Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan and South Pacific (Series on Contemporary China)

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Series on Contemporary China - Vol. 26

LOOKING NORTH, LOOKING SOUTH C h i n a , Taiwan, a n d the South Pacific

Anne-Marie Brady editor

LOOKING NORTH, LOOKING SOUTH China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific

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Series on Contemporary China – Vol. 26

LOOKING NORTH, LOOKING SOUTH China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific editor

Anne-Marie Brady

University of Canterbury, New Zealand

World Scientific NEW JERSEY

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Series on Contemporary China

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Series Editors: Joseph Fewsmith (Boston University) Zheng Yongnian (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore) Published* Vol. 14 Migration and Social Protection in China edited by Ingrid Nielsen & Russell Smyth Vol. 15 China’s Reforms at 30: Challenges and Prospects edited by Dali L Yang & Litao Zhao Vol. 16 Political Booms: Local Money and Power in Taiwan, East China, Thailand and the Philippines by Lynn T White Vol. 17 Politics of China’s Environmental Protection: Problems and Progress by Chen Gang Vol. 18 Oil in China: From Self-Reliance to Internationalization by Lim Tai Wei Vol. 19 China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization by Bo Zhiyue Vol. 20 China’s New Social Policy: Initiatives for a Harmonious Society edited by Zhao Litao & Lim Tin Seng Vol. 21 Oil and Gas in China: The New Energy Superpower’s Relations with Its Region by Lim Tai Wei Vol. 22 China and The Global Economic Crisis edited by Zheng Yongnian & Sarah Y. Tong Vol. 23 Social Cohesion in Greater China: Challenges for Social Policy and Governance edited by Ka Ho Mok & Yeun-Wen Ku Vol. 24 China’s Reform in Global Perspective edited by John Wong & Zhiyue Bo Vol. 25 The Transition Study of Postsocialist China: An Ethnographic Study of a Model Community by Wing-Chung Ho Vol. 26 Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific edited by Anne-Marie Brady

*To view the complete list of the published volumes in the series, please visit: http://www.worldscibooks.com/series/scc_series.shtml

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Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Series on Contemporary China — Vol. 26 LOOKING NORTH, LOOKING SOUTH China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Copyright © 2010 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

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CONTENTS

Preface............................................................................................................. vii Anne-Marie Brady About the Authors ........................................................................................... xv Part One: China and Taiwan’s South Pacific Rivalry 1.

The South Pacific: China’s New Frontier................................................. Bertil Lintner

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2.

The Software of China-Pacific Island Relations ...................................... 35 Ron Crocombe

3.

Sino-Pacifica: Extra-Territorial Influence and the Overseas Chinese ...... 49 James Jiann Hua To

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China: Stumbling Through the Pacific? ................................................... 83 Fergus Hanson

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The Security Implications of Cross-Strait Competition in the South Pacific from a Taiwanese Perspective............................................ 113 Cheng-yi Lin

Part Two: The Impact on Other Key Pacific Players 6.

Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific: Beijing’s Island Fever .... 137 Tamara Renee Shie

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Big Trouble in Little Chinatown: Australia, Taiwan and the April 2006 Post-Election Riot in Solomon Islands..................................................... 163 Joel Atkinson

8.

New Zealand, the Pacific and China: The Challenges Ahead .................. 189 Anne-Marie Brady and John Henderson v

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Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific

Part Three: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Pacific: Two Perspectives 9.

Chinese Foreign Policy in Asia: Implications for the South Pacific ........ 227 Phillip C. Saunders

10. The South Pacific in China’s Grand Strategy........................................... 259 Jian Yang Index................................................................................................................ 283

PREFACE

Looking North, Looking South brings together the work of leading China, Taiwan, and Pacific politics specialists to analyse a topic of growing importance: China and Taiwan’s ever-growing involvement in the South Pacific. The book covers this fascinating and topical subject from a range of angles and perspectives. In order to explore the complexity and differing perspectives on the significance of the issue, Looking North, Looking South incorporates a wide range of representative views. The aim of the book is not to come down on one side or the other of the arguments about China and Taiwan’s activities in the region, but rather to let the reader come to their own conclusions. China is on the rise in Asia, Africa, South America, the Caribbean, even Antarctica and the Arctic. China’s activities in the South Pacific are part of this rise. Looking North, Looking South locates China’s involvement in the South Pacific within the context of China’s wider foreign policy and the challenges it poses to the traditional dominant powers of the region. Despite the importance of the topic, there is no other comparable book in print. In contrast to China, Taiwan (still formally known as the Republic of China) is on the decline on the international stage, since the People’s Republic of China now claims the recognition of most countries of the world as “One China”. Only 23 countries continue to recognise the ROC, which makes the six nations in the South Pacific who have diplomatic relations with Taiwan disproportionately important to both the ROC and the PRC.

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The China-Taiwan rivalry has helped to alter the balance of traditional influence in the South Pacific. China is now one of the largest aid donors in the region, and is increasingly squeezing out Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, both in terms of influence and funding. Yet despite this, contradictorily, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States rely heavily on the Chinese economy for their ongoing prosperity. China offers both challenges and opportunities to these nations and the micro states of the South Pacific. Looking North, Looking South is organised thematically into three sections. The first section discusses China and Taiwan’s South Pacific rivalry. The second section analyses the impact of China and Taiwan’s activities on other key Pacific players. The third and final section provides two contrasting perspectives on Chinese foreign policy in the Pacific. Many of the papers originated in a conference with the same themes held at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, in June 2008. The other authors were invited to join the book project in order to represent as wide a range of ideas on China’s activities in the South Pacific as possible. The first section of the book fills in the detail of the claim that China is on the rise in the South Pacific. In the first chapter, veteran AsiaPacific journalist, Bertil Lintner argues that China is expanding its influence over the South Pacific region with the long-term aim of challenging the traditional powers in the South Pacific. Lintner draws on a fascinating series of examples from his extensive reporting of South Pacific affairs to illustrate his argument. Lintner asserts that since many of the Pacific nations recognise Taiwan, the Republic of China (ROC), it is in the interest of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to be involved in the South Pacific in order to deny the island its claim to legitimacy. However, according to Lintner, while competing with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, Beijing is also laying the groundwork for a future contest between the United States and China for supremacy in the Pacific Ocean, the “buffer” between China and North America. At the same time, Chinese migration to the region has resulted in anti-Chinese riots in island nations such as Tonga, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, further contributing to the volatility of the region. Bertil says the South Pacific is changing, it is no longer the peaceful backwater it once

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was, and China’s increased involvement in the region is part of the reasons for this. The second chapter is by emeritus professor Ron Crocombe, who sadly passed away while this volume was being edited. Professor Crocombe’s contribution is brief and to the point. Crocombe asserts that the “hardware” of China-Pacific Islands relations is well known, such as the growing exports of Pacific Islands minerals, timber, fish and agricultural products to China; the rapid increase in imports of Chinese manufactured goods; and the growing proportion of foreign aid to the Islands that comes from China. However what Crocombe calls the “software” of burgeoning China-Pacific interactions is less well understood. Crocombe divides this “software” up into ten different categories—religion; language; Sino-Pacific ethnic connections; media links; educational links; social and personal relations; tourism; similarities in value systems; approaches to governance; and the evolving new architecture of regional organization. Crocombe concludes with a warning that Pacific peoples must take on the challenge of better understanding China (and Asia in general), because he says, in future that will be the main external influence in the South Pacific. The third chapter in this section of the book by James To details the Overseas Chinese communities’ presence in the South Pacific; how both China and Taiwan attempt to maintain links with it; and, in the case of China, attempts to “manage” its allegiance. The Overseas Chinese community (OC) continues to be a significant channel for China’s extension of its national interests abroad. To argues that the OC are specifically targeted and mobilized by China as a means of advancing two of its key national interests around the world: increasing China’s soft-power and improving its image as a global citizen. While there are long-standing Chinese communities in many South Pacific countries, in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in illegal immigration. To outlines China’s attitude towards illegal and legal migration and its strategies for reaching out to both new and more established migrants. To says China’s attitude towards the Overseas Chinese in the Pacific reflects one of the main strategic goals for its involvement in the region: isolating Taiwan. China actively seeks to exert influence amongst OC

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communities in the Pacific in an effort to isolate and challenge political threats such as Taiwan and the independence movement. In the fourth chapter of this section Fergus Hanson provides detailed statistics on the extent of China’s aid assistance to the South Pacific and its overall strategy in dealing with the region. Hanson argues that China’s expanding influence in the Pacific region is less a well-thought out plan than a series of short-term objectives, focused on checking and reversing Taiwan’s diplomatic relations in the region. He notes that this approach both tends to undermine Pacific development objectives, as well as China’s own medium and long-term interests in the region. Hanson concludes his chapter with an assessment of the outlook for China’s engagement with the Pacific and suggested recommendations for change. The fifth chapter of this section looks at the China-Taiwan rivalry in the South Pacific from the point of view of Taiwan. Lin Cheng-yi states that the South Pacific has become increasingly important to Taiwan in recent years. Taiwan has six diplomatic posts in the region, so more than a quarter of all the countries that recognise the Republic of China on Taiwan are located in the South Pacific. China and Taiwan have both established dialogue partnerships with the Pacific Islands Forum even though Taiwan’s status is not fully recognized. Rivalries between China and Taiwan have caused some island states to bet their best interests for economic development, leading to increasing allegations of corruption. Diplomatic considerations, geographical proximity, the richness of ocean resources, and affordable foreign aid packages have made the South Pacific a region vital to Taiwan’s foreign relations. Lin states that the South Pacific—second only to Central America and the Caribbean—is now a key location for Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition. Despite the diplomatic truce proposed by the Ma government in 2008, the rivalries between China and Taiwan over the South Pacific are not likely to fade away. The second section of the book looks at the impact of China’s rise in the South Pacific region on three key Pacific powers, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. In the first chapter of this section Tamara Renee Shie examines the impact of rising Chinese influence in the South Pacific from the point of view of the United States. Shie locates China’s increased presence in the South Pacific region within China’s increased

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global engagement overall. Shie details China’s range of activities within the South Pacific and the regional response. She considers Beijing’s potential economic, political, and strategic motivations, and the implications for the US. She cautions that the US is currently being “eclipsed” in the region by China. In the second chapter Joel Atkinson uses the experience of the 2006 riot in the Solomons to examine Australia’s relations with Taiwan in the context of the South Pacific. Atkinson backgrounds Australia’s and Taiwan’s involvement in the South Pacific, then examines Taiwan’s role in the Solomon Islands crisis and the subsequent Australian-led intervention. Atkinson discusses the involvement of the Australian and Taiwan governments in the events surrounding the April 2006 elections in Solomon Islands, the selection of Synder Rini as prime minister and the subsequent riot, the ensuing sustained public controversy between Australia and Taiwan, as well as developments concerning Australia and Taiwan during the Manasseh Sogavare government. Atkinson notes that an end to Sino-Taiwan diplomatic rivalry will not necessarily improve the situation in the Solomons, and from the Australian point of view, will mean an increase in its aid burden. In the third chapter of this section I team up with John Henderson to look at the rising Chinese presence in the South Pacific region from the perspective of New Zealand. The paper addresses a series of questions, including: What factors generate China’s growing interest in Pacific island states? How important is the issue of Taiwan? What factors are driving increased Chinese migration to the region, and what are the repercussions? How prepared is New Zealand for the paradigm shift in the Pacific from a Eurocentric to a potentially Sinocentric order? Could New Zealand interests be challenged by this shift? And how important is the Pacific to Chinese interests? These questions were originally set by a New Zealand semi-governmental agency, which for reasons of political sensitivities, must not be named here. The authors’ response to these questions, this paper, proved to be too incendiary to have them published in an official paper as originally intended. The authors’ conclusions appear publicly here for the first time, though they have been presented orally at academic forums in Australia, the US, China, Taiwan, and New Zealand to a positive reception.

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The final section of the book analyses Chinese foreign policy from two different perspectives. The first paper is Phillip C. Saunders’ analysis of China’s Asia strategy and how it relates to the South Pacific. Saunders considers how China might use its growing power in the future, and assesses how other Asian and global powers are likely to respond to a more powerful and more influential China. He also examines likely implications if current trends continue, and potential developments that might alter China’s regional policy. Saunders argues that China’s reassurance strategy has been remarkably successful in preserving a stable regional environment and persuading its neighbours to view China as an opportunity rather than a threat. However, despite China’s restrained and constructive regional behavior over the last decade, significant concerns remain about how a stronger and less constrained China might behave in the future. In the second chapter of this section Jian Yang critiques what he calls “‘China threat’ theories on the South Pacific”. Yang says the South Pacific “China threat” discourse is characterised by its assertiveness and superficiality. He says that despite the claims of some analysts, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China’s deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. Rather, he argues that China’s main strategic interests in the region are the goal of resolving the Taiwan issue and furthering China’s economic development. Yang asserts that the South Pacific has little strategic value to China’s national security either at present, or in the foreseeable future. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its “no-strings-attached” aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. According to Yang, China has neither the hard power, nor the soft power, to become a genuine hegemon in the region. Looking North, Looking South offers a range of fresh perspectives on the implications of China and Taiwan’s activities in the South Pacific. I am grateful to all those who have helped this book come into fruition including: John Henderson, who first invited me to work with him on the topic of China-Pacific affairs; James To, who was my able assistant in organizing the conference on the same theme as the book and liaising with potential contributors for this book project; Lara Hawke, whose sharp eye for detail helped the index come together; Shiyavanthi

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Johnpillai, with whom I have now worked on getting three books ready for publication, who was as meticulous as ever in producing a highquality proof; and Dr K.K. Phua, Chairman of World Scientific, who valued the topic and its approach and who has given his full support to this book being published. I would also like to thank my husband Z.J. for his support and encouragement throughout this whole project, which all started with a discussion paper back in 2004. I dedicate this book, with love, to our three children: Francesca, Silas, and Matteo. Anne-Marie Brady

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Joel Atkinson is currently a visiting professor, Department of International Relations at University of Seoul, Korea. Anne-Marie Brady is an Associate-Professor in Political Science at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, New Zealand, specialising in Chinese politics. Ron Crocombe was, until his death in 2009, the leading expert on Pacific affairs. Fergus Hanson is a Researcher at the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia. John Henderson is an Associate-Professor in the Political Science Programme at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, New Zealand and a leading expert on Oceanic politics and New Zealand foreign policy. Cheng-yi Lin is a Senior Researcher at the Academia Sinica in Taiwan. Bertil Lintner is a world-renowned journalist specialising in the AsiaPacific region. Phillip C. Saunders is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, in the National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA.

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Tamara Renee Shie is a political analyst at the US Embassy, in Jakarta, Indonesia. James To is a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Programme, at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, New Zealand. Jian Yang is a Senior Lecturer in the Political Studies Department of the University of Auckland, in Auckland, New Zealand.

Part One China and Taiwan’s South Pacific Rivalry

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Chapter 1 THE SOUTH PACIFIC: CHINA’S NEW FRONTIER

Bertil Lintner

Treasure islands There is nothing wrong or unusual about the food at Ang’s Chinese restaurant. In fact, the roast duck served there is excellent as is its hotand-sour soup. It is just the way the place looks. The yard is surrounded by high walls with razor wire and surveillance cameras. Two security guards watch the entrance and open the sliding iron gate only if customers, in their vehicle, appear to be genuinely wanting to have just a meal. Having satisfied the guards and parked the car inside the gate, lunch or dinner guests are met by another steel door guarded by more watchmen. They will not only shut the door but lock it once the guests are in the actual restaurant building. Then they may enjoy Ang’s oriental fare in peace. According to a 2005 survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit, Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New Guinea, is the worst place to live among 130 world capitals and major cities. Two-thirds of all households were victims of crime in the first five months of 2005, and weapons were used in just over half of these instances. The murder rate is three times that of Moscow and 23 times higher than in London. Once a pretty town with a fine natural harbour, Port Moresby has become a law and order nightmare. Papua New Guinea’s notorious raskols—Pidgin English for rascals— are everywhere. They are gangs of young men for whom crime has 3

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become a way of life. Having moved into Port Moresby from the highlands or elsewhere in the countryside, they end up in shantytowns and suburbs where unemployment rates hover between 70 and 90 percent. And they were born into a culture where tribal warfare, vendettas and violence are deeply ingrained. Add the availability of firearms in urban areas, and it is not surprising that Port Moresby’s homes resemble top security prisons.1 It is also not difficult to understand why so many Australians— citizens of the former colonial power—and other Western expatriates have left or are leaving. At independence in 1975, there were nearly 50,000 non-citizens in the country. Now only a few thousand Australians, Britons and Germans remain. But, as the chatter in Ang’s restaurant indicates, newly-arrived mainland Chinese are replacing them as businessmen, contractors and importers-exporters. Jerry Singirok, a former Papua New Guinea Defence Force commander, wrote in a local newspaper in 2005: “Australia has always considered Papua New Guinea as its backyard [but] since 2000, Papua New Guinea has increased its bilateral relations with China in areas of trade, investment and the military…China is here to stay.”2 Many are indeed here to stay permanently. According to various estimates, there could be anywhere between 10,000 and 30,000 Chinese citizens in the country. Many of them are here illegally, but Papua New Guinea residence permits and even passports are not difficult to obtain. Corruption is endemic at all levels in the government and local administration. Aid from China comes in handy when countries such as Australia threaten to cut their assistance because of allegations of corruption, nepotism and abuse of power. Tarcy Eli, a high-ranking foreign ministry official, stated in 2005: “China’s rising status as an economic power is becoming an important pillar for developing countries like Papua New Guinea…China’s voice at the United Nations is one for the developing world.”3 According to Singirok, “Covertly, major powers are cautious and apprehensive about China’s greater role in the region in terms of trading and military.”4 That may be so, but it would be hard to lure anyone from

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those “major powers” to work, let alone settle, in Port Moresby—unless they are prepared to stay behind high walls with razor wire, and security guards with guns and ferocious dogs. But all this does not seem to deter Papua New Guinea’s new Chinese migrants and settlers. Papua New Guinea, with its vast reserves of minerals, timber, oil and gas has attracted not only private businessmen but Chinese state enterprises as well. In the mid-1990s, only 0.5 percent of Papua New Guinea’s log exports went to China. Today it is 80 percent. In the 1990s New Guinea’s mining sector was dominated mainly by Australian but also British and Canadian companies. Today, China is moving in there as well. Papua New Guinea has nickel, cobalt, copper, and, in the highlands, even gold. In 2003, the China Metallurgical Group became the majority shareholder of Ramu NiCo, which owns a nickel mine near Madang on the northeastern coast of the country. As Geoffrey York, a Canadian journalist, reported in January 2009: “With a planned investment of 1.4 billion US dollars and an expected lifespan of 20 to 40 years, Ramu is one of the biggest mining projects China has ever attempted overseas. And China Metallurgical is determined to do it right.”5 A red Chinese banner flies over the tallest new building in Madang. This is the headquarters of Ramu NiCo, which has financed some construction projects and built a bridge over one of the rivers in the area. But it has not done everything right. In early 2007, Papua New Guinea’s labour minister, David Tibu, paid a surprise visit to the mine. He found that the local workers were treated like slaves. They were paid less than three US dollars a day and given tins of fish as compensation for overtime work. Christianity is strong in the area, but the workers were not allowed to go to church on Sundays. When they went anyway, the company deducted a day’s work from their pay. The canteen where the workers ate was “not fit for pigs,” the minister declared, and the toilets were filthy. Tibu’s findings made the headlines of the country’s newspapers—and prompted the Chinese to embark on a vigorous PR drive. The Chinese-owned company pledged to set aside millions of dollars to build clinics, schools and churches, and to support rugby and basketball teams, local farmers and festivals.

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But many villagers were still unhappy when York visited the site in late 2008: “Tensions have sometimes erupted into violence. In August, a Chinese security officer was badly injured in a struggle with protesting villagers near the nickel refinery site, about two hours by boat from Madang. Guards still roam around the site, protecting the workers from further attacks by the landowners.” The main problem seems to be that the natives consider that the land in and around the site belongs to traditional landowners, while the Chinese do not have any real concept of private land ownership. York quoted a local radio journalist in Madang as saying that, “the Chinese have a system where everything is owned by the government, and the government tells you what to do. Their deal for the Ramu project is on a government-to-government basis. The Chinese don’t understand the value of land to the people.”6 Another controversy is over the Chinese company’s failure to obtain legal work permits for many of its technicians and engineers. In November 2008, police arrested 213 Chinese employees of the Ramu mine for having entered the country on improper permits. The company was hit with a 720,000 US dollar fine for breaching labour laws and blasted in the national media, which accused it of importing Chinese workers for jobs that locals could do. It was not the first time Chinese nationals were involved in a document forgery in Papua New Guinea. In 2000, it was revealed that officers from Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Affairs Department were involved in a major passport scam together with some non-citizens. In a “Special Brief” for the Foreign Minister—stamped “secret” and dated November 2000—the country’s National Intelligence Organisation, NIO, stated that it had “written literally dozens of briefs on various Papua New Guinea scams involving human smuggling, phony entry permits, and false passports.”7 But none of these scams could operate without the compliance of corrupt bureaucrats, the NIO concluded. The brief went on to name two government officials who had helped not only Chinese but also Sri Lankans, other Asians and even Africans obtain Papua New Guinea passports, which were then used to stay in the country, or travel on to Australia or New Zealand.


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Chinese-owned shops and small restaurants have sprung up all over Papua New Guinea by migrants using false passports and work permits, and often using locals as fronts. In Madang, and the capital Port Moresby, nearly half of the fast-food outlets and shops are owned by newly arrived Chinese migrants. There are allegations that Chinese shop owners send their earnings to foreign banks, and that little money stay in the country.8 Resentment of the migrants is growing. In September 2007, police fired warning shots at local people who were looting and ransacking Chinese-owned businesses in Mount Hagen in the Western Highlands. Even schoolchildren were reportedly seen running away with clothing, food and kitchenware. Several shops and warehouses were burnt to the ground and the gangs of looters hit back at the police with a barrage of stones.9 In May 2009, tens of thousands of Papuans went on a rampage, looting Chinese-run stores. At least four people were killed in the mayhem, which began with a fight between Chinese and Papuan workers at the Ramu nickel refinery, and soon spread to Lae, Papua New Guinea’s second city, and through the highlands. In Port Moresby, a protest march was held to petition the government to reduce the immigrations of “Asians”—a general term that refers to ethnic Chinese, mainly from China but also Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries.10 It is not only native Papuans who have reacted against the influx of newcomers from China. Papua New Guinea actually has one of the oldest Chinese communities in the Pacific. In the late 19th century, the island of New Guinea was divided between the Netherlands, which controlled the western half, Germany which had made the northeastern quarter its colony, and Britain, which from Australia ruled the southeastern part called Papua. It was an artificial, colonial division where borders were straight lines on the map drawn up in Europe. Britain and the Netherlands were not keen on encouraging Chinese immigration, but the Germans imported hundreds of Cantonese-speaking Chinese workers from the southern province of Guangdong each year to work on tobacco and coconut plantations, and as cooks or domestic servants for German officials and entrepreneurs. Some Chinese later

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became mechanics, carpenters and tailors required in the colonial economy. When World War I broke out in Europe in 1914, British-Australian forces took over the German colony. Some Chinese were repatriated and restrictions were imposed on those who remained. But many were not sent back to China, and some moved to other parts of the now combined territory of Papua New Guinea. In the late 1940s, after World War II, many Chinese came to play an important role as middlemen servicing the needs of the growing urban population. By then Britain had handed over the territory to its Commonwealth partner Australia.11 About 3,000 Chinese and part-Chinese lived in Papua New Guinea before independence in 1975. But many Chinese were worried about their future in a Papuan-ruled nation, and it was even unclear if they were going to be given Papua New Guinean citizenship. As a consequence, most of them emigrated to Australia and more moved out when raskol violence became a problem in the 1990s. But at least a thousand stayed behind, and one of those of mixed blood, Julius Chan, served as the country’s prime minister in 1980-82 and again in 1994-97. They were, however, a tiny minority in a country of 6.3 million people. Then came the newcomers. There is a wide gap between them and the Chinese who have been there for generations. Christine Inglis of the University of Sydney says that “‘local’ and ‘overseas’ Chinese are distinguished by more than birthplace and period of settlement. A cultural and social divide separates the locally born Cantonese speakers, who have been extensively influenced by contacts with Australians and other Europeans, from the new arrivals, few of whom speak Cantonese and have much closer links with traditional Chinese culture.”12 Many Chinese old-timers also feel closer to the Republic of China, or Taiwan, than the communist-ruled People’s Republic of China. That divide reflects a broader issue in the Pacific: rivalry between mainland China and Taiwan. Less than about two dozen countries recognise Taipei as the legitimate government of China—and six of them are small Pacific island nations: Kiribati, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands. The rest are a few African and


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Latin American states, and island nations in the Caribbean. Taiwan’s new Guomindang government has tried to downplay the diplomatic rivalry and declared an unofficial “diplomatic detente” as not to further antagonise the regime in Bejing, which happened under the previous government of the Democratic Progressive Party that advocated independence for Taiwan. But, even so, the fact that Taipei is recognised by some countries is essential to prove its status as a separate political entity with its own administration. Taipei’s efforts to get official diplomatic support for “the Republic of China” therefore always come with generous offers of aid, something that the impoverished island-countries of the Pacific badly need. Beijing has adopted similar tactics to deny Taiwan recognition. China’s aid to the Pacific’s largest and most resource-rich state, Papua New Guinea, is now second only to that of Australia, and Beijing has funded government buildings in Vanuatu, Samoa and the Cook Islands new sports stadiums for Fiji, Samoa, Kiribati and the Federated States of Micronesia. China now has more diplomats in the region than any other country. Officers from the Pacific countries which maintain armed forces have been being trained at China’s National Defence Academy in Beijing. China has also helped with equipment, computer systems, tents, uniforms, gymnasiums and other supplies, martial arts trainers and interpreters to all those countries—and appointed a military attaché to Papua New Guinea.13 But there is also another dimension to Beijing’s efforts to deny Taipei recognition from nations in the Pacific. While the attention of the United States after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington became focused on Afghanistan and Iraq, China began to gain even more influence in what had long been regarded as America’s home turf, the Pacific. Some analysts have even suggested that the ocean is becoming the venue for a new Cold War where the United States and China compete for client states and strategic advantage. Benjamin Reilly, a senior lecturer at the Australian National University in Canberra, argues that China is expanding its influence over the Pacific with “the long-term aim of challenging the United States as the prime mover in the Pacific. It can no longer be taken for granted that Oceania will remain a relatively benign ‘American Lake’.” The very

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weakness of Pacific island states makes them vulnerable as a strategic resource for China, Reilly asserts.14 Taiwan’s interests in the Pacific are clear and relatively narrow. Besides its need for diplomatic recognition, it also has economic interests to defend. Its fishing fleets are some of the largest in the region, operating across central and western Pacific. Beijing, on the other hand, has more far-reaching interests in the Pacific. Mohan Malik, an Indian-born China analyst at the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Honolulu argues that, “in the short term, it wants to isolate Taiwan in the international community. But in the medium and longer term its goal is to challenge and eventually displace the United States as the guardian and protector of the Pacific.”15 According to Mailk, Beijing wants to emerge as a major Pacificregion aid donor and economic partner, which would undermine the influence of the United States in the region and Oceania’s special ties with Washington and the West. He also argues that increased Chinese tourism and emigration are part of Beijing’s strategy of “economic penetration of Oceania.” In recent years, thousands of Chinese have settled not only in Papua New Guinea but all over the Pacific where they are also running grocery stores, restaurants and other small businesses, resulting in entirely economic patterns in the region. The realisation of China’s ambition to develop a blue-water navy, which it now lacks, would further increase its influence in the Pacific. Today, despite recent developments, the region is not at the top of Beijing’s list of security priorities. Taiwan and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea figure much more prominently. But China has seen how Japan and other countries have historically used the Pacific Islands to build their Pacific empires. In the 19th century, the region was effectively divided between Britain, France and Germany. The United States took over the independent kingdom of Hawaii in 1898 and, in the same year, seized Guam from the Spanish. A year later, the islands of Samoa were divided between the United States and Germany. After World War I, Japan expanded into the Pacific as it took over the German colonies of the Marshall Islands, the Northern Marianas, Palau and the Carolines, now Micronesia—small islands but with vast areas of


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ocean under their jurisdiction. That eventually led to war with the United States, when Japanese forces attacked Hawaii’s Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941. Although there is no evidence that China will seek to expand its influence by waging war, it seems inevitable that its economic, political and strategic interests in the region will clash with those of the United States in the longer term. Apart from being preoccupied with its Middle Eastern imbroglio, it is also clear how much Washington needs Beijing’s support there and with issues such as North Korea. The United States has even pulled out diplomats from the Pacific and downgraded its presence in the region. This has created a vacuum that China is taking full advantage of. The islands of Melanesia have always been vulnerable to outside penetration as they have no real concept of nationhood. More than 800 languages are spoken in Papua New Guinea and the 192,000 inhabitants of the much smaller Vanuatu speak 114 different languages. And there are bitter memories of Western colonisation, which were often a brutal experience. The missionaries, who arrived in Melanesia in the mid-tolate 19th century, condemned indigenous cultures as “pagan” and often ran roughshod over the local population. Measles, gonnorhoea, syphilis and smallpox came with the European sailors, and unscrupulous traders kidnapped the natives and sold them to plantations in Queensland, Australia. This practice, called “blackbirding,” continued throughout the 19th century, and almost entirely depleted the populations of many of the islands.16 During the colonial era, several thousand Chinese settled not only in Papua New Guinea but also in the Solomon Islands, where they came to dominate many aspects of commercial life. Today, the capital Honiara actually has its own distinct Chinatown consisting of a cluster of general stores selling all kinds of foodstuff and consumer goods. The sales assistants were mostly locals, and the Chinese owners are usually seated on high beachguard-style chairs, overlooking their stores and collecting money from the customers. It is a rather provocative scene and it could be argued that it would have been better for the Chinese store-owners to be a bit more considerate and supervise from the floor rather than from above, especially when the racial differences are so obvious: fair-skinned Chinese versus black Melanesians.17

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In fact, they have every reason to be more discreet. The Solomons has only about half a million people but it is a deeply divided, violent society. In the late 1990s, ethnic tension between people from different islands erupted into violent clashes. The capital Honiara is located on Guadalcanal, the richest of the islands. After independence from Britain in 1978, it began to attract migrants from the poorer nearby island of Malaita, which the tribes of Guadalcanal resented. In 1999, a local militia that styled itself as the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army began to terrorise Malaitian settlers, who responded by forming the Malaitan Eagle Force. Both groups were armed with guns as well as machetes and axes and equally brutal. Hundreds of people died in the fighting, and it did not end until Australia and New Zealand in October 2000 managed to mediate a settlement between the two forces. The Solomons, like Papua New Guinea, is a tribal society with little or no national cohesion. The lingua franca in both countries—and in nearby Vanuatu—is Pidgin, a bastardised kind of primitive English that was first introduced by European traders, who treated the natives as children and spoke to them in a descriptive, child-like language. It may sound like gibberish to most outsiders, but the fact that there is a common language in these ethnically divided societies has contributed to a sense of nationhood, albeit weak and fragile. And the tension in Solomon Islands never fully died down. In July 2003, a new contingent of Australian and Pacific Island troops arrived under the auspices of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, or RAMSI. Since that time, the Solomon Islands have been considered by many a failed state, unable to solve it own problems and dependent entirely on outside forces to maintain law and order. The Solomons have also been heavily exploited by unscrupulous logging companies, mainly from Malaysia but also from South Korea and some other countries. Around 80 percent of the Solomon Islands; 27,540 square kilometres are—or until recently were—covered with tropical rainforest. Since the early 1990s, the timber industry has been a significant sector in the economy, contributing 20 percent of government revenues annually, and more than 50 percent of export revenues. Laws


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have been enacted to regulate the logging industry, but rampant corruption has rendered those restrictions meaningless. Malaysian companies began raping the forests of the Solomon Islands and defrauding the people there to the extent that alarm bells sounded even at home in Malaysia. In 1996, in an unprecedented move, the then Malaysian deputy Prime Minister—and now opposition leader—Anwar Ibrahim called on Malaysian companies to be sensitive to environmental issues and not overlog. But no one was prepared to listen. And a 2005 report commissioned by the Solomon Islands government found that large amounts of tax had not been paid by the logging companies as they routinely bribed local politicians to obtain unlawful “exemptions.” Vast quantities of logs continue to be shipped out of the country.18 Most loggers from Malaysia were ethnic Chinese, which inevitably gave rise to anti-Chinese sentiments in the Solomons. It also meant that any Chinese was seen as an exploiter with little or no concern for local sensibilities, whether he was an ordinary local shopkeeper or someone who raped the environment. About 2,000 of Honiara’s 50,000 inhabitants are ethnic Chinese, and most of them have been living there peacefully for generations. Over the years, they worked hard and managed to set up retail stores and other businesses and thus came to dominate both wholesale and retail trade in Honiara. And, although the Solomons recognises Taipei and not Beijing, new settlers arrived from mainland China throughout the 1990s. The Solomons were ripe for another ethnic explosion. In April 2006, long-simmering discontent with the economically more powerful Chinese—old-timers as well as newly-arrived migrants from China and Southeast Asia—erupted into violent riots. The trigger was allegations that the newly elected Prime Minister Snyder Rini had used bribes from Chinese businessmen to buy votes of members of Parliament. Protesters armed with knives and axes threatened to destroy the entire capital unless Rini stepped down. Inevitably, the Chinese were the main targets and victims of the riots. Honiara’s Chinatown was almost levelled following looting and arson. The rioters also attacked the Pacific Casino on the waterfront between downtown Honiara and the airport, which was renowned for Chinese—in this case Taiwanese—money-laundering.

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But many victims were from the mainland, and since Taiwan—not China—has an embassy in Honiara, they appealed to China’s mission in Port Moresby for help. Beijing sent four chartered planes to evacuate several hundred of its citizens, and 21 from Hong Kong. They were airlifted to Port Moresby, and then on to Guangzhou in China.19 Australia, New Zealand and Fiji sent extra troops to the Solomons to help restore peace, and the Solomon Islands Governor-General Sir Nathaniel Waena—the local representative of the Queen of Britain, the Solomons’ Head of State—officially apologised to the Chinese community. He also appealed to those who had left to return if they still regarded the islands as their home. Rini was forced to resign. The Taiwanese denied any political interference in the Solomons, but it is undeniable that “check-book diplomacy” by Taiwan as well as mainland China has fuelled corruption not only in the Solomons but all over the Pacific. Taiwan is a major donor to the Solomon Islands government, which has received millions of dollars in aid for rural development projects, educational scholarships and urban infrastructure development. The Taiwan government has funded a hospital and an agricultural research station in Honiara, staffed partly by Taiwanese personnel. In 2007, 20 Solomon Islands policemen were trained in Taipei, and Taiwan is becoming more involved in the country’s security services, perhaps to keep an eye on newly arrived migrants from mainland China. On the seedier side was the now destroyed Pacific Casino, which was also where Robert Goh, a wealthy local Chinese businessman, had his office. He once served as advisor to Rini’s predecessor as Prime Minister, Allan Kemakeza, whose administration was tainted by corruption allegations. Kemakeza was also very close to other ethnic Chinese businessmen. Among them was Thomas, or Tommy Chan, father of Laurie Chan, Foreign Minister in the Kemakeza government. Tommy Chan owned the Honiara Hotel in Chinatown, where Rini and his followers camped in the run up to the elections. Chan was also the president of a group of influential parliamentarians called the Association of Independent Members of Parliament, to which Rini belonged.20


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Even if official ties with Taiwan are stronger than with China, local Solomon Islanders seldom comprehend the difference between the “two Chinas.” Even the Malaysian loggers are seen as belonging to the same group of “outsiders” who have come to dominate all economic aspects of their country—and to interfere in local politics. Asians have earned a bad name in the Solomon Islands, but what is the solution? Shortly after the April 2006 riots, Solomon Islands Labour Party leader Joses Tuhanuku stated that the ethnic crisis in 2006 was much worse than the clashes between the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army and the Malaitan Eagle Force in 1999-2000: “People feel that they have lost their country. The Solomon Islands are no longer in the hands of Solomon Islanders, it is now in the hands of the Chinese who control the economic life of the country, and now they are taking over the political life of the country.”21 Tuhanuku’s sentiments were shared by many other Solomon Islanders. Also commenting on the riots in an article in the local newspaper, the Solomon Star, veteran civil servant George Manimu observed that people have long resented their leaders’ giving preferential treatment to foreigners, especially Asians, when it came to trade, logging, and fisheries. “Business areas, often referred to as reserved for nationals, have also become dominated by Asian entrepreneurs,” Manimu wrote. “The actions of the people (during the riots), although criminal, reflect the release of bottled up frustrations and anger that they could not contain any longer.” As is the case in Port Moresby, there is widespread poverty and unemployment among young people, who make up most of the population in both places. There are no raskols in Honiara, but groups of restless young men can be seen loitering in the streets. It takes very little to ignite a riot.22 The rivalry between China and Taiwan—and the influx of Chinese businessmen and settlers to the Pacific region—is bound to result in more riots similar to those in Honiara in April 2006. And then there could perhaps be even an even more direct Chinese intervention than just airlifting nationals, as was done after the Honiara riots. As soon as the evacuees had been repatriated, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao instructed the Foreign Ministry in Beijing to “take measures to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals” in the Solomon Islands.23 In 2003 and 2006, Australian-led forces restored law and order,

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but what if China decides to send troops to protect its citizens and interests in the region? As Jerry Singirok, the former Papua New commander, said in 2005: “China is here to stay.” The mineral resources and vast forest reserves of Melanesia are too high a price to give up. And then there are long-term strategic considerations, which China’s security planners would be most unwilling to reconsider only because of some anti-Chinese riots in the Solomons or law and order problems in Papua New Guinea. Pearls of the Pacific Two buildings stand out on Beach Road, the main street through Samoa’s capital Apia. Near the town’s landmark clock tower is Chan Mow’s shopping centre, an imposing old building first opened as Burns Philps department store in 1934. Across the road and a green park towers the modern, seven-storey Government Building, erected in 1994 with a multi-million dollar interest free loan from the People’s Republic of China. The former represents the economic power of Samoa’s old Chinese; the latter the growing influence of China in this Polynesian nation of 185,000 people. Samoa has a small but prosperous Chinese community that dates back to pre-World War I days—and Samoa has had diplomatic ties with Beijing since November 6, 1975, the first of the Pacific islands to recognise the People’s Republic of China after Fiji, which established relations with Beijing a day ahead, on November 5. When Chan Mow took over the shopping centre in the mid-1990s, not long before he died, he was already one of the richest men in the country. But his life story also reflects the discrimination the Chinese had to endure when Samoa was ruled by colonial powers. The Germans, who arrived at the turn of the last century, were the first outsiders to take possession of the islands and they imported labour from China to work on coconut plantations and as domestic servants. In total, over 6,000 Chinese left for Samoa between 1903 and 1913, most of them from the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. The voyages to Samoa took about three weeks, with no ports of call along the way. It was an arduous journey with appalling conditions on the ships. A


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Chinese labourer later recalled: “Life onboard the ship was monotonous. Long hours were spent simply day-dreaming. No typhoons buffetted the ship. No sightings of playful dolphins nor whales, mammoth denizens of the deep. Not even that of a passing freighter. Crowded conditions prevailed. The men slept on double and triple-decker bunk beds in the hot and stuffy hold of the ship. Ventilation was poor, lighting dim, comforts minimal and sometimes the stench overpowering from the vomit of the seasick.”24 Many died on their way to Samoa, and those who survived the journey soon discovered that their employers did not adhere to the terms of contracts they had agreed upon while recruiting workers in China. Samoa was not the tropical paradise they had seen on posters in Guangdong and Fujian. Working conditions on the plantations were harsh, and, as Samoan historian Featuna’i Ben Liuaana put it, “to make matters worse, the German government sanctioned flogging for the minutest conduct, at twenty lashes each, once a week, before a government official, as if his presence made it less barbaric.”25 Then, in 1914, World War I broke out and New Zealand occupied the islands. Most Germans and Chinese were repatriated to their respective countries, but more than 800 Chinese stayed on in Samoa. All of them were men—and, in 1921, the new New Zealand authorities introduced a law prohibiting marriages between Chinese and Samoans. But many Chinese nevertheless lived together with Samoan women, and had children. So in 1931, the colonial power made it illegal for Chinese even to enter Samoan houses, and Samoan women entering the homes of labourers. The Samoan race had to be kept “pure” and the authorities must contain what a New Zealand official called “the yellow taint which was coming down through the Pacific.”26 But labour was still needed in Samoa, and between 1920 and 1934, New Zealand arranged for eight shipments from China carrying 3,116 men. The last shipment included Chinese from Taishan, or Toishan, in Guangdong province, a district that at the time saw massive emigration because of severe poverty. Most of the Toishan migrants ended up in New York, but those who went to Samoa were lured into signing contracts which once again did not tell the whole truth. Nancy W.Y. Tom, an ethnic Chinese, wrote in her detailed 1986 study The Chinese in

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Western Samoa, 1875-1985: the Dragon Came From Afar: “The agents wove an appealing tale of happy and well-fed Chinese in the islands accompanied by pretty brown-skinned belles clutching almond-eyed babies in their arms relaxing under the swaying fronds of stately coconut palms.”27 The reality was entirely different, and the newly arrived Chinese suffered from not only inhuman working conditions but also the terror of their own criminal gangs, secret societies which had followed the labourers to the islands—and still are active in some of the now independent Pacific states. The gangs extorted “protection money” from the labourers, and threatened to beat those who refused to pay. They also imported opium from China, sometimes via Hawaii, where many more Chinese had settled. A huge opium addiction problem afflicted the Chinese in Samoa. The colonial authorities made the importation of opium illegal, but that only led to the emergence of a thriving black market. And the smugglers were not only Chinese; many New Zealanders also brought in opium on ships from China. With little else to do, many Chinese spent their free time, when they had any, gambling in dens run by criminal gangs. The gambling trapped many Chinese in debt, while others became drug addicts. Nearly all Chinese were repatriated after World War II, and, in September 1948, the last Chinese repatriates were literally dragged onto the ships despite protests by Samoan families and friends, leaving behind spouses and children. But some with Samoan families managed to stay behind. Chan Mow was one of them. He had arrived in Samoa in 1934 with nothing and, as Ron Crocombe, the world’s leading expert on the Pacific, wrote in his study of Asians in the region, “began as a groundsman and plantation labourer, working as a share-cropper till late at night, and , on Sundays, selling pork from his bicycle.” He managed to save enough money to open a restaurant, grocery, farm, bakery and wholesale business—and, eventually, Samoa’s main shopping centre. At his funeral in 1996, Apia was brought to a standstill. Thousands of mourners showed up, among them Samoa’s Head of State, Malietoa Tanumafili II, Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana and his entire cabinet


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as well as leaders of the political opposition. The requiem mass—Chan Mow was a Roman Catholic—was celebrated by Cardinal Pio Taofinu’u. And, as a testimony to the futility of the old, colonial law banning sexual relationships between Chinese and Samoans, he left behind a Samoan wife, 13 children, 37 grandchildren and eight great grandchildren.28 Unlike in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, there are not any overt racial discrimination or prejudices in Samoa. The old laws separating the Chinese and the Samoans are, of course, long gone and many people are obviously of mixed blood. Most of the general stores and restaurants are owned by people of Chinese descent, but the lack of anti-Chinese sentiments had made it possible for Chinese, and people of mixed Chinese-Samoan blood, to become civil servants and elected members of parliament. In 1997, the new Miss Pacific was even a Samoan-Chinese, Verona Ah Ching. Some anti-Chinese feelings have remained though, and, in 2005, an opposition politician, A’eau Peniamina, began to question what he called “China’s real motives,” and warned Samoans “to be careful of the Chinese [because] they can run you out of business as seen elsewhere.” Few Samoans are employed in regular jobs other than for the government and as waiters in restaurants in Apia, cleaners in hotels and other service jobs. Many live on remittances from more than 100,000 Samoans who have settled in New Zealand. Even so, when a Chinese firm set up a factory outside Apia to make cashmere garments—a labour intensive industry—it decided to employ women from China for the purpose. This has caused some resentment, but Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi struck back against Peniamina’s statements: “That is racist and I will not stand for any racism in this Parliament.” Peniamina’s remarks about the threat posed by a few hundred migrants from mainland China were also remarkable in that Taiwan is known to have funded the opposition in Samoa in an attempt to break the country’s close relationship Beijing. In 1976, a year after Samoa and Beijing established diplomatic relations, the then Head of State, Malietoa Tanumafili II, travelled to the People’s Republic of China on an official state visit, the first by a head of state of a Pacific nation. He was given a red carpet welcome,

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emphasising the importance Beijing places on relations with the small Pacific states. The Samoan Head of State held talks with the then Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng and, according to an announcement at the time an agreement was signed “on economic and technical cooperation between the two countries,” which, in effect, meant Chinese aid to Samoa—as Samoa had nothing offer to China other than its strategic location in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.29 Apart from the Government Building in central Apia, China has also provided an interest-free loan to build a women’s centre on the outskirts of the capital. In February 2008, China announced that it would transfer yet another loan on favourable terms, now in the order of 44 million US dollars, to build more government buildings and a conference facility. Since 1976, China has maintained an active embassy in Samoa, the oldest in the Pacific. And, since 2005, Chinese television has the largest TV presence in the country. Samoa has become China’s closest and staunchest ally in the South Pacific. One reason for China’s eagerness to court the Pacific countries is that each state, no matter how small, has a seat at the United Nations. Today, there are twelve independent Pacific nations—excluding New Zealand—and all of them are UN members. Oli Brown at the Genevabased International Institute for Sustainable Development has pointed out that, “in total, the 7.5 million people of the independent states of the Pacific have more voting power in international fora like the General Assembly of the United Nations than the 3.5 billion people of China, India, Japan and the United States combined.”30 And of those 7.5 million people, more than six million live in Papua New Guinea. The next most populous country is Fiji with 837,000 inhabitants followed by the Solomon Islands and 552,000 people. Hence the intense diplomatic rivalry between Taiwan and China. Taiwan wants diplomatic allies as well as supporters in the United Nations its own bid to re-enter the organisation, which it left when Beijing took over China’s seat in 1971. China is equally eager to ensure that Taiwan does not get that support, and every vote counts. Tuvalu with 26 square kilometres and Nauru with 21 are the two smallest members by population of the


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United Nations. Tuvalu has only 11,000 inhabitants and Nauru, the world’s smallest republic, 13,000. But there are also strategic considerations behind China’s new-found interest in Polynesia as well as Micronesia to the northwest. These island nations may lack the mineral resources and forests of Melanesia and they have tiny land areas. But their sea areas and economic exclusion zones are huge. The 100,000 inhabitants of the Republic of Kiribati live on 726 square kilometres of land—but its 32 atolls and one raised coral island are dispersed over 3.5 million square kilometres, a strategically located area in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and straddling the equator. The Kingdom of Tonga has 112,000 inhabitants on 748 square kilometres of land—and an ocean area of 700,000 square kilometres. Even the tiny Cook Islands, still not fully independent but a territory in “free association” with New Zealand, has a sea area of 1.8 million square kilometres. And barely 15,000 Cook Islanders live on 240 square kilometres of land. The outside power that wins over these small island nations can control the Pacific, the world’s largest ocean, and the buffer between Asia and America. In recent years, however, the Cook Islands has developed strong relations with China. The biggest and newest buildings in the capital Avarura are the court house and a police station—both built with Chinese aid and by workers brought in from China. Ron Crocombe, the New Zealand-born dean of Pacific studies and a permanent resident of the Cooks, argues that such structures are fairly typical of Chinese aid to the Pacific: China builds symbols of power and authority for the authorities, and huge sports stadiums for the public at large.31 China is no doubt eager to expand its influence over the vast sea area that the Cooks controls, for fishing and, in the long run, to control yet another huge and strategically important piece of the Pacific Ocean. China has offered to build airports and wharfs on the Cooks to facilitate tourism and the fishing industry. But these could also be used for other purposes in times of crises. During World War Two II, the Americans recognised the strategic importance of the Cooks, and built two long runways on the northern aroll of Aitutaki, which until 1974 were longer than those at the international airport on Rarotonga.

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On September 14, 2004, Zhang Wei, spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Wellington, New Zealand, wrote in the Cook Islands News: “China seeks no self-interest in the South Pacific, non-interference is a fundamental principle underpinning China’s relations with South Pacific countries,” and, he asserted, “no strings whatsoever” are attached to Chinese aid. The article prompted Ron Crocombe to retort: “All countries’ foreign relations contain some self-interest, all influence internal affairs, and all aid has strings (some visible but more hidden— sometimes in the pockets and egos of the powerful.) But in recent years China pursues its self-interests more forcefully, interferes more in Pacific Islands internal affairs, and has more strings attached on its aid than any other country…China’s main condition of recognition of any country is that it accepts the ‘One China Policy.’ That is the public first step. Cook Islanders will have to live with other steps already in progress.” China has also used generosity to try to gain influence in French Polynesia, which actually has the largest of the old Chinese communities in the South Pacific. More than 8,000 people of Chinese descent live there, and the first to settle on Tahiti, the main islands, arrived in 1851. Today, there is a building in downtown Papeete with a roof curved in the Chinese style, and “Kuomintang” on a sign outside. Inside, there are portraits of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the founder of the Republic of China, and the flag of the republic which now is confined to Taiwan. The Chinese in French Polynesia have remained loyal to Nationalist rather than shifting their allegiances to Communist-ruled China. But the rivalry became obvious when the largest Chinese temple in the Pacific was built in Papeete in the late 1980s. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, donated a pair of carved dragons on the pillars as well as carvings and a plaque— while the People’s Republic of China’s contribution was a pair of stone lions. It was a rare gesture from Beijing to improve its standing among the Chinese of French Polynesia. However, French rule—and regulations laid down by the European Union—mean that immigration, legal and otherwise, is strictly controlled and citizenship cannot be bought. Consequently, there has been no influx of “new” Chinese to French Polynesia. The “old” Chinese are well established, and some of the richest people in French Polynesia are of


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Chinese descent. French Polynesia’s booming black pearl industry was founded by Robert Tan, who also has a partnership with the territory’s airline, Air Tahiti Nui. Other Chinese in French Polynesia own shops, ships, road transport, import-export businesses, restaurants and hotels. And they hold their celebrations at the local hall of the Kuomintang. France remains the only Western power besides the United States that still maintains a significant presence in the Pacific. Apart from French Polynesia, New Caledonia in Melanesia and the small Polynesian islands of Wallis and Futuna are also “French Overseas Territories.” Britain has given up all its former colonies—except for the island of Pitcairn with only about 50 inhabitants, most of whom are descendants of English and Irish sailors who staged a mutiny on the ship Bounty in 1798, and their Tahitian common-law-wives. European power in the Pacific is waning, and China, although not intending to establish colonies, is expanding its influence on all fronts: economically, politically and diplomatically. A turning point in the fight for control over the Pacific islands came when Tonga in 1998 decided to severe ties with Taiwan—and recognise the People’s Republic of China. Until then, Tonga and Taiwan had been very close allies. Tongan ministers were wined and dined in Taipei, and treated as leaders of some bigger and much more important nation. It is not certain how China managed to win over Tonga, but on November 1, 1998, the Taiwanese were suddenly and for many unexpectedly told to evacuate the rented building near the waterfront in the capital Nuku’alofa that served as the embassy of the Republic of China. A day later, it was announced that the Kingdom of Tonga and the People’s Republic of China had established diplomatic relations. In October 1999, Tongan King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV paid an official visit to China where he received a red-carpet welcome along with promises of aid. And the Chinese were quick to move into Tonga. In July 2000, Wu Quanshu, deputy chief of general staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), visited Tonga, followed in April 2001 by another army deputy, Wei Fulin.32 The following month, May 2001, Fu Quanyou, chief of the PLA, held a meeting in Beijing with Tonga’s army commander, Tau’aika Uta’atu. Tonga is one of very few Pacific island countries with a military force,

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and its links with China have grown steadily since the two countries established diplomatic relations. Addressing a New Zealand parliamentary select committee investigating links with Tonga, Kuli Taumoefolau, a former captain in the Tongan army who now lives in New Zealand, warned Australia and New Zealand “to increase their military links with Tonga or risk greater Chinese influence in the Pacific.” He said that when he was still in the Tongan army, it was obvious that the Chinese military influence was starting to replace that of Tonga’s traditional partners. “They use Tonga as a strategic location for them,” Taumoefolau continued. “When I was the acting commanding officer for the training, operations and intelligence unit, I worked closely with two officers from the People’s Republic of China, and they were there for martial-arts training, which is good, but you see China is slowly moving up there.”33 Then, in October 2004, Tongan King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV paid another official visit to China at the invitation of President Hu Jintao. The King passed away in September 2006 at the age of 88, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Siaosi Tupou V—who paid a state visit to China in April 2008. Evidently, Tonga is important to China, and Beijing spares no effort to maintain friendly relations with the tiny but strategically located Pacific kingdom. There is no other reason why China would befriend Tonga because it is hard to find a more odd couple: China, atheist and still ruled by the Communist Party—and fundamentalist Christian Tonga where a king wields great political authority over an essentially aristocratic system of government controlled by noble families. And with diplomatic relations with China came more migrants who actually had begun to arrive in Tonga in the 1980s. Before that, there was not a single Chinese-owned grocery store in the country. By the early 2000s, more than 70 percent of all stores were owned by newly-arrived Chinese migrants, who made up 3,000-4,000 of Tonga’s population of 100,000. In 2001, Tonga began to expel hundreds of Chinese who had become victims of a wave of ethnic violence. In that year, there had been about 100 cases of assault, armed robbery, burglary and arson of Chinese-owned shops carried out by native Tongans.34


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The Chinese embassy in Nuku’alofa expressed concern about the level of violence against its nationals while the chief immigration officer, Susana Fotu, said the expulsions were in response to “widespread anger at the growing presence of the storekeepers” and the fear that the Chinese had come to dominate the economy. It was a clash between two cultures: Tongan storekeepers were laidback and relaxed, and their stores served more as meeting places for local men than commercial outlets; the Chinese had come to make money, and kept their stores open all day and night, except, of course, on Sundays when they had to be closed. The Chinese were also able to bring in Chinese consumer goods, which were much cheaper than New Zealand and Australian ones sold by Tongan storekeepers, who were soon put out of business. The expulsions did not put an end to the conflict. A year and a half later, in November 2006, years of simmering discontent reached a breaking point. Ostensibly demonstrating for democratic reforms, angry mobs looted and burned at least 30 Chinese-owned stores. Cars were overturned and a reporter from the local news agency, Tonga News, described the looting: “Nuku’alofa is an inferno… and major Chinese outlets are up in smoke. Chinese stores were smashed and empty, save for mobs to carry booty of everything from toilet paper to boxes of chicken.”35 The mayhem did not end until Australian and New Zealand peacekeepers arrived, as they had done in the Solomon Islands a few months earlier. The official Chinese news agency Xinhua reported that the embassy in Nuku’alofa was trying to contact all Chinese residents to make sure they were safe. And, as was the case in the Solomons, Australia could by intervening militarily show the rest of the region that it was still a power to be reckoned with, regardless of increased China’s influence in Tonga and elsewhere in the Pacific. At the forefront of the riots were local youth gangs, unemployed and angry young men—not unlike the situation in Papua New Guinea and the Solomons, It is unlikely that the Tongan authorities will be able to prevent similar riots in the future, and Tonga may well be a testing case for the Chinese authorities preparedness to intervene if the lives of their

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citizens is in danger. And it is important for Beijing to maintain its influence over this island nation with its vast ocean area. China has also made considerable inroads in Fiji, where they are rapidly replacing the old Asian community in that island nation: Indians, who were brought in as indentured labour by the British colonial power in the late 19th and early 20th century. Most of them came from Bengal and Bihar and worked in sugar plantations—and brought with them Indian culture, religion and social structures to the South Pacific. They may have come as labourers, and many of them still are, but like the Chinese elsewhere in the Pacific, they soon came to dominate trade and commerce in Fiji, and soon even politics—which caused conflicts with the local Fijians. This, in turn, led to a series of military coups, which were condemned by Australia and New Zealand. In the wake of the upheavals, these two countries suspended their aid programmes, and India was also forthright in its criticism. The coups have led to the departure of many Indian businessmen and shopkeepers to Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Many of Fiji’s old Chinese residents also left. They—and the Indians—were, however, replaced by new migrants from China. No exact figure has been mentioned, but the number of migrants is significant, and growing. Estimates vary between 5,000 and 22,000. Fiji’s authorities privately put the number at about 15,000, but, according to Robert Keith-Reid, editor of Islands Business until his death in May 2006: “The government doesn’t want to mention the actual figure publicly because of fear of a backlash.”36 And not all Chinese migrants are law-abiding businesspeople. Chinese criminal gangs have established themselves in Fiji and are engaged in prostitution, gambling, drugs, passport fraud, corruption in the fisheries’ industry and corrupting local officials.37 In November 2000, 357 kilogrammes of heroin was seized in Fiji, not for local consumption but to be smuggled on to Australia and North America. The heroin came from Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle, and the gangs thought that Fiji would be a convenient transshipment point for drugs destined for world markets. Who would suspect that a container arriving from Fiji would contain Southeast Asian heroin?


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This has caused concern among Fiji’s old-time Chinese population. Bessie Ng Kumlin Ali, a Fijian-Chinese, wrote in her very personal book The Chinese in Fiji about a 1996 government scheme to invite Chinese from Hong Kong to settle in Fiji after the 1997 handover to China: “Leaders of the Chinese community themselves have voiced their reservation about an influx, which had the potential to spoil longestablished, hard-won relations with other communities.”38 “Chinese oldtimers are worried, especially about the influx of shady newcomers.”39 The first Chinese to arrive in Fiji were cooks and carpenters on American and Australian ships that had come to pick up sandalwood for the market in Guangzhou in the early 19th century. They were never nearly as numerous as the Indians, and at no stage before the recent influx were there more than 5,000 Chinese in Fiji. But, after generations of hard work, most of them had become relatively wealthy, and loyal to the Nationalist Chinese Guomindang, which even had an office in an old colonial mansion in Suva that doubled as a consulate for the Republic of China. When Britain established diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1951, the consulate was closed and its staff returned to Taiwan. Independent Fiji recognised the People’s Republic of China in 1975, and, given the sentiments of many local Chinese is almost paranoid about blocking Taiwan from establishing closer links with the islands. Fiji has not recognised Taiwan, but there is in Suva a “trade mission,” Taiwan’s usual name for its unofficial diplomatic offices overseas. Fiji, in turn, has encouraged investment from both China and Taiwan to make up for the loss of Indian-run businesses and aid from Western democracies. But it is definitely closer to Beijing than to Taipei. The Chinese community is acutely aware of this and now maintains a cautious balance between China and Taiwan. The national days of the People’s Republic—October 1—as well as that of the Republic— October 10—are celebrated with public events sponsored by the respective representatives in Suva. Fiji’s Chinese school, named after the first provisional prsident of the Chinese republic, Sun Yat Sen, benefits from a supply of teachers from Taiwan as well as the mainland.

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In July 2007, a Fiji/China Business Council was set up, and the inauguration ceremony was attended by the Chinese chargé d’affaires in Suva. The guest of honour was Commodore Josaia Voreqe “Frank” Bainimarama, the country’s new military leader, who had seized power in yet another coup in December 2006. Aid from Western countries had been cut again after that coup, so Bainimarama made a plea to China: “The Interim Government is also actively pursuing enhanced level of developmental collaboration with China. In particular, we are working on a number of proposals to seek developmental and soft loan funding from China to assist with upgrading of our rural roads and maritime transportation, provide low cost housing to squatters, improve our water supply and revitalise Fiji’s agricultural sector.” He also pledged to relax visa requirements for Chinese nationals, “to encourage tourism.”40 Chinese aid to Fiji has skyrocketed since the last coup in December 2006, from 900,000 to 135 million US dollars. Just as Australia and other Western donors are trying to squeeze Fiji’s military-appointed government, China has dramatically stepped up its aid, effectively dissipating any pressure Western donors might have been generating. In August 2008, Bainimarama visited Beijing, where he stated: “Fiji will not forget that when other countries were quick to condemn us following the events of 1987, 2000 and 2006, China and other friends in Asia demonstrated a more understanding and sensitive approach to events in Fiji. The Government of the People’s Republic of China expressed confidence in our ability to resolve our problems in our way, without undue pressure or interference.”41 When Western countries make “unreasonable” demands for democracy and good governance, China is always willing to step in, in Fiji as in Papua New Guinea. China is indeed here to stay, anti-Chinese riots or no riots in Tonga and the Solomon Islands. The spying game On November 7, 2003, Taiwan pulled off its biggest coup in the Pacific. The then foreign minister, Eugene Chien, announced that “the Republic of China and the Republic of Kiribati have established diplomatic


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relations.” Kiribati may consist of little more than a collection of lowlying atolls spread out over a huge area in the South Pacific—but, more importantly, it was where China had established a satellite tracking station, the only one of its kind outside the mainland. Kiribati, which straddles the Equator, is an ideal place for satellite-tracking.42 Within days of the announcement, China vacated its embassy in Tarawa, the capital of Kiribati, and began dismantling the tracking station. Diplomats from Taiwan moved into their new embassy building in Bairiki. The satellite station was set up in 1997 and, in October 2003, the facility helped track the first Chinese man in space, the 38-year-old Yang Liwei. It was a triumph for Chinese technological might and could not have been as successful as it was without land support from Tarawa. It was also long suspected that the Tarawa station was used by China to monitor American missile tests at nearby Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. But it is not certain that the loss of the Tarawa base was really that devastating for China. Some observers argue that the satellite dishes that China had at Tarawa were too small for monitoring US missile tests on Kwajalein. According to Des Ball, a professor at the Australian National University in Canberra and an expert on signals intelligence, China’s Yuan Wang tracking ships are far more useful for intelligence gathering: “These are packed with all sorts of communications gear.” But the loss of the Tarawa station nevertheless deprived Beijing of a land base in the Pacific, where the movements and activities of the Yuan Wang ships could be coordinated.43 Yuan Wang means “Long View” and is a fleet of maritime aerospace survey vessels, each with an impressive array of dishes and scanners. One of the tracking ships is permanently stationed in the Pacific while a second makes occasional visits. Others sail around the Yellow Sea off the coast of China, along the Namibian coast in southern Africa, and in the Indian Ocean. To support these vessels, the Chinese Academy of Sciences also has a fleet of research ships sailing under the name Xiang Yang Hong (“the East is Red”), which can undertake additional upper-atmosphere missile and satellite research as well as hydrometeorology.

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It may be argued that China has legitimate security interests in the Pacific. Several of China’s Western rivals have at various points in time carried out nuclear tests in the region. Following the communist takeover in China and the subsequent war on the Korean peninsula, the United States Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, also set up camp on Saipan in the Northern Marianas. This became a secret training base for nationalist Chinese guerrillas from Taiwan, who were going to be sent to the mainland in a bid to re-conquer it from the communists. Some of these were the legendary “frogmen,” divers who swam from smaller, Taiwanheld islands off the mainland and then went ashore to carry out sabotage and gather intelligence. In the mid-1950s—already before the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959—anti-Chinese Tibetan guerrillas were also trained on Saipan and then sent back to infiltrate a land very different from this tropical island.44 The CIA base was closed down in 1962, but the US Congressional Research Service stated in a 2007 report that its present and former island possessions in Micronesia “provide a vast buffer for [the US-held island] Guam, which serves as the ‘forward military bridgehead’ from which to launch US operations along the Asia-Pacific security arc stretching from South Korea and Japan, through Thailand and the Philippines, to Australia. The US military is building up forces on Guam to help maintain deterrence and respond to possible security threats in the Pacific.”45 Although the United States recognises the government in Beijing as the sole representative of China, it is obvious that Washington’s interests in the Pacific are much closer to Taiwan’s. Both the United States and Taiwan want to keep China out of the region. Ron Crocombe writes in his book Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West: “Asian spying may still be small compared with that of the USA, which has unmanned surveillance aircraft based in Guam as well as probably the most comprehensive system of submarine, telecommunications and land-based surveillance. But China is growing fast in this area.”46 So the rivalry continues, and China is the expanding, seemingly unstoppable power in the Pacific—in terms of aid, investment, migration and, increasingly, military ties and activities.


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References This paper is part of a larger research project conducted under the auspices of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

Ben Bohane, “Rascals: They rape, murder and steal,” The Bulletin, June 27, 1995. Post Courier, October 6, 2005. Post Courier, October 3, 2005. Post Courier, October 6, 2005. Geoffrey York, “Papua New Guinea and China’s New Empire,” The Globe and Mail, January 2, 2009. Geoffrey York, “Papua New Guinea and China’s New Empire,” The Globe and Mail, January 2, 2009. Copies of that “Special Brief” and other internal documents from the PNG government are in the author’s possession. Post Courier, July 22, 2005. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), September 21, 2007. Rowan Callick, “Looters shot dead amid chaos of Papua New Guinea’s antiChinese riots,” The Australian, May 23, 2009. The best overview of the Chinese communities in the Pacific is by Shanghai-born Lynn Pan, (ed.) The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Archipelago Press and the Chinese Heritage Centre, 1998, pp. 292-303). Many background data for this chapter also come from Ron Crocombe’s detailed study Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West. Suva (Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 2007.) Background information about the Pacific Islands, including Chinese migration, can also be found in Crocombe’s other detailed study of the region, The South Pacific (Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 2001.) Christine Inglis, “Papua New Guinea” in Lynn Pan, (ed.) The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas), pp. 296-298. For an overview of the rivalry between China and Taiwan in the Pacific, see Bertil Lintner, “A new battle for the Pacific,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 2004, and “The Sinicizing of the South Pacific,” Asia Times Online, April 18, 2007. Benjamin Reilly and John Henderson, “Dragon in paradise: China’s rising star in Oceania,” The National Interest, No. 72, Summer 2003. Quoted in Lintner, Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 2004, See Ron Crocombe, The South Pacific, Suva: University of the South Pacific, pp. 62-64. I visited Honiara and its Chinatown in October 2005.

32 18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35. 36. 37.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific A detailed report from the Christian Care Centre about logging as well as child abuse is available at www.melanesiangeo.org/resources/Solomons%20Child%20 Exploitation.pdf For an account of the 2006 Chinatown riots in Honiara, see Penny Spiller, “Riots highlight Chinese tensions,” British Broadcasting Corporation, April 21, 2006 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4930994.stm) and EastSouthWest North, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20060425_1.htm Communication with New Zealand academic Anna Powles, June 2006. For this and other quotes about the 2006 riots, see http://chinamatters. blogspot.com/2006/04/something-missing-from-solomon-islands.html See also Kalinga Seneviratne, “Fear of domination sparked anti-Chinese riots,” Inter Press Service, April 22, 2006, at http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews =32978 See public announcement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, http://www. chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t248680.htm Quoted in Featuna’i Ben Liuaana, Featuna’i’s Samoa Tula’i: Ecclesiastical and Political Face of Samoa’s Independence, 1900-1962 (Apia, Samoa: Malua Printing Press, 2004.), p, 218, originally in from W.Y. Tom’s 1986 study The Chinese in Western Samoa, 1875-1985: the Dragon Came From Afar. Featuna’i Ben Liuaana, Featuna’i’s Samoa Tula’I, p. 218. Featuna’i Ben Liuaana, Featuna’i’s Samoa Tula’i, pp. 216-218. Quoted in Featuna’i Ben Liuaana, Featuna’i’s Samoa Tula’i, p. 216. Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2007, p. 388. Communication with New Zealand journalist Michael Field, January 2009. See also Michael Field, Black Saturday: New Zealand’s tragic blunder in Samoa, Auckland: Reed Publishing, 2006. p. 195. However, Field gives the year in which Chan Mow died as 1978, which is incorrect. See China’s Foreign Relations: A Chronology of Events 1949-1988, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989, pp. 565-566. Quoted in Michael Field, Islands Business, 2007. Interview with Ron Crocombe, Cook Islands, May 15, 2007. For this and other exchanges between Tonga and China, see the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s announcement on http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/gjlb/ 3427/ ABC News, June 19, 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2004/06/19/113 5737.htm For an account of the riots, see “Overseas Chinese in Tonga,”, The Tokyo Foundation, July 20. 2008: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/series/sylff/theoverseas-chinese-in-tonga See also http://nomoa.com/articles/Nuku%27alofa_Burns... Interview with Robert Keith-Reid, Suva, May 20, 2005. Interview with Andrew Hughes, Commissioner of Police, Suva, May 21, 2005.

The South Pacific: China’s New Frontier 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46.

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Bessie Ng Kumlin Ali, Chinese in Fiji, Suva: University of South Pacific, 2002, p. 197. Interview with Hughes, Suva, May 21, 2005. For the full text of the statement, see http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_ 9469.shtml See http://www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_12606.shtml Islands Business covered in its February 2004 issue Kiribati’s switch to recognition of Taiwan, “Taiwan’s Tacky Tactics in Tarawa,” which included an interview with the new Kiribati president, Anote Tong. A detailed report on the 2002 election in Kiribati and Taiwan’s role in it also appeared in the February 15, 2004 issue of the Baltimore Sun (“Taiwan’s Pacific Power Play. Kiribati: Struggling for world respect, the ‘Republic of China’ uses dollar diplomacy, gets recognition from remote Pacific island nation,” by Gady A. Epstein.) It was a front-page report in the official Taiwan Journal: “Republic of China, Kiribati Forge Ties” (November 14, 2003.) See Lintner, Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 2004, and Asia Times Online, April 18, 2007. See John Kenneth Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan struggle for survival, New York: Public Affairs, 1999, pp., 140, 146, 148, 218. The Southwest Pacific: US Interests and China’s Growing Influence, Washington: Congressional Research Service, July 6, 2007. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, pp. 342-343.


Chapter 2 THE SOFTWARE OF CHINA-PACIFIC ISLAND RELATIONS

Emeritus Professor Ron Crocombe1

The “hardware” of China-Pacific Islands relations is well known—the growing exports of Pacific Islands minerals, timber, fish and agricultural products to China, the rapid increase in imports of Chinese manufactured goods, and the growing proportion of foreign aid to the Islands that comes from China—as reflected in the construction of highly visible government buildings and sports stadiums in Pacific Islands capitals for governments that recognize China diplomatically, as well as, roads, bridges and other facilities. However this paper focuses on ten less obvious but no less important “software” dimensions of the relationship—religion, language, the growing significance of distant origins, media and communications, education, social and personal relations, travel and tourism, values, ideas about governance, and the evolving new architecture of regional organization in order to consider what challenges increased interactions between China and the South Pacific may bring.

Constraints from the past 1. Religion: Caution rather than conflict Historically, Pacific Islands religions were localized and thus vulnerable. When challenged by Christianity, supported by improved technology and

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economic and military power, the local religions were soon replaced by Christianity. Christianity became a unifier in the Pacific and with the West, and nowadays there are some connections between Pacific Christian groups and the Taiwan minority, but not with China—although a few Chinese Catholic and Anglican priests served in the Islands in the 1920s and 1930s. The influence in the Pacific of Chinese religion and philosophy is minimal. Awareness of Confucian teachings has taken longer to enter the Pacific than I expected. On the other hand, Chinese people in the Pacific Islands have been very adaptive in religion, so it has seldom created problems. Many became Christian, a few practiced their own faith unobtrusively, and others did not practice any religion (or only nominally), so religion is not a matter of overt conflict as it is with Islam and Hinduism in some Pacific countries.2 2. Language: A barrier in need of overcoming As a by-product of the colonial era, English is the main lingua franca of Pacific Islanders (plus French for about 4% of Pacific Islanders, and Indonesian for the 2 million or so Papuans of West Papua). Languages are filters of thought, values and attitudes, so language constrains Chinese-Pacific Islands relations. Given its potential to strengthen future relations it is surprising that until 2006 China did little to promote Chinese language in Pacific Islands schools and the media, though there were a few Pacific students in Chinese universities and a handful of Chinese teachers in Islands’ schools and colleges. Most Pacific Islands countries and territories are short of funds and do not teach foreign languages other than English in their schools unless someone else pays—and in all cases this means the nation that is the source of that language (China, Japan, Indonesia and France are the main ones). From 2006 China has offered more Chinese teachers to Pacific Islands schools, and opened up many more scholarships to Chinese universities for Pacific Islands students. China is now the most active country outside the Islands in promoting its language within.

The Software of China-Pacific Island Relations

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3. The significance of Austronesian origins: A plus for Taiwan, a minus for China Austronesians who left Taiwan for the Pacific perhaps 4,000 years ago lost all contact and memory of that origin. Some probably went directly to Western Micronesia, but more came via the Philippines, which provides a series of stepping-stones from just south of Taiwan to Western Micronesia and Melanesia. These ancient origins are now gaining political relevance. Austronesian ancestors were overwhelmed in Southern China, so Austronesian connections are given more leverage by Taiwan than they are by China. Taiwan’s Austronesian heritage has been highlighted under the Democratic Progressive Party presidency of Chen Shui-bian (20002008). Pacific Islanders are delighted to find common elements of language and culture with the indigenous people of Taiwan. The Taiwan government has built on this element of “shared identity” to create linkages and organizations such as the Festival of Austronesian Cultures and the Forum of Austronesian Cooperation and Exchange. Taiwan participates in the Festival of Pacific Arts, and many Pacific Islands cultural groups are now invited to Taiwan to perform. Communicating the future 4. Media interactions: In need of fine tuning China provides free-to-air television in English (CCTV-9) from ground stations in Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu, and will do so to all countries that recognize the People’s Republic of China. No other foreign nation has ground stations in the Islands. This development is positive in that it familiarizes Pacific people with a country they know little about and need to understand better. Unfortunately the programs on CCTV-9 tend to be dull. Television stations are so expensive that whoever owns them (whether governments, businesses or churches), uses them to propagandize their own values and interests—but to do that too blatantly is counter-productive. Australia’s propaganda through its ABC Insight television is much more effective

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because it offers a wider range of opinion and criticism, and designs some programs for the Pacific Islands. Singapore’s Channel News Asia is excellent, but mainly seen only in the Micronesian Islands. China could learn from these and others who have been working the Pacific Islands media market for longer. Both China and Taiwan could learn from Radio Australia on how to use radio to communicate more effectively with Pacific Islands audiences. There is a growing ethnic Chinese involvement in the print media in the Islands. Within the past 20 years the second newspaper in Papua New Guinea (The National), is mainly owned by Malaysian Chinese; the Vanuatu Daily Post mainly by Australian Chinese; and The Saipan Tribune by the ethnic Chinese of the US/Hong Kong-based Tan family. There are two Chinese-owned, Chinese-language newspapers in Fiji. International journalism and media familiarization tours and training used to be only with Western nations, but now are mainly with Asia. China and Taiwan have recently become the most prominent in inviting Pacific media personnel. All such invitees are welcomed and receive a positive image of the host country, and accordingly provide positive articles and programs on their return home. These images and orientations may take some years to permeate widely through the receiving country, but they inevitably have an impact. China tends to be strong on links with top politicians and officials, but weak on public diplomacy. For example, the Cook Islands daily newspaper during the second quarter of 2008 had more letters and commentaries on Chinese aid projects and relations with China than on any other subject. Forty-seven were critical, while only eight were supportive. I have not kept a detailed count since then, but the same trend is apparent. In the other direction, historically China’s national daily (Renmin Ribao) gave prominent coverage to each Pacific Islands nation that recognized China diplomatically as it became independent. Relative to their size, Pacific Islands nations still receive disproportionate coverage by the Chinese media—their status as a nation seems to be the more important factor than their size, population, trade or security significance. Taiwan’s Taipei Times likewise gives disproportionate coverage to the six Pacific Islands nations that recognize Taiwan diplomatically.


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5. Education: Improving from a nil base Pacific Islands schools, colleges and universities teach very little about China or other countries of Asia. They have been slow to catch up with changing realities. Chinese schools and universities also teach little about Pacific Islands nations, their being so relatively small. But voluntary agencies from Western countries and Japan have provided large numbers of quality teachers to Pacific Islands schools, which benefits both sides of the relationship. I am surprised that China and Taiwan have not provided more. For over 100 years Pacific Islanders seeking education abroad went to Western countries. Almost every single Pacific Islands head of government since independence was educated in a Western country, and any few exceptions were educated at home by Western teachers. Japan is the main Asian country to have provided higher education to Pacific Islanders, but China in late 2006 announced that it would finance 2,000 students from the eight Islands nations that recognize China diplomatically for university studies in China, and more once that quota was filled. In addition to the 2,000 university students China has provided for, it also invites Pacific Islands military, media and legal personnel for training courses in China. It will take time to fill the quota because Chinese is a difficult language (being a tonal language and having a unique script) for students who have already had to learn at least two languages, and come from a very different culture, but the number of students taking up the offer is increasing steadily. Soon after this offer, Taiwan responded by providing for even more, relative to population size, from the six Islands nations with which it has diplomatic relations. Japan increased its already substantial quota to 4,000, and India, Indonesia and Malaysia all take smaller numbers, so in a very short time the relative impact of Western education will reduce. The impact of large numbers of Islanders studying in China, Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia will be significant in the coming decades. Research in the Islands has been overwhelmingly by Western scholars and Japanese. China needs to do more of its own research into Pacific affairs, in collaboration with Pacific Islanders who now want to be fully involved in the process.

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6. Social relations: Some accommodation, some tension Through hard work and thrift, many early Chinese settlers and their descendants achieved outstanding success, but shortly before and after independence of the Islands nations (from 1962 in Samoa to 1980 in Vanuatu) many of them emigrated if they could—mainly to the Pacific Rim. Those in Papua New Guinea were offered Australian citizenship in 1957. Almost all took it, but a number still maintain homes and businesses in both countries. Those born in French colonies were granted French citizenship in 1973. Some remained, but others migrated to North America, Australia, New Zealand or Europe. Canada accepted many Chinese from Fiji. The new Chinese who entered the Islands from the 1970s come from a wider range of places (China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and elsewhere) and in a wider range of occupations—men in logging and mining in Melanesia, women in factories in Micronesia (until the change in WTO rules caused most of them to close in 2007-8), farmers in Fiji and the Mariana Islands, small traders and fishermen everywhere, and diplomats, investors, professionals, criminals, and most recently tourists. Being new arrivals, their adjustment has at times been difficult, especially when they are seen to be taking work or business opportunities from indigenous people, entered illegally or involved in crime or corruption.3 Violence against immigrants has been disproportionately against Chinese—not only in spectacular riots in Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tahiti, and Papua New Guinea, but on a smaller scale also in Fiji and elsewhere. This has been overwhelmingly against those who arrived in recent years, vastly more than against the long-established Chinese who are generally well integrated. Akilisi Pohiva, Tonga’s most influential political leader, strongly opposed Chinese immigration but said that those married to Tongans and who learned Tongan language and respected the culture were welcome. That is happening more and more throughout the region. Early Chinese immigrants never became a majority (as Europeans did in Australia, New Zealand and New Caledonia), and were in positions of minimal power. Most came as single men and married


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Pacific Islander wives. Their part-Chinese descendants have become highly influential in commerce and government, as have some new Chinese immigrants. Overall, cultural and sporting interactions have been positive. Many performing arts groups from the Pacific Islands have performed in China and Taiwan. They are well received and enjoy the experience. Gymnastic groups sent as “ambassadors” from China have been enthusiastically welcomed in the Islands. Asia-Pacific sporting events, unknown until the Hong Kong Sevens became one of the big rugby features, are growing in number, and are a new element of Chinese-Pacific interaction. Martial arts from China, Japan and Korea are becoming widespread. Chinese New Year is becoming popular with people of all races in some national calendars. Chinese medicine, acupuncture and exercise routines are being adopted in the Pacific. 7. Travel and tourism: The need to ensure the potentials are kept positive Until 1970 all tourists to the Islands were from Western nations. Then Japan surged to become the biggest source for the Pacific Islands as a whole, especially the up to two million per year in Micronesia. Taiwan has been significant for Micronesia for two decades, and China is now emerging. Fiji now gets 500,000 tourists a year, overwhelmingly from Western nations, but Sir James Ah Koy, Fiji’s ambassador to China, says China will soon supply Fiji with 600,000 tourists a year—more than all other sources combined. The actual flow is only beginning, but given the size of the source population who can now afford travel from China, it is likely to replace Japan as the largest source of tourists to the Pacific Islands nations and territories. In the other direction, Pacific Islanders going abroad went almost exclusively to Western nations, but China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia are becoming increasingly attractive destinations.

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8. Values: Areas of congruence and divergence Values are imprecise, they differ for every person and they vary over time, but there are important differences between some dominant values of the key actors in the Islands who are guided by Western, Northeast Asian and Pacific Islands values. The values that matter here are those applied by Chinese involved in fishing, logging, trading, crime and political influence. Values given to saving against consumption, to accumulation against distribution, to the allocation of time to production and education as against ceremony and relaxation, have led to major differences between Europeans and Islanders, and even more so with Chinese. On the other hand some values are more congruent between Chinese and Islanders than with Europeans. For example the tendencies to avoid social conflict and open criticism, to seek consensus rather than majority rule, to accept authority and hierarchy, to give high priority to personal relations, are generally stronger with Chinese and Islanders than with Europeans. China gives much more attention to personal relations with Pacific Islands political leaders (or those from anywhere) than do Western nations. These factors are likely to lead to wider gaps between Chinese and ordinary Pacific Islanders, and to defensive reactions.4 Political relations 9a. Elite communication—Who visits who, who pays, and forms of reciprocity Following independence, the first overseas visit of any newly elected head of government in the Islands used to be to the former colonial capital to seek funds or technical assistance. Then the range broadened to other Western capitals, then to Japan. Now Beijing or Taipei is the first port of call for many newly elected leaders, and for ministers, officials, and many Pacific Islands businessmen. Much of the travel by Pacific Islanders to many countries is paid for by the host country, but this is much more so in the case of China than in the case of Western nations— and like aid, all international actions form a pattern of reciprocity.


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China’s main demand has been that Pacific Islands acknowledge Taiwan as a legitimate part of China and to act on that in voting in the United Nations and in all other international organizations. Like several other industrial nations of Asia and the West, China no doubt also has an interest in facilitating its access to Pacific Islands minerals, marine resources, timber and other primary products, as well as access for its exports to the islands, its investments, and those of its people who choose to live in the Islands. What future reciprocity will be expected and demanded is yet to be seen. 9b. Ideas about governance For thousands of years Pacific Islanders, like the rest of humanity, accepted notions of governance as being related to kinship, marriage ties, in most cases the superiority of males over females and of the first born over younger siblings, physical power and resource distribution. Colonial governments, Christian religion and international markets each substantially modified ideas about what was proper or at least acceptable. Constitutional independence brought new ideas about appropriate forms of governance, but in all cases post-independence Pacific Islands governments were designed on Western capitalist models. International organizations have also had an influence on systems of governance— particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the past decade, the Western governments and the international institutions they largely control, have given great emphasis to programs aimed at improving “governance” in the Pacific Islands, which correlate with making it accord with current Western values on the topic. The only alternative model given consideration (usually nominal) has been that of traditional governance, but this was designed for subsistence living in small self-contained communities and has limited relevance in the radically different global context today (except in isolated communities). The other model on offer was communism, which was much referred to, but only as a model to avoid. Pacific Islanders were mainly fundamentalist Christians, and communism was often spoken of as the

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work of the devil. Given a dominant philosophy of a world divided between good and evil, US President Reagan’s classification of the USSR as “The Evil Empire” struck a responsive chord. In this regard, to Pacific Islands leaders in the Cold War era, the China model was irrelevant—it was not only communist, but also poor, non-Christian, and depicted mainly in negative terms. Today, however, Western models are being more questioned in the Islands. The current financial crisis caused by following the US-led model of development is adding to doubts. In times of trouble, people look for a model to bring them salvation, and one model now being looked at by a growing number of prominent Pacific Islanders is that of China—not for its communist philosophy, but for its success in economic development while maintaining its own “traditional” political system. To some in the Pacific, since China is presented so often in the media now as a success story, and because China is the fastest growing source of aid and with fewer strings than Western aid, many Pacific Islanders who are invited to China are warmly welcomed and see impressive developments, and since people choose to use more Chinese goods and services, more and more people want to know more about how it is done and whether the model has any lessons for the Pacific. John Momis, one of Papua New Guinea’s most respected leaders, was a Catholic priest and for decades a member of parliament and minister who held a range of portfolios. He is now Papua New Guinea’s ambassador to China and he told the 2008 Waigani Seminar on Development Strategies in Port Moresby (attended by the present and former prime ministers of PNG among hundreds of leading citizens) that the Pacific had much to learn from China. Sir James Ah Koy, Fiji’s ambassador to China, is also a former senior cabinet minister and one of the country’s most successful businessmen. He too advocates more attention to Chinese ideas and experiences. These are not exceptions, they seem to be setting a new pattern which is congruent with the “Look North” (i.e. look to Asia) policy which many Pacific Islands governments have adopted. I do not think Chinese models will solve all the Pacific Islands problems any more than traditional or Christian or colonial or World Bank models did. None is perfect, but each has come into being as a


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result of particular balances of power in specific economic and other circumstances. The new power balances suggest that more ideas about governance will be sought from Asia, and probably from China more than from any other single model. This is not good or bad, but it is likely to be the new reality, and will bring with it various advantages and disadvantages. Another set of principles related to the governance agenda is the human rights agenda in the form currently vigorously promoted in the Pacific Islands by Western governments and institutions. It too is a product of its time, and heavily focused on rights of individuals rather than on balancing obligations to other individuals. It is congruent with the philosophies of the World Bank, IMF and the World Trade Organization in promoting the consumerism that kills Pacific Islanders by the thousands with its force-feeding of junk foods, junk drinks, and other junk products. It is congruent with the drive for gratification of immediate personal impulses that is part of the consumerist model. Pacific Islands concepts of human rights may have more in common with those of some Asian cultures in balancing one’s responsibilities to the wider community. I expect the human rights agenda in the Islands will be modified in the direction of Asian patterns, and that relations with China and Chinese people will be a factor in this. 10. Asia-Pacific regionalism—Growing Chinese participation Until World War II each colonial power kept all others out of its colonies, and even Australia and New Zealand kept strictly clear of each other’s colonies. But the attack from Japan in World War II, the fear of communism, the withdrawal of Britain from the Pacific, and United Nations pressure to decolonize, all made them realize they had common interests to protect. One technique for doing this was by setting up Pacific regional organizations, both inter-governmental and nongovernmental, in which the former colonial powers retained leverage by supplying funds and personnel. Between 1946 and 1980 over 300 regional organizations were set up with the focus on the Pacific Islands. Then Asia-Pacific regional

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organizations began to reach into the Pacific and are now in the process of eclipsing regional activity in the Pacific Islands region. Now there are at least 750 Asia-Pacific regional organizations involve the Pacific Islands. Japan remains the most important innovator, initiator and contributor to Asia-Pacific organizations, and Taiwan has played a positive role, but since the 1990s China has become a significant player. Conclusion A major challenge facing Pacific Islands governments, education systems, media and people, is to become more aware not only of China and Chinese people, but of Asia and Asian people as a whole, as it is from there that the major external influences will be coming. The goal of this essay is to point out some of the ways in which interactions can be improved and harmonized, for the benefit of all sides. References 1.

2.

3.

Emeritus Professor Ron Crocombe, known as the “father of Pacific Studies” suddenly passed away on 19 June 2009. Professor Crocombe presented this paper at the 2007 conference at the University of Canterbury which is the origin of this study. This brief paper is included in the book in memory of his long years of contribution to the field of Pacific Studies. It is representative of Professor Crocombe’s distinctive perspective on Sino-Pacific affairs. In order to improve readability I have made minor changes to Professor Crocombe’s original paper. For Chinese religious practices in the Pacific see Tung, Yuan-chao, “Chinese in Tahiti,” Encyclopaedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World, C. Ember et al (editors), New York: Springer Science Media, 2004; Tung, Yuan-chao, “Reflections on the Study of Overseas Chinese in the Pacific,” Asia-Pacific Forum, 2005, 30:29-54. Those who discuss the difficulties and achievements of Chinese minorities in the Islands include Ali, Bessie Ng Kumlin, Chinese in Fiji, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2002; Chiang, Lan-Hung Nora, Rebecca Stephenson, Hiro Kurashina and Fendy Chen, “Making Guam One’s Home: The Story of Taiwanese Chinese ‘Old-Timers’ in Guam”, 11th Pacific Science Inter-Congress, Tahiti, 2009; Ron Crocombe, Ron, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2007, 367-86 (general); Tung, Yuan-chao, “Tahitian Politics and Chinese Ethnic Revival”, Bulletin of the Department of


4.

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Anthropology, College of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University, 1997, 51:73-82; Tung, Yuan-chao, “Chinese in Tahiti”, Encyclopaedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World, C. Ember et al (editors), New York: Springer Science Media, 2004; Tung, Yuan-chao, “Reflections on the Study of Overseas Chinese in the Pacific”, Asia-Pacific Forum 2005. 30:29-54; Willmott, Bill, A History of the Chinese Communities in Eastern Melanesia: Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies Working Paper no 12, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 2005; Wu, David, The Chinese in Papua-New Guinea 1880-1980, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982. For discussions of Chinese values and those of Pacific Islanders, see for example Acharya, Amitav, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-building: From the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way”, The Pacific Review, 1997, 10(3):329; Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2007; Dobell, Graeme, The Choices and Chances of an AsiaPacific Journey, Sydney: ABC Books, 2001, chapters 3-4; Chad Hansen, “Asian Values”, public lecture, University of Auckland 18 September 2002; Hsiao, HsinHuang Michael (editor), “The Changing Faces of the Middle Classes in the AsiaPacific” Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 2006; Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996, p.153; David Kavanamur, “The Development Story”, South Pacific Journal of Philosophy and Culture, 2007, 9:11-37; Kishore Mabhubani, Can Asians Think: Understanding the Divide between East and West, New York: Public Affairs, 2004; Hirini Moko Mead, Tikanga Maori: Living by Maori Values, Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2003; J.T.H. Tang, “A Clash of Values: Human Rights in the Post Cold War Era”, AsiaPacific Forum, Shizuoka, 28 March 1997; Makiuti Tongia, Core Values of the Cook Islands, Wellington: privately printed, 1995.


Chapter 3 SINO-PACIFICA: EXTRA-TERRITORIAL INFLUENCE AND THE OVERSEAS CHINESE

James Jiann Hua To

Introduction The Pacific is a convenient and low risk testing ground for China to gain global leverage through a comprehensive set of cultural, economic, political and military relations. The results are immediate and visible, and when combined with an ethnic Chinese presence, there are significant implications for the region. The Overseas Chinese (OC) arrived and prospered throughout the Pacific over many decades. They tend to dominate local commerce and industry whilst maintaining a robust cultural identity; moreover, transnational mobility has facilitated their travel between countries without necessarily maintaining a sense of loyalty to their place of residence. As such, the OC are well placed to support Chinese interests abroad. The chapter does not seek to propagate or sensationalize theories of “yellow peril”, the “China threat” or “fifth column” activity of OC in the region. While a minority may actively seek benefit from a relationship with China and its qiaowu policies, most are insular, apolitical and indifferent. They prefer to work, save money and plan for their children and future. They are also a heterogeneous population and should not be unfairly stereotyped or confused with those associated with illegal or political activity. This chapter is divided into two parts: the first section explains and analyses the background, reasons and implications of an increased ethnic

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Chinese presence in the Pacific; the second section illustrates how the OC are at the heart of an intense political rivalry between China and Taiwan (especially during the DPP years). Both parts assess the mechanisms that the PRC employs for interacting with and influencing the OC. By analyzing a variety of newspaper reports, journal articles, anecdotal evidence and Chinese language policy documents obtained from fieldwork in China and the Pacific,1 the research examines whether the increase in the numbers of OC settling or working in the region, and their links with China, point to a specific strategy of using them to advance Beijing’s national interests.2 Ethnic Chinese in the Pacific Many island nations have played host to Chinese migrants for decades, with only Tuvalu, Tokelau, Niue and Tonga not having OC communities until the 1970s.3 The origin of Chinese settling in the Pacific has British roots. In an effort to curb smuggling and artificially high prices for tea, the 1784 British Commutation Act reduced tax on it (from 119% to 12.5%) thus encouraging cheaper imports into England. As tea supplies came predominantly from China, British merchants needed products to trade. Sandalwood, sea cucumber4 and other items originating in the Pacific proved to be suitable. Chinese deckhands, cooks and carpenters often accompanied British vessels into the island regions in search of such goods.5 They were also recruited as indentured labourers (and later as free migrants) for the plantation and mining industries.6 During this period, China was a land choked by chronic famine, poverty and corruption. Many were desperate to leave, while others had little alternative but to support their families by working abroad. Some eventually settled in their adopted lands, working in labour-intensive industries (such as restaurants, laundry, agriculture and merchant businesses) as their populations urbanized. Family links were a common feature of migration, whereby son followed father in pursuit of wealth. Return trips to China in order to bring out other relatives continue today. It is common for the OC to refer to their (emotional if not physical) connection with their ancestral village.

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Historically, “old” Chinese (laoqiao) have been a stabilizing factor in the Pacific by providing a solid commercial element. Apart from a few prominent personalities, they have seldom pursued aspirations of political office. In short, laoqiao were accepted into Pacific society, and their efforts often praised by local authorities. However, it is increasingly common for this group to seek a better life elsewhere. While some Chinese choose to stay in the islands as truly integrated locals, migration to Canada, Australia and New Zealand (NZ) is popular. Their children are sent overseas for study. The Pacific serves as a convenient, but not final, destination. Such movements have resulted in a significant decline in their numbers over the years.7 After a long period of relative stability, the established laoqiao community was increasingly being replaced and outnumbered by xinqiao (“new” Chinese migrants) throughout the late 1990s and 2000s. This latter group goes to the region with various aims in mind. Some are there for economic reasons, others for lifestyle, but mostly they go for their family’s welfare. While laoqiao arrived as labourers, merchants or tradesmen from southern coastal provinces (such as Guangdong or Fujian) under difficult circumstances, xinqiao originate from different parts of China and Asia, bringing with them a new set of attitudes and values often irreconcilable with those of their predecessors and thus posing a threat to their livelihood and business. Laoqiao toiled over many years to establish themselves, but “new” migrants tend to buy out existing businesses to “get rich quick”—particularly those in the hospitality and service industry (such as shops, restaurants, bars and nightclubs).8 Their businesses have quickly asserted dominance:9 Taiwanese OC own large retail facilities or have fishing interests and control prominent industries; Malaysian OC are involved in much of the logging and mineral extraction. To protect their lot, laoqiao argue “new” OC from China should be subject to immigration controls (such as a quota system, monitoring and sponsorship), arguing their hard-earned reputation might be tarnished.10

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Immigration in the Pacific By 2006, the ethnic Chinese population throughout the Pacific was conservatively estimated by one expert at 22,000 (not including illegal migrants).11 Other sources have cited larger numbers in Fiji12 and Papua New Guinea (PNG)13 to create a total of up to 80,000.14 These numbers are hotly debated. Rampant immigration abuses in the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) make it unclear as to how many ethnic Chinese live there, complicated by the fact that many hold local citizenship.15 There are gross variations and discrepancies between declared and actual immigration figures.16 Census details for many Pacific nations are outdated, and do not distinguish ethnic Chinese from “others”, or do not record ethnicity at all.17 Ethnic Chinese may be represented incorrectly as they might have arrived via other countries. In the absence of reliable official data and lack of information on illegal migrants, the true number and nature of the OC in the region is unknown. The Pacific is perceived to be an easy destination to which to migrate, settle down or move on from. Some Chinese make a point of choosing to live there for only the necessary time to gain the documentation required to immigrate elsewhere.18 Island nations are commonly used as back doors to enter more developed countries. Anecdotal evidence points to some migrants going overseas in search of one in order to return to China as a foreign national. As such, one can gain entry into prestigious universities as a foreign student, apply for jobs advertised specifically for foreigners, or even to bear a second child. A Pacific passport accords such privileges to the bearer. Chinese like working in the Pacific because the lifestyle there is relatively good when compared with other destinations. The region is conducive and attractive for business. Given the lower costs of compliance, overheads and wages, merchants can make and save more money than in China or other industrialized countries. As labourers, OC are favoured by employers (both local and Chinese) for their work ethics. Some are hired because of their family or business connections. Chinese businesses post job vacancies requiring the use of Chinese language as a means of out-sourcing for the staff they prefer.19

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“Going Out”—exporting China to the world To facilitate its ambitions to become a global economic power, China has actively promoted tourism, trade and enterprise amongst the OC as a key aspect of its “Going Out” strategy with various countries around the world.20 An international forum of OC in 2001 sought to establish transnational entities and investment overseas for securing access to essential resources and increasing exports of Chinese-manufactured goods. Beijing has earmarked the Pacific for such economic development.21 In 2006 measures were established to further promote OC trade and tourism in the region.22 These included a special fund and designation of seven pro-Beijing nations as Approved Tourist Destinations (ATD) for PRC citizens. Consequently, accommodation, cuisine, news media, education, finance and other services are established and upgraded through PRC state-owned or OC investment. Forecasts show that the numbers of tourists from China are projected to rise significantly, eventually making them the largest tourism market in the world.23 A PRC official hoped that Pacific nations would welcome “thousands” of Chinese.24 This sentiment is shared by impoverished island nations looking towards China as a much-needed source of income.25 Passport sales This is not the first time local authorities have sought to attract ethnic Chinese in order to invigorate their economies. As a means of raising revenue, passport sales were widespread during the late 1980s and 1990s. After a military coup in 1987, migrant Chinese settled in Fiji after responding to government efforts seeking foreign investment. In 1995, over 7000 were approved in a plan for Hong Kong Chinese to immigrate to Fiji if they paid the appropriate fees and investments. Chinese from other regions of China arrived to take over from Indian Fijian businesses left vacant after ethnic instability in the late 1990s.26 Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru and the RMI all had similar schemes in

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which citizenship was sold for thousands of dollars. These sales were embroiled in controversy and complications. Allegations of corruption and greed by local immigration officials were raised in every country where residency or passports were sold. In an environment where corruption is rife, payoffs in the form of “legal” and “consultancy” fees are accepted by politicians and officials in return for granting investment approvals, work permits, visas, citizenship and passports.27 There are many examples of their dubious behaviour: a senior immigration officer based at PNG’s embassy in Beijing issued suspicious business and tourist visas without checks;28 in 2000, Fijian officials were bribed to award Chinese and Koreans with investor certificates; Clement Rojumana (a SI minister) was arrested in 2004 for his role in granting citizenship certificates to Chinese;29 former Nauru Police Commissioner Paul Aingimea, personally intervened to let PRC national William Ng walk free after his arrest at Nauru airport with a briefcase full of passports and police clearance certificates. Such OC were given titles such as “envoy”, “consul” or “representative”—but many of them turned out to be opportunists, gangsters and criminals.30 Chinese transnational crime While transnational crime cannot be attributed to the OC alone (organized syndicates from Russia are also reported to be involved), they are often the ones that make the headlines.31 While most are hard working, some “new” Chinese have been accused of tax evasion, working and operating without registration, exploiting loopholes and other minor infringements.32 Such behaviour does not amount to transnational criminal activity and OC should not all be typecast under such extreme circumstances. However, in a region with relatively lax legal structures, impotent monitoring and weak punitive measures, there are some OC who decide that the possibility of a short jail sentence is a small price to pay for potentially lucrative gains. Transnational crime is pre-dominantly co-ordinated through international organized triad crime rings, facilitating the illegal trafficking of drugs and other contraband. Foreign students and PRC

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nationals on short-term visas form a significant proportion of the pseudoephedrine trade.33 Counterfeit goods are an emerging problem in Tonga, and it is already rampant in PNG. In Fiji, Asian fishing vessels are used to smuggle items into the country unchecked, aided by customs, immigration and police officers who have a “good relationship” with Chinese business people. Moreover, wharves and marinas have poor border security, with authorities relying on the captain’s declarations of cargo and number of people on board. In response to the high number of incidents concerning undeclared goods, the Fijian Customs Department imposed a 100% search on all containers imported by Chinese nationals, deeming them a “high risk” status.34 Prostitution is another concern for local authorities. In the Northern Marianas, 90% of the 1500 prostitutes in Saipan are Chinese.35 Some arrive on valid papers for work in garment factories, but end up overstaying and working without permits (as hostesses in nightclubs, bars and restaurants)—for as long as eight years working to pay off their recruitment fees and living expenses.36 Others are indentured to pay for their legal bills, smugglers’ fees and their transport costs for leaving China. At least forty “Chinese only” brothels are open in Suva, staffed by women on visitor or student visas working on the side while trying to gain entry into Australia.37 In Samoa, there were reports of girls provided to yachts and other visiting watercraft for a fee.38 Illegal migration Many of these criminal elements are directly related to international illegal migration. This is essentially a Chinese phenomenon, with 90% of it originating from the PRC.39 In fact, the number of illegal migrants from China exceeds that of legal ones.40 The problem is so big that Fijian authorities have lost track of controlling them. They are flown in, dropped off by fishing boats, or arrive under the guise of tourists. Others arrive legally, but end up being unaccounted for. Some of them become local residents after receiving coaching on how to evade immigration controls.41 Illegal migrants entering the region are a frustrating issue for border management. It puts stress on local infrastructure, and raises

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bilateral problems with China. For example, during the late 1990s, hundreds were housed temporarily in fenced compounds in Guam, raising health, hygiene and security concerns.42 Methods to control the influx of illegal migrants and overstayers include halting or limiting the travel of PRC citizens at the destination. As early as 1999, Fijian authorities were probing these concerns through a specially established Asian Unit. Fijian immigration officials later reduced the visitor visa period from four to one month following violations by Chinese. Using Rota Island as a springboard to Guam raised national security concerns from the US military, who called for strict enforcement of visa processing, opposing the visa waiver scheme, and placing a bar on Chinese tourists destined for the Marianas in 2004.43 Likewise in 2002, the RMI stopped issuing thirty-day visas to Chinese on their arrival after years of illegal overstaying.44 In 2004, the PNG immigration division imposed a blanket ban on Chinese citizens visiting the country, causing embarrassment over a case in which six businessmen (who had fulfilled visa procedures and requirements) were refused travel to Port Moresby. In this particular case, PRC officials actively campaigned for their release.45 Passing the buck: Moving responsibility for OC migrants from China Since the 1990s, Beijing has been passing on the costs and responsibility of policing the movement of its nationals onto others. For example, authorised travel agents handle the arrangements of PRC tourists into the Pacific, and guarantee strict monitoring of their whereabouts.46 As for the thousands of export labourers, 1400 licensed companies provide over 500,000 Chinese labourers to work legally in foreign construction and textile industries.47 PRC officials claim these workers are screened and approved for security clearance to avoid “unfortunate incidents.” Workers are expected to show good behaviour, and face consequences if they fail to do so. However, about 10,000 workers are uncertified by the Chinese Economic Development Association (China’s only authorized employment verification agency.48

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The PRC embassy is reluctant to act when their nationals are involved as perpetrators in criminal activity overseas. Delays arise from a lack of clear communication, difficulty of identification, and bureaucratic red tape. Despite alleged mistreatment and human right abuses of Chinese nationals jailed in the RMI, there was no comment from the PRC.49 Chinese garment workers based in northern Pacific sweatshops protested over poor conditions, but the Chinese embassy refused to be involved.50 PRC diplomats in Suva referred to the arrest of forty-one OC allegedly involved in illegal gambling and prostitution as “the responsibility of the immigration department and police to establish what these people come in for.”51 As internal domestic issues, “the embassy can only grant limited assistance because it is not our country.”52 Chinese officials often refuse to accept returns of deported PRC citizens. They take action upon receiving official notification from a complainant country within four days of an arrest. Only then will it help identify the people for issuance of travel documents “if proven to be Chinese nationals.” Without valid travel documents, they are not allowed to enter China, even as deportees. Illegal migrants, by their nature do not usually carry such identification. In other cases, China has argued certain locations are not ATD-approved for its nationals, and so it cannot be responsible for accepting deportees from those places.53 Beijing’s views on migration Several experts suggest that PRC authorities actively assist large numbers of Chinese to settle abroad as part of a strategy to enhance China’s influence.54 Beijing is actively working to find ways to push more migrants abroad by making destinations more favourable. For example, to improve worker safety, one state-owned company suggested basing contract labourers and their families in regions of relative political stability, and operate a “fly-in fly-out” system.55 Another sought to make the Fijian garment industry more competitive through loans, equipment and training.56 In an industry where immigration problems and ethnic tensions with Chinese workers are already rife, increasing their numbers

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would only serve to complicate matters. Nevertheless, Beijing is adamant to push forward with its objectives. Because of Beijing’s failure to effectively address and combat people smuggling and transnational crime, some observers argue that there is official support, or at least tacit recognition for it, on the part of Chinese authorities.57 PRC government officials, law enforcement agencies and military personnel are accused of helping gather illegal migrants, procuring travel documents and facilitating their transit.58 Chinese agents allegedly collaborate with consular officials and triad snakeheads in forging documents for illegal immigration, trafficking and other criminal activity in order to fund PRC foreign intelligence operations.59 There are suspicions that PRC diplomats cultivate criminals to spy, corrupt and infiltrate.60 Of course, Beijing vehemently denies these allegations.61 As the sending-government, Beijing would rather do without these issues, as they complicate state-to-state relationships. Its response to illegal migration and criminal activity is mixed. On the public front, China admits some “bad eggs” turn up amongst the two million Chinese overseas travellers each year.62 It promises to cooperate with international and regional bodies (such as the International Organization for Migration) and immigration authorities through the issue of official statements.63 It also holds discussions between concerned parties. Domestically, counter-measures include information campaigns, fines, and imprisonment for smugglers. Authorities also investigate and rescue women and children coerced into prostitution, and hold prevention campaigns using education materials.64 Laws and regulations prohibiting this practice include Articles 176 and 177 of the 1979 Criminal Law. In 1985, Beijing passed legislation regarding migration, passport and border control.65 In 1992, the PRC Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) and other government ministries issued its first document outlining illegal migration from China. It described the situation and addressed how it could damage China’s national interests. In 1993, Beijing authorities issued a second document to curb illegal migration along the southern coastal regions.66 However, these measures are mostly ineffective and penalties are not a deterrent.67 The main problem is that ambivalent local officials hardly care to enforce the directives.68 From their perspective, illegal migration

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helps solve unemployment concerns, and the resulting money sent back assists with constructing infrastructure.69 Consequently, they usually “keep one eye open and close the other.”70 The same attitude is also held at the state level. The PRC government is well-versed about illegal migration: including how migrants evade authorities, their diversity of origin, destinations, and even the numbers involved.71 Despite this knowledge, in its response to illegal migration, China absolves itself of any responsibility—by blaming it on macro-economic disparity, criminal gangs, and the immigration policies of receiving countries.72 For example, the PRC argues the numbers of illegal immigrants are an exaggeration and promotes the positive aspects of xinqiao migration and contract labour to the local economy.73 While it is an irritant to furthering its international relations, Beijing does not consider illegal migration an important issue to address.74 Instead, Beijing seeks to manage its migration in the context of its own internal situation and to serve China’s development.75 Encouraging migration (whether it be legal or illegal) has benefits for China. In addition to those mentioned earlier, it also relieves domestic population and environmental pressures, and most importantly, provides a friendly force to promote Chinese interests abroad. Moreover, Beijing views migration and globalization of ethnic Chinese as a natural phenomenon of human societal development.76 As long as there is no major negative impact upon its own interests, Beijing does not care about illegal migration from its shores. For example, an internal report cited that the majority of Americans felt “black work” performed by illegal migrants was acceptable as long as they did not encroach on the livelihoods of locals.77 Similar research found that while there was opposition to illegal migrants in some countries, others were mostly sympathetic to them.78 Given these opinions, Chinese authorities maintain a lax attitude towards policing the issue. For them, this contradiction between official policy and the demand for cheap labour abroad, coupled with the economic benefits, make illegal migration an acceptable practice.79 Rather than seeking resolution, China assumes illegal migration is inevitable, and emphasis is placed on how to better accommodate illegal migrants in qiaowu work after ten or twenty years time when they have

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become established as part of the general OC population.80 Thus research performed by the OCAO regarding illegal migration is not done for the purpose of putting an end to it, but to conduct accurate forecasting and to map changes in demographics and labour movement for guiding future qiaowu policy.81 Managing ethnic tensions The last decade of such non-traditional Chinese migration has upset conventional demographic and economic aspects of local life. Driven primarily by economic and personal interest, they do what they can to make a living, even if they consciously (or unconsciously) intrude on traditional ethnic and economic patterns of the region. Locals perceive their business acumen and short-cut practices as exploitive or conflicting with communal village culture (such as the wantok system of the Solomon Islands (SI)). For example, working on Sundays in Tonga has caused offence to those with strong religious beliefs. Similarly, cultural traditions and respect for the land are breached when migrants are seen fishing in streams and sea. Although xinqiao have set up businesses that provide access to commercial services and products previously unavailable, they also tend to sell shoddy, counterfeit, and other imported products that compromise the sustainability of fledgling Pacific industries. The sudden influx of new migrants and their practices into the region has contributed to xenophobic perceptions of being displaced from both their land and occupation.82 In 2002, Chinese topped the list of foreigners gaining Fijian citizenship, with 229 during the past three years.83 As president of the Fiji Indigenous Business Council Ulai Taoi remarks, “the government opened its doors to invite Chinese in…a lot more came than expected.”84 Leading up to the 2006 SI elections, the opposition party targeted new migrants and the influence of Chinese in politics as their election platform.85 Similar claims were made in Nuku’alofa in November later that year. Management of Asian immigration and a clampdown on corrupt behaviour is therefore a primary concern for Pacific nations. If regulations are not enforced, people will take the law

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into their own hands. In April 2006 and November 2006 in Honiara and Nuku’alofa respectively, these tensions finally boiled over, resulting in the selective targeting, looting and torching of OC businesses. China’s response to those riots is illustrative of its modern approach to foreign relations through its relationship with the OC. Instead of considering the ethnic violence as “internal affairs” and remaining silent as it did following the Indonesian riots in 1998, Beijing took immediate action by launching an “emergency response mechanism” and then evacuated hundreds of OC back to China. In addition to direct reporting by diplomatic personnel posted to the region, a special delegation (including top level OC staff) was sent to investigate the reasons that led to the violence—resulting in new policy recommendations for qiaowu affairs.86 “Unqualified” Chinese PRC officials view the OC and Chinese migrants as leading actors in promoting China’s image abroad. One area of migration that has gained Beijing’s attention is the phenomenon of many lower class, uneducated Chinese who have left China for economic purposes. As mentioned previously, their migration is poorly regulated, and they tend to be the most visible component of Chinese abroad—particularly in the Pacific and Africa. Many of the migrants to these (mostly) less-developed parts of the world do not possess academic or technical expertise. They believe simply working hard will be enough to become successful. Furthermore, their behaviour is sometimes selfish and insular, causing difficulty and conflict with locals. This group of OC has been problematic for the PRC and its aspirations to be acknowledged as a responsible global citizen. Because no matter how strong its hard power has become, or no matter how well it can get along with others, China cannot win the world’s trust or respect if certain OC continue to let it down. OC specialists are extremely critical of these “new” migrants, saying that they lack not only education, but also ethics and values.87 Their presence serves only to add to a lowend economy rather than to strategic economic and social development.88

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For Beijing, they are a liability for China’s desired image, and hence described by policymakers as “unqualified Chinese.”89 Upgrading the migrant OC experts acknowledge that conflict between such OC and locals was inevitable when competing for limited resources or market share. The goal was therefore not to politicize such events, but to deal with them from a long-term approach of “upgrading the software of migrants.”90 One OC official viewed the OC as an export commodity, suggesting that like any other product, there should be quality levels and standards put in place. Therefore, lower class OC must not be forgotten and their interests should be looked after.91 “New” OC should take responsibility for their actions and behaviour and raise their “quality” (which includes all human attributes and behaviour, such as manners, hygiene, discipline, education, morals and lifestyle).92 For China to become a true global citizen, it would have to be seen to understand and work with all countries. OC specialists suggested that the OC should improve their understanding of local culture and ways of life, learn the language and to integrate into local society. One recommendation was to prevent conflict by managing them before they departed China.93 They should be informed of destination customs, laws and policies in an effort to “prepare the migrant”.94 Upon completion of training by authorized agencies, migrants receive a certificate to prove they meet the requirements.95 Secondly, in the host country, the OC work must serve to network, facilitate and co-ordinate with various groups in a vision of “global harmony” with locals and earn their money through honest labour, abide by the laws of the land and respect their colleagues.96 Qiaowu seeks to address these concerns by presenting a benevolent face of the PRC— emphasizing co-operation and friendship by promoting the benefits of Chinese aid projects and making local residents feel it is sincere in helping them.97 The establishment and coordination of OC societies and associations are encouraged in order to improve the image, status and social awareness of ethnic Chinese amongst locals.98

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Moreover, the task is to operate pragmatically and flexibly without upsetting bilateral relations. Therefore, in order to improve relations with locals, qiaowu should not be ethnographically focused on solely promoting “Chineseness”—this would only reinforce chauvinistic thinking amongst OC;99 nor should the OC work rely on patriotism or sentimentalism for home or country. Rather, OC officials insist that qiaowu cannot be based simply upon a premise of “I am Chinese” but “I am a member of the world’s family.”100 This kind of work is usually done at community gatherings.101 As a common duty, PRC diplomats comment on the long history of Chinese in the Pacific, their contribution to local development, and praise friendly exchanges between Chinese and Pacific peoples.102 Improving relations between the OC and local law enforcement agencies and authorities is key to this task.103 More importantly, China makes sure to remind authorities to respect and protect the rights and property of PRC nationals. However, such events are no more than a photo opportunity to play up friendly relations with local officials, and they are completely impotent in stemming troublesome behaviour. The success of these measures is dependant on the number of those actually accepting and embracing the directives. “Upgrading” reaches only those departing China legally, whereas many of the problems that arise are due to illegal migrants without controls. This latter group does not participate for fear of being exposed, repatriated or punished. Secondly, induction courses in China are subject to a charge; as a result, not all migrants go through these official channels (many prefer to avoid bureaucracy and security checks). Moreover, the OC cannot be expected to adhere to Beijing’s demands once they are in a foreign country. As qiaowu is based on long-term education and guidance, results are yet to be seen. Evidence from fieldwork in 2007 suggests that little has been achieved. In the SI, lack of PRC diplomatic representation means efforts must come through the OC themselves. In Tonga, there is little cooperation between locals and the OC business community. There are also few opportunities for the younger generation of “new” OC to mix with locals, given that many of them were sent elsewhere for study following the riots in Honiara and Nuku’alofa. Without this demographic,

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a whole generation is removed from the socialization process and therefore prolonging misunderstandings. Rivalry in the Pacific Improving the OC relationship with the local population (and therefore raising China’s own friendly image) is only one of Beijing’s objectives with the OC. The other key aspect of qiaowu is to mobilize the OC as a channel for advancing Beijing’s national interests. A major component of this work is to isolate and oppose any threats to its power. This is very evident at the state level, and the Pacific has seen numerous examples of the rivalry between Beijing and Taipei in recent years—with chequebook diplomacy serving as the leading tool of both parties. Receiving less attention, however, is China’s efforts at the grassroots level. Beijing has actively sought to foster a pro-Beijing community sympathetic and supportive of its goals. Much of this effort has comprised of breaking down the long association between the OC and Taiwan. Historically, while some OC were indifferent towards the cross-strait rivalry between China and Taiwan, others preferred to integrate with the local lifestyle free of interference.104 There were also pockets of strong support amongst some OC for the Kuomintang (KMT). An Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) was established specifically to maintain educational, cultural, economic and political relations with them. As such, the Pacific OC were for a long time dominated by the KMT (and in turn, Taiwan)—even today, some still hold tightly to that relationship (particularly evident in the Fijian laoqiao community). Throughout the DPP period, sections of Taiwan’s domestic constituency expressed their distaste for an archaic, KMT-dominated OCAC that was seen to generously give to OC who did not contribute anything back to Taiwan (such as taxes or national military service). The DPP regime consequently turned OC policy attention away from capitalizing on the common bonds of blood, culture and anti-communist concern; instead, it sought legitimacy as an independent state by distancing itself from things “Chinese” and emphasizing its indigenous roots.105 Under such “Taiwanization”, Taipei’s connection to the Pacific

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(particularly at the state-to-state level) is trumpeted not through the generations of ethnic Chinese in the region, but through its Austronesian links.106 Under the DPP, Taipei was specific on how and to whom treatment would be directed. Requests for assistance from ethnic Chinese were largely ignored, and Taiwanese concerns given priority. In cases where the country concerned recognized Taipei, the rationale was to maintain robust state-to-state relations and to offer diplomatic assistance in the political context of its rivalry with Beijing. For example, when a Taiwanese volunteer was violently assaulted in the RMI, the ROC ambassador demanded the protection of its residents and questioned the safety of the island state.107 As a PRC dissident, Xu Bo was given a RMI work permit with assistance from the ROC ambassador, who arranged for a Taiwanese company to hire him.108 During the 2000 Fijian coup, Taiwan offered to evacuate Chinese nationals from the political turmoil.109 If the situation did not prove to have any political benefit, Taipei chose to relieve itself of all responsibility. For example, to distance itself from illegal PRC migration, Taipei provided a Mandarin translator to allow the RMI judicial system to communicate clearly with mainland overstayers.110 Similarly, SI OC caught in strife during 2006 were not offered diplomatic assistance. In their defense, Taiwanese government channels asserted that humanitarian aid is offered regardless of political background111 and that this policy had never changed. Diplomats claimed no official instruction was given to differentiate between OC—whether they be of Taiwanese origin or otherwise. Nor did the ROC have a formal policy on consular issues relating to ethnic Chinese who are not Taiwanese nationals. It was up to the discretion of local diplomats to offer assistance. In Honiara, the ambassador chose not to help.112 There were practical reasons for Taipei’s actions. In the SI case, few OC had ties to Taiwan. Many still held PRC passports, while others had Australian residency or citizenship. There were immigration and logistical issues if refugees were taken to Taiwan, given that they could not be airlifted directly to the PRC under travel restrictions between the two Chinas at the time. It would also set a precedent if assistance were

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offered. Countries that Taiwan has diplomatic relations with tend to be poor and unstable, and there is every expectation that such assistance could be rendered time and time again. In short, Taiwan’s situation under a DPP regime meant it could no longer draw or call upon the majority of ethnic Chinese overseas for support in the way it did under previous KMT rule. However, after the KMT re-took power in 2008, it appeared that Taiwan’s own qiaowu effort was still very much influenced by its domestic political situation. Reports that Ma Ying-jeou’s administration intended to scrap the OCAC soon surfaced. Not long after, Ma announced that the OCAC (served through only sixteen offices) would merge with Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to provide “better services to overseas Chinese” through its larger network of 121 offices.113 Domestically, the OCAC itself was hesitant for a merger, given it would alienate Taiwan from many old (predominantly nonTaiqiao) supporters, and create practical limitations for both OCAC and diplomatic personnel.114 OC groups around the world sent petitions of protest and threatened to boycott Taiwanese exchanges and visits. The PRC immediately capitalized on these sentiments—top Beijing OC official Li Haifeng appealed to these groups by telling them that the mainland would accept them if they were abandoned.115 Finally in April 2009, given these concerns, Ma made a last minute change to the proposal, and the OCAC was able to continue its functions fully intact.116 Whether the KMT is able to count on support from laoqiao communities remains to be seen. Since 2008, Taiwanese diplomats have moved away from the previously politically motivated relationship of the DPP years, preferring to return to the KMT style of supporting their long-term prosperity and encouraging more pragmatic relations with them. However, there still remains much work to be done in order to regain their favour. There have been other significant changes to Taipei’s relationship with the OC under the KMT. For example, Taiwan has reassessed its relationship with anti-CCP OC groups (such as the Free China Society). Taiwan no longer supports the FLG and pro-Tibet movement despite repeated requests for assistance from them.117 These actions reflect the KMT’s conciliatory approach towards dealing with Beijing. Although the change to of government may have signalled some

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improvements for OC relations, it is clear that Taiwan can never return to the level that it enjoyed with the OC in times past. In the contemporary period, Taiwan simply does not have the resources nor the political support to deal with such a large and diverse community; nor does it possess a sufficiently robust or attractive enough platform that ethnic Chinese can readily identify with. Qiaowu for the Pacific OC In the context of Taiwan’s long relationship with the Pacific OC, China’s rival efforts to strike a strong relationship with them were particularly evident during the DPP-led movement towards independence. Qiaowu comprised of various techniques: firstly, actively attacking Taiwan by sabotaging its “plot” for independence (through spreading bad rumours, or working to spoil Taiwanese success). For example, PRC diplomats were successful in preventing Double Ten (October 10th anniversary of the founding of the ROC) celebrations in Suva in 2005. Other work sought to encourage patriotism for China amongst local OC, such as a PRC national flag raising ceremony.118 The second aspect of qiaowu aimed to control OC resources and the community at large by consolidating support for Beijing and unifying OC organisations through the promotion of “One China”.119 Large numbers of xinqiao facilitate the establishment of various associations (business, political and cultural), lobby groups, and media structures. Such bodies appear as legitimate independent voices, but in fact have close links to the PRC. If necessary, they can be called upon to sway local political opinion in its favour, or at least publicise Beijing’s point of view. For example, the Tonga Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China was established in 2004 to counter support for Taiwanese independence.120 The OC community in Guam was out in force to welcome PRC naval vessels into Apra Harbour.121 The PRC was also directly involved in extraditing Taiwanese Falungong practitioners out of the country in 2003 by mobilizing OC groups to provide information and organising a protest at the police station.122 PRC ambassador to Fiji Cai Jinbiao remarked “the Chinese here in Fiji,

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although far from their hometown, love the motherland and support China’s reforms.”123 There is much work to do in winning over the entire Fijian OC community, particularly amongst the staunch pro-Taipei laoqiao community. According to State Council research, there remains a longheld belief that these laoqiao are predominantly representative of the “Three Knives” (lowly-educated market gardeners, restauranteurs and shop owners) who are too busy to participate in OC affairs; furthermore, amongst the xinqiao, there is a lack of harmony due to political, regional and provincial differences. This assessment leads the PRC to believe that these internal differences prohibit the formation of a unified OC organization.124 Therefore, qiaowu involves promoting unity amongst rival groups, inspiring them to drop selfish interests, and work together to prevent Taiwanese independence. Qiaowu should be aimed at the “Three News” (the new generation of those of ethnic Chinese descent, new migrants of PRC nationality and ethnic Chinese, and new OC organizations). This policy does not exclude laoqiao (some of whom are into their second or third generation and therefore can be considered part of the first grouping). They are also to be brought into the fold of OC work under the premise “old friends are not to be forgotten, while relations with new friends are to be expanded.”125 In cases where these efforts are unsuccessful, a third aspect consists of “converting” or “turning” influential backbone members of the Taiwan-friendly OC community to shift their support towards Beijing, or at least, persuade them that China is not so different after all. Qiaowu seeks to break down political differences by emphasizing the one thing all OC can relate to—cultural unity and ethnographic commonality. Although it is not supposed to take a chauvinistic attitude, qiaowu celebrates “Chineseness” in an effort to rally the OC for Beijing for the purposes of weakening or isolating alternative discourses. In this respect, China makes strong calls for the reform of Chinese education throughout the Pacific. Fiji is a prime example of this effort, but with mixed results. Fiji’s Chinese education system has long had a history of being dominated by pro-Taiwan forces. China’s main efforts focus upon dissolving Taiwan’s grip on local schools, working to persuade education committees and primary school teachers of Yatsen school to change over

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to the PRC system, and promoting the Hanyu shuiping kaoshi (HSK) test as a recognised standard with the Fijian Ministry of Education. In 2007, Fijian OC claimed the PRC embassy was attempting to influence the local Chinese Education Research Group and getting pro-Beijing “new” migrant OC onto the board of trustees (then dominated by pro-Taiwan laoqiao).126 Moreover, they were wary of PRC attempts to establish a Confucius Institute at the University of the South Pacific. In order to win over such staunch opposition, Beijing’s long-term goal is to increase friendly relations with them by utilizing and exploiting any opportunity to encourage them to participate in embassy activities. This kind of qiaowu consists of guidance, development and co-ordination under principles of “to guide but do not lead”, “penetrate but do not intervene”, “rely but do not depend upon”, and “help but do not take sole charge of ”.127 For example, tactics include “liberating the thinking” of pro-Taiwan supporters by actively engaging with them and reducing their sense of distance with China, and encouraging intensive mutual exchange while accommodating and respecting their political attitude. Activities include managing cultural events, conferences and propaganda with themes such as “One Heart, One Mind”. These efforts are essentially a bombardment of small soft power efforts to reduce Taiwan’s scope of activity and influence128 by seeking to persuade and influence OC into doing many small things supportive of China without actually realising it. In this context, working with the OC Chinese language media is another important aspect of qiaowu. Efforts include increased exchange and communication with editorial staff, encouraging them to participate in PRC-hosted international media conferences, and affiliating their paper with Xinhua News Service (China’s official news agency). By providing state-controlled news resources, funding, and in some instances using intense pressure, the PRC managed to stifle newspapers supporting independence.129 Evacuations of the OC are part of a wider effort to show Beijing as a capable and effective global power, particularly when it can expose Taiwan’s weaknesses. High profile airlifts are an ideal showcase for this, executed in a carefully choreographed “emergency response mechanism” with cooperation from foreign naval and air forces. China has been

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largely successful in gaining the support of the OC on this platform. As such, they are likely to demand and expect help from Beijing in times of trouble. When OC were frustrated at the inept efforts and limited resources of local authorities (or in the case of the Honiara riots, Taiwanese diplomats), they sought speedy resolution through PRC channels instead.130 In response, Chinese officials were quick to offer their assistance131 or criticise local inadequacies.132 Nonetheless, it should be noted that evacuations have been on a relatively small scale of less than 500 persons. Such numbers mean that logistical issues and problems with re-settling in China have been minimal. Despite numerous successful evacuations, OC officials reveal that it is only a stop-gap measure, and something China would rather not do. Not only do poor ethnic relations hinder China’s own state-to-state relations with other countries, evacuation is a costly exercise that is often abused. The OC are a drain on resources if expensive measures have to be taken to protect or rescue them. As such, qiaowu focuses on monitoring developments and investigating methods of preventing a recurrence rather than place efforts on an actual rescue.133 Therefore, it is unlikely that China would respond in full measure to a larger or more complex situation. For example, there are reportedly up to 30,000 ethnic Chinese in Fiji and thousands of illegal migrants in PNG. In June 2009, OC businesses were the targets of riots in Port Moresby. In that instance, the PRC embassy decided that an evacuation was not necessary. Diplomats explained that the local government had the necessary capability for containing the unrest and to protect those at risk.134 Had an evacuation been launched, the dispatch of PLA naval vessels might have sent uncomfortable signals of battleship diplomacy into the region and therefore compromise China’s benevolent image. It would have also exposed it to embarrassing criticism for its lack of action on illegal migration. The future of OC in the Pacific The PRC maintains it is not actively seeking to reclaim the OC as its own, but provides opportunities for them to reconnect with the

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motherland if they so wish. It welcomes them back “home” and is interested in maintaining their welfare, no matter what their origins.135 Rather than using heavy-handed methods of indoctrination, China prefers that the OC embrace China voluntarily. Through a strategic set of emotional and sentimental appeals, offers of diplomatic protection, facilitation of business, and general networking structures, China and its qiaowu policies form an attractive resource for the entire OC community to draw upon, and in turn, directly benefiting China’s interests. While the OC see the PRC government as a means of assistance in times of trouble, they still tend to be insular and family or businessminded. Attempts to form direct links through qiaowu programmes and conferences are not enthusiastically sought after by community leaders, with only a handful of invitations accepted each year. Overt support for either Taiwan or China in these smaller nations is limited to minor groups or individuals wishing to curry favour for personal prestige and status. This small number of OC seeking closer political relations is not reflective of the wider community. Therefore, employing common ethnography as a tool for political influence has not worked. Beijing and Taipei’s efforts have had very varied results across the Pacific—backfiring in Kiribati and causing political unrest in the SI. Rather than being manipulated, the majority of the OC actively use their ethnicity and heritage to claim benefits for their own political and economic gain. Sir Thomas Chan and son Laurie Chan of the SI, Sir Julius Chan of PNG,136 and Jim Ah Koy of Fiji have used their Chineseness as a tool of convenience for public office. While their ethnicity might explain their country’s stronger relationship with China and/or Taiwan,137 they themselves are clearly not political pawns. Another stumbling block for qiaowu is the heterogenous nature of Chinese migrants. Pacific sociologist Bill Willmott suggested that established OC could act as intermediaries and bridge the gaps between new and old migrants, as well as between governments. He argued old regional rivalries and political loyalties have faded over time.138 Similarly, commentator Graham Hassal noted that island OC

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communities were well established, with many into their third or fourth generation, and most “probably don’t have direct ties back to China.”139 Both these views are debatable. The author’s own fieldwork in 2007 showed that regional rivalry (in Tonga) and political loyalty (in Fiji) remain strong. Despite acculturation and intermarriage, the OC have in general maintained their cultural identity140 and connections. Antagonism amongst and within various groups of Chinese has resulted in infighting and in-effective leadership. This aspect of Chinese society will only intensify as migration continues, and it will be increasingly difficult to speak for all Chinese as a single entity. For example, while local associations have shared interests in building stability and prosperity, as individuals, the OC have their own personal agendas in mind. For example, Sir Henry Quan (a prominent SI OC elder) demanded Guangdong authorities do something about the illegal migration and “new” OC problem—the very groups that were competing with the business interests of “old” Chinese community. Ultimately, ethnic Chinese cannot be accused of being solely responsible for regional instability. There are deeper issues within island society that have existed (and will continue to exist) whether or not there is a Chinese presence. Attacks upon OC communities tend to be opportunistic rather than aimed at the people themselves. Chinatowns are a convenient and attractive target for looting. Rioting has frequently occurred on the back of political issues. Moreover, decades of neglect, poor infrastructure,141 low standards of education, exploitation and poverty are entrenched in a cultural lifestyle that is at odds with those of OC. Conclusion This chapter has summarized the two main goals of Beijing’s qiaowu policy in the Pacific: firstly, to form strong bonds with the OC as a channel for raising the profile and image of China; and secondly, to seek their support in challenging potential threats to its power. With regard to the first objective, the image of China as a benevolent and strong power has been cemented in the minds of many OC as a result of recent high

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profile diplomatic interventions. Months after the Honiara riots, the evacuation was publicly described by PRC Ambassador to NZ Zhang Yuanyuan, as a “successful practice” and that China was “better prepared as times goes by.”142 However, as this chapter has shown, the same has not been achieved with the OC themselves. The OC in the Pacific remain vulnerable—facing pressure from both local and external factors. The events in PNG in 2009 showed that recommendations made two years earlier to “upgrade” the migrant have had little effect. Tensions still run strong throughout the region. Both OC groups and locals believe that a recurrence of rioting in Honiara is still very possible. “New” Chinese shop-owners continue to complain about the attitudes and work ethics of local customers and staff; locals still accuse Chinese of being rude and exploitive. Qiaowu can only address this issue from the ethnic Chinese end, and even then it is limited in its scope and reach. In the short term it appears that the responsibility to address ethnic tension lies with all parties concerned. With regards to mobilizing the OC in China’s favour, qiaowu has made significant advances. For example, the increasing numbers of xinqiao has provided a ready source of support for muting, isolating or discrediting the Taiwanese independence and Falungong movements. Moreover, an extended period of “Taiwanization” turned many laoqiao groups away from Taipei. The subsequent re-ascension of the KMT to power in 2008 has only aided Beijing’s efforts to unify OC communities and orient them towards China. Given the anticipation that the “emergency response mechanism” may be used again, this points to an expectation that ethnic tensions will continue in the context of increased OC migration. Furthermore, together with the steady implementation of various cultural, economic and political qiaowu policies, China has the capacity and motivation to continue projecting its extra-territorial influence over the OC in an attempt to consolidate a global pro-Beijing community. References 1.

Three weeks were spent meeting with diplomats, community and business leaders, journalists and various local OC in Tonga, Fiji and the Solomon Islands in August-September 2007. Another four weeks were spent in Beijing and

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2. 3.

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9. 10.

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Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Guangzhou for policy research and analysis in November 2007. Research was funded by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Historical Research Grant, Chinese Poll Tax Heritage Trust Grant and an Asia:NZ Foundation NZASIA Studies Society Post-Graduate Award. The author wishes to thank the Ministry, the Trust, the Foundation and the Society for its support. Elizabeth Feizkhah, “How to Win Friends: Beijing is Courting Tiny Pacific Nations,” Time Pacific, June 4, 2001. Bill Willmott, “A History of Chinese Communities in Eastern Melanesia, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Caledonia,” Working Paper 12, MacMillan Brown Library, University of Canterbury, 2005. Michael Field, “Beche-de-mer—Ugly but Lucrative,” December 4, 2001, www.michaelfield.org/Pacific%20features.htm. Bill Willmott, “Riots in the Solomon Islands: The Burning of Honiara’s Chinatown,” (presentation at NZ-China Friendship Society May Meeting, Christchurch, May 25, 2006). Thomas V. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan,” Asian Survey 29, no. 8 (1989): 802. Bessie Ng Kumlin Ali, Chinese in Fiji (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South Pacific, 2002). Susan Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” Policy (Winter 2005), www.cis.org.au/Policy/winter05/polwin05-5.htm; Nick Squires, “Pacific Persuasion: Beijing’s Increasing Economic Muscle in the South Pacific,” South China Morning Post, July 21, 2005, www.cis.org.au/exechigh/Eh2005 /EH28905.htm. Giff Johnson, “Chinese Visa Abuse Vexes Marshall Islands,” Marianas Variety, January 16, 2006. Ofa Kaukimoce, “Chinese Community in Fiji Upset by Constant Criticism,” Radio Australia, May 31, 2002, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/ 2002/june/06%2D03%2Do8.htm. Bill Willmott, “Riots in the Solomon Islands: The Burning of Honiara’s Chinatown.” “Chinese Immigrants Flock to Fiji,” TVNZ Website, June 1, 2001, http://tvnz.co.nz/view/page/425822/42312. Hank Nelson, “The Chinese in Papua New Guinea,” State Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper 2007/03, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 2007: 7-8. Graeme Dobell, “The Pacific Proxy—China vs. Taiwan,” Islands Business, February 9, 2007, http://www.islandsbusiness.com/archives/index_dynamic /containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=130/focusContentID= 7798/tableName=mediaRelease/overideSkinName=newsArticle-full.tpl. Francis X. Hezel, “Who Will Own Business in Majuro?” Micronesian Counselor, Issue 61, May 12, 2006, www.micsem.org/pubs/counselor/pdf/mc61.pdf.

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28. 29. 30.

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Manoranja Mohanty, “Contemporary Emigration from Fiji: Some Trends and Issues in the Post-Independence Era,” in Current Trends in South Pacific Migration, Vijay Naidu, Ellie Vasta and Charles Hawksley (eds), Working Paper No. 7, Asia Pacific Migration Network, Centre for Asia Pacific Social Transformation Studies, University of Wollongong, January 2001. Asian Development Bank, “Ethnic Diversity in the Pacific,” 2006, www.adb.org/Pacific/ethnic-diversity.asp. “Suoluomen yueji huaqiao di Sui,” (Solomons Cantonese Arrive in Guangzhou) Nanfang Daily, April 24, 2006, http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/ jwxy/200604240115.asp. “Illegal Requirements: Chinese Language,” Marshall Islands Journal, June 15, 2001, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2001/june/06%2D29%2D22.htm. “Zhuanjia xixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo xianji xiance” (Specialist Advisory Committee Offer Suggestions for OC Work) Qiaoqing, No. 8, March 15, 2005, 11. Pliny Han, “Chinese Firms Encouraged to Invest, Run Operations in Fiji,” Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/04/content_4384135.htm. Wen Jiabao, “Win-win Cooperation for Common Development,” (speech presented at the Opening of the First Ministerial Conference of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, Nadi, Fiji, April 5, 2006), http://english.people.com.cn/200604/05/eng20060405_256110. html. James Brooke, “Typhoon of Chinese Tourists Hits the Pacific Islands,” New York Times, November 28, 2004, p.12. John Woods, “China Announces Major Projects in Cook Islands,” Cook Island News, March 6, 2006, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/march/03%2D06 %2D08.htm. “Tonga Expects Chinese Tourists to Help Economy,” Xinhua, April 13, 2006, www.matangitonga.com/Taimi/News.asp?db=1&N_ID=431. Michael Field, “Fiji’s Future Uncertain as Indians Continue Exodus,” Islands Business, April 27, 2006, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/April/04-27ft2,htm. Craig Skehan, “Chinese Gangs in Pacific Now Real Regional Threat,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 20, 2005, www.news.vu/en/news/RegionalNews/ 050220-Chinese-gangs-in-Pacific.shtml. “PNG Claims Visa Boondoggle in Beijing,” The Post-Courier, January 8, 2004, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/january/01%2D08%2D15.htm. “Chinese Migrants Warned,” PacNewsservice, April 25, 2006, www.pacificmagazine.net/pina/pinadefault2.php?urlpinaid=21628. Michael Field, “Nauru Passport Report Opens Murky Details,” May 24, 2006, www.michaelfield.org/nauru20.htm.

76 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38.

39. 40. 41.

42.

43.

44. 45.

46.

47.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Kent Atkinson, “Triads Spinning Murderous Web,” New Zealand Herald, October 25, 2005, www.nzherald.co.nz/location/story.cfm?l_id=10&ObjectID =10351783; Michael Field, “Currency of Persuasion,” The Listener, Vol. 198, No. 3391, May 7-13, 2005, www.listener.co.nz/issue/3391/features/3950/currency_ of_persuasion,2.html;jsessionid=185F35BFD774DA2CD41E47234608B224. “Chinese Businesses Pop Up in Bougainville,” The Post-Courier, July 22, 2005, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/07%2D22%2D09.htm. Matthew Roseingrave, “An International Perspective: Beijing,” Contraband, September 2006, 11. “Fiji Targets Chinese for Illicit Imports,” Fiji Times, May 3, 2005, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/may/05%2D03%2D05.htm. From a survey conducted by Northern Marianas College, noted on December 6, 2006, www.hawaiipublicradio.org/hulsen/pacific.htm. Giff Johnson, “Majuro Bar Operator Charged in Prostitution Case,” Marianas Variety, August 29, 2006, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/August/0829-15.htm. Robert Keith-Reid, Samisoni Pareti and Mere Tuqiri, “Chinese Galore,” Islands Business, August 2002, 12. “Observer Newspaper Says Chinese Mafia Likely in Samoa Too,” Samoa News, January 2, 2002, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/january/01%2D02%2 D14.htm. Jeremy Hillman, “Hong Kong: Gateway to the West,” BBC, July 5, 2000. “Shijie huaqiao huaren de renkou guji 2005 nian” (2005 Estimate of Global OC Population) Qiaoqing, No. 32, September 10, 2006, 18. Philip Kepson, “Probe Into Illegal Entry of Taiwanese into PNG Hits Snag,” The National, July 1, 1999, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/july/07%2D02% 2D07.html. Cookie B. Micaller, “CNMI Governor Tenorio Calms Worries About Illegal Chinese Nationals,” Saipan Tribune, April 20, 1999, http://archives.pireport.org/ archive/1999/april/04%2D21%2D01.html. Jude O. Marfil, “U.S. Defense Asks Rota to Bar Chinese,” Marianas Variety, December 9, 2004, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/december/12%2D09 %2D15.htm. Giff Johnson, “Chinese Visa Abuse Vexes Marshall Islands,” Marianas Variety, January 16, 2006. “China Unhappy Over PNG Detention of Businessman,” The Post-Courier, January 12, 2001, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2001/january/01%2D15%2 D07.htm. Liberty Dones, “Chinese Visitors Limited to 7 Days in CNMI,” Saipan Tribune, January 4, 2005, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/january/01%2D04%2 D03.htm. Frank N. Pieke, Pal Nyiri, Mette Thuno and Antonella Ceccagno, Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe (Stanford University Press, 2004),

Sino-Pacifica

48.

49.

50. 51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56. 57.

58.

59. 60. 61.

77

www.anth.mq.edu.au/maa/unit_pages/805/ANTH805_Chapter2TransnationalChi nese.pdf. “China: 10,000 Workers Without Clearance in CNMI,” Marianas Variety, January 24, 2003, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/january/01%2D24%2 D08.htm. Giff Johnson, “Lawyer Alleges Abuse of Marshall Islands Chinese,” Marianas Variety, May 11, 2006, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/may/05%2D12% 2D14.htm. “Chinese Garment Workers on Hunger Strike,” Agence France Presse, March 7, 2000. Craig Skehan, “Fiji to Crack Down on Foreign Prostitutes Posing as Students,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 25, 2005, www.smh.com.au/news/World/Fijito-crack-down-on-foreign-prostitutes-posing-as-students/2005/02/24/1109180047 381.html. “Boat People Seen in PNG’s National Capital District,” The Post Courier, September 3, 1999, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1999/september/09%2D06 %2D04.html. Cookie B. Micaller, “Another Chinese Immigrant Boat Diverted to Tinian,” Saipan Tribune, December 18, 1998, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/1998/ december/12%2D21%2D09.html. Bertil Lintner, “A New Battle for the Pacific,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 2004; James Brooke, “China Sees Chances for Fun and Profit Offshore,” New York Times, November 25, 2004, http://travel.nytimes.com/ 2004/11/25/business/worldbusiness/25islands.html?ex=1166677200&en=255eaf9 768e47e8f&ei=5070. “Chinese Miners to Live in Australia, Work in PNG,” Papua New Guinea Post Courier, June 7, 2006, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2006/june/06%2D07 %2D16.htm. Fiji Government News Briefs, August 3, 2005, www.fiji.gov.fj/publish/page_ 5090.shtml. Anna Powles and Brendan Taylor, “Double Headed Dragon,” The Diplomat, June/July 2005: 32-33; Ron Crocombe, “The Fourth Wave: Chinese in the Pacific Islands in the Twenty-First Century,” CSCSD Occasional Paper No.1, May 2007, 30. Ko-lin Chin, “The Social Organization of Chinese Human Smuggling,” in Global Human Smuggling: Comparitive Perspectives, eds. David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001). Bertil Lintner, Blood Brothers: The Criminal Underworld of Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). “Double Headed Dragon,”: 32-33. “Economic Growth Sees Rise of Crime Syndicates,” interview by Graeme Dobell, Abc.net, www.abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s1783293.htm.

78 62.

63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72. 73.

74.

75. 76. 77. 78.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific “China’s Ambassador to Fiji Accuses Media of Bias in Crime Reporting,” “Fiji Military Exercises as Talks Signal Progress,” Radio New Zealand International, December 10, 2003, www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?id=7752&op=read. “Nation Steps Up Efforts in Illegal Migration Fight,” People’s Daily, June 12, 2001, http://english.people.com.cn/200106/12/eng20010612_72445.html. US State Department report on illegal trafficking, www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/ tiprpt/2004/33191; Li Heng, “Accursed Snakeheads Failed to Get Away from Beijing,” People’s Daily, March 9, 2001, http://english.people.com.cn/english /200103/08/eng20010308_64453.html. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa (Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhi chubanshe, 1979). James K. Chin, “Reducing Irregular Migration from China,” International Migration Vol. 41 (3) (2003): 61-62. Jennifer Bolz, “Chinese Organized Crime and Illegal Alien Trafficking: Humans as a Commodity,”Asian Affairs, an American Review (Fall 1995). James K. Chin, “Trends and Government Policies: Reducing Irregular Migration from China,” http://ctool.gdnet.org/conf_docs/Chin-Paper.doc. Li Minghuan, “Transformation of Contingency into Meaning: Emergence of a New Qiaoxiang in South China,” paper presented at the CCTR conference “People on the Move: The Transnational Flow of Chinese Human Capital at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, October 21-22, 2005, www.cctr.ust.hk/conference/papers/Li,Minghuan_paper.pdf. Ko-lin Chin, Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999): 152. “Woguo Dalu renkou guoji qianyi de xianzhuang, qushi ji xiangguan duice jianyi,”: 16-17, 19. Xiang Biao, “Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective,” International Migration, Vol. 41 (3) (2003): 35. Penny Edwards, “Time Travels: Locating xinyimin in Sino-Cambodian Histories,” in Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, eds. Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002): 276, 283. Teresita Ang See, “Influx of New Chinese Immigrants to the Philippines: Problems and Challenges,” in Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China, ed. Mette Thuno (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007): 157. “Zhongguo guoji yimin qushi tantao” (Inquiry into Chinese International Migration Trends) Qiaoqing, No. 54, December 5, 2005, 7-16. Qiaowu gongzuo gailun (Outline of Overseas Chinese Work) (Beijing: Guowuyuan qiaoban qiaowu ganbu xuexiao, October 1993): 2-7. Qiaoqing, No. 11, April 23, 2007, p. 19. “Haiwai Zhongguo feifa yimin diaocha,” (Investigation into Illegal Chinese Migrants Abroad) Qiaoqing jianbao, November 23, 2006, 6.

Sino-Pacifica 79. 80. 81. 82.

83. 84. 85.

86.

87. 88.

89. 90. 91.

92.

93. 94.

95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

79

Li Minghuan, “Brokering Migration from Southern China,” IIAS Newsletter, No. 42 (Autumn 2006): 12-13, www.iias.nl/nl/42/IIAS_NL42_1213.pdf. “Zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui wei qiaowu gongzuo gongxianji xiance,”: 12. “Shijie huaqiao huaren de renkou guji 2005 nian,”: 20. “Beware of Chinese Businesses,” June 11, 2005, www.pacificislands.cc/pina/ pinadefault2.php?urlpinaid=15711; Michael Field, “Anti-Chinese Fervour in the Samoas,” Island Business, www.islandsbusiness.com/islands_business/index_ dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=4981/overide SkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl. “Chinese Top New Fiji Citizenship Figures,” Daily Post, May 15, 2002, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/may/05%2D16%2D14.htm. Angela Gregory, “Changing Fortunes in New Homeland,” Weekend Herald, December 10, 2005, B3. Craig Skehan, “Solomons Riot Threat if Opposition Nominee Loses PM Race,” The Age, May 3, 2006, www.theage.com.au/news/world/solomons-riot-threat-ifopposition-nominee-loses-pm-race/2006/05/02/1146335731222.html. Guangdong Provincial Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi…(From Speaking of the Burning of Chinatown…) (Guangzhou: Guangdong qiaoban, 2006). Ibid. 17-30. Anatolii M. Shkurkin, “Chinese in the Labour Market of the Russian Far East: Past, Present, Future,” in Globalizing Chinese Migration: Trends in Europe and Asia, eds. Pal Nyiri and Igor Saveliev (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002): 74-99. Cong Suoluomen tangrenjie bei shao shuo qi…17-30. Qiaoqing, 2007/1, January 8, 2007, p.22. “Dasuan hou de Yinni huaren ji wo dui Yinni qiaowu gongzuo” (Indonesian Chinese After the Election and Our OC Work) Qiaoqing, No. 51, December 1, 2004, 19. Lu Weixiong and Zheng Jianmin, “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo” (Who is the Unfortunate Victim of Anti-Chinese Incidents?) Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu (Overseas Chinese Work Research) No. 2 (2007): 23. Qiaoqing, 2007/1, January 8, 2007, p.23-24. Lin Lin, “Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli goujian hexie qiaowu” (Uphold Overseas Chinese as the Priority, Diligently Build Harmonious Overseas Chinese Relations) Qiaowu gongzuo yanjiu (Overseas Chinese Work Research), No. 6 (2006): 6. Li Minghuan, “Brokering Migration from Southern China,” IIAS Newsletter, No. 42 (Autumn 2006): 12-13, www.iias.nl/nl/42/IIAS_NL42_1213.pdf. “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,”: 23. “How Should China Protect Its Citizens Overseas?” PRC Consulate Statement, http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/nv/t140336.htm. “Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli goujian hexie qiaowu,”: 5. “Jianchi yi qiao wei ben, nuli goujian hexie qiaowu,”: 5.

80 100. 101.

102.

103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114.

115.

116.

117. 118. 119.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,”: 23. “Chinese Residents Told to Maintain Good Relations with PNG,” The PostCourier, October 3, 2000, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2000/october/10%2 D04%2D16.htm. “Jiang Zemin Meets the Chinese Community in French Polynesia,” Pacific Islands Report, April 4, 2001, http://166.122.164.43/archive/2001/April/04-05up4.htm. ““Xibanya shaoxie shijian” de fansi yu qishi” (Reflections and Thoughts on Spanish Shoe Store Fire) Qiaoqing, No.51, December 1, 2004, 13-14. Stuart W. Greif, “Political Attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in Fiji,” Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 11 (November 1975): 977. Chen Jie, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002. “China’s Authoritarian Values Hinder Pacific Development,” The Press, October 18, 2007, A11. “High Profile Assault Prods Marshalls into Action,” Yokwe, June 7, 2005, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/june/06%2D07%2Ded2.htm. Aenet Rowa, “Marshall Islands Gives Refuge to Chinese Dissident Xu Bo,” Yokwe, June 14, 2003, www.yokwe.net/index-php?name=News&file=article &sid=439. “Taiwan Warships to Pick Up Chinese From Fiji,” Radio Australia, June 9, 2000. “Marshalls Crack Down on Illegal Aliens,” Marianas Variety, June 7, 2006, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/June/06-07-07.htm. “ROC Aided Mainlanders in Solomons,” Liberty Times, June 16, 2000, www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20000616/20000616p7.html. There has been recent discussion that the ROC should help PRC citizens in certain situations, but only in times of extreme crisis. John Chen (TECO Representative), from communication with Anne-Marie Brady, May 1, 2007. http://english.csie.ncnu.edu.tw/modules/iWSML/Ben/html/200903250950.html. Flor Wang, “OCAC Head Reserved About Combining Agency with Foreign Ministry,” Central News Agency, June 11, 2008, http://english.cna.com.tw/ SearchNews/doDetail.aspx?id=200806110024. “Merger of Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission Opposed,” KMT website, March 11, 2009, www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112& anum=5891. Shih Hsiu-chuan, “OCAC Escapes Inclusion in Foreign Ministry,” Taipei Times, April 19, 2009, www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/04/19/200344 1459. Private communication with Taiwanese official, Wellington, July 5, 2009. “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,”: 6-16. “Jinnian lai qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo qingkuang” (The Situation of OC Work Towards Taiwan in Recent Years) Qiaoqing, No. 31, October 23, 2007, 3.

Sino-Pacifica 120. 121. 122.

123. 124. 125.

126.

127. 128. 129. 130.

131. 132. 133. 134. 135.

136. 137.

138.

81

“‘One China’ Group Set Up in Tonga,” Radio Australia, January 19, 2004, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2004/january/01%2D20%2D12.htm. Katie Worth, “Chinese Warship Calls on Guam,” Pacific Daily News, October 23, 2003, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/october/10%2D23%2D10.htm. “Fiji Police Arrest Falun Gong Members at Games,” Radio New Zealand International, July 3, 2003, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2003/july/07%2D 03%2D09.htm. “Fiji Vice President Praises Chinese Community,” Fiji Times, October 3, 2006, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2006/October/10-10-12.htm. “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo” (Increase Strength on Developing All Fronts of OC Taiwan Work) Qiaoqing, No. 15, June 6, 2007, 7. “Xinlao qiaotuan lianghao hezuo, huawen jiaoyu zaixian shengji (Good Cooperation Between New and Old OC Groups, Produce New Opportunities for Chinese Education) Qiaoqing, No. 34, August 2, 2004, 4. Laoqiao OC believed the embassy was using pro-Beijing xinqiao to ‘infiltrate’ the board of trustees. Interview with local Fijian OC academic, Suva, September 2007. See also “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo” (Increase Strength on Developing All Fronts of OC Taiwan Work) Qiaoqing, No. 15, June 6, 2007, 8, 11-12. “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,”: 6-16. “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,”: 6-16. “Jiada lidu, quanfangli kaizhan qiaowu dui Tai gongzuo,”: 6-16. “American Samoa Police Investigate Murder of Chinese Woman,” Radio Australia, February 5, 2002, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2002/february/02 %2D06%2D19.htm. Mark Neil-Jones, “Three Held in Vanuatu Murder,” Vanuatu Daily Post, June 8, 2005, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/june/06%2D08%2D02.htm. “Attacks on Fiji Chinese Raise Concern,” Fiji Times, May 31, 2005, http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2005/june/06%2D02%2D04.htm. “‘Yuanqiao’ shijian shi shei re de huo,”: 23. Private communication with PRC diplomats. Wellington, June 20th 2009. “China Offers to Take Mafia Queen’s Daughter,” Radio New Zealand International, April 21, 2005, www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?id=16263& op=read. “Former PNG PM Calls Taiwan Deal a Desperate Act,” interview by Michael Brissenden, abc.net, July 6, 1999, www.abc.net.au/pm/stories/s34120.htm. As SI Foreign Minister, Laurie Chan pushed for Taiwan’s acceptance in the United Nations. See Ron Crocombe, The South Pacific (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South Pacific, 2001): 498. Bill Willmott, “Varieties of Chinese Experience in the Pacific” in Paul D’Arcy (ed.) Chinese in the Pacific: Where Are They Now? Special Issue of Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, May 2007, 35-42.

82 139.

140. 141. 142.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Kalinga Seneviratne, “Fear of Domination Sparked Anti-Chinese Riots,” Inter Press Service New Agency, April 22, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews =32978. David Yen-ho Wu, The Chinese in Papua New Guinea, 1880-1980 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univeristy Press, 1982). “Wrong to Blame Aid Donors for Melanesia Instability—Academic,” Pacnews, August 18, 2006. Questions and answer session at the NZ Chinese Association Annual Conference, Wellington, June 17, 2006.

Chapter 4 CHINA: STUMBLING THROUGH THE PACIFIC?1

Fergus Hanson

Introduction2 China is often portrayed as pursuing a well thought out long-term plan to expand its influence in the Pacific. Yet a closer look at its aid program in the region suggests it lacks a coherent strategy to guide its aid giving— beyond checking and reversing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan—and tends to pursue short-term objectives. This approach tends to undermine Pacific development objectives as well as China’s own medium and long-term interests in the region. Building on previous publications detailing Chinese aid to the Pacific over the period 2005-2007,3 this chapter reports the scale of China’s aid to the region in 2008 and the drivers behind its aid giving. It examines the short-term attitude to aid that has dominated China’s recent approach and concludes with an assessment of the outlook for China’s engagement with the Pacific and suggested recommendations. The chapter covers the developing members of the Pacific Islands Forum that recognise China (China does not give official aid to countries that recognise Taiwan). These countries include: the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu.

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China’s aid program: 2008 China continues to regard the details of its aid program as a state secret and publishes no detailed annual reports. Previously,4 due to a lack of official information, it was impossible to confirm several Chinese aid pledges reported in the Pacific media and on Pacific government websites. For the 2008 period, extensive cooperation with numerous officials across the region—on the condition of anonymity—has allowed for the most accurate assessment of Chinese aid pledges to the Pacific to date, although the figures could still be enhanced.5 Due to the improved quality of data it was possible for the first time to disaggregate Chinese grants from soft loans. In 2008, China’s pledged grant aid to the Pacific was $US 53 million with an additional $US 153 million pledged in soft loans, making a total of $US 206 million for 2008. A full list of pledged Chinese aid projects in the Pacific for 2008 by country is set out in Annexure I. In relation to the soft loans, it is important to note that only the interest subsidy (and debt forgiveness) component can properly be counted as aid. The terms of these concessional loans appeared to be the same as in previous years: a two percent interest rate over 20 years with a five-year grace period, during which only the interest component must be repaid. Pledged Chinese aid (grants and soft loans combined) to the Pacific was estimated6 to have been $US 33 million in 2005, $US 78 million in 2006 and $US 293 million in 2007. As noted in those reports the figures for 2007 were somewhat distorted by a large $US 150 million soft loan to the interim regime in Fiji and a $US 58 million soft loan to Tonga, both of which are still being dispersed in 2009 and so distorted the yearly figure of pledged aid. Instead, an annual estimate of Chinese aid was offered at between $US 100-150 million. Given that figures for 2008 still fail to value most in-kind aid or grass roots aid administered by the Chinese embassies, as well as the fact that comprehensive lists were not available for Fiji or PNG, total Chinese aid in 2008 was probably closer to the $US 100 million figure.7

85

China: Stumbling Through the Pacific?

700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Austr alia

US

NZ

Ja pan

EC

Fr anc e

Source: OECD

Fig. 1: Top Aid Donors to the 14 Developing Pacific Islands Forum Members ($US Million 2007)

A comparison with other donors (Figure 1) suggests China is pledging aid to the region at a similar level to other significant donors like New Zealand, Japan and the European Community, but does not come close to rivalling the significance of Australia as a donor. Some patterns have begun to emerge regarding China’s approach to loans versus grants. Two officials confirmed that it is common for China to give grants in either $Y 10 million or $Y 20 million amounts and this is also supported by figures reported across the region. One official commented: “These sorts of agreements are normally signed during high level visits from and to Beijing. The funds are included in a pool of funds which the PRC draws on when they receive requests from the….government. The fund is also used for items like medical practitioners and…coaches.”

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Soft loans tend to be given for specific projects worth more than $Y 20 million8, although, sometimes unrelated projects are tacked on to these. For example, in the Cook Islands, a loan of $NZ 13.5 million ($US 9.6 million) was agreed in 2007 to build facilities for the South Pacific Mini Games and to cover operational expenses associated with the games, but $NZ 1.6 million ($US 1.1 million) was set aside to fund construction of a new education administration building. Drivers Why is China engaged in the South Pacific at all? Except in times of major war, the region has been strategically insignificant. It is home to well-defined spheres of influence dominated by Australia, New Zealand, the United States and France, which have also been its major donors along with Japan, the EU and Taiwan. Some see China as wanting to secure access to the region’s natural resources or believe it wants to establish intelligence facilities and island missile bases to block a US naval approach from Pearl Harbor.9 Others believe it is starving Taiwan of diplomatic recognition or trying to win cheap votes in international organisations. So what exactly is motivating China’s growing presence in the Pacific? Resources In the increasingly well-studied terrain of Chinese aid in Africa, there is a widespread assumption that China’s interests in the continent are driven by its need to secure resource and energy supplies. Its preference to direct aid and investment activities towards resource-rich countries such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo10 supports this and is a pattern repeated in Latin America.11 The Pacific offers China some resources, but not enough to fully explain its growing presence. At a summit held in Fiji for Pacific leaders in 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao said “to foster friendship and cooperation with the Pacific island

87


countries is not a diplomatic expediency. Rather, it is a strategic decision”. And later in the same speech he went on to say “China has funding and technical expertise. The island countries are rich in natural resources. Herein lie huge potentials for bilateral cooperation”.12 So what resources is China interested in? The natural resource all Pacific nations share in common to varying degrees is fish stocks. At over 3 million square kilometres, China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is large, but not in comparison to the 20 million square kilometres that is the combined EEZ of the 14 developing Pacific Islands Forum members (see Figure 2).13 Fish stock access is undoubtedly of some interest to China, which has the world’s largest fish production and is the largest fish exporter.14 Access is doubly important given declining Asian fish stocks and increasing demand from China.15 400000

Square Kilometres

350000 300000 250000 200000 150000 100000

Source: SOPAC

Fig. 2: Exclusive Economic Zones

Samoa

Nauru

Niue

Palau

Tonga

Vanuatu

Fiji

Tuvalu

Solomon Islands

Cook Islands

Marshall Islands

FSM

PNG

China

0

Kiribati

50000

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China’s aid program is, at least in part, focused on this interest. It has funded projects such as the construction of fish processing plants in Vanuatu,16 the Cook Islands17 and PNG18 and the building of the headquarters of the Tuna Management Commission in the Federated States of Micronesia.19 On the commercial front, a large Hong Kongowned fishing fleet is based permanently in Pohnpei,20 while another Chinese fleet operates in Fijian waters.21 This partly accounts for China’s presence in the region, but it is hardly a sufficient explanation. Licensing fish stocks is a commercial activity, and China faces competition from other fishing powers, not least Japan and Taiwan, that are also large regional aid donors. Most Pacific islands have few other natural resources, but there are some exceptions. PNG is well known for its mineral wealth and valuable timber resources, and China has shown a keen interest in these. It has invested in PNG’s mineral sector, for example the Ramu nickel/cobalt mine in 2006.22 PNG is the closest any Pacific state comes to a “China in Africa” model, where large aid projects are linked to multi-million dollar resource investments by state-owned firms. Beyond PNG, countries such as Solomon Islands and Fiji have smaller timber and mineral resources. There has also been limited speculation about China’s (and other countries’) interest in the Pacific’s sea-bed mineral deposits,23 which are a potential long-term consideration. In summary, China has an interest in those Pacific countries with sizeable fish stocks. Other natural resources are of increasing interest to China, but are only substantial in PNG (and, to a lesser extent, Solomon Islands and Fiji). Taiwan “DFAT … stated that a priority for China’s six embassies in the Pacific is competition from Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. The department suggested that both China and Taiwan use economic assistance as a lever in their competition for diplomatic recognition.”24 “Their [China and Taiwan] aid programs tend to focus on prestige projects in a ‘chequebook diplomacy’ competition, applying less


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rigorous standards of transparency, accountability and governance than other donors.”25

The trait most commonly associated with Chinese aid in the Pacific is its focus on isolating Taiwan. China regards Taiwan as a renegade province and has for several decades waged a largely successful battle to wrest diplomatic recognition from “the other China”. Besides the Holy See, states that recognise Taiwan are clustered in three areas: the smaller states of the Americas (12), Oceania (6)26 and Africa (4). This establishes the Pacific as a critical diplomatic battleground for both China and Taiwan. In the absence of other major interests to explain China’s substantial engagement in the region, it has to be concluded that simply trying to deny Taiwan diplomatic recognition has traditionally been one of the principal reasons for its active diplomacy in the Pacific. However, since President Ma assumed office in May 2008, there has been a steady warming of relations between China and Taiwan, including the publication of a Taiwanese aid white paper27 which rejected the old approach to dollar diplomacy. During this period there has not been a single change in the diplomatic balance—with Taiwan maintaining its remaining 23 diplomatic allies. This is despite several Central American states actively positioning to switch from recognising Taiwan to recognising China.28 The fact not a single one of these states has made the change—in the case of El Salvador the winning presidential candidate made it an election promise—suggests a deliberate strategy by China to delay or stop them as part of an effort to keep the wider warming in China-Taiwan relations on track.29 In the Pacific the truce also appears to be holding,30 although the big test will come in April 2010 when Solomon Islands—the jewel in Taiwan’s Pacific crown—holds elections. The truce offers China the opportunity to refocus its aid program towards longer-term Pacific development goals that also better serve China’s national interests, but so far it has found it difficult to adjust (see below).

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Trade The Ministry of Commerce is the main coordinating body dealing with China’s overseas aid program which underlines the mercantilist basis for many Chinese aid decisions. The first of the “Eight Principles” of Premier Zhou Enlai (Annexure II) that guide China’s aid policy reinforces this commercial motive. It states that China “always regards aid to other countries as mutual and not as a kind of unilateral alms”. In Africa, Brautigam has identified an acceleration of “win-win” cooperation, where trade and access to mineral resources have played increasingly central roles31 in China’s engagement with the continent. Africa watchers note that aid is often used “as part of a package of tools to support Chinese companies in expanding export markets”.32 In the Pacific, growing trade and investment links are also a common theme to bilateral agreements and statements by senior leaders. Reflective of this trend is China’s funding of a Pacific Trade Office in Beijing to foster two-way trade with the region.33 However, whereas China’s trade with Africa is rapidly expanding, with hopes it will reach $US 100 billion by 2010,34 the Pacific’s total worldwide trade35 is just over $US 15 billion, with China’s share of this a modest $US 978 million in 2007 (see Table 1 in Annexure III). China-Pacific trade is expanding: in 1999, bilateral trade with the region was just $US 168 million.36 Xinhua reported China-Pacific trade might reach $US 2 billion in 2009 and $US 3 billion in 2010.37 But given the paltry size of the trade on offer, it is clearly not a major motivating factor behind Chinese engagement. As Wesley-Smith observed, “trade with Oceania still only represents less than one-tenth of one percent of the total value of China’s global trade”.38 Military The Pacific has been of strategic importance during times of major war, and this gives it some enduring significance in times of peace. A US Congressional Research Service Report states: “Since World War II, the United States has sought to prevent any potential adversary from gaining a strategic posture in the South Pacific that could be used to challenge


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the United States”.39 Australia shares a similar objective in preserving a stable and friendly region.40 For this reason, there has been considerable speculation about China’s military ambitions in the Pacific.41 Robert Kaplan, writing in the Atlantic Monthly, points out the strategic importance to the United States of its Pacific bases in any confrontation with China,42 while the Congressional report cited above takes note of the view that “China has devised a comprehensive strategy to take advantage of waning U.S. interest in the region since the end of the Cold War, especially in Melanesia”.43 In this light, the “look north”44 foreign policies of some Pacific states suggest a degree of reciprocation. So what grand strategy might China have in mind? One thought is that China might try to establish missile bases on Pacific islands to block the approach of the US navy.45 And in 1997, China established a satellite tracking base in Kiribati, which analysts suspected was used to observe a US missile testing range in the Marshall Islands.46 There remain several problems with this argument. The first is that setting up missile bases on fixed islands is an unlikely way to win an asymmetrical military confrontation with the world’s military superpower, as they would make easy targets. Second, knowing any Chinese missile base would be a target in any US-China conflict, Pacific leaders would face a difficult sell to their local population as to why they should put themselves in the direct line of fire, no matter what the financial incentive on offer. Finally, as China learnt the hard way in Kiribati, the same tiny scale that makes Pacific states vulnerable to inducements to switch loyalties from one China to the other47 plays both ways. In 2003, Kiribati changed back to recognising Taiwan, and China was forced to close and dismantle its base. (More plausible than the missile base theory is that China sees the potential for intelligence facilities in the region to monitor US forces.) Some of China’s aid is directed towards regional defence and paramilitary forces (in Fiji, PNG, Tonga and Vanuatu). However, the manner in which China conducts its military cooperation programs reflects its currently modest security ambitions in the region. A look at the assistance it provides regional forces suggests it is quite limited.48

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It tends to be confined to more benign assistance such as upgrading a military hospital in PNG or the supply of non-lethal equipment like uniforms and cars for the Vanuatu Mobile Force. China’s defence aspirations in the South Pacific are likely to remain limited. Taking a lead role in the Pacific would require major investment from China that offers little in return. Any significant military move by China in the region would also risk antagonising the United States. That would force China into a pointless escalation it would be sure to lose and from which it would eventually have to back down. The fact that China has done nothing to disturb this balance reflects a clear understanding that building strong military links or establishing a military presence in the region would be counterproductive and remains off-limits. For China, it remains preferable for Australia to remain the primary external provider of development assistance and regional stability. Muscle flexing As has been observed in other regions, China appears to be engaging in the Pacific, at least to some extent, to assert itself as an emerging power.49 In Latin America, where the Monroe doctrine traditionally reigns, China is expanding its military cooperation and economic reach with the aim, in the words of one senior US official, of “showcas[ing] its emergence as a major power”.50 In Africa, the Americans and Europeans are being forced to reassess the challenge posed by a rising China and are scrambling to re-assert their influence. To a certain extent, the motivation seems the same in the Pacific. Votes Some speculate that another explanation for China’s engagement in the Pacific is diplomatic,51 but not solely related to Taiwan. The developing Pacific Islands Forum members represent a potential voting bloc of 14.52 Of course, there are many competing powers in the Pacific—the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, France, Taiwan and China—all expecting their beneficiaries to support them. This makes for uncertain times, especially over issues where the powers’ interests conflict.


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Well-known examples are the tussle between Australia/New Zealand and Japan over whaling, and China’s opposition to Japanese efforts to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. As with other powers in the region, China is certain to be using its aid activities to try to lever support for its positions in international fora. However, as Australia is all too aware in the context of whaling, the number of competing donors and some unscrupulous behaviour by competitor countries means it will be hard for China to sew up this bloc of votes. Chinese diaspora A more recent motivator for China’s engagement may be a rising concern over the need to protect people of Chinese heritage caught up in anti-Chinese riots. The deadly May 2009 anti-Chinese riots across PNG (following similar episodes in Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006) served as a reminder of the deep anti-Chinese sentiment in the region and the need for Chinese officials on the ground to engage in more active preventative measures with local counterparts. A related concern for China is the integration and behaviour of new Chinese migrants in the Pacific. Following the riots in Honiara in 2006, Lu Weixiong, the Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs of Guangdong, and a colleague flew to Solomon Islands for a private visit and produced an “internal but influential report”.53 They found the Chinese migrants—80 percent of whom originated from Guangdong Province—of “low quality” and that “their ‘outrageous’ behaviour… turned the local people’s respect to the Chinese into resentment”. They went on to state: “China is a ‘responsible power’. However, if the world does not have a positive image of the overseas Chinese, we will not be able to win the respect and trust of the international society and the people in the world, whatever we say about ‘the harmonious world’”.54

The report highlights the enormous image problems China faces in the region. However, it suggests the interest China has in re-focusing its aid program towards longer-term development goals and in cooperating with

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local counterparts on a broader range of transnational issues, such as illegal logging and immigration.55 Good international citizenship While all aid programs inevitably have some national interest objectives behind them, humanitarian goals are generally also important. China’s aid program is no different. One of the objectives of Eximbank loans is to “promote economic development and improve living standard[s] in developing countries,”56 while the “Eight Principles” (Annexure II) also hint at development objectives, with goals of fostering self-reliance and boosting recipient government revenues. Playing the short-game China is often portrayed as pursuing a well-thought out, long-term strategy to extend its influence in the Pacific.57 There is no doubt its aid program and diplomatic engagement in the region have both increased in recent years in an effort to reverse diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. However, there is little evidence that it has a comprehensive grand strategy guiding its approach beyond its tussle with Taiwan. Instead, the evidence suggests that one consequence of this diplomatic battle, notwithstanding the recent truce, is that China tends to pursue short-term opportunism that often undercuts its longer-term interests as well as those of the region. The legacy of short-termism that the China-Taiwan rivalry has left can be seen through the unpredictability of pledged aid, the projects it funds with that aid, the secrecy with which it approaches aid and the response to the coup in Fiji. These are explored below. Unpredictable aid With a growing data series on China’s aid program in the region, it is possible to observe the unpredictability of Chinese aid. Pledges often take multiple years to be dispersed (as is common with other donors) but


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also often vary wildly between years. In Micronesia, for example— where particularly good figures are available—China pledged $US 15.8 million in 2007 but gave just $US 4.5 million in new funding in 2008— just 28 percent of the aid pledged the previous year. This drop in aid could reflect waning Chinese interest following the warming in China-Taiwan relations and consequent reduced incentives to compete diplomatically, the loss of key personnel in Micronesia who dealt with Chinese officials, or the lack of agitation by Micronesian officials for Chinese assistance. Whatever the actual reason, it suggests Chinese aid is irregular. The Cook Islands offers another useful illustration. Figures obtained on economic and technical cooperation grants pledged by China since 2001 reveal how amounts vary between years—$Y 10 million was pledged in 2001, 2002 and 2006, but $Y 20 million in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008. The figures not only fluctuate between years, but seemingly also take no account of inflationary changes since 2001. In addition, of the seven pledges made, only two were actually utilised. Poorly designed aid The projects China funds also point to short-termism. China tends to focus the bulk of its aid on infrastructure projects. The Pacific is in critical need of good infrastructure; however, the criticisms leveled at China’s infrastructure projects tend to focus on sustainability, debt burdening and lack of flow-on benefits. Regarding sustainability, China tends to build major infrastructure projects without any consideration of ongoing operating or maintenance costs. Thus, Samoa now has a $US 12.9 million swimming complex that one official quipped would be beyond the ability of even New Zealand to maintain. Elsewhere in the Pacific, the Cook Islands—population 21,000—has borrowed $US 9.6 million for facilities related to the South Pacific Mini Games. The associated issue of debt burdening is also problematic. The Cook Islands Chamber of Commerce called for the government to reconsider the large loan. The Chamber’s President was quoted as saying:

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“We call on the Cook Islands government to take a really deep breath and step back from the brink of mortgaging our future in this way. It took our country over a decade to extricate ourselves from the Sheraton debacle at enormous cost and this new loan could be even more disastrous for the long term well-being of the Cook Islands.”58

When the Cook Islands Deputy Prime Minister Sir Terepai Maoate was asked by ABC Radio whether the Cook Islands were going to be able to pay the loan back he said: “We hope New Zealand will be at our aid to assist us with this”.59 Chinese officials also appear concerned about open discussion of the suitability of their aid: when debate about the loans heated up in the Cook Islands, government officials confirmed reports that China was unhappy about the unfavourable media coverage.60 In Tonga, concern was expressed over the difficulty of repaying the loans.61 Tonga’s GDP is estimated to be $US 259 million (current prices) in 200962 while the soft loan China pledged in 2007 was $US 57.8 million ($Y 440 million) or approximately 22 percent of its GDP. In Fiji, the ousted Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase criticised the interim government’s excessive borrowing from China saying: “Borrowing is good as long as there is a balance but if they keep borrowing at this rate then control would be lost”.63 Another former prime minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, joined him: “The Kings Road from Korovou towards Ra and the sports complex are only two examples [of Chinese projects] that we know to have not ended well….Will our President agree with our nation being betrothed to another nation just because they have been able to buy us?”64

One official speculated that one difficulty China might still be coming to terms with was just how small the Pacific Island countries are, and that one major loan has the potential to seriously undermine the fiscal situation of many regional governments. In China’s defence, it was also noted that it has, to date, never insisted on repayment of a soft loan where that was manifestly not possible. There is even an emerging sense that some Pacific governments are taking on these large loans with the expectation that China will invariably forgive them and so capacity to repay them need not be considered seriously.


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The lack of flow-on benefits to the local economy is another criticism. As one report in Tonga put it: “The real beneficiaries are actually the Chinese, because they have secured an agreement to provide all materials, labour, engineering and all necessary supplies for the construction. China will also receive the funds so no tangible financial exchange takes place. All funds will remain in China and all Tonga will get is the end product in the form of bricks and mortar.”65

One of the explicit conditions of Chinese soft loans is that “Chinese enterprises should be selected as contractor/exporter” and “Equipments [sic], materials, technology or services needed for the project should be procured from China ahead of other countries. In principle, no less than 50% of the procurements shall come from China.”66 The tied nature of these loans reflects the commercial nature of China’s aid program and China’s status as a developing country keen to limit the cost of its aid program. It nevertheless reduces the development impact of its aid and is a source of some criticism in recipient countries, where local suppliers, contractors and labourers are locked out of work opportunities. Secretive aid Further evidence of China’s short-term approach is the secrecy surrounding its aid giving. China not only refuses to publish figures on its aid program in any region, it also refuses to be transparent with the recipients of its aid. This tends to generate suspicion from other donors as well as recipients, undermining China’s long-term interests. For donors and recipients it is important for all donors to coordinate their aid efforts, because most Pacific countries suffer from major capacity constraints, and to prevent duplication of aid. To measure Chinese participation in coordination efforts an anonymous survey was conducted with stakeholders across the region, the results of which are set out in the following table.

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FSM

PNG

Samoa

Tonga

Vanuatu

In your experience, do Chinese officials attend donor coordination meetings…? All the time

X

Most of the time Occasionally Hardly ever

X

X

X

Never

X In your experience, what is the average level of attendance by all participants at donor coordination meetings?

Senior official Mid-level official

X X

X

X

Junior official

X

In your experience, what is the level of Chinese participation at donor coordination meetings? Senior official Mid-level official Junior official

X

X

X

X

No official present

X

Who generally calls donor coordination meetings, the host government or a donor? Host government Donors

X X

X

X*

X

NB: In the Cook Islands and Niue, New Zealand is the only resident donor. In Fiji, the Ministry of Finance stopped arranging donor coordination meetings after the coup and other donors do not regularly hold them. *In Vanuatu, donors often lead coordination on specific sectoral issues.


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The results indicate that in only one country (Tonga) China regularly attends donor coordination meetings. This suggests China is inadvertently increasing the burden on local government officials and failing to adequately participate in attempts to coordinate development efforts. To address the issue of donor coordination the leaders of all Pacific Islands Forum member states endorsed the “Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific” at their most recent summit meeting. It states “The key objective of this compact will be to drive more effective coordination of available development resources from both Forum Island Countries and all development partners, centred on the aim of achieving real progress against the MDGs.”67 Unfortunately, the immediate response from China was not promising. In an interview after the announcement Wang Yongqiu, from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: “We feel it is unnecessary to accept this multilateral co-ordination mechanism, but we need time to study it.” And his solution to the problem of coordination revealed an unfortunate lack of insight into the issue: “All the aid projects should be received by the government, and it can’t receive the same project—for instance, road construction—from two different donors.”68 Beyond on-the-ground engagement, AusAID has made significant efforts to engage China. AusAID engages in working-level discussions with the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries within the Ministry of Commerce on donor issues, including its approach to aid effectiveness and staff training. In February 2009, AusAID hosted a training workshop for 17 mid-level officials from the Ministry of Commerce to expose Chinese aid officers to Australian systems and approaches, and it was subsequently agreed to make this an annual event. On 5 February 2008, China’s Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, travelled to Canberra for the inaugural ministerial strategic dialogue that reached agreement to “strengthen regional cooperation to mutually promote regional peace and stability”.69 There are signs that the failure by China to be transparent with recipients of its aid is also leading to suspicion. In correspondence with the author one Pacific official wrote:

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“The evidence on the buildings is anecdotal but the comparative value of the buildings Chinese construction v local it appears that the projected cost for construction may be overstated against the real cost. The money is not received just the building. There is no transparency in materials used or the associated cost of these materials. So too with the labour component. There is also the issue of loan currency and the possible effect of currency fluctuations on the loan.…It is a complex and somewhat murky affair that does not afford the country a lot of control over the end product….”

Another complaint raised in the Tongan press suggested frustration with China’s approach: “One of the stumbling blocks with regards to the construction is that the construction company is also the architect. Normally, the architect is a different entity who would come along to inspect the construction, not only to make sure that the construction is in accordance with the plan but to make sure that the materials used are what was stated in the plan and that the concrete and the steel used is in accordance with the plan.”70

Whatever the merits of these suspicions, they highlight the unintended consequences China’s secretive approach has on its own interests and reputation in the Pacific. On the positive side, one official noted that having the design and construction of projects packaged as one allowed them to be built speedily and provided a single point of responsibility. Miscalculating in Fiji? The most striking example of China’s short-term approach to the region has been its support for the interim regime in Fiji. It is probable that the regime lacks popular support.71 The coup leader “Frank” Bainimarama has failed to implement his reform agenda and shown no efforts to change the ethnic balance in the security forces or improve transparency. And if past coups in Fiji are any indicator of likely future outcomes, Bainimarama’s leadership is not a guaranteed long-term proposition. Despite this, China has ploughed ahead with an ambitious engagement strategy with the interim regime.


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Before the December 2006 coup, China and Fiji were engaged in discussions on a large $US 150 million soft loan. However, it was only after the coup that China concluded the deal. China followed this loan up with a pledge in 2008 of $US 83.1 million ($F 132.45 million) in the form of a soft loan to part finance the Nadarivatu hydropower project. It has also maintained an active visit diplomacy with Fiji, including the “stop-over” by Vice President Xi Jinping in February 2009 on his way to Mexico.72 Initially, a plausible explanation for this active engagement was that if China failed to engage a regime starved of Western funds it would inevitably turn to Taiwan for assistance. But with the election of President Ma in March 2008, and the subsequent diplomatic truce that emerged, this no longer explained the extent of China’s engagement which has gone well beyond what normal relationship management would require. Furthermore, China had significant diplomatic leverage it could apply against Taiwan in Central America, where a string of states were poised to switch from recognising Taiwan to recognising China.73 The extent of China’s engagement with the interim regime suggests a miscalculation on China’s behalf. There is no doubt it has been successful in currying favour with the interim regime but it would seem a risky way to position itself in the longer term in Fiji. Outlook and conclusion China’s recently expanded engagement in the Pacific offers significant opportunities. Their engagement increases the pool of available donor funds, is growing trade and China has shown itself to be a supplier of potentially valuable low-cost infrastructure. Finally, China’s own successful experience with development also offers valuable lessons for the Pacific. The long-running struggle with Taiwan has left China without a coherent approach to its engagement in the region, but the recent diplomatic truce offers the opportunity for it to refocus on longer-term development outcomes that will better serve China’s reputation and interests in the region.

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There are tentative signs China might already be considering reform. In 2008, there were far fewer promises of flashy infrastructure projects than there were in previous years—although many of those pledged in previous years are currently being built. In some countries limited use of local labour was also allowed and China recently became an OECD Enhanced Engagement country.74 The truce poses the risk that China might reduce its engagement in the region, but this is unlikely over the medium to long term because, as a rising power, China sees its interests in global terms—that includes engagement in the Pacific—and the outlook for the truce remains uncertain. It is unclear what concessions China expects from Taiwan as part of the warming relationship. In the lead up to the next presidential election in Taiwan, Ma would appear to be in a strong negotiating position with China to keep the truce intact, as China would be wary of arousing nationalist sentiment in Taiwan. But after this it could unravel if China’s expectations exceed Ma’s capacity to deliver. For this reason, diplomatic recognition will continue to be China’s primary motivation for engaging in the Pacific with resources interests— in those few Pacific states that have them—and other interests secondary. Recommendations China should use the opportunity presented by the diplomatic truce to refocus its Pacific aid program towards longer-term development goals that also better serve Chinese national interests. It should explore options to ensure aid flows are more regular. It should start including recurring and maintenance costs as integral parts of its aid projects, look to boost opportunities for local workers and develop a more sustainable approach to debt burdening particularly in micro states. It should improve the transparency of its aid. In the wake of the diplomatic truce other donors should explore innovative ways of further engaging both China and Taiwan in aid discussions.


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Efforts to strengthen on-the-ground coordination should be pursued, including via top-down support through the Australia-China ministerial strategic dialogue. Anecdotal reports suggest China is more likely to participate in donor coordination meetings if they are called by the host state, and wherever possible donors should work to ensure this becomes the norm. Although a medium-term prospect, efforts to include China in the recently formed Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF)75 should be actively pursued, given China’s preference for building infrastructure projects and expertise in this area. The facility’s demand-driven philosophy also aligns closely with China’s own approach. The PRIF could be expanded, for example, to allow Chinese firms to win infrastructure contracts, provided they utilise Pacific workers. They should also offer China the opportunity to take on projects scoped by PRIF members. China has already shown itself amenable to this type of coordination, having taken on projects in Fiji like the Nadarivatu hydro project scoped by the World Bank. Major regional donors should look at other examples of engagement with China, such as the joint DFID-World Bank Partnership that seeks to engage China in development projects in Africa, and which required only a minor initial investment from DFID, and that could be applied in the Pacific. Pacific states should look to develop a more structured and united approach to their engagement with China, by putting more pressure on China to allow local workers opportunities to work on Chinese infrastructure projects, by increasing the grant to loan ratio of Chinese aid, by insisting provision be made for recurring costs and by requesting detailed budgets for aid projects. All aid—including that from China— should be transparently reported in government budget statements. Publicly tracking aid in this way would provide the added incentive for all donors to deliver on their pledges. All of these initiatives would also help improve China’s image problem in the region.

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ANNEXURE I: Chinese aid in the Pacific 2008 Where figures were not supplied in US dollars they have been converted using a year average exchange rate for 2008 (with the original currency amount reported in brackets). In several cases, supplied lists of Chinese aid included projects reported in previous years.76 These were removed from the below list. Cook Islands -

-

$US 2.9 million ($Y 20 million) “possible/probable” economic and technical cooperation grant. $US 1.1 million ($NZ 1.6 million) soft loan to construct a new education administration building (part of a $US 9.6 million ($NZ 13.5 million) soft loan the bulk of which was for MiniGames facilities and Mini-Games operational costs reported in 2007 aid figures). Sports coaches to train athletes for the Mini-Games.

FSM -

$US 0.03 million for a language instructor at the College of Micronesia, FSM. $US 0.32 million for four full scholarships to study at Chinese universities. $US 0.16 million for human resource development. $US 0.014 million for the provision of computers to the FSM Congress. $US 3.5 million discretionary grant to assist government reforms in Chuuk. $US 0.5 million discretionary grant to assist government reforms in Kosrae.


105

Fiji 77 -

-

-

$US 83.1 million ($F 132.45 million) soft loan to part finance the Nadarivatu hydropower project. $US 3.1 million ($F 5 million) for a new hospital at Navua (assumed to be a grant but possibly part of the soft loan announced in 2007). $US 3.8 million ($F 6 million) for the Naqali bridge project (assumed to be a grant but possibly part of the soft loan announced in 2007). Technical assistance to the Fiji justice sector. MoU signed on the production of ethanol from cassava.

Niue -

$US 0.2 million ($NZ 0.3 million) for asbestos reroofing.

PNG -

-

$US 1.6 million grant for undisclosed projects. $US 2.9 million grant. $US 3.7 million ($K 10 million) grant. $US 12 million loan: repayments extended for 10 years. Agreement for a Chinese medical team comprising eight doctors, an interpreter and a chef to work at the Port Moresby General Hospital. 30 scholarships to study in China. $US 0.13 million ($K 0.35 million) for the Taurama hospital. $US 1.9 million ($K 5 million) for a technical co-operation agreement.

Samoa -

$US 2.9 million ($Y 20 million) MoU signed 21 January (grant). US 1.4 million ($Y 10 million) MoU signed 7 September (grant).

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-

-

$US 2.9 million ($Y 20 million) MoU signed 17 September (grant).78 $US 40 million soft loan for infrastructure development for a parliamentary office complex, the ministry of justice and courts complex, a new government complex to house all utilities and four government ministries and a convention centre. (This is additional to a $US 20 million soft loan agreed in 2007 (previously reported as $US 21 million)). Grassroots aid program administered directly by the Chinese Embassy in Samoa. Five scholarships to study in China.

Tonga (For financial year 2008/2009) -

-

$US 3.6 million ($T 7 million) grant for the Tongatapu Trunk Road. $US 2.9 million ($Y 20 million) grant for the construction of Mu’a Super Health Centre, Vaini Health Centre and the Prince Ngu Health Centre. $US 0.7 million ($Y 5 million) grant for a piggery-biogasvegetable demonstration farm. $US 0.5 million for eight trucks for the Tongan Defence Force (an aircraft was also promised). $US 0.7 million ($Y 5 million) grant for the Ha’apai high school maintenance project. $US 12.1 million ($T 23.6 million) grant awarded as part of sale of Tonga Satellite. 15 scholarships to study in China. 40 officials and technicians sent to China for training.

Vanuatu -

$US 28.8 million ($Y 200 million) soft loan for an e-government project. $US 1.4 million ($Y 10 million) grant for economic and technical co-operation.

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ANNEXURE II: Eight principles of the Chinese Government for economic and technical assistance to other countries First, the Chinese Government consistently abides by the principles of equality and benefit in providing aid to other countries. It always regards aid to other countries as mutual and not as a kind of unilateral alms. Second, in providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries and never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges. Third, the Chinese Government provides economic assistance by giving interest-free or low interest loans and, where necessary, extends the deadline for repayment to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as much as possible. ANNEXURE III: China-Pacific trade Table 1: Total Trade 2007 (Imports + Exports) ($US Millions) World

Aust

Japan

China

NZ

US

EU

2570.45

439.23

85.02

72.39

323.21

206.09

179.35

Nauru

77.46

22.73

0.55

0.04

0.12

8.7

2.84

Kiribati

101.93

27.12

7.94

16.69

4.58

2.8

2.5

0.94

29.59

0.74

0.46

0

Fiji

Palau PNG

10385.8

3545.18

871.66

659.96

151.64

176.63

667.59

Samoa

508.66

105.61

23.92

12.98

79.27

23.92

6.22

Solomon Is.

660.5

90.63

34.07

176.97

16.13

7.6

32

Tonga

179.14

12.29

7.34

8.09

46.07

21.25

4.95

Tuvalu

58.38

3.66

17.78

6.7

2.1

0

1.26

Vanuatu

590.61

67.65

36.72

23.4

36.77

27.29

17.08

TOTAL

15132.93

4315.04

1114.59

977.96

660.35

474.28

913.79

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics CD-ROM

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14.

15.

Most of this chapter originally appeared in: Fergus Hanson, China: Stumbling Through the Pacific, Lowy Institute Policy Brief, July 2009. It also draws on parts of Fergus Hanson, The dragon looks south, Lowy Institute Analysis, June 2008. The author would like to thank, especially, Mary Fifita, for her excellent research work for this project over several months. Fergus Hanson, The dragon looks south, and Fergus Hanson, The dragon in the Pacific: more opportunity than threat. Fergus Hanson, The dragon looks south, and Fergus Hanson, The dragon in the Pacific. The figures only deal with pledged - rather than dispersed - aid, they often fail to capture the small grass roots aid programs administered directly by the Chinese embassies on the ground and values for several in-kind aid projects (provision of scholarships, seconded personnel such as doctors and training of local officials) were unavailable in many cases. In Fiji – under dictatorship since 2006 – official figures were impossible to obtain and it was only possible to confirm one new project during the period under review. Fergus Hanson, The dragon looks south. Considering the likely grant element of these and previously issued soft loans as well as the time taken for them to be dispersed. China Eximbank, “Chinese Government concessional loan”, http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/business/government.jsp. Friedman cited in Elizabeth Feizkhah, How to win friends... Time South Pacific, 6 April 2001. See also John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, Dragon in paradise: China’s rising star in Oceania. The National Interest 72 2003, p 100. Helmut Reisen and Sokhna Ndoye, Prudent versus imprudent lending to Africa: from debt relief to emerging lenders. OECD Development Centre Working Paper No. 268. Paris, OECD Development Centre, 2007, p 37. Stephen Johnson, Balancing China’s growing influence in Latin America. Backgrounder No. 1888. Washington DC, The Heritage Foundation, 2005, p 3. Wen Jiabao. Win-win cooperation for common development: keynote speech at the opening of the First Ministerial Conference of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, April 5, 2006. Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission. www.sopac.org; Pacific Islands News Association. http://www.pinanius.com/geography.shtml; Vijay Sakhuja, Maritime power of People’s Republic of China: the economic dimension. Strategic Analysis 26 (11) 2001. Meryl J. Williams, Enmeshed: Australia and Southeast Asia’s fisheries. Lowy Institute Paper 20. Sydney, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007, pp 40, 62. Meryl J. Williams, Enmeshed: Australia and Southeast Asia’s fisheries. p 29.

China: Stumbling Through the Pacific? 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

22. 23.

24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32.

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Vanuatu groups unhappy with Chinese tuna cannery project. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 19 September 2007. Tamara Renee Shie. China woos the South Pacific. Pacific Forum CSIS 2006: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0610a.pdf. Papua New Guinea Department of Treasury, National budget 2006. Waigani, Department of Treasury, 2006, p 504. Yang Qiang. Speech by H.E. Yang Qiang at the reception for the 56th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Friday, September 30, 2005. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Federated States of Micronesia 2005: http://fm2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200509/20050900492733.html. Olivier Wortel, China increasing its presence in FSM in big and small ways. The Kaselehlie Press, 7 February 2007. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn. The Southwest Pacific: U.S. interests and China’s growing influence, edited by Congressional Research Service, July 6, 2007. p 16 China, Papua New Guinea sign $650 mln mining deal at forum Dow Jones Commodities Service, 5 April 2006. Michael Powles, China looks to the Pacific. CSCSD Occasional Paper Number 1. Canberra, Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2007, p 50 and Xavier La Canna, Pacific sets the stage for diplomatic tussle. AAP General News Wire, 28 June 2007. Australia. Parliament. Senate. Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee. “China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia.” 2006. p 167. “Submission to the Inquiry by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee into Australia’s Relations with China.” edited by Department of Foreign Affaris and Trade, 2005. p 19. Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. Progressive partnerships and sustainable development: White Paper on foreign aid policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of China (Taiwan), May 2009. Jenny Hsu, “Nicaragua-Taiwan ties still strong: ambassador”, Taipei Times, October 25, 2008. “Sorry, the offer’s closed”, The Economist, June 25, 2009. Fergus Hanson, Relief for Canberra aid headache, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 2009 and Rowan Callick, China and Taiwan end war over Pacific aid, The Australian, 10 August 2009. Brautigam, Deborah. “China’s Foreign Aid in Africa: What Do We Know?” In China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, edited by Robert Rotberg. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. p 15. Davies, Edinger, Tay and Naidu. How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa. Stellenbosch: Centre for Chinese Studies, 2008. p 4.

110 33. 34.

35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48.

49.

50.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Inquiry by the Senate. Achieving the Millennium Development goals in Africa: working with China. Department for International Development 2007: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/china-factsheet-english.pdf. and Sun Shangwu. China, Africa adopt key partnership. China Daily 6 November 2006: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-11/06/content_725194.htm. Some Pacific Islands Forum members are excluded as data was unavailable. Rolfe, Jim. “Oceania Today: The Region, Regional Powers and Regional Cooperation.” Engaging Oceania with Pacific Asia, 2004. p 21. Regional trade figures reported in Annexure III. “China to step up trade with Pacific Island countries”, Xinhua, September 7, 2008, http://en.chinagate.cn /internationalcoop/2008-09/07/content_16407117.htm. Terence Wesley-Smith, China in Oceania: new forces in Pacific politics. Pacific Islands Policy 2. Honolulu, East-West Center, 2007, p 10. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, The Southwest Pacific, p 2. Jim Rolfe, Oceania today, p 18. See for example, Michael Powles, China looks to the Pacific, pp 43 - 44. WesleySmith, China in Oceania: new forces in Pacific politics, surveys the threat discourse and offers a more reasoned analysis. Robert D. Kaplan, How we would fight China. The Atlantic Monthly, June 2005. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, The Southwest Pacific, p 17. Susan Windybank, The China syndrome. Policy 21 (2) 2005, p 31. Friedman cited in Feizkhah, How to win friends... and Island strategy: why Fiji may matter. Global Intelligence Update 12 June 2000, Stratfor Strategic Forecasting, Inc., 2000. See also John Henderson, Benjamin Reilly. “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania.” The National Interest 72, (2003): 100. Nicholas Zamiska and Jason Dean, Islands of discord in the Pacific. The Wall Street Journal Asia, 9 May 2006. Senate Foreign Affairs, China’s emergence: implications for Australia, pp 171, 173, 175. See for example Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission to the Inquiry by the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee into Australia’s relations with China, p 19 and Wesley-Smith, China in Oceania, p 15-16. Yan Li. South Pacific: China’s test area of diplomatic strategy? Washington Observer 12 April 2006: http://washingtonobserver.org/en/document.cfm? documentid=45&charid=3, Sue Windybank, China’s Pacific strategy: the changing geopolitics of Australia’s “special patch”. CIS Executive Highlights No 393. St Leonards, Centre for Independent Studies, 2006. China seeks more influence in Latin America, State’s Noriega says. U.S. Department of State 7 April 2005: http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005 /Apr/07-272076.html.

China: Stumbling Through the Pacific? 51.

52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68.

69. 70.

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Phillip C. Saunders, China’s global activism: strategy, drivers, and tools. Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 2006, p 9 and Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: replacing the West. Suva, IPS Publications, University of the South Pacific, 2007, p 225. In the UN context this would be 12 as neither the Cook Islands or Niue are UN members. Yang, Jian. “China in the South Pacific: Hegemon on the Horizon?” The Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (May 2009): 139-58. Lu and Zheng cited in Yang, “China in the South Pacific”: 149. Powles examines China’s responsibility in the area of transnational crime and suggests the region put a “united regional view” to China on the issue, Michael Powles, “China’s rise: a Pacific view”, Asia NZ Online, March 2009. China EXIM Bank.Chinese Government concessional loan. 2008: See examples cited in Jian Yang, “China in the South Pacific” p 140-141 and “China’s foreign policy and ‘soft power’ in South America, Asia, and Africa.” A study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 2008: 40. “Cook Islands commerce chamber warns against China loan”, Asia Pulse, March 24, 2009. ABC Radio Australia, Pacific Beat program, March 23, 2009, http://www. radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/200903/s2523363.htm. “Chinese said unhappy with ‘negative comments’ on Cook Islands loan”, BBC, May 1, 2008. “Article warns China the real beneficiary of Tonga loan”, BBC (reporting Tonga Review), April 21, 2008; “Chinese loan seen as ‘huge risk’ given Tonga’s economic base”, BBC (reporting Tonga Review) April 17, 2008. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Tonga. Fact sheet, http://www.dfat.gov .au/geo/fs/tnga.pdf. “Qarase knocks regime loans”, Fiji Times, April 6, 2008. “Rabuka: Learn from past experiences”, Fiji Times, February 12, 2008. BBC (reporting Tonga Review), China real beneficiary. China Eximbank, “Chinese Government concessional loan”. Fortieth Pacific Islands Forum, Cairns, Australia 5-6 August 2009, Forum Communiqué. http://www.forumsec.org.fj/resources/article/files/Final_2009_ Forum_Communique.pdf Rowan Callick, China and Taiwan end war over Pacific aid, the Australian, 10 August 2009. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,2590543316953,00.html “China, Australia hold first strategic dialogue”, Chinese Embassy Media Release, February 6, 2008, http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/sgfyrth/t406171.htm. “Work on rebuilding Tongan capital to start after coronation”, BBC (reporting Matangi Tonga), May 7, 2008.

112 71.

72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific A poll, reported in February 2009, found just 27 percent of respondents saw Bainimarama as the preferred Prime Minister. Laisenia Qarase only just beat him with 31 percent. “Qarase still ahead as preferred PM”, Fiji Times, February 20, 2009. The soundness of the results, given the intimidating environment in Fiji, is questionable, but they still suggest the low level of popular support for the regime. “Chinese vice president meets Fiji leaders on cooperative partnership”, Xinhua, February 9, 2009. Jenny Hsu, “Nicaragua-Taiwan ties strong”. China has participated as an observer in some DAC processes and an OECDDAC/China Study Group has been established. AusAID, Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility, http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ hottopics/pdf/prif_flyer.pdf. Fergus Hanson, The dragon looks south. The only figure for Fiji able to be confirmed was the $US 83.1 million soft loan. The other projects were based on media reports. The $Y 50 million for three MoUs were used to fund the construction of two new primary schools, the renovation of another primary school, the renovation of the women’s and youth centre, sports coaches for archery and weightlifting and the provision of H1N1 virus testing/surveillance equipment. (NB: $US 0.5 million of this funding for the primary school in A’ele was included in 2007 figures set out in Fergus Hanson, The dragon looks south, Lowy Institute Analysis, June 2008, so is deducted from totals shown).

Chapter 5 THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CROSS-STRAIT COMPETITION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC FROM A TAIWANESE PERSPECTIVE

Cheng-yi Lin

Introduction As the United Kingdom and France gradually scaled back their involvement in the South Pacific, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has steadily increased its engagement in the region since the early 1990s. Compared with the security alliance of Japan, the US, and Australia and their interest in the South Pacific, the PRC is a late comer and acts on its own in the region. Beijing now has eight diplomatic posts in the South Pacific, whereas Taiwan has only six diplomatic ties. The South Pacific, second to the Central America and the Caribbean, has become a source of Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition. Diplomatic considerations, geographical proximity, the richness of ocean resources, and affordable foreign aid packages have made the South Pacific a region vital to Taiwan’s foreign relations. To compete with Taiwan and to demonstrate its global presence, China finds no reasons to overlook the region. China is now the only Asian nation that is a full member of Pacific Islands regional organizations.1 China and Taiwan have both established dialogue partnerships with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) even though Taiwan’s status is not fully recognized. Rivalries between China and Taiwan up until May 2008—when Mao Ying-jeou took over the presidency in Taiwan and adjusted Taiwan’s foreign policy—had caused some island states to dangle offers of diplomatic recognition in exchange for assistance with economic development. The diplomatic rivalry 113

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between China and Taiwan has also been a factor in high-level corruption scandals in Pacific and has contributed to fuelling existing local conflicts in some countries. I. China’s policy towards the South Pacific The PRC enjoys diplomatic recognition from 171 countries, and most of them acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of China. In recent years as China’s economy grew by an average of eight to nine percent annually, coupled with Beijing’s goal to become another superpower through a peaceful development strategy, the PRC amply demonstrated that it was capable of strangling Taiwan’s international space if necessary. Beijing does not accept the so-called dual recognition under the one China principle. Beijing proposed the “one country, two systems” formula for Taiwan to consider. This model would make Beijing the central government and Taipei the government of a special administrative region (SAR) without control over diplomacy or military affairs. Although the dual recognition of both Taiwan and China is impossible for the South Pacific nations, it is notable that Taiwan’s trade missions in Fiji and Papua New Guinea have carried the official title of the country, Republic of China.2 Nevertheless, Taiwan’s diplomatic foothold in the South Pacific is regarded by Beijing as a breach of the one China Principle. In a recent communiqué with the Cook Islands and Niue, Beijing insisted on the insertion of a clause that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the PRC’s territories, and that these two South Pacific countries would pledge not to have any official relations with Taiwan. Beijing entered the UN in 1971 with the assistance of East European and African countries. Beijing now blocks Taiwan’s entry to the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO). However, China has met dissenting opinions speaking on Taiwan’s behalf in these two inter-governmental organizations, some of them coming from the South Pacific. Beijing established diplomatic ties with both Australia and New Zealand, the two largest countries in the region in December 1972.

The Security Implications of Cross-Strait Competition

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Previously Australia and New Zealand had maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC for more than twenty years. China’s rival, Taiwan, was keen to establish a new footing in the South Pacific after Taiwan was expelled from the UN. In 1972 Taiwan gained two new diplomatic allies, Samoa and Tonga. Beijing started its first active involvement in the region in the period 1975-1976 by establishing ties with Fiji, Samoa, and Papua New Guinea. Yet the significance of the region to Beijing is only relative, it is notable that the Presidents of China, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have visited Australia and New Zealand from time to time but have never visited other island nations in the South Pacific. In contrast, it has now become routine for the president or prime ministers of South Pacific island nations to visit China and Taiwan to request economic assistance and technical advice (see Table 1). Comparatively speaking, Beijing has shown much less attention to South Pacific affairs, compared to its efforts to cultivate better relations with countries in Africa and Latin America. No Chinese academic institutions bear the name of South Pacific or Oceania studies. In 2006 the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Science co-sponsored a conference on relations between China and the South Pacific with academic institutions in Australia and New Zealand.3 Despite its name, the main focus of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies is Northeast and Southeast Asia not Oceania. Outside of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there are few Chinese specialists on the South Pacific. In February 2005, Beijing announced the formation of the China-Oceania Friendship Association (COFA), a subgroup of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC).4 If we exclude Sino-Australian and Sino-New Zealand trade figures, China’s bilateral trade with South Pacific nations is relatively insignificant. For example, China’s trade with the other two largest nations in the Pacific, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, was a paltry US$716 million and US$73 million dollars in 2008.5 So why is Beijing engaging with Oceania? For Beijing, the South Pacific is a major battleground for

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Table 1: South Pacific Presidential or Premier Visits to China from 2000-2009 President Leo Falcam (March 2000) Federated States of Micronesia

President Joseph J. Urusemal (March 2004; April 2006) President Emmanuel Mori (December 2007; August 2008)

Samoa

Prime Minister Tuila’epa Sailele Malielegaoi (August 2000; May 2005; March 2007)

Vanuatu

President Kalkot Matas Kelekele (July 2007; August 2008) PrimePrime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta (May 2001)

Papua New Guinea Sir Michael Somare (February 2004; April 2009) Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase (2002; 2004) Fiji Commodore Frank Bainimarama (August 2008) Prime Minister Robert Woonton (April 2004) Cook Islands Prime Minister Jim Marurai (November 2005; September 2007) King George Tupou IV (October 2004) Tonga King George Tupou V (April 2008) Source: Compiled from the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China


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sabotaging Taiwan’s foreign relations. In the 1990s Chinese State Minister Luo Gan was the key figure in charge of South Pacific affairs. Luo visited Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Vanuatu in 1993. Luo visited Tahiti as a Politburo member in December 2005 after Chinese President Jiang Zemin made a brief stop on the same island en route to South America in April 2001. Additionally, in 2005, the PRC Vice President Zeng Qinghong, and China’s National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Jia Qinglin, both transited in Fiji on their trips to Latin America. The reason for these transit stops is that Beijing’s leaders are now avoiding transiting through the US on their way to and from Latin America. Beijing also aims to consolidate its relations with Fiji and future diplomatic relations with Tahiti when it moves to full independence from France. Beijing’s diplomatic initiatives in Oceania stepped up in 2006. In April 2006, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Australia, Fiji, and New Zealand. In July 2006, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited seven countries, which recognized the PRC (see Table 2), and attended the first Ministerial Conference of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in Fiji. Interestingly, after this forum, Japan held its fourth summit meeting with South Pacific nations in May 2006, and France conducted its second summit meeting with Oceania countries in June 2006. Nevertheless, Chinese high-level officials’ visits to the South Pacific were still relatively scarce. For instance, China’s Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan visited Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu in March 2007, and China Table 2: China’s Diplomatic Ties with South Pacific Nations Cook Islands

1997

Fiji

1975

FSM

1989

Niue

2007

PNG

1976

Samoa

1975

1972-1975 maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan

Tonga

1998

1972-1998 maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan

Vanuatu

1982

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Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun visited Samoa on his trip back to China from a trip to Latin America in April 2007. Chinese Vice President (and projected future General Secretary of the CCP and State President) Xi Jinping also made a transit stop in Fiji on his way to Latin America in February 2009, and he met with the Prime Minister of Fiji’s interim government Frank Bainimarama as a gesture towards strengthening the “important cooperative partnership” between the two countries.6 In 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao declared that China’s ties with South Pacific nations are not diplomatic expediency but rather a “strategic decision”.7 Despite China’s clarification, in the eyes of many observers Beijing’s key driver for its assistance to the Pacific Islands appears to be “halting and reversing diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.”8 In 2000, Beijing set up the China-PIF Cooperation Fund then in 2006 it signed an agreement on China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and a Cooperation Guiding Framework to funnel its aid packages to the region. At the 2006 meeting in Suva, Premier Wen pledged that China would conduct regular exchanges with Pacific governments, parliaments, political parties and non-governmental sectors in order to “enhance mutual trust and understanding”. Furthermore, China planned to strengthen consultation and coordination with Pacific nations on major international and regional issues, in order to accommodate each other’s interests and reinforce mutual support.9 Wen’s comments raises specters of China using its allies in the Pacific as a pro-Beijing voting bloc. At the same meeting Wen announced that China would pour more investments into the region, waive debt burdens, and give zero-tariff treatment to the least developed countries in the South Pacific. Wen also vowed that “China will provide RMB 3 billion yuan (about 371 million US dollars) of preferential loans in the next three years to boost cooperation in resources development, agriculture, forestry, fishery, tourism, textiles and consumer products manufacturing, telecommunications and aviation and ocean shipping.”10 China’s foreign aid to the 14 developing PIF members in the period 2005-2007 is now the third largest in the region after Australia and the US After Wen’s visit, Chinese aid projects increased from US $78 million in 2006 to US $293 million in 2007.


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Chinese annual foreign aid to the Pacific Islands developing nations is estimated to be between US $100 million and US $150 million.11 Since the political troubles in Fiji has led to Suva being shunned by Australia and New Zealand, Beijing is now Fiji’s largest aid donor.12 Both Australia and New Zealand have been critical of China’s continued support for the Bainimarama government. If China attached improvement of political governance to its foreign aid program in the South Pacific, Australia, New Zealand, and the US might perceive China’s aid more favourably. At least 80,000 overseas Chinese are residents in the South Pacific, including 20,000 each in Papua New Guinea and Fiji, plus 15,000 in the Northern Marianas and 14,000 in French Polynesia. Chinese laborers and residents have outpaced the presence of other foreign nationals such as the US and Japan in the region.13 A couple of islanders with Chinese heritage have been elected to hold premiership or presidency. Julius Chan led Papua New Guinea in 1980-82 and 1994-1997 and Anote Tong became president of Kiribati in 2003.14 These politicians do not necessarily adopt a pro-Beijing policy as in the case of Kiribati switching diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei in 2003. Yet Chinese companies’ mistreatment of PNG workers15 and dominance in some local economies has spurred anti-China riots in a number of island nations, such as the Solomon Islands in April 2006, Tonga in November 2007, and PNG in June 2009. Similar anti-China sentiment is detected in Fiji, Vanuatu, and French Polynesia.16 Undeniably, China is helping its diplomatic allies in constructing governmental buildings, gymnasiums, schools, electric power companies, and other projects. But China’s assistance tends to be targeted at elites. China was initially encouraged to become more involved in the South pacific by the US, Australia, and New Zealand in order to thwart Soviet influence in the region.17 Although China’s involvement in the South Pacific would potentially weaken Australian regional influence in the South Pacific, Beijing was “quite happy with the leverage that Australia had exercised over PNG”, which under Australian pressure decided to rescind the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan made by Prime Minister Bill Skate in July 1999.18 In 2004 Australia employed similar tactics

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again and successfully blocked the planned establishment of diplomatic relations between Taiwan-Vanuatu. According to one observer, Australia “played a leading role in supporting Beijing’s objectives after Taipei made a higher bid in the local auction for diplomatic recognition.”19 Beijing’s focus on South Pacific affairs is mostly concentrated on Australia and to a lesser degree, New Zealand. Bilateral trade between China and Australia in 2007 was US $43.8 billion and with New Zealand was US $4 billion in January-October 2008. China’s bilateral trade volume with other South Pacific nations amounted to US $1.2 billion by the end of 2006, with China enjoying a US $187 million surplus.20 Yet resources in South Pacific island states attract Chinese aspirations for going south, particularly as the region has abundant fishing stocks, as China is the world’s largest fishing production country. In addition, China is looking for raw materials in the South Pacific. Timbers workers in Fiji and miners in PNG and Solomon Island denote Chinese investment in the region. PNG secured Chinese investment in the Ramu nickel project (US $843 million), which is the biggest Chinese resource investment in the South Pacific islands, and is looking for Chinese investment money for a proposed $3.5 billion pipeline to carry gas from Papua New Guinea to Australia.21 China provides military assistance to Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, and PNG. For Beijing, the South Pacific has become a monitoring base for observing US and Japanese military activities in the Pacific. Beijing also values the region as an ideal place for Chinese space program particularly when receiving the re-entry of a spacecraft to Earth. Developing a blue-water navy and increasing the PLA-N naval presence beyond the first islands chain has also become an important task for the Chinese leaders. When Kiribati decided to switch its diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei, China tried to find a substitute for its satellite tracking and control station in other countries.22 Although Chinese naval activities in the waters of the southwestern Pacific have been detected from time to time, according to the 2008 ROC defense report the PRC is still working hard to conceal its strategic goal of “controlling the western Pacific waters.”23 If the PRC wishes to deter, delay, and defeat the US’s military intervention in a Taiwan Strait crisis,


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Beijing will need to increase its naval presence closer to Taiwan in the Southwest Pacific. With the Chinese increasing naval presence in the region, Oceania will not necessarily remain “a relatively benign American lake.”24 However, to date, with the exception of the Federal States of Micronesia, all the island nations in the Micronesian islands group are either controlled by the US or have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. II. Taiwan’s efforts in the South Pacific For any ruling government in Taiwan since 1949, gaining diplomatic support in the international community has always been a challenging task. From Taiwan’s position, maintaining the status quo in the diplomatic front under a rising China is a complex and difficult task and diplomatic recognition from islands nations in the South Pacific is a part of a fight for survival. Taiwan is geographically located in the western Pacific and culturally attached to the Austronesian heritage of its indigenous peoples, so has more than strategic reasons for wanting to engage with Oceania. So far the price for maintaining diplomatic ties in the region has fallen within affordable range for Taipei. Taiwan has often been criticized for buying politicians in the island nations that recognize Taipei over Beijing. In addition to diplomatic expediency, Taiwan is searching for ocean and fishing resources in the South Pacific. For example, Taiwanese businessman Koo Kwang-ming cooperated with the Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority in developing marine and fishing resources. Taiwan’s Ching Fu Shipbuilding Company has invested US $20 million in the construction of a floating dry dock in the Marshall Islands to provide repair services for ships operating in the North Pacific and created hundreds of jobs for the Marshall Islands.25 Such joint ventures help to bolster Taiwan’s influence in the South Pacific. However, Taipei, like Beijing, also has failed to make a significant investment in developing expertise in the study of Oceanic affairs. From 2000 to 2008, during the administration of Chen Shui-bian, China faced fierce diplomatic competition from Taiwan. Kiribati

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changed its diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei in 2003, and in 2005 Nauru decided to return to Taiwan’s side after maintaining only three years of diplomatic ties with Beijing (see Table 3). Vanuatu switched its diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei in November 2004 but its Prime Minister Serge Vohar was forced to step down and then revoked the ties with Taiwan.26 Similar confusion also occurred in July 1999 when Prime Minister Bill Skate of Papua New Guinea decided to change his allegiances from Beijing to Taipei, and within weeks the Skate government was replaced.27 In 2006, Taipei was again involved in another secret offer to Papua New Guinea for diplomatic recognition through two notorious brokers, further tarnishing Taiwan’s reputation and image in the region.28 Taiwan’s participation in the PIF has never been smooth since 1992 when it was first invited to join post-PIF dialogue meetings. Taiwan has not been fully acknowledged as a formal dialogue partner, but its vice minister of foreign affairs can lead a delegation to attend the post-PIF dialogue meeting.29 Beijing will often block delegations from Taiwan from attending dialogue meetings when they are held in countries maintaining diplomatic ties with China. Regardless of such pressure, Taiwan has sought to join and cooperate with the PIF and endorse the four goals of Pacific Plan: economic growth, sustainable development, good governance, and security.30 In 2006, Taiwan assisted the PIF with funding of US $735,000, covering eight Pacific regional organizations Table 3: Taiwan’s Diplomatic Ties with South Pacific Nations Nauru

1980-2002, 2005-

2002-2005 maintained diplomatic ties with China

Kiribati

2003


Marshall Islands

1998-


Palau

1999

Solomon Islands

1983

Tuvalu

1979


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Table 4: Taiwan’s Assistance to South Pacific Organizations31 Fiji School of Medicine

USD 30,000

Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency

USD 80,000

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

USD 210,000

Secretariat of the Pacific Community

USD 238,000

Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program

USD 30,000

South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission

USD 80,000

South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment

USD 15,000

University of the South Pacific

USD 52,449

Table 5: President Chen Shui-bian’s Trips to South Pacific Nations Jan-05

Maritime Partners-A Cooperative Trip Palau and Solomon Islands

May-05

Island Partners-A Sunshine Trip Marshall Islands, Kiribati, and Tuvalu Strengthening Oceanic Democratic Alliances and Realizing Comprehensive Partnerships, Palau

Sep-06

Palau Declaration The First Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit Harmonious Co-prosperity, Everlasting Friendship, Marshall Islands

Oct-07

The Majuro Declaration The Second Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit

Source: News Releases, Office of the President Republic of China (Taiwan)

and 32 projects (see Table 4). This annual financial contribution suggests that the PIF intends to maintain close relations with Taipei, despite Beijing’s objections.32 In addition to dollar diplomacy and development assistance, during the Chen administration Taiwan worked hard to cultivate personal relations with South Pacific leaders. President Chen Shui-bian travelled frequently to the region during his presidency (see Table 5). President

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Chen initiated the first annual summit meeting of Taiwan-Pacific Allies at Palau in 2006. Eight Pacific nations attended the summit. In the Palau Declaration, Chen announced that Taiwan would assist its South Pacific allies in areas such as law enforcement training, digital governance, tourism, healthcare, protection of natural resources, the development of renewable energy, economic partnerships, cooperation on agriculture and fishery, and the preservation of culture.33 Taiwan has joined with the Republic of Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands in the Micronesian Challenge, aimed at preserving precious natural resources in the region. Taiwan is building solar power systems in Nauru and the Marshall Islands, and is helping improve the quality and technology of Palau’s telecommunications. Taiwan has also signed fishery agreements with its various South Pacific diplomatic allies and even with some Chinese allies such as Micronesia and PNG. In the 2007 Majuro Declaration, Taiwan emphasized cooperation with South Pacific nations in the fields of medical care, educational training, and environmental protection. President Chen committed to hold the Third Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit in Kaohsiung in 2008, but failed to deliver on this commitment before he stepped down.34 Derek Sikua, Prime Minister of Solomon Islands, agreed to host the Fourth Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit in the Solomon Islands, which is planned to go ahead in November 2009.35 Due to geographic closeness and diplomatic necessities, Taiwan has frequently invited leaders of Pacific Islands nations to pay state visits to Taiwan (see Table 6). Tommy E. Remengesau, during his presidency of Republic of Palau, visited Taiwan seven times. Both President Kessai Note of the Marshall Islands and Apisai Ielemia, Prime Minister of Tuvalu, have visited Taiwan six times. President Anote Tong of Kiribati is also a frequent visitor since he decided to switch diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei in 2003.


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Table 6: South Pacific Presidential or Premier Visits to Taiwan from 2000-2009 May-00 Dec-00 Nov-00 Jun-01, Feb-02 May-02 Mar-03 Feb-04 May-04 May-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Dec-05 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Aug-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Feb-07 May-07 Jun-07 Sep-07 Dec-07 Jan-07 Dec-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 May-08 May-08 Mar-08 May-08 May-08 May-08 May-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Feb-09 May-09

President Tommy E. Remengesau, Palau President Tommy E. Remengesau, Palau Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Faimalaga Luka, Tuvalu President Tommy E. Remengesau, Palau Prime Minister Sir Allen Kemakeza, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Saufatu Soponga, Tuvalu President Anote Tong, Kiribati Prime Minister Kemakeza, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Saufatu Soponga, Tuvalu President Tommy E. Remengesau, Palau President Kessai Note, Marshall Islands Prime Minister Sir Allen Kemakeza, Solomon Islands President Ludwig Scotty, Nauru President Kessai Note, Marshall Islands President Anote Tong, Kiribati Prime Minister Sogavare, Solomon Islands President Kessai Note, Marshall Islands Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia, Tuvalu President Ludwig Scotty, Nauru Prime Minister Sogavare, Solomon Islands President Kessai Note, Marshall Islands Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia, Tuvalu Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia, Tuvalu President Tommy E. Remengesau, Palau President Tommy E. Remengesau, Palau President Anote Tong, Kiribati Prime Minister Derek Sikua, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Derek Sikua, Solomon Islands President Marcus Stephen, Nauru President Litokwa Tomeing, Marshall Islands President Litokwa Tomeing, Marshall Islands Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia, Tuvalu President Tommy E. Remengesau, Palau President Anote Tong, Kiribati President Marcus Stephen, Nauru Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia, Tuvalu President Johnson Toribiong, Palau Prime Minister Derek Sikua, Solomon Islands

Source: Compiled from news releases from the Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan)

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III. Future prospects and security implications for the region For the DPP government (2000-2008), if Taipei continued to uphold the view that Taiwan is a part of China, then Beijing might use this as a justification for managing the Taiwan issue as an internal affair, brooking no international intervention. Chen’s government therefore did not accept the one China principle as a precondition for resuming crossStrait dialogue. In contrast the Kuomintang (KMT) government in power since May 2008 has accepted the position of “one China with different interpretations” and the “1992 Consensus”. As a consequence the KMT government is likely to make some adjustments in Taiwan’s policy towards the South Pacific. President Ma Ying-jeou has indicated that he will end dollar diplomacy in the South Pacific and focus instead on humanitarian assistance and soft power. President Ma and his advisors have proposed a “diplomatic truce” between Taipei and Beijing, instead of the previous diplomatic competition over recognition from other third countries.36 The notion of a diplomatic truce between China and Taiwan is not a new one. In March 1999, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tang Jiaxuan, in responding to a question asked by Taiwan’s United Daily News reporter, stated that a diplomatic truce is dependent on whether or not Taiwan can cease its separatist activities and take substantive steps in developing cross-Strait relations towards the ultimate goal of reunification. Furthermore, Minister Tang declared that, “the possibility of diplomatic truce cannot be founded in mere words alone, but should be grounded in the substantive aspects of reality.”37 The assumption behind these comments is that for China to accept a diplomatic truce, Taiwan must make concessions about its own sovereignty, i.e., to stop heading in the direction of Taiwan independence and recognize that there is only one China. From Beijing’s perspective, conceding that Taipei has diplomatic space would be tantamount to admitting that the two sides were in fact two separate countries. As the two sides have begun to resume talks since June 2008, the question of Taiwan’s diplomatic space must be addressed in these cross-Strait consultations. With the reduction of cross-Strait tension, both sides are increasingly lacking the justification to compete intensively on the international front. Moreover


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the slow down of the Taiwanese economy in recent years means that Taiwan cannot compete with China effectively when wooing a new diplomatic ally. Ma has argued that a diplomatic truce will lessen the likelihood of either Beijing or Taipei in engaging in costly “checkbook diplomacy” with other countries. Therefore, in his inaugural address, President Ma mentioned plans for “negotiations between China and Taiwan on the topics of international space and peaceful cross-strait talks.”38 Taipei’s unilateral initiative raises several key implications. First, Beijing might respect and accept Taiwan’s diplomatic standing, that is, diplomatic recognition from 23 states and membership in around 40 IGOs. This could mean that Beijing has less incentive to squeeze out Taiwan’s space in the South Pacific so as not to jeopardize cross-Strait détente. Second, under a diplomatic truce, Taiwan might receive a greater amount of leeway and flexibility in its participation in international conferences. Under this new arrangement, Taiwan might have more room to make contact with those countries in the PIF that do not recognize Taiwan. Third, it will be exceedingly difficult for Beijing to deny any proposals by South Pacific countries wishing to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, particularly when they request China’s political influence in the UN rather than China’s economic assistance.39 As such, in order to preserve the fragile crossstrait relations Beijing needs to exercise self-restraint in reaching out to new friends and to decline any invitations to establish new diplomatic relations. Beijing might be inclined to do all this for a KMT government, but is likely to become less willing to honor this commitment if the DPP returned to power. The fulfillment of a diplomatic truce has met challenges in Taiwan. Taiwan’s request for a diplomatic truce signifies that it is considering several shifts in its line of foreign policy thinking, as well as acknowledging the changing realities across the Taiwan Strait. The proposal for a diplomatic truce means that Taipei now considers crossStrait relations to be more important than its other foreign relations. A diplomatic truce furthermore demonstrates that there is a real limit to Taiwan’s diplomatic bargaining chips; it is no longer able to keep up with China in the game of “checkbook diplomacy.” Domestic concerns

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must also be taken into consideration when discussing the possibility of a diplomatic truce. The majority of the Taiwanese people support crossStrait reconciliation and a diplomatic truce in international arena, but not at the expense of sacrificing Taiwan’s self-governed political status and ability for national self-defense.40 Furthermore, Taiwan is a smaller actor in contrast with China. Taiwan risks the possibility of portraying itself in a weaker position in the initial process when requesting a diplomatic truce with China. It might send a signal to South Pacific nations that Taiwan is not willing to compete with China in terms of economic assistance, and that Taiwan’s subordination to the PRC is a matter of time. In this sense, Taiwan’s allies may become less enthusiastic to defend Taiwan’s position in international arena. Even though President Ma is the one who has signaled the request for a diplomatic truce, Ma and Foreign Minister Francisco Ou have also noted that “diplomatic truce” is not necessarily an appropriate term to use. They have emphasized the imperative of maintaining “flexible diplomacy” and clarify that the diplomatic truce policy should not lead to a diplomatic “rest” or “holiday.”41 A diplomatic truce should prioritize the consolidation of Taiwan’s existing diplomatic ties, in particular for those six allies in the South Pacific, preventing the further decline in these existing ties. If China betrays the principles of diplomatic truce by actively seeking to break Taiwan’s current diplomatic ties, Taiwan cannot treat the issue lightly. If Taiwan does not seek additional diplomatic recognition, Taipei could spend more efforts on each of its six friends in the South Pacific with the already authorized and appropriated foreign affairs budget in 2009-2010. If this is the case, the impact of the cross-Strait diplomatic truce might be minimal for South Pacific nations. The improvement of cross-Strait relations is likely to lessen tension and competition between Taipei and Beijing in the South Pacific. The small size of the island states relieves Taiwan from providing the same amount of regular foreign assistance as it does in Central America and Africa. But in the long run, Taiwan’s financial assistance may not be sufficient if Taipei wishes to compete with Beijing. Similar to China, Taiwan has failed to coordinate its aid activities in the Pacific with the other regional major powers such as Japan, the US, Australia, and New


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Zealand through the Pacific Plan.42 Taiwan tends to maintain close contact with ruling elites in the Pacific while paying little attention to cultivating close ties with local inhabitants. With the possible lessening of competition with Beijing, Taipei might improve its tarnished image of dollar diplomacy in the South Pacific and would have a new opportunity to take a broader outlook of its aid activities in the region. From Taiwan’s perspective the major current challenges posed by Beijing’s increasing presence in South Pacific are two pronged. In addition to the issue of whether Beijing will pursue a diplomatic truce or competition with Taiwan in the short term, Beijing will pose the US— which has reduced its presence in the South Pacific, placing emphasis only in its relations with Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau— with greater challenges in the long run. Beijing could serve as a mentor of economic development for some Pacific island nations under the socalled Beijing consensus and assist the island nations through economic aid and sending Chinese tourists to the region.43 Beijing has designated all the countries in the South Pacific having diplomatic ties with China as approved tourist destinations for Chinese citizens. Countries in the South Pacific are tending to look north to either Taipei or Beijing for economic development assistance when they fail to get what they want from the US, Australia or New Zealand. For both China and its South Pacific allies, the strengthening of diplomatic relations might serve as bargaining chips or countermeasures to the efforts of the US, Japan and Australia. From Australia’s standpoint, the diplomatic competition between China and Taiwan has weakened the efforts of Australian economic assistance and calls for good governance in the South Pacific. Journalist Graeme Dobell has blamed China for intervening in domestic affairs in the region and Taiwan for a lack of concern about stability in the South Pacific.44 The US has also been critical. In 2007 Taiwan and China were singled out by Glyn Davis, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in charge of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, for their attempts to engage in “checkbook diplomacy” to gain favor with Pacific leaders, which according to Davies, led to distortions in the political process in those countries.45

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The lack of interest from Australia in bringing Taiwan and China together to participate in a grand development plan for the South Pacific nations might be one of the reasons for the pervasiveness of dollar diplomacy. The sense of the South Pacific as Australia’s strategic backyard and historical attachments might explain Canberra’s antagonism to “foreign” intrusions into the region. With the rise of China and its abundant resources for diplomacy, Beijing is likely to pay more attention to the region and consolidate its position there. Yet in the last twenty years Aboriginal residents in Taiwan have rediscovered their ethnic connection with inhabitants in the South Pacific through studies of Austronesian languages and patterns of migration.46 As such, Taiwan can hardly be justified from being excluded as a worthy partner in the future development of the South Pacific. If a diplomatic truce is feasible between the KMT government and the PRC, the cross-Strait competition for winning new diplomatic ties will abate, and Pacific islands nations may find themselves under greater pressure to improve their ability of governance in order to secure foreign aid from Australia and other major players in the region. Conclusion Since the early 1970s China and Taiwan have competed with each other for diplomatic recognition in the South Pacific and have followed similar approaches to winning friends in the South Pacific. The lack of transparency in their aid programs and lack of a long term perspective for the island nations might lead to an unfortunate direction for the region. Pacific Island nations appear to be shifting their requests for financial assistance from the South to the North, and their leaders now travel to the PRC or the ROC as the first destination after inauguration. The US neglect of China’s increasing presence in the region and the exclusive mind set of Australia and New Zealand may hinder the emergence of a multinational and multilateral comprehensive program for the South Pacific which could bring both Taipei and Beijing together into the mechanism. Accusations of dollar diplomacy from Australia and other dominant powers will not end the competition between Taiwan and


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China in the region. But an easing of cross straits tensions may lead to a change in policy towards the South Pacific by both Taipei and Beijing. With the PNG secret fund scandal bringing down several top ranking national security officials in Taiwan and with a KMT government in charge, Taipei has an opportunity to reformulate its policies in the South Pacific. In terms of competition based on financial resources and political clout, Taiwan can hardly match China. However, Taiwan’s island economy model and technological superiority might offer a different kind of experience for some island nations. Cross-Strait competition as it has played out in the South Pacific has brought challenges to the dominant powers of the South Pacific and has been taken advantage of by some island nations. With the emergence of crossStrait détente, it is possible that Taipei and Beijing’s patterns of interactions with the region may gradually change. References 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West (Suva, Fiji: Universiaty of the South Pacific, 2007), p. 254. Thomas V. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific,” Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 8 (August 1989), p. 809. For information about the conference see Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, No. 7 (2006), p. 63 Michael Williss, “China-Oceania Friendship Association Formed,” May 9, 2005, in http://www.acfssa.org.au/China-Oceania%20Friendship%20Association%20 Formed.doc; Wang Lidan, “China-Oceania Friendship Association Founded,” Voice of Friendship, No. 2 (2005), p. 21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc. gov.cn/chn/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/gjlb/1923/default.htm, and http://www.fmprc.gov.cn /chn/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/gjlb/1928/default.htm. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-02/09/content_10787984.htm http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/06/content_561163.htm Fergus Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific: More Opportunity than Threat,” Policy Brief, June 2008, p. 3; “China’s Policy on South Pacific Nations is Strategic Principle, Premier,” Xinhua, April 27, 2006. “Wen’s Speech at China-Pacific Island Countries Forum,” Xinhua, April 5, 2006. “Wen’s Speech at China-Pacific Island Countries Forum,” Xinhua, April 5, 2006. Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific: More Opportunity than Threat,” p. 3.

132 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2009/04/20/1240079605043.html Graeme Dobell, “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess versus Pacific Political Rugby,” Policy Brief, Lowry Institute for International Policy, January 2007, p. 14. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, p. 90. Rowan Callick, “Chinese Mine Treating PNG Workers ‘Like Slaves’” Australian, February 9, 2007. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, The Southwest Pacific: US Interests and China’s Growing Influence, CRS Report for Congress, July 6, 2007, p. 18. Terence Wesley-Smith, China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2007), p. 12. Anthony Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition Between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2007), p. 134. Anthony Van Fossen, “The Struggle for Recognition: Diplomatic Competition Between China and Taiwan in Oceania,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2007), p. 137. http://mds.mofcom.gov.cn/aartice/ Nocategory/200210/20021000042986.html. “China Nickel Development Threatens Values, Traditions,” The Age, July 14, 2004; Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific: More Opportunity than Threat,” p. 4. Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, p. 342; Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” in Looking North, Looking South, China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. 2008 ROC National Defense Report (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2008), p. 66. John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania,” National Interest, Issue 72 (Summer 2003), p. 95; Lum and Vaughn, The Southwest Pacific, pp. 2-6 . “President Chen’s Remarks at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Ching Fu Group Headquarters,” News Releases, Office of the President ROC (Taiwan), December 25, 2007, cited in http://www.president.gov.tw/en/ Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, p. 260. John Henderson, “China, Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Significance of Oceania,” cited in www.upf.pf/IRIDIP/RJP/RJP_HS01/09_Henderson.doc. Issac Nicholas, “Pepson: PNG Not Aware of Taiwan’s Secret Offer,” Nations, cited in http://www.thenational.com.pg/050608/nation2.htm. “Fifteenth Taiwan/ROC–Forum Countries Dialogue Joint Statement,” Pacific Islands Forum, October 19, 2007, cited in http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages .cfm/2007/joint- taiwanforum- dialogue-statement.html “President Chen’s Remarks at Opening of Second Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit,” News Releases, Office of the President of Republic of China (Taiwan), October 12, 2007, cited in http://www.president.gov.tw/en/.

The Security Implications of Cross-Strait Competition 31.

32.

33. 34. 35.

36.

37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42. 43. 44.

45.

46.

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“Taiwan/ROC Assistance,” Press Statement, Pacific Islands Forum, May 16, 2006, cited in http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/press-statements-2006/ taiwanroc-regional-assistance.html “Taiwan/ROC Assistance,” Press Statement, Pacific Islands Forum, May 16, 2006, cited in http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/press-statements-2006/ taiwanroc-regional-assistance.html http://marshall.wetserver.net/livefiles/1sttaiwan-pacificalliessummitpalaudeclarati on.2006_documents_30.pdf http://www.rmigovernment.org/news_detail.jsp?docid=225 “President Chen’s Remarks at the 21-Gun Salute Ceremony to Welcome Prime Minister Dr. Derek Sikua of the Solomon Islands,” New Releases, Office of the President ROC (Taiwan), March 3, 2008; http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news _content.php?id=972263&lang=eng_news. “Taiwan’s President-Elect Vows End to Checkbook Diplomacy in Pacific,” Asian Economic News, March 31, 2007; Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “President Ma’s Remarks at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Concept and Strategy of the ‘Flexible Diplomacy’,” News Release, August 5, 2008. People’s Daily, March 8, 1999, p. 1. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “President Ma’s Inaugural Address,” News Release, May 20, 2008. China Review (Hong Kong), No. 129 (September 2008), p. 8. See a survey conducted by the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan (Taiwan), May 2008, in . Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), “President Ma’s Remarks at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Concept and Strategy of the ‘Flexible Diplomacy’,” News Release, August 5, 2008. http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/about-us/the-pacific-plan/ Wesley-Smith, China in Oceania, p. 22. Graeme Dobell, “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess versus Pacific Political Rugby,” Policy Brief, Lowry Institute for International Policy, January 2007, p. 3. Glyn Davies, “US Policy Toward South Pacific Island Nations, including Australia and New Zealand,” Statement Before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 15, 2007. Peter Bellwood, “The Austronesian Dispersal and the Origins of Languages,” Scientific American, July 1991, pp. 88-93.


Part Two The Impact on Other Key Pacific Players

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Chapter 6 RISING CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: BEIJING’S ISLAND FEVER

Tamara Renee Shie1

Introduction In the last decade and a half, the leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have presided over the rapid transformation of their country, seen primarily as a threat during the Cold War, to a proactive and confident member of the international community today. In the early nineties, China embarked on a strategy of rapprochement diplomacy with its neighbors—establishing or re-establishing diplomatic relations, opening negotiations on its contiguous border disputes such as the 1991 Sino-Russian border agreement, and signing accords like the 1994 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Mongolia. Additionally Beijing’s leaders began to reach out to multilateral forums. For instance, China became a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1991, a dialogue partner of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in 1994, and in 1996 was a founding member of the Asia-Europe Meeting and established the Shanghai Five, a precursor to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Although China’s relations with Asia warmed considerably in the early nineties, China’s willingness to use force to pursue territorial objectives in the case of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1995 and against Taiwan in the Strait Crisis of 1995 and 1996; however, only exacerbated concern over a growing “China Threat,” particularly in Southeast Asia. In response, Beijing’s leaders redoubled their efforts to 137

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reassure its neighbors of its peaceful rise. Just such an opportunity arose when China refused to devalue its currency and offered monetary assistance and infrastructure deals to countries hit hard in the Asian Financial Crisis. That year, 1997, served as watershed for the launch of China’s “charm offensive” with Southeast Asia2—a combination of diplomatic, economic, and cultural initiatives at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. That same year China joined with ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea to begin the ASEAN+3 meetings aimed at increasing multilateral cooperation between North and South East Asia. From launching the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, acceding to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and the signing of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, to an increase in student exchanges and tourism, and building major projects such as the North Railway in the Philippines and the Surabaya bridge in Indonesia—Chinese and Southeast Asian relations have improved dramatically over the last decade. Beijing’s strategy in Southeast Asia—increased high-level visits, educational and cultural exchanges, generous no-strings-attached aid packages, public works projects, and investments in resource industries and critical infrastructure—has become part of a broader trend of Chinese activism in many regions of the world. From Latin America and Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia, the world has witnessed an upsurge in Chinese activities over the past five years as part of Beijing’s efforts to pursue a wide-range of political, economic, and strategic objectives.3 China’s increased global engagement includes frequent visits by senior Chinese officials to countries around the world, multi-billion dollar oil and gas agreements with Saudi Arabia and Iran, a liquid natural gas contract with Australia valued at almost $18 billion4, a pledge to invest $100 billion in South America over the next 10 years, financing a $1 million scholarship fund in Grenada and a $500 million investment in Cuba’s nickel industry, launching the first Chinese overseas radio station in Kenya, and investing in hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific

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Source: University of the South Pacific Map: The South Pacific

China’s burgeoning influence has extended to even the South Pacific. Although to many observers the South Pacific is considered a backward and remote region, China’s relations with the region have nonetheless developed rapidly since the late 1990s. Of the 14 nations which make up the Pacific Islands Forum (excluding Australia and New Zealand),5 the seven that recognize the People’s Republic of China (the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Niue6, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu) have only seen their diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with China intensify—with an increasing number of official visits and various financial assistance packages aimed at enhancing trade, building infrastructure, equipping government and military assets, and developing natural resources. This rising Chinese involvement in the South Pacific also comes at a time when the US and European allies are drawing down—decreasing aid and scaling back their

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presence. Australia and New Zealand, which regard themselves as having a special relationship with the region due to proximity and historical and cultural linkages, and long time supporters like Japan find themselves facing an increasingly strong Chinese presence. This chapter examines recent Chinese engagement with the South Pacific, the nature of the regional responses to these overtures, and some potential economic, political, and strategic motivations behind China’s behavior. This chapter concludes with a section contrasting China’s increasing activities with the US gradual withdrawal from the early 1990s and considers the implications of rising Chinese influence in the South Pacific for United States policy. China’s growing relationship with the region China’s relations with the Cook Islands illustrate its changing role in the South Pacific. The Cooks lie in the South Pacific Ocean about half-way between the Australian and South American Continents. Although the group of fifteen small islands and atolls stretches over an area of 850,000 square miles of ocean they make up only 93 square miles in total land area (equal to 1.3 times the size of Washington, D.C.). The mainstays of the economy are tourism, fishing, and a declining agricultural sector. Like many small island nations, geography, the scarcity of land-based natural resources and a shortage of skilled workers require heavy dependence on foreign aid, investment, and remittances from Cook Islanders residing overseas. A high cost of living, ongoing political uncertainty, an economic crisis in 1994-1996, and damage from natural disasters have had economic implications for the Cooks and many Cook Islanders have migrated abroad. Despite the uncertainties, the People’s Republic of China established diplomatic relations with the government of the Cook Islands on July 25, 1997. Since the establishment of formal relations, the linkages between China and the Cook Islands have grown stronger and more robust. Just months after the two countries established ties, visiting high-level Chinese officials signed agreements to offer economic assistance to the Islands and the Chinese Red Cross Society donated $20,000 in hurricane


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relief. In December 1998, Beijing invited Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry on a week-long official visit to China, the first Prime Minister of the Cook Islands to do so. During the week, Prime Minister Henry traveled to Beijing, Shanghai, Xian and Hong Kong, met with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji and Vice President Hu Jintao, and signed a bilateral trade agreement. In 1999, China handed over the first of three sponsored construction projects: an open-air stage in the Punanga Nui market place, and the reconstructed Papua and Totokoitu bridges. In 2004, China began construction on a $4.8 million Rarotongan courthouse, sent a team to begin planning on a new $3.7 million police headquarters, and the Chinese company Shanghai Deep Sea Fisheries signed an agreement to build 10 fishing vessels and invest millions of dollars in the floundering Cook Islands Fish Exports plant in Nikao. In August of 2004, the Cook Islands secured the much coveted “approved destination status” (ADS) from the Chinese government to receive Chinese tourists. Diplomatic visits between the officials of the two countries have also gradually increased, culminating in Cook Islands Prime Minister Robert Woonton’s 8-day official visit to China in April 2004, during which Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pledged $16 million in grants to the Islands. The Cook Islands are not the only South Pacific nation to become a recent recipient of China’s growing largesse. The heads of state of eight South Pacific countries paid official visits to Beijing between March 2004 and July 2005 at the invitation (and most probably the financial support) of the Chinese government during which the leaders met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and/or Premier Wen Jiabao. The Prime Minister of Fiji, the President of Nauru, and the Prime Minister of Vanuatu each made two official trips during that same time period. Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG) Michael Somare’s February 2004 visit to China included eighty business and government officials—the country’s largest ever delegation to travel on an official state visit. These heads-of-state meetings have been supported with other highlevel engagement at multilateral summits such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, the Asian-African Summit, the International Conference for Asian Political Parties, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) sessions, and

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the Pacific Islands Forum consultations. Bilateral visits between trade ministers, foreign ministers, party leaders, and business and military delegations have also been on the rise. In April 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Fiji to attend the inaugural China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development Cooperation Ministerial Conference and meet with leaders of eight of the Pacific countries. This was the first time any Chinese Premier had visited the South Pacific. Although Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the EU and the US remain major economic partners with the region, China’s trade and aid contributions have leapfrogged in the past five years from insignificant to among the region’s largest. Chinese aid disbursements to Papua New Guinea are now second only to those from Australia.7 Trade with Tonga, nonexistent in 1998, has grown rapidly, with China becoming the country’s second largest export trading partner and fourth largest import partner in 2004.8 For other South Pacific countries where direction of trade statistics are available (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) Chinese trade has dramatically increased since 1999. Beijing is supporting several major infrastructure projects across the region in addition to those in the Cook Islands. These include $2 million for multipurpose sport facility in Fiji and $5.5 million for a national sports complex in Kiribati, plans to upgrade the facilities of Niue’s Broadcasting Corporation and fund the rebuilding of PNG’s Highlands Highway, and has constructed the law school at the University of the South Pacific, a television station, and a rice planting plot in Vanuatu. The Chinese government has also made a habit of donating equipment to regional government offices and militaries. For instance in Fiji, Beijing has donated $6,000 toward the improvement of the Foreign Ministry website, $13,000 for two small boats for the fisheries surveillance team, over $250,000 worth of military equipment and stores, and $30,000 worth of office equipment to the Fijian Parliament. To PNG China has donated at least 50 computers to the Department of Foreign Affairs, and over $1 million to the PNG Defense Force to improve its physical training facilities, provide uniforms, and fund the expansion of a military hospital. In Vanuatu, the PRC has funded the building of the National Parliament House, donated eight pick-up trucks to replace the


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government’s aging fleet, and provided two cargo ships worth $9.4 million to facilitate the delivery of goods to isolated island communities. Assistance in developing the region’s natural resources is another area where China has been playing a prominent role. The oceans of the South Pacific are rich in fish stocks, especially tuna. China has established memorandums of understanding (MOU) regarding fishing with at least the Cook Islands, Fiji, Micronesia, PNG, and Kiribati (until Kiribati recognized Taiwan). Financial assistance and development projects have also been awarded or discussed to support the forestry, agriculture, mineral extraction, tourism industry, and power and energy sectors. Both the Fijian and PNG governments have discussed joint development schemes of timber resources and mining with Chinese officials. Chinese corporations have investigated the feasibility of both copper and methanol projects in PNG. In perhaps the largest of China’s South Pacific development projects, the China Metallurgical Construction Company (CMCC) signed an MOU on the $625 million Ramu nickel and cobalt mine in PNG. In return for an 85% stake in the mine, the CMCC will fund the mine in total, complete all construction on the mine, and buy all of its products for the life (probably 40 years) of the mine.9 The region’s need and potential for energy sources has also attracted Chinese investment in areas such as PNG’s natural gas and oil reserves, and solar and wind power capabilities; Vanuatu’s hydropower, and Tonga’s electricity. On 24 June 2004 Tonga’s Shoreline Group, the country’s sole electric power supplier and distributor (and owned by the Tongan Crown Prince), received $17 million in “technical cooperation” funds from the Bank of China.10 In 2004, China granted four South Pacific countries, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu, approved tourism destination status. The potential for a large increase in tourists drawn from the growing Chinese middle class has energized tourism agreements between the four countries and the PRC. In 2003, China joined the South Pacific Tourism Organization (SPTO) and became the first full member of the grouping in April 2004. In February 2004, Beijing donated $100,000 to the SPTO, becoming the single largest paying member. China has even proposed direct air links between the PRC and Niue and the PRC and Fiji in order

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to avoid difficult visa restrictions in Australia; until they are established, charter flights are available. To prepare for the potential influx of Chinese tourists, Fiji is planning on sending workers to China to learn Chinese language, culture, and food preparation. In 2002, Chinese already accounted for over 90% of Fijian visas issued and the majority of foreigners granted Fijian citizenship. Chinese generosity does not end there. China has provided aid and development assistance for such projects as HIV/AIDS programs, a flour mill project, and the donation of medical supplies and doctors in PNG, flood relief in Fiji, promises for assistance in Fiji’s threatened garment industry, and forgave $5 million in outstanding loan payments for Vanuatu. Wen Jiabao’s 2006 visit to Fiji resulted in a slew of benefits for the South Pacific. In his keynote address entitled “Win-win Cooperation for Common Development,” Wen outlined six major Chinese assistance programs: 1) provide RMB 3 billion yuan (approximately US$ 374 million) of preferential loans to business communities in China and the South Pacific to boost cooperation in resources development, agriculture, forestry, fishery, tourism, textiles and consumer products manufacturing, telecommunications, and aviation and ocean shipping; 2) cancel debts that became mature at the end of 2005 and extend zero-tariff treatment to the majority of exports to China; 3) provide free anti-malaria medicines to island countries affected by the disease in the next three years as well as continue to send medical teams to conduct training courses; 4) provide training to 2,000 government officials and technical staff from the island countries to assist with capacity training; 5) extend ADS to all seven countries diplomatically recognizing China; and 6) provide assistance in building an earthquake and tsunami early warming system.11 Along with bilateral relations with the region, China has been stepping up its relationship with the region as a whole particularly through its regional organization the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). In 1988, the Chinese Ambassador to Fiji was first invited to the South Pacific Forum, the precursor to the PIF. The following year, China sent its first delegation and from 1990 has sent a government representative to attend the post-Forum dialogue meetings. Since 1991, the acting Secretary General of the PIF has regularly paid visits to China. On October 31 2000, China and the PIF signed an agreement under which


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the Chinese government donated $3 million to the Forum Secretariat in order to promote trade and investment, $1 million of which would fund the opening and operation of a Pacific Islands trade office in Beijing for three years. In 2004, a further $800,000 was provided to cover the PIF trade office up until 2008. The PRC has continued to donate thousands of dollars to support the PIF, including $100,000 to upgrade the Forum Secretariat’s computer network, a $100,000 annual pledge to supplement membership contributions to the PIF’s Forum Presiding Officer’s Conference (FPOC), which represents the Speakers of Parliament and Congress in the Pacific, and $30,000 to support the FPOC visit to Nauru in 2004.12 Workshops for Pacific diplomats and media are conducted in Beijing. In May 2004, China announced its intention to fund major construction projects in Fiji including the building of Pacific House, where the Forum Secretariat offices will be located. Regional responses The Chinese government is not only making major deals throughout the region, but is also winning over friends with its red-carpet diplomacy and interest-free, no-strings-attached, open-ended style of financial support. Such development assistance often comes in the form of grants, not loans. This is much appreciated in an economically vulnerable region where aid is often essential to survival. That China also offers an alternative to traditional Pacific partners such as Australia and New Zealand adds to the appeal. After cementing diplomatic ties with the PRC, then Cook Islands Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry stated, “Gone are the days when the Cook Islands’ future is linked solely and overwhelmingly to one country.”13 The praise has only continued. At the conclusion of the 35th Pacific Islands Forum Summit in August 2004, the Secretary-General of the PIF, Greg Urwin, said the Pacific states welcomed China’s growing role in the region and are optimistic about future cooperative exchanges.14 Following a violent national election in the summer of 2002, Papua New Guinea faced a major political and economic crisis. China was the first country to step forward under the “Friends of PNG” group to donate

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$1 million to boost the economy. PNG Finance and Treasury Minister called China a “true friend” of the country. By 2005, China had become PNG’s top trading partner and the largest buyer of PNG lumber. In Vanuatu, a local paper trumpeted China’s “extraordinary generosity and understanding” when covering Deputy Prime Minister Serge Vohor’s statement following the receipt of a $300,000 aid cheque from China. Voicing the opinion of many aid-dependent countries, Vohor reportedly said “similar help from other countries would include sending in their technical advisors so at the end of the day, the money all goes back to them through the huge salaries of their own people. But the Chinese government only provides the money and it is up to the Vanuatu government to decide how it is spent.”15 Yet despite voices of glowing admiration in the region, the relationship is not all rosy. Some government officials in the region have questioned the reach and aims of China’s chequebook diplomacy. In the Cook Islands, there were calls for a boycott of the Chinese-built courthouse opening ceremony. A local member of parliament expressed concerns about China’s aid strategy in the Pacific and a priest raised concerns about religious persecution by the Chinese government.16 A PNG politician cited concerns over plans for China building an office complex for the Foreign Affairs Department, saying it touched on national sovereignty and could possibly expose the country to spies.17 During the 2002 legislative elections in Kiribati, China—its use of the Tarawa satellite base and possible election interference—was a major campaign issue. The Chinese Ambassador to Kiribati admitted to donating funds to a cooperative group with ties to Kiribati President Teburoro Tito. During the 2003 Presidential campaign, one of the three candidates accused President Tito of using Chinese development funds to finance his re-election bid.18 Six months after the election, Kiribati switched recognition to the Republic of China. A former Tongan military officer also warned Australia and New Zealand to be aware of China’s growing military influence in the Pacific.19 Illegal fishing by Chinese fishermen has at times also been a problem for Pacific islands countries. Perhaps one of the greatest problems has been the influx of Chinese migrants—whether legal or illegal—to the region.20 Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu have all experienced difficulties


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due to selling passports to Chinese. In July 2004, the Kiribati Parliament passed a law repealing a 1996 investor passport scheme, which sold passports to Chinese for $15,000 so that they would invest in the country, although no investment actually ever took place. Around the same time, Marshall Islands immigration authorities began to crack down on Chinese who had overstayed their visas, the result of a passport-selling scheme which led to uncontrolled migration. A similar scheme by Tonga in the 1980s and 1990s led to strong anti-Chinese sentiment in the kingdom culminating in numerous cases of violence. In 2001, Tonga gave hundreds of Chinese victims of violence a year to leave the kingdom. Some ethnic Chinese locals and Chinese nationals have been linked to domestic and transnational crimes in several Pacific Island nations, further exacerbating anti-Chinese feelings. As a result, negative attitudes towards Chinese immigrants and workers have persisted in many Pacific countries. In many countries, like the Solomon Islands, ethnic Chinese dominate trading. The April 2006 riots following the Solomon Islands elections demonstrated how quickly domestic political frustrations can turn to violence against Chinese businesses. The tendency for Chinese construction companies to bring their own laborers rather than hire locals to work on building projects no doubt exacerbates this situation. China’s motivations Speaking before an audience at the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C. in December 2005, the Chinese Vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress, Mr. Cheng Si Wei, emphasized China’s diplomatic relationship with ninety-five percent of Latin America and the Caribbean “in terms of land area, population, and economic strength.”21 Although this statement is quite true, it represents a creative face-saving way to sidestep the fact that a third of the countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan.22 Cheng’s message implies nonchalance on Beijing’s part toward its diplomatic status with these small developing countries. But this belies China’s continuing aggressive attempts to diplomatically isolate Taiwan.

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In the South Pacific, China could make a similar claim, with Australia and New Zealand firmly in China’s corner, yet the intense campaign for recognition continues. In terms of Taiwan, every country counts, no matter how small. No doubt those countries which recognize the PRC are rewarded for supporting the “one-China” policy. By far the largest recipients of aid and attention have been Fiji, PNG and Vanuatu—some of China’s longest-standing diplomatic backers. Those countries which recognize Taipei generally receive a cold shoulder from Beijing. A notable exception is the Solomon Islands, which has recognized Taiwan since 1983. China is their largest export partner. After the country’s military coup in 2000, China pledged $3 million to the 2001 national election budget. At the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party, Solomon Islands National and Labor party representatives visited Beijing in March 2005. These opposition parties voiced support for the “one-China” principle. The Labor party representative said China is interested in investing in the Solomon Islands provided the “environment is right”23 —that environment is most probably based on renouncing diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Kiribati and Nauru, which both recently switched allegiances to Taiwan in 2003 and 2005 respectively, have seen their relationship with Beijing deteriorate almost overnight, although China maintains its facilities in Tarawa as the renamed “Chinese Care-Taking Group in Kiribati.” Sino-Taiwan rivalry in the South Pacific is hardly new; competition for diplomatic recognition began in the 1970s. However, diplomatic ties once forged are by no means guaranteed secure. South Pacific governments can be fickle in their support (see Chart). Even long-time supporters Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea have flirted with changing sides. Therefore China has often needed to maintain pressure on its supporters. Reportedly in 2003, when the Kiribati government indicated its intention to recognize Taiwan, the Chinese Ambassador to Kiribati reportedly hounded Kiribati President Anote Tong with so many phone calls the President was forced to change his telephone number.24 Although China has been generally disinclined to chastise its supporters beyond strong political language, Beijing is not beyond using its economic and political leverage to sway countries in the region to remain

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Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific The South Pacific Diplomatic Tango Year Diplomatic Relations Established with China

Year Diplomatic Relations Established with Taiwan

Cook Islands

1997

Micronesia

1989

Fiji

1975

197125

Kiribati

1980

2003

Marshall Is.

1990

1998

Nauru

2002

1980, 2005

26

Niue

1999

Palau 27

PNG

1976

Samoa

1975

1983

Solomon Is. 1998

Tonga

1972

1972 1979

Tuvalu 28

Vanuatu

1982

Sources: China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication with the Palau Embassy, Marshall Islands Embassy and Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington, D.C., the Tongan Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, and the Niue High Commission in New Zealand

loyal. In 1999 and 2000 China took advantage of its position on the UN Security Council to delay voting on Nauru’s and Tuvalu’s applications to the United Nations. 29 Nauru, which had recognized Taiwan since 1980, switched allegiances to Beijing in 2002, but then back to Taiwan in 2005. Sometimes the pressure has come from surprising sources, such as when in 1999 the Australian government advised Papua New Guinea not to switch diplomatic support to Taiwan in the interest of regional security or in 2001 when the US vetoed a visit of Taiwan’s warships to the Marshall Islands.30

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China’s donation to set up the Pacific Islands Trade Office in Beijing in 2000 came only after the Forum agreed to switch the chairmanship from Palau, which recognizes Taiwan, to Kiribati, which at the time recognized China. At the 15th Pacific Islands Forum meeting in August 2004, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong stated the “oneChina” principle was essential to the “smooth development of China-PIF relations” and that “China will continue to do its utmost to provide aid to all island countries that have diplomatic relations with China”31—a clear message that those who do not would lose out. At an October 2005 conference of the SPTO Beijing lobbied against Taiwan’s inclusion. Pointing out the recent Pacific Island additions to China’s approved tourist destination list and proposals of greater Chinese support for the organization, the Chinese Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, Li Zhengjun, said “the scheme of the Taiwan authorities to join the SPTO…[would] sabotage the good relations between China and its friendly countries.”32 As an additional carrot China pledged an added $100,000 a year for five years in organizational support. The following week the members voted against Taiwan’s admission. At the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum the countries which recognize Taiwan were conspicuously not invited and much of the benefits did not apply to them. Wen Jiabao clearly stated that only those countries recognizing China would be approved as Chinese tourist destinations and debt relief and zero-tariff status was only extended to China-friendly countries. Those countries recognizing Taiwan with debt to China had their payments extended ten years. But China’s vigorous diplomacy in the South Pacific over the past several years mirrors that of its activities in other regions—some where Taiwan’s likelihood of diplomatic recognition figures far less prominently. In his April 2006 speech in Fiji Wen Jiabao emphasized that China’s intentions in cooperating with Pacific Islands countries was “not [a matter of] a diplomatic expediency, [R]ather, it is a strategic decision.” Taiwan and the “one-China” principle remain a high priority for China, but they no longer explain the whole story in the Pacific. There are other issues of importance to China where it seeks backing from supporters in the region. In international organizations with a


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“one-country, one-vote” policy, such as the United Nations, a region of small nation supporters can be influential. With the exception of the Cook Islands and Niue (whose external affairs are handled by New Zealand), all the countries in the region belong to the UN. For several, including Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu, China has had a hand in securing their membership. In May 2005 China asked for Vanuatu’s support at the United Nations the same week as handing over approximately $1 million in “budget support.”33 Pacific Island countries also hold memberships in such influential organizations as the International Labor Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization. With their small populations, South Pacific countries hold some of the highest representation per capita in international organizations. In dollar diplomacy terms, relatively inexpensive but high profile projects may translate into valuable votes when China needs them. China is resource hungry; its economic growth is fueling a considerable appetite for natural resources. The need to secure those resources and the access to them is driving Beijing’s foreign policy around the globe. Although South Pacific nations are not particularly resource-rich, they do have some resources Beijing finds attractive— minerals, hydrocarbons, timber, gold, and vast areas of ocean for fishing. Part of the problem for these countries is they are too underdeveloped to harvest the resources themselves. Therefore when China proposes such projects it is often seen as a win-win for China and the Pacific nation. In many of the fishing agreements, China has provided the funds for boats, processing plants and facilities, even constructed them, in exchange for fishing rights for Chinese boats in regional EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones), a percentage of the profits earned, and a portion of the catch to be exported to China. The PNG Ramu nickel and cobalt mine is another such win-win situation. China is a major user of nickel to produce steel alloys. With the world supply of nickel declining, the mine is one way for China to secure a source of nickel for decades to come. In tandem with rising resource consumption, disposable incomes in China are also climbing. This translates to greater population mobility and a desire to travel abroad. A report on Chinese tourism trends

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indicates that by the year 2020 China will become the world’s largest source of outbound tourists—around 115 million.34 The Asia Pacific region is the fastest growing tourism area in the world. Although, Hong Kong and Macao remain the top “foreign” destinations for Chinese tourists followed by countries in Southeast Asia, tourism to the South Pacific may be both attractive to Chinese tourists and the Chinese government. The number one travel consideration for Chinese tourists is safety. Following the tsunami in South and Southeast Asia in December 2004, Chinese travel to Southeast Asia dropped considerably. The threat of terrorist activity or a severe outbreak of Avian flu akin to the rapid spread of SARS in 2003 also make Southeast Asia a less attractive option for the Chinese. Considering other major factors Chinese consider when traveling—outstanding scenery, experiencing a different culture, opportunities for participating in sports and outdoor activities, staying in resorts, and the availability of package tours - several destinations in the South Pacific offer relatively safe and clean alternatives. With China’s recent heavy involvement in the regional tourism organization, conferring approved travel destination status (including most recently to Tahiti35), and exploring direct flights or supporting small national airlines, its clear the South Pacific is on Beijing’s travel radar. China looks poised to surpass the region’s top inbound tourist markets of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Within five years of granting ADS to Australia, Chinese tourists had become the largest growing inbound market, outnumbering Japanese tourists, with similar trends being seen in Guam and the Northern Marianas.36 Since 1999 the number of US tourists to Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu has fallen. Over the long term the South Pacific may also serve as an important strategic asset to China. In 1997, China established a satellite-tracking station on South Tarawa Atoll in Kiribati. One of three overseas China Space and Telemetry Stations run by the Chinese military, the strategically located Tarawa facility was instrumental in China’s first manned space flight in October 2003. However, there were also accusations the base was being used to spy on the US Army Kwajalein Atoll/Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands, a center of operations for the development of the US Ballistic Missile Defense system. With Kiribati’s diplomatic defection to Taiwan in November


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2003, a disgruntled China announced the station would be dismantled. However, a Chinese official also noted that China could find another place in the region to build a similar base or send monitoring ships to the region.37 Another Chinese goal may be to challenge American predominance through weakening US alliances in the region. By politically and economically strengthening its partnerships in the South Pacific, Beijing may be able to build its own strategic alliances in the long-term. The PRC maintains bilateral military ties with those Pacific Island countries with defense forces. Although primarily limited to providing equipment, training, and logistical support, there exists the potential for increased exchanges. Chinese involvement in improving infrastructure such as airports, bridges, and highways, as well as seeking agreements to allow Chinese ships in Pacific EEZs may have potential strategic implications in the future. Conclusion — Waning US influence and policy implications In 1995, Pacific Island expert Ron Crocombe noted that although the United States possessed significant potential to expand its relations with the region, instead it faced “decreasing leverage” due in large part to growing East Asian competition in trade, aid, investment, tourism, education, research, and political influence in the context of a shifting global security environment.38 More than a decade on, the Chinese have made considerable progress in all of these areas. In fact, by coordinating its economic assistance with a sophisticated diplomacy strategy, China is engaging the region in other ways—from expanding familiarity with Chinese goods and services, broadcasting Chinese television programming, expanding student exchanges, increasing business ties, encouraging the study of Mandarin, and paving the way for an increase in Chinese tourists. Such activities can be categorized as those that might enhance a country’s “soft power”—the ability of a country to influence other countries through its culture, values, and institutions. Such power, as opposed to hard power drawn from military or economic prowess, is derived from sources as diverse as a country’s willingness to cooperate

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multilaterally, through its television and film, commercial goods, and people.39 In the face of what many countries see as US moves toward unilateralism and a preoccupation with counterterrorism and Iraq, US soft power, once a strength of its foreign policy, is considered by some to be in decline.40 Some of the greatest sources of US soft power come from interaction with its people, aid, and development programs. However, over the past decade the US has reduced many programs that offer such exchanges with the South Pacific. In July 1993, the US closed its embassy in the Solomon Islands, reducing its diplomatic posts in the region to four—in Fiji, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Papua New Guinea.41 The US reopened a “virtual” embassy in the Solomon Islands in May 2005 (the first of its kind) and another in Vanuatu in July 2005.42 Although a potential new diplomatic model that recognizes the reality of limited resources and technological advances, a virtual embassy lacks the tangible demonstration of US interest that public outreach programming and actual personnel on the ground a physical embassy provides. China, on the other hand, continues to open more posts and as of 2006 maintains nine government representative offices in the region, including the CareTaking Group in Kiribati and the consulate general expected to open in Papeete, Tahiti in 2006. Between 1995 and 2003 the number of US Peace Corps volunteer missions active in the region was halved.43 Although in the past few years there has been resurgence in volunteer numbers, those countries still hosting Peace Corps missions have, for the most part, seen a reduction in the numbers of volunteers from highs in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. The US also closed its United States Information Agency offices in the region during the early to mid-90s. As a result the two-way Fulbright student scholarship program with South Pacific countries came to an end. The Chinese government on the other hand has been opening Chinese cultural centers, promoting the study of Chinese, and increasing funding for Pacific Island students to study in China. In 1994 USAID’s Regional Development Office for the South Pacific located in Suva, Fiji (with a branch office in Port Moresby, PNG) also closed. Although the regional development office covered ten countries, 5 million people, and a geographic area larger than the US, at


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$12 million annually it was considered too expensive to maintain.44 Upon closure the office transferred its remaining projects to the USAID office in the Philippines. Despite the closure, USAID still supports projects in the region such as the South Pacific Disaster Training Program, local volcano monitoring efforts, an HIV/AIDS Program in Papua New Guinea, and assistance for South Pacific fisheries. However, funding is small—the most recent USAID Congressional Budget Justification Report for the 2006 fiscal year designates only $100,000 for the Pacific Islands and $18 million for the South Pacific fisheries, an annual payment obligation required by the Pacific Multilateral Fisheries Treaty of 1988 that allows US commercial fishing vessels access to South Pacific fishing areas.45 For the most part Chinese overtures have been welcomed positively in the region. In contrast the pullout of Western interests has been met with apprehension—a sense of abandonment. According to the CloseOut Summary Report when the USAID Regional Development Office closed in the mid-1990s, countries in the region expressed concern that the US government was “turning its back on the region.” The recent closure of three UK embassies and its withdrawal from the region development body, the Pacific Community, evoked a similar response.46 Although Admiral Thomas Fargo, then Commander of the US Pacific Command, visited Tonga and Fiji in March 2004 it was primarily to reaffirm US bilateral military ties and seek support for the US global war on terrorism and efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such bilateral ties are important; however, the US needs to communicate to the region that it cares about goals beyond fighting terrorism, such as supporting democracy, human security, environmental conservation, disaster management, development and fair trade. South Pacific countries do not want to choose between the US (or the UK or Australia) and China. They want a range of options, not an exchange of one dominant partner for another. Despite assurances to the contrary, the message being conveyed is that China is paying attention to the region and the US is not. The rise of Chinese activities in the region is not sufficient justification for an increased US effort in the South Pacific; but recognition of US economic, strategic, and political interests is reason to

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do so. US interests in the region may be modest but are not unimportant. Total trade between the US and the countries of Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu was $406 million in 2004. US commercial fishing interests are high. The South Pacific produces more than half of the world’s annual tuna catch. As party to the Pacific Multilateral Fisheries Treaty, US fleets land between $250 and $400 million worth of fish stocks annually after processing and distribution.47 Strategically the US maintains the Kwajalein Missile Range, Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, and two satellite tracking stations on the Johnston and Kwajalein atolls in the Marshall Islands The support of South Pacific nations for certain US initiatives in international forums such as the United Nations, is, from time to time, important. Between June and December 2004 Tonga provided a unit of 45 troops as part of the US coalition in Iraq. The US also has broad global interests in promoting democracy, human rights, and economic development. These are at risk in the region as the political coups in the Solomon Islands and Fiji in 2000 as well as political instability and economic vulnerability in other South Pacific nations demonstrate. Modest, but important, US interests require only modest investment, but the US is moving in the wrong direction. As a result, although Washington’s involvement in the region has not disappeared, it is being eclipsed by Beijing’s rising influence. However, it is not too late for the US to reverse these trends. Chinese aid and investment in the South Pacific has so far been fairly small in absolute terms, and its “no-strings” approach is not aimed at supporting democratic institutions, human rights, or sustainable development. On the other hand, US programs such as USAID, the Peace Corps, and the Fulbright student exchange contribute lasting benefits in the countries where they operate. For example, the Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP), one of only two research institutes in the US dedicated solely to South Pacific Studies, administers among many projects the United States-South Pacific Scholarship Program, the United Nations Governance Project, the Fiji Futures Project, and serves as the Secretariat for the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders and the United States/Pacific Islands Joint Commercial Commission. Such programs should be supported and expanded—these


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relatively small investments in scholarships and public diplomacy initiatives positively promote long-term development in US-South Pacific relations. The US government can also work more proactively with its allies in the region—Australia, New Zealand, Japan, UK, France, and Singapore—not to contain China, but to promote good governance and strong economies in Pacific Island nations. However, should the United States continue to remain passive in the face of a growing Chinese presence, China may not only woo the South Pacific, but possibly win it. References 1.

2.

3.

This chapter first appeared in Asian Survey @2007 by The Regents of the University of California. Reprinted from Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 307-26, by permission of the Regents. Tamara Renee Shie is a U.S. Department of Defense Southeast Asia and Oceania analyst and formerly a Research Associate at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Policy Brief No. 47, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2006, p. 2. For articles on Chinese activities in other regions see, R. Evan Ellis, U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2005 ; Kerry Dumbaugh and Mark P. Sullivan, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America,” CRS Report for Congress RS22119, April 20, 2005; Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “China’s Emerging Role in the Middle East,” PacNet newsletter, no. 7, February 23, 2006 < http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac 0607.pdf>; Chris Alden, “China in Africa,” Survival 47: 3 (2005), pp. 147-164; Phillip Liu, “Cross-Strait Scramble for Africa: A Hidden Agenda in ChinaAfrica Cooperation Forum,” Harvard Asia Quarterly, V, 2 (Spring 2001) ; Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” Current History, 105: 691 (May 2006), pp. 219-224; Howard W. French, “China Moves Toward Another West: Central Asia,” New York Times, March 28, 2004, p. 1; Jeremy Bransten, “Central Asia: China’s Mounting Influence, Part 1 -- An Overview,” Radio Free Europe, November 18, 2004 ; Dan Erikson, “China in the Caribbean: A Benign Dragon?” Focal Point 4: 4 (April 2005) ; for a succinct analysis of the parallels in Chinese activities across several regions see, Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, Institute for National Strategic Studies Occasional Paper 4 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, June 2006). All dollar figures in this paper are in U.S. dollars. The Pacific Islands Forum is a regional organization for the independent countries of the South Pacific. The members are: Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. The Forum’s website is: . The Secretariat is based in Suva, Fiji. This paper does not cover territories in the South Pacific such as the French territories of Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and New Calendonia. Although Niue is often listed as having established formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, it has only approached New Zealand to express its interest in doing so. As of 2006, Niue does not have the adequate resources to make this possible. However the government has established a technical relationship with China and has no relationship with Taiwan. Personal communication with Niue High Commissioner in New Zealand, 11 January 2006. Bertil Lintner, “A New Battle for the Pacific,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 2004, p. 30. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2005. “Papua New Guinea-China Nickel Deal Formally Signed,” Port Moresby Courier, February 10, 2004 Internet Version, in Open Source Center. Pesi Fonua, “Shoreline looks for cheaper fuel supply for Tonga power,” Matangi Tonga Online, February 7, 2005 . The text of Wen’s speech is available at: . “China Funds Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat IT Upgrade,” Suva Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat website, March 31, 2003, in Open Source Center; “Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General Says PRC’s Support Will Help Governance,” Beijing Xinhua in English, November 22, 2004, in Open Source Center. “Cooks’ Henry on Bilateral Trade Pact Signed with China,” Roratonga Cook Islands News in English, December 5, 1998, in Open Source Center. “Pacific Forum Leader Urwin: China’s Role Welcomed,” Beijing Xinhua in English, August 10, 2004, in Open Source Center. “Vanuatu Deputy PM Thanks ‘True Friend’ China for Financial Help,” Port Villa Vanuatu Trading Post in English, August 30, 2001, p. 5, in Open Source Center. “China Insists No Strings to Cook Islands Courthouse Funding,” Melbourne Radio Australia, November 17, 2004, in Open Source Center.

Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific 17.

18.

19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25. 26.

27.

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“PNG Prime Minister Defends Foreign Affairs Building Project by China,” Port Moresby Post Courier, Internet Version, September 21, 2000, in Open Source Center. “Kiribati Candidate Warns President May ‘Buy Votes’ with Chinese Aid,” Wellington Radio New Zealand International, January 9, 2003, in Open Source Center. “Australia, New Zealand Warned of Chinese Influence in Tonga, Pacific,” Melbourne Radio Australia, June 18, 2004, in Open Source Center. Kalinga Seneviratne, “Islanders Welcome Chinese Cash, but not Chinese,” Asia Times Online, September 17, 2002 ; John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania,” The National Interest 72 (Summer 2003), pp. 98-99; “MP Calls for Government to Regulate Number of Chinese Workers in Tonga,” Wellington Radio New Zealand International, July 19, 2002, in Open Source Center; “MP Urges Limit on Number of Chinese Allowed Tonga Residency,” Wellington Radio New Zealand International, October 18, 2004, in Open Source Center; “Samoan MP Hits Out at Growing Chinese Influence,” Hong Kong AFP in English, January 21, 2005, in Open Source Center; “Chinese Envoy Protests Crime Against Nationals in PNG,” Port Moresby Post Courier, Internet Version, September 11, 2002, in Open Source Center. Cheng Si Wei, “Bright Prospects for China-Latin America and the Caribbean Cooperation,” speech at the Organization of American States, December 6, 2005 . Of the 33 countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean, 12 countries have diplomatic ties with Taiwan as of mid-2006: Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Paraguay. “Solomon Islands Opposition Parties Back One-China Principle,” Honiara Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation, March 31, 2005, in Open Source Center. Graham Norris, “Pawns in the Game: Pacific Becoming Key Battleground Between Taiwan and China,” Pacific Magazine, May 2004 . In 1971, Taiwan opened an official trade mission in Fiji. Due to its free association status, Niue must consult with New Zealand before establishing diplomatic relations with any country. Niue first raised the matter with N.Z. in 2000. Although Niue maintains good technical relations with China, formal diplomatic relations have yet to be established. On July 4, 1999, then Papua New Guinean Prime Minister Bill Skate signed a diplomatic recognition statement with Taiwan in Taipei. Under pressure to retain political power and reverse a severe fiscal shortfall, recognition was expected to bring in major loans and grants from Taiwan. The story broke on July 2, before

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28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

33. 34. 35. 36.

37.

38. 39. 40.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific the PM’s visit to Taiwan and the move backfired. Bill Skate resigned on July 7 and within two weeks the new Papua New Guinea government severed ties with Taipei. Bill Standish, “Papua New Guinea 1999: Crisis of Governance,” 21 September 1999 . Briefly in November 2004 Vanuatu recognized Taiwan. On November 3, the Vanuatun Prime Minister Serge Vohor and Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Tan Sun Chen signed a joint communiqué to establish full diplomatic relations. On November 10 Vanuatu’s Council of Minister’s annulled the proposal. “Vanuatu withdraws Taiwanese diplomatic ties: China,” 11 November 2004 . John Henderson, “China, Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Significance of Oceania,” La Revue Juridique Polynesienne, 2001, , p. 151. Henderson and Reilly, “Dragon in Paradise,” pp. 94-104. Liu Shinan, “‘One-China’ Essential to Ties with PIF Nations,” China Daily, August 11, 2004 . “Chinese Envoy Warns on Taiwan Bid to Join Pacific Tourism Body,” Port Moresby Post Courier, Internet Version, October 18, 2005, in Open Source Center; “South Pacific Tourism Body Rejects Taiwanese Application,” Port Moresby National, Internet Version, October 24, 2005, in Open Source Center. “China Boosts Funding for Vanuatu, Seeks Support at UN,” Port Vila Vanuatu Presse website in English, May 11, 2005, in Open Source Center. CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, Chinese Tourists: Coming, Ready or Not!, Special Report, September 2005. Although Tahiti is part of French Polynesia and not a member of the Pacific Island Forum, China’s interest represents another footprint in the region. “Australia Opens Travel to Entire China Market,” SinoCast China Business Daily News, October 26, 2005, p. 1, in ProQuest; James Brooke, “In Pacific, a Red Carpet for China’s Rich Tourists,” New York Times, May 13, 2004, p. W1. “Sino-Kiribati Diplomatic Dispute won’t Hurt Space Mission,” People’s Daily Online, December 1, 2003 . Ron Crocombe, The Pacific Islands and the USA (Honolulu: Pacific Islands Development Program/East West Center, 1995), pp. 329-362. This concept of soft power comes from Joseph Nye’s 1990 essay “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990), pp. 153-171. See Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Decline of American Soft Power,” Current History 104: 686 (December 2005), pp. 419-424 and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs 83: 3 (May/June 2004), pp. 16-20.

Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific 41.

42.

43.

44.

45. 46. 47.

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U.S. representation in Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu is accredited to embassies located in other countries. There are only 11 U.S. diplomatic missions with accreditation to more than one country, and five of them are in the South Pacific. The Solomon Islands virtual embassy opened May 3, 2005 and can be found online at . The U.S. has maintained a consular agent in the Solomon Islands capital of Honiara since the closure of the physical embassy. The Vanuatu virtual embassy opened July 19, 2005 and can be found at . In 1994 the U.S. had Peace Corps volunteers in 13 of the 14 South Pacific countries (excluding Nauru). Operations in the Cook Islands, Fiji, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu were closed due to budgetary constraints, while the Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Niue missions were closed due to safety/security concerns. The Peace Corps closed its mission in Fiji in 1998 but reopened it in 2004. Information provided by Peace Corps headquarters, 15 March 2006. The reporting officer indicated that Washington decided to close the South Pacific development office “unilaterally”—announcing the closure of the office without informing or consulting the mission. They had less than one fiscal year to close out. In USAID, USAID/RDO/SP Close-Out Summary Report, Volume 1, 9 September 1994. Personal email communication with USAID, 13 March 2006. The U.K. closed its diplomatic posts in Kiribati and Vanuatu in 2005 and Tonga in March 2006, and withdrew from the Pacific Community on January 1, 2005. Internet Guide to International Fisheries Law .


Chapter 7 BIG TROUBLE IN LITTLE CHINATOWN: AUSTRALIA, TAIWAN AND THE APRIL 2006 POST-ELECTION RIOT IN SOLOMON ISLANDS

Joel Atkinson

Introduction The South Pacific has emerged as a source of contention between two key Asia-Pacific middle powers, Australia and Taiwan. Taiwan’s effort to maintain and expand the list of countries with which it has formal diplomatic relations, in the face of hostility from China, has clashed with Australia’s governance reform agenda for the Pacific Islands. This conflict is particularly acute in Solomon Islands which have longstanding ties with Taiwan and a close association with Australia. Hox wever, while this divergence of interests is real, Australia has fuelled this conflict through imputing Taiwan for Australia’s difficulties in an apparent attempt to avoid acknowledging the ambitious nature of Australia’s agenda relative to the political, economic and social conditions in Solomon Islands. This inclination to make Taiwan a scapegoat brought about sustained public Australian criticism of Taiwan following the April 2006 post-election riot in Solomon Islands, based on little more than the unsubstantiated claims of a single Solomon Islands politician. This episode inflicted serious harm on Taiwan’s reputation in Australia. The incident also contributed to the Chen Shui-bian Taiwan government’s perception of Australia as being increasingly pro-China. This chapter draws on local media and interviews conducted in Australia, Solomon Islands and Taiwan to analyze the development of this recent Australia-Taiwan conflict in Solomon Islands. First, it 163

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provides a brief background of Australia’s and Taiwan’s involvement in the South Pacific, followed by an examination of Taiwan’s role in Solomon Islands Crisis and the subsequent Australian-led intervention. It then discusses the involvement of the Australian and Taiwan governments in the events surrounding the April 2006 elections in Solomon Islands, the selection of Synder Rini as prime minister and the subsequent riot, and the ensuing sustained public controversy between Australia and Taiwan. Next, the chapter looks at developments concerning Australia and Taiwan during the Manasseh Sogavare government. In conclusion, it considers the significance of the events in Solomon Islands to wider Australia-Taiwan involvement in the South Pacific. Australia, Taiwan, China and the South Pacific The Republic of China (ROC) government continued to contend with Beijing for international recognition as the government of China, following its defeat in the Chinese civil war and retreat to Taiwan in 1949. The ROC’s position in this competition continued to deteriorate to the point that it lost sufficient support for its claim in the United Nations and walked out in 1971.1 However, the economic success of Taiwan relative to China through the 1970s and 1980s made it easier for Taipei to purchase diplomatic recognition from small impoverished countries.2 The South Pacific emerged as an arena for China-Taiwan diplomatic competition during the same period, as increasing numbers of countries became independent.3 The character of China-Taiwan competition in the South Pacific changed with the “Taiwanization” of the ROC under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui. Taipei increasingly began to act as a government of Taiwan and not China, dropping its version of the Hallstein doctrine, the condition that Taiwan would only recognize a country if it cut relations with China.4 However, Beijing maintained its insistence on the nonrecognition of Taiwan. The advent of China-Taiwan diplomatic competition in the South Pacific was not initially a significant concern for Australia. Australia had increased its involvement in the South Pacific since the mid-1970s, in

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part to counter the Soviet Union.5 As the interest of external powers in the region declined after the Cold War, the expectations of the South Pacific countries on Australia increased.6 As such, Australia supported what Albinski described as “the PRC-Taiwan ‘creative tension’ basis of benefits accruing to the region.”7 Australia’s attitude towards the involvement of Taiwan and China in the South Pacific hardened as this involvement escalated, and as Australia became increasingly focused on reforming countries within its sphere of influence through the 1990s.8 This growing conflict in the interests of Taiwan and Australia sparked a public clash between the two countries over Papua New Guinea in 1995, and again in 1999.9 Taiwan and Solomon Islands crisis Solomon Islands became independent from Britain in 1978, and had entered Australia’s sphere of influence by the 1990s. During the 1990s, Australia became the country’s largest aid donor and pursued a “modernization” programme to bring about political reform and economic growth.10 The new Solomon Islands government actively courted both Beijing and Taipei, before establishing relations with Taiwan in 1983 in response to inducements.11 After 1998, the political situation in Solomon Islands deteriorated into low-intensity civil warfare. This “Solomon Islands Crisis” had its roots in people from the island of Malaita settling on the island of Guadalcanal. These Malaitans and their descendants came to predominate in the capital Honiara (on Guadalcanal), filling the majority of positions within the civil service and police. Conflict between the ethnic Malaitan and Guadalcanal communities developed through a series of murders, forced evictions and often spurious compensation demands. A militia group representing indigenous Guadalcanal people, the Isatabu Freedom Force, confronted the Malaitan-dominated Royal Solomon Islands Police Force and, after a period, the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF) militia as well. Marginalized elites utilized these militias, drawn from a large population of discontented and underemployed youth, as “stage armies” to pursue financial and political objectives. Following

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a 5 June 2000 coup conducted by the MEF and the regular Solomon Islands police force, a new Solomon Islands government committed to a close relationship with the MEF was elected, headed by Manasseh Sogavare.12 As the crisis developed and international donors began withholding aid due to serious governmental irregularities, Solomon Islands’ leadership turned to Taiwan to meet the spiralling compensation demands of the conflicting parties. The Chen Shui-bian government, elected in March 2000, aimed to improve Taiwan’s tarnished donor image, but was unable to resist being pulled deeper into the crisis. In June 2001, Taiwan’s state-owned EXIM Bank agreed to a US $25 million loan after Solomon Islands government threatened to switch diplomatic recognition to China. The package was used to finance hundreds of payouts routed through Allan Kemakeza’s Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace. Kemakeza himself was at the top of the list, and was later sacked for embezzlement over the issue. Parliament nonetheless elected Kemakeza prime minister following the December 5, 2001 elections. The final tranche of the EXIM loan arrived in September 2002, and as the money ran out the crisis reached its nadir, with Cabinet and the Finance Ministry invaded by armed men, including police, demanding money.13 RAMSI Australia had been extremely reluctant to become too involved in the crisis; however, by early June 2003, Canberra decided on military intervention.14 Anxious to avoid charges of neocolonialism, this Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was ostensibly a Pacific Islands Forum member country initiative, authorized under the Forum’s 2000 Biketawa Declaration, which sanctioned intervention upon invitation by the government concerned.15 The intervention received further legal basis with a treaty signed between Solomon Islands and contributing countries and an act in Solomon Islands parliament.16 In July 2003, an Australian-led force of 2,225 soldiers from six regional nations entered the country unopposed.17 The mission quickly restored


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order, arresting 4,000 suspected militants.18 Although there was widespread support from the general populace, there remained significant segments hostile to the mission, most notably the families of prisoners and those with links to the militias. In December 2003, an Australian protective services officer was shot and killed.19 Despite unanimously voting in favour of the intervention, there were mixed feelings about RAMSI among Solomon Islands’ politicians. Parliamentarians with links to the militias found themselves under threat, with three members of the MEF in Kemakeza’s cabinet arrested and imprisoned.20 Politicians also faced prosecution for corruption, over what had previously been routine political practice. In addition, RAMSI meant an inevitable loss of effective sovereignty, which the country’s political class resented. At the same time, Australia was hamstrung in its ability to reform the old political order by its reliance on the Kemakeza government. According to Fraenkel, “Australian intervention might have been justified by the need to rescue a “failed state,” but to get regional support under the Biketawa Declaration, the mission would have needed an invitation from the head of what was undoubtedly a failed government. And so Kemakeza, for the sake of convenience, became the darling of the Australian-led mission....”21 It appears that Australian policymakers presumed they could rely on a threat of “all or nothing”—either RAMSI would be fully implemented or not at all—to overcome this obstacle. However, it became apparent as the mission progressed that Australia was extremely reluctant to pull out with so much money and prestige invested. Instead, RAMSI and the local political powerbrokers would engage in a continual negotiation of sovereignty, and much of the pre-RAMSI political order endured, with RAMSI unable to bring to justice key figures in the earlier violence or to trim the bloated government.22 Australian personnel were inserted into Solomon Islands administration in an attempt to reform governance,23 which to an extent bifurcated the government into competing structures loyal either to RAMSI or the de jure government. While RAMSI had markedly improved the security situation, and restored basic services and stabilized the country’s finances,24 it also raised expectations among the populace that would not be met. Most significantly, the core issues of

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ethnic rivalry and unemployment remained largely unaddressed. Hence, Australia’s position in Solomon Islands was more precarious than the veneer of success suggested. Australia-Taiwan conflict This vulnerability, as well as the massive commitment of reputation and resources, sensitized Australia to Taiwan’s involvement in the Solomons. The crux of the problem was Taiwan’s lax supervision of its aid programmes, totalling some US $15 million per year,25 and how this conflicted with Australia’s reform agenda. Australia tackled this issue, and the issue of money coming from foreign logging companies, businessmen, foreign fishing fleets, and even Japan’s whaling lobby, by what RAMSI head James Batley called “beefing up” the institutions responsible for accountability: the Auditor-General’s Office, the Ombudsman Commission and the Leadership Code Commission. RAMSI also worked with civil society to “help build up” demand for “better standards, more transparency and more integrity.”26 In addition, Australia engaged Taiwan directly at regular donor meetings, encouraging Taiwan to apply higher standards of accountability. The two countries also came to an arrangement where some Taiwanese aid funds were channelled through trust accounts set up by Australia.27 However, the general trend was towards greater Australia-Taiwan conflict in the South Pacific. Taiwan’s attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Vanuatu in late 2004 led to a significant clash of interests between Australia and Taiwan.28 A March 2006 report from an Australian Senate committee articulated the growing concern about the issue: “Among some Pacific Island nations, competition between China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition has, on occasion, appeared to take on the characteristics of a bidding war, conducted mainly through bilateral ‘aid’ payments.”29 However, the Australian government was not so much concerned about the activities of China and Taiwan, as what effect they were seen to be having on Australia’s policy goals. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) told the committee, “Australia opposes such chequebook diplomacy, because …


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we have made a very considerable effort to try to address governance issues … [and we] see chequebook diplomacy as directly undermining the efforts that we have made.”30 This Australian governmental perception of China-Taiwan rivalry was a mix of reality and exaggeration. Money from China and Taiwan certainly provides South Pacific governments with a bulwark against Australian pressure, presumably undermining Australia’s efforts to use aid as a “stick” in pursuit of its reform agenda. However, it is debatable to what extent China and Taiwan undermine Australia’s reform agenda simply through providing South Pacific governments with funds to misuse. Presumably, if Australia’s efforts were effective, the administration of aid from China and Taiwan would improve accordingly. As events following the April 2006 Solomon Islands election would show, the Australian government has a strong incentive to exaggerate the impact of China and Taiwan on Australian policy and on the South Pacific, as this diverts responsibility for any failure to carry out its governance reform policy, or in the conception of that policy. This is even more so in the case of Taiwan, which is less economically important to Australia than China. The April 2006 elections Taiwan’s involvement in Solomon Islands made Australian newspaper headlines in the lead-up to the elections when the long-time Solomon Islands’ parliamentarian, Joses Tuhanuku, accused Taiwan of funding candidates. He averred, “Taiwan is acting like a local political party, sponsoring candidates and involving itself directly in the business of Solomon Islands politics.” He accused Prime Minister Kemakeza and “senior members of the community” of colluding with Taiwan over a number of years. His evidence that Taiwan was sponsoring candidates was that “the candidates themselves are boasting about it.”31 He called on voters not to support corrupt candidates or the “puppets of foreigners.”32 Tuhanuku also specifically accused Kemakeza and Taiwan of operating a scheme to fund “special projects” used to lure members of the opposition to join the government.33

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Taiwanese Ambassador Antonio Chen and Kemakeza dismissed these claims.34 Chen told the media that all of Taiwan’s aid funding was transparent and made through Solomon Islands Central Bank.35 According to Chen, Taiwan had unknowingly approved and funded an agriculture rehabilitation project submitted through the Solomons government by a person contesting Tuhanuku’s seat.36 Although Tuhanuku’s views gained traction among the population and in Australia, he appears to have mischaracterized Taiwan’s ability to manipulate the country’s political system to keep a puppet in power. Kemakeza almost certainly misused funds from Taiwan for political purposes. However, contrary to Dobell’s assertion,37 there is no evidence or compelling reason to conclude that Taiwan actively manipulated the election. Moreover, Tuhanuku had political reasons to exaggerate the role of Taiwan and cast his political opponents as “puppets of foreigners.” The more apt explanation that Kemakeza was pulling Taiwan’s strings might have raised Kemakeza’s standing in the community as a man who could deliver the goods. Taiwan’s image problems were compounded when another candidate accused Taiwan of interference. Alfred Sasako complained that a rival candidate had told his electorate that they would receive no Taiwan funding as long as Sasako remained MP. He also alleged that Taiwan had provided the rival candidate with funding for two projects.38 Antonio Chen told the media that Taiwan had stopped funding projects for which Sasako applied because he had failed to account for a SI $315,000 (US $44,000) police post project which, unbeknown to Taiwan, had also been funded by Australia.39 There was little in this episode to suggest that Taiwan was “funding candidates,” and Taiwan’s withholding of funds from a cheat was actually to its credit. However, that there were now all of two candidates who had made accusations created a robust characterization of Taiwan that would shape post-election perceptions, especially in the Australian media. The first parliamentary election after the arrival of RAMSI generated much interest, with an unprecedented 453 candidates contesting the 50 seats.40 Half of the existing parliament was ousted, which was not unusual for the Solomons. Along with numerous small parties, 18 members of the new parliament were listed as independents.41 More than


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half of those elected won their seats with less than 30 percent of the vote,42 also unremarkable for Solomon Islands. Despite reports of the usual bags of rice being arranged for voters, the international election observers declared the election free and fair.43 However, over two weeks later, and after the rioting, one Australian election observer reported concern from voters on polling day about Taiwan’s involvement in the election.44 This concern most likely stemmed from the statements of Tuhanuku and Sasako in the media, in which case it would not constitute further “evidence” of Taiwanese involvement. The Australian Federal Police later stated that it had uncovered evidence of large amounts of cash flowing into Solomon Islands’ bank accounts ahead of the election, though no link to Taiwan has been made to date.45 Following the elections, parliamentarians began the horse-trading to select a prime minister. Snyder Rini had stood aside for Kemakeza during the 2001 prime ministerial vote,46 and, according to Kemakeza, he now made way for Rini in 2006 on the basis of this “previous agreement.”47 As the candidate for the best financed parliamentary bloc, Rini was in line to become prime minister. According to an e-mail apparently sent by an Australian finance official, Australian High Commissioner Patrick Cole discussed Australia’s preferences in the prime ministerial race with the caretaker foreign minister Laurie Chan, an ethnic Chinese, and his wealthy businessman father, Tommy Chan, who is also a former politician and president of Rini’s political party. The Chans assured Cole that Rini, who had made anti-RAMSI statements, would not be the bloc’s candidate for prime minister. However, the bloc did select Rini, and Cole told the Chans of his disappointment with the decision. According to the e-mail, Cole believed that Tommy Chan was relying on Rini to facilitate his acquisition of a second casino licence.48 The e-mail’s author wrote, “Of the candidates the depressing choice will be between Rini (most likely) and Sogavare (Social Credit—anti-banks) but either way things do not look good for the future of RAMSI or the future good governance of RAMSI.”49 If this e-mail is genuine, and all indications are that it is, the Australian officials in Honiara never believed the opposition group’s

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candidate, Job Tausinga, was in contention, and had an explanation (though possibly the wrong one) as to why Rini had been selected as the candidate. This suggests that the Australian government’s later statements suggesting that Taiwan engineered the selection of Rini were either disingenuous, or key officials came to change their minds on what had brought about Rini’s selection on the basis of what was in the media after the rioting. Rini’s group based itself at Tommy Chan’s Honiara Hotel, and an opposition group’s headquarters were at the Iron Bottom Sound Hotel.50 This opposition group was the one Taiwan would be watching. The owner of the Iron Bottom Sound Hotel has regularly worked as a middleman for China.51 In addition, the opposition group included Francis Billy Hilly, who reportedly receives funding from China on the basis that he works towards breaking diplomatic ties with Taiwan.52 This “ragtag grouping” was also a concern for Australia, because in addition to “genuine reformists horrified by corruption during the Kemakeza years,” it included “ministers who had been sacked by Kemakeza, [and] anti-RAMSI politicians left out in the cold.”53 The opposition group selected Job Tausinga as its candidate, and Sogavare and his supporters left to establish a third group.54 For Rini or Tausinga to win they had to reportedly secure the votes of Sogavare’s group or lure members of each other’s group with offers of cabinet posts and individual cash payments somewhere between SI $20,000-SI $60,000 (US $2,800-$8,400).55 Rumours circulated that the Taiwanese naval ships that arrived in Honiara just as the vote buying was due to begin brought in cash to influence this horse trading. Ambassador Chen told the press the ships came on purely a goodwill visit,56 though the Australian High Commission nevertheless considered the timing of the visit inappropriate. Although the possibility that Taiwan bribed MPs to support Rini cannot be ruled out, no evidence has emerged linking Taiwan to Rini’s election, and the simplest explanation is that the cash inducements came wholly from locally based businessmen. As Taiwanese fishing companies—like other foreign fishing and logging companies—have shady links with local politicians,57 a certain amount of private Taiwanese money may have been involved in securing Rini’s election. However, as Moore points out, for the Taiwan government “the


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stakes are diplomatic not economic,”58 and any such involvement lies beyond the topic of investigation here. The riot On April 18, Parliament elected Rini prime minister. Members of Tausinga’s camp left the parliament building and told the media the result was unfair. One of these, Gordon Lilo Darcy, said, “Today’s election was not truly free and fair because it was controlled by outsiders.” Hilly added, “Today’s election of the prime minister was not free. It was controlled and influenced by outsiders. We accept that the process of democracy has taken place, but we believe the result was unduly influenced by outsiders.”59 Whether they were referring to Tommy Chan and other ethnic Chinese or Taiwanese or both was ambiguous, perhaps intentionally so. Whether these particular politicians were intent on fomenting a riot is unclear, but these statements appear aimed at pushing the anti-Chinese buttons of the anti-Kemakeza/Rini crowd gathered outside parliament. Video footage shows that this crowd of about 200-300 people, mostly men, became agitated following the announcement of Rini’s election. There were shouts of Waku (Asians), and the crowd turned violent.60 The crowd trapped Rini and members of his new government inside parliament for most of the day. As RAMSI police officers escorted Rini from the building, the crowd began pelting his vehicle with rocks. After officers fired tear gas, the crowd set eight RAMSI vehicles on fire and moved into the main town, attacking and looting Chinese shops. The crowd swelled to over 1,000 as the rioters crossed the bridge into Chinatown.61 Fifty-seven buildings were burnt down in Chinatown and 17 elsewhere.62 The riot was an expensive and embarrassing episode for Australia, which was forced to deploy an extra 220 troops, 70 Australian Federal Police personnel and two patrol boats.63 Tuhanuku immediately appeared on Australian television blaming Taiwan and Tommy Chan for the riot. He said the riot was the result of “the people” being unhappy that essentially the same government had been returned when they had wanted change, and that they were angry at

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Taiwan and “business houses owned by Solomon Islanders of Chinese origin” for corrupting the process with dirty money.64 Initially, the Australian government was satisfied that the elections were “on the whole pretty free and fair.”65 However, Australia now began to make public statements suggesting Taiwan’s involvement had been the cause. Australian Prime Minister John Howard told the Queensland division of his Liberal Party: We should remember that there are countries other than countries that are geographically part of the region which have an interest in involving themselves and gathering allies and partners in the region, not necessarily with the longer term interest of the region at heart.66

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer had earlier told the media: Some people decided to take to the streets, particularly focusing on the Chinese people because they believe Synder Rini has been supported by the Chinese, not just ethnic Chinese in Solomon Islands, but by the Taiwanese as well. Now, I’m not getting into these sorts of allegations but it would appear that that’s what sparked these particular events.67

It seems likely that those informing the prime minister and the foreign minister were directly or indirectly basing their opinion on Tuhanuku’s statements. Criticism came from the Australian opposition as well, with Labor’s Pacific Islands spokesperson directly referencing Tuhanuku in his condemnation of the supposed connection of Taiwan to the riot.68 The Taiwan government believed Australia was seeking a scapegoat to deflect attention away from its inability to anticipate or handle the riot.69 For Taiwan, this was part of a wider pattern demonstrating Australia’s growing willingness to side with China and act against Taiwan’s interests as the economic relationship between Australia and China reached new heights. Australia’s stance alarmed Taipei, as did the battering Taiwan was receiving in the Australian media. The negative publicity not only had implications for Australia-Taiwan relations, but for Taiwan’s image throughout the world. Taiwan’s de facto ambassador in Australia, Gary Lin, denied Taiwan was to blame, saying that like Australia, Taiwan was committed to a


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stable and economically viable Solomons Islands.70 Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) also denied any inappropriate action, and vowed to “find out why Taiwan is rumored to have been involved.” Responding directly to the accusation from Prime Minister Howard, MOFA stated, “Australia and New Zealand are important regional partners in the Oceania area. Taiwan’s aid to Solomon Islands is actually helping to share the international burden.”71 Nevertheless, Australia’s public criticism of Taiwan at the highest level continued for another week. With the Chinese ambassador to Australia in the audience, Foreign Minister Downer labelled the “chequebook diplomacy” of China and Taiwan in the South Pacific “completely unacceptable.”72 Downer also announced that the Australian Federal Police would investigate claims that Taiwanese bribes influenced the leadership vote.73 In Taipei, Minister of Foreign Affairs James Huang rejected the accusation: “Taiwan absolutely has never got involved in the elections. Accusations like this are groundless.”74 Although Howard and Downer did not make any further statements about Taiwan, Australian police and intelligence agencies continued to investigate Taiwan’s role in any vote-buying.75 Australian Federal Police (AFP) Commissioner Mick Keelty also continued to insist publicly on the need to examine “whether recent outbreaks of violence in the Solomons were instigated by other nations, like China or Taiwan” despite the fact that, “We (the AFP) are yet to unravel the role, if any, of Taiwanese and Chinese influences behind the recent violence in the Solomons.”76 The traducing of Taiwan was not limited to the Australian government and media. In a recent publication, Australian academic Clive Moore argued that the feeling of “powerlessness” felt by the Solomon Islanders against, inter alia, the “dollar diplomacy” of the Taiwanese government, was a factor in the riot. Moore also made accusations against the Taiwanese government in the Australian media following the riot.77 However, the fact that not one of the rioters made an effort to travel to and attack Taiwanese people, buildings, projects or businesses, even though many targets were available, and that Taiwan continued to have a good relationship with the government when Rini was replaced,

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unequivocally suggests that Taiwan was not the target of the riot. This remains the case even if Taiwan is later found to have funded candidates in the election and/or bribed politicians to support Rini. “Evidence of organised violence” The Australian government’s targeting of Taiwan also occurred despite evidence that four men had orchestrated the riot for political purposes. As early as April 23, Solomon Islands Police Commissioner Shane Castles, an Australian national, said there was “evidence of organised violence.”78 Police later alleged that MPs Nelson Ne’e, Charles Dausabea, his brother David Dausabea and former foreign minister and former MEF leader, Alex Bartlett, held a meeting on April 13.79 Charles Dausabea had been elected on an anti-Chinese and anti-RAMSI platform and was considered one of the “prime architects” of Solomon Islands Crisis.80 At the meeting, Charles Dausabea allegedly talked about “wiping out Chinese businessmen by burning and looting,” as they had supported the Kemakeza government. The others present all allegedly supported this statement. Charles Dausabea also allegedly told the group that if he came to power the existing charges against Bartlett would be withdrawn. The prosecutor alleged that Charles Dausabea told Ne’e to “prepare his people and to destroy everything by rioting and looting.” According to the prosecutor, “[t]heir plan was political. If the prime minister of their choice is not elected, their comrades would start the riot. There’s a clear connection between the meeting and the riot.”81 On April 17, the day before the vote, radio announcements told of a “huge feast at a beach outside of Honiara.” Meat and hundreds of cartons of beer were reportedly given to supporters. The next day a crowd from all over Honiara, said to have included many male youths from Charles Dausabea’s electorate in eastern Honiara, waited to hear who had been elected prime minister.82 According to Solomon Islands government report, this was not “an openly angry crowd, but there were danger signs: very few women, sullenness, the presence of some ‘hard-faces’, known ‘tough-men’, clear messaging that the old government must go. It was not a ‘happy crowd’, but a strong group waiting in anticipation.”83 The


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director of public prosecutions alleged that when Dausabea left parliament following the election of Rini, he told the crowd: “Mi fala lose nao, iu fala doim what nao iufala likem [We’ve lost, just go ahead and do whatever you want to do].”84 Video coverage of the parliament protests showed agitators urging the crowd on to more militant action and handing out bottles of water.85 Witnesses saw Bartlett encouraging rioters, and inciting a man to burn down a building.86 The charges against the three MPs were dismissed due to a lack of cooperative witnesses.87 However, the New Zealand government (and presumably the Australian government) continues to believe the three MPs were responsible.88 Moreover, the Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate the riot found evidence of the involvement of an “identifiable group of politicians.”89 Many commentators have misread the significance of a riot occurring at all.90 It should not be surprising that the instigators found it straightforward to first assemble a crowd and then encourage it into attacking the Chinese, as resentment over disparity in wealth, business practices and cultural differences ensure that the Chinese are almost universally attacked during unrest throughout the South Pacific. A riot targeting the Chinese cannot be taken as evidence of particularly intense anti-Chinese feeling; rather it is evidence of the granting of “permission.” The latent conditions are always there to be set off by what a Solomon Star editorial called, the “spark” from the “top echelon,”91 the authority of community leaders. It should also be noted that Kemakeza and Rini’s electors are in their own (non-Honiara) constituencies of Savo/Russell and Maraovo, respectively. Charles Dausabea’s and Ne’e’s supporters are in Honiara, and it is to be expected that they did not want Rini as prime minister and their own man out of government. Attempts have been made to describe the riot as something approaching an expression of “people power.”92 However, in a country as ethnically diverse as Solomon Islands, and where political loyalties are parochial and based on clientele relationships,93 a crowd in Honiara cannot sensibly be considered representative of the country as a whole.

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Sogavare confronts Australia Following the riot, Rini resigned ahead of a certain no-confidence motion, and Parliament elected Manasseh Sogavare prime minister.94 Sogavare immediately pledged to retake control of the country’s finances.95 Sogavare planned to then use this control to address “the underlying issues that caused this country to collapse,”96 presumably by revving the pre-RAMSI practice of compensating grievances. Sogavare argued: “lasting peace could not come to Solomon Islands until and unless all the underlying issues were fully addressed…. For foreigners to think they would address peace in Solomon Islands by heavy handed legalistic approach was a wistful [sic] thinking.”97 This policy placed him on a collision course with Australia. Conflict between Sogavare and Australia soon erupted when Australia opposed Sogavare’s move to establish an inquiry into the riot. Downer declared the “real motive” of the inquiry was to “ease the pressure on two of Mr Sogavare’s henchmen, Mr (Nelson) Ne’e and Mr (Charles) Dausabea.”98 However, it is also likely that the Australian government was wary of the spotlight the inquiry would put on RAMSI’s failure to anticipate or control the riot. Sogavare stood the attorney general down on 21 September 2006 when he objected to the inquiry in favour of a long-term associate, Australian lawyer Julian Moti.99 However, Moti did not take up the position until July 10, 2007.100 Moti had not only drawn up the terms of reference for the inquiry, but was also Dausabea and Ne’e’s lawyer.101 Australia’s high commissioner, Patrick Cole, apparently lobbied donors to prevent Sogavare from finding funding for the inquiry, and Sogavare expelled him on 12 September.102 Australia reduced visa privileges for Solomon Islands MPs in response.103 Australia then issued an arrest warrant for Moti over child sex offences.104 These events touched Taiwan when the Sydney Morning Herald accused Taiwan of funding Julian Moti’s escape from PNG (despite it being on a PNG military plane), and providing money to defeat a noconfidence vote against Sogavare.105 The newspaper argued, “While a lot of Australians see Taiwan as a brightening torch of democracy in Greater China, in our own neighbourhood it risks appearing more like a rogue


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nation.”106 These unsubstantiated claims and singling-out of Taiwan came despite an Australian government body, Airservices Australia, making payments totalling A $2.1 million (US $1.8 million) to “third parties” at the direction of Solomons officials “outside the terms” of contracts,107 and China directly funding at least one Solomon Islands political party. It seems unlikely that Australian media organizations would have made such attacks on Taiwan if not for the lead and encouragement provided by Canberra. Australia’s problems with Sogavare continued until December 2007, when Derek Sikua, a leader supportive of Australia’s agenda and RAMSI, finally replaced him.108 Relations also seem to have improved with the election of an Australian government with a somewhat less confrontational approach to Pacific Island reform in November 2007. Taiwan had its own concerns with the Sogavare government. There were reports that Sogavare would switch recognition to China, fuelled by statements from Sogavare himself. Moore references “informed sources” suggesting “China rebuffed feelers from Sogavare for a change of allegiance, which pushed him back towards Taiwan.”109 However, China is unlikely to have discouraged a genuine and realistic approach from Sogavare. Sogavare’s public statements were most likely aimed at extracting greater funding from Taiwan, and securing the votes of Hilly and other pro-China MPs. Ties with Taiwan were confirmed when Sogavare became prime minister.110 Clearly rattled by the battering it had received following the riot, Taiwan moved to reform aspects of its aid delivery to Solomon Islands. Taiwanese Ambassador Antonio Chen told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, “something we are going to encourage is that it [the aid program] is now transparent 100 percent.”111 For his part, Sogavare said Taiwanese funds would no longer be channelled through the prime minister’s office.112 Sogavare also told Parliament he intended to reform the administration of Taiwanese aid, with “greater transparency” in disbursing the money.113 Improvements were made to the controversial —and Taiwan funded—Rural Constituencies Development Fund (RCDF),114 which provides development money for parliamentarians to spend in their electorates. Each constituency is now appointed a

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“Constituency Development Officer (CDO)” to administer the RCDF, significantly improving outcomes, though politicians still maintain leverage over RCDF expenditure through approving the CDO appointed for their constituencies.115 The popularity of the RCDF with Solomon Islands MPs, and its divisiveness within and across communities, will ensure that it remains a double-edged sword for Taiwan in its effort to maintain diplomatic relations. Taiwan’s funding became more important to the Sogavare Government as its dispute with Australia intensified. Sogavare told Antonio Chen that by delivering its aid through the government, Taiwan not only “directly addressed issues crucial for lasting peace” but restored “the trust of the people of Solomon Islands in their government.” He contrasted this with RAMSI, which he said “shifted that trust to foreign governments, alienating the people from the government.” He added that Taiwanese aid was “directly spent in Solomon Islands,” and that it was not “the size of aid assistance that matters but rather how much of it was spent in Solomon Islands.”116 Sogavare also turned to Taiwan to help rearm Solomon Islands police in the face of opposition from Australia and RAMSI. However, Australia persuaded Taiwan to withdraw its support for the scheme.117 Conclusion Taiwan’s involvement in the April 2006 elections is unknown. However, in the lead-up to the elections, a Solomon Islands politician accused Taiwan of funding candidates. Following a post-election riot targeting Honiara’s Chinese commercial district, the same politician then stated that the riot was sparked by popular anger towards Taiwan. Neither of these accusations was supported with evidence, nor have they since been substantiated. Nevertheless, these accusations were sufficient to see Australia publicly criticize Taiwan’s involvement in Solomon Islands. This was due to existing Australia-Taiwan tension, and because Australian policymakers found Taiwan a more palatable focus than acknowledging the actual sources of Australia’s woes: the political, economic and social conditions in Solomon Islands, and the ambitious


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reach of Australia’s agenda. Australia’s rhetoric drew a negative reaction from Taiwan, which believed Canberra was seeking a scapegoat to deflect from its inability to anticipate or control the riot. The incident also contributed to the Taiwan government’s perception of Australia as increasingly pro-China. Despite efforts from Taiwan and Solomon Islands to improve accountability for Taiwanese aid, the differing interests of Australia and Taiwan continued to be an issue as funding from Taiwan became more important to Prime Minister Sogavare during his dispute with Australia. Australia’s relationship with Solomon Islands has since improved, with the change of government in both countries in late 2007 reducing friction between Australia and Taiwan. Herr overestimates the impact that Australia’s “emphasis across the region for improved standards of governance” will have on Taiwan.118 It is doubtful that Australia will be able to influence Taiwan’s relations with Solomon Islands to a greater extent than it does presently. If Taiwan is to preserve ties with Solomon Islands, it is only able to modify its aid programme as far as Solomon Islands government of the day agrees. This is unlikely ever to be to the extent that it would completely satisfy Australia. In addition, Australia’s readiness to work with Taiwan in Solomon Islands—and thus improve the accountability of Taiwanese aid—is limited by its desire to propitiate China. Dobell argues that Australia can pressure China and Taiwan into behaving in ways compatible with Australian aims.119 However, Australia lacks the wherewithal to deter China and Taiwan from what they consider their vital interests. Moreover, it is questionable how far the United States and Japan will support Australia’s efforts to pressure Taiwan if this strengthens a rising China’s position. For example, Dumbaugh suggests the US might seek “to counter PRC efforts to isolate Taiwan by conditioning US assistance and economic interaction with other countries on Taiwan’s greater international participation.”120 Hence, the current trend of reduced Australia-Taiwan tension in Solomon Islands will only continue if Taiwan and Solomon Islands maintain efforts to reform their aid arrangement, and if Australia continues to take a less confrontational approach to Solomon Islands reform.

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The ultimate disposition of Australia-Taiwan relations in Solomon Islands, and the South Pacific generally, will depend on developments in relations across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s chequebook diplomacy is a direct result of China’s efforts to challenge its sovereignty,121 and the nature of Taiwan’s relationship with Solomon Islands would completely change if Taipei and Beijing simply agreed not to compete for diplomatic relationships. In a May 2006 visit to Australia, a then prospective Taiwan presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, promised to solve Australia’s problem of China-Taiwan rivalry in the South Pacific through negotiation with Beijing.122 Ma has continued to call for this “diplomatic truce” as president, and there is some indication that a tentative agreement is in effect.123 However, it remains to be seen if such an ambitious outcome is really possible. Australia has welcomed Ma’s initiative,124 demonstrating Australia’s continuing conviction that China-Taiwan rivalry is a salient factor in the problems of the Pacific Islands. However, as argued above, Australia over-estimates this importance, and it is doubtful that an end to the dollar diplomacy of China and Taiwan will noticeably improve the effectiveness of Australia’s South Pacific reform policies. On the contrary, Australia may find that a diplomatic truce between China and Taiwan—with the likely reduced funding to the South Pacific125—merely increases its own aid burden. References This chapter was originally published in Pacific Affairs, Volume 82, No. 1 (2009), the author and editor are grateful to Pacific Affairs for permission to republish this paper. The author gratefully acknowledges the support from the Monash Arts Postgraduate Publications Award and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. 1. 2.

3.

Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 (Armonk, NY: East Gate/M.E Sharp, 2004), p. 120. Randall E. Newnham, “Embassies for Sale: The Purchase of Diplomatic Recognition by West Germany, Taiwan and South Korea,” International Politics, vol. 37, September (2000), p. 273. Thomas V. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan,” Asian Survey vol. 29, no. 8 (1989), pp. 803, 811.

Big Trouble in Little Chinatown 4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

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Chiao Chiao Hsieh, “Pragmatic Diplomacy: Foreign Policy and External Relations,” in Peter Ferdinand, ed., Take-off for Taiwan? (London: Pinter, 1996), p. 80. Gregory E. Fry, “Regionalism and International Politics of the South Pacific,” Pacific Affairs vol. 54, no. 3 (1981), p. 460. Ken Ross, Regional Security in the South Pacific: The Quarter-Century 1970-95 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1993), p. 172. Henry S. Albinski, “Taiwan and Hong Kong in Australian External Policy Perspective,” in Colin Mackerras, ed., Australia and China: Partners in Asia (Melbourne: Macmillan Education Australia, 1996), p. 37. See for example Gordon Bilney, “The Pacific Island States, Rich in Resources, Need to Do Better,” International Herald Tribune, 1 August 1994. For 1995 see Ronald Hideo Hayashida, “Papua New Guinea in 1995: Restructuring and Retrenchment,” Asian Survey vol. 36, no. 2 (1996), pp. 152157; for 1999 see Katherine S. Kerr, “Papua New Guinea in 1999: Stepping Back from the Brink,” Asian Survey, vol. 40, no. 1 (2000), pp. 61-66. Clive Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis: the Historical Causes for a Failed State in Solomon Islands, 1998-2004 (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2004), pp. 196-198. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific,” p. 807. Jon Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2004), pp. 49-107. Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, pp. 124-159. Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, pp. 160-163. Jon Fraenkel, “Pacific Democracy: Dilemmas of Intervention,” Open Democracy, 28 November 2006. James Batley and Paul Ash, “RAMSI and How it Works,” Solomon Star, 9 June 2006. “FACTBOX-Solomon Islands, a Troubled Tropical Paradise,” Reuters, 18 September 2006. Patrick Walters, “Race for Supremacy,” Australian, 20 April 2006. Craig Skehan, “A Nation on the Brink,” Age (Melbourne), 22 April 2006. Fraenkel, “Pacific Democracy.” Fraenkel, “Pacific Democracy.” Helen Hughes, “Aid for Growth Only Hope for a Pacific Solution,” Australian, 1 May 2006. Shahar Hameiri, “Cole Removal About Politics, Not Diplomacy,” Age, 15 September 2006. Sinclair Dinnen, “Dilemmas of Intervention and the Building of State and Nation,” in Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth, eds., Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands (Canberra: Australian National University Asia Pacific Press, 2008), p. 14. Interviews by the author in confidence, Honiara, June 2006.

184 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific “Solomons Development Problems Remain: RAMSI Head,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 26 April 2006. Interview: Canberra, January 2006. See Joel Atkinson, “Vanuatu in Australia-China-Taiwan Relations,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 61, no. 3 (2007), pp. 351-366. Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia (Canberra: Senate, 2006) p. xvii. Senate, China’s Emergence: Implications for Australia, p. 174. All quotes from “Solomons Politician Accuses Taiwan of Meddling in Election,” RNZI, 10 March 2006. “Solomons Opposition Fears Taiwan Effect,” Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 14 March 2006. Joses Tuhanuku, “Taiwan Funds Fill Solomons Minister’s Pockets,” Pacific Islands Report, 22 March 2006. “Record Registration for Solomons Poll,” Age, 29 March 2006. “Taiwan Rejects Solomons Election Bribery Claims,” RNZI, 10 March 2006. “Solomons Opposition Fears Taiwan Effect,” SMH, 14 March 2006. Graeme Dobell, China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess versus Pacific Political Rugby (Policy Brief 18) (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007), p. 11. “Donors Accused of ‘Interference,’” Pacific Magazine, 15 March 2006. “Caretaker Minister Fined For Misconduct,” Pacific Magazine, 16 March 2006. Sam Alasia, “Rainbows across the Mountains: The First Post-RAMSI General Elections in Solomon Islands, April 2006, and the Policies of the Second Sogavare Government,” Journal of Pacific History vol. 42, no. 2 (2007), p. 168. “Voters in Solomon Islands Oust Half of Parliament in Poll,” Taipei Times, 11 April 2006. “Contenders Vie For Solomons’ Top Job,” Pacific Magazine, 17 April 2006. For bags of rice see “Corruption an Issue in Solomons Poll,” Age, 2 April 2006; for election observers see “Voters in Solomon Islands Oust Half of Parliament in Poll,” Taipei Times. Alexandra Kirk, “Underlying Problems Sparked Solomons Riots: Election Observers,” ABC, 20 April 2006. “Money Flowed into Solomons Before Elections: Australia,” Radio New Zealand, 10 May 2006. Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom, p. 138. “Kemakeza to Back Snyder Rini to Ensure Stability,” Pacific Magazine, 18 April 2006. This is inaccurate; Chan does not have a casino licence. Solomon Islands government, Commission of Inquiry into the April 2006 Civil Unrest in Honiara: Second Interim Report 7 September 2007 (Honiara: Department of the Prime Minister, Government of the Solomon Islands, 2007), p. 28.

Big Trouble in Little Chinatown 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

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Matthew Allen, “Politics of Disorder: The Social Unrest in Honiara,” Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands, p. 43. Interview, Honiara, June 2006. “Minister Sacked for Not Denouncing MOU with China,” Pacific Magazine, 8 August 2006. Fraenkel, “Pacific Democracy.” Alasia, “Rainbows across the Mountains,” p. 174. Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, “Force for the Good,” Australian, 29 April 2006; Clive Moore, “Helpem Fren: The Solomon Islands, 2003–2007,” Journal of Pacific History vol. 42, no. 2 (2007), p. 152; Alasia, “Rainbows across the Mountains,” p. 173. “Taiwan Navy Vessels Dock in Solomon Islands,” ABC, 14 April 2006. Clive Moore, “No More Walkabout Long Chinatown: Asian Involvement in the Economic and Political Process,” Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands, pp. 77-78. Moore, “No More Walkabout Long Chinatown,” p. 88. All quotes from “Outsiders Dictate Election Outcome: Hilly,” Solomon Star, 19 April 2006. Solomon Islands government, Commission of Inquiry into the April 2006 Civil Unrest in Honiara: First Interim Report 12 July 2007 (Honiara: Department of the Prime Minister, Government of the Solomon Islands, 2007), p. 10. Evan Wasuka, “Tausinga Appeals to Crowd,” Solomon Star, 19 April 2006. Solomon Islands government, Commission of Inquiry: Second Interim Report, p. 17. “More Troops to Solomons,” Age, 21 April 2006; “Opposition MPs Arrested in Solomons,” Age, 24 April 2006. “Joses Tuhanuku on the Solomons Situation,” ABC, 19 April 2006. Craig Skehan and Brendan Nicholson, “More Troops to Honiara as Rini Breaks Silence,” Age, 22 April 2006. John Howard, Address to the Queensland Division of the Liberal Party of Australia (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet) 19 April 2006. “Taiwan Denies Involvement in Elections,” China Post (Taipei), 20 April 2006. Denis Peters, “Taiwan Denies Solomons Meddling,” Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 20 April 2006. Interviews, Taipei in May 2006 and Canberra in June 2006. Peters, “Taiwan Denies Solomons Meddling.” All quotes from “Envoy Slams Australian Accusations,” Taipei Times, 21 April 2006. “Australia Warns Against Pacific Political Interference,” ABC, 26 April 2006. “Australia Warns Against Pacific Political Interference,” ABC. Yun-ping Chang, “Solomons Ties Appear in Doubt,” Taipei Times, 27 April 2006.

186 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92. 93.

94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Craig Skehan and Russell Skelton, “Solomons Group Plans Tilt from Taiwan to China,” SMH, 29 April 2006. “Keelty Warns Over Unstable Neighbours,” ABC, 9 May 2006; Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, “Cash Inflow to Solomons Riots,” Australian, 11 May 2006. For publication see Moore, “Helpem Fren,” p. 152. For media comments see “Taiwan Diplomacy Linked to Solomons Unrest,” ABC, 20 April 2006. Michael McKenna and Cath Hart, “Solomons MP Held Over Riots,” Australian, 24 April 2006. “Disgraced Mayor Faces Fraud Charges,” Solomon Star, 29 August 2006. For election platform see Ashley Wickham, “Taiwan Payments Cloud Solomons Democracy,” Pacific Islands Report, 18 May 2006; for role in crisis see MaryLouise O’Callaghan, “Solomons Ministers Sacked Before Downer Lands,” Australian, 19 May 2006. Ofani Eremae, “Bartlett Back in Police Cell,” Solomon Star, 29 August 2006. Wickham, “Taiwan Payments Cloud Solomons Democracy.” Solomon Islands government, Commission of Inquiry: Second Interim Report, p. 13. “Dau Incite Violence, Claims Prosecution,” Solomon Star, 26 April 2006. O’Callaghan, “Force for the Good.” Evan Wasuka, “Ex-Solomon Islands FM Charged with Inciting Riots,” China Post, 17 May 2006. Robert Iroga, “Three MPs Free of April Riot Charges,” Solomon Star, 31 July 2007. “Honiara Riot Report Missed Point: Goff,” Solomon Star, 23 July 2007. Solomon Islands government, Commission of Inquiry: Second Interim Report, p. 14. For example, Moore, “No More Walkabout Long Chinatown,” p. 80; Dinnen, “Dilemmas of Intervention and the Building of State and Nation,” p. 18; Dobell, China and Taiwan in the South Pacific, p. 3. “Harmful Events,” Solomon Star, 14 September 2006. For example, Alasia, “Rainbows across the Mountains,” p. 184; Allen, “Politics of Disorder,” p. 58; Moore, “No More Walkabout Long Chinatown,” pp. 91, 97. See for example Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, “Parties, Constitutional Engineering and Governance in the Solomon Islands,” in Roland Rich, ed., Political Parties in the Pacific Islands (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2006). Allen, “Politics of Disorder,” p. 40. Evan Wasuka, “PM Sogavare Plots Islands’ Future, but Needs Cabinet to Move Forward,” Islands Business, 6 May 2006. “New PM Says RAMSI’s Operations Will be Reviewed,” ABC, 5 May 2006. Deli Oso, “PM Explains Why He Expel Mr Cole,” Solomon Star, 19 September 2006. Chris Merritt and Patrick Walters, “PM Hits ‘Corrupt’ Einfeld Probe in Solomons,” Australian, 14 September 2006.

Big Trouble in Little Chinatown 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121.

122.

187

“PM Warns of Aid Cuts as Solomons Dispute Simmers,” Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 2006; Moore, “Helpem Fren,” p. 159. Ralph Sao, “Moti Officially Sworn in as Solomon Islands AG,” Solomon Times, 10 July 2007. Janet Fife-Yeomans, “Intrigue Under Coconut Tree,” Daily Telegraph, 15 September, 2006. Alasia, “Rainbows across the Mountains,” p. 182. Merritt and Walters, “PM Hits ‘Corrupt’ Einfeld Probe in Solomons.” “Ellison Denies Moti Case Politically-Motivated,” ABC, 4 October 2006. “Taiwan’s Dubious Role,” SMH, 13 October 2006. “Taiwan’s Dubious Role,” SMH. Audit Report No.8 2006–07: Airservices Australia’s Upper Airspace Management Contracts with the Solomon Islands Government (Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 2006), p. 15. Dinnen, “Dilemmas of Intervention and the Building of State and Nation,” pp. 2124; “PM Pledges RAMSI Support,” Solomon Star, 23 January 2008. Moore, “Helpem Fren,” p. 155. Yun-ping Chang, “Solomons PM Pledges to Stick with Taiwan,” Taipei Times, 11 May 2006. “Taiwan Confident Diplomatic Ties Will Remain in Place,” ABC, 4 May 2006. “New Solomons PM Defends Decision,” ABC, 7 May 2006. “New PM Vows Clean Sweep,” Advertiser (Adelaide), 10 May 2006. “Solomon Islands Government Changes Allocation of RCDF,” RNZI, 30 August 2006. Interview, Taipei, March 2008. “PM to Campaign for Taiwan’s Admission to UN,” Solomon Star, 14 September 2006. Dinnen, “Dilemmas of Intervention and the Building of State and Nation,” p. 24. Richard Herr, “Sovereignty and Responsibility: Some Issues in Chinese/Taiwan Rivalry in the Pacific Islands,” Fijian Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (2006), p. 94. Dobell, China and Taiwan in the South Pacific, p. 1. Kerry Dumbaugh, China’s Foreign Policy: What Does It Mean for U.S. Global Interests? (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008), p. 26. The motivations behind China’s South Pacific diplomacy are subject to debate. For arguments that China is motivated by strategic ambitions, see John Henderson and Benjamin Riley, “Dragon in Paradise: China’s Rising Star in Oceania,” The National Interest vol. 72 (summer 2003), pp. 94-104; Susan Windybank, “The China Syndrome,” Policy, vol. 21 no. 2 (2005), pp. 28-33. For China seeking support on a range of political issues, most notably Taiwan, see Terrance WesleySmith, China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics, Pacific Islands Policy 2 (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2007). “Interview with Taiwan’s Opposition Leader, Dr Ma Ying-jeou,” ABC, 12 May 2006.

188 123.

124. 125.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Ralph Jennings, “China Keen on Diplomatic Truce: KMT Official,” China Post, 15 October 2008; Jenny Hsu, “Nicaragua-Taiwan Ties Still Strong: Ambassador,” Taipei Times, 25 October 2008. “Australia Praises Ma for Avoiding Dollar Diplomacy,” Taipei Times, 27 October 2008. For Ma’s assertions to the contrary, see “President Hopes Taiwan Can Spend More on Allies,” Taiwan News, 16 September 2008.

Chapter 8 NEW ZEALAND, THE PACIFIC AND CHINA: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

Anne-Marie Brady and John Henderson

Introduction It has been argued that China’s entry into the Pacific Island region is comparable to that of the European Pacific arrival 200 years ago. The Samoan historian, Malama Melesia has observed: “The Pacific Islands are going through a geo-political transition, from the sphere of European—American influence to that of Asian influence”.1 Long-time Pacific analyst Professor Ron Crocombe agrees, “It’s a paradigm shift. The overall influence, package of trade, investment, political leverage, military involvement is moving from West to East.”2 In Crocombe’s view, China “obviously values the Pacific. It wants to be the major influence in the Pacific …in a fairly short time.”3 Others—both observers and politicians, have highlighted the growing tendency of Pacific Islands states seeking assistance to “look North” to Asia, and particularly China, rather than to the traditional allies of Australia and New Zealand. In recent years China has, in a complementary move, increasingly been “looking South”, viewing the South Pacific as part of its global strategy for security, diplomatic support, and economic growth through access to markets and raw materials. This chapter seeks to build on earlier research by the authors4 and utilises both Chinese and English language sources and interviews with Pacific diplomats and specialists to consider the following questions: Regarding China, the core questions for which answers are sought are: 189

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What factors generate China’s growing interest in Pacific Island states? Are these likely to change over time into broader political, economic, or strategic interests? How important is the issue of Taiwan? How does China’s involvement with Pacific Island states impact on other major players in the region, such as the United States (US), Japan, and Australia? Could Sino–Japanese rivalry be played out in the region? And what factors are driving increased Chinese migration to the region, and what are the repercussions? From the perspective of New Zealand and the Pacific the following questions will be addressed: how prepared is New Zealand for the paradigm shift in the Pacific from a Eurocentric to a potentially Sinocentric order? Could New Zealand interests be challenged by this shift? What are the tension points in the New ZealandChina relationship that relate to the Pacific Islands? Does a greater Pacific role for China inevitably mean a lesser role for New Zealand? What has been the current impact and what are the future implications of growing Chinese influence for the fourteen Pacific Island states which, with the addition of Australia and New Zealand, make up the Pacific Island Forum? And how important is the Pacific to Chinese interests? New Zealand-Pacific relations New Zealand has a long history of involvement in the Pacific Island region driven by geography, culture, constitutional links and security concerns. At the turn of the twentieth century New Zealand Prime Minister Richard John Seddon campaigned to keep Oceania British Empire pink. But during World War II New Zealand, unlike Australia, left the bulk of its fighting forces in the European theatre rather than joining the Pacific war against Japan. Perceptions of a Japanese “threat” were nevertheless deeply ingrained in the New Zealand psyche, and had a lasting impact on attitudes towards Asia more generally. In the rough division of “responsibility” in the Pacific, New Zealand’s focus has been on Polynesia, while Australia concentrated on Melanesia, and the US on Micronesia. With Polynesians making up around 25% of New Zealand’s population (the indigenous Maori plus Pacific migrants from Samoa, Tonga, the Cook Islands, Niue and

New Zealand, the Pacific and China: The Challenges Ahead

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Tokelau) New Zealand regards itself as a Pacific Island state, and not an outside power of the region. This has generated a strong sense of obligation. No external military threat is envisaged in the region. While New Zealand’s willingness to play a major role in resolving local conflicts reflects defence concerns, policy has been increasingly driven by humanitarian, rather than strategic, considerations (as is arguably the case with Australia). Two Polynesian island countries, the Cook Islands and Niue, have chosen to remain in free association with New Zealand, the former colonial power. (Tokelau has chosen to remain a New Zealand dependency). On foreign policy issues New Zealand generally plays a supportive role to the Cook Islands and Niue. It is interesting to note that on the issue of relations with China, New Zealand has advised a cautionary approach. In 2000 New Zealand effectively blocked a Niuean move to obtain Chinese assistance for establishing and maintaining an air link with the outside world. In 2006 Cook Islands Premier Jim Marurai, commented that in his view New Zealand had concerns about the Cook Islands’ ties with China and did not wish to see the relationship expressed “too strongly”.5 China’s rise In 2004 China was officially included as one of New Zealand’s six “bedrock” relationships—the others are Australia, the US, the EU, the Pacific Island states and Japan—all in the Pacific centre or rim, and deeply interested in issues relating to China’s growing involvement in the Pacific Island region.6 China has been one of New Zealand’s largest trading partners for more than 20 years. China’s rise and rise has been widely commented on. Phil Goff, New Zealand’s former Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs Minister, has referred to China’s increased role in the Pacific as “dramatic and far reaching”. While this was, according to Goff, an “inevitable and growing reality”, it was not something to become “paranoid” about.7 The former Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, commented that

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Australia regarded China’s increasing economic, political, and strategic weight as the “single most important trend in the region”.8 Both New Zealand and Australian governments have been careful to avoid characterising China’s increased regional role as threatening, or criticising the Pacific Island’s “look North” (or East) strategy. After all, both Australia and New Zealand are also increasingly seeking their economic futures in Asia, and in the process of negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with China. New Zealand’s FTA is of particular interest as it is the first such agreement China has negotiated with a developed economy. In a move that in hindsight may be seen as somewhat reckless, since the 1980s New Zealand has actively courted China’s involvement in the South Pacific, initially as a counter to the Soviet Union. At a meeting in Beijing in 1980, NZ Prime Minister Rob Muldoon told Chinese senior leader Deng Xiaoping “any support China could give to the island states of the [Pacific] Forum whether political or economic would help to maintain political stability in the South Pacific and make it difficult for Soviet penetration to take place.”9 With the end of the Cold War, from New Zealand and Australia’s point of view, China’s involvement in the Pacific was needed all the more with the decline in development assistance from other traditional donors such as the US and the UK. During much of the 1990s China generally followed a low profile foreign policy in the Pacific and elsewhere, characterised by the phrase “tao guang yang hui” (hide strengths and bide time). In 1991 one senior Chinese diplomat told New Zealand officials that South Pacific countries were “of little direct importance to China” and talked of closing down the PRC Suva embassy.10 Throughout the 1990s China showed little interest in South Pacific regional developments, other than when they conflicted with the One China policy. However since 1999, China has increasingly been following a more assertive foreign policy, both with regard to Taiwan and the interests of Overseas Chinese, and China’s greater involvement in the region is a direct reflection of that. As one China-based analyst noted in 1999, the time had now come to “use two hands to combat two hands”. This means that China will be strong in both its political and economic activities in order to combat perceived strong attacks on both the economic and political front from the West.11


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It is notable that in 1999, according to China’s own figures, PRC trade with the countries of the South Pacific increased 93.6%.12 The dramatic increase was due to China’s logging exports from PNG and the Solomon Islands. According to 2006 figures, 83.4% of PNG’s timber goes to China and PNG is China’s second largest source for logs. The Solomon Islands is China’s sixth largest source for log imports.13 However these are only official figures, environmental groups say much of PNG’s (and the Solomon Islands) logging is illegal. It can no longer be said that the South Pacific is not important to China. The Taiwan issue The main area of concern regarding China in the Pacific expressed by both the New Zealand and Australian governments, has related to the destabilising fallout from the competition between China (People’s Republic of China, PRC) and Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) for the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Island states. It is important to deal fully with the Taiwan issue as it impacts on all other aspects of the China-Pacific relationship. Beijing regards Taiwan as a part of China and insists on the endorsement of the “one China” policy (meaning that other countries must only recognise the PRC and should exclude the ROC as the precondition for diplomatic recognition and aid). The ROC also seeks diplomatic recognition, but unlike the PRC, no longer either expects exclusivity or even declares itself the true China. The Taiwan issue is an outcome of the unresolved Chinese Civil War 1946-1949. In 1949 the Chinese Communist Party seized power and declared the new People’s Republic of China. The government of the previous regime, the Kuomintang, clung on to power in Taiwan and a few other small islands. They refused to accept defeat and retained the name Republic of China. The Kuomintang’s claim to represent the whole of China was supported by the US and its allies, including New Zealand, during the Cold War era. During this period the ROC and the PRC competed with each other for diplomatic recognition as to who was the

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true leader of China. It was a zero sum game; to recognise one was to exclude relations with the other. However, the improvement in relations between the PRC and the US from 1971 altered the status quo on the Taiwan issue irrevocably. The ROC began a gradual process of democratisation aimed at improving the ruling regime’s legitimacy. The eventual outcome was a release of Taiwan nationalist sentiments that had been suppressed under the Kuomintang and earlier Japanese rule. It can be argued that, since 1949, Taiwan has in fact existed in a state of de facto, but undeclared, independence. Taiwan’s democratisation, and the upsurge of Taiwan nationalism, has greatly decreased the likelihood that Taiwan will ever become a part of the PRC through peaceful means. In contrast the PRC is determined to resolve the Taiwan issue as soon as possible, and has not ruled out the use of force. The diplomatic competition between the PRC and the ROC is now no longer about whether or not other states recognise either as the true leader of China, but rather about suppressing or maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence. This has been an issue of concern in the Pacific in the last 15-20 years due to the intense diplomatic rivalry between the PRC and the ROC. The ROC is recognised by 6 Pacific Island Forum states (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands). This represents more than one quarter of the 23 states in the world which recognise the ROC, meaning that from both China’s and Taiwan’s perspectives, the relationship with the Pacific Island states has taken on an importance way out of proportion of their respective size and influence. Since 1988 Taipei has adopted a policy of both encouraging formal diplomatic relations, as well as attempting to develop substantive relations with states which do not formally recognise it. The importance of the Pacific Island states to both China and Taiwan has been highlighted by two recent events. As will be covered later in this paper, in April 2006 China’s Premier Wen Jiabao co-hosted with his Fijian counterpart, Laisenia Qarase, the first ever China summit with Pacific Island leaders held in Nadi, Fiji. States recognising the ROC did not attend. This followed the 2005 goodwill tour by Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian of the Pacific states recognising the ROC. These states


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met again at the Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit in Palau in September 2006 and plan to hold such meetings annually. Both Beijing and Taipei have offered Pacific Island states considerable financial incentives for their continued diplomatic recognition, or to swap sides. The consequence has been widespread allegations in the Pacific of the buying off of key politicians to support either Taipei or Beijing’s stance, numerous white elephant aid projects and the Taiwan issue becoming a local domestic political issue, for example, as it did in the Solomon Islands in 2006. In May 2006 Phil Goff criticised as “unhelpful”14 Taiwan’s use of “cheque book diplomacy” to win Pacific Island support—the first ever official public criticism of Taipei’s behaviour in the Pacific by New Zealand. Soon after, Foreign Minister Winston Peters also issued a stern public warning to Taiwan that the evidence of dollar diplomacy was “irrefutable” and Taiwan should “cut it out.”15 Given that similar allegations have been made against China it is significant that similar rebukes were not publicly been delivered against Beijing, although Goff did condemn cheque book diplomacy “from any source.”16 In recent years there have been a number of changes in Taipei’s foreign policy which may help to reduce the impact of the Taiwan issue in South Pacific politics. Taipei is becoming disinclined to fight to maintain diplomatic recognition with states who swap sides to recognise the PRC for increased economic aid. In August 2006 Taiwan cut off relations with the African state of Chad as it was about to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Unlike in the past, the ROC did not fight to maintain recognition and cut off relations before the opposite nation had a chance to do so. Since the election of the KMT President Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008 the Taiwanese government has proposed a “diplomatic truce” with China. China has made no public comment on this suggestion, but has now on several occasions refused requests of aid from several of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Africa and Latin America in exchange for diplomatic recognition.17 For Taiwan’s allies, the diplomatic truce means that they will have fewer opportunities to manipulate Beijing or Taipei for foreign aid. Yet this situation is likely to be only a temporary one.

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The informal “truce” will only last as long as Beijing feels satisfied that Taipei is moving towards reunification with the Chinese Mainland. Since the Ma government is playing for time on the reunification issue, there is bound to be an eventual clash between Beijing’s goals and Taipei’s domestic political interests. Taipei has become increasingly responsive to outside criticism in recent years and has lately made a number of adjustments to controls over its Pacific fishing fleets. Taiwanese boats dominate the Pacific fishing industry and have been widely accused of illegal fishing. The new measures include reducing the long line fleet which operates in the Pacific by 20%, passing new laws that put the boats of Taiwan investors under Taipei’s jurisdiction, and setting up a national Coast Guard with the core task of patrolling the activities of Taiwan’s international fishing fleet.18 The effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen. In response to its critics, Taipei is increasingly moving towards a policy of greater accountability and transparency in its aid policies. It is difficult to be precise as to the exact amount of aid Taiwan gives to Pacific Island states, since published accounts are incomplete and do not account for the unofficial “donations” given to local politicians. According to Taiwan’s own International Cooperation and Development Fund the ratio between Taiwan’s officially disclosed AID figures and the amount the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives through nontransparent channels is 15:85.19 In locations such as the Solomon Islands, these can have a major (but undisclosed) impact on the economy. It is known that Taiwan gives US $500,000 annually for scholarships for Pacific Island students to study in Taiwan. It underwrites the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat by US $700,000; it gives an annual cash grant to the Solomon Islands of US $8.9 million; and provides an annual cash grant of US $1.65 million to Tuvalu. The South Pacific Tourism Office (SPTO) provides an informative case study of China-Taiwan rivalry and the (unintended) benefits for Pacific Island states. Taiwan started giving aid to SPTO in 2001, at a time when other donors, such as the EU and the US, were pulling out. Over the next 5 years Taiwan gave US $237, 000 to the SPTO. In 2003 China was the first donor country to join the SPTO as a member, and provided a donation of US $99,000. As a condition of its membership,


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China insisted that the ROC be excluded from joining. Pro-ROC Pacific Island states resisted. However in 2005, the ROC was formally excluded from becoming a member of the SPTO (but not a donor). Policy on the Taiwan issue has divided the main regional organisation, the Pacific Island Forum. The six states that recognise Taiwan are the same group which backed Japan over whaling and for similar reasons: dollar diplomacy. The group is made up of the smallest and (apart from Palau) the poorest states in the Pacific. Palau, Nauru, and Tuvalu all have populations of less than 20,000. The Solomon Islands is amongst the poorest of the Pacific Island states. The small size and vulnerability of these states means that their support can be obtained for a relatively minor investment. There is a strong expectation from China that New Zealand and Australia will discourage Pacific Island states from granting diplomatic recognition to the ROC. New Zealand’s official position is that it respects the sovereignty of other countries, but it does use its influence to an extent, such as urging that the ROC contacts at Forum meetings be given a low profile.20 Only one country from Polynesia (Tuvalu) and one from Melanesia (Solomon Islands) currently recognises the ROC. Australia put pressure on Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 1999 when PM Bill Skate sought to change PNG’s support from the PRC to the ROC. The Chinese government asked Canberra to use its influence to prevent the change. Canberra agreed, as it was concerned about repercussions for its own relations with China. The Skate government fell, and the new government in 2000 confirmed PNG’s recognition of the PRC. In 2004 Taiwan accused Australia of pressuring Vanuatu not to switch to supporting Taiwan.21 A further four Pacific Island states have in the past recognised the ROC but no longer do so. These, along with the years of their diplomatic relations with the ROC, are Samoa (1972-75), Tonga (1972-1998), PNG (briefly in 1999), and Vanuatu (very briefly in 2004). In short, just four Pacific Island states have remained consistently loyal to the PRC. Two of these, the Cook Islands and Niue, are both freely associated states (FAS) linked with New Zealand, and could be expected to take a similar stance to New Zealand. However this is not the

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case with the three US FAS in the South Pacific, Palau, and the Marshall Islands, which recognise the ROC. Fiji has taken advantage of its size and high regional status which puts it in a special category. It has consistently supported the PRC, which established an embassy in Suva in 1977. At the same time, the ROC has maintained a trade office in Suva since 1971, and has continued close, but unofficial, relations with the Fiji government. In the past the ROC has made an annual “donation” directly to the Fijian prime minister’s office.22 As Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara made a number of quiet, unofficial visits to Taiwan, and then went on to visit Beijing, as have other high level Fiji officials and politicians. In 1997 China ended preferential treatment relating to sugar when it considered Fiji was getting too close to Taiwan. China strongly protested when Taiwan President Chen made a stopover visit to Nadi in 2005. Nonetheless, China took no further action, and has effectively allowed Fiji to pursue a de facto two-China policy, though at times this has severely tested the limits of Fiji-China relations. China has established embassies in Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu. The ROC has embassies in the Solomon Islands, Palau, Tuvalu, Nauru and the Marshall Islands. It also maintains “economic and cultural” offices in other Pacific Island capitals, which effectively act as embassies. Where rivalry between PRC and ROC has been intense, this can contribute to political instability. In 2006 an Australian report concluded that “China and Taiwan have added to corruption by competing for recognition”.23 An Australian journalist specialising in Asia Pacific affairs, Graham Dobell, has highlighted the “destructive impact” of China/Taiwan rivalry, which he says is “making South Pacific politics more corrupt and more violent”.24 In the Solomon Islands the rioting and burning of Honiara’s Chinatown which followed the 2006 election raised the question of whether this explosion of anti-Chinese anger was a regional aberration or warning shot. Would the Solomon Island experience become the Pacific experience? Michael Field, one of the most experienced Pacific journalists, concluded that it was “the price to be paid for the battle of the two Chinas”.25


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The Taiwan issue has infected Solomon Islands politics. Snyder Rini, who briefly served as Prime Minister following the 2006 election, was considered by many to have bought the necessary support to win the parliamentary vote for PM with money provided by the ROC. He also had the support of wealthy local Chinese business men, most notably Tommy Chan, who held the position of President of the Association of Independent Members of Parliament. Chan’s family settled in Honiara several generations ago. But the popular perception was that ROC money was manipulating Solomon politics, and Snyder Rini was forced to stand aside in favour of a new Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. Although Sogavare indicated that his government would consider a shift and support the PRC, he took no further action. Change has continued to be advocated by the former Prime Minister and opposition MP, Billy Hilly. The 1993 Kiribati election is a further example of PRC–ROC tensions influencing an election outcome. During the election there were bitter exchanges between the government and opposition candidates led by Harry Tong about receiving campaign finance from China and Taiwan respectively. The opposition accused the government of being “over friendly” with China, and objected to the presence of the Chinese satellite tracking station near Tarawa.26 Although Beijing insisted that this facility was for peaceful purposes only, it forms part of China’s ambition to develop rocket and space technology, which has significant military implications. China was keen to ensure that the incumbent Tong government re-elected to protect the future of the tracking station. But instead the election brought about a change of government, the closure of the tracking station and a switch in diplomatic recognition. China accused Kiribati of “betrayal” and Taiwan of an “unscrupulous policy of money diplomacy”.27 The communication equipment remains in storage on Tarawa, as China awaits a change of political fortunes. Vanuatu has also been pressured by the Taiwan issue. Former Prime Minister Edward Natapei has recalled that shortly after he took office he was offered US $2 million to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan.28 He refused, but in November 2004 Vanuatu PM Serge Vohor sought to change his government’s recognition from China to Taiwan. He bluntly stated the reason for the changes “we need the money”. However he

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failed to gain the support of his cabinet, and lost a vote of no-confidence after just six months in office. In Opposition Vohor argued that China exercised too much influence and was “corrupting our leaders”.29 Whatever the truth, it is clear that the result was to further destabilise the turbulence that surrounds Vanuatu politics. These cases demonstrate how the Taiwan issue has become a divisive and destabilising influence in Pacific Island politics. Nevertheless the role of China/Taiwan rivalry in creating regional instability should not be exaggerated. Many of the problems underlying political instability result from internal issues. These then become accentuated as a result of the rivalry between China and Taiwan. Pacific Island Forum states and PRC-ROC rivalry The Pacific Island Forum member state’s relationship with China and Taiwan is summarised below (by country in alphabetical order).

Cook Islands (Self governing since 1965)

Consistently supported PRC since the Cook Islands took a position on the issue in July 1997.

FSM (Independent 1986)

Consistently pro-China since 1989. The PRC has an embassy in Pohnpei.

Fiji (Independent 1970)

Consistently supported the PRC since 1975. The PRC has an embassy in Suva, as Fiji has in Beijing.

Kiribati (Independent 1979)

In 1980 recognised the PRC. Changed support to the ROC following the 2003 election.

Marshall Islands (Independent 1986)

Established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1990. Changed to the ROC in 1998.

Nauru (Independent 1968)

Recognised the PRC 1980, change to the ROC in 1985. Changed recognition to the PRC in 2002, then back to the ROC in 2005.

Niue (Self governing in 1974)

In 2000 declared itself pro-PRC.

Palau (Independent 1994)

Consistently pro-ROC since 1999. ROC established embassy in Karor.


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Papua New Guinea (Independent 1975)

Recognised the PRC in 1976, which established an embassy in Port Moresby. PM Skate sought to change to the ROC in 1999, but lost office.

Samoa (Independent 1962)

In 1972 backed the ROC. In 1975 changed to the PRC, which established an embassy in Apia.

Solomon Islands (Independent 1978)

In 1982 recognised the ROC, which established an embassy in Honiara in 1985. Guadalcanal Province has a “sister” relationship with China’s Guangdong province.

China’s political interests in the Pacific While China’s regional political interests mainly concern Taiwan, there are a number of other factors which explain Beijing’s increasing involvement in Pacific Island affairs. As previously mentioned, since 1999, China has stepped up its international activities. Beijing looks to its diplomatic partners in the Pacific and elsewhere in the world to provide ongoing support for China’s position in international organisations. With 14 sovereign nations the countries of the Pacific Island Forum are a significant voting bloc. Beijing also seeks to curb the influence of Chinese dissident groups such as pro-democracy activists, Falungong, and the Taiwan independence movement on local Chinese communities in the South Pacific (as indeed elsewhere in the globe). Since the 1999 crack down on Falungong in China, PRC embassy officials in Wellington have been tasked with monitoring and seeking to limit Falungong activities in New Zealand. To date Wellington has acquiesced to Chinese pressure and excluded Falungong from official events, even local ones such as cultural festivals. From Wellington’s perspective to do so is politically expedient, but at what cost to our prized freedom of speech and association? Chinese embassies are instructed to do ideological work on Overseas Chinese schools, social groups, business networks and prominent individuals.30 China’s representatives abroad privilege those who shun Beijing’s ideological enemies by rewarding them with business opportunities, financial subsidies, and help with administrative matters. In contrast those who interact with Beijing’s foes risk being denied their

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consular rights if citizens of the PRC, denied visas if they are non-PRC citizens, and refused access to funding and other assistance. In a relatively new development, Chinese diplomats are now being tasked with working to win the loyalty and support of Overseas Chinese for the PRC itself. During the 2006 political crises in East Timor, the Solomons, Tonga and Fiji, China offered aid, shelter and even “repatriation” to ethnic Chinese regardless of their nationality or the historical distance of their connection to China. Even ROC passport holders were given assistance. This is a complete turnaround on longstanding government policies established in the 1950s which made a clear distinction between matters affecting PRC passport holders and other ethnic Chinese. In the past, even during the most extreme crises affecting ethnic Chinese, such as the race riots in Indonesia in 1998 (when more than one thousand people died, ethnic Chinese women were mass raped by Indonesian soldiers and thousands of businesses and homes owned by Chinese people were deliberately destroyed) the Chinese government made no public comment on the events, the Chinese media was forbidden from reporting on the topic, and three Beijing University students who staged a lone protest outside the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing were expelled for their efforts.31 In contrast the “return home to China” of ethnic Chinese refugees from East Timor and the Solomons in particular was given saturation coverage in the Chinese media. Their stories fit in with the ongoing post-1989 project by the CCP leadership to emphasis patriotism (aiguozhuyi)—the social glue to replace Mao Zedong Thought. However what differed in 2006 from, for instance, 1998, was that previously “patriotism” was only directed at Chinese citizens, now it clearly encompasses all ethnic Chinese people. This new development is likely to provoke some concern among nations with sizeable ethnic Chinese populations. Beijing’s emergence as a major Pacific player has been dramatic. In less than a decade Beijing has gone from sending only relatively low level diplomats to engage in the Pacific Island Forum dialogue process, to hosting its own summit in 2006 in Fiji, chaired by China’s Premier Wen Jiabao. The Pacific precedent for China’s Fiji summit was set by Japan’s triennial PALM Summit of Pacific Island leaders, held since 1998.


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It is notable that the Nadi summit occurred in the same year as the Forum on China-African Cooperation held in November 2006 when 48 heads of state of African countries which recognise the PRC met in Beijing. Observers from the 5 African countries which recognise the ROC were also invited. By hosting such a forum, China made a strong statement about its re-awakened desire to take on a leadership role in international affairs. It is interesting to compare China’s increased involvement in Africa32 with parallel developments in the South Pacific. China’s thirst for oil and other key natural resources are pulling China and Africa together, as is China’s ability to produce low-cost goods for the African market. These are also factors in China’s involvement in the Pacific. Similarly, China looks to Africa as a voting bloc in the UN and other international organisations, as indeed it does in the Pacific. The desire to squeeze out the ROC is a key influence on China’s interest in developing close political and other ties with African nations, as it is in the Pacific. In Africa, as in the South Pacific, illegal Chinese migrants, exploitative labour practices on China-run projects, and the use of low-skilled Chinese workers to take over the work locals could do is causing considerable friction in the host population towards both the PRC and ethnic Chinese.33 China’s strategic interests in the Pacific China’s strategic interests in the Pacific Islands clearly extend well beyond the Taiwan issue. Its ambition is to be one of the leading regional powers. This will ensure secure trade routes and supplies of raw materials (timber, petroleum, minerals) and food resources—particularly fish. China is developing a “blue water” navy capable of projecting its power throughout the Asia Pacific region. It is also developing space warfare capability, for which it requires monitoring stations. (Hence the importance of Kiribati referred to earlier). During the 2005 launch of the Shenzhou spacecraft two of the four tracking ships were based in the South Pacific. These vessels also seek to monitor US activities, including

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missile testing at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. In January 2007 China successfully tested a “hit to kill” missile with a strike on one of its own aging weather satellites.34 China has demonstrated that it has the capacity to challenge the US’s Star War satellite technology which, in NE Asia, is aimed at shielding Taiwan from Chinese missiles. According to Professor Zhang Guihong of Fudan University, the development of China’s satellite and space programme is now the primary reason for Beijing’s interest in the South Pacific. According to Professor Zhang, “a number of observatories can be set up in the Pacific once foreign relations are established; which will be important for China’s future satellite and space technologies.”35 The US and China Concern has been expressed that China has taken advantage of the Pacific power vacuum that developed following the end of the Cold War and US preoccupation with the Middle East. This has resulted in a declining US presence in the South Pacific.36 Congressman Eni Faleomavaega, who represents American Samoa in the US House of Representatives, and chairs the House subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and Global Environment has been critical of what he called the US “Euro–centric mentality”.37 The US closed its Honiara embassy, but continues to maintain embassies in Fiji and Papua New Guinea, and looks to Australia to help protect its South Pacific interests. There have been increasing signs of a change in US interest in the region, partly in response to China’s growing influence. In October 2003 US President George Bush met with Pacific leaders in Honolulu. US Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Hill, attended the 2005 and 2006 meetings of the Pacific Island Forum. The US has retained its strong interest in Micronesia, especially with the FAS states of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Palau. The US military base in Guam is now regarded by Washington as one of the most strategically important US bases in the Pacific, particularly for dealing with potential conflicts in Asia.38 Washington’s announcement of a planned build up of US forces in Guam has been linked to concerns


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about China’s expanse of naval facilities at its base on Hainan Island. The US facilities on Guam are the likely staging bases from which aircraft would be despatched to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack from the Chinese mainland. The US is duty-bound to defend the ROC under the Taiwan Relations Act, but only if the PRC attacked first or had precipitated any conflict through its actions. Australia is bound to support the US under the ANZUS treaty, which, however, remains “inoperative” for New Zealand. Japan Given Japan’s long history of strained relations with China, the question arises: Could Sino-Japanese strategic competition be played out in the Pacific region? The answer is yes, and this competition is already underway. In this regard the US offer to Japan to use Guam for military training takes on a much greater significance.39 Japan has strong economic interests in the region, relating particularly to fish, tourism and minerals, including the potential of sea bed mining. It remains a major aid donor to the Pacific Island region. Japan also has vital strategic interests relating to the security of trade routes and access to vital raw materials. In recent years it has also sought to exercise the power of the Pacific voting bloc. As was noted earlier, the Pacific Island countries’ strength in numbers was recently demonstrated over the whaling issue when a number of Pacific Island states supported Japan’s position on scientific whaling at the annual International Whaling Commission meeting. The Pacific voting bloc is also a factor in moves to reform the United Nations. Japan has been successful in gaining the support of most Pacific Island states for its bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council, with the notable exception of Tonga. China is likely to try and use its Pacific friends to block Japan in future bids, much in the same way as it uses these same votes to block the ROC from membership in various international organisations.

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Korea South Korean ties with the Pacific Island region are increasing. In January 2006 a South Korean consulate office was established in Honiara. The Korean Ambassador to the Solomon Islands, and a number of other Pacific Island states, is based in PNG where South Korea established an embassy in 1980. It also has an embassy in Fiji. Korea is interested in gaining access to construction projects, investment opportunities and resources, particularly timber, fish, and tourism. It has a modest aid program. The EU Another emerging force in Pacific affairs which will compete with China comes from the EU. While individual European states, such as the UK have largely withdrawn from Pacific regional affairs, others such as France, have reasserted the importance of the region. France has close ties with its Pacific territories. In 2006 New Caledonia and French Polynesia became associate members of the Pacific Islands Forum. In June 2006 a Paris summit of Pacific leaders was hosted by President Jacques Chirac. The renewed Pacific interest of the US, Japan, Korea and the EU means that China and Taiwan’s Pacific diplomacy faces an increasingly crowded field, all with competing interests and agendas, not all of them favourable. In 2006 during a meeting to set up a regional fisheries management organisation the then New Zealand Minister of Fisheries Jim Anderton criticised the EU, South Korea and Russia for not cooperating with efforts to manage fish stocks in the South Pacific, and singled out the EU for its history of destroying its own local fish stocks.40 China’s economic interests in the Pacific China, the world’s fourth largest economy, is becoming increasingly dependent on imported resources, including petroleum, gas, timber and fish. It has a significant economic presence in a number of Pacific Island


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countries. It has been widely reported that there are more than 3,000 Chinese State-owned and private enterprises in Pacific Island countries, from mining ventures to restaurants and grocery stores. China has made an investment in the region of approximately US $800 million. According to Chinese sources, trade between the Pacific Island states and China grew 58% in 2005 to US $838 million,41 and is expected to have topped the US $1 billion mark in 2006. PNG accounts for nearly half of this trade—US $422 million.42 China has a strong interest in resource development, particularly minerals, but also fisheries, agriculture and forestry. There is a downside to this. According to a Greenpeace report in 2006, China is the main destination for illegal logging in PNG. The Malaysian firm Rimbuman Hijau and other companies sell the logs to China for use in cheap plywood products that are then on sold to markets such as New Zealand and Australia. Unsustainable logging in the Solomon Islands also feeds China’s demand for timber, which makes up around 40% of China’s trade with the Pacific Island region. A further issue of concern is the lesson of the Bougainville conflict: the risk that China’s investment into projects, such as mines in PNG, will exacerbate existing conflicts over land and other matters. There is a potential that China could send in troops and offer weapons to local governments to defend their investment, as they have done in the Sudan to protect their oil supplies. This scenario would be extremely disquieting from a New Zealand, and (even more so), Australian perspective. China has growing investment interests in Papua New Guinea. Chinese corporations have signed a gas exploration deal with PNG. A Chinese SOE, China Metallurgical and Construction Company, is making a US $800 million investment in the Ramu nickel project in PNG’s Madang Province. China retains 85% equity in the project in return for providing 100% of the funding.43 But there are areas of concern. PNG Secretary of Labour David Tibu recently described China’s treatment of PNG workers at this mine as “slavery”.44 China’s rapid and accommodating response demonstrates the importance of the project.

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China’s aid to the Pacific The PRC is emerging as one of the region’s top aid donors, although it automatically excludes the 6 Pacific Island Forum countries which have a diplomatic relationship with the ROC. The exact level of Chinese aid is hard to establish as reliable data is not available. The New Zealand NGO aid organisation, the Council for International Development, puts China’s annual aid contribution to the region at US $400 million, which is approaching the same level as Japan.45 PRC aid-funded construction projects use imported Chinese labour and Chinese construction firms. China tends to prefer high-profile projects, such as the multi-story government office complex in Apia, the Foreign Ministry building for Papua New Guinea, a hotel complex in Tonga, the Cook Islands courthouse, and the Vanuatu parliament. There have been a number of recurring problems associated with China’s approach to aid. In 2006 Fiji cancelled a road construction project because of delays and poor workmanship.46 China-built structures are often of poor-quality construction and may require repairs not long after being finished. The prestige projects, such as sports stadiums in Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji and Kiribati—while highlighting China’s presence—have high maintenance costs and contribute little towards longer term economic development. In addition, there is concern about the numbers of illegal migrants who come in as labourers on these and other China-related activities and do not return to China at the completion of the project. Many subsequently become involved in criminal activities or use illegal means to make their way to New Zealand and Australia. There is a strong political component to China’s trade and investment. For instance “approved destination status” for tourists was granted to Tonga, Fiji, the Cook Islands and Vanuatu in 2004 and extended to Samoa, the FSM, PNG and Niue in 2006, but not to Pacific nations which recognise the ROC. At the April 2006 Nadi summit China declared the establishment of the “China-Pacific Islands Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum” to facilitate investment and aid in the Pacific (but again, only to those countries which have established diplomatic relations with the PRC). China would like to


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make the summit an annual event at which it could suitably reward its friends. At the 2006 summit Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China would offer: -

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US $375 million of soft loans over the next three years for the development of agriculture, minerals, forestry, fishery, tourism, textiles, telecommunications, aviation, shipping, and consumer goods manufacturing in the South Pacific. A separate fund to encourage Chinese companies to invest in those Pacific Island countries who have established diplomatic relations with the PRC. The cancellation of all debts that became mature at the end of 2005; and extension by 10 years for payment of any other debts. Zero tariffs to the majority of exports to China from the eight Pacific countries who recognise the PRC. Training in capacity building for 2,000 Pacific Island officials and technicians from those countries. Free anti-malaria medicines in the next three years to the eight proPRC Pacific nations. Chinese medical teams to continue to be sent to these island countries. China will also conduct annual training courses for local health officials, hospital managers and medical researchers.

Overseas Chinese An emerging issue with profound implications is the growing number of Overseas Chinese living in or passing through the Pacific Island region. Ron Crocombe has estimated that there are currently about 80,000 Overseas Chinese living in the Pacific Islands region.47 Around 20,000 live in PNG and Fiji respectively. A further 14,000 Overseas Chinese live in French Polynesia. Given the large numbers of ethnic Chinese living in Fiji, it is unsurprising that there was considerable interest and concern about how China would handle Fiji’s 2006 coup d’etat and 2008 constitutional crisis. To date, there has been no violence directed at ethnic Chinese and Beijing’s response has been muted and circumspect.

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Historically there have been ethnic Chinese communities in most Pacific Island capitals for the past 150 years or even longer. Chinese migrants were drawn into the region in the nineteenth century as plantation workers and traders. Many set up business, intermarried and became part of the local community. A few entered politics, and became regional leaders, such as Julius Chan in PNG; and the Tong brothers in Kiribati. This favourable perception contrasts with the negative response created by some of the recent migrants from China who have been linked with unfair commercial competition, and organised crime. The tension created by the numbers and activities of recent Chinese migrant’s activities was highlighted in Tonga in the November 2006 Nuku’alofa riot which targeted Chinese businesses for looting and burning. About 500 Chinese lived in Tonga at the time of the riots, and around 150 had their homes and businesses destroyed.48 Earlier the pro-democracy leader, Akilisi Pohiva, claimed Chinese immigrants were taking Tongan jobs, and causing “economic, political, social and moral problems”. In the late 1990s the Tongan government offered Tongan passports for sale and Chinese citizens made up the bulk of those who took up the offer. In late 2000 several hundred Chinese were ordered out of Tonga “for their own protection”. In 2005 the then Minister of National Planning in the Solomon Islands, Fred Fono, expressed his concern about the “influx of Asian people coming into the region… and taking over businesses that are supposed to be operated by our local people.”49 Similar complaints were made in the Marshall Islands, Fiji and PNG, which also have sizable Chinese minorities, most of them recent arrivals. Over a third of businesses in Majuro, the capital of the Marshall Islands, are operated by ethnic Chinese. Fiji trade unions have complained that the influx of Chinese immigrants has depressed wages, work conditions and opportunities. The Fijian government offered preferential migration opportunities to Chinese citizens after the 1987 and 2000 military coups led to a brain drain of skilled Indo-Fijian labour and capital from Fiji. The growing concentrations of Chinese business and labour in the Pacific Island states, and the problems associated with these communities, points to the potential for backlash; and a repeat of the 2006 Honiara and Nuku’alofa riots.


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Although many Chinese migrants enter Pacific Islands countries with legitimate visas, in the last decade many times this number, perhaps numbering tens of thousands, are illegal migrants. A number of Pacific diplomats interviewed in the course of this research expressed strong concern about the problem of illegal immigrants from China and the link with organised crime. Their governments lack the resources to effectively police all the borders of their often far flung island archipelagos. Australia and New Zealand are likely to respond sympathetically to requests to provide more assistance in border control. Although China claims to be taking action, for instance by screening nationals working on aid projects, a much more determined approach is required to deal with illegal immigration and the organised crime problem.50 As with other immigration matters in the Pacific, the Chinese government does not appear to be doing anything to prevent the problem. This should be a matter of grave concern to New Zealand, and it needs to be brought to Beijing’s attention. The impact of these “new” Chinese on local Pacific communities has been considerable. Clear links have been established between recent immigrants and Chinese criminal gangs associated with drug smuggling, people trafficking and prostitution. The US territory of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are known as hubs for drug-trafficking and people smuggling from Asia into the US.51 However it is important to stress that the majority of the increased Chinese presence is legal, and brings a considerable amount of capital into the region. Tourism has received a major boost with China granting “approved” status to the Forum states which have established diplomatic relations with Beijing. Air New Zealand is now operating direct flights to China and there are proposals for direct flights between China and Fiji. Even before direct flights began, New Zealand alone received 101,000 visitors from China in 2005-2006.52 How does China pursue its Pacific interests? China has made a considerable investment into “buying” friends and winning influence in the region by means of “visit” diplomacy, which

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supplements the aid policy. “Visit” diplomacy is a more discreet form of gaining influence than Taiwan’s and to a lesser degree China’s notorious “cheque book” diplomacy, but it has the same outcome: individual politicians and their associates receive financial advantages, these include the payment of per diems (these are paid by both China and the Pacific Island governments, so some Pacific politicians get to “doubledip”) and luxury trips to the PRC. Given the perks, it is unsurprising that according to Pacific expert Ron Crocombe’s calculations “there are more Pacific Island Minister visits to China than to any other country.”53 “Visit” diplomacy involves generous State visits to China by influential foreign figures, including present and future leaders. These can be quite grand affairs. For instance an 80-person delegation accompanied PNG Prime Minister Somare when he visited Beijing in 2004. Even Pacific countries which don’t currently recognise the PRC can be invited to Beijing for “talks”. It is now the accepted practice for newly elected Pacific leaders to make Beijing an early port of call after coming to power. China treats the visiting island leaders as “world leaders”—as indeed it treats the visits of all foreign heads of states regardless of the size and status of their countries. This attention is greatly appreciated by island politicians who don’t get such a welcome when they visit Washington, Canberra or Wellington. Very senior Chinese leaders also regularly visit the island countries. The result, according to Pacific diplomats, is that Pacific elites have closer personal contacts with their Chinese counterparts than they do with the US, Australia or New Zealand.54 For China “visit diplomacy” is a worthwhile investment, as the establishment of personal relationships are very important in the Pacific, as they are also in Chinese culture. “Visit” diplomacy may also be supplemented by “cash” or “dollar” diplomacy. Chinese diplomats have been accused of giving backhanders to local elites. The bribes may be in the form of cash handouts or other bonuses. In return they demand favours on matters of interest to Chinese diplomats, such as the release in 2006 of Chinese fisherman caught fishing illegally in Vanuatu. Cultural exchanges provide a further means to cement ties and build warm feelings. China now offers a wide range of scholarships in the


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Pacific region.55 It also funds local cultural groups to visit China and sends out its own subsidised cultural delegations to the Pacific. Through Sky Pacific, the pay-to-air satellite station whose footprint covers Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Nauru, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, Kiribati and parts of New Zealand, CCTV-9 is available to Pacific viewers. CCTV-9 is China’s declared foreign propaganda channel, which is modelled on, and aims to be a rival for, CNN. Some of the local free-to-air stations in the Pacific also carry Chinese programming. While very few Pacific Island states (only Fiji, PNG, and Tonga) possess military forces, China has made a point of establishing military links through such activities as “logistical support” and training. China also invites local military leaders on formal visits to China. China’s efforts to strengthen military ties can be seen as a means to develop close personal links with key Pacific elites in nations where the military has a prominent role. Given China’s need for secure shipping routes, as well as friendly ports for satellite tracking boats and the future blue water navy, this is an understandable move. However from the perspective of New Zealand, the small Pacific militaries face, and create, enough problems (recent events in Fiji being a case in point) without the complication of involvement with an emerging regional power. In June 2004 a former Tongan army officer told a New Zealand Parliamentary Select Committee that in Tonga Chinese military influence was starting to replace traditional friends such as Australia and New Zealand.56 Pacific Island interests Pacific Island states have been playing and profiting from playing the “China card” since the late 1980s. As ANU analyst Sinclair Dinnen has observed, China /Taiwan rivalry “is one of the few leverages available to them to get increased aid.”57 Pacific Island states have been well rewarded for giving loyalty to their chosen side. If expectations do not work then the option to change sides can be explored. In late 2004 Vanuatu PM Vohor justified his desire to recognise Taiwan by complaining that China “hadn’t delivered the aid it promised for years,

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whereas Taiwan was ready to deliver reward for recognition”. In 2000 the new Solomon Foreign Minister, Danny Philips, travelled to China to see if he could obtain a better aid deal than that provided by Taiwan. He could not, and apologies for “misunderstandings” were issued. Pacific countries have benefited from the competition between Japan and China for their support in recent years, and, for similar reasons, look set to regain the interest and greater assistance of the US. What may appear as heavy-handed tactics by former colonial powers may work to China’s advantage. Australia’s ongoing strained relations with PNG and the Solomon Islands are a case in point, as was the New Zealand and Australian reaction to the four Fiji coups. From a Pacific Island perspective these reactions to the coups showed a serious lack of understanding. In the post-coup period Fiji turned to Asian countries such as China and Malaysia to make up for what was lost by sanctions imposed largely by Australia and New Zealand. Pacific Island countries now have an Asian alternative for gaining assistance that does not require the conditions of “good governance”. After securing a trade deal with China the former Cook Islands PM Sir Geoffrey Henry stated that China’s presence in the region “ends the days” of dependency on New Zealand. Senior advisors in PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare’s office were reported to be keen to look beyond Australia for economic advice to China, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia. In recent years Taiwan has provided PNG with very practical advice and assistance on how to grow rice in PNG’s climate. Chinese and Malaysian investors have also signed major deals to exploit PNG’s natural resources. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that historically both the New Zealand and Australian governments have regarded such international linkages are complementary, rather than as a threat. However, the fact that violence against ethnic Chinese was a major factor in the 2006 riots in both the Solomons and Tonga and that the role and activities of both PRC and ROC elsewhere in the Pacific is increasingly a source of tension, means that New Zealand and its allies may need to think again about further encouraging China to step up its role in the South Pacific.


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Conclusion: The challenges ahead Finally, let us return to questions raised at the beginning of the chapter on the implications for New Zealand of China’s increased involvement in the Pacific and summarise the arguments raised in the main text. Firstly, what factors generate China’s growing interest in Pacific Island states? Are these likely to change over time into broader political, economic, or strategic interests? And what are the repercussions of increased Chinese migration into the Pacific? China’s interests in the region are generated by economic, strategic and cultural interests that are already strong, and are continuing to expand rapidly. The Chinese population in the Pacific, though still relatively small in number, plays a disproportionably strong role in economic affairs. In a number of Pacific Island states Chinese residents dominate key sectors of the economy. The need to protect the Overseas Chinese community and its business interests could conceivably be used as the pretext for extending China’s military presence into the region, but so far, as shown in the conflicts in the Solomons and Tonga when Chinese citizens were deliberately targeted, China has been extremely circumspect. Instead, China has been content to allow New Zealand and Australia to be its proxies in protecting Chinese interests. Unlike Africa, where Chinese armed forces protect Chinese oil interests in Sudan,58 the stakes are just not high enough in the South Pacific for China to go beyond acceptable norms. In that sense, despite the China’s interest in utilising certain South Pacific countries as sites for observatories to support its space and satellite programme, dramatic increase in trade in recent years, the influx of Chinese migrants, the increasing investment in minerals and other natural resources, and the importance of the Taiwan issue, all of these are clearly not yet crucial enough for Beijing to risk changing the status quo in the Pacific region. The appearance of Chinese troops in the Pacific would cause considerable alarm to New Zealand, Australia, and their friends and allies in the Pacific and elsewhere. It should be noted that in a radical change from past practice, in times of crisis Chinese embassies now offer consular aid and support to all

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ethnic Chinese, not just PRC passport holders. China is also actively recruiting the support of the Overseas Chinese.59 For countries with a large ethnic Chinese population, this arouses spectres of the Chinese as a Fifth Column. In the Cold War era New Zealand was, with good reason, resistant to the notion of its local Chinese population being seen as a security threat.60 However, now as then, New Zealand would still be wise to keep a close watch on China’s overtures to both the Overseas Chinese in the South Pacific and in New Zealand and consider how this may impact on New Zealand’s interests. Secondly, how important is the issue of Taiwan? As we have shown, the diplomatic rivalry between the PRC and the ROC has been a major destabilising factor in the South Pacific in recent years. However, Taiwan politics is in a state of flux and public opinion now seems much closer to coming to some agreement with the Mainland than ever before. If Taiwan’s status was resolved amicably then all the problems related to the PRC-ROC diplomatic battle in the South Pacific will simply become a matter of interest to historians. From New Zealand’s perspective a speedy and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue would be the best case scenario. Otherwise, there is a high likelihood that the PRC-ROC rivalry will continue to put fuel on the fire of existing conflicts in the Pacific and the potential cost to New Zealand will be very high. Thirdly, how does China’s involvement with Pacific Island states impact on other major players in the region, such as the United States (US), Japan, and Australia? Could Sino–Japanese rivalry be played out in the region? For China one of the main challenges ahead is to convince the world that its rising power does not pose a threat to others. There are signs that the US is becoming concerned about the prospects of China rivalling their dominance in the Pacific. If not carefully handled these concerns could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. While New Zealand’s interests are best served by maintaining a peaceful Pacific and working in cooperation


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with the dominant powers whoever they may be, the US’s China concerns have helped restore US-New Zealand relations to a level not seen for many years. It is ironic that China may have provided the incentive for New Zealand and the US to put differences behind them.61 The China-Japan relationship is delicate, given the past history of hostility. As we have shown, Sino-Japanese rivalry is already being played out in the Pacific region. If tensions heighten between the two countries, the importance of the Pacific as a voting bloc at international organisations and the potential for “vote-buying” in the region with its destabilising effect on political institutions and processes will only increase. How prepared is New Zealand for the paradigm shift in the Pacific from a Eurocentric to a potentially Sinocentric order? Could New Zealand interests be challenged by this shift? China’s new role as a major Pacific power and its potential to become the dominant power, poses a difficult challenge for New Zealand. Unlike the past when New Zealand worked with Britain and the US as the dominant powers, New Zealand does not have a framework of shared assumptions (or world view) and common political experience with China to draw upon in developing a subsidiary relationship with that country. China and New Zealand have been moulded by very different political cultures. What New Zealand does share with China is membership of a series of fairly loose groupings of Asia-Pacific-based multi-lateral organisations formed in the post Cold War period such as APEC, ARF, CSCAP and EAS. Although these forums have provided an opportunity for participants to get to know each other better, despite numerous attempts at building common ground over the years, none of these organisations appear to have progressed much beyond anything other than a talk shop. There is scope to further develop common ground. But matters that touch on New Zealand’s interests and conflict with China’s interests will be much harder to resolve than past differences with the US or Britain. From China’s perspective New Zealand is small and insignificant. It does

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not need New Zealand’s support or trade. If New Zealand challenges China on an issue that it regards as crucial, Beijing may respond by removing trade and other privileges. New Zealand officials are very cautious to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities, but sometimes, as has already been shown with Falungong in New Zealand, they may do so at the cost of the interests of New Zealand citizens and permanent residents. As a nation New Zealand is not well prepared for a paradigm shift from West to East. It will need to make some adjustments to accept China as a dominant, rather than minor force, in the region. As historian Nigel Murphy’s research has shown, New Zealand has a long history of popular and official racism towards Chinese people.62 The 2002 apology for those wrongs by the New Zealand government to Chinese New Zealanders, went some way to redressing the past. However, in New Zealand as in the Pacific Island states, the recent influx of Chinese migrants into New Zealand has led to an increase in racist incidents against Chinese and other Asian people.63 Racial prejudice is based largely on ignorance. New Zealand has failed to develop significant levels of expertise in China knowledge. The Chinese language is taught in very few high schools and the numbers of students enrolling in university Chinese classes are falling. There is currently only one course on Chinese politics taught in all New Zealand universities and there are no China-specific courses in economics, law or management. China is simply taught as a component in other, wider courses, which limits the ability of New Zealand students to develop any real expertise in China-related social sciences. Even if there were appropriate courses to train young New Zealanders to deal with China, there is no obvious career structure for them to follow. Australia has a long-standing policy of employing trained China experts to work in their specialist areas. In contrast, New Zealand’s politicians, business community, diplomats, security, immigration and defence personnel who deal with China issues tend to be generalists rather than specialists. Where training is given, it is usually on the job. If New Zealand is to benefit from China’s growing economic and political power, it will need to make the required investment in knowledge and provide a clear career structure for those with the necessary skills.


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What are the tension points in the New Zealand-China relationship that relate to the Pacific Islands? Does a greater Pacific role for China inevitably mean a lesser role for New Zealand? Geography determines that the Pacific will remain a key focus of New Zealand foreign policy. This will increasingly bring New Zealand and other Pacific Island states into contact with the emerging regional power of China. But an either/or situation need not develop. Increased involvement by China in Pacific affairs does not necessarily mean a lesser role for New Zealand. Indeed China appears to welcome New Zealand’s continued involvement, given its “Pacific advantage” made up from experience, Pacific identity and ready acceptance by most Pacific Island states. New Zealand has the advantage of similarities in language, religion, and a shared political tradition—however shaky in practice. New Zealand also has a unique relationship with the region generated by its indigenous Maori population and the family ties created and continued by the many Pacific Islanders who have made New Zealand their home. However New Zealand must not be complacent about its “Pacific advantage”. The relationship between New Zealand and it smaller neighbours cannot be taken for granted and requires ongoing attention and a willingness to listen. For instance in the area of trade New Zealand and China need to take into account Pacific Island concerns about FTA negotiations and their potential impact on the Sparteca relationship whereby South Pacific countries have had special access to the New Zealand (and Australian) markets. There is a justified fear that China will dominate new markets and that this will drive out Pacific Island products. We need to think more about what we can do to help strengthen Pacific economies. New Zealand should also learn from China’s approach to making personal connections in the Pacific through respecting cultural practices, such as adopting less lecturing and more listening, and not shaming leading figures in public, but rather dealing with conflict behind closed doors. What has been the impact, and what are the implications of growing Chinese influence for the fourteen Pacific Island states which, with the

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addition of Australia and New Zealand, make up the Pacific Island Forum? And how important is the Pacific to Chinese interests? China’s Pacific interests have proved to be a mixed blessing for the Pacific Island states. Competition for influence has pushed up aid levels, but recent Chinese immigrants have fostered crime and corruption. The Taiwan issue has divided, but not paralysed, the push for greater regional cooperation. Pacific Island states are seeking greater independence from former colonial powers and reacting against perceived “neo-colonialism” and “bullying” (the term used by coup leader Commodore Frank Bainimarama to describe sanctions imposed by New Zealand following Fiji’s fourth coup). China is stepping in to fill the breach. The lure is the alternative source of aid and the perceived advantages of the China market, but the outcome may well be the same: dependence on a stronger power which will expect political support at international forums and preferential treatment on security matters. In recent years corrupt, undemocratic, non-transparent governments in the Pacific Islands have been able to gain support, despite their behaviour, from China and Taiwan. This severely undermines New Zealand and Australian efforts to promote good governance. China and Taiwan have their own problems with corruption and lack of transparency, and they are disinclined to criticise island counterparts, but instead stress their understanding of the needs of developing countries. Beijing is now promoting the “China model” to the Pacific and other developing countries. Yet the importance of the South Pacific to China should not be overstated. China has no specific strategy on the South Pacific and like Taiwan, has a severe lack of Pacific expertise among its public policy analysts. China’s investment and engagement with Oceania is simply part of the overall expansion of China’s foreign relations and bid to gain influence and access to resources in a number of areas of the world where Western power is in decline: such as Africa, Latin and South America, Southeast and Central Asia. Taipei’s engagement with the region is similar: part of a global strategy to maintain Taiwan’s international space. In that sense, the South Pacific can only be said to be “fairly” important to China and Chinese interests.


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References 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Pacific Island Report, 9 July 1998. Island Business, 22 May 2006. Pacific Beat, ABC, 15 June 2005. Anne-Marie Brady, Friend of China–The Myth of Rewi Alley, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002; Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003; Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007; “The War that Never Was, Or, New Zealand, China and the Cold War,” Lenin’s Legacy Down Under. New Zealand and the New Cold War History, ed. Aaron Fox and Alex Trapeznik, Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2004; “The Curious Case of Two Australasian ‘Traitors’, or, New Zealand, Australia and the Cold War,” The New Zealand Journal of History, 2001; John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, “Dragons in Paradise. China’s Rising Star in Oceania,” National Interest, Summer 2003; John Henderson, “China, Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Significance of Oceania.” Revue Jurisdique Polynesienne, 2001. Pacific Island Report, 13 April 2006. http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/media-and-publications/soi2004-05.pdf Island Business, 22 May 2006. New Zealand Herald, 15 March 2005. “Muldoon Visit to China,” 18 November 1980, 59/264/11, NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade archives (MFAT). 13 August 1991, 264/2/4 volume 2, MFAT. Chen Junhong, ed., Jiaqiang he gaijin sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo xuexi duben (A Reader on Strengthening and Reforming Political Thought Work) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1999), 30. Sino-South Pacific Island Nations Relationship, http://www.chinagate.com.cn /english/354.htm Tropical Timber Market Report, Vol. 11 No. 21, 1-15 November 2006, 9. http://www.itto.or.jp/live/Live_Server/2844/mis20061101.pdf Radio New Zealand International, 28 April 2006. Pacific Islands Report, 16 August 2006. Dominion Post 28 April 2006. http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/276308,analysis-some-taiwan-alliesunhappy-about-diplomatic-truce.html ROC diplomat, interview with Anne-Marie Brady, May 2006. Cited by Graeme Dobell, “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: Diplomatic Chess Versus Pacific Political Rugby,” Lowy Institute Policy Brief, January 2007, 17.

222 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific See, for example, Note to file, 26 August 1991, 264/2/4 volume 2, MFAT. BBC, 27 September 2004. Interview with Fijian diplomat, August 2006. Susan Windybank, Pacific Magazine, 14 April 2006. Dobell, 3. Islands Business, 22 May 2006. Pacific Island Report, 18 November 2003. Pacific Islands Report, 10 November 2003. Pacific Islands Report, 7 December 2004. Radio New Zealand International, 19 March 2006. For more on this topic see, Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994, Appendix. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Rowman and Littlefield, 2007, 52. For an excellent analysis of China-Africa relations see Dexter Roberts, “Magnet of Needs Pulls China to Africa,” Business Week Online, 14 September 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/sep2006/gb20060914_000920.ht m?chan=top+news_top+news+index_global+business Chris McGeal, “Chinese influx revives colonial fears,” Guardian Weekly, February 9-15 2007, 3. For an example of parallel problems in the South Pacific see, Rowan Callick, “China’s neo-colonial slavery in PNG,” The Australian, 12 February 2007. Dominion Post, 22 January 2007, B5. Zhang Guihong, Paper presented at the Second China-New Zealand Fudan Roundtable, Shanghai, 17 March 2008, cited by Michael Powles, in “China’s Rise: A Pacific View,” Fudan University Working Paper. Dobell, 5. Pacific Islands Report, 14 February 2001. Richard Halloran, “Guam Seen as Pivotal US Base,” Washington Times, 11 March 2006. Pacific Islands Report, 17 March 2006. “Northern Hemisphere states bloc South Pacific fishing talks,” 13 November 2006, http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=27688 AFP, 3 April 2006. Pacific Island Report, 7 April 2006. Pacific Island Report, 9 January 2006. Callick, “China’s neo-colonial slavery in PNG.” Pacific Island Report, 29 May 2006. Radio New Zealand International, 26 March 2006. Dobell, 7. Dominion Post, 18 November 2006. Pacific Beat, Radio Australia, 15 June 2005. Pacific Island Report, 6 March 2006.

New Zealand, the Pacific and China: The Challenges Ahead 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63.

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United States Government Accountability Office, “Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal Response,” May 2005. “Government Tourist Leaders from China and New Zealand Meet,” Press Release New Zealand Government, 17 November 2006. AFP, Northern Advocate, 3 April 2006, 1. Interviews conducted by Anne-Marie Brady, August 2006. Pacific Island Report, 7 April 2006. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 19 June 2004. Dominion Post, 25 April 2006, 1. See “China’s National Defense in 2006,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china /2006-12/29/content_771191_16.htm “Senior official speaks at congress of returned Overseas Chinese,” BBC World service, 17 July 2009. See Brady, “The War that Never Was, Or, New Zealand, China and the Cold War,” in Fox (ed.). “NZ-US relations ‘new and improved’,” TVNZ, 20 July 2006, http://tvnz.co.nz /view/page/425823/792112 On this topic see the articles in Manying Ip, Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: The Chinese in New Zealand, Auckland, Auckland University Press, 2003, in particular the work of Nigel Murphy, “Joe Lum v. Attorney General: The Politics of Exclusion.” Yvonne Martin, “Asian Students Falling prey to Violent Racists,” 3 April 2004, stuff.co.nz

Part Three Chinese Foreign Policy in the Pacific: Two Perspectives

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Chapter 9 CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Phillip C. Saunders1

After decades of exerting only modest influence in Asia, China is now a much more active and important regional actor. Economic reforms and China’s subsequent integration into regional and global production networks have produced three decades of rapid economic growth that has dramatically increased China’s national power. China’s regional security strategy and a range of diplomatic, military, and economic assurance measures have had a significant impact in easing Asian concerns about a strong China. Several recent studies confirm that Asian views about China have generally shifted from viewing China as a threat to viewing China as an opportunity, although Japan is an exception to this trend.2 To some degree, this reflects an accommodation to a reality that smaller Asian states—including those in the South Pacific—are powerless to change. Nevertheless, the shift from the anti-China sentiment prevalent a decade ago is an indicator of the success of China’s Asia policy. As Robert Sutter has pointed out, it is difficult to assess the degree to which Chinese influence in Asia has actually increased because China has not asked Asian states to take costly actions that are against their interests.3 This chapter examines China’s regional strategy and the sources of Chinese influence, considers how China might use its growing power in the future, and assesses how other Asian and global powers are likely to respond to a more powerful and more influential China. It also examines likely implications if current trends continue, and potential developments 227

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that might alter China’s regional policy. This chapter argues that China’s reassurance strategy has been remarkably successful in preserving a stable regional environment and persuading its neighbours to view China as an opportunity rather than a threat. However, despite China’s restrained and constructive regional behaviour over the last decade, significant concerns remain about how a stronger and less constrained China might behave in the future. China’s Asia strategy China’s regional strategy derives in part from its global grand strategy.4 The top domestic concern of Chinese leaders is maintaining political stability and ensuring the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). CCP leaders have tried to build new sources of political support by raising living standards through rapid economic growth and by appealing to nationalist sentiment.5 Throughout the reform era, Chinese leaders have focused on maintaining a stable international environment that supports economic modernization. This objective requires China to avoid a hostile relationship with the United States, the dominant power in the current international system. Given the high costs of confrontation, Beijing seeks stable, cooperative relations with Washington. Yet many Chinese elites believe that the United States seeks to subvert the Chinese political system and to contain China’s economic and military potential. China therefore seeks to build positive relationships with current and potential great powers to facilitate the emergence of a multi-polar world order and to deny the United States the opportunity to construct a coalition that would contain China and prevent its continued rise. By properly managing relations with the United States, other great powers, and developing countries Chinese leaders hope to take advantage of the period of strategic opportunity in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, build China’s comprehensive national power and improve China’s international position. This grand strategy defines the international and domestic context in which China formulates and pursues its Asia policy. Asia is the most important region of the world to China in economic, security, and

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political terms. It is the most important destination for Chinese exports (taking about 48% of Chinese exports in 2008) and for Chinese investment (hosting at least US $11.36 billion in Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as of 2007).6 Asia serves as a source of raw materials, the supplier of components, technology, and management expertise for global production networks operating in China, and increasingly as a market for finished Chinese products. Asian FDI played a critical role in fuelling China’s economic takeoff and export boom. Much of China’s economic success can be attributed to the operations of multinational companies which import components from Asia, assemble goods using Chinese workers, and export the finished products to markets in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. Approximately 60% of Chinese exports are now produced by foreign invested enterprises, many of which are based in Asia.7 China has become increasingly dependent on oil imported from the Middle East and on sea lanes of communication to support its trade. Much of this traffic passes through Asian waters, including through potential choke points such as the Malacca Strait. Geography also makes Asia critically important to China from a security perspective. China shares land borders with 14 East Asian, South Asian, and Central Asian countries. Chinese leaders worry that neighbouring countries could serve as bases for subversion or for military efforts to contain China. This is of particular concern because much of China’s ethnic minority population, which Chinese leaders view as a potential separatist threat, lives in sparsely populated border regions. Chinese concerns about threats posed by “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism” have prompted increased efforts at security cooperation with its Central Asian and South Asian neighbours. China’s unresolved territorial claims are all in Asia, including claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and parts of the East China Sea, and China’s claim to Taiwan. Six of the 23 countries that officially recognize Taiwan are in the South Pacific. China also worries about the possibility of encirclement and threats from conventional military forces based on its periphery. In the 1960s, the United States had significant military forces based on Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand, all within striking

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distance of Chinese territory. Chinese strategists are highly sensitive to recent US actions to improve its military power projection capability in the Pacific and the possibility that US alliances in Asia might someday be turned against China. Finally, Asia is also an important political environment. It is home to major powers such as China, Japan, India, and advanced economies such as Korea and Singapore. East Asia houses 29% of the world’s population, and produces about 19% of global GDP.8 If Asia were able to act collectively, it could rival the geopolitical weight of North America and Europe. Asia has historically lacked the web of regional institutions that produced economic and security cooperation in Europe and which supported the regional integration process that led to the creation of the European Union. The political, ethnic, and cultural diversity of the region and the tendency of Asian states to jealously guard their sovereignty have impeded the creation of strong regional institutions. However, over the last decade, new regional institutions have emerged to promote regional cooperation between Asian states in the economic, security, and political domains. A robust set of non-governmental organizations and people-to-people contacts have also emerged at the societal level. Some see these processes as promoting greater regional integration, which would greatly alter the political dynamics in Asia. China has a strong stake in influencing the political evolution of the region in ways that advance Chinese interests, and in blocking developments that might work against Chinese goals. China’s preferred outcome is a stable environment in Asia that permits rapid Chinese economic growth to continue and supports a continuing increase in Chinese influence. Many Western analysts believe that China’s ultimate (but unstated) goal is to eventually displace the United States as the dominant power in Asia.9 Many Chinese analysts acknowledge that the US role in supporting regional stability and protecting sea lanes of communication makes a significant contribution to regional stability and supports Chinese interests. The US security alliance with Japan exerts a degree of restraint on Tokyo, although Chinese analysts believe this restraining influence has been reduced in recent years with the transformation of the alliance and the gradual lifting of legal constraints on Japanese military activities. However, the


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potential for US power and US alliances to be turned against China makes Chinese analysts uneasy at the prospect of an enduring US security role in the region. China disclaims any desire to dominate Asia, declaring that it will never seek hegemony and talking about cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. But Chinese leaders are also acutely aware of changing trends in the global and regional balance of power, which are closely followed by Chinese intelligence agencies and research institutes. Chinese leaders are aware that rising Chinese economic and military power is viewed as a potential threat by other countries in the region.10 This wariness partly reflects the legacy of China’s earlier support for communist parties and national liberation movements in Asian countries. Beijing ended such ideologically-based support by the early 1980s, but Asian countries remain wary of the possibility that China could build relationships with their ethnic Chinese citizens that undermine their sovereignty. These latent concerns were aggravated by China’s aggressive efforts to pursue its territorial claims in the Spratly Islands, including its 1995 seizure and subsequent fortification of Mischief Reef, a small island in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines. In late 1995 and March 1996, China alarmed many in the region by using military exercises (which included live ballistic missile firings in waters near Taiwan) to express its displeasure at the US decision to permit Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States and speak at Cornell University. These actions prompted articles highlighting China’s rapid economic growth, continuing military modernization, and growing nationalism and asking whether China posed a threat to the Asia-Pacific region.11 Chinese officials and scholars attacked the “China threat theory,” but also recognized the need to address the concerns of their neighbours. Yet reassurance efforts have been paralleled by continuing increased in military spending (official defence budgets have experienced double-digit real annual increases since 1999) and expanding military capabilities that are a source of concern in Asia, especially in Japan.

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China’s dilemma is finding a way to reconcile the rest of Asia to a dominant Chinese regional role without antagonizing the United States or destabilizing the region. This task is complicated by the Taiwan issue, given Beijing’s self-defined “core interest” in preventing Taiwan independence. In the near term, China’s military modernization is focused on developing capabilities that can deter Taiwan independence (which the PLA has defined as developing capabilities to deter and raise the costs of US military intervention). Beijing has refused to rule out the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, although it would greatly prefer to resolve the issue peacefully. Chinese leaders have tried to compartmentalize Taiwan as an “internal affair” that has no relevance to PRC international behaviour, but most countries in Asia (and the United States) would be highly alarmed if China uses force against Taiwan. China’s military preparations to deal with Taiwan contingencies implicitly undercut its efforts to reassure the region that it will be responsible in how it uses its growing military power. Sources of Chinese power in Asia Economic power China’s rapid economic growth, and the increasing economic ties with Asia that it has produced, is the most important source of China’s increasing influence in Asia. One important pattern in China’s trade relations is that other East Asian countries are becoming more dependent on exports to China, but China’s relative dependence on East Asian markets is staying the same. The volume of Chinese trade with East Asia has increased dramatically over the last decade, but the share of Chinese exports going to East Asia (excluding Hong Kong) has declined from 34% in 1996 to 24% in 2006.12 Conversely, China has become the first or second largest trading partner of almost every country in the region since the turn of the millennium (see Tables 1 and 2). Despite periodic political tensions, Japan’s trade with China (not counting Hong Kong) now exceeds Japan’s trade with all ten members of ASEAN and surpassed US-Japan trade levels in 2007. ASEAN exports to China have

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grown rapidly in recent years, but the China market is still only the third most important export market for ASEAN products. These changes in Asian dependence on the China market reflect both the shift of export production from other East Asian economies to tap inexpensive Chinese labor and the Chinese domestic market’s appetite for imports from Asia. Chinese leaders and analysts appear to believe that trade dependence can generate significant political influence as

Table 1: Percent of Imports from China (China’s Rank as Import Source) Japan

South Korea

Taiwan***

ASEAN 6

India

1986

4.7% (4)

0% (--)

.28% (33)

4.0% (6)

.55% (27)

1996

11.6% (2)

5.7% (3)

3.0% (7)

3.0% (5)

1.9% (18)

2006

20.4% (1)

15.7% (2)

12.2% (2)

11.0% (3)

9.4% (1)

2007

20.6% (1)

17.7% (1)

12.7% (2)

11.7% (2)*

11.2% (1)

2008

18.8% (1)

N/A

12.7% (2)

11.1% (2)*

10.0% (1)

Sources: UN Comtrade Database; ***Taiwan Trade Statistics13 ASEAN 6 are Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Brunei

Table 2: Percent of Exports to China (China’s Rank as Export Market) Japan

South Korea

Taiwan***

ASEAN 6

India

1986

4.7% (4)

0% (--)

0% (--)

2.3% (12)

.74% (28)

1996

5.3% (5)

8.8% (3)

0.54% (23)

2.9% (12)

1.8% (14)

2006

14.3% (2)

21.3% (1)

22.7% (1)

8.8% (3)

6.6% (3)

2007

15.3% (2)

22.1% (1)

23.3% (1)

9.4% (3)*

6.5% (3)

2008

15.98% (2)

N/A

27.4 (1)

9.3% (2)

5.6% (3)

Sources: UN Comtrade Database; ***Taiwan Trade Statistics *Does not include statistics from Brunei

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groups that benefit from trade mobilize to protect their economic interests. However these groups do not necessarily exert a dominant influence within other countries. For example, Japanese business groups have called for better Sino-Japanese relations, but this has sometimes been insufficient to outweigh other Japanese voices seeking a more assertive policy toward China. China has also emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment in Asia. Chinese statistics indicate that Chinese enterprises have invested at least US $11.36 billion in Asia as of 2007 while ASEAN statistics show US $2.3 billion of Chinese FDI from 2002-6. This makes a significant contribution to Southeast Asian economies, but Chinese investment only accounts for 1.3% of total foreign investment in ASEAN over the 2002-6 time period—a very small percentage. China does not publish a detailed breakout of its foreign aid programs, but the poorer countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the South Pacific are significant recipients of Chinese development assistance. Much of this assistance goes to improve transportation infrastructure connecting Southeast Asian and Central Asian countries to China. This infrastructure contributes to these countries’ economic development, but it also links them more closely to the Chinese economy and will produce greater trade dependence in the future.14 China’s role as a production site in regional production networks serves as an important link between Asian producers of capital goods and production inputs and developed country markets in the United States and Europe. This ties together the economic interests of Asian companies and countries in a positive-sum manner. Military power Another form of Chinese power that deserves attention is China’s military power. China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has historically been a large land force with a very limited ability to project and sustain power beyond China’s borders. China’s military power has increased significantly over the last decade, creating both newfound respect and heightened concerns in other Asian countries.15 One analyst has described “three pillars” of PLA reform and


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modernization, including: 1) development, procurement, and fielding of new weapons systems and capabilities; 2) institutional and systemic reforms to improve the professionalism and quality of Chinese military personnel; and 3) development of new warfighting doctrines for employing these new capabilities.16 China’s military modernization has been supported by significant increases in defence spending, with the PLA receiving double-digit real budget increases every year since 1997. The official 2008 defence budget was approximately US $60 billion, but estimates that include military-related and off-budget spending suggest that total 2008 spending may range from US $105-150 billion.17 This increased funding has underwritten higher salaries, expanded training and facilities, and the development and acquisition of advanced Chinese and Russian arms. Many of the new weapons systems the PLA is acquiring appear to be focused primarily on deterring Taiwan independence and deterring or delaying possible US intervention. These include development of more accurate short-range and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, acquisition of Russian Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny destroyers equipped with missiles designed to target US aircraft carriers, and modernization of China’s strategic nuclear arsenal. Chinese military strategists are exploring tactics such as attacks on US military computer systems and space assets as means of deterring or delaying the arrival of US military forces in the event of a Taiwan crisis. China’s January 2007 test of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon illustrates one aspect of these efforts. To the extent that these “anti-access strategies” are actually able to hold US military forces in the Western Pacific at risk, they may begin to shift regional perceptions of the military balance of power in Asia.18 Some of the new military capabilities that China is developing will significantly expand the PLA’s ability to project power within Asia. In addition to the capabilities listed above, China is also deploying tankers and air-refueling technology that will extend the range of Chinese fighters. The PLA is improving the capabilities of its airborne and amphibious forces—through making efforts to improve its airlift and sealift capability and expeditionary operation abilities. Chinese military officials are now openly discussing building an aircraft carrier, citing the

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need to contribute to humanitarian relief operations and protect China’s sea lanes of communication as justification.19 A recent study notes that the PLA already performs power projection missions to some extent by responding to crises, contributing to deterrence, and enhancing regional stability. Although lack of foreign bases constrains PLA power projection capability, the PLA is increasing its “presence deployments” through naval visits and port calls and PLA participation in joint and combined military exercises with other militaries.20 China’s accelerated military modernization program has been accompanied by efforts to reassure its Asian neighbors that a more powerful PLA will not threaten their security. China has sought to demonstrate that its military and paramilitary forces can make useful contributions to regional and global security, including via increased participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions and humanitarian relief operations following the India Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake in 2005. The latest example was China’s deployment of a three-ship task force to the Gulf of Aden in December 2008 to participate in counter-piracy operations. China has also offered to increase regional cooperation on non-traditional security issues. Although the resources committed to these missions have been relatively modest, they are intended to showcase a constructive role for Chinese military power. Chinese military officers are now discussing ways in which the PLA might contribute to regional security goals by providing “public goods” such as counter-piracy measures, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and by contributing to the security of sea lanes of communication. China clearly hopes that defining ways in which the Chinese military contributes to regional security will ease concerns about its military spending and improvements in its power projection capabilities. “Soft power” In contrast to China’s military modernization, Chinese efforts to expand its “soft power” within Asia have not raised similar concerns. The discussion below focuses on soft power in terms of China’s ability to persuade others to pursue its goals and values or to emulate its


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behavior.21 One important trend is increasing contact between Chinese citizens and people in other Asian countries. Flows of tourists and students between China and other Asian countries have increased dramatically in recent years as China has loosened restrictions on overseas travel by its citizens. Chinese tourists have flocked to Asia, with over five million visiting other East and Southeast Asian countries in 2008.22 Many Chinese tourists visit Asian countries with tour groups, which do not always leave a positive impression in the countries they visit. Educational contacts between China and Asia have also increased significantly. China sent about 100,000 students to East Asian countries in 2007, and hosted more than 115,000 East Asian students, with South Korea and Japan sending the most. In Oceania, China sent nearly 65,000 students—all to Australia and New Zealand—and hosted roughly 2,000, with most coming from Australia.23 The Chinese government has supplemented these educational exchanges by supporting the establishment of “Confucius Institutes” in foreign countries to teach Chinese language and promote Chinese culture. The first Confucius Institute was established in 2004; there are now more than 328 institutes in 82 countries. As of the end of 2007, seven East Asian countries, Oceania and India hosted some 54 Confucius Institutes, with Thailand, South Korea, and Japan hosting at least ten apiece.24 In addition to business, tourism, and student contacts, the Chinese government actively encourages Chinese scholars and experts to participate in academic and unofficial “track 2” policy conferences in Asia. Much of this participation occurs via Chinese government thinktanks or Government Operated Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) created to interact with foreign non-government organizations. The Chinese government has sought to increase contacts between Chinese and East Asian think tanks—and to exert some degree of control over the regional agenda—by providing financial and organizational support for participation of Chinese experts and by sponsoring the establishment of the “Network of East Asian Thinktanks” (NEAT) in 2003. NEAT includes members from all the ASEAN + 3 countries. The China Foreign Affairs University, which reports to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, serves as NEAT’s General Coordinator with

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responsibility for coordinating cooperation between think tanks in the ASEAN + 3 countries and coordinating Chinese domestic think tanks. NEAT’s agenda is focused on increasing East Asian cooperation and promoting regional integration.25 Chinese scholars and experts increasingly have the language skills and expertise to function effectively in these types of meetings. However, the perception that Chinese participants often deliver approved government talking points and cannot fully express their individual viewpoints probably limits their influence. Appeals to cultural and linguistic affinities have been important in dealing with countries with significant ethnic Chinese minorities. Malaysia and Indonesia, which previously viewed their ethnic Chinese populations with suspicion, now regard them as an asset and comparative advantage in building economic relations with China. China found some sympathy in Southeast Asia for appeals to “Asian values” during its efforts to resist human rights pressure from the United States and Europe in the 1990s. Cultural and linguistic diversity in Asia is likely to limit China’s ability to harness purported common “Confucian values” as a diplomatic tool. Few Asian elites are attracted to Chinese values, or desire to emulate China’s system of government. However, appeals to regional solidarity may have some impact, particularly as countries in Asia struggle to deal with the effects of the ongoing global economic crisis. In the cultural sphere, talented China artists are beginning to win regional and international recognition. Some Chinese cultural products reflect traditional Chinese culture in ways that resonate within East Asia, but many others have more limited regional appeal due to their focus on Chinese domestic concerns, their derivative nature, and language barriers. Films have arguably been China’s most successful cultural exports. Some artists such as director Zhang Yimou and actress Gong Li have built international reputations based on their work in China, but the most successful Chinese actors and directors (such as Jackie Chan and Ang Lee) are actually from Hong Kong or Taiwan. A boomlet is underway in Chinese visual arts, but much of this work is derivative rather than setting new trends. In comparison with the work being produced in other Asian countries, Chinese cultural products are limited by the less developed Chinese market, political constraints on content, and the lack


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of effective intellectual property rights to ensure that innovation is appropriately compensated. Some of these constraints are likely to relax as China becomes richer, but for now other Asian countries are producing work that has more regional impact and influence. It is also worth noting that many of the most successful Chinese achieved their fame with work done outside China, including Nobel-prize winning novelist Gao Xingjian. Chinese companies have sought, with limited success, to build internationally recognized brand names. Hai’er (refrigerators) and Huawei (routers and communications products) have been most successful. However, in most cases Chinese products currently compete on the basis of price rather than quality. Nevertheless, if goods are cheap enough, Chinese products can still have a significant impact that promotes a positive image of China. For example, Chinese motorcycles that sell at about a quarter of the price of those produced in Japaneseowned factories in Thailand have become affordable for poor villagers in Laos. The resulting access to transportation has literally saved lives and has had a major improvement in the quality of life for Laotian villagers in remote areas.26 Many Asian elites look at China’s economic success with envy and admiration. The pace of construction in China’s major cities—and the number of architecturally ambitious new buildings in Beijing and Shanghai—is striking. Beijing built an impressive set of facilities and infrastructure improvements to support the successful 2008 Olympics. China’s manned space program is regarded by some Asian elites as an important technological achievement of the Chinese system. Yet these impressive accomplishments have a darker side that is quickly evident. China’s breakneck growth has been accompanied by rampant environmental degradation that has damaged China’s air and water.27 Rapid growth and construction in China’s major cities has destroyed many of their most distinctive features and displaced poorer citizens to distant suburbs with limited compensation. Poor urban planning and rapid growth in the number of automobiles are making traffic a nightmare in many Chinese cities.

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Some believe the Chinese approach of reforming the economy while limiting political freedom represents a new development model with considerable appeal to authoritarian leaders in developing countries.28 China’s development model actually draws heavily on orthodox development economics and benefits from special factors such as a large domestic market and large labor supply that cannot readily be replicated by most other countries.29 Domestic problems, social inequality, environmental degradation, and periodic political clampdowns also limit China’s attractiveness as a model for others to emulate. Within Asia, Vietnam has clearly been influenced by China’s approach to economic development, but the country Chinese leaders have tried hardest to influence—North Korea—has proved reluctant to embrace a Chinesestyle opening. A slowdown in growth or a major political incident would highlight the downsides of the Chinese model and significantly reduce China’s ability to employ soft power as a diplomatic tool. China’s reassurance campaign China has pursued a variety of diplomatic, economic, and military means to reassure its Asian neighbours that a stronger China will not threaten their interests. China’s diplomatic efforts in Asia now rest upon a foundation of well trained and capable diplomats who are able to convey Chinese messages effectively.30 The content of China’s diplomatic messages has also changed to have more appeal in Asia. In 1997-98 China advanced the “New Security Concept,” a reformulation of its five principles of peaceful co-existence that called for mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and resolution of conflicts through dialogue.31 This concept meshed reasonably well with the principles and preferred methods of operation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states.32 (The so-called “ASEAN way” emphasizes decision-making by consensus, respect for national sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and a gradual pace to security cooperation). Chinese pledges of non-interference and respect for


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sovereignty provide assurances that Beijing will not support separatist groups or intervene on behalf of ethnic Chinese outside its borders. China has sought to reassure ASEAN states by engaging and negotiating with them on a multilateral basis, foregoing the bargaining advantages that the stronger country enjoys in bilateral negotiations. Beijing’s willingness to negotiate in the “ASEAN + China” framework offered some reassurance that China would not pursue a divide and conquer strategy. China also launched a series of annual summits with ASEAN, began participating more actively in the ASEAN Regional Forum and its unofficial counterpart the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), and signed the “Declaration of Conduct on the South China Sea,” a non-binding pledge to resolve territorial disputes peacefully. This pledge was an important confidencebuilding measure because four ASEAN countries claim parts of the disputed Spratly Islands, but recognize they lack the power to stand up to China on their own. At the 2003 Bali summit, China became the first non-ASEAN member to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which codified ASEAN’s preferred principles of international conduct such as nonaggression, non-interference, and peaceful resolution of disputes. Beijing also signed a strategic partnership agreement with ASEAN, giving the organization a status equal to its partnerships with other major powers. China has also become more willing to participate substantively in regional multilateral organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Coordination (APEC) forum, ASEAN +3 (Japan, China, Korea), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asian Summit. China had historically been reluctant to participate in multilateral fora due to fears that other countries would gang up on it and because multilateral norms and procedures could constrain its ability to pursue its interests. China’s increased multilateralism is a means of channeling Chinese power in ways that make it more acceptable to its neighbors.33 Some analysts argue that China now views multilateral and regional organizations as important political venues and has become more active in these organizations as a means of pursuing its national interests.34 China’s establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a

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means of combating terrorism and expanding its influence in Central Asia is compatible with this view, as is China’s effective use of bilateral diplomacy to influence the agenda of multilateral organizations such as ASEAN and the SCO in directions that advance Chinese interests. China has also taken some concrete measures to address Asian security concerns. One of the most important has been its efforts to resolve almost all of its outstanding land border disputes with its neighbors in the 1990s.35 These efforts have eased concerns about potential conflicts over borders and paved the way for increased crossborder cooperation against terrorism and organized crime. In many cases, China has made territorial concessions in order to resolve these disputes (although Beijing has often sought to keep the details of these concessions secret to avoid nationalist criticism).36 It is important to note, however, that China has not resolved its numerous maritime sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, which remain a significant source of tension with Southeast Asian countries and Japan. China’s restraint in the use of its military forces has been an equally important factor. The aggressive actions that alarmed China’s Asian neighbours in the mid-1990s have not been repeated in recent years. Beijing’s rhetoric claims that China’s increasing military power is a force for peace that does not threaten any country. China has made some efforts to demonstrate that its military and paramilitary forces can make some useful contributions to regional and global security. These include increased participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions. As of November 2008, China had 1,949 military personnel deployed on nine UN missions and in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In September 2007, Major General Zhao Jingmin became the first Chinese officer to command a UN peacekeeping mission.37 China has also offered to increase regional cooperation on non-traditional security issues such as disaster relief, counter-terrorism, and counter-piracy. China’s three deployments of three-ship task forces to the Gulf of Aden provide an indicator of China’s expanding ability to conduct military operations out of area, albeit on a relatively small scale. Although the resources committed to these missions have been relatively modest, they provide a positive contribution to regional security and symbolize a constructive role for Chinese military power.


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China has also made modest efforts to increase its transparency on military issues as a confidence-building measure. China published its first white paper on arms control and disarmament in 1995, and began publishing biannual white papers on national defence in 1998. The defence white papers provide ample assurances of China’s peaceful intentions and only limited information on PLA military capabilities, but are nevertheless an important step toward greater transparency.38 Starting in 2002, China began to observe and then participate in bilateral and multilateral military exercises with neighbouring countries as a confidence building measure. Although most are simple search and rescue exercises, they do provide an opportunity for Asian militaries to interact with their PLA counterparts. China has also improved the quality of its participation in multilateral security dialogues at both the official and unofficial levels, and established bilateral security dialogues with most major countries in Asia. Although Chinese participants remain reluctant to talk about Chinese military capabilities and often repeat official talking points, these dialogues still have some value. In the economic realm, China has sought to persuade Asian countries that they will share in the benefits of China’s rapid growth, while simultaneously advancing Chinese interests through commercial diplomacy. “Win-win” and “mutual benefit” are the watchwords of China’s economic diplomacy. Chinese imports are fuelling growth throughout Asia and in other regions of the world. In 2003, China became the largest export market for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Demand from China is credited with helping to revive the Japanese economy from its decade-long slump. China’s increasing role in world trade and expectations of future growth make it an attractive market and give Beijing leverage in dealing with trade partners. A relatively new element in China’s economic diplomacy involves negotiation of regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). The China-ASEAN FTA is the most significant example, but China signed a bilateral FTA with New Zealand in 2008 and is currently discussing similar deals with Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, and others.39 China’s FTA with ASEAN includes “early harvest” provisions that provide additional benefits to ASEAN agricultural producers. Chinese officials also regularly use

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trade-facilitation agreements or non-binding bilateral trade targets to leverage market access as a diplomatic tool in bilateral relations. Assessment of China’s Asia strategy China’s efforts to provide reassurance of its benign intentions has had significant impact, but Asian states still have significant concerns.40 Some Southeast Asian states are actively encouraging the United States, Japan, and India to take a more prominent role in regional affairs to balance against Chinese influence. Asian governments have decided to treat China as an economic opportunity, but Southeast Asian businessmen regard competition from Chinese exports as a serious challenge and Korean and Japanese businessmen worry that Chinese enterprises may quickly move up the technology ladder to compete with their exports of more advanced goods. Asian states have welcomed China’s participation in multilateral organizations, but Beijing’s behaviour within regional fora has been mixed. In negotiations with ASEAN states over the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, China let individual ASEAN states determine their own comfort level with the coverage and pace of trade liberalization commitments. The resulting agreement is a hodgepodge, but ASEAN states were pleased at Beijing’s willingness to defer to their concerns. One Southeast Asian diplomat noted that China has generally been willing to adapt its proposals for regional cooperation to build consensus, deferring contentious issues or delaying proposals that are moving too fast for ASEAN sensibilities.41 In other areas, China’s behaviour has been less accommodating. Asian officials and security analysts praise Beijing’s willingness to cooperate and to defer resolution of maritime territorial disputes and sovereignty issues, but also note that China has been unwilling to make substantive concessions on most issues. China agreed to participate in a sub-regional organization to address Mekong River issues, but has generally been unresponsive to the concerns of those in downstream countries adversely affected by Chinese dams.42 Beijing’s responsiveness to Asian concerns about food and product safety has also varied. China is quick to pull any foods that have safety issues from the Japanese market,


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but reportedly rebuffed Indonesian efforts to apply its domestic food safety standards to Chinese imports.43 China has pursued joint energy exploration projects with the Philippines and Vietnam in the Spratly Islands that violate the spirit of its pledge to resolve its sovereignty claims multilaterally, and has reportedly begun to press its claims to the Spratly Islands in bilateral meetings with some ASEAN states. The May 2009 deadline for states to file declarations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea has heightened regional tensions over competing claims to the Spratly Islands as a number of countries (including China) sought to reiterate and reinforce their territorial claims. China’s efforts to pressure international oil companies not to sign exploration agreements in disputed waters and its harassment of US survey ships operating in its exclusive economic zone have also raised concerns. China’s military confidence building measures have helped reassured some sceptics, but others note that Beijing has provided only limited information about its military capabilities and has refused to discuss the most important security issues (such as Taiwan) in multilateral settings. China’s regional security strategy depends on increasing Chinese influence without antagonizing the United States. Chinese officials have made conscious efforts to reassure the United States that Beijing recognizes US interests in Asia and has no intention of pushing the United States out of the region. Beijing has not repeated its 1997 campaign to press US allies in Asia to abandon their alliances with Washington. China’s cooperation on counter-terrorism and critical role in efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program have provided positive security cooperation that has helped ease US concerns. Nevertheless, US officials remain wary of Chinese efforts to improve its security ties with US allies and have noted China’s apparent preference for regional organizations such as the SCO and the East Asian Summit where the United States is not a member. US officials and analysts are also paying close attention to China’s military modernization efforts; China’s January 2007 test of a direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) weapon sparked serious debate in the United States and elsewhere about China’s strategic intentions in space.44 US preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan has distracted attention from

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China’s efforts to increase its influence in Asia, but these concerns have not gone away. Japanese officials share many of the same concerns about Chinese regional influence and military modernization efforts, which have become an aggravating factor in Sino-Japanese relations. China’s interests in the South Pacific The South Pacific is not a primary focus of China’s foreign policy, but a number of elements of Beijing’s broader regional strategy shape its activities there. Perhaps the most important, and the most distinctive, element has been the competition for diplomatic recognition between China and Taiwan. Twenty-three countries give official diplomatic recognition to Taiwan; mostly smaller states in Africa, Central America, and the South Pacific. China and Taiwan have engaged in a bitter struggle to hold onto their diplomatic allies and to steal away states that recognize the other side; using technical assistance, foreign aid, and sometimes outright bribery as weapons. Currently six of the fourteen states in the Pacific Island Forum recognize Taiwan instead of China, thus constituting an important part of Taiwan’s claim to status as a sovereign nation. Although competition between China and Taiwan has provided Pacific island states some resources, it has also exacerbated local governance problems and sometimes been a significant source of domestic political tensions.45 The Taiwan issue is the factor that has prompted Beijing to commit significant economic and diplomatic resources to the South Pacific in recent years, including a series of highlevel visits and sponsorship of the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in Fiji in April 2006 (highlighted by Wen Jiabao’s presence, the first visit to a Pacific island by a PRC Premier). Since taking office in May 2008, Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou has sought a “diplomatic truce” with China that would put an end to each side’s efforts to woo away the other’s allies. Beijing has not formally accepted Ma’s proposal, but no countries have changed recognition since Ma came into office. If it holds, the diplomatic truce would reduce the urgency of China’s primary motivation for expanding its influence and


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presence in the South Pacific. At the same time, the ability to create a domestic crisis in Taiwan by persuading Taipei’s diplomatic allies to switch recognition is an important source of PRC leverage in cross-Strait relations, even if Beijing chooses not to exercise this option. As a result, competition between China and Taiwan is likely to remain an important factor in the South Pacific, albeit in somewhat muted form. China has other economic and strategic interests at play in the South Pacific, but these are relatively modest when considered from the perspective of China’s global interests. Resource acquisition has been a key rationale for China’s “go out” strategy of encouraging Chinese firms to expand their international investments and operations. For firms in industries that require a steady supply of imported raw materials, meeting current and projected resource needs requires them to go where potential supplies are available. In the South Pacific context, the single most important Chinese project has been the Chinese Metallurgical Construction (Group) Corporation’s investment in the Ramu nickel mining project in Papua New Guinea in 2005. Chinese companies are pursuing other mining opportunities in Papua New Guinea and the China National Petroleum Corporation is also pursuing access to natural gas resources there. Chinese companies are also interested in timber and mineral resources in Fiji and the Solomon Islands.46 While resource acquisition efforts typically involve larger (usually state-owned) Chinese companies that are actively supported by the Chinese government, one of the characteristics of China’s overseas economic involvement is the diversity of large and small firms that are active internationally. Many of these firms are pursuing their individual commercial interests with little direction (and sometimes little direct support) from the Chinese state. China’s trade with the island states in the South Pacific probably exceeded US $1 billion in 2007, with Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands being China’s largest trading partners. China enjoys a significant trade surplus, which is a source of some frustration among Pacific Islanders. A significant area of Chinese commercial interest is in exploitation of fish resources in the South Pacific. Some Chinese companies do pay for legal access to fisheries, and there is significant Chinese investment, grant aid, and joint ventures

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in fish-processing facilities located on various islands. However, there are also persistent problems with illegal Chinese fishing in South Pacific waters (as well as numerous complaints about illegal fishing from Taiwan-owned fleets). The commercial activities of relatively new Chinese immigrants and entrepreneurs who are less well integrated into local society have created significant tensions between local populations and Chinese immigrants. Illegal immigration from China is also viewed as a significant problem.47 The remote geographic location of the South Pacific islands limits their strategic relevance in terms of stationing or operating military forces in the region. However, particular characteristics of satellite operations make some degree of access useful for conducting space operations and operating a global communications network. China established a satellite tracking station on South Tarawa Atoll in Kiribati in 1997, which has been used to support China’s manned space flight operations. There are also reports that the facility has been used to monitor US ballistic missile defence tests in the Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands. The Chinese satellite station was reportedly mothballed following Kiribati’s diplomatic defection to Taiwan in November 2003, but China has a significant interest in establishing a similar facility elsewhere in the South Pacific.48 China has reportedly used space monitoring ships operating in the South Pacific to support its manned space flight operations since the loss of the station in Kiribati. This discussion of Chinese interests supports an overall assessment that diplomatic competition with Taiwan is the primary motivation for China’s increased high-level interest in the South Pacific in recent years. Absent that competition, one would have expected China’s rapid growth to produce a significant expansion of Chinese trade and investment activities, similar to expansions in China’s economic presence that have occurred in other regions. However if competition with Taiwan is the primary explanation for increased Chinese high-level diplomatic contacts and foreign assistance efforts, then China’s future activity will continue to be modulated by the dynamics of cross-strait relations. July 2009 testimony by the Republic of Nauru’s Ambassador to the United States highlights concerns of Pacific Island states regarding the decline in the United States diplomatic presence in the South Pacific and


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the desire for a more active US role. Although his testimony does not mention China by name, it highlights “the rise of certain donor countries and the emergence of new partners” as a rationale for increased US attention to the region.49 The United States has sought to maintain active foreign assistance programs in the region, and has also made greater use of military channels to engage Pacific Island states on non-traditional security and humanitarian/civic assistance programs.50 China’s emergence as a significant economic and diplomatic actor in the South Pacific has come at some cost to US, Australian, and New Zealand influence. The issue is less the absolute level of Chinese assistance (which appears to be significantly smaller than Australian and US aid programs and roughly comparable with New Zealand efforts) than China’s impact as an alternative source of assistance that does not impose governance or anti-corruption conditions. The perceived need for a free hand to compete with Taiwan is a factor in China’s preference to handle foreign assistance in bilateral channels and to resist efforts to engage Beijing in cooperation with other donors. However, this pattern is also evident in Chinese foreign aid policy in other regions, such as Africa. As a result, efforts by other donors to engage Beijing in cooperative approaches are likely to meet with resistance, unless aid recipients actively request China to participate in such coordination. But because most aid recipients see the ability to play China off against Western donors as increasing their leverage, they are unlikely to press Beijing to coordinate its activities. China’s expanded economic and diplomatic role in the South Pacific is likely to limit the ability of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to execute a coordinated policy approach focused on improving governance and promoting economic development. At the same time, China is unlikely to displace these countries as significant actors in the South Pacific. Conclusion A useful way of thinking through future possibilities is to examine likely consequences if present trends continue as well as potential developments that could alter or reverse those trends. China’s political

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leadership must continue to manage a host of difficult domestic challenges in order to maintain stability and support economic growth. Growth gives the central government additional resources, but also aggravates problems such as pollution, inequality, and energy insecurity. China’s rapid growth is increasing trade with Asia, the United States and Europe, and providing resources that underwrite China’s military modernization and help to create jobs and rising living standards that contribute to social stability. If this trend continues, Chinese political influence in Asia is likely to grow. However, China will also experience increasing economic frictions with the United States and with Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea where politically important industries already complain about unfair competition with Chinese firms. The Chinese economy’s demand for energy and commodity imports may also stimulate increased competition with Asian countries, including for resources in the South Pacific. If China’s military modernization continues on its present path, Beijing’s position with respect to Taiwan is likely strengthened considerably, but at the cost of heightened tensions with the United States, Japan, and some Southeast Asian countries as PLA capabilities increase. Efforts to reassure neighbours are likely to continue, notably through an increase in exercises with Asian militaries and increased cooperation on non-traditional security issues. A Chinese decision to acquire an aircraft carrier would be viewed as a watershed event, even if Beijing justifies the acquisition in terms of non-traditional security missions. Continued Chinese diplomatic success would likely require Beijing to pursue positive regional initiatives while exercising military restraint and deferring controversial issues to the future. A more confident China would likely continue to focus on cooperative approaches and long-term regional goals. A key question is whether China will continue to pursue a moderate course if issues such as territorial disputes or energy security force themselves onto the regional agenda. A number of domestic and regional developments could alter the trajectory of China’s Asia policy. Serious internal unrest could lead to a domestic crackdown, which would damage China’s reputation within the region and heighten concerns about Chinese international behaviour. Crackdowns on domestic unrest in Tibet in 2008 and in Xinjiang in 2009


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have had a modest negative effect on China’s regional image. A domestic economic crisis could lead China’s leaders to focus on restoring growth and exporting their way out of a crisis, regardless of the negative impact on its neighbours. The current global economic crisis could have a similar result; China’s neighbours are already concerned about China’s efforts to maintain a trade surplus at their expense. Regional security problems could also produce changes in Chinese policy. A North Korean collapse or a military conflict precipitated by Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons ambitions could led to assertive Chinese actions to control the situation, which could heighten conflicts with Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. Despite China’s efforts to paint Taiwan as a “domestic issue” that is qualitatively different from its approach to international security concerns, Asian countries still view Beijing’s approach to Taiwan as a litmus test for Chinese behaviour. A decision to use force against Taiwan would alarm East Asian countries and could undo many of the gain’s made in Beijing’s decade-long reassurance campaign. Finally, heightened rivalry between China and Japan could raise bilateral tensions and potentially disrupt economic cooperation and the trend toward greater regional cooperation in the region. Both governments seek to stabilize relations, but competition for regional leadership or a security incident over resources or disputed territory in the East China Sea could alter the dynamics of the relationship in a negative direction. During the reform era, China has sought to preserve a stable international environment that supports continued economic growth which can help maintain domestic stability, build its national wealth and power, and expand its influence. These principles have also guided China’s Asia policy, which has emphasized the need to avoid a confrontation with the United States and to reassure Asian countries that a stronger China will not threaten their interests. China’s policy has been remarkably successful in preserving a stable regional environment and persuading its neighbours to view China as an opportunity rather than a threat. Despite China’s restrained and constructive regional behaviour over the last decade, significant concerns remain about how a stronger and less constrained China might behave in the future, concerns that are especially prevalent in the United States and Japan, two of the strongest

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countries in the Asia-Pacific region. These uncertainties—and China’s increasing role in shaping Asia’s future—ensure that debate about how a stronger China will behave in the future will remain a contentious issue in both the United States and in Asia. This debate will have implications for how China and other powers operate in the South Pacific, but is unlikely to turn Pacific islands states into a major focus of great power competition. References The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government. 1.

2.

3. 4.

Adapted from the author’s chapter in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, eds., International Relations in Asia: Towards a New Regional System (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2008). The author thanks Michael Kiselycznyk and Dean Knox for research assistance. Suisheng Zhao, ed., Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004); Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Evelyn Goh, ed., Betwixt and Between: Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the U.S. And China (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005); David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006); Michael A. Glosny, “Heading toward a Win-Win Future?: Recent Developments in China’s Policy towards Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 2, no. 1 (2006), 24-57; Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007); and Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon, eds., China, the United States, and Southeast Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics (New York: Routledge, 2008). Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia, 9-10. For assessments of China’s grand strategy, see Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past Present and Future (Washington, DC: RAND, 2000) and Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).

Chinese Foreign Policy in Asia: Implications for the South Pacific 5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

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Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/1999), 114-146. Trade figures are from the Ministry of Commerce website. FDI totals are from MOFCOM/SAFE and National Statistic Bureau, “2007 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.” Both use China’s definition of Asia (which includes South Asia and Persian Gulf countries) and Oceania, but exclude Chinese FDI to Hong Kong and Macao. David Barboza, “Made in China’ labels don’t tell whole story,” International Herald Tribune, 9 February 2006. World Bank “Key Development data & statistics,” available at . East Asia percentage of global GDP is based on 2005 purchasing power parity estimates in World Bank, 2007 World Development Indicators (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 185. Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Marvin C. Ott, “Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response?,” Strategic Forum, no. 222 (October 2006), (15 Jan. 2008). For accounts of how Chinese leaders and analysts came to this realization, see David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order.” International Security 29, no. 3 (2004–2005), 64–99 and Yong Deng, “Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 186-214. Michael T. Klare, “The Next Great Arms Race,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (May/June 1993), 136-152; Denny Roy, “Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s threat to East Asian security,” International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), 149-168; and Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). For a survey of regional views and strategies, see Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999). Percentages are calculated from Chinese export statistics as reported in the UN Comtrade database. Taiwan figures are from Taiwan’s Bureau of Foreign Trade, available at < http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/english/FSCE/FSC0011E.ASP>; 1989 data (the earliest available) is used for the 1986 figure. 1986 India data is from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistical Yearbook 1990. ASEAN 6 data for Brunei uses 1985 data and 1998 data to substitute for unavailable 1986 and 1996 data. ASEAN 6 rankings consider intra-ASEAN 6 trade with other ASEAN 6 members

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14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19. 20.

21.

22.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific (e.g. ASEAN 6 exports to Singapore) as trade with other countries for ranking purposes. John W. Garver, “Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-west and South Asia,” China Quarterly, no. 185 (March 2006), 1-22; Phillip C. Saunders, China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006), (15 Jan. 2008). Two important recent studies of China’s military are David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004) and Dennis J. Blasko, “The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century” (New York: Routledge, 2006) David M. Finkelstein, “China’s National Military Strategy: An Overview of the ‘Military Strategic Guidelines,’” in Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 70-72. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, p. 31. The higher figures are a DIA estimate of total PRC defenserelated spending. For an assessment of Chinese anti-access strategies and their implications, see Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2007). Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007. Roy D. Kamphausen and Justin Liang, “PLA Power Projection: Current Realities and Emerging Trends,” in Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security, ed. Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Evan Medeiros (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International peace, 2007), 111-150. For a useful discussion, see Ralph Cossa, “chapter” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, eds., International Relations in Asia: Towards a New Regional System (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2008). ASEAN Secretariat, “Top ten country/regional sources of visitors to ASEAN,” 15 July 2009; Japan Tourism Marketing Co., “Statistics of Visitors to Japan from Overseas,” http://www. tourism.jp/english/statistics/inbound.php, 9 July 2009; Xinhua, “S Korea relieves visa application burden on Chinese tourists,” 14 July 2009.


24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

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Figures for 2007 outbound Chinese students are from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, ; figures for 2007 East Asian students studying in China are from China’s Foreign Affairs 2008 (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2008), table 9. Confucius Institute Online, “Confucius Institutes in the World,” http://www .confuciusinstitute.net/college/globalColleges.htm (30 July 2009). Network of East Asian Think-Tanks, “About Us,” (18 Jan. 2008). Thomas Fuller, “Made In China: Cheap Products Change Lives.” New York Times, 27 December 2007, Section A, Foreign Desk, Long Lao Gao Journal, 4. See Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Joshua Cooper Ramos, The Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), (18 Jan. 2008); Joshua Kurlantzick, “Cultural Revolution: How China Is Changing Global Diplomacy,” New Republic, June 27, 2005, 16-21. For other views, see Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006) and Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Chinese labor costs are beginning to rise, especially in major cities in Southeast China. Some labor-intensive production is beginning to move to countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam that have lower labor costs. Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003), 22-35. David M. Finkelstein, “China’s New Security Concept: Reading between the Lines,” Washington Journal of Modern China 5, no. 1 (1999), 37-50. The 10 ASEAN members are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. On the role for multilateral organizations in legitimating and constraining power, see John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” International Security 23, no. 3, 43-78. On China’s changing attitude and increasing participation in these institutions, see Elizabeth Economy and Michael Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Socialization in International Institutions: the ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory,” in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York:

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34.

35. 36.

37.

38.

39. 40.

41. 42.

43.

44. 45.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Columbia University Press, 2003), 107-162; and Bates Gill, Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC; Brookings Institution, 2007). See Marc Lanteigne, China’s Engagement with International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power (New York: Routledge, 2005) and Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, eds., China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security (New York: Routledge, 2008). China’s border dispute with India is the one important land border dispute that remains unresolved. M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005), 46-83. “China’s National Defense in 2008,” Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, January 2009; Xinhua, “First Chinese UN Peacekeeping Force Commander Takes Office,” 18 September 2007. See Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, Assessing Chinese Military Transparency (Washington, DC.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2009) (forthcoming). “China Moves on Free Trade Negotiations,” Asia Pulse, 8 March 2005. See Ellen L. Frost, James J. Przystup, and Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Rising Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy,” INSS Strategic Forum No. 231, April 2008. [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Strforum/SF231/SF231.pdf] and Evan S. Medeiros, Keith Crane, et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2008) Interviews with Southeast Asian diplomats, 2004-7. Alexander Liebman, “Trickle-down Hegemony? China’s “Peaceful Rise” and Dam Building on the Mekong,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (2005), 281–304; Richard P. Cronin, “Destructive Mekong Dams: Critical Need for Transparency,” Henry L. Stimson Center, 26 March 2007, ; Evelyn Goh, Developing the Mekong: Regionalism and Regional Security in China-Southeast Asia Relations, Adelphi Paper 387, (London: IISS, 2007). Interviews, Beijing, August 2007; Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Asians Say Trade Complaints Bring Out the Bully in China,” Washington Post, 5 September 2007, A1. See e.g. K. K. Nair, “China’s ASAT Test: Implications and Options,” Air Power 2, no. 2 (Summer 2007), 57-74. See the contributions to this volume by James To and Lin Cheng-yi.


47. 48. 49.

50.

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For useful overviews, see Terence Wesley-Smith, “China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics,” Pacific Islands Policy #2 (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2007), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/pip002_1.pdf, Fergus Hanson, “The dragon in the Pacific: more opportunity than threat,” Lowy Institute Policy Brief, June 2008, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=814 and Fergus Hanson, “China: stumbling through the Pacific,” Lowy Institute Policy Brief, July 2009, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1084. See the chapter in this volume by James To [update final reference here.] Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific: Beijing’s ‘Island Fever,’” Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 2 (March/April 2007), p. 322. Marlene Moses, Ambassador of the Republic of Nauru to the United States and Chair of the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment hearing “Ushering in Change: A New Era for U.S Regional Policy in the Pacific,” Washington, D.C., July 29, 2009, available at http://foreignaffairs .house.gov/111/mos072909.pdf. For an overview of U.S. efforts, see Alcy R. Frelick, State Department Director for Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Island Affairs, Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment hearing “Ushering in Change: A New Era for U.S Regional Policy in the Pacific,” Washington, D.C., July 29, 2009, available at http://www.state .gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/07/126656.htm.


Chapter 10 THE SOUTH PACIFIC IN CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY

Jian Yang

China’s influence in the South Pacific has grown substantially in the past one or two decades.1 China’s deepening involvement in the region has caused concerns in the West, ranging from the perceived destabilising effect and China’s strategic motivations. This chapter focuses on the China strategic threat discourse and attempts to present an in-depth analysis by assessing the strategic value of the South Pacific in China’s grand strategy. It concludes that China’s policy toward the South Pacific is not mainly driven by its security strategy. China’s growing influence China’s connections with the South Pacific could be traced back to 5,000 years ago as the languages used by the first settlers in the South Pacific originated in Taiwan.2 However, from 1949, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established, to the early 1970s when China started to normalise its relations with the West, Beijing did not have much contact with the South Pacific, although its ideology-driven foreign policy ensured Beijing’s moral support for the independence movement in the region. The South Pacific was under Western hegemony in terms of the prevailing Cold War spheres of influence.3 Chinese policy towards the South Pacific became more active in the 1960s and 1970s. One major catalyst was the public split between

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Beijing and Moscow in 1960. The Soviet Union subsequently emerged as Beijing’s primary security concern. Consequently, China sought to normalise its relations with the United States. The subsequent rapprochement between Beijing and Washington in the early 1970s paved the way for US allies to normalise their relations with Beijing. Australia established its diplomatic relations with China on December 21, 1972 and New Zealand followed the very next day. Meanwhile, the decolonisation process swept through the South Pacific, enabling China to establish diplomatic relations with the Pacific Island countries (PICs). Taiwan has been a key factor in China’s policy towards the South Pacific. Beijing replaced Taipei at the UN Security Council in 1971. Taipei was forced to seek new friends among the emerging independent states to offset Beijing’s diplomatic victory. It outmanoeuvred Beijing and established diplomatic relations with Fiji in 1971 and with Western Samoa and Tonga in 1972. Beijing did not seem to have a comprehensive policy to engage with the PICs until 1974. In that year, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Fiji and the Soviet Navy paid several “conspicuous” visits. Michael Godley observed that “By the closing months of 1975, a Chinese South Pacific strategy was almost fully developed.”4 It established diplomatic relations with Fiji on November 5, 1975 and with Western Samoa the following day. Up till then, Fiji and Western Samoa had recognised Taipei. About one year later, in October 1976, China established diplomatic relations with Papua New Guinea. Although China made efforts to develop its relations with the PICs in various areas after the mid-1970s, Beijing’s policy towards the South Pacific, like its policies towards other regions, had a clear ideological element—that is, both China and the PICs belonged to the Third World and it was their common interest to fight against imperialism. Indeed, Beijing’s pledge to resist “Great Power Hegemonism” seemed to strike “the most-responsive chord”.5 By the mid-1980s, however, Beijing’s global foreign policy was no longer based on “de facto alignment with the West in confronting the Soviet Union” but had adopted a more independent posture.6 In the South Pacific, Beijing had become more interested in maintaining the status quo of regional stability than emphasising the common struggle against hegemonism. In 1985, Hu

The South Pacific in China’s Grand Strategy

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Yaobang, the General Secretary of the CCP visited the region and articulated three principles that would guide China’s policy: (i) full respect for the foreign and domestic policies of the PICs, (ii) full respect for the existing close relations among these countries, and (iii) full respect for the treaties the PICs had signed with third parties.7 Observers have long noted that China would become a major player in the South Pacific. Godley concluded in 1983 that “China is in the Pacific to stay and there is no question that she is a potential giant in the area.”8 Likewise, Thomas Biddick observed in 1989 that “in the long term, the PRC is likely to play a larger role as a Pacific maritime power, raising new questions for this region of traditional Western influence.” He believed that Beijing regarded the South Pacific as a region in transition—i.e., “presenting opportunities for outside powers to expand their political influence”.9 At about the same time, Ramesh Thakur argued that “as an Asian-Pacific regional power with global aspirations, China is a reminder of emerging multipolarity even in the isolated South Pacific.” He thereby anticipated that “in a longer perspective, China could be seriously interested in gaining access to the region’s fisheries and seabed resources, and perhaps even emerge as a major maritime power in Asia-Pacific”.10 It was not until the late 1990s that China’s influence in the region started to grow substantially. In 1991, China had only four diplomatic posts in the South Pacific while Australia and New Zealand had ten each and the United States had six.11 Currently, China has the largest number of diplomats in the region.12 Moreover, “it is now accepted routine that the first official overseas visit by a new head of government from the region is made to Beijing, not to Canberra, Washington or Wellington”.13 Economically, Beijing has offered various financial assistance packages aimed at enhancing trade, building infrastructure, equipping government and military assets, and developing natural resources.14 China is now believed to be one of the region’s top three aid donors after Australia and the United States. Its estimated annual aid to the region is somewhere between $100 million and $150 million, which represents a rapid increase, although, it is still much smaller than Australia’s contribution (over $400 million).15 China’s trade with the 14 island states that make

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up the Pacific Islands Forum has increased from $121 million in 1995 to $1,534 million in 2007.16 Chinese immigration to the South Pacific since the opening up of China in 1979 has also been a source of increasing influence for China, although of a far less positive nature as discussed later. Concerns about Chinese involvement Analysts have made efforts to explore the motivations behind China’s deepening involvement in the South Pacific. Some argue that China wants to secure South Pacific nations’ votes in international organisations.17 Others note the growing Chinese communities in the region and Beijing’s responsibility to protect the Chinese diaspora. It is estimated that the region has about 80,000 of the world’s 30 million overseas Chinese.18 Most observers focus on Beijing’s diplomatic rivalry with Taipei, China’s economic interests, its thirst for natural resources, the rise of China, and increasingly, China’s strategic interests. It is believed that “Most Pacific governments have welcomed China’s overtures, adopting official “look north” (or “look east”) policies and, at times, playing the “China card” in an attempt to remind longstanding, but demanding, aid donors like Australia that they have other options.”19 However, observers are divided on the implications of China’s deepening involvement in South Pacific. What has been pervading the English language literature is a concern about China’s role in the region. These analysts are worried that the chequebook diplomacy rivalry between Beijing and Taipei is “making Pacific political rugby more corrupt and more violent”20 and “may exacerbate underlying political, social, and economic tensions in the region.”21 They argue that the region is particularly vulnerable due to weak political and legal institutions, corruption, civil unrest, and economic scarcity that exist in some countries. Some are worried that China might be increasingly involved in the internal affairs of Pacific Island states because of the growing Chinese communities in the region. John Henderson, a well respected expert on the South Pacific based in New Zealand, does not agree with the view


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that the Chinese government has encouraged emigration to the region as a means of increasing its influence in the region. However, he does think that “China can be a vocal advocate of the rights of ethnic Chinese in the Pacific.”22 He later suggested in his submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the New Zealand Parliament that China could use the need to protect its overseas community “as a justification for ramping up its military presence in the region.”23 A deeper concern is that China’s growing influence in the South Pacific has strategic implications. China’s deepening involvement in the region coincides with the waning influence of the United States and its European allies. Ron Crocombe noted in 1995 that the United States was facing “decreasing leverage”, in large part because of growing East Asian competition in trade, aid, investment, tourism, education, research, and political influence.24 Benjamin Reilly was concerned in 2001 that “There’s the potential that in five or ten years, we could have in our immediate neighbourhood a collection of states that owe their primary allegiance to a country outside our alliance.”25 Two years later, Henderson and Reilly argued that “China’s long-term goal is to ultimately replace the United States as the pre-eminent power in the Pacific Ocean.”26 As a result, it could no longer be taken for granted that Oceania would remain a relatively benign “American lake”.27 The concern has deepened since then. Susan Windybank emphasised in 2005 that “Foreign policy pundits are already calling a new geopolitical game of power politics and interstate rivalry as a rising China seeks to draft as many countries as possible into its sphere of influence.”28 Tamara Renee Shie noted in 2007 that “By politically and economically strengthening its partnerships in the South Pacific, Beijing may be able to build its own strategic alliances in the long term.”29 More alarmist analysts have even suggested that the Pacific Ocean could in future become the venue for a new Cold War, where the United States and China compete for client states and strategic advantage.30 There is a growing body of literature rejecting the China threat discourse. Yongjin Zhang argues that “there is no sufficient evidence to suggest that China has a clearly defined and well-coordinated strategy to fill a power vacuum in the Pacific.”31 Furthermore, China’s economic

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engagement provides “valuable development opportunities” for the island states.32 Terrence Wesley-Smith discredits the argument that China has encouraged corruption and instability in Oceania and rejects the view that China poses a strategic threat to the West. “China does not appear to be setting itself up to . . . assume a leadership role in Oceania,” observes Wesley-Smith.33 China’s grand strategy During the Cold War years, China defined its national security in excessively narrow military terms. After all, China believed that it was under constant and imminent threat, first from the United States and then the Soviet Union. Beijing’s ideology-driven worldview determined that China would always have a strong sense of military insecurity. Chinese analysts now accept that security means “comprehensive security” (zonghe anquan). It no longer equals national defence and diplomacy and is no longer limited to the defence of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition to traditional military security, national security now includes, among other things, economic security, political security, societal security, environmental security, human security, and technological security. One Chinese analyst concluded that “Basically, every aspect of human life can be regarded as a part of national security.”34 The fundamental change in China’s understanding of national security is the realisation that without a strong economy, the military dimension of national security is not sustainable. This understanding contributed to China’s concept of “comprehensive national power” (zonghe guoli) which was adopted in the 1990s and has constituted the foundation of China’s foreign and domestic policies. The emphasis on economic security, however, should not overshadow military security. “Military security is no less important [than economic security]. It still is an effective guarantee of comprehensive security and the last resort,” cautions a Chinese analyst.35


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China’s security map The Chinese government’s security map is different from those of many other governments in that Beijing has to take care of not only China’s external and internal security, but also the complicated Taiwan issue. China tried to redefine its main potential threats in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War. According to some analysts, Japan was likely to replace the Soviet Union/Russia to become the Chinese leadership’s major concern.36 China’s perceptions of security threats became more complicated after 1996 when the Taiwan Strait crisis made clear the possibility of a military clash between China and the United States over Taiwan.37 Just one month after the dangerous escalation of the Taiwan Strait crisis, US President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto held a summit meeting in Tokyo and signed the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Century. The crisis and the joint declaration as well as the subsequent revision of the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Security Cooperation deepened China’s suspicion of US motives regarding Taiwan and, in the longer term, US strategy toward a rising China. However, many Chinese analysts tend to perceive the United States as a competitor rather than a threat. A basic assessment at the end of the 20th century was that “in short and medium terms the United States will not publicly challenge the overall integrity of our territory and sovereignty by using forces.”38 Chinese leaders see no major military clashes between China and other great powers before 2020. They deemed the first two decades of the 21st century “an important period of strategic opportunities” (zhongyao zhanlue jiyuqi) for China’s economic development. For Chinese leaders, more imminent security concerns are not externally caused but come from within. As an undemocratically elected government with a controlled economy and society in a globalised world, Beijing is acutely aware of its vulnerability. Marxism or a Communist utopia is no longer appealing to the Chinese and the Chinese economy is now more capitalist than socialist. Beijing has a persistent sense of internal crisis. It faces a number of explosive issues, especially the

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widening gap between the rich and the poor, mass unemployment, environmental degradation and rampant corruption. The biggest threat to China is that internal and external threats combine forces. China’s late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping used to remind his comrades that the 1989 Chinese students’ anti-government demonstrations were the result of the combination of the external environment and internal problems. Externally, the West had been trying to “peacefully change China” by exporting Western values to China. Internally, anti-government forces had played upon China’s social problems, such as corruption and inflation. Similarly, Falun Gong and separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang have all been accused of plotting with foreign hostile forces for anti-China activities. The Taiwan issue is closely related to China’s external security and internal stability. Externally, a military clash across the Taiwan Strait could escalate to a China-US military conflict. Internally, a soft stance on the Taiwan issue could trigger off social instability and a power struggle in China. China’s grand strategy According to Michael Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, a grand strategy is a country’s “basic approach to politico-military security.”39 Swaine and Tellis also argue that China’s grand strategy seeks to preserve domestic order, defend against external threats, and eventually attain geopolitical influence as a major, and perhaps, primary state. This is in line with the above discussion which demonstrates that China’s security concerns include external security and internal stability as well as the Taiwan issue, and that China’s overall goal is to enhance its “comprehensive national power”. China’s grand strategy thus consists of at least two main components—national security strategy and national development strategy. National reunification strategy is also an important component but is largely embedded in other two main strategies. National security strategy is based on diplomatic strategy and national defence strategy. National development strategy is more complicated. It encompasses


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economic, political, technological, social and cultural development strategies. National security strategy and national development strategy are interrelated. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese are aware that a strong economy is the foundation of the military dimension of national security. Economic development is also the key to internal stability. Indeed, it has been widely accepted in China that to develop its economy remains China’s “ultimate solution (genben chulu) to all internal and external problems.”40 Internally, to claim its legitimacy, the Chinese government has to raise the living standard substantially. Externally, economic development is a key to comprehensive national power. Chinese leaders often remind themselves that the Soviet Union lost the Cold War to the West mainly because the Soviet economy was not able to sustain the conflict. Military modernisation therefore must be based on economic modernisation. With regard to the Taiwan issue, military coercion is necessary but may not be effective. In fact, it has further strengthened the “China threat theory”. Economic competition and ad hoc economic cooperation with Taiwan is emerging as a more acceptable and effective strategy. On the reunification issue, Beijing has made efforts to accommodate Taipei’s requests.41 However, the fundamental principle of China’s reunification strategy has remained unchanged. That is, Beijing will make every effort to seek peaceful reunification but will retain the right to using force as the last resort. The South Pacific in China’s grand strategy As China develops and becomes more globalised, it becomes more involved abroad, including in the South Pacific. Like other governments, however, Beijing has limited resources in realising its strategic goals and has to prioritise them. Against this background, the strategic value of different regions in China’s grand strategy varies substantially.

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The South Pacific in China’s national reunification strategy In Chapter five of this book, Cheng-yi Lin presents a detailed account of the Taipei-Beijing competition in the South Pacific. Indeed, the region plays an important role in Beijing’s reunification strategy. This is highlighted by the fact that six of the 23 countries that have diplomatic relations with Taipei are in the South Pacific (see Table 1). Biddick noted in 1989 that Beijing and Taipei had been and remained most immediately concerned with their competition for diplomatic recognition and political influence in the South Pacific.42 The Beijing-Taipei competition for diplomatic recognition in the region escalated in the past two decades. As Fergus Hanson argues, to halt and reverse diplomatic recognition of Taiwan has been “the main driver” of Chinese aid to the region.43 Table 1: The South Pacific Diplomatic Tango Country

Year Diplomatic Relations Established with: China

Taiwan

Cook Islands

1997

Micronesia

1989

Fiji

1975

1971

Kiribati

1980

2003

Marshall Islands

1990

1998

Nauru

2002

1980, 2005

Niue

2007

Palau

1999

Papua New Guinea

1976

Samoa

1975

Solomon Islands Tonga

1983 1998

Tuvalu Vanuatu Source: Based on Shie, p. 149

1972

1972 1979

1982


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Shortly after being elected Taiwan’s President on March 22, 2008, Ma Ying-Jeou vowed to end Taiwan’s “chequebook diplomacy” in the South Pacific and to focus on “humanitarian assistance” and “soft power” in Taiwan’s relations with its allies.44 With the improvement of the cross-Strait relations, both Taipei and Beijing are likely to make an effort to honour the “diplomatic truce” and will be restrained in undermining each other’s diplomatic efforts in the region. However, as Lin notes, Taipei has made it clear that the “diplomatic truce” is not a diplomatic “rest” or “holiday”. Both Taipei and Beijing will continue to consolidate their existing diplomatic relations in the region. The South Pacific in China’s national development strategy The South Pacific has a small but fairly significant role to play in China’s national development strategy. The trade volume between China and the 14 Island states has increased substantially in recent years albeit from a low base (see Figure 1). Chinese investment in the region has also been growing. It is believed that in 2005 about 3,000 state and private Chinese companies were doing business in the South Pacific, with nearly US $1 billion invested in hotels, plantations, garment factories, fishing and logging operations.45 In addition, service industries, such as tourism, have a great potential. The number of Chinese tourists to the South Pacific reached 50,000 in 2005, up from 35,000 in 2002.46 China is the fastest growing outbound source of tourists in the world, forecast to reach 100 million by 2020—a tenfold increase in two decades.47 More importantly, China has a demand for the natural resources found in the South Pacific, including fisheries, minerals, gold, copper, lumber, timber, and some hydrocarbons. An oftcited example is the majority Chinese-owned nickel mine in Papua New Guinea’s Madang province. It is one of the biggest offshore mining developments undertaken by a Chinese company valued at US $800 million.48

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1800 1600

Total

1400 1200

Export

1000

Import

800 600 400 200 0 1995 1996 1997

1998 1999 2000

2001 2002 2003 2004

2005 2006 2007

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Total

121.43

143.35

123.27

123.1

135.95

267.57

Export

31.82

43.98

46.43

46.45

49.54

52.71

Import

89.61

99.37

76.84

76.65

86.41

214.86

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

186.36

273.89

471.39

533.58

838.01

1228.6

1534.2

Export

57.34

94.18

201.43

224.27

423.65

708.05

877.89

Import

129.02

179.7

269.86

309.31

414.36

520.56

656.3

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 1996-

Fig. 1: China’s Trade with 14 South Pacific Island Nations (US$ Million)

On the other hand, it should be noted that China’s economic interests in the South Pacific are still limited. The trade volume of $1.5 billion in 2007 was a tiny fraction of China’s total trade of $2,174 billion in the year.49 The region does have valuable natural resources. But it does not have the commodity that China needs most—oil. Pacific ocean-floor resources are difficult to extract in the foreseeable future. Internal instability remains a challenge to China’s economic interests in the region.


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The South Pacific in China’s national security strategy China’s deepening involvement is often portrayed as part of a longerterm political and strategic investment aimed at challenging the leadership of the United States in the greater Asia Pacific region. More specifically, it has been suggested that China could set up missile bases in the region to attack American warships. George Friedman, CEO of the US-based private intelligence corporation Stratfor, claimed in 2001 that China could place some antiship missiles on a number of South Pacific islands and “if . . . U.S. carriers came sailing through from Pearl Harbor, things could get very nasty.”50 This point was repeated by Henderson and Reilly in 2003 and by Windybank in 2005. To some observers, the Chinese may well be playing a well-planned long-term strategic game in the South Pacific. Some even argue that increased Chinese tourism and migration are also part of Beijing’s “economic and strategic penetration of Oceania”.51 As Wesley-Smith has pointed out, these writers “assume, rather than demonstrate” that China poses a long-term security threat to the West.52 The assumption of China placing missiles in the region is largely based on the Western worry over China’s “second island chain” strategy— running from west of the Aleutians down through the Marianas to the eastern extremities of Papua New Guinea. The concept of three “island chains” originated from Admiral Liu Huaqing’s 1988 instruction to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy to establish a long-term development plan. According to this strategic plan, by 2010 the PLA Navy (PLAN) should have established a blue-water presence in the first island chain running south from Japan past Taiwan to the Philippines, followed by the second island chain by 2025 and the third island chain, extending from the Aleutian Islands in the north to Antarctica in the south by 2050.53 This is easier said than done, however. China’s military modernisation started from a very low point. David Shambaugh has observed that “The PLA had been implementing reforms for more than a decade when the [1991] Gulf War starkly demonstrated that it was still operating in terms of a bygone era of warfare.”54 Beijing has since made an effort to speed up its defence modernisation. “However,” Shambaugh argues, “without access to equipment and technologies from the West,

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the PLA will have difficulties closing the conventional weaponry and defence technology gaps with Japan and the West. Indeed, these are steadily widening.”55 Shambaugh found that while “Taiwan’s destroyers and frigates are truly blue-water capable; the same cannot be said of the PLAN, which remains principally a coastal fleet.”56 On the other hand, Robert S. Ross has noted that “Chinese military and regional political advances to date reflect its improved ground force and land-based capabilities. But the United States keeps the peace and maintains the balance of power in East Asia through its overwhelming naval presence.”57 The South Pacific’s value to China’s national security should not be exaggerated. As mentioned earlier, Beijing does not see an imminent military threat. Shambaugh observed in 2002 that “At the beginning of the twenty-first century. . . it would seem that China faces no tangible or immediate external military threat.”58 Beijing’s top security concern has been the Taiwan issue.59 In recent years, the supply of energy and natural resources has become an increasingly important security issue.60 Much of the South Pacific is too far away from the Taiwan Strait to be part of China’s limited military strategy to attack Taiwan. And, as WesleySmith notes, “None of the island states lie close to the strategic sea lanes that service the bulk of China’s trade in energy and raw materials or, for that matter, to other important trans-Pacific commercial or military sea routes.”61 Washington understands this well. It deems much of the vast South Pacific unimportant strategically. However, it maintains a firm control over the northern part of the “second island chain”, particularly Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands where the US military could stage and manoeuvre in the event of any conflict with China over Taiwan. In addition, it has the Free Associated States (FAS) the Republic of Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau. Together with Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, they form a security perimeter of the United States.62 The United States could build military facilities in Palau but so far has found it unnecessary. In a 2002 report to Congress, the US General Accounting Office even argued that the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands no longer play any role in US strategy in the Asia Pacific region.63 Nevertheless,


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under the Compact of Free Association, the United States is obliged to defend the FAS against attack or threat of attack. The United States may block FAS government policies that it deems inconsistent with its duty to defend the FAS, the so-called “defence veto.”64 A widely cited evidence of the region’s strategic value to China has been China’s satellite tracking station at Temawaiku village, South Tarawa atoll in Kiribati which was opened in October 1997.65 Jane’s Defense Weekly quickly claimed that the station was China’s “strategic foothold in the South Pacific.”66 Some observers echoed the claim. They pointed out that the facility played an important role in the development of China’s space warfare program.67 The military nature of the facility seemed obvious to these observers also because it might be used to spy on the US Army’s Kwajalein Atoll/Kwajalein Missile Range in the Marshall Islands, a centre of operations for the development of the US Ballistic Missile Defence system approximately 600 miles from Tarawa.68 Most of such claims were based on speculations. What really concerned some of these observers was not the actual military value of the station, but the fact that it was owned by China. Realising that the station might be closed with a change of government in Kiribati, Henderson and Reilly insisted in 2003 that “Whatever the real purpose of the space-tracking station, the fact that China operates a military facility on the territory of a Pacific Island Forum member stands as a reminder that the potential strategic significance of the Pacific islands may be exploited by non-Western powers.”69 It implies that rising China, a nonWestern country, is likely to be a trouble maker (to the West). Such being the case, whatever China does in the South Pacific can be interpreted as strategic moves against the West. Admittedly, as Wesley-Smith has observed, China’s foreign policy in Oceania “has always had a powerful strategic component” and that “it was China’s intense antagonism toward the Soviet Union that spurred its early involvement in the region.”70 However, with the end of the Cold War and China’s opening up, Beijing’s strategic thinking and environment have changed. While China has been preparing for a limited war over Taiwan in which the United States could be involved, it is too

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early to conclude that China has put in place a strategy for a global conflict with the United States or West which will involve the South Pacific. As mentioned earlier, Beijing has been preoccupied with massive internal challenges and to maintain a peaceful external environment is crucial in this regard. At the moment, military contacts do exist between China and some South Pacific countries, but they are logistics based and far from what one would consider an alliance. In 2007, the Fiji Interim Government, which came to power through a coup, did indicate a willingness to move closer to China in the military arena. The attempt was more likely an effort to register the Fiji military government’s resentment against Australia and New Zealand, which imposed sanctions on Fiji, than a genuine move to deepen military cooperation between the two countries. At this stage, the evidence shows that China is not actively pursuing policies for its national security strategy in the South Pacific. The South Pacific in China’s strategic landscape The South Pacific is marginal in China’s strategic landscape. In its effort to create a peaceful external environment conducive to its economic development, Beijing has been focusing on improving its relations with great powers and its peripheral regions like Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia in parallel with other regions, such as the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. The South Pacific is a low priority to Beijing in terms of strategic attention. This can be illustrated by a comparison between the South Pacific and two similar regions—Latin America and Africa. Latin America and Africa are similar to the South Pacific in that there are a number of countries in each region that recognise Taiwan.71 This means both regions, like the South Pacific, play a part in China’s national reunification strategy. But Latin America and Africa’s importance to China goes beyond the Taiwan issue. They are more important strategically to China than the South Pacific for at least three reasons. First, both Africa and Latin America have a larger base of natural resources, and most critically, oil. Since China’s economic expansion is


275

heavily reliant on a continued inflow of natural and energy resources, it is no surprise that the two regions have become an integral part of its national development strategy. China now gets between 25 and 30 percent of its oil from Africa.72 And China’s oil imports from Latin America amount to over 3 percent of its total oil imports in 2005, up from 1 percent in 2003.73 More importantly, Latin America holds 9.7 percent of world oil reserves. As Francois Lafargue notes, this could potentially enable China to meet its projected energy requirements.74 Beginning in the 1990s China has steadily improved its political relations with both regions in order to create an environment conducive to investment by Chinese corporations. These efforts have been quite successful, and China now has investments across both continents. One example is in Nigeria, where China has secured four oil drilling licenses in a deal involving $4 billion in investments.75 In Latin America, an illustrative example is CNPC’s (China National Petroleum Company) operation of two Venezuelan oil fields, and its commitment to spend over $400 million in the Venezuelan oil sector.76 China’s investments in both regions are also much larger than those in the South Pacific. The total investment by China in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2005 was $11.4 billion.77 In Africa the total was $6.27 billion in 2005.78 In the South Pacific, the sum of Chinese investment in 2003 was $800 million.79 Secondly, Africa and Latin America have become increasingly important markets for China, with trade surging over the last decade. From 1995 to 2007, China’s trade with Latin America grew from $6.1 billion to about $102.7 billion. In the same period, China’s trade with Africa increased from $3.9 billion to $73.7 billion.80 Both regions provide valuable markets for China’s exports while China has a strong demand for the natural resources exported by each region. Although China-South Pacific trade grew at a similar speed during this period, the volume was a relatively minor $1.5 billion in 2007. The South Pacific also lacks the potential offered by Latin America and Africa in terms of future economic development. Thirdly, Latin America, with its geographical proximity to the United States, could be crucial to China’s long-term strategy. Beijing knows that

276


it is playing in the only superpower’s backyard, and does not want to arouse suspicion. Despite China’s caution, the United States has recently shown that it is not oblivious to China’s growing presence in the region. In early 2006, US Assistant Secretary of State Tom Shannon travelled to Beijing to discuss China’s activities in Latin America. This was the first visit by a US official for this purpose.81 The South Pacific, on the other hand, plays a comparatively minor role in US strategy. Chinese analysts’ attention to the three regions reflects their different strategic importance to China. While Chinese analysts have a wellestablished interest in Africa and Latin America, they are unfamiliar with and uninterested in the South Pacific. So much so that one Chinese South Pacific expert is considering publishing an introductory handbook on the South Pacific to “educate” the public and to facilitate the study of the region.82 The lack of interest in the South Pacific is evident in the comparatively much smaller number of Chinese publications about the region (see Table 2).83 On the other hand, Windybank argues that “Paradoxically, the very fact that the Southwest Pacific is considered a strategic backwater may make it more attractive as a testing ground for China’s growing power

Table 2: Search Results of China Academic Journals Full-Text Database (Root Catalog: Politics/Military Affairs/Law) Field

Term

Date Range

Matching

Entries

Title

Nantai (South Pacific, short version)

2000-2008

Precise

6

Title

Nan Taipingyang (South Pacific)

2000-2008

Precise

21

Title

Lading Meizhou (Latin America)

2000-2008

Precise

150

Title

Lamei (Latin America, short version)

2000-2008

Precise

589

Title

Feizhou (Africa)

2000-2008

Precise

1138


277

and ability to shore up allegiances in a region hitherto considered an ‘American lake.’”84 This could be the case. However, as Wesley-Smith rightly points out, this sort of argument “could be applied indiscriminately to any part of the globe… At best, this seems like a shaky basis for serious policy planning and analysis.”85 Conclusion China’s security perceptions display multiple dimensions, reflecting the shifting complexities of world politics. While the military dimension remains a key element, especially because of the Taiwan issue, the political and economic dimensions have become more prominent. To meet the external and internal challenges, Beijing has been focusing on enhancing China’s comprehensive national power with economic development as its foundation. Economic development has been “the highest goal in making external strategies.”86 A strong economy is not only the foundation of the military dimension of national security, it is also a key to maintaining internal stability and to resolving the Taiwan issue. China’s economic growth has been breathtaking. Parallel to China’s economic growth is the increase of Chinese influence. And with the rise of China’s influence comes the emergence of the “China threat theory”. The China threat discourse in the South Pacific thus has become a part of a fixture of geopolitical analysis. Concerns about China’s strategic intentions are not well founded. China’s deepening involvement in the region has been driven mainly by its diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan and its economic interests. There is no clear evidence to suggest that it is a calculated strategic move for China’s military security. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China’s national security is very much limited at the present and will remain so for the foreseeable future. In addition to China being constrained by its power capability, Hanson argues, rightly, that “China’s defence aspirations in the South Pacific are likely to remain limited. Any significant military move by China in the region would be counterproductive.”

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References 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

The South Pacific in this chapter refers to the 14 nations that make up the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (excluding Australia and New Zealand). They are the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly, “Dragon in paradise: China’s rising star in Oceania”, The National Interest, 72 (2003), p. 98. Ralph Premdas, “Ideology, Pragmatism, Identity” in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics (Suva: IPS, 1983), p. 219. Michael Godley, “China: The waking giant”, in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics (Suva: IPS, 1983), p. 131. Godley, pp. 131-132. Thomas V. Biddick, “Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific”, Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 8 (1989), p. 812. Biddick, p. 812. Godley, p. 140. Biddick, p. 813. Ramesh Thakur, “Introduction” in Ramesh Thakur (ed), The South Pacific (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 21-22. Stephen Hoadley, The South Pacific Foreign Affairs (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), p. 35. Graeme Dobell, “China and Taiwan in the South Pacific”, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007, p. 6. Henderson and Reilly, p. 95. Tamara Renee Shie, “Rising Chinese Influence in the South Pacific,” Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2007), p. 309. Fergus Hanson, “The Dragon in the Pacific,” Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008, p. 3. National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 1996-2008. Susan Windybank, “The China Syndrome”, Policy Vol. 21, No. 2 (Winter 2005), pp. 28-33. Dobell, p. 7. Windybank, p. 31. Dobell, p. 10. Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, “The Southwest Pacific: U.S. Interests and China’s Growing Influence”, CRS Report for Congress, July 6, 2007, Summary page.

The South Pacific in China’s Grand Strategy 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

35.

36.

37. 38.

39.

279

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280 40.

41.

42. 43. 44.

45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Chu and Wang, p. 6; Yan Xuetong, “Guoji huanjing ji waijiao sikao” (International Environment and Thoughts on Diplomacy), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), No. 8, 1999, p. 10. For more information, see Sheng Lijun, China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian (London and New York: Zed Books; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). Biddick, p. 801. Hanson, p. 3. Associated Press, “Taiwan’s president-elect vows end to checkbook diplomacy in Pacific”, 26 March 2008 Accessed July 13, 2009 from http://www.breitbart.com /article.php?id=D8VL2UHG0&show_article=1 Windybank, p. 32. Kalinga Seneviratne, “South Pacific: Chinese Relief From Domineering Australia”, Inter Press Service (IPS), April 17, 2006. Acessed July 9, 2009 from http://ipsnews.net/news.asp ?idnews=32909. Windybank, p. 32. Windybank, p. 32. National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2008. Feizkhah, p. 34. Lintner. Wesley-Smith, p. 14. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 67. Shambaugh, p. 3. Shambaugh, p. 330. Shambaugh, p. 322. Robert S. Ross, “Assessing the China Threat”, The National Interest, Fall 2005, pp. 81-87. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, p. 284. Shambaugh, p. 307. Russell Ong, China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 17. Wesley-Smith, p. 14. Lum and Vaughn, p. 5. Wesly-Smith, p. 15. Lum and Vaughn, p. 7. China dismantled the tracking station after Kiribati shifted its diplomatic relations from Beijing to Taipei in November 2003. “New Chinese Tracking Station” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 18, 1998, p. 17.

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72.

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82. 83.

84. 85. 86.

281

Henderson and Reilly, p. 99. Shie, p. 322. Henderson and Reilly, pp. 100-101. Emphases added. Wesley-Smith, p. 12. In Latin America, they are Paraguay, Guatemala, Belize, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. In Africa, they are Burkina Faso, Gambia, Swaziland and Sao Tome and Principe. Anver Versi, “Is China Africa’s best Friend?” African Business, May 2006, No.320. FindArticles.com Accessed April 14, 2008 from ttp://findarticles.com /p/articles/mi_qa5327/is_200605/ai_n21391002 He Li, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America and Its Implications”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No.4-5 (August 2007), p. 858. Francois Lafargue, “China’s Strategies in Latin America” Military Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 (May/June 2006), p. 80. Reuters, “China hunts Latin American energy, commodities”, Aug 25, 2006. Acessed July 16, 2009 from http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKPEK24 226120060825 Reuters, 25 August 2006. Li, p. 845. People’s Daily Online, “Roundup: Africa to be more attractive for Chinese investors”, Feb 2007. Accessed July 16, 2009 from http://english.peopledaily. com.cn/200702/03/eng20070203_347297.html Henderson and Reilly, 2003. National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 1996-2008. Daniel P. Erikson and Janice Chen, “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Summer 2007), p. 83. Author’s interview with a senior analyst in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing in November 2007. There are signs that Chinese think tanks and research institutes are now increasingly interested in the South Pacific. We have seen more academic exchanges and conferences on the South Pacific in the past couple of years. Windybank, p. 29. Wesley-Smith, p. 16. Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fenxi (An Analysis of China’s National Interests), (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1996), p. 309.

INDEX

Afganistan and America, 9, 155, 245 Africa and America, 92 and China, vii, 86, 89, 92, 114, 138, 157, 195, 203, 215, 220, 274-277 and Europe, 92 and immigration to the Pacific, 6 and Taiwan, 8, 89, 128, 157, 195, 203, 246 Chinese aid, 90, 103, 108-110, 249 Chinese immigration, 203 Chinese interests, 86, 274 trade with China, 90, 203, 275 Air Tahiti Nui, 23 Aleutians and China, 271 America, United States of aid to the Pacific, 154-156, 192, 249, 261 and Australia, 157, 204-205 and China, 11, 119, 129, 148, 193-194, 228, 232, 238, 244-245, 249-251, 260 also see: rivalry with China and France, 157 and Japan, 157, 205, 265 and New Zealand, 157, 191, 205, 217 and Pacific governments, 204, 212 and Singapore, 157 and Taiwan, 30, 129, 148, 181, 182, 193-194, 205, 229, 231-232, 235, 265, 271-273

and Tibet, 30 and the United Kingdom, 157 interest in the Pacific, 11, 276-277 role in the Pacific, 9-11, 92, 113, 120-121, 129, 130, 139-140, 141, 153-157, 189, 191, 192, 196, 204, 206, 214, 216, 248-249, 252, 261, 263-264, 271, 273, 276-277 trade in the Pacific, 155-156 with Fiji, 107, 155 with Kiribati, 107, 155 with Nauru, 107, 155 with Palau, 107 with Papua New Guinea, 107, 155 with Samoa, 107, 155 with Tonga, 107, 156 with Tuvalu, 107 with Vanuatu, 107, 156 United Nations, 156 USAID, 154-156 War on Terror, 153, 155-156, 245 World War II, 11, 21 American Samoa, 204 Americas and China, 89 and Taiwan, 89 Antarctica and China, vii, 271 Anwar Ibrahim, 13 APEC, 137, 141, 217, 241 ASEAN, 137-138, 232-234, 240-245 ASEAN+3, 138, 237-238, 241 283

284


Asia, 46, 230 and America, 228-231, 235, 244-245, 271 and China, 227-229, 231-246, 250-252 China’s interest in, 228-230, 250 also see: role of China role of China in, 227-232, 235-246, 250-252 also see China’s interest in Asia trade, 229, 232-234, 243-245, 250 Association of Independent Members of Parliament, 14, 199 Akilisi Pohiva on Chinese immigration to the Pacific, 40, 210 Australia aid to Fiji, 26 aid to Papua New Guinea, 9 aid to the Pacific region, 129, 169, 182, 214, 249, 261-262 also see: Australia: role in the Pacific and “Good Governance” aid to the Solomon Islands, 165, 182 and America, 157, 181, 205 and China, 92, 99, 103, 115, 117-120, 128-130, 138, 141, 145, 148, 163, 174, 181, 191-192, 197, 207, 214-215, 218, 249, 260 and Japan, 93, 181 and Melanesia, 190 and New Zealand, 191 and Pacific governments, 212-214 and Papua New Guinea, 119, 120, 148, 165 and Taiwan, 115, 129, 163-165, 168, 180-181, 197, 214 also see: rivalry with Taiwan AusAID, 99, 129-130 Chinese immigration, 8, 40, 51 immigration, 7 Indo-Fijian immigration to, 26

interests in the Pacific, 19, 190-191, 220 also see: power projection in the Pacific and role in the Pacific role in the Pacific, 25, 26, 91-92, 113, 118, 119, 128-131, 140, 141, 155, 163-165, 169, 180, 181, 189, 190-191, 207, 211, 213-214, 220, 249, 261 also see: power projection in the Pacific and interest in the Pacific intervention in Solomon Islands, 12, 14, 15, 26, 124, 166 intervention in Tonga, 25, 26 military in the Pacific, 12, 24 power projection in the Pacific, 26, 120, 129-130, 148-149 also see: role in the Pacific trade with China, 115, 120, 192, 243 also see: relationship with China and China: trade with Fiji, 107 with Kiribati, 107 with Nauru, 107 with Palau, 107 with Papua New Guinea, 107 with Samoa, 107 with Solomon Islands, 107 with Tonga, 107 with Tuvalu, 107 with Vanuatu, 107 World War II, 190 Australians in Papua New Guinea, 4 Bainimarama, Josaia Voreqe (“Frank”), 28, 100, 112, 116, 118-119, 220 Canada Chinese immigration to, 40, 51

Index Caribbean and China, 147, 275 and Taiwan, x, 9, 113, 147 Indo-Fijian immigration, 26 Central America and China, 89, 101 and Taiwan, 89, 101, 113, 128, 246 Central Asia and China, 137-138, 220, 229, 234, 242, 275 Chad and China, 195 and Taiwan, 195 Chan, Julius, 8, 71, 119, 210 Chan, Laurie, 14, 71, 171 Chan Mow, 16, 18-19 Chan, Thomas (Tommy), 14, 71, 171-173, 199 chequebook diplomacy and China, 14, 88-89, 130-131, 146, 151, 168-169, 175, 182, 195, 199, 211-214, 246, 262 see also: China: motivation for Pacific involvement and China: aid to the Pacific region and rivalry: China and Taiwan and China: aid to the Pacific region and crime: corruption and Japan, 197 see also: Whaling and Taiwan, 14, 33, 88-89, 121, 123-124, 126-131, 168-169, 175, 182, 195, 198-200, 212-214, 246, 262, 269 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan and China: aid to the Pacific region and Crime: corruption and Solomon Islands: Allegations of Taiwanese Interference in Elections China, People’s Republic of aid to the Pacific region, 9, 21, 22, 30, 35, 44, 53, 62, 83, 88, 93, 107, 118, 119, 128-129, 130-131, 142-145, 148-150, 156, 169, 195, 208-209, 211, 213-214, 220, 234, 249, 261

285 aid grants, 84-85, 103-106, 141-142, 144-145, 145-146 aid loans, 84-86, 95-97, 101, 103-107, 118, 144-145, 209 Beijing Consensus, 129 benefits of aid, 101, 102 compared with aid from other nations, 44, 85, 118, 208, 249, 261 improvement of aid, 102, 103 motivations for aid giving, 83, 86-94, 97, 101, 118, 150, 152-153, 212, 249, 267 see also: chequebook diplomacy and rivalry: China and Taiwan problems with aid, 94-100, 114, 119, 146-147, 208, 211, 213 total aid, 84, 208, 261 see also: compared with aid from other nations types of aid, 84-85, 96, 145, 208-209, 261 see also: Education and China aid outside the Pacific region, 138, 234 ancestral relationship with the Pacific, 37, 259 and the arts, 238-239 and the developing world, 4, 5, 260-261 and dissidents, 201 and the environment, 239-240, 244, 266 and non-Pacific government relations, 138 and Taiwan independence movement, 201 also see: rivalry: China and Taiwan “China Threat”, 49, 137, 231, 263-264, 267, 273, 277 also see: rivalry and Asia: role of China in and China: military and soft power: China

286

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Chinese migration to the Pacific, 10, 16, 40-41, 49-53, 146-147, 190, 211, 215, 220, 262-263, 271 migration from the Pacific to third countries, 40, 51 controls on, 51 Chinese occupations in the Pacific, 10, 40, 50-53, 60, 147, 215 also see: Racism and Riots civil war (1949), 193 cultural exchanges to Asia, 138 cultural relations with Pacific countries, 41, 49, 139, 212-213 domestic issues, 228-230, 239-240, 250-251, 265-267, 274, 277 economic growth, 4, 44, 228, 239-240, 266-267, 277 see also: Africa: and China and Africa: China’s interest in and Asia: China’s role in and Asia: Trade and China: Aid to the Pacific Region and China: motivation for Pacific involvement and China: Trade and China: role in the Pacific negative effects of, 239-240, 244, 250, 265-266 governance, 24 image, 38, 93, 96, 101, 103, 251 intelligence activities, 28-30, 58, 91, 120, 146, 152, 199, 203-204, 213, 231, 248, 273 see also: Kiribati: and China and China: military and rivalry: America and China investment in the Pacific, 4, 118, 207 see also Overseas

Chinese and Fishing and Papua New Guinea: Ramu Nickel Refinery knowledge about the Pacific, 38, 115, 122, 154, 220, 276 military, 49, 90-92, 120, 146, 152-153, 199, 203-205, 213, 215, 227-232, 234-236, 240, 242-243, 245-246, 248, 250, 263-267, 271-274, 277 see also: rivalry: America and China and China: Motivation for Pacific Involvement and Asia: China’s role in and rivalry: China and Taiwan military in the Pacific, 4-5, 10, 30, 86, 90-92, 120-121, 146, 152-153, 199, 203, 215, 248, 263, 271, 273, 277 motivation for Pacific involvement, 10-11, 15-16, 21, 30, 43, 83, 86-87, 89-94, 101, 113-115, 120, 139, 142-143, 150-151, 189-190, 193-194, 201, 203-204, 206-207, 213-215, 220, 229, 246-249, 259-263, 268, 269-274, 276-277 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan National Defense Academy, 9 nationalism, 228 “One China” policy, 22, 43, 67, 114, 126, 147-150, 164, 192, 193 Overseas Chinese, see Overseas Chinese Pacific military relations, 4, 9, 39, 49, 91-92, 106, 120, 139, 141-142, 213, 261, 274

Index relationships with Pacific governments, 9, 19-20, 24, 28, 33, 36, 42-43, 49, 114-118, 130-131, 140-142, 148-149, 194, 202, 211-212, 219 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan and “soft power” and China: aid to the Pacific region and China: motivation for Pacific involvement relationship with South East Asia, 137-138 resentment of Chinese, see Racism and Riots role in the Pacific, 4-5, 9-11, 15-16, 21-23, 26, 29, 30, 35-37, 92, 101, 113-115, 117-121, 129-131, 139, 145-146, 153-157, 189-190, 191-194, 201-203, 207, 215-220, 246, 252, 259-264, 267, 269-271, 273-277 Tibet, 30, 66, 250-251, 266 trade in the Pacific region, 5, 35, 43, 49, 53, 90, 120, 139, 141, 193, 203, 207-208, 215, 219, 247, 261-262, 269-270, 275 with Cook Islands, 140-141 with Fiji, 107, 115, 142 with Kiribati, 107 with Nauru, 107 with Palau, 107 with Papua New Guinea, 4, 107, 115, 142, 146, 207, 247 with Samoa, 107, 142 with Solomon Islands, 107, 142, 148, 207, 247 with Tonga, 107, 141 with Tuvalu, 107 with Vanuatu, 107, 142

287 trade outside the Pacific region, 243-244 see also: Asia: Trade training of Pacific lawyers, 39 unemployment, 59 Xinjiang, 250-251, 266 Cook Islands and America, 21 and China, 21-22, 38, 114, 116-117, 139-141, 145-146, 149, 190-191, 197, 200, 214, 268 also see: Cook Islands: China’s interest in and New Zealand, 190-191, 197, 214 and the United Nations, 151 China’s aid to, 9, 21-22, 38, 95-96, 104, 140-141, 146, 208 also see: China: aid to the Pacific region China’s interest in, 20-21, 22, 142 also see: Cook Islands: relationship with China and China: motivation for Pacific involvement economy, 140-141 Exclusive Economic Zone, 21, 87 land area, 21, 140 migration from, 140 New Zealand’s aid to, 95-96, 98 population, 21, 95 relationship with China, 21-22, 114, 116-117, 139-141, 145-146, 149, 191, 197, 200, 214, 268 also see: Cook Islands: China’s interest in World War II, 21 Cold War and China, 137, 192, 193-194, 259-260, 264, 265, 267, 273 and New Zealand, 192, 216 and the Soviet Union, 119, 192, 259-260, 264, 265, 267, 273 impact on the Pacific, 119, 164-165, 260, 273

288


crime, 40, 42, 54, 58, 147, 208, 210-211, 220 and Russia, 54 China’s attitude towards, 56-60, 211, 265 corruption, 4, 6, 13-14, 40, 54, 58-60, 113-114, 131, 168, 196, 220, 262-264 in China, 265 in Papua New Guinea, 4, 6 in the Solomon Islands, 12-15, 166, 169, 198 see also Solomon Islands: allegations in Fiji, 26, 55 in Vanuatu, 199-200 drug trafficking, 54-55, 211 in Samoa, 18 in Papua New Guinea, 6, 7 human trafficking, 6, 58, 211 illegal fishing, see Illegal Fishing illegal immigration, see illegal immigration in Fiji, 27, 55 in Papua New Guinea, 3-4, 6-7, 16, 55 in Russia, 4 in Samoa, 18 in Solomon Islands, 14 in Tonga, 55 in the United Kingdom, 4 opium, see Hawaii: opium and Samoa: opium Cuba relationship with China, 138 Dausabea, Charles, 176-178 see also: riots: Solomon Islands diplomatic truce, see rivalry: China and Taiwan: diplomatic truce dollar diplomacy, see chequebook diplomacy East Asia, 230, 232-233, 237-238 East Timor, 202

education, 39, 46, 68-69, 144, 153-154, 156, 196, 213, 218, 237 academic research, 40 higher education of Pacific people, 39 languages, 36, 39 Europe, 230 and America, 250 and China, 238, 250 Chinese immigration, 40 in the Pacific, 22, 113, 139, 189, 263 European Union, 230 and New Zealand, 191, 206 immigration laws in the Pacific, 22 in the Pacific, 141, 196, 206 trade, with Fiji, 107 with Kiribati, 107 with Nauru, 107 with Palau, 107 with Papua New Guinea, 107 with Samoa, 107 with Solomon Islands, 107 with Tonga, 107 with Tuvalu, 107 with Vanuatu, 107 Falungong, 67, 73, 201, 218, 266 Federated States of Micronesia, aid from China, 9, 95, 98, 104 and America, 129, 154, 191, 204, 271-273 and China, 116-117, 121, 139, 149, 198, 200, 268 and Germany, 10-11 China’s interest in, 21, 142 Chinese occupations, 40 Fiji aid from China, 9, 28, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 105, 118-119, 142-144, 145, 147, 208 aid from Taiwan, 28 and America, 154-155, 204 and Australia, 26, 28, 119, 214, 274

289

Index and China, 16, 26-29, 100-101, 115-118, 119, 139, 141-142, 143-144, 147, 149, 198, 200, 209, 214, 260, 268, 274 and india, 26 and indians in, 26, 210 and indo-Fijians leaving, 26, 210 and Malaysia, 214 and New Zealand, 26, 119-220, 214, 274 and Taiwan, 27-28, 101, 149, 198, 260, 268 and the Soviet Union, 260 business, 28 Chinese immigration, 26-27, 53, 60 Chinese interest in, 142, 247 Chinese occupations, 27, 40 Chinese population, 26, 70, 119, 209 colonialism, 26 coups, 26, 28, 53, 98, 100-101, 156, 209-210, 213-214, 220, 274 indian occupations, 26, 28, 210 intervention in Solomon Islands, 14 investment, 27 numbers of, 27 “old” Chinese, 27 population, 21 prostitution, 5, 26 fishing, 118, 120-121, 144, 168, 261 and America, 155-156 and China, 22, 42, 87-88, 140, 142-143, 151, 203, 206-207, 247-248, 269 and the European Union, 206 and Japan, 88, 205 and Russia, 206 and South Korea, 206 and Taiwan, 10, 88, 124, 196 France and America, 157 and Pacific governments, 117, 206 in the Pacific, 10-11, 22, 92, 113, 117, 206

French Polynesia, also see: Tahiti aid from China, 22-23 and China, 22, 23 and Pacific Island Forum, 206 and Taiwan, 22-23 Chinese businesses in, 23 Chinese immigration, 22, 23 Chinese interest in, 22 Chinese population, 22, 119, 209 “new” Chinese, 22 “old” Chinese, 22-23 Fu Quanyou, 24 Futuna, 23 Germany and Samoa, 16-17 Germans in Papua New Guinea, 4, 8 in the Pacific, 7-8, 10-11 Grenada and China, 138 governance “good governance”, 28, 43-44, 122, 129-130, 157, 171, 214, 220, 249 ideas about, 43-45 Guam and America, 30, 56, 204-205, 271 colonial past, 11 Hawaii colonial past, 11 opium, 18 World War II, 11 Hu Jintao, 15, 24, 115, 141 Hua Guofeng, 20 human rights, 57, 238 and America, 156 and Asia, 238 and New Zealand, 201, 218 in the Pacific, 45, 57, 156 human trafficking, see crime: human trafficking illegal fishing, 146, 196, 212, 248

290


illegal immigration, 4, 6, 7, 40, 52, 54-60, 63, 65, 70, 72, 94, 146, 203, 208, 211, 248 Chinese migration law, 58 illegal logging, 94, 193, 207 India and China, 243-244 and the United Nations, 21 Indians in Fiji, 26 Indonesia and China, 138, 238, 244-245 intelligence activities, 29, 30, 271 Iran and China, 138 Iraq and America, 9, 153, 155-156, 245 Japan aid to the Pacific, 208 and America, 157, 205, 229-232 and China, 232, 243-244, 271-272 see also: rivalry: China and Japan and Pacific Governments, 117 and Taiwan, 181 in the Pacific, 10-11, 92, 113, 117, 140, 141, 202, 205-206 see also: Japan: interest in the Pacific and chequebook diplomacy interests in the Pacific, 205-206 see also: Japan: in the Pacific and chequebook diplomacy military, 230, 231, 271-272 trade with Fiji, 107 with Kiribati, 107 with Nauru, 107 with Palau, 107 with Papua New Guinea, 107 with Samoa, 107 with Solomon Islands, 107 with Tonga, 107 with Tuvalu, 107 with Vanuatu, 107

whaling, see whaling World War II, 10-11, 45, 190 Jiang Zemin, 115, 117 Kemakeza, Allan, 15, 166-167, 169-173, 176-177 Kenya and China, 138 Kiribati aid from China, 9, 142, 146 see also: chequebook diplomacy and rivalry: China and Taiwan and America, 155 and China, 28-29, 146, 148-150, 152, 154, 199-200, 203, 248, 268-269, 273 see also: chequebook diplomacy and rivalry: China and Taiwan and Taiwan, 9, 28-29, 33, 121-125, 146, 148-149, 152, 193-194, 199-200, 248, 268-269 see also: chequebook diplomacy and rivalry: China and Taiwan China’s interest in, 21, 28-29, 142, 146, 152, 199, 203, 248, 273 see also: chequebook diplomacy and China: intelligence activities and Kiribati: and China and rivalry: America and China and rivalry: China and Taiwan Chinese immigration, 53, 146-147 Exclusive Economic Zone, 21 land area, 21 population, 21 Kyrgyzstan and China, 138 language, 36 Laos, 239 Latin America and America, 275-276 see also: rivalry: America and China and China, 92, 115, 117, 118, 138, 147, 195, 220, 274-276

Index and Taiwan, 9, 147, 195 China’s interests, 86, 275 Malaysia and China, 238 Malaysian Chinese, 13, 15 Malielegaoi, Tuilaepa Sailele, 20 Marshall Islands and America, 129, 154, 204, 271 and China, 117, 149, 200, 268-269 and Germany, 11 and Taiwan, 9, 65, 122-123, 124-125, 148-149, 194, 198, 200, 268-269 Chinese immigration, 53, 146-147 Chinese population, 52 media in the Pacific, 20, 25, 37-38, 46, 67, 69, 145, 153, 213 Chinese influence on media, 69 Chinese media coverage of the Pacific, 38 Taiwanese media coverage of the Pacific, 38 training of media, 38, 145 Melanesia and Australia, 190 Chinese occupations, 40 colonization, 11 concept of nationhood, 11 missionaries, 11 resources, 16, 40 Middle East and America, 11, 204, 245 and China, 138, 157, 229, 274 military, 271-272 military in Asia, 30, 204, 229-230, 235, 271-272 military in the Pacific, 29-30, 86, 90-92, 120-121, 152, 155-156, 203-205, 230, 248-249, 271-272 Mongolia and China, 137 Nauru and America, 155, 248-249

291 and China, 141, 148-150, 200, 249, 268 and Taiwan, 9, 122, 124-125, 148-149, 194, 197-198, 200, 268 and the United Nations, 150 Chinese immigration, 53 land area, 20-21 population, 20-21 Netherlands, the in the Pacific, 7-8 New Caledonia, 23 New Zealand aid to Fiji, 26 aid to the Pacific, 214, 249 also see: New Zealand: and China, and New Zealand: in the Pacific and “good governance” attitude toward Asia, 190, 218 and America, 157, 191, 217 and Australia, 191 and China, 114-115, 117-120, 145, 148, 190-192, 197, 201, 207, 211, 214-219, 243, 249, 260 domestic impact, 201, 218 and the Cook Islands, 21 and the European Union, 191 and Japan, 93, 191 and Pacific governments, 212, 214, 219 also see: New Zealand: in the Pacific and Polynesia, 190-191 and Taiwan, 115, 193-195 and the United Kingdom, 217 Chinese immigration, 17-18 immigration, 7 in the Pacific, 92, 96, 130, 139-140, 141, 189-191, 207, 211, 213-214, 216, 219-220, 249, 261 Indo-Fijian Immigration, 26 interest in the Pacific, 190-191, 219 intervention in Solomon Islands, 12, 14

292


intervention in Tonga, 25 knowledge about China, 218 military in the Pacific, 24 population, 191, 219 trade, 219 with China, 115, 120, 191-192, 243 with Fiji, 107 with Kiribati, 107 with Nauru, 107 with Palau, 107 with Papua New Guinea, 107 with Samoa, 107 with Solomon Islands, 107 with Tonga, 107 with Tuvalu, 107 with Vanuatu, 107 World War II, 190 Nigeria and China, 275 Niue aid from China, 105, 142 and China, 114, 117, 139, 191, 197, 200, 268 and New Zealand, 150, 190-191, 197 Chinese immigration, 50 North America Chinese immigration, 18, 40 North Korea and America, 11, 245 and China, 11, 240, 245, 251 Northeast Asia and China, 274 Northern Marianas and America, 30, 271 and China, 271 and Germany, 11 and Japan, 10-11 Chinese occupations, 40, 55 Chinese population, 119 prostitution, 55 Oceania and China, 89 and Taiwan, 89

Overseas Chinese (OC), 49-52, 93, 192, 202, 209 and China, 25-26, 50, 53, 56-57, 59, 61, 66-73, 93, 192, 202, 215-216, 262-263 and Taiwan, 64-71 competition for loyalty, 64-72 connections with China, 50 crime, see crime and crime: China’s attitude towards education, 68-69 evacuations, 14, 15-16, 61, 69-70, 73, 202 Free China Society, 66 in Pacific politics, 60, 71-72, 119, 210 Laoqiao, 41, 50-51, 64, 66, 69, 71-73, 210 and Xinqiao, 51 voyage to Pacific, 50 Malaysian Overseas Chinese, 51 motivation for migration, 51-52, 57, 60-61, 262-263 “new Chinese”, see Overseas Chinese: Xinqiao numbers of, 52, 119, 209, 215, 262 occupations, 40, 50, 210 also see: China: immigration to the Pacific and racism “Old Chinese”, see Overseas Chinese: Laoqiao Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC), 60, 64, 66 patriotism, 49, 63, 67-68, 71, 202 political involvement, 49-50, 58-59, 67 promoting China’s image, 61-64, 69-70, 72-73, 93 promoting China’s interests, 49-50, 57, 61-62, 64, 67-69, 72-73, 201-202, 216, 263 propaganda, 50, 53, 62-73, 201-202 see also: Overseas Chinese: Qiaowu and media in the Pacific

Index Qiaowu, 49, 59-64, 67-73 see also: Overseas Chinese: Propaganda Taiwan’s Qiaowu, 66 returning to China, 52, 71, 202 see also: Overseas Chinese: evacuations and Overseas Chinese: and China Taiwanese Overseas Chinese, 51 “Taiwanization”, 64, 73, 164 “Three Knives”, 68 “Three News”, 68 Xinqiao, 40-41, 51, 59-61, 67-68, 71-73, 210, 248 Pacific, 45-46 colonization, 10-11, 17, 45-46 disease, 11 European traders, 12 “blackbirding”, 11 missionaries, 11 knowledge about China, 37, 39, 46 regional organizations, 35, 45-46 United Nations, 20 voting bloc, 217, 262 World War II, 45 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 85, 92, 99, 118-119, 127, 139, 190, 200, 246, 261-262, 273, 277 and America, 204 and China, 113, 122, 141, 144-145, 149, 194, 197, 200-202, 208, 273 see also: Pacific Islands Forum: and Taiwan and rivalry: China and Taiwan and French Polynesia, 206 and New Caledonia, 206 and RAMSI, 166 see also: Solomon Islands: RAMSI and Taiwan, 113, 122-123, 149, 194, 196, 197, 200 Biketawa Declaration, 166-167 Pacific Islands Trade Office, 149-150 Palau and America, 129, 271 and Germany, 10-11

293 and Taiwan, 9, 122-125, 149, 194, 197-198, 200, 268 Papua New Guinea, 7, 19 African immigration, 7 aid from China, 4, 9, 98, 105, 141-143, 145-147, 208 see also: China: aid to the Pacific and Papua New Guinea: and China aid from Taiwan, 131, 214 and America, 154-155, 204 and Australia, 4, 8, 119, 120, 197, 214 see also: Skate, Bill Australians leaving, 4 and Canada, 5 and China, 4-9, 29, 115-118, 122, 139, 141-142, 145-149, 193, 197-198, 201, 207, 212, 214, 260, 268, 269, 271 and Germany, 7 and Japan, 214 and Malaysia, 214 and Singapore, 214 and Taiwan, 8, 119, 122, 148, 165, 197-198, 201, 214 and the Netherlands, 7 and the United Kingdom, 5, 7 Asian immigration, 7 Chinese businesses, 5-7 China’s interest in, 142, 271 see also: Papua New Guinea: Ramu Nickel Refinery Chinese investment, 5 Chinese immigration, 4-8, 11 see also: China: immigration to the Pacific Chinese in local politics, 8 Chinese occupations, 7-8 Chinese population, 4, 8, 119, 209 Chinese repatriation, 8 colonialism, 7-8 culture, 4 independence, 4 land disputes, 6, 207 languages, 11-12

294


logging, 5 migration from, 4 mining, 5 nationalism, 11 “new” Chinese, 8 “old” Chinese, 7-8 population, 8, 21 Ramu Nickel Refinery, 5-7, 88, 120, 143, 151, 207, 247, 269 working conditions, 5, 119, 207 religion, 5 resources, 5 societal structure, 12 Sri Lankan immigration, 7 unemployment, 4 World War I, 8 World War II, 8 Peniamina, A’eau, 19, 20 Philippines, the, and America, 154, 229 and China, 138, 231, 245, 271 Pitcairn Islands, 23 Pohiva, Akilisi, 40, 210 Polynesia, and China, 20-21 and New Zealand, 190-191 racism, 6-8, 13-20, 25, 29, 40-41, 57, 60-64, 70, 72-73, 93, 119, 146-147, 173-174, 176-177, 180, 198, 202-203, 210, 214-215, 218, 248 see also: riots regionalism, see Pacific and Asia religion, 24, 35-36, 43-44, 60, 146 Rini, Snyder, 13-15, 164, 171-178, 199 riots, 40, 72 Fiji, 40 Indonesia, 202 Papua New Guinea, 40, 93, 119 Solomon Islands, 13-16, 29, 40, 61, 63, 70, 73, 93, 119, 147, 163-164, 171-178, 180-181, 198, 210, 214 Tahiti, 40

Tonga, 25-26, 29, 40, 61, 63, 93, 119, 210, 214 rivalry 1992 Consensus, 126 America and China, 9-11, 29-30, 86, 90-92, 117, 118, 119, 120-121, 128-131, 139-140, 152-153, 157, 181, 203-205, 216-217, 227-232, 235, 245-246, 248-252, 263-266, 271-273, 276 Australia and Taiwan, 163, 197 in Papua New Guinea, 165 in the Solomon Islands, 163-165, 168-172, 174-176, 178-182 in the Pacific Region, 169, 178-179 in Vanuatu, 168, 197 China and Japan, 93, 128, 181, 190, 205, 214, 216-217, 227, 230, 231, 234, 242, 246, 250-252, 265, 271 China and Taiwan, 8-10, 14, 16, 20-24, 27-29, 35, 37-38, 50, 64-73, 83, 86, 88-89, 91-92, 94-95, 101-102, 113-115, 117-124, 126-131, 137, 147-150, 152, 163-166, 168-169, 172, 174-175, 181-182, 190, 192-206, 208, 212-216, 220, 229, 231-232, 234-235, 245-251, 260, 262, 265-269, 271-274, 276-277 see also chequebook diplomacy: China and chequebook diplomacy: Taiwan Diplomatic truce, 9, 66, 89, 94, 101-102, 126-131, 182, 195-196, 246-247, 269 Russia and China, 137, 264-265 arms sales, 235 and New Zealand, 206

Index Samoa and America, 155 and China, 16, 19-20, 115-118, 139, 142, 149, 197-198, 201, 260, 268 and New Zealand, 19 and Taiwan, 19, 115, 149, 197-198, 201, 260, 268 China’s aid to, 9, 16, 20, 95, 98, 105-106, 208 China’s interest in, 20 Chinese immigration, 16-17, 17-18, 53 Chinese occupations, 17, 19 Chinese population, 17 Chinese repatriation, 17-18 colonial past, 11, 17 “old” Chinese, 16 voyage conditions, 16-17 working conditions, 17-18 opium, 18 population, 16 Samoan occupations, 19 World War I, 17 World War II, 18 Saudi Arabia and China, 138 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 137, 241-242, 245 Sikua, Derek, 124, 179 Singapore and America, 157 Singirok, Jerry, 4, 5, 16 Skate, Bill, 119, 122, 197, 201 “soft power”, 153-154, 236-237 America, 153-154 China, 35-46, 49, 69, 126, 153-154, 157, 236-240 Taiwan, 37, 126, 269 Sogavare, Manasseh, 164, 171-172, 178-181, 199 Solomon Islands aid from Australia, 165 aid from China, 148

295 aid from Taiwan, 14, 168-170, 175, 179-181, 195-196 allegations of Taiwanese interference in elections, 169-176, 180, 195 and America, 154-156 and Australia, 163, 165, 167-168, 171, 178-181, 214 see also Australia: Solomon Islands intervention and China, 14, 29, 122, 142, 147-148, 193, 199, 201, 214, 247 and Fiji, see Fiji: Solomon Islands intervention and New Zealand: see New Zealand: intervention in Solomon Islands and Taiwan, 9, 13-15, 122-123, 125, 149, 163, 165-166, 168, 175, 179-182, 194, 196-199, 201, 214, 268 Bougainville, 207 child exploitation, 32 Chinese immigration to, 11-13, 147 see also China: immigration to the Pacific Chinese occupations, 11-13, 15 Chinese population, 13 civil unrest, 12, 165 coups, 148, 156, 166 “failed state”, 12 fishing, 15 Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army, 12, 15 history, 12, 165 independence, 12 language, 12 locals employment, 12 local politics, 15 logging, 12-13, 15 Malaitan Eagle Force, 12, 15, 165-167 nationalism, 12 “new” Chinese, 13-14

296


“old” Chinese, 13 population, 12, 21, 177 poverty, 15 RAMSI, 12, 166-168, 170-173, 176, 178-180 societal structure, 12 Southeast Asian migrants, 13 Taiwanese Training of Security Forces, 14 trade, 15 unemployment, 15 unrest, 165-167, 195, 198 see also: riots: Solomon Islands Somare, Michael, 116, 141, 212, 214 South America and China, 117, 138, 220 South Korea aid to the Pacific, 206 and America, 229 and China, 243, 250-251 and Fiji, 206 and New Zealand, 206 and Papua New Guinea, 206 and the Solomon Islands, 206 in the Pacific, 206 interest in the Pacific, 206 South Pacific Tourism Organization, see tourism: South Pacific Tourism Organization (SPTO) Southeast Asia and America, 252 and China, 137-138, 220, 234, 238, 242, 244, 252, 274 and India, 244 and Japan, 244 Spratly Islands, 10, 137, 229, 231, 241, 245 Sri Lankans, 7 Spain, 11 Sudan, 207, 215 Tahiti, 23 and China, 117, 154 Chinese immigration, 22 Chinese population, 22

Taiwan aid to the Pacific, 9, 85, 88-89, 113, 121, 122-124, 128, 130-131, 169-170, 195-196 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan and chequebook diplomacy problems with aid, 128-129 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan and chequebook diplomacy ancestral relationship with region, 37, 65, 121, 130, 164, 259 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan and China, 267, 268, 269, 271 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan and Japanese rule, 194 and Pacific governments, 122-126, 128-129, 130-131, 194-195 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan cultural exchanges, 37, 41 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 9, 37, 50, 64-67, 126, 127 democratization, 194 economy, 126-127 Guomindang, 9 Hallstein Doctrine, 164 image in the Pacific, 38, 122, 128-129, 166, 169-170, 173-174, 179 in the Pacific, 9, 10, 92, 113, 121, 130-131, 164, 246 see also: chequebook diplomacy and rivalry: China and Taiwan and Taiwan: aid to the Pacific independence movement, 73 interest in the Pacific, 10, 113 see rivalry: China and Taiwan knowledge of the Pacific, 122 Kuomintang (KMT), 64, 66, 73, 126-127, 131, 193-195 military, 148, 271-272

Index nationalism, 194 relationships with Pacific governments, 23, 42-43 “substantive relations”, 194 see also: “soft power” and rivalry: China and Taiwan and Taiwan: and Pacific governments Taiwan Straits crisis, 137, 265 sees also: rivalry: China and Taiwan training Pacific militaries, 180 Tajikistan and China, 138 Tanumafili, Malietoa II, 19-20 Taofinu’u, Pio, 19 Taumoefolau, Kuli, 24 Tausinga, 172-173 Thailand and America, 229 and Japan, 239 Tokelau and New Zealand, 190-191 Chinese immigration, 50 Tonga aid from China, 96-100, 106, 143, 208 and America, 155-156 and Australia, 24-25 and China, 23-26, 29, 116-117, 139, 141, 149-150, 197-198, 268 and New Zealand, 24-25 and Taiwan, 23, 115, 149, 197-198, 260, 268 and the United Nations, 150 Australian intervention, 25 China’s interest in, 21, 24, 26 Chinese immigration, 25, 40-41, 50, 53, 146-147, 210 Chinese occupations, 25, 40-41 Chinese population, 25 Chinese military training, 24 Exclusive Economic Zone, 21 GDP, 96

297 governance, 24, 25 land area, 21 New Zealand intervention, 25 population, 21, 25, 210 religion, 24 Tongan occupations, 25 unemployment, 26 Tourism and Southeast Asia, 151-153 destinations, 41, 151-152 from America, 152 from Australia, 152 from China, 10, 41, 53, 55-56, 118, 129, 140, 142-144, 151-152, 153, 269-271 “Approved Tourist Destination”, 53, 57, 129, 140, 143-144, 150, 152-153, 208, 211 to Asia, 137-138, 151, 153, 237 to the Pacific, 41, 53, 143, 150-151, 153, 208-209, 211, 269-271 to Cook Islands, 22 to Fiji, 28, 41, 55-56 to New Zealand, 211 to the Marshall Islands, 56 to the Northern Marianas, 56 to Papua New Guinea, 56 from Japan, 41, 152, 205 from New Zealand, 152 from the Pacific, 41 from South Korea, 206 from Taiwan, 41 from “the West”, 41 to Fiji, 41 South Pacific Tourism Office (SPTO), 143, 150, 196-197 and America, 196 and China, 196 and the European Union, 196 and Taiwan, 196-197 Tuhanuku, Joses, 15, 169-171, 173-174 Tupou IV, Taufa’ahau, 24, 116

298


Tupou V, Siaosi, 24, 116 Tuvalu and China, 149, 150-151 and Taiwan, 9, 20, 122-125, 149, 194, 196-198, 268 and the United Nations, 150 Chinese immigration, 50, 53 land area, 20 population, 21 United Kingdom aid to the Pacific region, 192 and America, 157 and China, 27 and New Zealand, 217 British in Papua New Guinea, 4 colonialism, 26 in the Pacific, 7-8, 10-11, 23, 45, 113, 155, 192, 206 trade with China, 50 United Nations, 150 and America, 156 and China, 5, 20-21, 114, 127, 149, 150-151, 203, 236, 242, 245, 260 and Japan, 21, 93, 205 and Kiribati, 150 and Nauru, 20-21, 149 and the Pacific, 20-21, 45, 141, 150-151, 156, 205 and Taiwan, 20-21, 114-115, 149, 164 see also: rivalry: China and Taiwan and Tuvalu, 20-21, 149 Uta’atu, Tau’aika, 24 values “Asian values”, 238 interaction between value systems, 42 of “new” Chinese, 61 Pacific values, 42

Vanuatu aid from China, 9, 98, 106, 142-143, 145-147, 208, 213 and America, 154, 156 and Australia, 119-120 and China, 116-118, 122, 139, 141-142, 145-150, 197-198, 199-200, 212-214, 268 and Taiwan, 122, 148, 168, 197-200, 213-214 Chinese immigration, 53, 146-147 languages, 11-12 nationalism, 11 population, 11 Venezuela and China, 275 Vietnam and China, 240, 245 Waena, Sir Nathaniel, 14 Wallis, 23 Wei Fulin, 24 Wen Jiabao, 15, 86-87, 117-118, 142, 143-144, 150, 194, 202, 209, 246 whaling, 93, 168, 197, 205 world trade with Fiji, 107 with Kiribati, 107 with Nauru, 107 with Palau, 107 with Papua New Guinea, 107 with Samoa, 107 with Solomon Islands, 107 with Tonga, 107 with Tuvalu, 107 with Vanuatu, 107 Wu Quanshu, 24 Xi Jinping, 118 Zhang Wei, 22

LOOKING NORTH, LOOKING SOUTH China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific Looking North, Looking South brings together the works of leading China, Taiwan, and Pacific politics specialists analysing a topic of growing importance: China and Taiwan’s ever-growing involvement in the South Pacific. There is no doubt that China is on the rise in Asia, Africa, South America, the Caribbeans, and even the Antarctica and the Arctic, this rise can be partly attributed to China’s activities in the South Pacific. This book will pinpoint China’s involvement in the South Pacific within the context of China’s wider foreign policy and the challenges it poses to the traditional dominant powers of the region — the China-Taiwan rivalry has helped to seriously alter the balance of traditional influence in the South Pacific where China is now one of the largest aid donors in the region, squeezing out Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, both in terms of funding and influence.

World Scientific www.worldscientific.com 7718 hc

ISBN-13 978-981-4304-38-2 ISBN-10 981-4304-38-7

,!7IJ8B4-daedic!

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan and South Pacific (Series on Contemporary China)

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MIGRATION AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN CHINA (Series on Contemporary China)

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Tobacco Control Policy Analysis In China (Series on Contemporary China)

Political Civilization And Modernization in China: The Poltical Context of China's Transformation (Series on Contemporary China) (Series on Contemporary China)

Discontented Miracle: Growth, Conflict, and Institutional Adaptations in China (Series on Contemporary China) (Series on Contemporary China)

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Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China

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Institutional Change and Legitimacy in Contemporary China (Routledge Contemporary China)

Cultural Heritage Management in China (Routledge Contemporary China Series)

On China

Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan and South Pacific (Series on Contemporary China)

China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics (Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series)

Globalizing South China (RGS-IBG Book Series)

MIGRATION AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN CHINA (Series on Contemporary China)

North and South

North and South

North and South

North and South

North and South

North and South

North and South

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Tobacco Control Policy Analysis In China (Series on Contemporary China)

Political Civilization And Modernization in China: The Poltical Context of China's Transformation (Series on Contemporary China) (Series on Contemporary China)

Discontented Miracle: Growth, Conflict, and Institutional Adaptations in China (Series on Contemporary China) (Series on Contemporary China)

Looking Out, Looking In

South Pacific & Micronesia

Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Harvard Contemporary China Series)

South Pacific: paradise rewritten

Frommer's South Pacific 2004

Looking Back on India

North & South

North, South, East, and West

China and Africa Development Relations (Routledge Contemporary China Series)

Popular Protest in China (Harvard Contemporary China Series)

Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China

Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China

Institutional Change and Legitimacy in Contemporary China (Routledge Contemporary China)

Cultural Heritage Management in China (Routledge Contemporary China Series)

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