47–8, 49, 50, 74, 109,

130–1, 143–4, 150, 203–5, 210 strikes, 2, 41, 109, 111–13, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 131, 143, 145, 148, 156–7, 164, 165, 170, 172, 173, 184–5, 187, 188, 192, 198, 204, 215 n. 4 Labin 1987 strike, 116–17 see also Stari Trg students, 41, 57, 88, 122, 145, 172, 173, 183, 184, 188, 197 Belgrade protests in 1989, 191 demonstrations in 1968, 41–2, 105–6 protests in Montenegro, 160–1, 162, 164 Šuvar, Stipe, 59, 67, 76, 130, 147, 150, 163, 183, 184, 185 symbols and symbolism, 41, 97, 118, 125, 141, 142, 146, 166, 167, 170, 175, 176, 178, 189, 194, 199, 205 Tarrow, Sidney, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19 Tilly, Charles, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19 Tito, Josip Broz, 1, 5, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 54, 55, 57, 60, 61, 64, 67, 70, 74, 75, 114, 115, 118, 119, 141, 150, 166, 176, 180, 183, 196, 202, 204 see also personality cult trade unions, 29, 114, 117, 119, 132, 133, 134, 141, 151, 153, 156, 157, 158–9, 160, 164, 165, 168, 202, 203 Ustašas, 28 Vllasi, Azem, 92, 95, 100, 101, 181, 182, 183, 184, 189, 191, 192, 215 n. 18 Vojvodina (autonomous province of ), 2, 28, 36–7, 56–8, 66, 68, 76, 112, 126–8, 130, 132–3, 140, 143–4,

Index 145, 148, 149, 157–60, 169, 181, 187, 191, 192, 203 local mobilization, 135, 140–1, 175, 176, 177–8, 197 popular protests in, 109–10, 119–24, 138–9, 151, 152, 219 n. 23 see also Yoghurt Revolution Vrhovec Commission, 46 Vukmanović, Svetozar Tempo, 90, 164 White book (the 1984 report), 47, 59 workers, 2, 109–10, 113, 196–7 demands, 111–12 demonstrations, 114–15, 117–19, 125–6, 143–4, 146, 155–7, 160–2, 164–5, 170, 183, 188

235

living standards of, 111–12 see also communism; cult of labor; everyday resistance; Milošević; miners; shockwork; strikes; trade unions Yoghurt revolution, 157–60 Yugoslavia, 27–8 break-up of, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 25, 147, 190, 207–9, 210, 212 n. 3 scholarly debates on, 4, 7, 8, 25, 212 n. 3, n. 1 see also authoritarianism; communism; elite conflict Žarković, Vidoje, 129, 131, 137, 138, 153, 163

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