Greeks Bearing Gifts: The Public Use of Private Relationships in the Greek World, 435-323 BC

Using models from social anthropology as its basis, Greeks bearing gifts takes a new look at the role of personal relati...

Author: Lynette G. Mitchell

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Using models from social anthropology as its basis, Greeks bearing gifts takes a new look at the role of personal relationships in classical Greece and their bearing on interstate politics. It begins with a discussion of what friendship meant in the Greek world of the classical period, and then shows how the models for friendship in the private sphere were mirrored in the public sphere at both domestic and interstate levels. As well as relations between Greeks (in particular those with Athens and Sparta), Dr Mitchell looks at Greek relations with those on the margins of the Greek world, particularly the state of Macedon, and with neighbouring non-Greeks such as the Thracians and the Persians. She finds that these other cultures did not always have the same understanding of what friendship was, or practise the same kinds of exchange, and that this led to misunderstandings and difficulties in the relations between non-Greeks and Greeks. This book revises the current orthodoxy that personal friendships worked against the interests of the/w/ts, and instead sees such relationships as playing an important part in political activity. In discussing how these trends differed in Athens and Sparta, it argues that personal 'aristocratic-style' friendships were integral to polis ideology.

Greeks bearing gifts

Greeks bearing gifts The public use ofprivate relationships in the Greek world, 435-323 BC Lynette G. Mitchell British Academy Post-doctoral Fellow, Oriel College, Oxford

I CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13,28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1997 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1997 First paperback edition 2002 Typeface Plantin 10/12 pt. A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Mitchell, Lynette G. (Lynette Gail) Greeks bearing gifts: the public use of private relationships in the Greek world, 435-323 BC. / Lynette G. Mitchell. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Romanized record. ISBN 0 52155435 7 (hardback) 1. Greece - Civilization - To 146 BC. 2. Interpersonal relations Greece - Political aspects. 3. Friendship - Greece. 4. Greece Relations - Foreign countries. I. Title. DF78.M54 1997 302.3'4'0938-dc21 97-7583 CIP ISBN 0 52155435 7 hardback ISBN 0 52189330 5 paperback

For Stephen were bound to each other by varying degrees of reciprocity and affection, but there was also another side to the equation which places these relationships in sharper focus. Society was defined in Greek thought according to a number of oppositions: Greek and barbarian; slave and free; friend and enemy.87 The flip side of the philia coin was enmity (echthra), and popular concepts of justice were founded on the belief that one should help friends and harm enemies (echthroi) .88 Solon wrote in the sixth century: Grant that I may always have happiness at the hands of the blessed gods and a good reputation at the hands of all men; and thus that I may be sweet to philoi and bitter to echthroi, and respected by the former, but for the others terrible to behold.89 85 88

89

Xen.,/&//. 4.1.39-40.

86

Seech. 10.

87

SeeCartledge (1993) esp. 8-17.

Cf. Lys. 9.20,15.12; Dem. 21.118; Mitchell and Rhodes (1996) 12-14. On this principle of helpingfriends/harmingenemies, see also, for example, Dover (1974) 180-4; Blundell (1989) esp. 26-31; Goldhill (1986) 79-106. Solon 13.3-6 (West); cf. Homer, Od. 4.691-2; Hesiod, WD 342,349-56.

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Xenophon's Socrates says that doing good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies is the mark of a virtuous man, 90 and Isocrates moralistically declares: consider it disgraceful to be beaten by your enemies in doing evil, and surpassed by your friends in benefactions.91 Just as one repaid a friend good for good, so one paid back one's enemy bad for bad. 92 Blundell writes: 'The question of who started a quarrel is crucial. It is common to argue that one's opponent is responsible for initiating hostilities, thus giving oneself the right to retaliate.'93 In a poem of the Theognidean corpus, the poet prays he may give grief in return for grief to the men who stole his property.94 One of the worst positions that one could find oneself in was to be humiliated at the hands of one's enemies; conversely, to vanquish them was one's greatest triumph. Medea crows as she plans the death of Glauce and Creon: 'Now, philoi, I will be triumphant over my echthroi, and am on the way to it, now there is hope that echthroi will pay the penalty.'95 The friends-enemies polarisation was one way of organising the world into two camps, and this division had a real consequence as a determinant of social behaviour: those inside the friendship network received good for good, or what we might term a positive reciprocity, while those outside received bad for bad, or a negative reciprocity.96 There was also a category for those who were neither philoi nor echthroi but could potentially belong to either group. In his third speech against his guardian, Aphobus, Demosthenes presented three witnesses: Aphobus' brother; Phanus, who was the friend (epitedeios) and fellow-tribesman of Aphobus; and Philip, who was neither his friend nor his enemy.97 In general, to lay an indictment against someone who was not one's enemy was to lay oneself open to accusations of sycophancy.98 On a private level this division between friends and enemies could cut across barriers of social distance. We have already seen the breadth of relationship that philia encompassed, and, despite the agony and upheaval that it could cause, an echthros could as easily be a kinsman or 90 92 94 96

98

91 Xen.yMem. 2.6.35. Isoc. 1.26. 93 See Easterling (1989) 12-13; Seaford (1994) 25-9. Blundell (1989) 37. 95 [Theognis] 341-50. Eur.,Med. 765-7; cf. Soph., Ajax 79. Although Davis ((1992) 23-4) objects to the term 'negative reciprocity' on methodological grounds, we are dealing with a system in classical Greece where harm is exchanged for harm, that is true reciprocity. For positive and negative reciprocities, compare Sahlins' 97 Dem. 29.23. model (see n. 1 above). [Dem.] 53.1. On sycophancy see Osborne (1990); cf. the reply by Harvey in the same volume. Note, however, that in cases of murder enmity became a motive to be denied: Carey (1989) 65-6.

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fellow citizen as anyone else." In the mythical world of tragedy, although he is Menelaus' nephew, Orestes calls his uncle a bad philos because he refuses to repay the debt Orestes believes he owes, and therefore Orestes responds to him in a hostile manner by killing Helen and taking Hermione hostage.100 Even in the real world those who had been philoi could become echthroi. For example, the speaker of [Lysias] 8 complains of the treatment meted out to him by fellow-members of a religious society, saying that it is impossible not to speak when one has been badly treated contrary to expectation and discovers one has been wronged by those who seemed to be one's philoi.101 In Lysias 4, the speaker asserts that he and his accuser are friends - the proof of this is the favours he has done the man102 - although his accuser insists they are enemies.103 The speaker of Isaeus 1 {On the Estate ofCleonymus) says: My opponents and I, gentlemen, do not have the same feelings towards one another, for I think that the worst part of my present troubles is not that I am unjustly in danger, but that I am contesting against kinsmen (oikeioi), against whom it is not 'nice' to defend oneself. For I would not think it was less of a misfortune to harm them in defending myself, since they are kinsmen, than to have originally suffered harm at their hands. But these men do not hold such an opinion, but they have come against us, having summoned their philoi, prepared orators and spared none of their resources as though, gentlemen, they were punishing echthroi and not doing harm to relatives and kinsmen.104 It was possible for anyone to become an echthros, just as anyone could become a philos. But as well as his private friendships and enmities, there was also a sense in which the individual had a public self. In his role as the citizen of the polis, he was required to give his primary loyalty to the polis, and that meant to all the members of \hepolis, his fellow citizens. As a result, whatever his private relationships, at a polis level fellow citizens were insiders, while non-citizens were outsiders. Xenia provided at once a resolution for this crux, while at the same time creating fresh problems of its own.105 The xenos was fundamentally the 99

100 101 102 105

See Earp (1929) 34. There is an important distinction between a private enemy {echthroi) and a public enemy (polemios). A private enmity could carry over into the public sphere (see Rhodes (forthcoming a)), but one could have personal friends among the public enemies of one's state: see ch. 10. Eur., Or. 740 (cf. 748), 1129-30, II43~53 H9i-3> 1296-310,1323-48. [Lys.] 8.2; cf. 8.1. The speaker ultimately left the association ([Lys.] 8.19). 103 104 Lys. 4 . 3 - 4 . Lys. 4.5; see also R h o d e s (forthcoming a). Isaeus 1.6-7. Xenia was b o t h personal and political, subjective (in that it imitated intimate relationships) and objective (in that it was calculated a n d balanced). T h e r e were m a n y deeply entrenched difficulties with the intrusion of this kind o f friendship into public affairs (see the following chapters), but these tended to be glossed by the ideology which allowed xenia relationships to coexist with other morepo/w-based loyalties (see ch. 10).

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stranger, the outsider, who stood beyond social and religious boundaries.106 Yet, through the mediation and protection of Zeus xeniosy107 the xenos/stranger had the right to be drawn into someone else's community as the xenos/guest.108 The outsider also had the potential to become the x£W0s/ritualised-friend and so a permanent member of a philia network through the ritualised exchange of tokens (xenia),109 and ritualised-friends are sometimes distinguished from other types of xenoi by the label 'philos and xenos9.110 Consequently, through the institution of xenia, at least to the Greek mind, the non-Greek, the barbarian, the archetypal outsider, could become an insider, and was treated - and was expected to react - as one of those inside the friendship network by both giving and receiving in positively reciprocal ways.111 The trouble began when, with his own understandings and expectations, he did not. So the ritualised-friend was the outsider who had been brought in, the xenos who had become philos and become part of the philia network. Thus a xenos could mediate for his foreign xenos, and provide for him a 106

107

108

109

110

111

Cf. Cartledge (1993) 47. See also, e.g., Hdt. 5.72.3, 6.81; Sourvinou-Inwood (1988) 268-70; (1990) 297. Note also a grave inscription from Attica dating to the early sixth century, in which passers-by whether astoi or xenoi are called on to grieve for the young hero (IGi3 1194bis;cf. Jeffery (1962) 113no. 34;Guarducci (1961) 158-9). Frost ((1994) 50-1) may be right in claiming that here xenos does not mean foreigner outside Attica but simply someone not from the city. On the different meanings of xenos (guest-friend, mercenary soldier, ally, foreigner, metic, non-resident foreigner unconnected with Athens, parepidemos), see Whitehead (1977) 10-11. Note that Odysseus sought the protection of 'Zeus xeinios, the avenger of suppliants and xeino? (Homer, Od. 9.270-1) when he met Polyphemus (though the Cyclops respected neither aegis-bearing Zeus nor the blessed gods (Od. 275-6)). For Zeus' role as the protector of xenoi, see Lloyd-Jones (1983) 5,7,27; Herman (1987) 124-5. S o there was always a positive discrimination towards s o m e o n e b e c o m i n g a philos: t h e stranger can choose to b e echthros, but there is a sense in w h i c h h e can b e a philos by right; cf. Gould (1973) 90-1. Note also Gauthier ((1972) 19) who compares the xenos of the archaic period who stood outside the oikos with the xenos of the classical period who was outside the political community. This word also refers to the meal of hospitality given to strangers: it is no accident that non-Athenians visiting Athens were invited to the prytaneion for xenia, while Athenians were given deipnon (dinner). Note the inscription honouring Arybbas of Molossia (JG ii2 226 (Tod 173)). Arybbas' grandfather was a naturalised Athenian citizen, and this decree confirms Arybbas' own citizenship. Arybbas is invited to the prytaneion for deipnon (as a citizen), while those with him (Molossians, so non-Athenians) are invited for xenia: see Rhodes (1984b) 193-9. E.g., Eur., El. 82-3; Phoen. 402; Lys. 19.19. On the close connection between xenos and philos see also Benveniste (1973) 278-9. This is not to disregard or diminish the Greek polarity between Greek and barbarian, but there is an element of personal identification with the barbarian xenos which transcends this distinction. As Cartledge ((1993) 45) writes: 'is it not of the nature of "othering" that the "other" group may be treated categorically and normatively as an undifferentiated mass, while individual members with whom ego has a personal relationship that contradicts the stereotyped image are treated as being by definition exceptions who prove the rule?' (cf. 47-9).

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legitimate point of entry when he visited the community. On the other hand, the xenos also posed a potential threat to the polis as a competing loyalty, presenting a problem which the Greeks had difficulty resolving and for which there was no single solution.112 1.4

Dora, charites and commodities

Finally, a word needs to be said about the medium of the exchange, the gifts themselves. Up to this point we have only spoken generally about reciprocity as an exchange of gifts, which encompassed exchanges of services and honours as well.113 The 'gifts' in an exchange are often, although not exclusively, designated by two terms: dora (gifts) or charites (favours). These two types of exchange objects, their differences and their relationship to another important kind of exchange in the classical world, commodity-exchange, need to be investigated further.114 Dora were the tangible representations of the exchange and the relationship that was created, so that, for example, the xenia relationship was initiated by the exchange of dora (here equal to the specialised gifts of xenia, xenia). For example, Xenophon says that some men who wanted to make a philia with Medocus the king of the Odrysians brought dora (and note here the exchange of the intangible - goodwill - in return for the tangible),115 and elsewhere says (about another Thracian) that it is necessary to show goodwill (eunoia) to the man from whom one has received dora.116 Gifts could also take the form of favours (charites). Charis was a word whose meaning could range from simply 'joy' or 'pleasure' and 'gratification' to 'favour',117 but always implied a return. Orestes says to Menelaus: Give a share of your good fortune to your philoi, since you have come as one who is fortunate, and having received what is good, do not keep it to yourself, but also take your fair share of troubles, 112 113 114

115 117

See chs. 3 and io. On gifts, services, and honours as 'gifts' involved in exchanges, see Finley (1977) 64. Gregory ((1982) 12) follows Marx ((1954) 1.91) in viewing commodity-exchange as an exchange of inalienable things between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal independence, and says that 'the corollary of this is that non-commodity (gift) exchange is an exchange of alienable things between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal dependence'. Gregory also claims (based on the assumption that gift-exchange is the exclusive preserve of clan-based societies which hold all property in common and commodityexchange of class-based societies) that the distinction between alienability and inalienability 'is just another way of talking about the presence or absence of private property' (44; cf. 19). But as Morris (1986) points out, this model is too simple: in archaic Greece (which Morris discusses) clan and class are both evident (esp. 4-5) and yet gift-exchange still persists alongside commodity-exchange (7; cf. Seaford (1994) 14). 116 Xen.,Anab. 7.3.16. XenÂnab. 7.7.46. Hewitt (1927) 142-61; Blundell (1989) 33-4; von Bergson (1985) 14-16.

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paying back the charites of my father to those whom you ought. For they are phihi in name, not in deed, who are not philoi in times of misfortune.118

A charts produced gratitude and so induced the favour in return, so that charites could be both the thing given and the thing returned.119 Aristotle says that the reason why men set up shrines to the Graces (Charites) in public places was so that a repayment (apodosis) of charites might occur, and that this is the thing that makes charts distinctive: that it is necessary both to do a service in return to the man who did a favour (charts) and also to be the initiator oneself in doing a favour (charts) again.120 As well as these embedded forms of exchange other exchange processes included the disembedded exchange of commodities. Not surprisingly, the relationship between gifts (whether dora or charites) and commodities is complex and has been variously interpreted by anthropologists and political economists. According to Gregory the gift 'refers to the personal relations between people that the exchange of things in certain social contexts creates'.121 Its value is subjective and lies only in the social relations it produces.122 Gregory contrasts this with the commodity, which he defines as something which creates a relationship between the things exchanged and has an objective value.123 Von Reden (following Kopytoff) defines gifts and commodities as cultural constructs, and argues that, while gifts are things which in their cultural context are special and have a history, commodities are things which have become objectified, that 'are no longer singular or unique but become commonly available', and whose biography and history have become irrelevant.124 As a result, things that could be interpreted as gifts in one context may be interpreted as commodities in another.125 However, gifts can also have a latent objective value (that is they can be given an economic value apart from their social value) just as commodities can have a latent subjective and symbolic value (that is they can transcend or add to their economic value by their symbolic value). In addition there can be room for a great deal of ambiguity about the status of particular objects at particular times, which could all lead to the 118 119 120

123 124

125

Eur., Or. 449-55. See Hands (1968) 26-49; Millett (1991) 123-6; Kurke (1991) esp. 66-70. Arist., M e . Eth. 5, 113333-5. O n this passage, a n d charts i n general, s e e Millett (1991) 121 122 123-6. Gregory (1982) 8. V o n R e d e n (1995) 17. Gregory (1982) 8-10,42; Seaford (1994) 14; cf. Marx (1954) 1.54-75. Von R e d e n (1995) 6 0 ; cf. Kopytoff (1986). Although there are problems with this as a general definition of commodities, since, as Robin Osborne has pointed out to me, supply and demand pricing depend upon things not being not too commonly available. See esp. Bourdieu (1977) 194-5; (1990) 112-18 on 'symbolic capital'; cf. Kopytoff (1986).

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misinterpretation and social havoc that could be caused if the meaning of an object was read in the wrong way.126 This became a particular problem for ambassadors who received gifts from foreign courts as part of the normal diplomatic protocol, but then found them being reinterpreted as bribes on their return home. 127 To complicate matters even further, some gifts could in fact have an economically calculable value which was intrinsic to their status as gifts. Although Gregory has argued128 that the emphasis in gift-exchange is on 'quality, subjects and superiority' and in commodity-exchange on 'quantity, objects and equivalence', gift-exchange in its balanced forms as we have seen can be dependent on equivalence (or near equivalence) of value in the exchange, and this is particularly true oixenia. This meant that some sort of objective assessment had to be made about the economic value of the gifts exchanged, as Homer makes clear. At the end of the passage concerning Glaucus and Diomedes cited above, Homer adds this note: Then indeed Zeus son of Cronus took away Glaucus' wits, since he exchanged his armour with Diomedes son of Tydeus, gold for bronze, a hundred oxen worth for nine oxen worth.129 As Seaford points out, the gifts exchanged by Diomedes and Glaucus 'both confirm the inherited relation of xenia and are evaluated against each other by means of a common measure'.130 But more than this, the poet makes a joke out of the fact that the gifts are unequal, the point being that they should have been equal; in order to determine their non-equivalence an economic value was assigned to them. These factors also create further difficulties for the relationship between dora and charites. As dora are tangible and charites are more abstract, so dora are more quantifiable and the value of a charis is more ambiguous and more open to interpretation.131 Dora could be interpreted as having a specific and recognised economic value whereas charites^ being more abstract, were more difficult to assign a 'real' value.132 Further, while the value of any gift could come under threat under different conditions, charites in particular were even more vulnerable to revaluation. A service performed in good faith in one context might depreciate in value (or be wilfully depreciated) because of changed circumstances or needs, and so produce a different response to the one expected. A corollary of this is the requirement of a greater moral force to 126 127 130

132

On meaning, history and disjunction, see Sahlins (1985) esp. 136-56. 128 129 See chs. 6 and 10. Gregory (1982) 50-1. Homer, R 6.234-6. Seaford (1994) 199. The economic value of a gift can sometimes even add force to the 131 relationship. See Arist., Me. Eth. 8,1163310-21. For a similar kind of argument, see Arist., Me. Eth. 8,1162021-1163323.

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propel the return as the exchange becomes more abstract in character and quantity; in this way the relationship becomes more vulnerable to corruption or to complete dysfunction. To sum up: philia was a complex exchange-relationship which blended elements of instrumentality and affection in differing measures. It was also conceptually an equal relationship, although in some cases the equality may have been more qualitative than quantitative. Philia was also integral to a number of other kinds of exchange-relationship, including kinship, companionship and ritualised-friendship. These all formed part of the repertoire of philiai relationships, although each expressed the relationship in a different way. However, non-Greeks did not necessarily have the same repertoires of exchange as the Greeks did. They did not always divide their societies into friends and enemies in the same way or by the same criteria. Nor did they necessarily include xenia, for example, among their exchange-repertoires, or have the same understanding of gift-giving. Barbarian xenoi did not necessarily understand (or perhaps chose not to understand) the obligation they were put under when entering a xenia relationship. Similarly not all Greeks in their relationships with their non-Greek philoi allowed for or could cope with different assumptions and expectations of the relationship. These difficulties gave enormous scope for misinterpretation and exploitation in interstate relationships and resulted on many occasions in misunderstanding, disappointment and often failure in Greek/non-Greek affairs. In the chapters that follow, we shall consider the role of philia in both domestic and interstate politics. In chapter two we shall consider what happened when states tried to form relationships with other states as well as with individuals. Chapter three will look at the role of individuals and their friends in forming and implementing foreign policy, while chapters four and five will consider the importance of foreign connections for magisterial appointments. In chapters six, seven and eight, we shall turn specifically to relations between the Greek states and Persia, Thrace and Macedon, and scrutinise in detail the reasons why relations between Greeks and non-Greeks and those on the fringes of their world often went so disastrously wrong. Chapter nine, on the other hand, concentrates on Alexander, and looks forward to a world where a Greco-Macedonian elite was to dominate its non-Greek subjects. Finally, chapter ten looks inward, and takes stock of the problems of ideology and the conflict of interests. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. I fear the Greeks even when they bear gifts.

(Virgil, Aeneid 2.49)

Philia and the polls

The only reward of virtue is virtue; the only way to have a friend is to be one. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Friendship

Just as people relate to each other in different ways, there were also a number of ways in which states could relate to each other: for example, as mother-city and colony, bilateral allies, members of a federation of states like the fourth-century Arcadian Federation, members of a league with a hegemon such as the Peloponnesian League, or even members of an empire such as the fifth-century Athenian empire. Each of these relationships were different from each other and the partners in the relationship were expected to relate to each other and interact with each other on a variety of levels. In fact, in many ways interstate relations reflected personal relations, and states qua states copied relationships found in the private sphere, so that the repertoire of exchanges in both public and private relationships were in many cases very similar, if not the same. 1 This mirroring of private models and repertoires in the interstate sphere is reflected in the terminology of some early alliances. For example, in the middle of the sixth century Sybaris and the Serdaei formed a friendship (philotes) with each other, and in about 550 Croesus of Lydia formed a xenia and alliance with the Spartans against Persia, complete with an exchange of gifts.2 It is also significant that states which swore to become allies swore to have 'the same friends and 1 2

22

See Giovannini (1993) esp. 274-86. Sybaris and Serdaei: ML 10; see also Jeffery (1976) 45,169. Note also the use of proxenoi here (5): ML translate as 'guarantors' (cf. Bengtson (1962-75) 2.15 (no. 120)) and cite IG xiv 636, but the two cases are not identical. Whereas in the latter decree the proxenoi are individuals, the proxenoi here include Zeus, Apollo, the other gods and thepolis Poseidania. Gauthier ((1972) 33-5) prefers the translation 'witnesses'. Croesus and Sparta: Hdt. 1.69-70. There are a number of interesting features to this story: the Spartans agreed to the alliance because of benefactions (euergesiai) they owed to Croesus (1.69.3); and the krater which the Spartans sent as a gift to Croesus itself had been a gift to the Spartans from Amasis of Egypt (3.47).


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enemies'.3 The paradigms for private and individual relationships were being adapted for public use. Ultimately, a more specialised terminology for interstate relations was developed,4 but the basic models and presuppositions of interstate relations were still based upon relationships of a more personal and individual nature. Building on a personal model created certain conceptual difficulties and ironies. In thefirstplace, personal reciprocalfriendshipswere binary, so if a polis wanted to contract a relationship with an individual or another polis, it had to assume the mantle of a corporate identity.5 Secondly, the polis - by its nature an essentially impersonal abstraction - also imitated and exploited many of the features of personal and private relationships in public interstate relations through its guise as the corporate citizen. By appealing to personal relationships such as kinship, proxenia (the public manifestation of xenid) and citizenship (which is just as much a statement of who I am and where I belong as a definition of political status), poleis bound themselves together with chains of expectation, duty, loyalty and commitment, emotions and sentiments more appropriate to personal contexts which could be manipulated by skilful operators in non-personal situations to secure political results. In this chapter we shall look at how states formed relationships with other states through kinship, and how they formed relationships with individuals in other states through proxenia and citizenship. 2.1

Kinship6

As we have already seen in the previous chapter, kinship was not least among the nexus of relationships which tied individuals to each other. Well attested for the Hellenistic period,7 even in the classical period good 3

4

E.g., [hnst.],Ath. Pol 23.5; Th. 3.70.6; Xen., Hell. 2.2.20; cf. Th. 1.44.1 (where the distinction is made between a symmachia, or offensive and defensive alliance where one swears to have the same friends and enemies, and an epimachia, or defensive alliance). These were often simply balanced reciprocal agreements where each party agreed to corresponding and answering terms: e.g., the alliance between the Athenians and the Spartans (Th. 5.23.1-24.1); see Hooker (1974) 166-7. Although for the use of philia in treaties, see Tod i n and Hammond and Walbank (1988) 601.

5

6 7

In antiquity there were two ways of viewing the polis: one with the 'state* as an abstract, as an institution; and one in which the emphasis is placed on state as made up of men who work together in the pursuit of the common good. For discussions of the 'old' and 'new' paradigms for citizenship in Athens, see Manville ((1994) 21-33), although I do not agree wholly with his claim that 'there is no abstract "state"; citizenship and polis are one and the same, growing out of a dynamic and constantly evolving association of families and kinship groups'. Rather, the two facets of thepo/w, both its corporate and collective identity, were held in tension with each other. I am indebted to Dr S. Hornblower for many of the references in this section. See Curty (1994) 193; cf. (1995) XI-XVI.

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relations between states could also depend upon kinship, and kinship bonds could be manipulated in order to draw states into alliances, to procure their assistance in war, or to provide an excuse for interventionist policies. In line with kinship between individuals, the strongest form of kinship between states was the 'horizontal' bond between mother-city and colony.8 It was because of their status as colonists of Corcyra that the Epidamnians sought the help of the Corcyraeans for settling their internal difficulties.9 Likewise, it was 'because of their kinship {syngeneidf that Syracuse, a Corinthian colony, appealed to Corinth in 415 to support it against the Athenian threat, and in the summer of 411 some Methymnian exiles brought hoplites and mercenaries to attack Methymna commanded by Anaxarchus the Theban 'out of kinship', a link which originated in the founding of Methymna by the Boeotians.10 And when the Athenians arrived in Sicily in 415, ostensibly to help the Segestans and Leontines, they hoped to exploit colonial feeling to enlist allies by stirring up brother-like feelings among the Naxians, Rhegians and people of Catana (who had all been colonised by Chalcis) for the Leontines (who were also colonists of Chalcis).11 Nevertheless, as with individual relationships, the possibility existed that parent could reject child and child could reject parent. This of course was the case with Corcyra, which was a colony of Corinth and yet had been on bad terms with the metropolis since at least the seventh century.12 Other forms of kinship also carried great weight, not least the racial kinship among Ionians and Dorians. Although Thucydides himself is 8 9

10

11

12

See generally Graham (1964); but also Curty (1994) 193-4. Th. 1.24. Although genuine colonists (apoikoi), the Epidamnians presented themselves at Corcyra as suppliants (hiketai). Supplication followed two basic patterns: 'help me* and 'spare me' supplication (see Gould (1973); Parker (1983) 181-5). The Epidamnians' appeal was an example of the former (cf. Hornblower (1991-6) 1.68-9), and this representation of themselves as suppliants is both bold and paradoxical. Both Gould and Parker agree that this kind of supplication was made by the outsider who did not belong to the network of obligation of the supplicated but wanted to be drawn in. The Epidamnians were not outsiders in relation to the Corcyraeans but were bound to them by the strongest natural ties, those of apoikoi. That the Epidamnians took this action indicates the insecurity in their relationship with the Corcyraeans (well justified as it turned out), but also smacks of defiance. Syracuse: Th. 6.88.7. Methymian exiles: Th. 8.100.3. For Methymna as a colony of the Boeotians: Th. 7.57.5; cf. 8.5.2. Th. 6.20.3, 46.2; for the colonisation of Naxos, Leontini and Catana, see Th. 6.3; for Rhegium (which was a mixture of Chalcidians and Messenians whom they had invited to join them), see Strabo 6.1.6. This is surely not an appeal to their membership among the Ionians, as Curty believes ((1994) I95)5 since Thucydides emphasises their relationship to Leontini as the common denominator (not to Athens or the Ionians). Hdt. 3.49-53; Nicolaus of Damascus, FGrHist 90 F 59; cf. Th. 1.13.4, 25.3-4. See Graham (1964) 8,30-1.


25

dismissive of the real significance of this connection as opposed to its use as a pretext for action, the link between Ionians and Ionians and Dorians and Dorians was very strong at least during the fifth century in both political and religious terms.13 Part of the Leontines' appeal to the Athenians in the summer of 427 was based upon the fact that they were both Ionian, and the Athenians justified their intervention in the same terms (although Thucydides says that their real reason was both to prevent corn being brought to the Peloponnese and to see whether they could gain control of Sicily).14 Hermocrates5 speech to the Sicilians in 424 is also laced with this kind of rhetoric, and when the Athenians decided to go to Sicily again in 415, they salved their public conscience and justified their action once more in terms of kinship, although Thucydides says their 'truest reason' was to conquer the whole of Sicily.15 These ethnic divisions were themselves linked to colonial ties.16 The Athenians claimed to be autochthones and Athens was also said to be the mother-city of the Ionians.17 Surely Thucydides is alluding to Athens' 'natural' leadership role as metropolis when he says that the Ionians and Greeks of Asia Minor approached the Athenians in 478 to lead the Greek alliance, thinking them worthy because of their kinship (syngenes).18 The Athenians later turned this to further propagandist purpose under the empire, portraying Athens as the 'mother-city' of the allies, and demanding customary participation of colonists in some of their religious festivals, and the Greater Panatheneia in particular.19 13

14

15 16

17

19

Cf. Th. 1.6.3, 95-i; Hdt. 5.72.3. See Alty (1982); Jeffery (1976) 44-5 and 48-9 n. 4; Hornblower (1992b); Curty (1994). There has been a fairly lively reaction in the second half of this century to Will's rejection of the importance of the Ionian-Dorian division in the political discourse of the classical period (Will (1956); cf. de Romilly (1963) 82-4). The question revolves around how seriously Thucydides or his contemporaries took this Ionian-Dorian divide. Curty has argued that Thucydides radicalised the use of the term syngeneia so that he always uses it to refer to the racial division. Although some of his examples appear to support this thesis, others could just as easily refer to a kinship connection as a result of colonisation (e.g. Th. 6.88.7). F ° r discussions of syngeneia in Thucydides, see now Crane (1996) 149-61 and the excellent discussion in Hornblower (1991-6) 2.61-80.) Th. 3.86.3-4; cf. 4.61.2-3. For Thucydides' use of oikeiotes to indicate a weaker relationship than syngeneia, see Curty (1994) 194. Hermocrates: Th. 4.61,64.3; the Athenians: Th. 6.6.1. Curty ((1994) 193-4) tries to make the distinction between the metropolis-colony relationship and the racial division too clear-cut. E.g., Hdt. 1.146-7,5.97.2,9.106.3; Th. 1.6.3,12.4; see also Hornblower (1991-6) 1.26-7, 18 40-1. Th. 1.95.1. IG i3 34.41-2 (=ML 46: see commentary for date); IG i3 71.57 (=ML 69); schol. Ar., Clouds 386; compare Athens' 'real' colony of Brea which is required to send a cow and panoply for the Great Panatheneia and a phallus for the Dionysia: IG i3 46.15-17 (=ML 49.11-13). See also Schuller (1974) 112-17; Hornblower (1992b) 197; Parker (1996) 142-3.

26


Myth also had an important functional value in establishing kinship claims, and could have significant political consequences.20 The Thebans formed an alliance directed against Athens with Aegina in about 505 BC by rather cleverly interpreting an oracle through the myth associating Thebes and Aegina as daughters of Asopus.21 It is indeed true that the Thebans looked for a myth that suited their requirements (the Pythia had told them to make an alliance with those 'nearest'; but the Thebans did not think their neighbours the Tanagrans, Coronians and Thespians were suitable allies, so someone suggested that they interpret the oracle as 'nearest-in-kinship'), and that the Aeginetans were also looking for an excuse to start a war with Athens, but the issue of whether anyone thought the myth historically accurate or not was irrelevant. The justification for this kind of argument was a live and potent tradition, that through its own dynamic allowed room for interpretation and reinterpretation and for the legitimisation of the present.22 There are other examples where myth and history intersected creating a virtual reality by which political actions and decisions could be validated. The Macedonian kings, for example, were able to persuade the Greeks of their Argive descent from Temenus, one of the Heracleidae (although scepticism was still possible and sometimes convenient).23 Although it was commonly recognised that this kind of argument could be pushed to absurd lengths, as when it was used as a justification of the Argives* inaction in the war against the Persians,24 claims of kinship still generally had a political validity and could affect specific policy decisions. After Argos had gone over to Sparta in the winter of 418/17, Perdiccas of Macedon is said to have seriously considered encouragement from Sparta to leave the Athenian alliance because he wanted to keep in line 20

22

23

C o m p a r e Callias' speech arguing for peace with Sparta o n the grounds that the first foreigners the Athenian Triptolemus s h o w e d the mysteries o f D e m e t e r and Core to were Heracles the founder of Sparta and the Dioscouri w h o were Spartan citizens, and that the Peloponnese was the first place t o b e given the seed o f Demeter's fruit as a gift ( X e n . , Hell. 6.3.6.). Although X e n o p h o n ' s characterisation o f Callias is touched with gentle mockery ( X e n . , Hell. 6.3.3), Callias' arguments are n o t the only examples of their kind, s o were apparently n o t just the stock-in-trade o f an elaborate rhetorical style, but provided valid political justifications. See also Georges ((1994) 1-12) o n the Greek use of myth t o 21 'appropriate' the world. H d t . 5 . 7 9 - 8 1 ; cf. H o w and Wells (1912) 2.45. See esp. Parker (1996) 2 2 6 - 7 o n the importance o f myth and traditions, whether wholly credible or not. Hdt. 5.22,8.137-9,9.45.2; Th. 2.99.3,5.80.2; see also the Vergina tripod of the mid fifth century: SEG 29 (1979) 652. Note also the change in the legend, as the Macedonians 'rewrote' their history: Herodotus gives Perdiccas as the founder of the Argead dynasty (Hdt. 8.137-9); Euripides changed this to Archelaus (Archel. col. n.1-25 [Austin]; cf. Hyg. Fab. 219), which was again changed to Caranus (Justin 7.1.7-8; Satyrus, FGrHist 631 F 1; Plut.Alex. 2.1); see Greenwalt (1985); Borza (1990) 83,179. Athenian cynicism: 24 e.g., Dem. 9.31. On myth and history generally, see Veyne (1988). Hdt. 7.150.


27

with his Argive 'kinsmen'.25 The Thracian kings apparently also tried to trace their ancestry to Athens through Tereus, the mythical king of Athens, and his consort, Procne.26 Thucydides is quick to deny the connection, but his rationality extends only so far as to argue that Tereus and Teres simply sound the same without being etymologically linked, not that the appeal to mythological ancestry is itself methodologically unsound. The alleged kinship also became a bargaining point between the Odrysian king Seuthes and Xenophon when he was leading the army of the Ten Thousand.27 Linked to this use of myth to validate action was the 'myth-creation' of the hero-cult associated with the foundation of colonies.28 Apart from his practical role in establishing and administering the colony, the founder, or oikist, also was often buried in the market-place on his death and worshipped as a hero, becoming the cultic focus for the new community.29 In this way, particularly in the semi-historical years of the early archaic period, the oikist could acquire a quasi-mythical status, and we might consider here the different stories given by Herodotus about the foundation of Cyrene in the seventh century by Battus, a mixture of fact and fiction which even the ancients found difficult to disentangle.30 In a number of other foundation stories belonging to this period, myth was used to explain and justify not only the choice of oikist, but also the site of the colony and its early history.31 Even with colonies founded in the classical period myth was used to bolster foundations. Hornblower argues that the Spartan Alcidas was appointed as oikist of Heracleia Trachinia in 426, on the basis of his Heraclid associations despite his incompetent performance as Nauarch in 428/7, since Diodorus claims that the Spartans decided to make Trachinian Heracleia a great city 'both by reason of kinship (syngeneia) and Heracles, who was an ancestor of theirs'.32 As Hornblower notes, 'kinship' presumably refers to the Spartans' alleged ancestry from the Dorians of neighbouring Doris; and as for Heracles, one of the names of 25

28 29 30

31

T h . 5.80.2; cf. HCT 4.146. For Perdiccas' motives and his apparent fickleness, see Cole 26 27 (1974). Th. 2.29.2-3. X e n . , Anab. 7.2.31. See, e.g., H o m e r , Od. 6.7-10; Graham (1964) 2 9 - 3 9 ; Malkin (1987) esp. Pt II. Burkert (1985) 2 0 6 . Hdt. 4.150-8; cf. Pindar, Pythian 4.4-8,59-63,5.85-96; Menecles of Barca, FGrHist 270 F 6. Compare also the fourth-century foundation decree which is alleged to contain part of the original foundation decree: ML 5. On these traditions, see Malkin (1987) 60-9; Osborne (1996) 8-17. E.g., Tarentum: Strabo 6.3.2-3; [Scymnus] 330-6 (Muller); Paus. 3.12.5, 10.10.6-8; Dion. Hal. 19.1; Arist., Pol. 5,13o6b29~3i; Justin 3.4; see also Malkin (1990) 115-42; the various traditions concerning Metapontum: Strabo 6.1.15 (in Strabo the oikist was Daulius the tyrant of Crisa; cf. Dion. Hal. 19.3); Bacchylides 10.115-23, who gives 32 Metapontum a Homeric founding. Diod. 12.59.4.

28


Heracles was Alcidas, and 'what was more appropriate than for the Spartans to send a real-life Alcidas to bring the colony luck?'33 Even more interesting is the reaction of the Athenians' northern colony of Amphipolis, who went over to the Spartan Brasidas in 424.34 The colony, although of mixed composition, was originally founded by the Athenian Hagnon in 437, and although his position as oikist appears to have been magisterial, Thucydides implies that he at least received honours from the city before it revolted, possibly even those of a hero-cult even though he was still alive.35 When Brasidas was killed defending the city against the Athenians in 422, Thucydides says that the Amphipolitans buried Brasidas in the city with full public honours, named him as their founder in place of Hagnon, and established a cult in his honour.36 Although this was not the only instance where a city appointed a new oikist in place of the actual founder, in the case of the Amphipolitans the replacement of Hagnon by Brasidas was particularly pointed.37 In effect, the Amphipolitans were creating a new mythology for themselves about their foundation. By reinventing their history and so their very ancestry (both religious and actual), the Amphipolitans were redefining their kinship obligations in order to accommodate and justify their new political affiliations. 2.2

Proxenia

The corporate identity of ttiepolis is strongly reflected in the institution of proxenia, where the polis contracted a relationship with an individual on the model of xenia.3* Perhaps from the seventh century the Greek states had established this institutionalised and politicised version of the ancient xenia relationship, whereby citizens of one state were appointed by another state to act as their local representatives.39 These were men acting on an official level to provide the services an individual might expect from 33

35

37 39

Hornblower (1992a) 151-2 (=(1991-6) 2.134-5); (1991) 506-7- Alcidas as oikist: Th. 3.92.5; on his Nauarchy: Westlake (1968) 142-7; Hornblower (1991-6) 1.400; (1992a) 151-2; Hodkinson (1983) 261; see also Lateiner (1975) 175-84; for a more favourable (although still unconvincing) view of Alcidas, see Roisman (1987) 385-421; cf. Badian 34 (1987)23. Th. 4.106. Th. 4.102.3,106.1,5.11.1 (can we infer cult buildings, even though Hagnon was still alive? See Malkin (1987) 228-32 and Hornblower (1991-6) esp. 2.452-6). On Hagnon's posi36 Th. 5.11.1. tion in Amphipolis, see Graham (1964) 37-8. 38 Cf. Malkin (1987) 230. Herman (1987) 132. Wallace (1970); Gauthier (1972) 18-27; Mosley (1973) 4-7; Adcock and Mosley (1975) 11; Walbank (1978) 1-9; Baslez (1984) n-25; Herman (1987) 130-42. For the earliest extant proxeny decree: ML 4; although see also van Effenterre and Ruze ((1994) 146-8) who date the inscription to the sixth century, and see it as a magistracy of the type discussed below, although on this second point they are not convincing.


29

a xenos.40 However, unlike xenia, which was a private and personal relationship between individuals, proxenia was a public and official relationship between an individual and a state.41 As with xenia, exchange was fundamental to the relationship: the proxenos9 part in the arrangement was to look after the interests of the nominating state and its representatives.42 Consequently, in 427 the Corcyraean hostages taken in the naval battles off Sybota were released after their Corinthian proxenoi had supposedly pledged eight hundred talents as surety for them (although in fact the Corcyraeans had been bribed to bring Corcyra over to the Corinthians), and some of the proxenoi of the Athenians at Mytilene, who were from a different political group from those leading the rebellion, informed the Athenians of the revolt in 428. 43 Proxenoi could also be expected to entertain ambassadors who were visiting from their honouring state, so that when the Spartan ambassadors came to Athens in 378 they stayed at the home of the Spartan proxenos, Callias.44 In return for services rendered, the proxenos not only enhanced his personal status within his own community, but also was often extended privileges by the honouring state, which included assurances of protection from harm, access to the courts, or simply an invitation to a meal in the prytaneion.45 The position of proxenos also had other benefits for the honorand, and he could sometimes turn the relationship to his own material benefit. Thus the Athenian proxenos Nicias of Gortyn was able to use his influence with the Athenians to persuade them to sail against Cydonia in 429/8, and Polydamas, who was virtually the tyrant of Pharsalus in Thessaly, appealed to Sparta for support against the encroachments of Jason of Pherae on the grounds that he, like his forefathers before him, 40

41

43

45

It is important to note, however, as Gauthier points out ((1972) 25), that the proxenos' position is only official in relation to the awarding state; in his own state h e is a private citizen. A rather striking exception is the grant of proxenia m a d e b y Mausolus o f Caria t o all the people of Cnossus (Hornblower (1982) M 7 —Labraunda m 4 0 ) , probably in the 350s (see Hornblower (1982) 4 0 ) . This is not true proxenia but is playing a different kind of game within the rules of proxenia, and anticipates the purely honorific proxeny grants that were made in the Hellenistic period. It looks very m u c h like a grant of citizenship (compare the citizenship grants made by the Athenians t o the Plataeans and Samians), although there 42 was n o such thing as citizenship of Caria. Mosley (1973) 4 - 5 . Corinthian proxenoi: T h . 3.70.1; for the background, see T h . 1.55.1. T h e nationality of the proxenoi is n o t agreed b y all: if, as Kagan ((1974) 175-6) does, and as I think is more natural to the sense, one understands the proxenoi to b e Corinthian (pace Losada (1972) 9 6 - 8 ; Gerolymatos (1986) 6 4 - 7 0 ) , this is a straightforward example of h o w the Corcyraean representatives in Corinth helped the Corcyraeans in need (albeit in theory rather than in fact). Mytilenean proxenoi: T h . 3.2.3; Arist., Pol. 5, 130439-10; see also 44 Gerolymatos (1986) 53-8. 'Ken., Hell. 5.4.22. See for example, W. 2 9 , 4 5 , 6 4 ; see also Perlman (1958).

30


was the Spartan proxenos and benefactor.46 On this occasion the Spartans, although willing in principle, checked their diaries, found that they had too much on, and politely declined to help. Polydamas, just as politely, thanked them for their straightforwardness, went home and brought Pharsalus into alliance with Jason and supported him in his ambitions to become Lord of Thessaly. There could also be a close personal bond between proxenos and awarding state, and there are a number of examples of proxenoi who supported their honouring polls although this was in direct opposition to the policy of their own states. During the Third Sacred War the Tenedian proxenos of the Boeotians made a contribution to the Boeotian war fund, despite his city's 'unwavering loyalty' to Athens.47 In 349/8 an Athenian taxiarch, Mantitheus, collected money in Mytilene from Apollonides, the Athenian proxenos there, and from the Athenians' philol on Mytilene, even though Mytilene was under the control of the tyrant Cammys, who was an enemy of Athens as well as of Mantitheus.48 But Callias the Athenian proxenos of the Spartans effectively led the Athenian hoplites against the Spartans at Corinth in 390 although he had served on a number of embassies to Sparta.49 How personally a proxenos interpreted the relationship depended on the individual proxenos. Plato's Megillus, portrayed as the hereditary Spartan proxenos for the Athenians, talks about the affection even children must feel for the state they are to represent as proxenoi.50 Nevertheless, Jason of Pherae, the proxenos of the Thebans, although he responded to the Theban appeal after Leuctra with men and ships, dissuaded them from the campaign and made a truce with Sparta on their behalf, a move that was probably intended to further his own interests rather than the interests of Thebes.51 Yet foremost proxenla was a civic institution, created by the state for the state, and could be put to a number of state uses. Proxenoi could be used as intermediaries in forming relationships between states. In the summer of 431 the Athenians made Nymphodorus, brother-in-law of Sitalces king of the Odrysian Thracians, a proxenos as a political expedient in order to facilitate an alliance they wanted to make with Sitalces.52 Despite 46

47 48

49 51

Nicias o f Gortyn: T h . 2.85.5; see Davies (1993) 71. For supposed difficulties with this passage, see Hornblower (1991-6) 1.366; Walbank (1978) 174-6; Gerolymatos (1987) 8 1 - 5 contra C o n n o r (1976) 6 1 - 4 . Polydamas of Pharsalus: X e n . , Hell. 6.1.2-19. IG vii 2418.14-15 ( = T o d 160); see also Tod's commentary to the text. D e m . 3 9 . 1 7 , 4 0 . 3 4 , 3 6 - 7 . N o t e that Mantitheus' father had been honoured b y Mytilene previously, so was an 'appropriate* choice for this mission: see also ch. 5 below. 50 X e n . , Hell. 4.5.13; for his embassies t o Sparta, see ch. 5. Plato, Laws 1 , 6 4 2 b - d . X e n . , HeU. 6 . 4 . 2 0 - 5 . Proxenia: X e n . , Hell. 6.4.24. His father had also been aphilos to the Thebans. For Jason's motives, see Tuplin (1993) 118.


31

Nymphodorus' former hostility to Athens he proved of good value to them as he also brought about a reconciliation between Athens and Perdiccas of Macedon. 53 And it was also probably to ease negotiations with the Chalcidians that Brasidas took with him his epitedeios Strophacus, the proxenos of the Chalcidians at Pharsalus, on his campaign in the north in 424/3. 54 Awards of proxenia were also useful as a strategy for keeping more farflung allies faithful. This may have been the rationale behind an Athenian grant to Archonides king of the Sicels, since once Archonides was dead the Sicels and Geloeans were far more eager to go over to the Spartans.55 Not surprisingly^ proxenoi could be of use in their natal state as well because of their good relationship with the awarding state: the Spartan Lichas son of Arcesilaus, proxenos of the Argives, was sent twice to Argos as ambassador, and in the same way it was the Spartan proxenos at Plataea, Lacon son of Aiemnestus, who was appointed as spokesman before the five Spartan judges in 431. 56 The essentially civic nature of proxenia is highlighted by an interesting deviation from the normal pattern of the institution. The duties of a proxenos could also include the religious functions a xenos would perform for his fellow-xewos in mediating with the local cult.57 In some cases it would appear that this could reach the extraordinary lengths of proxenoi being appointed by the sanctuaries themselves as magistrates of the sanctuary to intercede between foreign visitors and the god. Two unusual inscriptions from Olympia dating to the archaic period appear to illustrate this point. The first of these records a philia for fifty years between the Anaeti and the Metapii, to which the condition is attached that if one party or the other does not remain firm, the proxenoi and the soothsayers are required to drive the offenders away from the altar.58 In a second, more obscure inscription also from Olympia a certain Timocrates is to be driven from the altar by the proxenoi and priests.59 Gauthier suggests that these 52

54

55

56

57 58 59

T h . 2.29.1. See also Graham (1992) 66. O n N y m p h o d o r u s ' previous hostility t o Athens, 53 see Graham (1992) 6 6 . T h . 2.29.6. T h . 4.78.1. At least T h u c y d i d e s thinks it worthwhile to point out that Strophacus was the proxenos of the Chalcidians. IG ii2 32; Th. 7.1.4; HCT 4.379-80, Walbank (1978) 354-8. The naturalisation of Sadocus the son of Sitalces was probably for this purpose (Th. 2.29.5, cf. 67.2); see Hornblower (1991-6) 1.288-9; Osborne (1981-3) 3.26-7; cf. the naturalisation of Tharyps of Molossia: Osborne (1981-3) 3.29-30. Lichas: T h . 5 . 2 2 . 2 , 7 6 . 3 . For a more detailed discussion of ambassadors and their foreign connections, and Lichas in particular, see ch. 4. Lacon: Th. 3.52.5. For the origin of the proxenia, see Hdt. 9.72; Hornblower (1991-6) 1.444. Cf. chs. 4 and 5. Marek (1984) 168-70; Baslez (1984) 39-40; see also Sourvinou-Inwood (1990) 295-7. IvO 10 \=Staatsvertrdge i n ; van Effenterre and Ruze (1994) no. 51). IvO 13; van Effenterre and Ruze (1994) no. 36.

32


proxenoi were in fact magistrates appointed by the sanctuary to act as mediators and to make oracular sacrifices in the name of the foreign visitors in order to avoid sacrilege.60 Indeed proxenoi may also have played a similar role in oracular sacrifices at Delphi as late as the classical period.61 What is unusual about these appointments is that the proxenoi appear to be appointed not by another community, but by the religious community itself, and this is clearly a departure from practice noticed elsewhere. Van Effenterre and Ruze have suggested that this was the original form of proxenia and was the forerunner of the classical institution, but this argument is difficult to sustain chronologically.62 Instead, it is probably easier to see this kind of proxenos as a deviation from the norm, although a phenomenon which is conceptually linked to the more usual forms of the institution and possibly grew up beside it. For although the appearance of proxenoi as magistrates is peculiar, it does not necessarily fall outside the patterns already observed of the civic role of the proxenos^ since the proxenos is still acting as a xenos in a civic capacity but viewed from a different perspective. In the more normal form of proxenia the polis or community is looking at itself on the outside of another community and is trying to find a way in, so finds a proxenos to act as a mediator on this civic level. In this second form, the religious community as a corporate body is looking for a way of bringing outsiders in, and so needs to appoint a proxenos from within itself to perform the task of mediation. The two kinds of proxenia reflect on a civic level the responsibilities of xenoi to each other. The inherent tension in the proxenia relationship between its public and private aspects was complicated by the way in which proxenoi were appointed. Proxenia could be hereditary, and a number of Athenian proxeny decrees specify that the grant is to be made to a man and his descendants: descendants of Sthorys, possibly of Thasos, were proxenoi of the Athenians; and Apollodorus son of Empedus of Selymbria was made proxenos of Athens as his father had been. 63 Callias, the Athenian proxenos of the Spartans, said that not only did he hold the proxenia^ but that his father's father also had held it, having received it from his father.64 At Sparta, Herodotus says, the king appointed proxenoifromamong the Spartan citizens.65 This is certainly unusual, as it is usually the prerogative of a polis to award its own proxenoi^ given the basic understanding of the proxenia relationship: mutual xenia-like sympathy - although on a polis rather than a personal scale - between the awarding state and the 60 61

63

Gauthier (1972) 4 1 - 6 ; see also van Effenterre and Ruze (1994) 1 4 4 - 5 , 1 5 2 - 4 * 2 1 0 - 1 2 . Compare Eur., Androm. 1102-3: see Gauthier (1972) 4 6 - 5 0 ; Sourvinou-Inwood (1990) 62 297. Van Effenterre and Ruze (1994) 1 4 4 - 6 1 , 2 1 0 - 1 3 (note esp. 1 4 5 , 1 5 6 - 7 ) . Sthorys: W. 78; see also W. 15,25; Apollodorus: W. 86.37,44~5- See also Walbank (1978) 64 65 7; H e r m a n (1987) 135,137. X e n . , Hell. 6.3.4. Hdt. 6.57.2.


33

honorand. It also seems unlikely as a way of accounting for all proxenoi in Sparta: Iichas the Spartan proxenos of the Argives did have men in Argos who were epitedeioi of the Spartans with whom he was able to work closely - perhaps they were even xenoi> although Thucydides does not say so. 66 Mosley has explained this discrepancy by pointing out the importance of the kings and their xenia relationships in providing hospitality, and arguing that the Spartan king did not appoint all proxenoi but merely supplemented the arrangements made by other states.67 Cartledge, on the other hand, finds no inconsistency at all in Herodotus' statement, but regards this as all of a piece with the Spartan desire to control foreign contacts.68 We do have one Athenian proxeny decree dating to 368/7 awarding proxenia to a Spartan, Coroebus, although this may only indicate that Spartan practice had changed by the middle of the fourth century.69 In Athens grants of proxenia to foreign citizens were placed firmly in the public domain since proxenoi had to be appointed directly by the assembly at the nomination of a citizen.70 Herman argues that 'the most natural person' to make such a recommendation was a xenos, and that 'to the users of the language it simply seemed self-evident that proxenia implied xenia\71 Setting aside the problems of identifying proposers, this is difficult to test from the proxeny decrees themselves because many of these decrees were probouleutic, so the proposers must have come from the Council of Five Hundred.72 One we can test is Thrasycles who proposed the proxenia of Asteas of Alea.73 The decree is securely dated to 421/0, and Walbank suggests that the context is the negotiations that led to the Peace of Nicias, and that the Thrasycles of the decree is the Thrasycles who swore the oath to the Peace.74 Walbank further 66 67

69

70

71

72

74

Th. 5.76.2-3, but see also below. M o s l e y (1971c) 4 3 3 - 5 ; cf. Wallace (1970) 198; Cartledge (1982) 251. O n the importance 68 of the personal connections of the kings, see ch. 3. Cartledge (1987) 108. IG ii 2 106 ( = T o d 135). C o m p a r e also Olympia Bericht 4.164 ( = v a n Effenterre and Ruze (1994) no. 37), dating t o the sixth century, w h i c h is inscribed: 'Gorgos, Lacedaemonian, proxenos o f the Eleans* (see also van Effenterre a n d Ruze (1994) 156-7). T h e earliest Spartan proxeny decree belongs t o the s e c o n d century BC (IG v(i) 4 ) , by which time the practice of royal appointments could have changed. See, e.g., W. 39; H e r m a n (1987) 137. Other states o f course issued proxeny decrees (see the lists o f Marek (1984)), but Athens provides u s with b y far the largest selection from this period. F r o m Sparta, for example, w e d o n o t have extant proxeny decrees before the s e c o n d century, and w h e n they d o appear their form was o f a rather different nature (see n. 72 below). Herman (1987) 139-40; cf. (1989) 87 (although the specific argument here seems improbable: see Hornblower (1991-6) 1.365) contra Marek (1984) 134. C o m p a r e the Spartan proxeny decrees, w h i c h admittedly date t o the s e c o n d century B C when Sparta belonged to the Achaean League, where the man wishing to become a proxenos makes an 'approach' himself to the synarchiai and the damos: IG v(i) 4, 5; see also 73 Rhodes with Lewis (1997) 82,496. W. 49. Walbank (1978) 279, see also 276. For date: W. 49.6-7.

34


suggests that the nature of Asteas' service was hospitality to the embassy negotiating the Peace and the ensuing alliance, pointing out that Alea lies on the overland route to Sparta.75 If this is so, it may be a fair guess that Thrasycles and Asteas were xenoi. But we cannot assume as Herman does that there was a xenos behind every proxenos. There were also other ways for states to identify likely proxenoi. like xenia, proxenia was often established at least in the first instance on a quid-pro-quo basis, so that grants were sometimes made by the corporate polls as a reward for services already rendered to the state whether solicited or not.76 When Alcibiades in 420 was trying to renew his family's proxenia with Sparta, he looked after the Spartan prisoners from Sphacteria in the hope that the Spartans would recognise his services.77 There is no suggestion that Endius, Alcibiades' Spartan xenos, was involved.78 Grants of proxenia may sometimes have been made in anticipation of services in the future. In these cases any member of the assembly with relevant information could have been behind the proposal for a suitable candidate. This could have been a xenos, but need not have been. The Athenians awarded proxenia to Nymphodorus of Abdera in order to facilitate their Thracian policy. Hornblower is tempted to think that 75 76

77 78

See W. 4 9 . 9 - 1 2 ; Walbank (1978) 2 7 9 . It is difficult to pin d o w n exactly what constituted a service which could be rewarded by a proxenia, as the formulae in the decrees are n o t always specific concerning the services rendered. A m o n g M . B. Walbank's collection (1978), however, W. 4 0 (though heavily restored) may b e a grant of proxenia t o a m a n w h o helped the Athenian army in Sicily ( 6 - 7 ) , and W. 4 4 a grant to a (?)family of Illyrians w h o helped the 'demos and the army o f the Athenians' ( 9 - 1 0 ) (cf. W. 55.3-5). W. 4 7 praises a certain Heracleides w h o assisted the Athenian ambassadors t o the Great King (15-18). W. 9 0 is a grant o f proxenia t o Archelaus o f M a c e d o n for his assistance in ship-building (25-32) (cf. W. 6 0 ) . Yet o n e cannot b e t o o rigid in defining the kind o f service that would b e rewarded b y a grant of proxenia, since it could be u s e d prospectively t o produce services rather than as a reward for services (for example, N y m p h o d o r u s ) , a n d as time went o n the grants b e c a m e increasingly more frequent and linked t o other honours (see F. W. Walbank (1992) 1 4 8 - 9 ) , s o that the h o n o u r of proxenia itself decreased in value. Citizenship, o n the other hand, as Osborne notes ((1981-3) 4 . 1 8 6 - 2 0 4 ) , was awarded for a wide range of activities, and could be either honorific or practical, depending o n to w h o m the grant was m a d e to. T h i s basic difference in the award is best illustrated b y the grant m a d e by the Athenians to Cotys, king o f the Odrysians,((Dem.) 12.9 (for the emendation: Osborne (1981-3) 3 . 4 9 , 1 2 2 ) ; D e m . 23.118), with w h o m they h o p e d t o maintain a friendly relationship (see ch. 7 for a detailed discussion o f this), and then their later grants o f citizenship and gold crowns to Python and Heracleides of A e n u s , w h o assassinated Cotys, o n the grounds that they were benefactors (euergetai) ( D e m . 23.119; cf. 127). Th. 5.43.2. Contrast Herman (1987) 137-8. Cf. IG ii 2 n o , which is a decree of the demos in favour of Philiscus son of Lycus for laying information against the Byzantine fleet. Unfortunately the proposer is lost, but the generals may have b e e n involved (see D i o d . 16.21.3-4) a s interested persons (although there is n o n e e d to make t h e m xenoi,pace H e r m a n (1987) Appendix B ) .


35

Thucydides himself may have been involved in promoting the proxeny, and this is at least a possibility in view of Thucydides' Thracian interests, without it being necessary to make a xenia link between Nymphodorus and the historian.79 Sometimes there may have been no xenoi to call upon. If the Corcyraeans really had kept themselves to themselves, there may have been no Athenian connections with any individuals in Corcyra before the Corcyraeans' approach to Athens in 433. In all probability, there was a pre-existing xenia in some instances, but in others proxenia was granted to fill a political need, as with Nymphodorus, or to recognise a benefaction.80 To draw all this together, proxenia was a purpose-built civic relationship and was undoubtedly important in the late fifth and early fourth centuries as a means of formally making contacts between states. It was after all an officially recognised position, and the examples of the Spartan Lichas and the Athenians Alcibiades and Callias acting as ambassadors have already been given. However, despite the fact that we have the names of a large number of proxenoi from decrees, relatively few of them appear as being actively involved in activities between states, and this seems to be as true for one polis as for another.81 There were many occasions when states interacted through the medium of individuals to form alliances, incite revolts and so on, other than through proxenoi. Not only were there also other official channels the military commanders, ambassadors and other magistrates - through which states interacted, but also, as we shall see, such interstate relationships could be conducted through the medium of the informal contacts of philoi and xenoi. Endius son of Alcibiades was appointed to numerous embassies to Athens on the basis of his xenia with the family of Alcibiades 79 80

81

Hornblower (1991-6) 1.286. For T h u c y d i d e s ' Thracian interests: see ch. 5. It is possibly with this in m i n d that w e should consider Peithias the Corcyraean etheloproxenos of the Athenians ( T h . 3.70.3). Hornblower thinks that T h u c y d i d e s ' use ofetheloproxenos looks like a technical term for an Athenian institution, and suggests that h e was a voluntary proxenos^ s o called in order t o distinguish h i m from a hereditary proxenos ((1991-6) 1.468). Davies translates etheloproxenos as a 'self appointed' proxenos ((1993) 70). Rhodes proposes that either the previous proxenos had died and Peithias stepped into the breach and/or h e had not b e e n appointed proxenos by the assembly ([1994a] 2 2 9 - 3 0 ) . Peithias m a y well have b e e n angling for a proxenia through services to Athens in the same way that Alcibiades had with Sparta. Whatever his actual status, the Corcyraeans at least felt that the Athenians should know what had happened t o Peithias ( T h . 3.71.2), which suggests that the 'protection' clauses o f regular proxeny decrees applied t o Peithias in spirit, even if there was n o actual decree t o ratify this for Peithias himself. However, see M o s l e y ((1973) 6 ) , w h o notes the relatively small n u m b e r of proxenoi actually involved in the affairs o f their honouring state, but w h o points out that 'the importance attached by states t o their proxenoi may be confirmed by the lengths to which they are prepared to g o t o secure the safety of their representatives'. Cf. Hornblower (1991-6)

1.285-6.

36


son of Cleinias.82 In Athens Alcibiades' lapsed proxenia with Sparta was pointedly not used (although Alcibiades clearly placed a lot of importance on renewing it), and Lacedaemonius son of Cimon was sent on a mission which was allegedly designed to embarrass him because of his Spartan connections.83 That proxenoi do not figure as largely in public affairs as we might expect reflects both the tension between the public and the private aspects of the relationship and the factional nature of Greek politics.84 If a proxenos was himself linked to an individual within the honouring state (such as a xenos of his), he might try to further the interests of that xenos, even though other politicians and other political groups might oppose this. Meidias the proxenos of the Eretrians supported the cause in Athens of his xenos Plutarchus, although Phocion, who had even been associated politically with Meidias on some issues, actively did not.85 This brings us to another problem: in dealing with the awarding state, the proxenos did not represent the corporate interests of his natal state, but at best he may have belonged to a political group within the state. We have already mentioned above the Mytilenean prarewo/ who betrayed the revolt to the Athenians. These men were part of a group in Mytilene opposed to the revolt, yet one of those who gave information later repented and went to Athens with others to persuade the Athenians that there was no cause for alarm.86 Individual loyalties could pull in more than one direction and the divided nature of political activity exacerbated the problem. Furthermore, a change came about in the way in which grants were made as awards of proxenia became increasingly honorific.87 This is reflected in the fact that it was no longer implicit in some grants that the proxenos would reside in his native state, and with some Athenian grants of the fourth and possibly even the late fifth centuries the assumption was made that the proxenos would spend a considerable amount of time in Athens itself.88 Other grants were made which were designed to flatter and please the recipients in the hope of a return, although the chances of being able to secure it were more remote. This is particularly true of 82 83

85

87 88

Seech. 4. Plut., Per. 29.1—2; but there is n o evidence that Lacedaemonius inherited his father's pro84 Spartan attitude, see d e Ste Croix (1972) 7 6 - 7 . See esp. Perlman (1958) 1 9 0 - 1 . Proxenia: D e m . 21.200; Meidias a n d Plutarchus: D e m . 2 1 . n o , 2 0 0 ; Phocion and 86 Plutarchus: Plut., Phoc. 13.7. T h . 3.4.4; cf. Walbank (1978) 2 0 0 - 1 . A l t h o u g h for a different view see Gauthier (1972) 1 8 , 2 5 . E.g., o n W. 55 and W. 85 e x e m p t i o n from the metoikion has b e e n restored as suggested b y Willhelm (although the restoration has n o t b e e n included by Lewis in IG i 3 ) and has b e e n restored for IG i 3 107 (although Walbank does n o t include the restoration in the text of W. 93); IG ii 2 83, and probably IG ii 2 288 for awards o f isoteleia (which e x e m p t e d o n e from paying the metoikiori), see esp. W h i t e h e a d (1977) 13.


37

grants made in the second half of the fourth century when the power balance among the Greek states had changed and Macedon dominated the Aegean. As a result, states from whom it had been an honour to be awarded a proxeny now courted the favour of leading Macedonians through honours such as proxenia. It is in this light that we should regard the awards made by Athens to Alcimachus and Antipater of Macedon as being made undoubtedly in the hope of thus acquiring sympathetic patrons at the Macedonian court.89

2.3

Athens and citizenship

As well as honorific grants of proxenia> increasingly in the fifth and fourth centuries in Athens naturalisation of non-Athenians became a significant part of foreign policy.90 In this way, those from outside the community could potentially become residents and active participants in the community itself, a prospect which was limited for the proxenos who was essentially non-resident. But why grants of citizenship? In the fifth century, grants of proxenia were far more common than grants of citizenship, which were rare.91 Sometimes such awards were made in response to initial benefactions, such as the award made to Euagoras of Salamis, probably in connection with negotiations with Tissaphernes.92 Often, as with grants of proxenia^ awards were made with a view to receiving other benefactions.93 The kings of the Bosporus were rewarded with citizenship for their benefactions to the city in maintaining the corn supply in the hope and expectation that they would continue to do so.94 Sometimes, as in the case of the Odrysian kings, the awards were prospective, that is not as rewards for benefactions received but looking forward to benefactions in the future.95 That the Athenians valued the exclusivity of Athenian citizenship is evidenced by Pericles' citizenship law in the middle of the fifth century and 89 91

92

94

95

90 Hypereides F 77; Anaximenes of Lampsacus, FGrHist 72 F 16. See esp. ch. 7. For lists and analyses of naturalisations, see Osborne (1981-3) esp. the summary 4.210-21; see also Walbank (1978) 7; Manville (1990) 3; Herman (1987) 141. On the differences between proxenia and citizenship, see Osborne (1981-3) 4.146 and n. 25; Hornblower (1991-6) 1.288-9; Manville (1990) 207. Osborne (1981-3) 4.146, 189-90. Euagoras: IG i3 113; Costa^(i$74) 45-6; Osborne 93 (1981-3) 1.31-3,2.22-4; Krentz (1989) 179. Osborne (1981-3) ^,146. See D e m . 20passim (esp. 2 9 - 3 5 ) ; Osborne (1981-3) 3 . 4 1 - 4 . T h e Bosporart Jongs were n o t only faithful, but quickly b e c a m e hellenised - s o m u c h s o that s o m e time ft\ the s e c o n d half o f the fourth century a decree records Paerisades and his sons themselves making grants of proxenia (Corpus Inscriptionum Regni Bosporani (1965) 1 (=5/G 3 217); also 2,3,5; Paerisades' Athenian citizenship: IG ii2 212 (=Tod 167); citizenship of Leucon his father and Satyrus his grandfather: Dem. 20.30. Very Greek indeed. Osborne (1981-3) 4.188.

38


its re-enactment towards the end of the century.96 As an Athenian citizen, there were rights and privileges one could draw upon, such as protection under Athenian law, participation in religious festivals and the holding of magisterial positions, but conversely there were duties that one was also expected to perform, such as the active involvement in and protection of civic interests.97 Citizenship implied a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the state. Blundell writes that for the citizen: The fatherland must be cherished like a real father, and like a parent it must be 'repaid' for the benefits of birth and nurture which it has, metaphorically, bestowed upon us . . . In return, the polls has ways of rewarding the service of its most devoted 'children' which go beyond the benefits it provides.98

In theory at least citizenship drew the recipient into the network of duties and obligations that one owed to one's fellow countrymen and to one's polls.

When a non-Athenian was granted citizenship, the individual became part of this web of obligation whether the honorand took up active citizenship or not. As Herman notes, grants of citizenship 'not only convert the grantees into external allies but effect their actual incorporation into the communal group'.99 Although it was not always practical for grants of citizenship to be exercised, they were made on the assumption that they would, or at least could be. 100 Aristophanes' quip in the Acharnlans that the Odrysian Sadocus, who was made a naturalised citizen in 431, desired to eat sausages at the Apaturia graphically illustrates the idea of full participation as the model of citizenship.101 Some naturalised citizens did take part in the polis> although at some date before 427 it became illegal for naturalised citizens to hold archonships and priesthoods at Athens.102 Phanosthenes the Andrian seems to have served as a general in 407, and Charidemus from Oreus was on the board of generals in the mid fourth century and served as a trierarch perhaps in the 330s.103 Other naturalised citizens were compelled to leave 96

98 100 102

For Pericles' decree, see [Arist.], Ath. Pol. 26.4; Plut., Per. 37.3; Ael., VH 6.io, 13.24, Suidas s.v. SÔTTOU/TO? (d 451); for the re-enactment, see Dem. 57.30; Eumelus, FGrHist JJ F 2, Carystius ap. Athen. 13. 577b-c; on both decrees see Rhodes (1993) 331-4. Cf. 97 Dem. 59.88. Manville (1990) 3-7. Blundell (1989) 43 and esp. 44 and references there. " Herman (1987) 140-1. 101 Osborne (1981-3) 4.148-9,187-92. Ai.,Ach. 145-7; cf. Th. 2.29.5. Osborne ((1981-3) 4.173-6) suggests 451/0 (his upper limit of 473/2 depends upon the Thessalian Menon being the archon for this year, which is unlikely): [Dem.] 59.92,104, 106.

103

Phanosthenes: for citizenship, see IG i3 182; for generalship, see Xen., Hell. 1.5.18; Plato, Ion 54ic-d; Develin (1989) 174; see also Appendix I: 'Athenian Generals'. Charidemus: for citizenship, see above; for his civic career in Athens, see PA 15380; Davies (1971) 570-2; Develin (1989) 268,291,310,312,313,343.


39

their homelands through force of circumstance, and sought refuge in Athens. Anaxicrates, Ariston, Cydon and Lycurgus, who betrayed Byzantium to Alcibiades in 408, escaped from the city in 405 when it was retaken by the Spartans, and fled to Athens where they were awarded citizenship for their services.104 And although bound at least theoretically by the duties of a citizen, still others chose to exercise their citizen rights intermittently, as Sadocus seems to have done. 105 Some simply lived too far away from Athens to make the exercise of grants feasible.106 In these cases, although citizenship was technically hereditary, grants were generally renewed in successive generations of non-practitioners: grants made to the Bosporan and Thracian kings were renewed despite the fact that citizenship should technically have been passed from father to son. 107 Likewise the children or grandchildren of an honorand could take up the grant, but this also generally entailed its renewal. Phormio and Carphinas of Acarnania, who were probably exiled after fighting with the Athenians at Chaeronea, came to Athens and had the citizenship awarded to their grandfather Phormio renewed.108 This clearly shows how the notion of citizenship was poised between two extremes: although one could legitimately bear the name of citizen in the abstract, there was a sense in which true citizenship was still founded upon participation in the state. Finally, a word about citizenship and proxenia. It is generally assumed that proxenia and citizenship were incompatible with each other since, it is claimed, a proxenos could not by definition be a citizen of the state he was representing109 - but we should resist the temptation to make the Athenians this legalistic. Since the role of a proxenos was to look after the interests of the honouring state in his natal state, a subsequent grant of citizenship did not disenfranchise him in his own polis or nullify the proxenia. His status as proxenos would be threatened only if he was unable to fulfil his obligation to look after the interests of the awarding state. A good fourth-century example of the compatibility of citizenship and proxenia is given by an inscription honouring a Phil[...7....]es of Rhodes. 110 In the main body of the decree he is awarded proxenia, while in a rider to the decree he is awarded citizenship. Osborne finds this 104

105 Xen., Hell 1.3.18,2.2.1; Osborne (1981-3) 3.37-8. Osborne (1981-3) 3.27. Ibid. 107 Ibid. 3.41-4, 49-50, 59-60, 65-7, 87, 110-13; cf. 4.150-4. However, in the case of the Bosporan and Thracian kings, there must certainly have been a propaganda value in reaffirming the citizen status of each king and thus reminding the king of his duties and obligations to Athens. 108 p o r r e n e w a i of citizenship: IG ii2 237 (=Tod 178); for exile: see Osborne (1981-3) 2.84 109 and n. 300 on Diod. 17.3.3. For example, Larsen OCD2 893, s.v. Proxenos. 110 IGii2 19 (=Osborne (1981-3) D 7). 106

40


problematic, assuming that proxenia is 'a privilege clearly incompatible with citizenship', and argues that the rider supersedes the main decree.111 Although it is clear that Phil[... 7....]es was in Athens at the time of the awards,112 there is no reason to assume that he remained in Athens or that he did not return to his native Rhodes to exercise his proxenia on Athens' behalf while remaining an honorary Athenian citizen. In this case, the citizenship would have emphasised his rights in Athens and given him status there, but the proxenia would have emphasised his duties to the Athenians when in his natal state. What is interesting about Greek political relationships is the interplay between public and private on a number of levels. When xhepolis behaved as a corporate body, it often assumed models for relationships which to modern sensibilities could be considered more appropriate to personal activities than for impersonal state relations. But the corporate polis could appeal to ties of kinship, form proxenia relationships as if they were xenia, and award citizenship in order to elicit strong bonds of responsibility to the state. All of these relationships implied and appealed to duties and obligations that were more natural to personal relationships. But even if it was manufactured or artificial (and to understand the Greek psyche is to understand that it was not always so), this call to loyalty and duty was still strong: kin should help Vin^proxenoi should help benefactors, 'citizens' should help fellow citizens. How seriously this responsibility was taken depended on the individual and on individual situations, but it was part of what made these relationships work, and if it was rejected or ignored it could lead to the failure of the relationship with all the (real or assumed) hurt, disappointment and anger that entailed. 111 112

(1981-3) 2.45. He is invited to dine at the prytaneion (for xenia on the occasion of his proxenia, and deipnon on his citizenship): IG ii2 19(0)2,10 (=Osborne (1981-3) D 7(0) 3,11).

Philia and political activity

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient. Democracy . . . cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America

Aristotle wrote that the polis is a koinonia (association) which aims at achieving the common good.1 Implicit in this is the belief that citizenship, or membership of the polis> is participatory and that it is the duty of the good citizen to take his part in seeking the common benefit and security of the state.2 But what was best for the state could be variously interpreted and was a point on which citizens could disagree. Public policy - and the popular perception of the common good - could change swiftly and erratically according to the fortunes of the political leaders and their political groups.3 The common concern to achieve what is best for the state, Aristotle argues, is grounded in philia^ 'for philia is the motive for social life', and political relationships were embedded within social relationships.4 Not only were philia relationships based on utility naturally suited to political contexts, but other more personal relationships, such as kinship and comradeship, could also become politicised. As a result, political activity in the city-states depended upon groups of philoi clustering in various ways to negotiate for power. This can be described in terms of a 'vertical axis' which penetrated down through society, and a 'horizontal 1 2

4

Pol. i, 125231-7. Arist., Pol. 3, i276bi6-29. Compare Thucydides' formulation (7.77.7): 'men are a polis, 3 and not walls or ships void of men'. See also ch. 2. E.g., Th. 3.36-49. Arist., Pol. 3, i28ob38-9. See also Cooper (1990) on 'civic friendship' and the polis in Aristotle and the reply by Annas (1990). Contrast Seaford ((1994) 194) who argues that although *interpersonal amicable reciprocity within the polis . . . remained a substantial and largely beneficial ingredient of social and economic relations' this did not have 'the political centrality possessed by such reciprocity in pre-state society'. 41

42


axis' which linked individuals of similar power and status both within communities and of different communities.5 3.1

Vertical axis

The vertical axis was the upward and downward flow of goods and services through the layers of society. One of the most obvious and most extreme expressions of this was patronage.6 The Athenaion Politeia talks about the situation in Athens in the early fifth century and how Cimon opened up his estates to his demesmen 'so that it was possible for those who so desired to enjoy the harvest'.7 Although as an institution patronage was far less pronounced in the fourth century, Lysias has examples of men giving financial help to their demesmen, and in fourth-century Sparta there is also evidence of the patronage networks exercised by Agesilaus.8 By giving freely to demesmen, tribesmen, or fellow citizens, one was not merely winning distinction but buying goodwill which could be paid back with political support.9 Such relationships were qualitatively balanced, if not quantitatively so in their real value to each partner in the relationship. But there were other relationships as well as patronage networks that could be tapped into and put to good political use: connections between brothers, fathers, sons, in-laws and neighbours.10 As a result, this theoretical vertical axis comprised a system of superimposed pyramids, embracing the layers of society, with individuals interacting in exchange-relationships of benefits, and each member of the pyramid had a whole network of relationships of his own which could be exploited for political ends. Xenophon tells the story that before the assembly at which the fate of the generals at Arginusae was to be decided, Theramenes and his friends made arrangements with large numbers of people at the festival of the Apaturia wearing black cloaks and with their heads shaved, to come to the assembly, as though they were kinsmen of the dead, and so try to excite public feeling against the generals.11 Whether this story is 5 6

8

10 11

Compare Griffith (1995) 68-72. In Greece patronage belonged to the repertoire of philia relationships: see esp. Xen., Mem. 2.9-10, which refers to patronage relationships of some sort and where Archedemus and particularly Hermogenes are referred to as philoi. Contrast Davis ((i977) 147-8) who rejects Pitt-Rivers' ((1971) 140) definition of patronage as 'lop-sided friendship', and Gellner (1977) w n 0 argues that the essence of patronage is not exchange, 7 but power. [Arist.], Ath. Pol. 27.3; cf. Plut., Per. 9.2. Financial help to demesmen: Lys. 16.14, 31.15-16; Agesilaus: Cartledge (1987) 139-59. For the existence of patronage in the classical period, although in a 'vestigial and periph9 eral' form, see Millett (1989). Cf. Rhodes (1986) 136. Mitchell and Rhodes (1996) 11-21. Xen., Hell. 1.7.8. See also Lintott (1968) 17-18 on the use of the 'squalor' of mourning to gain political support.


43

true or not is disputed, but it is a story which seemed plausible to a contemporary. There was a complex 'meshing5 of reciprocal activities which could all be called on, and which could all be motivated for political profit. Hansen is right to say that this was not rallying a regular political party,12 but it was probably using other networks, 'friendship' networks, for a political purpose. That is not to say that political, or politicised, groups did not exist, despite Hansen's objections.13 There is abundant evidence both from Athens and from other Greek states of groups which clustered around prominent individuals: Pericles, Alcibiades, or Agesilaus, for example.14 Hansen has argued that these men did not have political groups or followings whom they could call into action to vote on their behalf in the assembly or the courts, but as we shall see the sources appear to present us with a different picture. The basis for political groups in the classical period was traditionally small gatherings {hetaireiai) of companions of the same age and status (hetairoi).15 Many were originally drinking clubs, and most in fact probably remained social groups, but it was all too easy for these sympotic clubs to become politicised and become the basis for political associations.16 So, for example, Cylon, the young aristocrat who tried to seize tyranny in Athens in the seventh century, gathered together a group of his friends to undertake his attempted coup, and in the fifth century Thucydides says that synomosiai at Athens (a similar style of organisation to hetaireiai) were associations for use in law courts and appointments, and that these groups were influential in the oligarchic coups of 411 and 404. 17 They also played an important part in the civil war in Corcyra, and, in Thebes, Ismenias and Leontiades are both said to be leaders of their own hetaireiai}* There is evidence for political groups in many Greek states, and in the 12 13 15

16

17

18

Hansen (1991) 284; however, Hansen mistranslates and misinterprets Xen., Hell. 1.7.8. 14 Hansen (1991) 266-87. See Calhoun (1913) 7. Small size: See Arist., Me. Eth. 9,1171314-15; cf. Connor (1971) 28 n. 43. Equality of age and rank: Arist., Me. Eth. 8,1161325-7, Ii6ib33-n62ai, 9-10; Calhoun (1913) 29. Cf. Arist., Me. Eth. 8,1157019-24,1159032-4,9,1165329-30. Cf. Hutter (1978) 27-8; see also Connor (1971) 26-7 and n. 40. On the connection between symposia and hetaireiai, see Murray (1990) 150-1. Cylon: Hdt. 5.71.1; kw courts 3nd elections: Th. 8.54.4; 411: Th. 8.48.3-4, 65.2, 92.4; 404: Xen., Hell. 2.3.46 (on the importance of these as political associations in Athens, see below). As the name suggests, synomosiai were bands of individuals who swore oaths to each other, so probably a more formal group, snd it must be made clesr th3t they were not sbsolutely synonymous with hetaireiai: not all hetaireiai were synomosiai, as hetaireia covered a greater range of associations, just ss not all symposia were hetaireiai. Calhoun ((1913) 6) suggests th3t synomosiai could be made up of a few hetaireiai. Corcyra: Th. 3.82.5, 6; Thebes: Xen., Hell. 5.2.25; see also Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) i7.i = (Ch3mbers) 20.1; cf. Cook (1988).

44


fifth and early fourth centuries they are often designated by phrases like 'those about Theramenes'; or 'those with Xenares and Cleobulus'.19 They were not rigid parties as we would understand them with a political programme. Instead, bound to each other by ties of philia of different strengths and pulling in many directions, these groups tended to be fluid in their composition and policy so that outside the nucleus of the hetaireia the same people did not necessarily support the same group on every issue.20 For Athens, Connor has argued that in the late fifth century there was a shift away from personal politics and individual relationships towards a new style of politics of'mass alliances' between political leaders and large sections of the state.21 As an example of this, Connor discusses Pericles who on entering public life was said to have withdrawn from his philoi^ only allowed himself to be seen on the street that led to the agora and the bouleuterion, and turned down all private dinner invitations, except for his cousin's wedding when he stayed only until the libations were made. 22 As Connor explains, this would win Pericles the support of the demos by presenting him not only as the 'indispensable expert' in public affairs, but also as an 'impartial public servant, without dangerous obligations to philoi9.23 Connor also believes that Pericles was the forerunner to Cleon, who developed this new style of politics which 'de-emphasises the power of the friendship groups and stresses the mass allegiance which skilful and eloquent leaders can win'. 24 And yet as important as this new style of politics was, it was not entirely a fresh development but more an adaptation of the existing pattern. By withdrawing from his philoi and using state funds for jurors' salaries and his building projects,25 Pericles was changing the range and scale of his philia network but was not essentially changing the pattern of the relationship. It should be pointed out not only that he still had the nucleus of a political group supporting him,26 but also that he was creating obligations which could be put to political purposes. Now, rather than forming 19

20

23 24

25

E.g., Th. 5-46.4; Xen., Hell. 3.2.27, 5-449, 6.5.7, 7-4-15; Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1; on the significance of 01 nepl Selva I ol /xera SeiVa, see Calhoun (1913) 128; Connor (1971) 25-9. Note, however, that the phrase also came to refer to X alone (even as early as Xenophon (e.g., Hell. 6.4.18)) as well as X and his associates: Radt (1980) 47-56. Cf. Rhodes (1995) 161; o n political groups in the fourth century, see also Mitchell a n d 21 22 R h o d e s (1996). C o n n o r (1971) 117-18. Plut., Per. 7.5. C o n n o r (1971) 1 2 1 - 2 ; see also Seaford (1994) 197. C o n n o r (1971) 135. It is also worth noting the wild card that persuasive oratory m u s t have been. S o m e o f these connections were relatively weak, a n d a persuasive orator would always have b e e n able t o capture the swinging voters. T h i s is undoubtedly the case in the debate over the Mytilenean revolt. 26 See [Pirist.],Ath.Pol. 27.3-4; Plut., Per. 9.2-3,11.4-12.1. Plut., Per. 7.7-8.


45

relationships with individual philoi, he was effectively and ostentatiously making all the citizens his friends.27 Every political leader needed to bind people to himself by ties of obligation and loyalty. This was a new strategy for achieving such support on a large scale. Public liturgies were also an extension of this giving by the rich to the less well off. Liturgies were in effect an institutionalised version of the patronage system, where the giving created philotimia (glory), which could then buy public returns regardless of the fact that they were compulsory.28 For example, the orators argue that one's liturgies ought to be taken into account in legal decisions.29 The speaker in Lysias' Against Aristophanes says: concerning my father, since the accusations have been made as of a man who has done wrong, forgive me if I say what he has spent on the city and on his philoi, for I don't do this for the sake of philotimia but as a proof that it is not the nature of the same man both to spend a great deal without compulsion and to desire to have some public property at the greatest risk . . . Indeed my father did not ever desire to hold public office, but he has produced all the choruses and performed seven trierarchies, and has made many large public contributions.30 There was a return for services such as these. A man who performed a liturgy with distinction would gain enhanced honour (time), and no doubt the support of those who had benefited from his liturgy. Although the relationship was not with an individual but a collective, liturgies still amounted to giving for a return: something was expected back for what had been given.31 The main effect of this change from individual to group canvassing was that political groups became at the same time larger and more fluid as the ties that bound individuals to the leaders in the second half of the fifth century became more remote and consequently weaker. But by the end of the fifth century and into the fourth, the pattern in the formation of these groups changed again towards greater fragmentation and less cohesion.32 With the levelling effects of war and a stronger egalitarian spirit, more individuals each with a different view of what was best for the state became actively involved in the political leadership. This led to greater 27

29 31

32

Compare Herodotus (5.66.2) o n Cleisthenes w h o brought the demos into his hetaireia (TOV Srjfxov irpoaeraipiCcrai). T h i s is significant n o t s o m u c h as an indication o f sixthcentury practice, as for H e r o d o t u s ' fifth-century interpretation of what Cleisthenes was 28 doing. See Finley (1983) 3 6 - 7 ; Whitehead (1983) 5 5 - 7 4 ; cf. Veyne (1990) 8 5 - 1 0 1 . 30 Davies (1981) 9 6 - 8 . Lys. 19. 5 6 - 7 . A s Seaford notes ((1994) 1 9 7 - 8 ) , liturgies were compulsory in the classical period. In the fourth century, as Davies ((1993) 226) has argued, philotimia acquired a n e w importance as a major source for revenue and the development of public works. T h i s had the spin-off that the rich could b e c o m e even more powerful as the result of their benefactions and this was difficult to control. See also Parker (1996) 1 2 8 - 9 . Mitchell and Rhodes (1996) 16-19; cf. Hansen (1991) 283.

46


political instability within Athens, and an increased inability to form a united political voice in the face of the rise of Macedon.33

3.2

Horizontal axis

As well as the vertical axis which cut down through the layers of society, there was also a horizontal axis which included contacts made between groups in the same community as well as between groups from different communities. Within the community, the leaders of political groups could band together for greater political leverage. For example, Plutarch says that when the vote for ostracism looked likely to fall on either Alcibiades, Nicias or Phaeax, Alcibiades and Nicias united their respective hetaireiai and turned the vote against Hyperbolus.34 Likewise, when Peisander was agitating for support in 411, he visited all the synomosiai in Athens.35 Contacts could also be made between communities primarily through the medium of pre-existing personal connections. Political groups and political sympathisers from different poleis could be linked by ties of personal and individual friendships such as xenia.36 These personal philiai could form bridges between a group in one polls and a group in another polls. In all this, aristocratic connections and philia networks played an important part. Not only were the hetaireiai fundamental to political activity, but overseas connections such as xenol could be put to political use, and in fact were necessary for the smooth running of international relations in many states. Demosthenes declared in 351 when he was pleading the case of the Rhodians: I would never have said these things, if I thought it would advantage the demos of the Rhodians alone, for I am neither the proxenos of the men, nor am I the private xenos of any individual among them.37 33

34

37

T h i s was perhaps achieved fleetingly in 3 4 6 , although the groups involved s e e m e d to have different motivations for their desire for peace. A l m o s t before the peace h a d b e e n sworn, however, Demosthenes, one of the main proponents of the peace settlement, was stirring up the city against Philip so that the peace had floundered almost before it had begun: see ch.8. Plut.,^4/c. 13.4-7;Me. n.i-51 Arist. 7.3-4. Hansen rejects this story ((1991) 280-7) but it 35 36 is defended by Rhodes ((1994b) 92-8). Th. 8.54.4. Finley (1977) 102. Dem. 15.15. Compare Herman ((1987) 140) who cites this passage for a different purpose and wrongly infers that this implies a link between proxenia and xenia. However, as Christopher Pelling has pointed out to me, this passage is doing something rather different. Demosthenes is highlighting the symmetrical and yet parallel relationship between proxenia and xenia: there is a symmetry of expectation between proxenos and polis on the one hand, and xenos and individual on the other, and yet a parallel in their function. Demosthenes is saying in fact that he is neither one nor the other; he has no link with the Rhodians at all.


47

Although Demosthenes claims he is neither their proxenos nor their xenos, he implies that this is the role a proxenos or xenos could be expected to play in forming the link between poleis. Political conflict and rivalry had always been a feature oipolis politics. The tyranny of Peisistratus in Athens resulted from tensions between political groups, as did the fall of Eretria to the Persians in 490, the collapse of democracy and its restoration at Athens in 411/10, and the revolt of Thebes against Alexander in 335.38 The geographer Pausanias notes that the most impious of all deeds, the betrayal of fatherland and fellow citizens for private gain, had never been absent from Greece,39 but in a political system where judgements about what was best for the community were open questions, the imputation of treachery and treason was a subjective judgement: what was treachery for one man might be salvation for another. This was further complicated by the complex relationship between public and private, where private friendships could be used in public situations for public gain, whether this also entailed private advantage or not. The policies of the political groups were driven by a variety of factors. Sometimes the principal issue was democracy versus oligarchy,40 and this could be important in determining the actions of political groups. For example, in 365 when there was civil unrest in Elis Xenophon says that those about Charopus, Thrasonides and Argeius were trying to lead the state into democracy, while those about Eualcas, Hippias and Stratolas were trying to bring it into oligarchy.41 Of course, there were also poleis who sought the help of Athens or Sparta precisely because they did represent democracy and oligarchy respectively.42 There were also groups who were not so much interested in democracy or oligarchy as simply friendship with a powerful state. For many smaller states, the question of which 'super-power' they aligned themselves with had more to do with immediate circumstances and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the major states. In such circumstances personal connections could be as influential as other factors. Particularly in the period of Athenian weakness after the Sicilian disaster, Sparta took advantage of Alcibiades' connections. In 412 Alcibiades and Chalcideus were sent by the ephors to Chios to 38

40

42

Peisistratus: [Arist.], Ath. Pol. 13.4; Hdt. 1.59.1, 3; Eretria: Hdt. 6.100; 411/10: Th. 8.47-54,56,63.3-77,81-2,86,89-98 (for the restoration of democracy in 410, see Kagan (1987) 254-5 and n. 30; for its association with the victory at Cyzicus, see Andrewes 39 (1953) 4); Thebes: Arrian, Anab. 1.7.1-3. Paus. 7.10.1. Cf. Th. 5.31.6: in 421 the Boeotians did not want an alliance with the Argives because they were democratic; Th. 5.44.1: in 420 Argos wanted an alliance with the Athenians 41 because they were democratic. See also Dem. 15.18. Xen., Hell. 7.4.15. Cf.Th. 3.82.1.

48


bring about a revolt with the oligarchs on the island. 4 3 Thucydides writes: Chalcideus and Alcibiades on their voyage seized all they met so that news of their approach might not precede them. They first attacked Corycus on the mainland and deposited the prisoners there. They then made contact with some of the Chians who were conspiring with them, who told them to put in without giving notice of their arrival to the city, and arrived at Chios unexpectedly. The many (hoipolhi) were amazed and in a state of consternation. It had been arranged by the few (hoi oligoi) that there happened to be a meeting of the Council. Since speeches were made by Chalcideus and Alcibiades to the effect that many ships were on the way and they did not elucidate the news about the blockade of the ships in Speiraeum, the Chians and Erythraeans detached themselves from the Athenians straight away.44

It is likely that the Chian oligarchs were friends of Alcibiades. The idea of going to Chios seems to have been Alcibiades' in the first place, and he persuaded the ephors to agree to the expedition on the grounds that he would persuade the Ionians to revolt and would seem more trustworthy (pistoteros).45 Alcibiades may have had 'confidence in his persuasive powers as great as ever',46 but this was no empty boast, since he was epitedeios to the leading men in Miletus, and was said to have friends in a number of other Greek cities in Asia Minor, including Chios.47 The group of Chians in 412 must have had contact with Alcibiades and Chalcideus to co-ordinate their arrival with the meeting of the Council.48 It was then left to the persuasion and deceit of Alcibiades and Chalcideus to bring the Chians over, which they did with surprising ease considering the conspirators' initial fear that 'the multitude' would be hostile if told of the plans to revolt.49 Indeed, as Quinn points out, it was probably the assurances that the Peloponnesian fleet was coming that brought them over.50 Whether or not the Chians remained anti-Spartan 43

47

48

50

On the Chian government prior to the establishment of the oligarchy by Pedaritus in 412, see Jones (1966) 67-8, 69; Bradeen (i960) 265; Bruce (1964) 276; Andrewes (1992b) 465; HCT5.22; Forrest (i960) 180; Quinn (1969) 22-30; Kagan (1987) 43. For an important new view, arguing that Chios was stasis-free before the Ionian war, see Pierart 44 45 46 (1995). Th.8.14.1-2. Th.8.i2.i. HCT5.25. T h . 8.17.2; Plut.,^4/c. 12.1; Satyrus ap. Athen. I2.534d; [ A n d o c ] , 4.30: although these are anecdotal and romanticised, they still may contain the essence o f truth: see Andrewes {HCT5.26). For contacts between Sparta and Chios, note also an inscription, dated m o s t recently by Pierart (1995) t o the Ionian war, which lists contributions t o the Spartan war fund a n d records a contribution b y 'the exiles o f the Chians w h o were philoi o f the Spartans'. Pierart identifies these with the exiles w h o m D i o d o r u s (13.65.3-4) says Cratesippidas reinstated in Chios in 409/8 (see also L o o m i s ((1992) esp. 4 6 - 7 ) w h o favours a date in the Archidamian war; cf. Barron (1986) 101; Quinn (1981) 4 0 ) . For the n e e d for the coincidence of the Spartans' arrival with the meeting of the Council, 49 see Quinn (1969) 24-5. Th. 8.9.3. Quinn (1969) 24-5,27,28 on Th. 8.14.2.


49

or anti-Athenian was as much a matter of expediency as anything else. The point is that personal contacts were brought to bear in order to secure the trust (however misplaced) of the Chians and to detach them from the Athenian alliance. Often questions of policy were more personal: what do my philoi and I think is best for the state? The political groups in Megara in 424 appear to have determined their policies along these lines.51 Thucydides says that the people in the city were being pressed both by the Athenians, who invaded their territory each year, and by their own exiles in Pegae. As a result, the philoi of the exiles in the city urged the citizens to receive back the exiles. The leaders of the demos, on the other hand, became frightened, and made overtures to give up the city to the Athenian generals, since they thought that this would be the least dangerous course of action. The whole plan went astray when the Athenians only managed to take the long walls of the city, and were forced to fall back on Nisaea in the hope that Megara would soon surrender if they could lay siege to the city. At this point, Brasidas, who had been around Sicyon and Corinth making preparations for his northern campaign, sent to the Boeotians for help and went to Megara with a select group of his own men. The two factions in the city were afraid: one that he would bring in the exiles and drive them out, and the other that the demos might attack them. Neither faction would admit Brasidas but both decided to wait and see what would happen. The stalemate wasfinallybrought to an end by the philoi of the exiles in Megara who plucked up their courage and opened the gates to Brasidas and his men; those who had negotiated with the Athenians were cowed. Both groups had looked for the help which they believed would most further their own interests, and which they probably identified with the interests of their polis. Events appear to have followed a similar pattern in Thebes in 395 where there were two political groups, 'those about Leontiades', and 'those about Ismenias'.52 Leontiades' group sympathised with the Spartans, but those with Ismenias were accused of atticising because of their support for the demos when it had been removed from power, although they did not in fact sympathise with the Athenians.53 While the 51 53

52 Th. 4.66-73. Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1. Cf. Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 18.1 = (Chambers) 21.1. Cf. the dealings Eurymachus son of Leontiades (1) (the father of the Leontiades (n) in Thebes in 395) had with Naucleides and his political group when Plataea was betrayed to the Thebans in 431 (Th. 2.2.2-3). Leontiades (1) brought Thebes over to Persia at Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.233.1-2; cf. Aristophanes of Boeotia, FGrHist 379 F 6. On the reconciliation of these two sources, see HCT2.3 n.i), and Leontiades (11) surrendered the Cadmeia to the Spartans in 383-2 BC (Xen.,Hell. 5.2.25-36; Plut., Pelop. 5.1-2; cf. Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1; Bruce (1967) 111-12; see also HOT 2.3-4 and Kagan (1974) 46). It may be that Eurymachus' pro-Spartan tendencies made him seem a suitable and approachable

50


group led by Ismenias may have cared more for the support of the Athenian demos than for Athens, it would appear that Leontiades' group identified itself more with Sparta than with oligarchy as such.54 Yet both groups were probably pursuing what they perceived to be the best interests of their group, and probably they themselves identified the interests of their group with the interests of the polis. But what was in the interests of xhepolis was not always self-evident, and their opponents might equally sincerely believe that they had given the interests of their group priority over the interests of the state.55 In contrast to this view, Gabriel Herman's influential work on xenia and the polis has concentrated on the relationship of leading figures with their hetairoi at home and their xenoi abroad, and has contrasted these upperclass relationships with a demos which he regards as being outside them. 56 He has then supposed that a leader's loyalty to his upper-class friends would conflict with his loyalty to his polis.57 Although he allows 'a certain element of symbiosis between public and private interests', he concludes that 'the interests of xenoi only rarely coincided with civic interests: structurally and inherently they were opposed to them'.58 Elsewhere, he sums up his position by saying: throughout its history, the Greek world was torn by conflict between upper-class factions who derived their power and resources from foci of power which lay outside its boundaries. Networks of alliances linked factionsfromseveral cities and radiatedfromthe great empires located at thefringesof the world of cities, creating a system of externalfriendshipsthat could offer rewards - wealth, fame, position even more tempting than those of the city itself. It was a system which had not changed significantly since the days of the epos.... By the same token, however, there emerged a class of men who, unlike the aristocracy, the rich and their clients, werefreeof such ties of dependence and uninvolved in the alliance system.59 The issue is not as straightforward as Herman would make it appear, and his argument seems to be based upon a number of ill-founded assumptions. While I shall deal with the question of ideology elsewhere,60 the emphasis on a lateral and class-based division of society is misleading. As I have argued above, at least in Athens a distinction should not be made

55

56 58

go-between for the Plataean conspirators, so there may be no need for a personal connection, but it still prompts the question why he was specifically chosen, and specifically 54 named by Thucydides. See also McKechnie and Kern (1988) 161-2. Cf. the political tensions involved in the formation of the Arcadian federation after Leuctra and the conflict in Tegea between Callibius, Proxenus and their political group (who had the support of the Mantineians), and Stasippus and his group (who had the support of Sparta, perhaps specifically Agesilaus: Cartledge (1987) 261-2 seems to infer that they were his friends and xenoi, but the sources do not make this inevitable) in Tegea: Xen., Hell. 6.5.6-10; see Larsen (1968) 183-4. 57 Herman (1987) esp. 150-6; cf. (1990) 91-4. Herman (1987) esp. 156-61. 59 60 Ibid. 142. Ibid. 155-6, see also 130. See ch. 10.


51

between political groups and the demos. To a large extent the demos comprised political groups, since many men who were not political leaders were to a greater or lesser extent committed to following one of the leaders and caught up in their leader's network of connections.61 While the leaders needed to win the votes of the citizens, the citizens in the assembly were glad to make use of the leaders' connections for the city's benefit to direct and expedite public policies. Pre-existing connections could prejudice the policy any given political leader and his group might follow, but equally they could be used to facilitate the interests of the state, or at least of a dominant group within the state. Furthermore, in Athens at least there were those in the emergent class of powerful non-aristocrats who sought to form personal connections of their own on an inter-polis level. Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, Phormio son of Asopius, Iphicrates son of Timotheus, and Aeschines son of Atrometus, all men of non-aristocratic backgrounds, made personal friendships abroad which they exploited for the benefit of the state as well as themselves.62 3.3

Philia and interstate relations

Herman's polarised model is too simple. As we saw in the previous chapter, there were a number of ways in which states could relate to each other, and some of these were of a very 'personal' (if corporate) nature. It is not surprising then to find that there were also a great variety of personal connections which could be used to influence the direction of interstate affairs, and the events that took place after the Peace of Nicias provide a good illustration of the range of relationships that could be utilised and the uses to which they could be put. If we focus in the first place on these years, we can see how almost all the different kinds of philia connections could be employed in inter-polis matters.63 After the conclusion in 421 of the fifty years' peace between the 61

62

63

It should also b e borne in mind that the division between those w h o supported oligarchy and those w h o supported democracy was n o t the same as the division between aristocrats and non-aristocrats. Many of the radical democratic leaders of the fifth century, such as Pericles, were aristocrats, just as (more surprisingly) many of the oligarchic leaders involved in the revolutions of 411 and 4 0 4 were non-aristocrats: see Rhodes (forthcoming b). O n D e m o s t h e n e s : Davies (1971) 112-13; o n Iphicrates (in the tradition his father was a cobbler): Plut., Mor. i86f; Suidas s.v. Iphicrates (1 772); Davies (1971) 2 4 8 - 9 ; o n Aeschines: Lane F o x (1994). Phormio's antecedents are unknown. O f course there were others (Cleon, for example) w h o pointedly did n o t attempt to form such connections: see C o n n o r (1971) esp. ch. 3. T h . 5.25.1-48.1. In t h e past, scholarship has t e n d e d t o concentrate o n t h e tensions between oligarchs and democrats in regard t o these events: e.g., Kagan ( i 9 6 0 ) 2 9 1 - 3 1 0 ; (1962) 209-18; Kelly (1974) 81-99; cf. Westlake (1940) 413 n. 3; (i97O 315-25 (=(1989) 84-96); Seager (1976) 249-69. For a partial recognition of the role of friendship, see Kelly (1974) esp. 93; see also (1972) 159-69-

52


Athenians and their allies and the Spartans, we are told that Corinthian ambassadors involved in the negotiations were unhappy with the Spartan settlement; so rather than go home they went to Argos and suggested to some of the Argive magistrates that the Argives should form an alliance among the Peloponnesian states.64 The Argive magistrates in turn were happy with the suggestion and persuaded the Council and the demos of the Argives to elect men whom interested states (except Athens and Sparta) could approach for an alliance.65 In due course, the Argive alliance was set up, and the Mantineians were the first to join. Over the summer the Eleians, the Corinthians (who had not joined straight away) and the Chalcidians also joined the alliance, although the Tegeans would not, and the Boeotians prevaricated (although they did agree to accompany the Corinthians to Athens and to help in the Corinthian negotiations for a truce).66 Relations between Athens and Sparta also deteriorated, and in the following winter some of the new ephors at Sparta were opposed to the Peace as well.67 In fact, Xenares and Cleobulus - the two ephors who particularly wished to bring the Peace to an end - and their philoi made private proposals encouraging the Boeotians to join the Argive alliance.68 The Argives also had Boeotian aspirations, and as the Boeotian ambassadors were on the way home from a conference in Sparta in the winter of 421/0, two high-ranking Argives met them and suggested that the Boeotians join the Argive coalition, although the Argives were not intending to give the alliance a pro-Spartan direction. The Boeotians were pleased since the Argives happened to want the same thing as the Boeotians' philoi at Sparta had done, but the arrangements came unstuck when the Council of the Boeotians would not agree to an alliance with Corinth on the grounds that it would be overtly antiSpartan, since they did not know that it was Cleobulus and Xenares and their philoi who had suggested it, or that the intention was to align with Sparta. Thucydides suggests that it was important that the Boeotian Council should be aware, which they were not,69 that it was actually their 64

65

67

68

69

For the possible Corinthian motives, that is t o try to renew the Archidamian War, see Westlake (1940) 4 1 3 - 2 1 . This had all been part of the Corinthian plan, which was accepted almost unaltered: see 66 Kagan (1981) 37-8. For an analysis of Corinthian tactics, see Kagan (1981) 44-5. Kagan (1981) 51 suggests that the conference w a s convened 'presumably t o try o n c e more t o achieve a general acceptance of the peace'. Cf. Plut., Nic. 10.7; Xenares was probably the m o r e important o f the two, despite t h e order of their n a m e s at 36.1 - note that they are switched about at 37.1 ( H C r 4 . 3 8 ) . Thucydides does not go very far towards explaining why this apparently simple misunderstanding was not cleared up: he claims that the Boeotarchs thought the Council would simply follow their lead (Th. 5.38.3). Seager ((1976) 257-8) suggests that the Boeotarchs needed to keep their true intentions secret in order to deceive the Argives.


53

sympathisers in Sparta, and particularly those associated with Cleobulus and Xenares, who had proposed the alliance. After the pro-Boeotian group in Sparta had failed to effect the Boeotian-Argive alliance, the Spartans made a private alliance with the Boeotians on the condition that the Boeotians returned Panactum and the prisoners to the Athenians.70 At the beginning of the following spring the Argives, who were now afraid of being alienated, sent envoys whom they thought would be 'most friendly' (prosphilestatot) to Sparta as quickly as possible to make peace.71 Meanwhile, the Athenians and the Spartans were quarrelling over Panactum, and there were those in Athens who wished the Peace to be broken and were eager for an Argive alliance. Alcibiades son of Cleinias was one of these, and he sent private messages to Argos for the Argives to come as quickly as possible (he had xenoi there) and invite the Athenians into an alliance. Thucydides says that Alcibiades genuinely thought it was better to side with the Argives, but that he was also opposed to the treaty with the Spartans because the Spartans had negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches. This was a blow to Alcibiades' pride, as the Spartans had apparently overlooked him because of his youth, and had not honoured his hereditary proxenia with Sparta. Alcibiades' grandfather had renounced this relationship, but Alcibiades had tried to renew it by looking after (therapeuori) the Spartan prisoners from Pylos.72 When the Argives realised that the alliance had been made between Boeotia and Sparta without the Athenians' knowledge, Thucydides says that they gave no more thought to their ambassadors in Sparta but turned their attention to Athens.73 Since they believed that Athens was not only a democracy, as they themselves were, but that she had also been 'friendly' (phUios) for a long time and would fight with them if they became involved in war, they sent ambassadors at once. The Spartans, afraid that the Athenians would make an alliance with the Argives in their anger over Panactum and the Boeotian alliance, also quickly sent ambassadors to Athens, choosing men who seemed to be 'friendly' (epitedeioi) to the Athenians. When the Spartan ambassadors addressed the Athenian Council, they said that they had come with full powers.74 Afraid that if they said this to the demos the Athenians might be persuaded and reject the Argive alliance, Alcibiades played a trick on the Spartan ambassadors - even though one was his own xenos, Endius75 - by persuading them not to tell 70

71

73

T h e Athenians would only restore Pylos to the Spartans if they, in turn, received back Panactum. O n the whole question of the appointment of ambassadors and other magistrates for 72 their 'friendliness', see chs. 4 and 5. See also T h . 6.89.2; Plut., Ale. 14.1. 74 75 T h . 5.44. Cf. VluuAlc. 14.7-12. For the xenia, see T h . 8.6.3.

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the assembly the extent of their remit, then denouncing them. But the decree ratifying the Argive alliance was never made on account of an earthquake, and on the next day Nicias seized the opportunity and urged the Athenians to become philoi of the Spartans, and proposed that an embassy be sent to Sparta with himself as one of the ambassadors.76 The Spartans, however, refused to give up their alliance with the Boeotians since the ephor Xenares and his group had secured control in Sparta. The Athenians flew into a rage and made an alliance with the Argives, who happened to be present and whom Alcibiades brought forward. All of this highlights the role that individuals could play and the importance they could have in determining the course of events, and in forming and implementing foreign policy. Not only were contacts made through the private representations of men who were philoi from political groups in different poleis, but also the leaders of one political group made contact with the leaders of another like-minded political group in order that they might put into action a joint policy. This illustrates the ways that the system of bridging between political groups in two poleis could work. The Corinthian ambassadors approached the Argives on their own initiative and opened negotiations with them apparently without the authorisation of the Corinthian assembly.77 The Corinthians may or may not have been personal philoi of the Argive magistrates,78 but they were prepared to act in a personal capacity to manipulate public affairs, and the initial offer to the Argive magistrates was also made on an unofficial level. In a similar vein the political group of Xenares in Sparta tried to make a connection between the Spartans and the Boeotians through private negotiation with other individuals in Boeotia. 'Friendly' ambassadors also played an important part in various stages of the negotiations; in turn, Alcibiades in Athens exploited all his private connections to discredit the Spartan ambassadors and to make an alliance with Argos. What is more, it was not always those in official positions who influenced the direction of foreign relations. Alcibiades worked privately through his personal relationships to form the Argive alliance, although the alliance itself had to be ratified in the assembly. Similarly, it is not clear whether the Argives who met the Corinthians and Boeotians 'on the road5 were official representatives of Argos, but they probably were not. 76

77 78

N o t e n o t only that t h e Spartan ambassadors h a d b e e n with Nicias (was h e their proxenos?), but also that h e h a d s h o w n pro-Spartan tendencies o n other occasions: see ch. 5. See K a g a n (1981) 37. Probably n o t in this case, since b o t h held official positions - t h o u g h certain philoi m a y well have helped to bring the meeting about (compare the Mytilenean supporters in Athens who helped the Mytilenean ambassadors gain an audience with 'those in office' (Th. 3.36.5)).


55

Finally, even the regularly appointed magistrates did not work through official channels. The ephors Cleobulus and Xenares were not following a plan approved by the assembly of the Spartans, but were acting on their own initiative. How much one could circumvent official procedure would depend on the particular state and on the individual's position within the state. The Boeotarchs apparently felt that the Council would follow their lead in decision-making, although this turned out not to be the case. This places the picture of foreign relations in a different light. Public politics could be determined in the private sector. The Corinthian ambassadors, Cleobulus and Xenares, and Alcibiades all made decisions about what was best for the state, and used their personal connections to implement these policies apart from and alongside official decisionmaking procedures. This does not mean to say that all public policy was decided in this way, but the events after the Peace of 421 show that it could be and that personal relationships could be important in determining the course of events.

3.4

Personal friendships and interstate relations in Sparta and Athens

Those involved in the negotiations surrounding the Peace of Nicias were all individuals who were prepared to form and use personal connections for their own ends and the perceived ends of their state. Although there is evidence of many poleis making use of such relationships, the degree of exploitation of these connections seems to have varied from polis to polis. In particular, there seems to be a difference between the use of such connections in Sparta and Athens, our two best-attested poleis, and this says something about the nature of political activity within each.79 3.4.1

Sparta

The Spartans were particularly keen to make use of interstate friendships in the formation and implementation of policies at a number of levels. For example, in 418 the epitedeioi of the Spartans in Tegea sent a message to Sparta to report that the city had all but gone over to the Argives and their allies, and a Spartan force was despatched immediately to avoid this.80 79

80

T h i s perhaps should n o t b e surprising since the demos in oligarchic Sparta was m a d e u p of a privileged minority, whereas in democratic Athens the demos e n c o m p a s s e d a larger spectrum of the community. Th. 5.64-74. For the other political group in Tegea which wanted to give the city up to the Mantineian, Eleian, Argive and Athenian alliance, see Th. 5.62.2. Compare also Spartan intervention in Corcyra in 374 after appeals from their pMot: Diod. 15.46.1-2.

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After the subsequent battle in front of Mantineia which also involved the Eleians, Argives and Athenians, the Spartans used their epitedeioi in Argos to persuade the Argives to make peace with them and sent to them the Argive proxenos in Sparta, lichas son of Arcesilaus.81 These same men later persuaded the Argives to give up their alliance with the Mantineians, Eleians and Athenians and to make an alliance with the Spartans instead, and the Argives decided for the time being that their security lay with Sparta.82 These groups of pro-Spartan philoi were not always just indefinable gatherings of sympathisers: some can actually be identified as definite political groups with leaders we can name. For example, in the winter of 412/11 the Spartan Hippocrates sailed from the Peloponnese to the Hellespont with ten Thurian ships under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoreus and two colleagues.83 Dorieus, originally a Rhodian, had been expelled from his own city during a conflict and had subsequently become a citizen of Thurii.84 The Spartans had it in mind to sail to Rhodes, since they had received overtures from the aristocrats there (a group who are identified in the revolt of 395 by the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia as the Diagoreii), and cause them to revolt from the Athenians.85 Although Thucydides does not say so, Dorieus was probably one of the party which sailed from Cnidus to Rhodes and helped to bring them over.86 Xenophon certainly implies that he was present after the fall of the city when he says that Dorieus sailed from Rhodes to the Hellespont.87 Diodorus adds that Mindarus, on hearing a group of Rhodians was gathering together to stage a counter-revolution, despatched Dorieus to Rhodes with his thirteen ships.88 Dorieus should probably be identified then with a political group formed from the aristocrats on Rhodes which the Spartans were able to motivate through him to bring about the fall of the island. There are other similar examples. In 377 Xenophon says that 'those about' Hypatodorus, who were philoi of the Spartans, had control of Tanagra.89 In 371 the Tegeans followed Archidamus zealously since those with Stasippus were still alive and laconising and clearly in control.90 In the following year, those with Callibius and Proxenus were 81 82

83 84

85

89

Th. 5.76.2-3. T h . 5.78-80.1. But w h e n in 417 a counter-revolution took place, Thucydides says that the Spartans did not c o m e , though their philoi kept sending for them (Th. 5.82.3). T h . 8.35.1. Xen., Hell. 1.5.19; Krentz (1989) 87; cf. / / C T 5 . 7 7 . For Dorieus' Olympic victory, see also Th. 3.8.1; Paus. 6.7.1; Hornblower (1991-6) 1.389-91. T h . 8 . 4 4 . 2 - 3 . O n the Diagoreii: Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 15.2=(Chambers) 18.2; see also 86 87 88 HCT5.91. David (1986) 161. Xen., Hell. 1.1.2. D i o d . 13.38.5. 90 Xen.,Hell. 5.4.49. Xen.,Hell. 6.4.18.


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making efforts for the unification of all Arcadia, while those with Stasippus made it their policy to leave the city undisturbed.91 A battle took place between the two groups, and of those with Stasippus (about eight hundred) fled to Sparta. Often these men had connections with individual Spartans which were the basis of their or their state's relationship with Sparta itself.92 Spartiates with such connections were more than willing to use them if the opportunity arose both for themselves and for the state. For example, Brasidas had epitedeioi in Pharsalus whom he called upon when he was making his way north to the Chalcidians in 424. 93 In 421 after the Peace of Nicias had been concluded with the Athenians the Spartans sent Ischagoras, Menas and Philocharidas as ambassadors to Thrace to tell Clearidas the young archon in the area to give up Amphipolis, although Clearidas did not give up the city, thus gratifying (charizomenos) the Chalcidians.94 One of the first things Lysander did on his arrival in Asia Minor as Nauarch in 407 was to establish new friendship networks among the cities there.95 The Spartan kings in particular were obvious points of contact for such connections. Over the years there has been a great deal of discussion about political groups within Sparta, and particularly in relation to early-fourth-century tensions and the collapse of the fourth-century Spartan imperialistic drive.96 Cartledge sees the line demarcating policy as tending to fall between the two kings, and reconstructs a political group centring on Agesilaus which included both the kinsmen and companions (hetairoi) of the king (among whom was Lysander) and 91

92

93

94 95

96

X e n . , Hell. 6.5.6-10. For the founding of Megalopolis, see D i o d . 15.59.1 (noting the mistake of Lycomedes the A e g e a n ' , for Lycomedes the 'Mantineian': see Underhill (1900) 256);Paus. 8.27.1-8; Flut., Pelop. 24.8. For a 'special relationship' between Sparta and Samos in the archaic period which probably arose out of xeniairelationships between aristocrats, see Cartledge (1982) 2 4 3 - 6 5 . T h . 4.78.1. Thucydides even gives u s their names: Panaerus, D o r u s , Hippochides, Torylaus and Strophacus w h o was proxenos o f the Chalcidians (these are legitimately Thessalian names, see Habicht (1994) 221 n. 4; Hornblower (1991-6) 2.257-8). Thessaly had a reputation for being difficult territory to cross without an escort: see T h . 4.132.2. T h . 5.21.1-2. O n Clearidas' position, see Parke (1930) 4 2 - 3 . For a full discussion, s e e ch. 4 below o n Spartan Nauarchs. C o m p a r e D i o d o r u s ' story about Lysander w h e n h e allegedly attempted t o d o away with the hereditary kingship in favour of an elected position ( D i o d . 14.13.2-8). After initial failure at Delphi, h e is said t o have travelled t o Cyrene and tried t o bribe the oracle there, since Libys the king of those parts was a xenos of his father and h e supposedly thought his relationship with the king could b e u s e d t o bring pressure t o produce the right oracular utterance. D i o d o r u s also says that Lysander's brother had b e e n n a m e d l i b y s after his father's xenos. O n political groups i n Sparta and their policies: Rice (1974); Rice (1975); D a v i d (1981) esp. ch. 1; Hamilton (1979) passim; (1991) esp. 120-51, 164-74; cf. Smith (1948); (1953-4) (although he does not use formulation of political groups, this is implicit in his argument).

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explains the influence of Agesilaus as being enacted through this group.97 As prominent members of the upper class, the Spartan kings tended to be the foci of political activity within Sparta, and they still also held some influence on policy.98 They also had connections abroad: as Mosley notes, the kings could have 'obligations of hospitality to specific states or their leaders and rulers' stemming from the practice of cementing alliances by a personal relationship of xenia." As a result it was obviously still considered a worthwhile thing to be the philos of a king,100 and the importance - or not - of one or other of the dyarchs had important effects on policy choices that were made in foreign relations. For example, Xenophon tells an odd little story about Agis, and his attack on Elis in 402. 101 Xenias (a very wealthy man in Elis and the xenos of Agis and xheproxenos of the Spartans) and his political group wanted to bring the city over to the Spartans and get the credit for it, so while Agis' army was ravaging the countryside about Cyllene, Xenias and his group began a massacre. Believing that Xenias had killed the leader of the demos Thrasydaeus (ho tou demou prostates), the demos gave up the fight only to discover later that the man had been sleeping off a drunken hangover.102 When Thrasydaeus recovered, he led the demos to victory in another battle against Xenias and company, who fled to the Spartans. Pausanias also had xenia connections with prominent Athenians. In 403 Xenophon says that Pausanias marched out against Athens after the Thirty at Eleusis and the Three Thousand in the city had sent to Sparta for help against the demos.103 Although Pausanias mounted an attack on 97

98

99

100

101

102

103

Cartledge (1987) 100, 1 4 4 - 5 6 . H e argues (151) that formal hetaireiai such as existed at Athens would n o t b e possible in Sparta 'where t h e c o m m o n messes were specifically designed to cut across age-grouping in the interests of promoting trans-generational solidarity. Agesilaus' chromenoi, therefore, will have b e e n a more diverse and fluid group of intimate associates' (cf. 131). However, even at Athens the political group (particularly in the fourth century) tended to b e fluid and amorphous with only a relatively small stable nucleus. O n the powers of the Spartan kings, Lewis (1977) 4 3 - 9 contra de Ste Croix (1963) 138-49. For a clear and comprehensive survey of formal Spartan policy-making institutions and procedures, see Cartledge (1987) 116-38. Mosley (1971c) 434. This makes Agesilaus' refusal to make a xenia with the Persian King in 386 which X e n o p h o n reports even more pointed (Xen., Ages. 8.3-4; cf. Plut., Mor. 213d). See esp. Cartledge ((1987) 140-59) for political friendships and patronage within Spartan society. Xen., Hell 3.2.21-31, esp. 27-9; cf. Paus. 5.4.8; cf. Diod. 14.17.4-12, 34.1-2: Diodorus describes a campaign by Pausanias, which Krentz ((1995) 171) believes should be treated as historical. For the xenia with Agis and proxenia with Sparta: Paus. 3.8.4, 7.10.2-3. See Krentz ((1995) 175) for the suggestion that Xenophon thought that Thrasydaeus dominated Elis too much. Xen., Hell 2.4.28-35. Lysander had also arranged for himself to be sent as harmost and his brother Ubys as Nauarch (Xen., Hell. 2.4.28).


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those in the Peiraeus when his original attempts to persuade them to disperse had failed, Xenophon claims that he was sympathetic to them, 104 and that he sent to them secretly and advised them to send ambassadors both to himself and to the ephors, and gave them instructions on what to say. But Xenophon's story looks a little odd, and we need to look to other sources to fill in some of the gaps. In Lysias' On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother ofNicias the speaker says that Pausanias' sympathy for those opposed to the oligarchy was aroused when Diognetus the brother of Nicias reminded Pausanias of his bonds of philia and xenia by placing Nicias' grandson on his knee.105 As a result, the speaker says, Pausanias rejected the xenia (gifts of xenia) of the Thirty and accepted those of Diognetus instead. The way we should reconstruct the episode then is to see Pausanias as making a genuine attack on Peiraeus in the first instance, and only positively supporting the cause of the democrats, rather than accepting the offer of a new xenia with some of the oligarchs, after he was presented with the claims of a preexisting xenia. This change of policy to supporting the democrats was aimed as a personal attack on Lysander, which is in fact what Xenophon says it was.106 Agesilaus also had and made use of a complex network of connections both hereditary and newly formed, and because of his influence individuals as well as states also looked to form connections with him.107 For example, when Lysander returned to Asia Minor with Agesilaus in 396, Plutarch says that a crowd was always visiting him, accompanying him and attending to him.108 But Agesilaus was no longer simply content to be Lysander's protege and puppet, and was annoyed by his former mentor's princely behaviour. Consequently, we are told, he began ignoring Lysander's advice and neglected those who sought his help through Lysander.109 Lysander then had to backtrack quickly, and told his philoi that they were being dishonoured because of him and advised them to pay court to the king instead. This jockeying for power amounted to a leadership-challenge in Lysander's and Agesilaus' political group as Agesilaus 104

Xenophon says that he only went to the point from which the battle-cry is given, but he did this so that it might not be apparent that he was well disposed (eumenes) to them (Xen.,i&//. 2.4.31). 105 Lys. 18.10-12. This clearly suggests a xenia between Nicias and Pausanias (see also Herman (1987) 181), but the origins of the relationship are obscure. Perhaps it was a product of the negotiations for the Peace ofNicias in 421 with Pleistoanax the father of 106 Cf. Pausanias' jealousy of Lysander: Xen.j/fe//. 2.4.29. Pausanias. 107 See esp. Cartledge (1987) 139-59. 108 pi u t # j Ages. 7.1-2; Xenophon declares that it came to the point that Agesilaus appeared to be the man in private station and Lysander the king (Xen., Hell. 3.4.7); cf. Tuplin 109 (1993) 57P l u t . , ^ s . 7.4-8.

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came truly into his own. Then, trading on these relationships inherited from Lysander, Agesilaus sent word in 395 to the cities and islands on the coast to build triremes, and, Xenophon says, the private citizens did this as they wished to gratify (charizesthai) him. 110 The personal prestige of one of the kings could also have its effect on political choices. In 385 when the Spartans decided to punish the Mantineians, Agesilaus requested that he be relieved of the command, since the city had served his father many times in the war against the Messenians.111 Agesipolis therefore led the army, although his father Pausanias was well disposed (philikos echein) to the leaders of the demos in Mantineia, thus providing a convenient opportunity for Agesilaus to humiliate his younger colleague.112 When the city was taken, those who were argolising and the leaders of the people thought they would be put to death, but Pausanias negotiated with Agesipolis and secured their safety.113 Here we have two sides of the same coin: the king with connections who is able to avoid the embarrassment of a conflict of duty; and the other king who lacked the influence to prevent the same clash of loyalties and was simply left to make the best he could of a bad situation. Nevertheless, it was clearly still felt to be profitable to form a connection with the young and inexperienced Agesipolis: in 381, when Agesipolis was sent to Olynthus on the death of Teleutias, horsemen from Thessaly also went who wished to become known to him.114 However, there is an addendum to the story of Agesilaus and the Mantineians. After the Spartan defeat at Leuctra in 371 the Mantineians, deciding that they were now free and independent according to the agreement sworn in Athens, resynoecised their villages into one city and rebuilt their walls.115 The Spartans despatched Agesilaus to negotiate with them (Xenophon says that he was thought to be their patrikos philos) and he promised that if they stopped the work on the fortifications for the time being he would arrange things with the Spartans. The Mantineians 110 111

112

114

Xen.,//e//. 3.4.28. Xen., Hell. 5.2.3; cf. Diod. 15.5.1-2 where Diodorus says that when the Spartans decided to make war on the Mantineians they immediately set about stirring up trouble in the cities and established factions in them through their private (idiot) philoi. The Spartan offensive against Mantineia seems to have comprised two parts: military offensive (as described by Xenophon) and fifth-column activities (described by Diodorus). Agesilaus is referring to the Third Messenian War of 464 (see Underhill (1900) 179); on Agesilaus and the Mantineians, cf. Xen., Hell 6.5.3-4. For other possible connections between Agesilaus' family and a family in Mantineia, see Tuplin (1977a) 5-10. Cartledge ((1987) 258, 260) suggests that Agesipolis' relationship with Mantineia may have originated with his grandfather, Pleistoanax, whom he believes can be detected behind the agreement made with Mantineia in 418/17 (cf. Th. 5.81.1). See also 113 Cartledge (1987) 260; cf. P\ut.s Ages. 20.7-9. Xen.,iJe//. 5.2.6. 115 Xen., Hell. 5.3.8-9. Xen., He//. 6.5.3-5.


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refused, and Agesilaus went away angry.116 Then in 370 the Mantineians helped some of the Tegeans who were trying to form a united state of Arcadia.117 The Spartans, who of course could not tolerate the formation of an Arcadian federation, used the pretext that the Mantineians had broken the autonomy clause of the peace made after Leuctra, and sent out Agesilaus with an army. This time he did not quibble but marched against them. 118 Goodwill towards philoi generally only went so far. Apparently Agesilaus had decided that his relationship with the Mantineians had worn rather thin and that his interests, the Spartans' interests and the interests of the Mantineians were no longer the same. Agesilaus also had xenoi in Phleius. In 384 Phleiasian exiles, judging that the time was right to secure Spartan support, came to Sparta looking for help to bring about their return to Phleius.119 They argued that while they had been in Phleius, they had received Spartan troops into their city and had accompanied the Spartans on all their expeditions, and that the current administration in Phleius was not so accommodating. The Spartans agreed with them (probably influenced by Agesilaus), and sent to the Phleiasians demanding that they recall the exiles. It was by no means accidental that the exiles included xenoi of both Agesilaus and his father, and Xenophon says that Agesilaus was motivated by philetairia, attachment to his friends.120 The Phleiasians capitulated to the Spartan demands out of fear because they knew the exiles would have the support of relatives and others within the city who wished them well for one reason or another if the Spartans attacked. But when in 381 Agesipolis had been sent out against Olynthus, he had raised funds for the expedition from among the Phleiasians, for which he had praised them.121 Xenophon says that the Phleiasians decided that with one king away in the north the Spartans would not risk sending the other king out on campaign against them, and did not restore the exiles to their full rights. The poor treatment of the exiles was enough it seems for Agesilaus, and the Spartan ephors sent out an expedition with Agesilaus at its head.122 Xenophon says that Agesilaus was pleased by the decision to attack since his xenoi were involved,123 but of course he himself was probably behind the decision. In fact Xenophon says that he made arrangements with his philoi in Sparta so that he had complete control over the Phleiasian affair.124 This does not mean to say that Agesilaus' 116

117 120 121 122

Cartledge ((1987) 261) suggests that Agesilaus was implicated in the rebuilding of the walls, but this seems unlikely in the light of the events of 370. 118 119 Xen.,Hell. 6.5.6-9,see also above. Xen.,He//. 6.5.10. Xen.,HeU. 5.2.8-10. Xen., Hell. 5.3.13; Ages. 2.21; cf. Cartledge (1987) 262. Xen., Hell. 5.3.10. Cf. Cartledge (1987) 264-5 for the tensions in this episode. 123 124 Xen., Hell. 5.3.11-17,21-5. Xen., Hell. 5.3.13. Xen., Hell 5.3.24; cf. 25.

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policies went unchallenged, and Xenophon says that there were those in Sparta who could not see why they were conducting a campaign that would lead to the hatred of the Mantineians for the sake of a few men, 125 but ultimately Agesilaus had his way and saw to the installation of a new oligarchic administration comprising his xenoi, and in all likelihood their friends and relations as well.126 Cleombrotus was another Spartan king faced with difficult choices. Although Xenophon does not explicitly specify that he had Theban philoi, he was thought to be sympathetic towards Thebes, and not without cause as he led a series of expeditions against the Thebans in which he displayed a lack of interest bordering upon insubordination. In the winter of 379/8 Cleombrotus was sent out against Thebes after the liberation of the Cadmeia.127 He set up camp in Theban territory, but after about sixteen days fell back on Thespiae, where he left Sphodrias with a garrison and returned home. 128 Again in the spring of 376, since Agesilaus was ill and unable to lead the now annual raid on Boeotia, Cleombrotus was despatched.129 When he came to Cithaeron he sent his peltasts ahead, but when they were repelled by Thebans and Athenians who occupied the heights, he concluded that he was unable to cross Cithaeron and turned back. Yet again in 371 after the general peace was made the Spartan assembly sent word to Cleombrotus to attack Thebes if the Thebans refused to leave the Boeotian cities independent.130 At this point the Spartan philoi of Cleombrotus warned him that unless he expelled the Thebans he would risk the extreme penalty at the hands of the Spartans; his enemies declared that he would now make it clear whether he cared for the Thebans as it was said. Xenophon says that when he heard this Cleombrotus was eager for war, although it took him to his death at Leuctra.131 Typically, Cleombrotus had tried to play a double game and look after the interests of his friends while at least nominally obeying the orders of his state. But personal and political survival came first, and when the real crisis came philoi could go to the wall. Despite the importance of personal relationships, they were not always at the centre of interstate affairs, even though this may have been the general suspicion. In the events surrounding the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 431, xenia was expected to play a part, but actually did not. Thucydides says that Pericles suspected that Archidamus, who happened to be his xenos, might leave his fields unravaged during the 125 128

130

126 127 Xen., Hell. 5.3.16. Xen., Hell. 5.3.17,25. Xen., Hell. 5.4.13-16. Diodorus (15.29.5-6) gives the main responsibility for Sphodrias' attack on the Peiraeus to Cleombrotus (although compare Xen., Hell. 5.4.20 where Xenophon makes the 129 Thebans the instigators of the attack). Xen., Hell. 5.4.58-9. 131 Xen., Hell. 6.4.3-4. Xen., Hell. 6.4.5-6.13-14; Diod. I5-55.5-


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invasion, either because he wished to gratify (charizesthai) Pericles in private or even because the Spartans had commanded him to in order to make the Athenian unpopular.132 Consequently, before the Peloponnesians launched their attack on Attica, Pericles announced to the assembly that Archidamus was his xenos and made over his land as public property so that he might not come under suspicion. When in fact the Spartan army under Archidamus' command was on the point of attacking Attica, they delayed at Oenoe on the border of Attica and Boeotia.133 Thucydides goes on: Archidamus received considerable blame for it, since he seemed even in the mustering for war to be soft and epitedeios to the Athenians, and not eagerly encouraging them to go to war. When he had collected together an army, he was slandered because of the waiting about on the Isthmus and the leisurely progress on the march, and particularly for the hold-up at Oenoe, for the Athenians brought everything inside during this time. The Peloponnesians thought that if they attacked quickly they would have taken them when they were still outside, if it were not for his delays. Thus the army was angry with Archidamus during the siege. Archidamus held his hand, as it is said, since he expected the Athenians, while the land was still untouched, to yield in some way and shrinkfromallowing it to be cut up.134 While most commentators see this dilatoriness on the part of Archidamus as part of his general moderate attitude to war,135 Herman argues that Archidamus' motives in this episode are founded on his xenia with Pericles.136 Yet although it is true that Thucydides did have in mind the xenia relationship between the two men, he does not mention it here, and so far from thinking or guessing as Herman would have it that this was the real cause for Archidamus' slowness, he tries to distance himself from this idea. In fact, by putting the accusation of sympathy for Athens in the mouths of the Peloponnesians he seems to be indicating that he himself does not believe in it.137 Thucydides goes on to suggest another reason why Archidamus delayed, a reason unconnected with his xenia but consistent with his original reluctance: Archidamus hoped that the Athenians would not allow their land to be ravaged, and this hope was perhaps not unfounded as the Athenians had indeed cut short a similar Spartan invasion in 445. 138 It must be noted, as Herman points out, 139 that it was 132 134 135 137 138

133 Th.2.13.1. Th.2.18.1-2. Th. 2.18.3-5. F ° r m e varied vocabulary describing his dilatoriness, see HCT2.69. 136 Kagan (1974) 50; Lewis (1977) 46-7. Herman (1987) 143-4See Hornblower (1991-6) 1.271-2. Th. 2.20. On the use of and his grandfather had been the Spartan proxenos in Athens, a connection which his grandfather had renounced but Alcibiades tried unsuccessfully to re-establish.184 When events turned sour in Athens for 177 178

179 181 182 183 184

Middleton (1982) 298-303; see also Herman (1987) 153. Middleton (1982) 299-300. On the use of Thracian fighting techniques: Xen., Hell. 2.4.12,15, 25, 33 (compare Th. 7.27.1); on peltasts: see Anderson (1970) 112-14. The decree: Osborne (1981-3) 1.37-41. On Thracian names and the cult of Bendis: see also Hereward (1952) 117. On the cult of Bendis in Athens, see also Parker (1996) 170-5. 180 Middleton (1982) 300. Xen., Hell. 4.8.26; cf. Diod. 14.94.2. Cf. Herman (1987) 116-18. For a fuller account of Alcibiades' Argive connections, see ch. 5. Argive xenoi: Th. 6.61.3; Argives in Sicilian campaign: Th. 6.29.3; cf. 6.61.5. Endius' xenia: Th. 8.6.3; Alcibiades' lapsed proxenia: Th. 5.43.1, 6.89.2; cf. Plut., Alcib. 14.1.

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Alcibiades in 415 and he was forced to escape, one tradition claims that he went first to Cyllene in Elis and then went on to Sparta to seek refuge.185 It was on account of Alcibiades' encouragement that the Spartans decided to support Tissaphernes' and the Chians' request for help in 412 rather than that of Pharnabazus.186 Alcibiades not only made use of hereditary connections, but also was not averse to forming new relationships as well. Although he was unsuccessful in his attempt to form a formal friendship with the Persian Tissaphernes, he did eventually manage to establish a relationship with Pharnabazus the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia instead. Xenophon says that Alcibiades and Pharnabazus exchanged oaths through their representatives, declaring that they had made a 'common oath' and 'private pledges of faith (pisteis) with each other'.187 According to Nepos, when Alcibiades withdrew from the Chersonese after Aegospotami, he went, firstly, deep into Thrace, and then to Pharnabazus, 'whom Alcibiades so caught by his charm, that no one could surpass him in friendship (amicitid)\ and who gave him Grynium, a fort in Phrygia.188 But Alcibiades' friendship with Pharnabazus proved ill-founded as Pharnabazus probably organised Alcibiades' death a few years later.189 We have already noted his connections with Asia Minor, but Alcibiades, like other Athenians,190 also apparently had ties with the important Thraceward district and the Thracians. He had made use of Thracians in his army in 409 when he laid siege to Byzantium, and when the Athenians were at Lampsacus in 404 Alcibiades, again an exile, came from his castle in the Chersonese to warn the Athenians of their bad position.191 Diodorus claims that Alcibiades offered to bring Thracian land troops from Medocus and Seuthes saying that they were philoi of his.192 185

187

188 189

190

191

192

Th. 6.88.9. Interestingly, the alternative tradition in Isoc. 16.9 and Plut.5^4/c. 23.1-2 says that Alcibiades went to Argos first, but was forced to go to Sparta when the Athenians 186 demanded that the Argives give him up. Th. 8.6.3: see above. X e n . Hell. 1.3.12. It is perhaps noteworthy that o n e o f Alcibiades' representatives w a s probably his cousin Euryptolemus (see A p p e n d i x I: 'Athenian Ambassadors' under Euryptolemus), w h o was also a m o n g his political philoi ( X e n . , Hell. 1.4.19). Alcibiades was master of the art of using all his personal connections whether at h o m e or abroad. Nepos, Ale. 9.3. Diod. 14.11.1-4; Plut.,^4/c. 39.1-7. On the different accounts of Alcibiades' death, see Ellis (1989) 95-7. N o t a b l y T h u c y d i d e s s o n o f Olorus, Thrasybulus s o n o f Lycus, a n d Iphicrates s o n o f Timotheus. Siege of Byzantium: Diod. 13.66.4; castle in Chersonese: Xen., Hell. 2.1.25. Nepos claims that Alcibiades had three forts in the area {Ale. 7.4); cf. Xen.iAnab. 7.3.19 which must be an oblique reference to Alcibiades. Diod. 13.105.3; cf. Plut., Ale. 36.6-37.3; Lys. 10.5-7; Nepos, Ale. 7.5, 8.2-3; Krentz (1989) 176 (who believes in Diodorus' Thracian troops). In support of Diodorus' version of Aegospotami: Ehrhardt (1970) 225-8; for a more even-handed treatment: Strauss (1983) 24-35.


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Alcibiades was a man of infinite resource, who freely made use of his personal connections in the interests of the state - whichever state it was in his interests to support - and was always keen to form new relationships and renew old ones when the opportunity arose. Thus, fresh from his failed approaches to Tissaphernes, he seized the opportunity for exchanging private pledges of faith with Pharnabazus. In the same way, it is perfectly in character that, when the Athenians once more grew disillusioned with him, he turned to his overseas friends again. Just as he had gone to Endius and Sparta in 415, he went to his Thracian philoi in the Chersonese in 406. What is more, when it seemed the time was right to curry favour again with the Athenians, he offered to use the troops of his Thracian philoi to help Athens. It is ironic that hefinallymet his end at the hands of one of the philoi he had made. 3.5

Friends and friendship in interstate relations

In the Greek world, interpersonal relations played a part in implementing and determining foreign policy. Political groups could appeal to the major powers for help in their internal revolutions because of their personal sympathies, and personal friends, such as xenoi, could form the link between a polis and a political group, or any two such groups. This was a phenomenon which occurred in many Greek communities. In Athens personal connections could and did have an effect on the direction of public policy, but when they were used they tended to be used overtly by the demos and could only be used officially with the sanction of the Athenian assembly, a feature which seems to distinguish Athenian usage from Spartan. Whether it was the formation of an alliance or the appointment of commanders, the assembly had to approve. Alcibiades was able to influence foreign policy in 421 through his Argive xenoi, but he still had to work directly through the Athenian assembly. Cephalus and Thrason may have acted privately on behalf of the Thebans, but they needed a decree of the assembly to motivate Athenian troops. The contrast between Athens and Sparta seems to be that in Sparta private relationships could be used privately for public purposes, whereas in Athens everything had to be enacted formally in the public arena whether private connections influenced an individual's decision to support his philoi or not. Nevertheless, wherever such relationships were used publicly, difficulties could arise when loyalties clashed, whether the clash was real or perceived, and tensions and contradictions occurred between the interests of one's philoi and the interests of one's state. One could all too easily be accused of working in the favour of one's philoi and against the

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interests of the state, especially in hindsight. It was a difficult line to tread. Sometimes such accusations could be justified, but not always. Some were able to excuse themselves from this conflict of obligations, others simply had to juggle their various responsibilities as best they could, and what has sometimes been mistaken as irony in the shifting of philia relationships193 may reflect indecisiveness when dealing with these confused relationships. Sometimes these friendships were found to be wanting, but often the state not only condoned their use, but encouraged them as a necessary part of political life. 193

See Wilson (1989) 147-51.

Magisterial appointments: Sparta

Whoso boasteth himself of a false gift is like clouds and wind without rain. Proverbs 25.14

There were a number of factors which could influence selection for magisterial appointments. At Athens selection for military and diplomatic posts was by popular election, a process which automatically favoured those prominent in the community, and therefore the upper classes,1 a fact reflected in how many important politicians were ambassadors and generals.2 Similarly at Sparta magistrates were chosen from among the families that formed a privileged subset of the Spartiates.3 On diplomatic missions, there was the expectation that a city would be represented by men of repute. Isocrates wrote that 'the Athenians sent to the more factionalised [of the cities] those of the citizens with the greatest repute among them'. 4 Herodotus says that Megabazus sent as messengers the seven Persians who were most notable after himself, and Diodorus that the Spartans sent as ambassadors to Athens in 369 the most illustrious men.5 Wealth was also a desirable attribute in ambassadors: for example, Tellias, ambassador to Centoripa, was the richest man in Acragas, and Sperthias and Bulis, Spartan envoys to Persia, were from families of noble birth and great wealth.6 Ability was also important: Plutarch advises that one should take a good orator as one's colleague on an embassy; Gorgias the rhetorician was sent on a mission to Athens on the grounds that he was the most able of all the Leontines; and Philomelus of Phocis chose the 1

2 Herman (1990) 93; cf. Ober (1989) 15. Adcock and Mosley (1975) 158. 4 Mosley (1973) 52. Isoc. 12.164. 5 Megabazus: Hdt. 5.17.1; Spartan ambassadors: Diod. 15.67.1; compare also Curtius' description of the embassy sent to Persia in 333: Q. C. 3.13.15. 6 Diod. 13.83.1-4 (Tellias); Hdt. 7.134.2 (Sperthias and Bulis). Although note that at Athens elective magistracies were paid at higher rates than those chosen by lot: see Ar., Acharn. 66,90,596-617; Jones (1966) 49. 3

73

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best qualified (euthetotatoi) of his friends for embassies to Athens, Sparta and Thebes. 7 In inter-polis relationships magistrates whether diplomatic or military were the public face of the corporate polls, and the appointment of magistrates also invited the manipulation of personal connections. This chapter and the next will look at the incidence of this phenomenon, focusing on Athens and Sparta as our two best-attested poleis. They will consider how often personal connections affected selection for overseas posts and offer suggestions about how these results can be explained in terms of the appointment procedures, constitution and political style. Perhaps not surprisingly in view of the differences discussed in the previous chapter, there is a marked variation in these kinds of appointments in Athens and Sparta, and this too sheds interesting light on domestic politics and the processes of administration within these poleis.8 The statistics given below are of limited reliability and their analysis is necessarily rather crude. We do not know all the office-holders in Athens or elsewhere, and some of those whom we do know may have had foreign connections which are not attested. Equally, we do not know how large a pool of men with foreign connections there was in Athens or in any other state. Nevertheless, the contrast between Athens and Sparta is striking, and, in view of the shortage of evidence for Sparta, the true difference is likely to have been even greater. The origin of these connections will only be discussed incidentally in those cases where it is known, as, for the most part, it is only relevant to this present discussion that a connection seems to exist; how it came about is only of secondary importance. It should be noted, however, that there are a number of ways that personal connections could be made. Firstly, personal friendships could be hereditary. Endius' xenia with Alcibiades and Megillus' proxenia with Athens provide two examples of this.9 Secondly, they could be personal connections formed in a private capacity in the present generation, such as the attempted friendship between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus negotiated through the medium of their common friend, Apollophanes of Cyzicus.10 Thirdly, the connection could be formed through contacts made on official missions. The connection of Phormio, the Athenian, with the Acarnanians, and almost certainly a particular Acarnanian family, probably arose out of the alliance 7

9

Plutarch: Mor. 819c; cf. Phaeax son of Eristratus, ambassador to Italy and Sicily in 422 (Th. 5.4.5), of whom it was said ws AaAeiV apiaros, ahvvwraros Xeyeiv (PCG Eupolis n6=Kock 95). Gorgias: Plato, Hipp, maior 282b; Diod. 12.53.2; cf. Prodicus in Plato, Hipp, maior 282c. We might contrast here Aeschines' denunciation of Demosthenes' performance on his first embassy to Philip in 347/6 (Aeschin. 2.34-5). Phocian ambassadors: 8 See also Mosley (1965) 262. Diod. 16.27.3. 10 Endius and Alcibiades: Th. 8.6.3; Megillus: Plato, Laws 1,642b-d. See ch. 6.


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he made between Athens and the Acarnanians sometime in the 430s.11 Since the Spartans were known for their dislike of travelling,12 the Spartan connections in the Hellespont probably came about through missions to the region in the current generation, although Clearchus' proxenia with Byzantium may have been hereditary. 13 Likewise, the official business of the Delian League in the fifth century must have brought many Athenians into contact with people and states they had not encountered before. Connections could also be made through trade, 14 or travelling to the panhellenic festivals. What is important is that connections were made between individuals, which, although essentially private in nature, played a significant part in public affairs, so that the public and the private were inextricably intertwined.

4.1

Ambassadorial appointments

The most obvious place for using foreign personal connections officially was in ambassadorial appointments.15 One of the qualifications for prospective ambassadors could be that they were pleasing and 'friendly' (epitedeios) to the state to which they were being sent, which could imply a xenia relationship with an individual from that state, a proxenia with the state itself, or some other background of 'friendly' relations or associations with the state in question.16 For example, the Argives sent Eustophus and Aeson to Sparta to make a treaty with the Spartans in 420 on the grounds that they seemed to be 'most friendly' (prosphilestatoi) to the Spartans.17 In 346 the Thebans sent an embassy of Philip's xenoi to Macedon, and Aeschines rejected Demosthenes' claim to have made the alliance with Thebes in 338 on the strength of their sympathy for him as their proxenos, saying that in the past many men 'who were particularly intimate with them' had been sent to Thebes without making them friends of the Athenians.18 Mosley notes that since ambassadors were wealthy and politically influential they frequently developed contacts abroad on a personal level as well as obtaining appointments as proxenoi, but it is not clear that we can say with Herman that interstate treaties 11 13 14 15

16 18

12 See ch. 5. Dercylidas was thought to be a notable exception (see below). See below. On the connection between trade and proxenia, see Amit (1965) 128-35. Oath-takers will not be classified simply among the ambassadors, as not all those who negotiated treaties were elected to receive the oaths: see also Mosley (1961) 59-63. 17 Mosley (1973) 44-5; cf. Harris (1995) 35~6Th. 5-4O.3Theban xenoi: Dem. 19.140; Demosthenes as the Theban proxenos: Aeschin. 2.141,143; Athenians intimate with Thebes: Aeschin. 3.138-9. Mosley notes ((1973) 59) that it is 'in the case of Thebes that individual Athenians are known to have the strongest connections with the state to which they were sent'.

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naturally implied private friendships, or at least not on all occasions or for all states.19 In order to assess the importance of private friendships in intex-poleis relations, we need to look more carefully at who was appointed and how the appointments were made. Mosley points out that one criterion for ambassadorial embassies was an attempt to maintain continuity of service between a particular ambassador and a state, and that selection could be made on the basis of personal ties,20 but we can push this a stage further, as those who do serve as ambassadors to a particular state more than once are often also known to have personal connections with that state, so that both appear as two parts of the same phenomenon. Some of the best examples of Spartan ambassadorial appointments influenced by personal connections are set out below. 4.1.1

Aneristus son ofSperthias and Nicolaus son of Bulls

Aneristus and Nicolaus were sent to Persia in 430 along with other envoys from Sparta, Corinth, Tegea and Argos (although the Argive was acting in a private capacity) in order to obtain finance for the war with Athens.21 Their selection for this mission does not seem to have been indiscriminate. In 480 both of their fathers (Sperthias son of Aneristus and Bulis son of Nicolaus) had gone to Persia to offer their lives to the Persian King in atonement for Persian envoys who had been killed.22 Far from putting them to death, Xerxes decided to show greater mercy than the Spartans had displayed by sparing them. A bond seems to have been formed as a result of the fathers' action,23 so that their sons are then seen to be appropriate envoys to gain a sympathetic hearing at the Persian court. Yet Aneristus and Nicolaus did not get that far, but were handed over to the Athenians by the Thracian Sadocus and were put to death.24 4.1.2

Endius son ofAlcibiades

In 420 the Spartans sent to Athens Philocharidas, Leon and Endius because they seemed to be epitedeioi to the Athenians.25 We know that Endius was the xenos of the Athenian Alcibiades, so that the basis for their appointment in 420 - at least in the case of Endius - was apparently personal connections with individual Athenians.26 But this was not Endius' 19 21 23 24 26

20 Mosley (1973) 44; Herman (1990) 94. Mosley (1973) 51. 22 Th. 2.67.1; Hdt. 7.137.2-3. Hdt. 7.133-6. Sperthias and Bulis may have h a d a xenia with Hydarnes (Hdt. 7.135.1). 25 Th. 2.67.2-4; Hdt. 7.137.3. Th. 5.44.3. For a rather tentative suggestion of a personal relationship between Philocharidas and Nicias son of Niceratus, see ch. 5.


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only diplomatic mission. In 410 he was sent as the leader on a mission to Athens after the battle of Cyzicus to sue for peace.27 In 408/7 we probably find Endius in Athens once more with Philocharidas and Megillus (who is probably to be identified with the Spartan proxenos for Athens)28 to ransom the prisoners of war.29 These are clearly instances when his Athenian expertise is being used. 4.1.3

Lichas son ofArcesilaus

Lichas son of Arcesilaus was the Argive proxenos in Sparta.30 He was an Olympic victor, one of the advisers (symbouloi) to Astyochus in 412/11, and arranged the treaty with Tissaphernes in 411.31 He was sent to Argos in 421 and again in 418 to renegotiate the Argive alliance.32 Without a doubt his selection for these Argive embassies was dependent upon his proxenia. 4.1.4

Aristomenidas (Aristomelidas)

Aristomenidas was one of the five judges sent from Sparta to try the Plataeans in 427 - an occasion when a pro-Theban may have been desirable - and an ambassador to Thebes in 396. 33 Pausanias describes him as 'being friendly5 (echein epitedeios) to the Thebans.34 Table 4.1 sets out all Spartan ambassadors who seem to have been selected because of their connections: twenty-six out of a total of seventy-six attested appointments, about 34 per cent, are known to have been selected on the basis of a personal connection.35 This is a striking proportion, given that we know so little about Spartan affairs, but all the same not necessarily a surprising one, since this is the kind of result one would expect from a society whose political life was dominated by friendship networks. 27

28 29

30

31

32 34

35

Diod. 13.52.2. Since Endius' earlier ambitions to collaborate with Athens' recalcitrant Asian allies and Persia, fostered by Alcibiades (Th. 8.12.1-3), had come to nothing, Lewis ((i977) 114 n. 44) asks: 'Is he now returning to sponsor the old Athens-Sparta collaboration, or is he simply here as an Athenian specialist?'. See Appendix I: 'Spartan Ambassadors'. Androtion, FGrHist 3 2 4 F 4 4 . O n the emendation w h i c h produces the n a m e s o f the three ambassadors, see Jacoby Supp. 1 1 5 2 - 3 . Th. 5.76.3. His family also seems to have had connections with Thasos: see Cartledge (1984) 102. Olympic victor: Th. 5.50.4; Xen., Hell. 3.2.21; Paus. 6.2.1-3; adviser to Astyochus and negotiator of treaty: Th. 8.39.2,43.3-4,52; cf. 57.1,84.5,87.1. 33 421: Th. 5.22.2; 418: Th. 5.76.3. Paus. 3.9.3; cf. Th. 3.52.2-3. Paus. 3.9.3; see also M o s l e y (1973) 5 2 ; cf. Cartledge (1987) 147, w h o suggests that Aristomenidas, Agesilaus' father-in-law, could have also provided Agesilaus 'with an entree into the d o m i n a n t oligarchic circle o f Leontiades at T h e b e s ' . The figures can only be approximate owing to the poor nature of the evidence.

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Table 4.1. Spartan ambassadors with relevant connections (For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix i) a

Ambassadors

Connection

?Melesippus son of Diacritas Aneristus son of Sperthias Nicolaus son of Bulis Athenaeus son of Pericleidas Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas Ischagoras lichas son of Arcesilaus Leon son of Anticleidas Endius son of Alcibiades Gylippus son of Cleandridas ?Pasippidas Megillus Aristomenidas Antalcidas son of Leon Etymocles Ocyllus Agesilaus son of Archidamus PEuthycles Lysander son of Aristocritus

Athens Persia Persia Athens Athens Thraceward parts Argos Athens Athens Thurii Persia Athens Thebes Persia Athens Athens Mantineia Persia Dionysius of Syracuse

Years of relevant appointment (432/1), 431 430 430 423

(422/1), 421,420, 408/7 421

421,418/7 420

420, 410, 408/17 414 408

408/7 396 (393/2), 387/6, 375> 367 (378/7), 370/69 (378/7), 370/69 37i

367

a ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative. 0 indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics.

Ordinarily, Spartan ambassadors were appointed by the assembly, probably after a resolution had been drawn up by the ephors.36 Xenophon says that when the representatives from the Peiraeus came to Sparta in 404 to make terms, 'after they had heard all of them, the ephors and the assembly sent fifteen men to Athens'.37 It is not known how ambassadors were nominated, but it is not inconceivable that the ephors put together a list which merely had to be ratified by the assembly. One could easily imagine that the 'appropriate' man or his hetaireia might be able to apply to or exert their influence upon members of the ephorate to have their names included, or indeed that the ephors themselves could hand-pick the men with the right kind of qualifications. Extraordinary appointments could also be made on the battlefield, where the power to select envoys rested with the king whose prerogative it was to lead the Kienast (1973) col. 526.

Xen., Hell. 2.4.38; see also Xen., Hell 3.2.23.


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army.38 It would be a simple enough choice to make, as long as the king was given the right information, perhaps even from the ephors who were there to advise him.

4.2

Spartan non-royal commands

When we turn to the appointment of military commanders, the point of personal connections abroad as a criterion for selection is not so obvious. Yet the role of commanders in the field did not simply entail directing battles, but could involve ad hoc diplomacy of various kinds required by the exigencies of the situation, and in these circumstances personal relationships could be an advantage.39 Although this list is by no means exhaustive, the range of duties performed by military commanders for which personal connections might be an advantage could include: the collecting of troops (Demosthenes used his connections with the Acarnanians and Messenians as a means of acquiring more troops for his campaigns in north-western Greece and the Peloponnese);40 making new or renewing old treaties and alliances (the Spartan Chalcideus made the treaty with Tissaphernes in 412 while commanding in Asia Minor);41 bringing about the revolt of cities (Nicias' attempts to cause a revolt in Syracuse through his contacts there);42 impromptu diplomatic negotiation (Alcibiades' negotiations for a settlement with the people of Selymbria in 408 which was later ratified at Athens);43 or other services in the field (Brasidas' procurement of an escort through Thessaly by sending a message to his personal contacts at Pharsalus).44 38

40 42

Xen., Lac. Pol. 13.10: some have found such a statement inconsistent with the usual powers of the ephors in diplomacy, leading Weiske to emend the text. But the emendation is unnecessary (see esp. Hamilton (1991) 45-7 and n. 39). Hamilton in his discussion of this passage cites a number of instances when Agesilaus, leading the army, both sent and received envoys, and we need look no further than Book 2 of Thucydides for Archidamus' sending Melesippus son of Diacritas to the Athenians with a final warning immediately before his first invasion of the plains of Attica (Th. 2.12.1). There are also parallels among the military commanders and harmosts. One such example is particularly pertinent. When in 394 Dercylidas brought to Agesilaus news of the victory in mainland Greece, Agesilaus sent Dercylidas himself back to the Hellespont to spread the report. Not only was he the 'appropriate' man, as Agesilaus tells him, because he actually took part in the battle (Xen., Hell. 4.3.1-3), but he was also a man who seems to have had 39 links with Asia Minor and Abydus in particular. See also Griffith (1995) 67. 41 Th. 3-iO7i 5 4 9 i 5 3-3> 36.1,41.2,7.315; compare Th. 6.29.3. Th. 8.17.4. 43 44 Th.7.48.2;cf.7.73.3. Plut.,^4/c. 30.2-10;IGi 3 118 (=ML87). Th.4.78.1.

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In his examination of Spartan non-royal military appointments, Hodkinson has noted three important elements: firstly, that there was a limited number of men who served on commands abroad; secondly, that those who were appointed to foreign commands often served abroad for a number of years; and, thirdly, that they were men from the highest stratum of Spartiate society.45 There was also a fourth factor which influenced selection for some commands: personal interstate friendships. Although the appointment procedures for military and naval commands are parallel,46 the number of foreign posts prompted by foreign friendships varies significantly and they must be explained in different ways.

4.2.1

Harmosts and archons

Spartan military magistrates seem to have been selected in either of two ways.47 Firstly, as with ambassadors, it was the right of the supreme commander of the expedition, whether the king or the Nauarch, to appoint subordinate commanders in the field. For example, Brasidas appointed Polydamidas as archon of the Mendaeans and Scionians in 423, and Agis sent for Alcamenes and Melanthus to be the archons for Euboea.48 Likewise Eteonicus was sent by the Nauarch Astyochus to Antissa and Methymna as archon, and left by Callicratidas when he was Nauarch as archon at Mytilene.49 Appointments could also be made through formal procedure at Sparta, although again the chief responsibility seems to have rested with the ephors.50 Xenophon tells us that Agesilaus received orders from 'the officials at home' (probably the ephors) that he was to have control of the fleet and to appoint as nauarch whomsoever he wished.51 Similarly Eudamidas asked the ephors to allow his brother Phoebidas to bring troops to him at Olynthus, and Xenophon says that Dercylidas was replaced as harmost of Abydus through no fault of his own, but because Anaxibius arranged to become harmost there through the ephors, who 45 47 48 49 50

51

46 H o d k i n s o n (1993) ^Z^H o d k i n s o n in (1993) 160. See especially Hodkinson (1993) 159-61. Polydamas: T h . 4.123.4,129.3; Alcamenes and Melanthus: T h . 8.5.1-2. Antissa and Methymna: T h . 8.23.4; Mytilene: X e n . , Hell. 1.6.26. Finley, highlighting the position of elites in Spartan society, has argued that the 'primary principles o f selection were appointment and cooptation' and that only the ephors and the gerousia were elected in o p e n competition ((1981b) 29; see also Hodkinson (1983) 263). However, as Lazenby points out ((1985) 23), at least for the Nauarchs, the annual tenure of the position implies election. X e n . , Hell. 3.4.27; see also PhitÂges. 10.9; Paus. 3.9.6. O n the expression 'the officials at

home', see HCT4.23.


81

were his philoi.52 All of this seems to suggest that it was the prerogative of the ephors to make such decisions about leadership, or that they at least played an influential part in the decision-making process.53 The circumstances of Anaxibius5 appointment as harmost at Abydus lead us to the next point: it was not just friends abroad that influenced selection, domestic networking mattered too. As Hodkinson has shown, whatever the procedure, appointees were drawn from the Spartan elite, and private influence and patronage could play a part in securing appointment.54 Lysander, despite his doubtful status, was apparently of noble birth, although his family was impoverished.55 Cartledge attributes Lysander's rise to high office to the patronage of the kings, and suggests that Lysander, given his intimate connections with Agesilaus, may have been launched on his public career under the patronage of Archidamus II and that Agis may have inherited him as a client from his father.56 He then concludes that: 'Lysander's appointment as nauarch presumably therefore had the support of Agis, if indeed it was not actually made on Agis5 personal recommendation.'57 Using the network in a similar way, Agesilaus is said to have been responsible for the Nauarchy of his brother Teleutias, and Lysander to have arranged for himself to be sent as harmost against Peiraeus in 404, and for his brother libys to be Nauarch of the fleet.58 But that does not mean that foreign connections were irrelevant. Spartans with connections of various kinds were either appointed, or 52

53

54 55

56 57 58

Phoebidas at Olynthus: X e n . , Hell. 5.2.24. For a different account o f the story (reversing the roles o f the brothers) see D i o d . 15.19.3, 20.3; Dercylidas and Anaxibius: X e n . , Hell. 4.8.32. Evidence for election b y the assembly, o n t h e other hand, is slight. Callicratidas in response to the plotting of the friends of Lysander said to an assembly of Spartans that he had been sent 'by the state' to command the fleet (Xen., Hell. 1.6.5; cf- 4.8.20). This may mean no more than ratification by the assembly of a decision made by the ephors, that the Spartan assembly voted on a list prepared by the ephors, or that the ephors as the bureaucrats of the state may be seen as embodying the state. See also Finley ((1981b) 33), whose views on the probable docility of the Spartan assembly are approved by Lewis ((1977) 38); although, as Lazenby notes, the opposite may equally be true: that the impression that the ephors decided the appointment may indicate no more than their influence in such appointments ((1985) 23). The most likely solution may well be selection by the ephors and ratification of the choice by the assembly. Hodkinson (1993) 157-9,161. Lysander was a mothax: Phylarchus, FGrHist 81 F 4 3 ; Ael., VH 12.43. T h e mothakes are a group w h o s e exact definition is u n k n o w n , but probably covered a large group of different types o f classes, ranging from nothoi t o t h e p o o r sons o f Spartiates; s e e Lotze (1962) 4 2 7 - 3 5 ; Lazenby (1985) 1 9 - 2 0 ; Cartledge (1979) 314-15. Lysander's noble birth: Plut., Lys. 2.1; see also Krentz (1989) 134. Cartledge (1987) 79; cf. de Ste. Croix (1972) 145,147. Cartledge (1987) 79; o n patronage in Spartan society, see H o d k i n s o n (1983) 2 6 3 - 4 . Teleutias as Nauarch: Plut., Ages. 21.1; Cartledge (1987) 145-6; see also H o d k i n s o n (1993) 161; Lysander as harmost with l i b y s as Nauarch: X e n . , Hell. 2.4.28.

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were able to get themselves appointed to commands appropriate to their interests and their connections. The social elite had xenoi overseas,59 which would have made their appointment to such positions easier. In a society where high-level friendships abroad were considered important, one can catch a glimpse of a system where high-level friends could help high-level friends to high positions. This is best seen by looking at particular cases where domestic connections, however good, do not explain everything. 4.2.1.1 Brasidas son of Tellis Brasidas son of Tellis first appears in Thucydides when he came to help against an Athenian attack on Methone in Messenia.60 He was elected eponymous ephor for the year 431/0, perhaps as a result of the popularity derived from his successes at Methone.61 He served in a number of other positions in the following years: as one of three advisers to Cnemus in 430/29, as a single adviser for Alcidas in 427, and as a trierarch at Pylos in 425-62 In 424 we find him preparing an army for Thrace around Sicyon and Corinth.63 Brasidas' position in Thrace is interesting. His ostensible motive was the liberation of Greece from the Athenians, and Parke suggests that his role was essentially that of harmost.64 Thucydides gives two reasons for his selection to this command: because Brasidas himself wanted to go; and because the Chalcidians were eager for him to come.65 As Hodkinson points out, despite his earlier brilliant career, which 'would seem to be an excellent demonstration of the significance attached to personal merit in the choice of Spartiate leaders', Brasidas was not sent through the positive choice of the Spartans.66 Did he then have connections in the north? Although he is not known to have had a prior connection with the Chalcidians, he was known to have epitedeioi in Pharsalus with whose escort he crossed Thessaly, leading Hodkinson to suggest that Brasidas' advancement may have depended partly on hereditary factors.67 4.2.1.2 Clearchus son ofRamphias Clearchus son of Ramphias is known to have had Byzantine connections. Although it is unclear whether these were hereditary, he was the Spartan 59

60

62 63 65

H o d k i n s o n (1997) 9 3 notes the relatively high incidence of Spartans with xenia c o n n e c tions. Th. 2.25.2; cf. Diod. 12.43.2. Note that Tellis was one of the signatories to the Peace of 61 Nicias and subsequent alliance (Th. 5.19.2,24.1). Xen., Hell. 2.3.10; PL 177. Adviser to C n e m u s : T h . 2.85.1; adviser to Alcidas: T h . 3.69.1; trierarch: T h . 4.11.4. 64 Th. 4.70.1. Th. 4.85.1,86.1 (see also Lewis (1977) 68-9); Parke (1930) 42. 66 67 Th. 4.81.1. Hodkinson (1983) 261. Th. 4.78.1; Hodkinson (1983) 263.


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proxenos of Byzantium and a number of his appointments are connected with Byzantium or that region.68 In 412 he served as a commander in the Hellespont, in 411 he was sent to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont with ships, and in 410 king Agis sent him as the proxenos of Byzantium both to Byzantium and to Chalcedon to try to prevent the grain supply getting to Athens.69 In 408 Clearchus was the harmost in Byzantium.70 After the Peloponnesian War, Clearchus' relationship with the Byzantines becomes rather murky, and there are two different traditions. Xenophon says that Clearchus persuaded the Spartans that the Thracians were harming the Greeks in Asia Minor, and so set sail to make war upon the Thracians living about the Chersonese and Perinthus.71 Although the ephors changed their minds after he had gone and tried to turn him back from the Isthmus at Corinth, he ignored them and kept sailing for the Hellespont. In 403 Cyrus befriended him, gave him a thousand darics for an army and made him his xenos, and Clearchus used the Chersonese as his base, making war upon the Thracians until Cyrus summoned him for his Persian campaign.72 Diodorus' account is rather different.73 He says that the Byzantines, owing to internal trouble and a war with the neighbouring Thracians, asked the Spartans to send them a commander and Clearchus was despatched.74 However, Diodorus reports, he set himself up in the city as a tyrant, exiling some citizens, putting others to death for their money, and establishing a large mercenary army.75 When the Spartans heard, they sent ambassadors to him ordering him to behave, and then sent troops against him under the command of Panthoi'das. Since Clearchus did not think that Byzantium would remain friendly after his treatment of the citizens, he moved to Selymbria, and finally escaped to Cyrus who provided him with money for mercenaries. The two stories may not be incompatible,76 but in any case both stories emphasise Clearchus' connections with the Byzantines, which seem to have led to his selection for office there in 412,411,410,408 and possibly 403. 77 68 69 70 72 73 74 75 76

77

Xcn.3Hell. 1.1.35; HCT5.21. 412: Th. 8.8.2; 411: Th. 8.39.2,80.1; 410: Xen., Hell. 1.1.35. 71 Xen., Hell 1.3.15-19; Diod. 13.66.5-6. Xen., Anab. 2.6.2-5; cf. 1.1.9. Xen., Anab. 2.6.4-5; cf. Polyaenus 2.2.6-10. Rather more dramatic than X e n o p h o n ' s , it may also b e less likely but see n.76 below. Diod. 14.12. For Clearchus' reputation for harshness, cf. Xen., Anab. 2.6.6-13; D i o d . 13.66.6. See Grote (1869-84) 8.310 n. 3, although Lenschau ((1922) col. 576) treats them as two separate series of events with X e n o p h o n Js account preceding that of Diodorus. Although, if w e believe D i o d o r u s , his treatment o f the Byzantines might well support Herodotus' claim that the king appointed Spartan proxenoi (see ch. 2).

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4.2.1.3 Dercylidas Xenophon describes Dercylidas as very resourceful and fond of foreign travel.78 Dercylidas' career seems to be linked with Abydus. In 411 he was sent with a small force to cause the revolt of the city, and he was also the harmost of Abydus during the Nauarchy of Lysander in 407. 79 From 399 to 397 he commanded the Spartan forces in Asia Minor, perhaps remaining in Asia after the end of his command as one of Agesilaus' advisers in 396. 80 He commanded again in 394 after Agesilaus sent him back to the Hellespont to report the Spartan victory at Nemea, and basing himself at Abydus he rallied at Sestus and Abydus the Spartan harmosts ejected from the cities by Conon and Pharnabazus after the battle of Cnidus.81 It is difficult to say whether a connection with Abydus preceded the revolt of 411, but it looks as if he may have had a connection with the city from that time on. Given his other qualifications, this connection almost certainly earned him the post of harmost at Abydus and may have been a factor in his selection for other Asian commands.82 4.2.1.4 Eteonicus According to the received text of Xenophon, Eteonicus was harmost of Thasos but was expelled along with the Spartan sympathisers in the summer of 410. 83 Some have questioned the reliability of the MSS, however, and many have accepted Kahrstedt's emendation of Thasos to Iasos on the grounds that this was a city in Tissaphernes' satrapy, and the Persian was also accused of being involved in the coup.84 Nevertheless, Krentz argues in favour of keeping the text on the grounds that Lysander later sent Eteonicus to the Thraceward region after the battle of Aegospotami, where he was said to have brought over everything there to the Peloponnesians, claiming that this assignment 'could be explained by Eteonikos' experience in the area'.85 Table 4.2 displays Spartan harmosts and archons with connections relevant to their appointments. Sixteen of the ninety-six attested Spartan 78

80

81 82

85

Resourceful: X e n . , Hell. 3.1.8 (see also Ephorus, FGrHist 7 0 F 71); fond o f travel: X e n . , 79 Hell. 4.3.2. 411: T h . 8.61.1; 407: X e n . , Hell. 3.1.9. Cf. HCT5.149. 399-387: X e n . , Hell. 3.1.8, 3.2.6; adviser t o Agesilaus: X e n . , Hell. 3.4.6; cf. 3.4.2; Plut., Ages. 6.5; Lys. 23.4. O n the status o f the Thirty as symbouloi, see Pritchett ( 1 9 7 4 , 1 9 7 9 ) 2.37 contra Smith (1953-4) 279 n. 9; cf. X e n . , Hell. 5.3.8: the Thirty Spartiatae sent with Agesipolis; Plut., Ages. 36.6: thirty symbouloi sent with Agesilaus to Egypt in 361/0. Xen., Hell. 4.3.1-3,4.8.3-6. See Westlake ((1986) 413 ( = ( 1 9 8 9 ) 2 4 5 ) ) , w h o writes that Dercylidas had 'considerable experience in Asia' prior t o being given the c o m m a n d o f the expeditionary forces in the 83 84 390s. X e n . , Hell. 1.1.32. Meiggs (1972) 5 7 7 - 8 ; Krentz (1989) 105. X e n . , Hell. 2.2.5; Krentz (1989) 105; compare Hodkinson ((1993) 156) o n Eteonicus: *a kind of all purpose, often subordinate commander, loyally performing a variety of services'.


85

Table 4.2 Harmosts and archons with relevant connection? (For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix I)*

HannostlArchon

Connection

BrasidassonofTellis PPasitelidas son of Agesander ?Xenares son of Cnidis Clearchus son of Ramphias Eteonicus ?Pedaritus son of Leon Dercylidas ?Leon son of Anticleidas ?Agesandridas son of Agesander ??Herippidas

Thraceward Thraceward Boeotia Byzantium Thraceward Chios Abydos Chios Thraceward Thebes

Years of relevant appointment parts parts

parts

424 423 420/19 412,411,410,408 (412), 410, 405 412

(411), 4O7>399>394 411

parts

408 (399), ?382-379

a In contrast to the case of Athenian generals, who have to be re-elected annually, I have only counted the first year of selection for continuous appointments. b ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative. 0 indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics.

appointments (about 17 per cent) seem to display connections which affected their selection.86 Although this is not an enormous proportion, and a number are not secure, it is significantly higher than is found for the Athenian military appointments. It also probably under-represents the truth owing to the poverty of our Spartan prosopographical information, and is still high enough to correlate overseas connections with overseas appointments. The reason these figures are not higher may be to do with the fact that Spartan harmosts for the most part were working within new theatres of war in Asia. Hitherto the Spartans had been more concerned with establishing their control in central Greece and the Peloponnese; Brasidas' movement into Thrace and Lysander's and Agesilaus' campaigns in Asia represent a fairly radical departure from former Spartan policy. The Spartans were notorious for their dislike of foreigners (Dercylidas' love of travel was unusual enough to be worth comment), and so they may simply not have had many of the 'right' sort of connections. This may also have contributed to the iteration of command. 86

Again, there would be no point in a more precise calculation. Ninety-six is the total number of appointments listed in Appendix I: 'Spartan Harmosts and Archons' as possible or certain. An appointment continued beyond one year is counted as a single appointment. Men listed as second- or third-in-command under autumn 426-winter 426/5 and summer 425 in Appendix II are not included.

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4.2.2

Nauarchs87

The Nauarchs are an altogether different issue, particularly in the fifth century. Antalcidas was selected as Nauarch in the year 388/7 because the Spartans thought this would please the Persian satrap, Tiribazus,88 but this is almost an isolated example. Lysander represents the only other naval commander who was selected because of his connections, but this was a special case. Although he in fact held the supreme naval command, technically he could not be re-elected as Nauarch, so was appointed 'secretary' (epistoleus) instead.89 This does not mean that foreign personal friendships were not intrinsically important for such a command. In fact the charge was made by the allies on the appointment of Callicratidas as Nauarch that often the Spartans ran the risk of disaster by sending men who were inexperienced in naval matters and ignorant of the people in that place. These new appointments, they said, replaced men who were suitable, just coming to understand naval matters and knew how men must be dealt with.90 This accusation in itself emphasises how important personal connections could be for overseas posts. The careers of three of the Nauarchs (Astyochus, Lysander and Callicratidas) highlight further the significance of this kind of appointment and it will be instructive to look briefly at the terms of office of these men to see how they tried, or did not try, to use overseas friendships. 4.2.2.1 Astyochus Though apparently incompetent in his leadership, Astyochus did try to initiate a personal friendship with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades (who was with Tissaphernes at the time and was supposed to have great influence with the Persian).91 Whether he ultimately intended to exercise such a friendship for the benefit of Sparta is unknown, although, as Lewis suggests, Pedaritus did not think so since he laid accusations against Astyochus at Sparta to this effect.92 Astyochus is also later found to be ingratiating himself with Tissaphernes by betraying the letters of Phrynichus to Alcibiades, and allegedly trying to attach himself for personal gain to the satrap, causing 87

89 90 91

92

I a m using N a u a r c h to refer to the supreme c o m m a n d of the fleet, and nauarch to refer to the subordinate c o m m a n d e r o f a squadron o f ships. O n the regularity of the appoint88 m e n t , see Appendix I: 'Spartan Nauarchs'. X e n . , Hell. 5.1.6. X e n . , Hell. 2.1.7. X e n . , Hell. 1.6.4 (the text is corrupt, but the meaning is clear enough). For the apparent friendship o f Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, see ch. 6. T h e eleven symbouloiwere given the power to replace h i m if he thought it necessary ( T h . 8.39.2). Lewis (1977) 96 (cf. Th. 8.38.4).


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friction between himself and his men. 93 But whatever the truth of the accusations, it seems that once the mood in Sparta had turned against Tissaphernes, Astyochus, who does not seem to have obtained any significant gain and could only lose by further contact with him, was more than willing to jettison the friendship by backing Hermocrates' allegations against Tissaphernes in Sparta.94 4.2.2.2 Lysander son ofAristocritus Lysander played the friendship game for all it was worth. Almost as soon as he had succeeded to the Nauarchy in 407/6, Lysander formed a private friendship with Cyrus the son of the Persian King, and this was one of the most successful Greco-Persian friendships of the period.95 Yet Lysander also established other friendship networks in Asia Minor. Diodorus says that after visiting Cyrus at Sardis, Lysander's next act as Nauarch was to go to Ephesus and, calling together the most influential men of the cities, divide them into hetaireiai, promising that if he was successful he would put them in charge of the cities.96 It was because of this promise, Diodorus claims, that these men gave greater assistance than was needed by competing with each other, and Lysander was quickly supplied with all the equipment necessary for prosecuting the war. It was also Lysander's philoi who plotted against Callicratidas, and on his death sent to Sparta asking for Lysander's return.97 Lysander's success in his Nauarchy was based upon his willingness to initiate such friendships abroad with Greek and barbarian alike, and to exploit these networks for his own political and personal ends, as no doubt his newly made friends also did for theirs. 4.2.2.3 Callicratidas Callicratidas held the Nauarchy between Lysander's two terms of office.98 Diodorus says of him (although his tone is generally more favourable to this young commander) that he had no inexperience of foreign peoples,99 and he displayed all the features of the stereotypical Spartan in his dislike of foreigners. Unlike Lysander, Callicratidas was unable to secure the 93

94

95 96

97 98

99

T h . 8 . 5 0 . 2 - 4 , 83.3; Lewis (1977) 9 8 - 9 ; for an analysis o f this episode, s e e Westlake (1956). X e n . , Hell. 1.1.31; cf. Lewis (1977) 113-14. O n Astyochus' feebleness and incompetence (or at least T h u c y d i d e s ' portrayal of h i m as having such) see Westlake (1968) 2 9 0 - 3 0 7 . Seech.6. D i o d . 13.70.4. F r o m X e n o p h o n , w e know that these included m e n from n o t only Ephesus, but also Chios and the other allies in Asia Minor (Xen., Hell. 2.1.6). Xen., Hell. 1.6.4,2.1.6. Although n o t e that Lysander's s e c o n d term o f office was n o t as N a u a r c h ( X e n . , Hell. 2.1.7; Diod. 13.100.8). D i o d . 13.76.2, noting, however, that it is Callicratidas' moral characteristics that D i o d o r u s applauds.

88


help of the Ephesians and the citizens of the other cities which supported Lysander, and instead was actively hindered by them. 100 He was also not prepared to flatter Cyrus, but declared instead that the Greeks were fools to pay court to barbarians for money, and that he would do his best to reconcile Athens and Sparta if he were to arrive home safely.101 Furthermore, Cyrus tried to form a private xenia with Callicratidas, although Callicratidas refused. Plutarch writes that when Cyrus sent Callicratidas pay for the soldiers and xenia (gifts of xenia) for himself, Callicratidas accepted the pay, but sent back the xenia, saying that it was not necessary for them to have a private friendship, but that the public philia with all the Spartans was enough.102 To a large degree it was this attitude to foreign friendships that marked the difference between the Nauarchies of Lysander and Callicratidas.103 But if these friendships were so important to international appointments, why were the Nauarchs not for the most part selected according to this principle? In the first place, there must have been difficulty finding candidates with suitable experience in the early years of the Peloponnesian War when Spartan experience of the sea was limited. Brunt has pointed out the inferior experience and training of the Peloponnesian fleet compared to the ships of Athens, and Sealey has argued that the Nauarchy did not become a regular office with annual tenure until approximately 409, when large fleets were operating for long periods of time at a great distance from Sparta.104 The problem then came to perpetuate itself, for until the Spartans were regularly able to maintain a fleet where men could gain leadership experience, they had difficulty finding suitably qualified men. Hodkinson suggests a tension between birth and merit as the factors influencing a man's career, contrasting the brilliant if somewhat slow rise of Brasidas with the undistinguished career of the Nauarch Alcidas.105 All the same, birth rather than naval ability seems to have been a distinguishing characteristic of the Nauarchs of the earlier years.106 Three of the Nauarchs in the years 435-404 (Cnemus, Alcidas and Astyochus) were thought to have conducted themselves so badly that advisers (symbovioi) including Brasidas and lichas were sent to supplement their shortcomings.107 100 102 103 104 105 107

101 Xen.,ifc/Z. 1.6.4. Xen.,Hell. 1.6.7; Lewis (1977) " 7 . Plut.,Afor. 222e;Krentz (1989) 150;Lewis (1977) ii7;cf.Xen.,/Je#. 1.6.18. For a further discussion o f the relationship b e t w e e n Callicratidas and Cyrus, see ch. 6. Brunt (1965b) 259-60; Sealey (1976) 335-58; see also HCT 5.454-5. 106 Hodkinson (1983) 260-3. Hodkinson (1983) 261-2; cf. Lazenby (1985) 20. Th. 2.85.1,3.69.1,76,8.39.2; compare the symboulot sent to Agis (Th. 5.63.4).


89

In later years things changed, and generally appointments to the Nauarchy were of men with experience of a number of commands both on land and sea. For example, Pollis held the Nauarchy in 396/5, perhaps also in 376/5, and was second-in-command for Podanemus in 393/2.108 Similarly, Teleutias served in a number of commands on land and sea, as well as doing his tour of duty as Nauarch probably in 390/89. 109 But it was not until Lysander and Cyrus that the Spartan fleet was transformed into a force to be reckoned with and the Spartans really bothered to concern themselves with its form or leadership. 108 109

SeePareti(i96i). S e e Pareti (1961) with A p p e n d i x II: 'Spartan N a u a r c h s , H a r m o s t s and Archons'.

Magisterial appointments: Athens

Friendship is a disinterested commerce between equals; love, an abject intercourse between tyrants and slaves. O. Goldsmith, The Good Natured Man

5.1

Ambassadorial appointments

At Sparta, as we have just seen, personal connections were one of the factors which could influence magisterial appointments. If we turn now to Athens, we can also see that there were clearly instances (although by no means all) where selection seems to have been influenced by an individual's connections,1 and I have set out below some of the best examples. 5. /. 1

Nicias son ofNiceratus

Nicias was one of the three generals who swore to the armistice with Sparta in 423.2 The Spartans also conducted their negotiations for peace in 421 through Nicias and Laches, to the disgust of Alcibiades, and Nicias is known to have had a xenia with the family of the Spartan king Pausanias son of Pleistoanax.3 In addition, when the Spartan envoys tried to prevent the Argive-Athenian alliance supported by Alcibiades in 420, Thucydides' narrative makes it clear that the Spartans again were working primarily through Nicias.4 What is more, after the earthquake 1

3

4

90

Mosley notes ((1973) 58): 'Frequently envoys did have specific connections with the state to which they were being sent, and many instances may be cited.' That connections did sometimes play a part cannot be refuted; that this was a 'frequent' phenomenon is not so 2 clear, as will be shown. Th. 4.119.2. 421: Th. 5.43.2; xenia with Pausanias: Lys. 18.10. Pleistoanax was also an oath-taker to the Peace of Nicias and subsequent alliance (Th. 5.19.2,24.1). This may be the origin of the xenia, although it could have preceded it. Th. 5.45.3. Given that the ambassadors who came to Athens in the summer of 420 to stop Athens forming an alliance with the Argives were said to be epitedeioi of the Athenians, and that the Spartan ambassadors who came seem to have been working particularly through Nicias, we might guess that either Leon or Philocharidas had some personal connection with Nicias, since Endius was the xenos of Alcibiades (Th. 8.6.3). Philocharidas seems a likely candidate since he was an oath-taker for the armistice with Athens in 423 and swore to the Peace in the following year (Th. 4.119.2,5.19.2,24.1). In both cases he would have been directly involved with Nicias in the negotiations.


91

prevented the Athenians making the alliance with the Argives, Nicias persuaded the Athenians to send ambassadors to Sparta with Nicias himself as one of them.5 Given his recent relations with Sparta, it was a suitable choice.6 S.i, 2

A ristophanes son ofNicophemus

Aristophanes had connections with Cyprus through his father Nicophemus (who lived there with his Cypriot wife and their children),7 and eagerly supported the interests of Cyprus and Euagoras king of Salamis in Athens. When Conon wanted to send someone to Sicily to persuade Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse to make a marriage alliance with Euagoras probably in 394/3 in order to detach him from Sparta, Aristophanes offered himself and went with Eunomus, the philos and xenos of Dionysius.8 In a delicate matter such as this and so intimately concerned with Euagoras, Aristophanes was an appropriate choice, just as Eunomus was. It is further evidence of his Cypriot interests that Aristophanes entertained the ambassadors from Cyprus who had come to seek Athenian assistance for Euagoras in 390/89, and supplied them with a large amount of money in addition to the fleet despatched by the Athenian assembly.9 He was then elected as an ambassador to Euagoras.10 But his connection with the Cypriot also had its price. When the expedition was captured by Teleutias on its way to Cyprus, the Athenians in anger recalled Aristophanes and his father Nicophemus and they were executed without trial.11 5.1.3

Callias son ofHipponicus

Callias son of Hipponicus was the hereditary proxenos of the Spartans in Athens, which honour he boasted his grandfather had received from his father.12 His grandfather had served on an embassy to Sparta in 446 to negotiate to secure peace, and Callias himself entertained the Spartan ambassadors in his role as proxenos in 379/8.13 Despite the rather cautious 5 6 7 8

10 11

13

Th. 5.46.2. See Mosley (1973) 59. For the Spartans' general regard for Nicias, see also Th. 7.86.3-4. Lys. 19.36,44; cf. Isoc. 9.57; see also Davies (1971) 200-2. Lys. 19.19-20. Lysias says that the primary purpose was to detach Dionysius from Sparta 9 and make him the philos and symmachos of Athens. Lys. 19.21,27,43, cf. 24-6. Lys. 19.23. Xen., Hell 4.8.24; Lys. 19.7. On their execution, see Pritchett (1974,1979) 2.25; Seager 12 (1967)113-14. Xen., Hell. 5.4.22,6.3.4. Callias' grandfather: Diod. 12.7.1; Callias: Xen., Hell 5.4.22.

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political stance of his family, Callias served on three embassies to Sparta to try to make an end of the war, one of these being in 371 when he made a conciliatory speech before the Spartan assembly.14 His selection was obviously based upon his Spartan link. 5. 1. 4

Thrasybulus son of Thrason

Aeschines describes Thrasybulus son of Thrason as a man trusted in Thebes as no other.15 He had also been among those at Phyle in 403, and supported a Theban embassy in the assembly in 395. 16 He was probably the maternal uncle of Thrason of Erchia (the Athenian proxenos of the Thebans), and was accused of raising a revolution in Boeotia and robbing the Athenians of that alliance.17 He was elected as ambassador to Thebes in 378/7 in connection with obscure matters arising out of the formation of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy presumably because of his connection.18 As we can see - and perhaps not unexpectedly - selection for embassies in Athens was influenced to a certain extent by personal connections. This then raises the question of whether we see behind these appointments the manoeuvrings of the political groups and the bridging between states that we discussed in an earlier chapter, but, before we can look at this, we need to consider briefly the selection processes. Although the actual procedure for election seems to have varied to a large extent from case to case, and may have been affected by the particular requirements of particular cases, the first step was to decide the number of envoys to be appointed, then how the nominations were to be taken: that is, whether the candidates were to be drawn from all citizens, or whether there were to be any limitations on nomination, such as age restrictions or selection from a particular board, such as the Council of Five Hundred (boule), and in some cases it could be delegated to the boule to elect them. The election itself was conducted by a show of hands in the assembly.19 Nomination for election seems to have taken place on the assembly 14

15

17

19

Xen., Hell. 6.3.2,4-6. Note, however, that he did lead the Athenian army against Sparta at Corinth in 390 (see ch. 2). See also Davies (1971) 259-63. Aeschin. 3.138; see also Mosley (1973) 59. On Thrasybulus' links with Thebes, see esp. 16 Trevett (forthcoming). At Phyle: Dem. 24.134; 395: Xen., Hell. 3.5.16. Thrason of Erchia: Aeschin. 3.138 (see Davies (1971) 238-40); Thrasybulus as the cause 18 of revolution: Lys. 26.23. IG ii2 43.77 (=Tod 123). Number of envoys: IG i3 61.16-18 (=ML 65); IG ii2 16 b.10-13 (=Tod 103.17-20); IG ii2 204.5-6. Mosley ((1972b) 141-2) argues for tribally based elections on the principle that the rubric 'from all Athenians' must have some equivalence with the statement made by [Aristotle] that the generals were elected 'from all' (Ath. Pol. 61.1), but surely the c|


93

floor, and this allowed scope for the political groups to nominate their own members. As a result, it is not surprising that we often find more than one member of a particular political group on an embassy. In 346 Philocrates and Demosthenes, and Nausicles and Aeschines, 20 who seem to be pairs from two political groups (whatever their differences later on), were all elected for the embassy to negotiate peace with Philip as Aeschines describes in the speech On the Embassy: When these things had been said, Philocrates proposed a decree to elect ten men as ambassadors, who would discuss peace with Philip and things of common advantage to the Athenians and to Philip. Ten men were elected by show of hands; I was nominated by Nausicles, and Demosthenes, who now brings charges against Philocrates, was nominated by Philocrates himself. Demosthenes was so eager for the business that he put forward a proposal in the Council to elect ambassadors for the poleis in which it was necessary for Aristodemus to compete, who would intercede over the penalties on his behalf, so that Aristodemus might be our fellow-ambassador without harm to himself.21 As is clear from this passage, members of the same political group were able to nominate each other: Nausicles nominated Aeschines, and Philocrates nominated Demosthenes. Other sources indicate that it was also possible for an individual to nominate himself. For example, Xenophon says that Theramenes offered himself in the assembly to go to Lysander to find out the Spartans' intentions for the city in 403, and in 420 Nicias offered himself as an ambassador to Sparta.22 This allowed political groups to have their own representatives sent on missions to carry out or facilitate policies which they supported. Certainly Demosthenes, Philocrates, Aeschines and Nausicles all wanted peace with Philip in 347/6, although undoubtedly not for the same reasons. This v dirdvTcov of the inscriptions is meant to contrast with the other kinds of limitations which could be placed upon selection (whether age or membership of the boule), and not to refer to tribally based election. Nominations: IG ii2 31.17 (=Tod 117); IG ii2 116.21-2 (=Tod 147); IG ii2 360.36-7; IG ii2 555.18-19; IG ii2 653.43-4; see Kienast (1973) col. 527; Mosley (1972b) 141. Limitations on nomination: see, for example, IG i3 61.16-17 (=ML 65); Sinclair (1988) 32; five to be elected from the boule and five from all citizens: IG ii2 16 b. 10-12 (=Tod 103.17-20); Dem. 18.164-5 gives two examples of decrees where ambassadors were limited to the boule, but the decrees in the speech On the Crown are regularly thought to be inauthentic; see, for example, Goodwin (1901) 351. Delegation to boule: IG ii2 16 b.10-11 (Tod 103.18-19); IG ii2 548.5-6. 20 At this stage Philocrates and Demosthenes seem to have been co-operating: Aeschines claims that Demosthenes was the hetairos of Philocrates (Aeschin. 2.19), although they were later to fall out (Aeschin. 3.81), and when Philocrates was tried in 348 for proposing an allegedly unconstitutional decree to open peace negotiations with Philip, Demosthenes spoke in his defence (Aeschin. 2.13-14,3.62). On the embassy to Philip in 346, see also chs. 8 and 10. For the friendship between Aeschines and Nausicles, see 21 Aeschin. 2.184. Aeschin. 2.18-19. 22 Theramenes: Xen., Hell. 2.2.16; Nicias: see above.

94


Table 5.1. Athenian ambassadors with relevant connections (For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix I) a Years of relevant appointment

Ambassadors

Connection

PLaches son of Melanopus Nicias son of Niceratus Alcibiades son of Cleinias Archeptolemus son of Hippodamus Antiphon son of Lysonides Euryptolemus son of Peisianax Aristoteles son of Timocrates Aristophanes son of Nicophemus Eunomus Conon son of Timotheus Callias son of Hipponicus Thrasybulus son of Thrason Pyrrhander Aristophon son of Aristophanes Leodamas son of Eristratus Demus son of Pyrilampes Aristodemus (of Metapontum but working for Athens) Phrynon Iatrocles son of Pasiphon Ctesiphon Aeschines son of Atrometus Demosthenes son of Demosthenes Demades son of Demeas Thrason Archedemus Phocion son of Phocus

Sparta Sparta Argos Sparta Sparta Pharnabazus Sparta Euagoras of Cyprus Dionysius of Syracuse Persia Sparta Thebes Thebes Thebes Thebes Persia

422/1 ?422/i, 420/19 419/18 411 (under 400) 411 (under 400) 409/8 404/3 394/3> 390/89 394/3 393/2 387/6, 375/4, 372/1 378/7 378/7 ??

Macedon Macedon Macedon Macedon Macedon Thebes Macedon Thebes Thebes Macedon

348/7, 347/6, ?343/2 347/6 347/6 (348/7), 347/6 347/6, 346/5, 338/7 339/8 338/7, 335/4 (twice?)

}}

??

}}

?? 335/4

a ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative. 0 indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics.

would also apparently provide an official means for political groups in one state to contact political groups in other states. Although neither Aeschines nor Philocrates had contracted relationships with Philip before this first embassy as they were to do later on, 23 this was probably the motive behind Theramenes' and Nicias' self-nominations. What is surprising about the trends in ambassadorial appointments in Athens is the small percentage made on the criterion of personal con23

Seech. 10.


95

nections. Table 5.1 summarises all Athenian ambassadors who seem to have been elected on the basis of their connections. Of the one hundred and eighty-one known appointments, thirty-six, or about 20 per cent, are of men for whom specific connections are attested.24 Conversely, not all those with personal connections with a particular state were appointed to all the embassies to that state, nor did it appear to have restricted their appointment on embassies to other states (although of course they might have had friends in more than one state). 25 For example, Mosley draws attention to Callias son of Hipponicus, who did not take part in the peace negotiations with Sparta of 392/1. 26 Demosthenes is another who served on a large number of embassies to the Peloponnese, Byzantium and Macedon, but is only known to have gone to Thebes once, although he was their proxenos.21

Political groups still appear to have been important, but not necessarily because of contacts they may have had in other states.28 In some cases, political groups seem to have had their man appointed so that their point of view could be represented. A notable example is the ambassadors of 372/1 who were sent to Sparta to make peace.29 Callias son of Hipponicus, the first of the three speakers, was the hereditary proxenos of the Spartans, as we have seen before.30 The second speaker, Autocles, made a speech which would not have found favour with the Spartans.31 Callistratus, the third speaker, was looking for a compromise between the two states.32 Consequently, on this particular embassy all the colours of the political spectrum were represented. Ambassadors could be either well-known public figures, such as orators,33 for example Demosthenes, Lycurgus or Aristophon of Azenia; or men who are otherwise unattested, such as Lycaethus who went to Sparta in 371 or Ameiniades son of Philemon, ambassador to Sitalces in 430. Similar trends are evident in the appointment of generals. 24 25 27

29

31

33

T h e s e figures can only be approximate owing to the nature of the evidence. 26 Mosley (1973) 58-9. Mosley (1973) 59. For Demosthenes' particular embassies, see Develin (1989) 319 (347/6: Philip), 323 (346/5: Philip), 327 (344/3: Peloponnese), 329 (343/2: Peloponnese), 334-5 (341/0: Peloponnese and Hellespont, esp. Byzantium), 341 (339/8: Thebes), 344 (338/7), 373 28 (335/4: Alexander). See Mosley (1965) 263-6; (1973) 59-60. Xen., Hell. 6.3.2-17. For a likely emendation of the text, see Tuplin (1977b) 51-6 (which I have accepted in Appendix II: * Athenian Ambassadors'). See also Mosley (1962) 41-6; (1965) 264-5. Compare this embassy with the generals chosen for the expedition to Sicily 30 in 415, each of whom represented a different political group. Xen., Hell 6.3.4. Davies ((1971) 161) makes Autocles a member of a consistently anti-Spartan family, but the revision of Tuplin ((1977b) 51-6), which Rhodes finds 'attractive' ((1994c) 579 n. 55), 32 would eliminate this link. Xen., Hell. 6.3.10-17. This seems particularly true of the mid fourth century.

96


5.2

Appointment of generals

The generals at Athens were also elected by popular vote in the assembly.34 Annual elections were held in the spring and ten generals were elected to the board on the principle of one for each tribe.35 Further votes were held as the need arose to decide which of the ten generals should be sent on a given campaign.36 Although many of the generals were undoubtedly elected for their military prowess or personal influence in Athens,37 there is evidence to suggest that some at least of the generals were elected to the board because of their specialist interest or personal connections in a particular area. The relative frequency of appointments made on this basis, and indeed the general pattern of appointment, is once more of interest for what it can tell us about the Athenian attitude to military commands. The examples below are a selection of those generals who seem to have personal relationships which influenced election in a particular year.38 Some clearly have formal ties of proxenia or xenia; others are more loosely connected, and for some the suggestion that there may be a personal link can only be inferred. 34 35

36

37

38

[Arist.], Ath. Pol. 4 4 . 4 , 6 1 . 1 . Although the election of generals was first instituted o n the basis of one from each tribe in 501/0 ([Arist.], Ath. Pol. 2 2 . 2 , 6 1 . 1 ) and seems to have continued d o w n until at least 469/8 (Plut., Cim. 8.8), a system o f modified tribal elections seems t o have been established at s o m e time before 441/0 after which it appears that two (or perhaps more) m e n could represent one tribe (see Androtion, FGrHist 3 2 4 F 38 where two representatives are listed from tribe v: Pericles and Glaucon), and perhaps as early as 460/59 (Fornara (1971) 1 9 , 4 4 ; for an attempt to place this even earlier (in 479/8), see Bicknell (1972) 101-10). Although Fornara (1971) argues against this intermediate stage, instead hypothesising a change to non-tribal elections in the late 4 6 0 s , modified tribal elections remained the n o r m until at least 357/6 BC (where eight known generals represent seven tribes: too many o n e would suppose for a random spread across the tribes), although it probably changed soon after this (compare 338/7 where there appear to b e four representatives of tribe vi). Pierart (1974) and Hansen ((1991) 235) have suggested electoral procedures that would allow for this kind o f double representation, but there are still problems as I have argued in m y D u r h a m doctoral dissertation ((1994) 126-43), and hope t o publish elsewhere. Since the models suggested b y Pierart and H a n s e n both require s o m e candidates to have been elected as a 'second choice' (a suggestion which is improbable in terms o f the elections m a d e ) , and there were tribes which notoriously did not find candidates, there is a strong case for preselection a m o n g the tribes, which allowed tribes w h o could not produce suitable candidates of their o w n to fill the vacancy from other tribes (cf. Bicknell (1972) 105-6). See, for example, the sequence of elections w h i c h sent Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus

to Sicily in 415 (Th. 6.8.2; IGi3 93 (=ML 78b)).

Although note Nicomachides (Xen., Mem. 3.4) who complains that he was not elected general despite all his battle experience, and yet Antisthenes was elected who had never served as a hoplite or distinguished himself in the cavalry, and knew nothing except how to make money (3.4.1). For a complete list and discussion o f all possible and probable cases in these years, s e e Appendix I: * Athenian Generals'.


5.2.1

97

Phormio son ofAsopius andAsopius son ofPhormio

Phormio is first known to have served as a general in 440/39. 39 At some time probably in the 430s, the Ambraciots expelled the Amphilochians from Amphilochian Argos.40 Thucydides says that the Amphilochians put themselves into the hands of the Acarnanians, and both then appealed to the Athenians for help, who responded by sending their general Phormio and thirty ships. It was after this that the alliance between Athens and Acarnania began,41 and apparently an ongoing relationship between Acarnania and Phormio himself. At the end of the summer of 431 there was once again trouble in this region, when the Ambraciots and as many of the barbarians as they could raise attacked Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia.42 In the winter of 430 the Athenians sent Phormio to Naupactus to keep watch in case anyone sailed in or out of Corinth or the Crisaean Gulf.43 It would appear from the way that Thucydides uses the one event - that is, the trouble in Amphilochian Argos - as the backdrop for the other Phormio's despatch to Naupactus - that one is expected to infer their causal relationship. Because Phormio has had positive dealings previously with the region, he is sent there again as one who, at the least, has influence with the people there.44 Again in the following summer, when the Ambraciots and Chaonians with the help of the Spartans made advances against Acarnania, the Acarnanians appealed to Phormio to come to their aid, though he refused not unreasonably to leave Naupactus unguarded.45 Yet in that winter, after the Spartan fleet had dispersed, Phormio did then make a largely successful campaign in Acarnania before returning in the spring to Athens.46 Even after Phormio himself was unavailable, either through death or perhaps through disqualification for election, the connection between the Acarnanians and the family of Phormio continued. In the following summer, when the Acarnanians requested that 'either a son or kinsman' 39 41

43

45

40 Th.1.117.2. Th. 2.68.6-8. The date of the expedition and alliance is controversial. Hammond ((1967) 496-7) places them before Pericles' campaign of the 450s, and Gomme also (HCr2.4i6) favours a date in the 450s or 440s. Likewise, Salmon ((1984) 422-3), who sees the alliance as an attempt by Athens to apply pressure to Corinth, would date it between 454 and 446. Rhodes ((1988) 248), however, thinks it should be placed 'a few years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War'. Hornblower ((1991-6) 1.353-4) sees the episode as Relevant to the build-up of tension between Corinth and Athens' and thinks a date in the early 430s best 42 Th. 2.68.1. (see also (1991) 88-9), as does Lewis ((1992a) 145 n.no). Th. 2.69.1. Phormio was also general in 432/1 and served at Poteidaea (Th. 1.64.2; cf. 44 2.29.6,58.2; 3.17.4; Diod. 12.37.1; Isoc. 16.29). See also Jacoby Supp. 1131. 46 Th.2.8i.i;cf.8o.i Th. 2.102.1,103.1.

98


of Phormio be sent to them, the Athenians despatched his son, Asopius, as general in command of thirty ships.47 What is more, in about 400, the Athenians passed a decree reaffirming Athenian citizenship for Phormio the Acarnanian which he had inherited from his grandfather.48 Xenia relationships were often marked by giving the name of one's xenos to one's son, 49 so it seems reasonable to infer that Phormio, the Athenian, formed a xenia relationship with an Acarnanian, probably at the time the alliance was made. It would appear then there was a strong personal tie between Phormio the Athenian general and an Acarnanian family, making him a suitable choice for an appointment to this area. 5.2.2

Hagnon son ofNicias

Hagnon son ofNicias of Steiria was also one of the generals in Samos in 440/39, where he is first known to have served as general with Phormio.50 In 437/6 Hagnon was sent to Thrace as founder of Amphipolis, establishing a personal connection with the city which was maintained until Amphipolis was lost in 424. 51 Then in 431/0 Hagnon was sent with Cleopompus son of Cleinias to lay siege to Poteidaea, being, as Hornblower remarks, 'something of a northern expert'.52 This expedition began in the summer of 430, and Hagnon returned with the fleet about forty days later in the new archon-year of 430/29 after the start of the new board for that year, and presumably remained in office.53 In 429 Hagnon was again to be found in Thrace with Sitalces, acting as leader (hegemori) probably of the Athenian troops which were expected.54 Hagnon's last 47

49 50

51 53

54

Th. 3.7.1; see also Hornblower (1991-6) 1.387-8. Asopius was killed on this campaign 48 (Th. 3.7.4). IG ii2 237.15-21 (=Tod 178); see Osborne (1981-3) 344O n this, see H e r m a n (1987) 1 9 - 2 1 . T h . 1.117.2; see Fornara (1971) 4 9 - 5 0 ; Develin (1989) 91. T h e demotic is inferred from that of his son Theramenes: see also Pesely (1989) 191-209. 52 T h . 4.102.3, cf. 5.11.1. T h . 2.58.1; Hornblower (1991-6) 1.329. Th. 2.58.3; see also HCT2.164; Fornara (1971) 54-5; Develin (1989) 119. For discussion of the year of office for the generals, see Pritchett (1940) 469-74, contra Mayor (1939) 45-64. T h . 2 . 9 5 . 3 . 1 accept Hagnon's generalship in this year. Although T h u c y d i d e s describes h i m as hegemon (leader) rather than using the technical term strategos (general), it is not an unreasonable guess that, because of his specialist knowledge and connection with the area, h e had b e e n sent ahead o f the troops b y the assembly with the Athenian ambassadors to help with their negotiations and was later to lead the army (although admittedly it w a s P h o r m i o w h o h a d previously dealt with Sitalces ( T h . 2.29.6). A t this time, however, P h o r m i o was engaged at N a u p a c t u s ( T h . 2 . 1 0 2 - 3 ) , his specialist area). T h e y had b e e n appointed b y the Athenians for the very purpose o f joining the expedition against Perdiccas, and so it is likely that H a g n o n was sent as general also. There is little t o suggest, as H a m m o n d supposes, that Sitalces may have 'intended t o impose H a g n o n as c o m m a n d e r o n the as yet unassigned Athenian force, which the Athenian Assembly was


99

known involvement in international affairs was when he appears as one of the signatories to the Peace of Nicias in 422/1. 55 Hagnon's international career centred on Thrace. Having a strong connection with the Thraceward parts as the founder of Amphipolis (although we do not know whether the connection preceded this), he was an obvious choice as a general to work in this region, where he was prominent from 431 to 429. 5.2.3

Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes

Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna was probably first appointed general in 427/6. 56 Late in the archon-year of 427/6 Demosthenes and Procles were sent on an expedition around the Peloponnese.57 Early in the new archon-year of 426/5, their first action was to ambush and to destroy a Leucadian garrison in Ellomenus, before marching on Leucas with the help of all the Acarnanians (except Oeniadae), and the Zacynthians, Cephallenians and Corcyraeans.58 The Acarnanians wished to wall in the city, but Demosthenes was persuaded instead by the Messenians of Naupactus to attack the Aetolians.59 Although Demosthenes' main reason for being won over to the Messenian plan was perhaps that this would provide him with a route to Boeotia, he was also persuaded by the favour (charts) this would be for the Messenians.60 By acceding to their wishes, albeit pleasing to himself, and so performing a charts for the Messenians, Demosthenes was laying the building blocks for a relationship with them which was to bring him returns later on. However, when Demosthenes sailed on to Sollium and made his plans known to the Acarnanians, in a fit of petulance they remained behind because he had refused to gratify them.61 In the end the attempt on Aetolia was disastrous, and Demosthenes remained at

56

58

60

proposing to vote no doubt with its own chosen generals for the campaign' (Hammond (1969) 120 (=(1973) 360)). Thucydides makes it clear that, at the time Hagnon and the ambassadors were in Thrace, the Athenians fully intended to send a fleet and troops as well (Th. 2.95.3), so presumably they had appointed Hagnon to lead them, although in the end the Athenians lost confidence in Sitalces and did not send them (Th. 2.101.1). 55 See also HCT2.241. See also Andrewes and Lewis (1957) 177-80. There are two possibilities. Since the spring elections for the year 426/5 had already taken place, either he was a regularly elected general for the year 427/6 and had already been elected for the year 426/5, so had been sent out on a campaign late in the year in the knowledge that it would continue into the next year, or he was elected in the spring of 426/5 and sent out early as one of the incoming generals on a campaign that would con57 tinue into the new year. Th. 3.91.1. Th. 3.94.1. Demosthenes was definitely a general in this year: see Lewis (1961) 119-20; 59 Rhodes (1988) 255 contra Fornara (1971) 57-8; Develin (1989) 127. Th. 3.94.2-3. Th. 3.95.1. Demosthenes' motives have been much discussed: see most recently Rhodes 61 (1988)252. Th. 3.95.1-2.

ioo


Naupactus rather than go home, since, Thucydides says, he was afraid of the Athenians because of what had happened.62 It is probable that he was deposed before the end of the year 426/5, although he remained at Naupactus and called on Acarnanian troops when he heard of the impending attack of the Spartans.63 The Acarnanians came reluctantly, and the Spartans withdrew. When in the same winter the Ambraciots made an attack on Amphilochian Argos, the Acarnanians called on Demosthenes to be the leader of the allied Acarnanian and Amphilochian army, as well as summoning the two Athenian generals who happened to be off the coast of the Peloponnese.64 Demosthenes arrived - significantly - with two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen.65 Despite the unpromising beginnings, it would seem from later events that this was also the start of a continuing relationship between Demosthenes and the Acarnanians. For when in 424/3 Demosthenes was general once more in Naupactus, engaged in negotiations for revolution in Boeotia, he recruited troops from among the Acarnanians and other allies there.66 Demosthenes also developed a strong Messenian connection. At the beginning of the summer of 425, after his return from Acarnania, although now a private citizen (idiotes), Demosthenes was given the use at his discretion of the forty ships which were sent to Sicily with the elected generals Eurymedon and Sophocles.67 Thucydides writes that as they were sailing about Laconia on the way to Corcyra, Demosthenes requested that they put in at Pylos.68 The two generals did not want to, although they were finally forced to do this because of a storm. Later, when Demosthenes wished to fortify the place (according to Thucydides this was the reason he had sailed with them), Eurymedon and Sophocles were again reluctant, as they argued there were other headlands along the Peloponnesian coast which he could fortify if he wished to put the city to the expense.69 As far as Demosthenes was concerned, this place seemed better than any other to him not only because there was a harbour but also because it was the ancient home of the Messenians which they regarded as their fatherland.70 Later, after Pylos was fortified, other Messenians who happened to be present were brought in as hoplites.71 62 63

65 69

70

Th. 3.96.1-98.5. Th. 3.102.3-7. For Demosthenes' deposition, see Th. 4.2.4: Demosthenes is described as idiotes though it is still in the archon-year 426/5; see Rhodes (1988) 255; Lewis (1961) 64 119-20; contra HCT3.437-8; Fornara (1971) 57. Th. 3.105.3,107.2. 66 67 68 Th.3.107.1. Th. 4.76.1-2,77. Th. 4.2. Th. 4.3.1-3. N o t e , however, that T h u c y d i d e s may have exaggerated the reluctance of E u r y m e d o n and Sophocles t o make the success at Pylos appear more accidental than it actually was. 71 Th. 4.3.3,41.2. Th. 4.9.1; see also 4.41.2.


101

Demosthenes was able to exploit his earlier favour for them, and it seems established a reciprocal relationship with the Messenians. In addition, Thucydides makes it plain that Demosthenes intended to fortify Pylos when he left Athens, and states twice that this place was once part of Messenia.72 By choosing Pylos from among other places which would be equal in terms of their other advantages, as Sophocles and Eurymedon pointed out, Demosthenes chose the place which would gratify the Messenians and ensure their assistance. All things considered, it is not surprising that we find Demosthenes named as one of the generals involved in the Pylos campaign in the next archon-year of 425/4. 73 Demosthenes was general again in 414, when he went once more to Acarnania on his way to Sicily, taking up Cephallenian and Zacynthian hoplites and sending for the Messenians from Naupactus.74 What is more, in the catalogue of Athenian allies at Syracuse, Thucydides writes that some of the Acarnanians came for pay, but the majority were allies because of their philia for Demosthenes and goodwill (eunoia) for the Athenians.75 The pattern of Demosthenes' early years as general provides us with some very interesting insights. Demosthenes not only appears to have made fiill use of the personal relationships he had to levy troops, but also seems to have actively sought and established these connections of his own volition, and then used them to facilitate his practical needs. What is particularly significant, however, is the fact that the Athenian assembly seem to have recognised his speciality in the north-west and continued to appoint him to this command. This is even more to the point when we consider that Demosthenes' antecedents are unknown, and he appears not to have come from a family of noble birth or great wealth.76 Unlike his colleague Alcibiades he was not provided with a natural path into public life, but was forced to make his own way. Demosthenes' use of the traditional means of exploiting personal relationships in order to launch his public career indicates not only that personal connections were a legitimate means to public office (so much so that if one did not have them, one made them), but also that they were approved of by the Athenian assembly. 5.2.4

Alcibiades son of Cleinias

Alcibiades had Argive xenoi77 and his early magisterial career centred upon Argos. In 420 he was instrumental in forming an alliance 72 73

77

Th. 4.3.2,3. On the possible circumstances of his re-election in this year, see HCT3. 437-8, 470-1; 74 75 76 Lewis (1961) 120. Th. 7.31.2. Th. 7.57.10. Davies (1971) 112-13. Th. 6.61.3. See also ch. 3.

102


between Athens and Argos, and was subsequently elected to the board of generals for 420/19. 78 In 419/183 as a regularly elected general and in concert with the Argives, he marched into the Peloponnese. 79 Later in the same year he was sent to help the Argives at Epidaurus.80 In 418/17 he was sent with the Athenian forces to Mantineia to help the Argives, perhaps as a general, but certainly as ambassador.81 And when in this year Lichas the Spartan proxenos of the Argives arrived in Argos with proposals for peace, Thucydides says that he was hindered by the presence of Alcibiades. 82 In 417/16, after an attempted coup in Argos, the Athenians sent Alcibiades to Argos with twenty ships to take into custody as many of the Argives as still seemed to be suspicious and looking to the interests of Sparta, and in 415 Thucydides says that the Argives and Mantineians took part in the war against Sicily because of Alcibiades. 83 Interestingly, in 411, after Alcibiades had been recalled to Samos, Argives came to the island to offer their support to the democracy, although Alcibiades simply thanked them and sent them away.84 Although Alcibiades' birth and parentage predisposed him for a public life, he still needed to thrust himself into public attention, and he did this by championing the Argive cause in Athens.85 The popularity of the Argive alliance of 420/19 ensured him his first election to the board of generals, and thereafter he seems to have set himself up as the Argive specialist in Athens.

5.2.5

Iphicrates son of Timotheus86

Perhaps there is little that can be said conclusively about Iphicrates, but the evidence suggests that his election in the 380s and the mid 360s, and his subsequent despatch to the north (although these were by no means the only commands he held in his long career), may be attributed to his connections with the northern kings. Iphicrates' origins may have been humble, as his father is known in the tradition as a cobbler.87 Despite this, he inherited or more probably developed on his own account connections with the royal families of the 78 79

83 85 87

Plut., Me. 10.9; see Th. 5.43.1-47.12, esp. 43.2; for chronology, see HCT4.69. 80 81 T h . 5.52.2. T h . 5.53. T h . 5.61.2; perhaps also to b e restored in IG i 3 370.17 82 (=ML 77). See also Appendix I: 'Athenian Generals'. Th. 5.76.3. 84 417/16: Th. 5.84.1; Argives and Mantineians at Sicily: Th. 6.29.3. Th. 8.86.9. 86 See also ch. 3. On Iphicrates' relations with the Thracians, see also ch. 7. Plut., Mor. i86f; Suidas s.v. Iphicrates (1 772); Davies (1971) 248; cf. Arist., Rhet. 1367^7-18; Plut., Afor. 187b.


103

north, becoming the adopted son of Amyntas the Macedonian king, and marrying the daughter or sister of Cotys, one of the kings of Thrace in the 380s. 88 Iphicrates5 first-known command (although possibly not as general), probably from 393 until 390, was at Corinth where he was in charge of mercenary forces.89 In 389 the Athenians sent Iphicrates to the Chersonese against the Spartan Nauarch Anaxibius, and Iphicrates eventually ambushed him at Abydus.90 It may well have been desirable to have someone in this sensitive region with the right kind of connections, and in fact Iphicrates seems to have lent assistance to the Thracian Seuthes II while in the area.91 From 368 to 365, Iphicrates again served in the north, this time against Amphipolis.92 Once again he assisted in the local monarchic disputes, driving out Pausanias the pretender to the Macedonian throne at the request of Eurydice, the wife of the dead king Amyntas.93 When the Athenians replaced him with Timotheus for the Amphipolitan campaign, Iphicrates retired to Cotys and the Thracian court, where he gave Cotys his help against the Athenians.94 It is not possible to prove that Iphicrates was elected to the board of generals because of these northern connections, yet his associations with these northern kingdoms, even if they were formed with his own interests rather than with the interests of Athens in mind, 95 may still have seemed convenient to his fellow countrymen at a time when war was clearly brewing in these northern parts. 88

89

Adoption by Amyntas: Aeschin. 2.28; marriage to daughter or sister of Cotys: Dem. 23.129; Anaxandrides ap. Athen. 4.i3ia-f; Nepos, Iph. 23.4. On the date, see Davies (1971) 249. Rehdantz ((1845) 29) suggests that Iphicrates had a family connection with Thrace, and both Parke ((1933) 52) and Davies ((1971) 249) tentatively support this. Yet there is no reason to suppose that Iphicrates did not form these relationships on his own initiative. He was not the only general of a non-aristocratic background in the fourth century: Chares son of Theochares is probably also a self-made man who created his own destiny. In the fifth century, Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes seems to be another who established his credentials by launching his career from the north-west; cf. above. X e n . , Hell. 4.4.9; D i o d . 14.86.3. S e e Appendix I: 'Athenian Generals'. T h e s e peltasts may have b e e n recruited in Thrace b y C o n o n : Parke (1933) 5 0 - 1 ; see also N e p o s , Iph.

1.3-4. 90 92

91 X e n . , Hell. 4.8.33-9. N e p o s , Iph. 2.1; cf. ch. 7. D e m . 23.149; Aeschin. 2.27; N e p o s , Iph. 3.2. Aeschines implies h e was elected specif-

ically for this campaign (ixcipOTOvrjaav AOrjvaloi arpar-qyov e-n AînoXiv

94 95

fyiKpar-qv),

although h e is probably referring to the votes which appointed the m e m b e r s of the annual 93 board of generals t o specific c o m m a n d s . Aeschin. 2 . 2 6 - 9 . D e m . 2 3 . 1 3 0 , 1 4 9 ; see also Parke (1933) 127. Iphicrates went s o far as t o fight with Cotys, his ?father/brother-in-law, against the Athenians ( D e m . 23.130), in an ultimately misguided and ill-judged loyalty t o his royal relation.

104


5.2.6

Charidemus son ofPhiloxenus

Charidemus was a Euboean from Oreus, and was granted Athenian citizenship (probably in 357/6) as a return favour to the Thracian king, Cersobleptes, after the conclusion of the peace with Chares.96 Charidemus served as an Athenian general in 351, perhaps continuing into 350, and in 349/8.97 His early career was chequered, and shows more his propensity for looking to his own survival than any loyalty to a king or country. He had served as a mercenary commander in the north, first with Iphicrates at Amphipolis, then with Cotys against the Athenians, before joining Timotheus at Amphipolis again.98 After he had been discharged from Timotheus' service, he hired himself and his troops out to Memnon and Mentor, the sons-in-law of Artabazus, who were gathering troops to release their father-in-law, but finding the cities of Scepsis, Cebren and Ilium unguarded he took them.99 When Artabazus was released, he collected an army and came against Charidemus, who then turned to the Athenians and promised in a letter that he would hand over the Chersonese to them if they came to his aid. Yet when Artabazus unexpectedly let Charidemus go, he crossed to the Chersonese and once more entered the service of Cotys and laid siege to the last remaining Athenian strongholds in the Chersonese. On Cotys' death, Charidemus remained in the service of Cersobleptes, married his sister, and continued to make war on the Athenians until peace was at last successfully negotiated in 357.10° Charidemus was undoubtedly a man with strong northern connections, although rather dubious loyalties. In 351 the Athenians sent him to Thrace to meet the expected attack of Philip, although the expedition was abandoned when news came that Philip was either ill or dead.101 Again in spring 348 when the Chalcidians sent to Athens for help, Philochorus says they despatched Charidemus, their general in the Hellespont.102 It is likely that he won election and the Hellespont command through his northern expertise. Table 5.2 gives a list of all generals who seem to have been elected on the basis of connections. 96

97

98

99 100 101

D e m . 23.213; Parke (1933) 132; Davies (1971) 571; s e e also Appendix I: A t h e n i a n Generals'. O n the treaty, see D e m . 2 3 . 1 6 7 - 7 6 . See Develin (1989) 3 1 0 , 3 1 2 - 1 3 . N o t e , however, that Develin's conjectured generalship in 361 is unlikely to b e correct; see Appendix I: * Athenian Generals'. With Iphicrates: D e m . 23.149; with Cotys: D e m . 23.131-2. H e w a s captured b y T i m o t h e u s o n his way from Cardia t o Amphipolis t o help t h e m against the Athenians. T i m o t h e u s in his extreme n e e d , w e are told, took h i m into his service ( D e m . 23.150). Dem. 23.154-8. Dem. 23.129,163-7,169-74; IO ii2 126 (=Tod 151); see also Parke (1933) 130-2. 102 Dem. 3.5. Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 50.


105

Table 5.2. Athenian generals with relevant connections (For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix I) a

General

Connection

PDiotimus son of Strombichus Hagnon son of Nicias Phormio son of Asopius Asopius son of Phormio Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes

Corcyra/southern Italy Thrace/Amphipolis Acarnania/Naupactus Acarnania Acarnania/Messenians

Eurymedon son of Thucles

Corcyra

PPythodorus son of Isolochus Lamachus son of Xenophanes Thucydides son of Olorus Alcibiades son of Cleinias PLaches son of Melanopus ??Nicias son of Niceratus Dieitrephes son of Nicostratus Conon son of Timotheus Thrasybulus son of Lycus Phanosthenes (from Andros, but naturalised Athenian) Tydeus son of Lamachus Iphicrates son of Timotheus

Sicily/southern Italy Black Sea area Thrace Argos Sparta Syracuse Thrace Naupactus/Acarnania Thrace

Timotheus son of Conon

Corcyra/Acarnania/satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia Ceos Thrace Byzantium

Aristophon son of Aristophanes Charidemus son of Philoxenus Phocion son of Phocus

Andros Chios Thrace

Years of relevant appointment 433/2 431/0,430/29, 429/8 430/29,429/8 428/7 (427/6), 426/5, 425/4, 4I4/I3 (427/6), 426/5, 425/4, 4I4/I3 426/5 425/4, 424/3 424/3 420/19, 419/18, 417/16 418/17 415/14, 4i4/i3> 413/12 (414/3), 411 (under 400) (414/13), 411 (under 5000) (410/9), 409/8, 408/7 407/6 405/4 389/8, 388/7, 367/6, 366/5, 365/4 375/4, 374/3, 367/6, 365/4 363/2 351/0,350/49,349/8 340/39

a

? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative. 0 indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics.

Three broad points are worth discussing about these appointments: I. Generals could be elected because of their personal connections. This much should now be obvious, but we cannot allow this to stand without some qualifications. Although the ethos of personal friendships abroad developed out of aristocratic networks of xenia, in the fifth and fourth centuries non-aristocrats, such as Demosthenes and Iphicrates, and even naturalised citizens, such as Charidemus, were able to develop personal connections abroad and use them as a means of acquiring high office. This implies that the demos was willing at least to some extent to

106


work through connections of this kind, and that these connections were not perceived to be by their nature opposed to the interests of the demos. This is of a piece with the patterns in political activity in Athens we discussed in chapter three, that is that the Athenians were happy to make use of such relationships as long as this was done through official channels. II. Nevertheless, not all or even most appointments to military commands were made on this basis. Out of three hundred and seventy-nine individual attested appointments in the years of this study, only fortythree, about I I per cent, show any sign of having been made on the basis of personal connections.103 Of course, other cases may have been affected by personal connections of which no evidence survives - but the same can be said of Sparta, where the proportion of appointments which appear to have been affected by personal connections is higher.104 Although personal connections are influential in the election of some generals - and this must be taken into account - this is obviously not the only criterion for selection. Obviously men with military prowess, established military careers, personal influence and charisma, men such as Pericles, Alcibiades, Iphicrates or Chares, secured election more readily than those without. Yet there also seems to be an element of the 'democratic spirit' in each man having his turn in the board of generals. Fifty-eight out of the ninety-five generals attested during the years of the Peloponnesian War (excluding 411) as far as we know served on the board only once. Fourteen of these were prevented from serving a second time either through death, exile, or some other misfortune. Only fifteen men are known to have served on the board for four years or more, of whom twelve were eventually killed or otherwise prevented from serving on the board again. So most known generals served for fewer than four years, the bulk for only one year, and of these the majority are not known to have died in battle. Consequently, there were a large number of men who served as general without apparently developing their military careers further. Like the archons and petty magistrates chosen by sortition, are they simply taking their turn? In line with this, there also seems to have been a trend similar to that observed among ambassadors of trying to appoint across the range of political opinion, or at least the political groups tried to make sure that they got their man on the board. This seems to be particularly true of important and controversial campaigns, such as the expedition to Sicily in4i5. 1 0 5 103

105

There is no point in calculating more precisely when the evidence is so far from com104 plete. Seech.4. Cf. the entry for Laches in Appendix I: 'Athenian Generals' under 418/17.


107

III. Setting aside the problematic question of the election procedure,106 we also need to ask how such connections could influence the spring election when further elections were needed to appoint to specific commands. Looking at the places where these 'special' generals were sent, Corcyra/'the west', Acarnania/Naupactus, and Thrace figure as appointments which are given to those with connections in these areas. This suggests three things: firstly that there was a degree of specialisation in appointments as early as the fifth century; secondly that there seem to have been recognised 'theatres of war'; and thirdly that these 'theatres' had special requirements which made it necessary for the Athenians to deal with them through such specialists. Contrary to the general opinion that special competencies were only regularly given to particular generals in the latter part of the fourth century, Fornara argues that it is after the defeat at Syracuse and the revolution in 411 that instances occur of'the apportionment of particular commands to certain generals', and cites as examples of this movement the practice of assigning particular generals to Naupactus and Thrace.107 He writes: 'The oligarchic movement probably had something to do with the new system of apportionment apparently adopted, for it is a notable step away from the thoroughly democratic procedure of election of generals without regard to prospective duties.'108 Two comments should be made in response to Fornara's assessment. Firstly, the apportionment of commands to Thrace and the north-west demonstrably pre-dates the disaster in Sicily. For example, Phormio held the command at Naupactus in 430/29 and 429/8 and was succeeded in his command in 428/7 by his son Asopius. Eurymedon son of Thucles served on campaigns to Corcyra and Sicily in 427/6, 426/5, 425/4, 414/13 and 413/12. Hagnon was active in Thrace in 431/0, 430/29 and 429/8, Thucydides son of Olorus in 424/3, and Dieitrephes son of Nicostratus in 414/13 and 411. What is more, all these men appear to have been elected to these commands because of their personal connections with the area. But this specialisation by region is not quite the same thing as the specialisation of functions of Athenaion Politeia 61.1. 109 The emphasis is on a different aspect of the command. In the Athenaion Politeia it is the function of the office which is highlighted and there is a specific post to be filled each year. In these cases not only is the link with a particular region, but also no one place regularly had to have a constitutionally appointed general assigned to it. 106 109

107 108 See n. 35 above. Fornara (1971) 79-80. Fornara (1971) 80. Fornara sees these long-term commands to Thrace and Naupactus as the forerunner of av r commands such as k-nd TTJV xP > f° example ((1971) 79-80). On [Arist.], Ath. Pol. 61.i, see Rhodes (1993) 678-9.

108


If there is going to be regional specialisation, however, there must also have been an awareness of a number of theatres of war which constantly required specialist attention. This is less surprising when we consider where these apparent theatres were. Athens had had an interest in the west since at least the 440s.110 Once the Corcyraeans re-entered the field in 432 they were also obviously a catch worth preserving, and their rather volatile political situation made it more important to keep someone on hand who had experience in dealing with them. Naupactus was also a key point for controlling the Corinthian Gulf and the Athenians had tried various measures since at least 456 to keep the city secure.111 As we have already noted, there seems to have been a general regularly posted at Naupactus to watch the Corinthian Gulf from at least 430. Thrace and the north was another crucial area for the Athenians for their mining and timber interests, and their ongoing preoccupation with the loss of Amphipolis bears witness to the importance the Athenians placed on the region.112 All of these regions would have been on the Athenian agenda as requiring special attention annually. Consequently it is not unreasonable to suppose that various individuals used specialisms in these areas as part of their election platform before the annual spring elections. This suggests the third point: that it was easier to deal with states and poleis on thefringesof the Greek world by means of personal connections. The Acarnanians5 insistence on Phormio or his descendant seems to imply this, and Thucydides' appointment to Thrace at least makes sense in these terms. As will be seen in later chapters, the Athenians did not always deal with these outlying communities as successfully as they might have done, but they did attempt to deal with societies who were not institutionalised in the same way as they were by personal rather than institutional means. 5.3

Magisterial appointments and friendship in Athens and Sparta

As we have seen, appointment to a whole range of magisterial appointments could be affected by one's foreign friendships. Men could be selected because of their personal connections not only as foreign diplomats, but also as military commanders. The continual selection of the 110

111

112

On the colonisation of Thurii, see Diod. 12.9.2-10.7; Plut., Per. 11.5; see also Hornblower (1991) 41,57. The activities of Tolmides: Th. 1.108.5; the Athenians settled the Messenians from Ithome there probably in 455: Th. 1.103.3 ( o n the chronology, see Reece (1962)). See esp. chs. 7 and 8.


109

same men can also be explained on this basis, as men with connections with another state were often sent to that state more than once. This is not to say that all men with connections undertook magistracies directly related to their connections, or that these were the only magistracies they performed. Alcibiades did not take part in the negotiations with Sparta in 421, despite the lapsed proxenia which he wanted to renew.113 The only thing we know about Boeotius the Spartan, whose name clearly implies Boeotian links, is that he served on an embassy to Persia.114 But we do not know what other embassies he may or may not have served on, such is the nature of the evidence. Not all those with connections used them, nor were all those with connections used. Indeed, it is impossible to know how many men did have private connections: again, the evidence simply fails us. What we can say is that there was a predisposition, more marked in Sparta than in Athens, to select men because of their connections, and this points again to the meshing of the public and the private in the Greek world. Furthermore, a comparison of the relative percentages of magisterial appointments on this basis in Athens and Sparta is very interesting. We do not know all the men who were appointed to magistracies in this period, nor do we know all the foreign connections, but the difference between Athens and Sparta is so striking that it is unlikely to be due to the chance of available evidence. In Athenian military appointments, in about 11 per cent of elections overseas connections are likely to have played a part, whereas almost a fifth of the Spartan harmosts and archons (laying aside the Nauarchs) were influenced by this criterion. Among the ambassadors, a magistracy where one would expect to find relatively high percentages, in 18 per cent of elections of Athenian ambassadors as opposed to the 34 per cent of Spartan ambassadors overseas connections are likely to have been a contributing factor. The difference in the proportions of foreign friendships affecting foreign posts highlights some more significant points about the styles of political activity in Athens and Sparta, and the ethos which underpinned them. Spartan political activity was clearly conducted within the framework of personal connections, and this is not inconsistent with an oligarchy of elites. It was easier to take account of relevant connections when appointments were made ad hoc, as was the case with Sparta's non-royal commanders, than when there was a regular annual election, as with the Athenians' generals. The same kind of personal associations which 113 114

Th. 5.43.2. Xen., Hell. 1.4.2; cf. libys, the brother of Lysander, whose name implies Libyan connections, is only known as the Nauarch of 403 (Xen., Hell. 2.4.28).

no


secured the acquittal of Sphodrias in 378 115 could also procure the election of magistrates. Personal friendships with men in other states, such as xenia and proxenia, form part of this same pattern, and so it is not surprising that these were also exploited, and one finds the proxenos of a particular state serving as the magistrate to that state, or xenoi in different states acting as the media of interstate diplomacy. In Athens, the case is different. Athens was a democracy, and as such had supposedly undermined the power of the aristocracy. Although 'suitable' appointments seem to have been made far less often in Athens than in Sparta - although there must have been many Athenians with overseas connections after half a century of the Delian League - such appointments were sometimes made, and it is consistent with the trends discussed in chapter three that there were personal relationships exploited officially in this way. The Athenians would know to some extent where they were likely to need generals in the coming year, so relevant connections could be taken into account, not only in giving particular postings to men already elected as generals, but also in the annual elections themselves, and in the ad hoc appointment of ambassadors. It would seem that the demos was willing to work to a limited extent through the aristocratic ethos of friendships and networks of friends, to harness its potential for their own ends, rather than to work against it. The age of the aristocrat may have been passing away, but it had not yet outlived its usefulness to the Athenian demos. 115

Xen.,Hell. 5.4.25-33; Diod. 15.29.5-6; Vlut., Ages. 25.1-10.

Persia and the Greeks

Then the king made Daniel a great man, and gave him many great gifts, and made him ruler over the whole province of Babylon, and chief of the governors over all the wise men of Babylon. Daniel 2.48

Up to this point, we have concentrated mainly on Greek relations with other Greeks, but, despite their deeply entrenched insularity, the Greeks did live in a world peopled by non-Greeks as well, and were often brought face to face with cultures with quite different cultural assumptions from their own.1 This often complicated political relations as the Greeks were forced to grapple, with limited success, with new kinds of relations based as they were on different types of exchange, and different exchange repertoires from their own. In this chapter we shall look specifically at relations between Greeks and Persians, to consider why they were successful when they were, but more particularly why they so often failed, and the role of different repertoires of exchange in contributing to this failure. 6.1

Persian gift-giving

Diplomatic activity between Greece and Persia in the hundred or so years we are considering was dominated by the interaction of individuals, and not just any individuals, but men who were in a personal relationship with each other. Persia was a monarchy in which the King, although not divine, ranked far above his subjects.2 The one area on which the Greeks most impinged was court life, whether in the courts of the satraps or of the Great King himself. Although gift-giving and reciprocity may have had little real impact outside these small circles,3 life in these Persian 1

2

3

For a survey of Greek-Iranian contacts and cross-cultural influence, see Momigliano (1971)123-50. He was the instrument of god, rather than god himself (e.g., Kent (1953) DB I §6.1.12-26, DB 11 §20.2.1-5,18-29; cf. Kuhrt (1995) 2.676-7). Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1989) 140-1. Ill

H2


courts was governed to a significant degree by the giving and receiving of gifts. However, the patterns and modes of exchange were not always the same as those the Greeks expected, or were underpinned by different assumptions, and this often inevitably led to disappointment and anger, as well as accusations of unscrupulousness and treachery. Although the evidence is not as abundant as it is for exchange among the Greeks and much of what we have has been filtered through Greek sources and distorted by Greek preconceptions, Persian gift-giving is reasonably well documented.4 A number of Greek writers refer to gifts given by the King to others.5 Gifts flowed out from the King on special occasions and at feasts, such as the King's birthday, or on his accession, and gifts were a normal part of the hospitality offered to ambassadors.6 Careful account was also taken of those who performed good deeds, and lists of benefactors were kept so that each could be rewarded according to his due.7 There was probably a ranking of benefactions, and gifts were given accordingly by the King.8 In return the King received counter-gifts and tribute, and the Persepolis relief depicts representatives of the subject nations bringing gifts to the King.9 He also secured the loyalty of his subjects and their military support, while those who gave gifts to the King, whether or not they 4

5

6

7

8

9

See esp. Momigliano (1971) 133-7. The Cyropaedia of Xenophon in particular needs to be treated with great caution. Although Xenophon has apparently observed many of the elements of Persian gift-giving, his interpretation of these phenomena is disturbingly Greek. On the Greek 'invention' of the barbarian as a means of self-definition, and die Persian in particular, see Hall (1989). For difficulties in using the Old Testament book of Esther as evidence for court life in the Achaemenid period, see Lewis (1977) 15. There are many examples of this. For a selection: Hdt. 7.26.2, 106.1, 116, 8.10.3, 120, 9.110.2; Ctesias,FGr//wt688 F 15.49; Th. 2.97.4; Strabo 15.3.17; Plut., ^4r&uc. 22.i-2;cf. Briant (1987b) 5-6. For the kinds of gifts that could be given by the King, see Knauth with Nadjmabadi (1975) 189-95. King's birthday: Hdt. 9.110.2; cf. Plato, Ale. 121c; accession: Plut., Artax. 26.5; Ctesias, FGrHist 688 F 15.49; gifts to ambassadors: see, for example, Timagoras the Athenian ambassador: Plut., Artax. 22.9-12; Pel. 30.9-12; see also Perlman (1976) 223-33; Lewis (1989) 227-35. On the tukta, see esp. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 147-50. Hdt. 3.139-41, 154.1, 160.1-2, 6.30.1, 8.85.3, 90-4; Th. 1.129.3; s e e ako SancisiWeerdenburg (1980)157-8. Plut., Pelop. 30.7; Diod. 17.14.2; Hdt. 3.160.2, 7.106.1; see Lewis (1989) 228; Knauth with Nadjmabadi (1975). Hdt. 3.89-97 distinguishes tribute in cash levied by Darius from gifts given before Darius and by peoples outside the satrapies; but the Persepolis reliefs show gifts in kind continuing to be brought: see esp. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1989) 129-30. Cf. Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 263; Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 149-50 (who discusses the difficulties of distinguishing between 'gifts' and 'tribute'); Lewis (1989) 227-8. As Sancisi-Weerdenburg points out, these gifts were not meant to represent the different peoples, as has sometimes been thought, but were prestige goods which had a sociopolitical value apart from their economic value ((1989) 136-8); see also Root (1979) 227-9. Note that not all gifts received by the King were thought to be of high enough value: Hdt. 3.13.4.


113

received gifts directly from his hand themselves, benefited from the law and order he maintained.10 The King stood at the centre of this matrix of gift and counter-gift, and the function of the gifts was to fix the King in his position of regal superiority.11 As Sancisi-Weerdenburg points out, the man who can give away the most valuable gift is the most powerful man in the community, and the King always took care to pay his own debts and to give a gift in return that was of greater value than the gift given, thus putting the giver in a state of debt to the King.12 This was one of the chief ways in which Greek and Persian exchange differed: while Greek reciprocity was stabilised by a rough equality of exchange,13 Persian exchange was marked by inequality. The King gave more than anyone else, which, by keeping the recipients in his debt, created a power imbalance in the relationship.14 The King was the dominant partner in any relationship and was able to direct the relationship and to abandon it whenever he wanted to. Furthermore, while we have seen that Greek exchange tended to deal in the medium of the more sophisticated and ambiguous 'favours', Persian exchange depended to a large degree on the display of the material objects.15 Those who received the gifts from the King received not only an object of value, but also status,16 and so it was important to have them on show even during battle as a mark of one's recognition by the King and one's influence at court. After the battle at Plataea, the Greeks were amazed by the gold and jewellery they found in the Persian camp.17 Both these factors contributed to the marked difference in the attitudes 10

11

12

13

14

15 16

Loyalty and military support: cf. Kent (1953) DB I §8.1.20-4, DB IV §63.4.61-7; Kuhrt (1995) 2.689; Hornblower (1982) 157; (1991-6) 1.373; Briant (1987b) 5-6; law and order: Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1989) 139; cf. Kuhrt (1995) 2.678-82. See Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1989) 139-41; cf. Sahlins (1968) 86-95; (1972) 204-15; Powis (1984) 27-31. See, e.g., Hdt. 3.139-41. See also Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 146; cf. 74; (1989) 138-9; Kuhrt (1995) 2.689. The point about this kind of giving is made explicit by Curtius (Q. C.8.12.17). Even among those relationships which were unequal (for example, between parent and child), Aristotle felt that there should be a kind of equality, since equality (isotes) was a characteristic oiphilia (Arist., Me. Eth. 8, H58b27~8). This kind of power imbalance is not exclusively Persian, and could also be used in interstate politics to assert a state's dominance. Solomon reinforced his superiority over the Queen of Sheba by giving her, as a return for her gifts, everything she asked for, and more than she had given him (2 Chronicles 9.9-12). Thucydides' Pericles talks about a similar kind of "unbalanced relationship' at Th. 2.40.4-5, where Athens by her generosity keeps the allied states in her debt (following Hooker's interpretation of this passage ((1974) 164-9) contra Missiou (1992) 114-21). Cf. Sahlins (1968) 6-8; Gregory (1982) 55. See esp. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1989) 134-5; cf- c n - I 17 Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 146. Hdt. 9.80.

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of Greeks and Persians to relationships individuals had contracted with each other, and it is striking how often Greco-Persian friendships end disastrously. 6.2

The Greeks and their Persian philoi

Greco-Persian relations were never without their difficulties. Individual Persians are often portrayed as faithless and unreliable: the faithlessness (apistia) of Tissaphernes has often been noted, displayed most prominently by his treachery towards the commanders of the Greek mercenary army; Pharnabazus too, although often contrasted with the treacherous Tissaphernes as a faithful Persian, proved untrue to the Spartan Anaxibius, and Alcibiades learned at the cost of his life how faithless he could be.18 Nevertheless, although relegating the Persians to the category of barbaroi,19 the Greek world continued to look for the support of the King in their wars against each other as Persia supported first one then the other of the major Greek powers. What follows is a narrative of Greek and Persian relations in our period which provides the setting for discussions of specific relationships between particular Greeks and their Persian philoi.

Persia provided the economic backing necessary for Sparta to bring the Peloponnesian War to an end and to secure her dominance in Greece. From the resources of the Peloponnesian League alone, the Spartans were unable to maintain a fleet for long enough periods to train rowers and develop new strategies adequate to deal with the Athenian fleet.20 The only clear way that sufficient funds could be amassed was through contracting a friendship with Persia, a policy difficult for the Spartans, who, Lewis writes, held the conviction 'that for more than a hundred years they had stood for the integrity of all Greek cities against Persia'.21 Despite this, Archidamus suggested in 432 that Persia should be approached for money and ships.22 Indeed in 431 both the Athenians and the Spartans were contemplating Persian aid, and in 430 an embassy from the Peloponnesian League was sent to Persia, although this party was 18

19

21

On the faithlessness of Tissaphernes: Xen., Anab. 2.5.27-6.1, 3.2.4; Starr (1975) 51; Hirsch (1985) 21-9; Lewis (1977) 151. On Tissaphernes' high-handed treatment of the Greeks, see also Westlake (1985) 51-2 (=(1989) 174); (1981) 257-79 (=(1989) 289-309). Pharnabazus contrasted with Tissaphernes: Hirsch (1985) 22; Starr (1975) 51. Note, however, Pharnabazus' claim at Xen., Hell. 4.1.32. Pharnabazus and Anaxibius: Xen., Anab. 7.1.2,2.7; see Cook (1983) 210; and below. For the connotations of 'otherness' and inferiority attached to the appellation barbaros from the fifth century onwards, see Starr (1975) 50; Baldry (1965) 22-4; Bacon (1961) 20 passim; Starr (1968) 49-56. Brunt (1965b) 259-60 (=(1993) 89-90). 22 Lewis (1977) 62. Th. 1.82.1; Lewis (1977) 63.


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intercepted by the Athenians at the Thracian court of their ally Sitalces.23 Again in the winter of 425/4 one of the Athenian generals arrested the Persian ambassador Artaphernes on his way to Sparta with a message from the Persian King, which declared that he did not know what the Spartans wanted, for although they had sent many embassies to him, no two had said the same thing.24 The cost of Persian support was the cities in Asia Minor, a heavy price for the 'liberators' of Greece which they were not yet prepared to pay.25 The Athenian ambassadors accompanied Artaphernes to Asia, but when they heard at Ephesus that the King had died the Athenians returned home. 26 Perhaps about 423 the Athenians contracted a 'philia for all time' with the Persians - the Peace of Epilycus.27 In 413/12, however, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus made independent approaches to Sparta promising Persian support, and Sparta was ready to relinquish her high moral position and accepted the offer of Tissaphernes.28 After the revolt of Chios and Miletus, the first treaty with Persia was agreed, although the Spartans soon grew discontented with this one and a second was made.29 Yet after the eleven advisers (symbouloi) assigned to assess the performance of Astyochus the current Nauarch had arrived, Lichas son of Arcesilaus, the leader of the team, repudiated the two draft treaties, claiming that the clauses dealing with the King's territory would enslave all the islands, Thessaly, Locris and everything as far as Boeotia, and that 'instead of freedom, the Spartans would impose upon the Greeks Persian rule'.30 Tissaphernes was offended and departed in anger.31 In 411 after trouble in Sparta Alcibiades defected to the court of 23

25 27

28

29

30

431: Th. 2.7.1; Lewis (1977) 64; Brunt (1965b) 259-60 (=(1993) 89-90); Spartan ambassadors intercepted in Thrace: Th. 2.67.1-4; Lewis (1977) 64. On Aneristus and Nicolaus, 24 see ch. 4. Th. 4.50.1-2; Lewis (1977) 64 n. 93. 26 Brunt (1965b) 259-60 (=(1993) 89-90); see also Lewis (1977) 65-8. Th. 4.50.3. A n d o c . 3.29. T h e Peace itself is confirmed b y an inscription honouring Heracleides o f Clazomenae. O n the restoration and joining o f the inscription (IG i 3 227 and IG ii 2 65), see Walbank (1982a) 261-3; (1983) 183-4. Wade-Gery ((1940) 127-32 (=(1958) 207-11)) argues for a date in 424/3, but it appears from Babylonian evidence discussed by Stolper ((1983) 223-36) that it may be hard to fit a treaty with Darius 11 into that year (cf. Lewis (1992b) 422 n. 132). Other suggestions are 425/4: Murison (1971) 24-6, 30; 424-18: Thompson (1971) 119-24; 422/1: Blamire (1975) 21-6; just before 415: Raubitschek (1964) 155-7 ( = ( i 9 9 x ) 6-8). T h . 8 . 5 . 4 - 6 . 2 . D i d the Persians look for the Spartan alliance because of Athens' support for Amorges (Andoc. 3.29)? Andrewes ((1961) 3 - 4 ) thinks Andocides is right, b u t Westlake ((1977a) 319-29 (=(1989) 103-12) and Kagan ((1987) 29-32) place the change in Persian policy before the change in Athenian policy. T h . 8.17.4-18.3 (the main thrust o f the treaty was that the cities o f Asia M i n o r should stop paying the Athenians tribute, and, as Lewis writes ((1977) 9 0 - 1 ) , for Tissaphernes it was 'an essential preliminary t o their starting t o pay h i m , a point o n which the treaty has nothing to say') 5 2 9 , 3 6 - 7 . 31 Th. 8.43.3. On the status of the successive treaties, see HCT 5.142-6. Th. 8.43.4.

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Tissaphernes, and was acting as his adviser.32 He also approached the Athenians and suggested that if they overthrew the democracy and took him back he could obtain Tissaphernes' support for Athens through his alleged friendship with the Persian. 6.2.1

Alcibiades and Tissaphernes

The partnership between Tissaphernes and Alcibiades was never actually formalised in a relationship with a clear understanding of the obligations; Alcibiades' negotiations with the Athenians merely required that it appear that this was so. Citing Th. 8.47.2 as evidence of ritualised-friendship terminology, Herman lists Alcibiades among the xenoi of Tissaphernes,33 but Tissaphernes and Alcibiades were not xenoi, nor even really phUoi. Rather, Alcibiades, although he tried unsuccessfully to establish a permanent connection with Tissaphernes, made an appearance of friendship with the satrap in order to convince the Greeks. Tissaphernes, on the other hand, was not averse to using the connection, such as it was, for his own purposes when the need arose or abandoning it as and when he wished. Alcibiades' first known contacts with Tissaphernes are when Alcibiades used his influence in Sparta on behalf of the Chians and Tissaphernes in 412. 34 Alcibiades later fled to Tissaphernes when Sparta became too hot for him, but such retreats to Persians by Greeks were not unprecedented.35 In addition, although Alcibiades used a proposed friendship between the Athenians and Tissaphernes to bring about his own recall to Athens in 411, Thucydides emphasises that there was only an apparent intimacy between the two men, 36 that Alcibiades magnified his influence with the Persian,37 and that in fact his relations with Tissaphernes were not secure.38 Alcibiades was an adviser to Tissaphernes, and suggested how he should conduct the war to Persia's advantage.39 Tissaphernes at first acted on his advice, and 'gave his confidence (pistis) to Alcibiades'.40 He was willing to go along with Alcibiades largely because of the trouble over the alliance with the Spartans and, Thucydides says: 'Alcibiades, because he was contending for great things, eagerly attached himself to Tissaphernes and courted (therapeuori) him.'41 This is not the language of an existing philia relationship, although it does suggest that Alcibiades was trying to form one. 32 35

38 41

33 34 Th. 8.45.1-46.5; 52.1,56.2-4. Herman (1987) 153 and n. 95,183. Th. 8.6.3. Th. 8.45.1. Greeks at the Persian court: e.g., Hippias (Hdt. 6.102, 107.1) and 36 37 Themistocles (Th. 1.137.3-8.2). Th. 8.47.1,82.2-3. Th. 8.81.2. 39 40 Th. 8.56.2; see also Lewis (1977) 92. Th. 8.45-6. Th. 8.46.5. Th.8.52.


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Tissaphernes treated Alcibiades as a courtier, not an equal partner, and when Alcibiades did try to cement the relationship and make it a formalised friendship by coming to the Hellespont with xenia (gifts of xenia) and dora*2 Tissaphernes responded by not only refusing to receive the gifts, but also imprisoning Alcibiades.43 The relationship between Alcibiades and Tissaphernes depended on flattery and utility. When Alcibiades wanted Tissaphernes' help he took up an attitude of courtly blandishments, but, when he lost his usefulness, Tissaphernes simply got rid of him. In order to convince the Greeks, however, Alcibiades pretended to an intimacy and philia which did not exist. He tried to play the game by double rules and was ultimately unsuccessful. When Alcibiades' negotiations with the Athenians broke down, Tissaphernes made a third treaty with the Peloponnesians.44 This third treaty declared: 'All the King's land in Asia belongs to the King.'45 This, coupled with lichas' statement that it was necessary for the Milesians and other peoples in the King's country to be dependent on Tissaphernes in a reasonable way and serve him until the war should come to a good conclusion, amounted to the handing over of Asia to the King.46 In the following years down to the fall of Athens and the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404, Spartan-Persian relations see-sawed as Tissaphernes continued to show himself unreliable in his maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet. In 411 Mindarus the incoming Nauarch headed for the Hellespont where Pharnabazus was offering assistance, and Alcibiades and the Athenians followed suit in 410. 47 6.2.2

Alcibiades and Pharnabazus

Not long after his failed attempt to formalise the relationship between himself and Tissaphernes,48 Alcibiades succeeded in establishing a friendship with Pharnabazus. Xenophon records that Alcibiades made 42

46

47

H e r m a n ((1987) 5 8 - 6 9 , esp. 60) discusses h o w a compact o f friendship was formally c o n cluded b y means o f an initiation ritual, key elements o f which were xenia or dora. Cf. 43 45 C o o k (1983) 2 0 9 . Xen.,i/dZ. 1.1.9. " T h . 8.57-8. T h . 8.58.2. l i c h a s ' statement: T h . 8.84.5. S e e also Lewis (1977) 107 and n. 100; see also Brunt (1965b) 2 6 3 ( = ( 1 9 9 3 ) 9 4 ) . It is unclear what exactly the position o f the Greek cities in Asia was after this treaty: see Lewis (1977) 110-14; Andrewes (1992b) 4 7 8 . Mindarus: Th. 8.99; Diod. 13.38.4-5; see also Th. 8.87; Xen., Hell. 1.1.14, 24-5. It does not seem that Mindarus was averse to accepting Tissaphernes' help when it was offered (Diod. 13.45.6,46.6,49.4; for Pharnabazus as an error for Tissaphernes in Diodorus, see Lewis (1977) 113 n. 42), although associations with Tissaphernes were now frowned upon at Sparta (Xen., Hell. 1.1.32; see also Krentz (i989])io6). Note also IG i3 113 which suggests that the Athenians had tried to resume talks with Tissaphernes sometime 48 between 411 and 407 (see ch. 3 n. 169). Xen., Hell. 1.1.9.

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oaths to the representatives of Pharnabazus and Pharnabazus, in turn, made oaths to Alcibiades5 representatives, declaring that they had made a common oath and private pledges (pisteis) to each other.49 Immediately after this, Pharnabazus went to the Great King, taking ambassadors from Athens.50 Two of the members of the mission were Alcibiades' men: Euryptolemus, who was also one of Alcibiades' representatives at the oath-taking, and Mantitheus.51 Although this was an official embassy of the Athenians,52 it was obviously 'Alcibiades' mission', engineered by him, or at least heavily influenced by him. But just as Tissaphernes had proved treacherous, Pharnabazus also proved himself a faithless philos. When Pharnabazus found Alcibiades to be dispensable a few years later, he simply organised his death.53 In 407 Xenophon reports the return of a Spartan embassy from Persia which was led by Boeotius, who claimed that they had received everything they wanted from the King.54 Also in this year Lysander, the most successful Nauarch of these years, struck up a personal friendship with Cyrus, the young son of the Persian King, as well as with the leading citizens of the cities in Asia Minor.55 This brought Lysander the resources he needed for ultimately winning the war.

6.2.3

Lysander and Cyrus

One of Lysander's first acts as Nauarch was to establish a personal relationship with Cyrus. Diodorus says that on his appointment to the Nauarchy Lysander sailed to Asia Minor, and when he heard that Cyrus had been despatched by his father to join the war with the Spartans and was at Sardis, he went to him and, 'stirring up Cyrus' youthful enthusiasm for the war', received from him a thousand darics for pay for the soldiers.56 Cyrus then told him, according to Diodorus, to ask for more without reserve, since he had been enjoined by his father to provide whatever the Spartans asked for. Xenophon, on the other hand, is more 49 51 52 54

55 56

50 Xen., Hell. 1.3.12. Xen., Hell. 1.3.13. X e n . , Hell. 1.1.10; o n Euryptolemus, see A p p e n d i x I: 'Athenian Ambassadors'. 53 Xen., Hell. 1.3.8. Diod. i4.n.i-4;Plut.,;4/c. 39.1-7. Xen., Hell. 1.4.2. Lewis ((1977) 124-5) s e e s in this a fourth treaty with the King in which the autonomy of the Greek states was secured. Kagan ((1987) 332 n. 28) rejects this, as does Tuplin ((1987) 133-53), but Andrewes ((1992) 489) writes that: 'Xenophon says nothing of any further concession, but the form of the negotiations suggests that the doubtful status of the Greek cities was now regulated: they were to be autonomous while they paid tribute to Persia'; see also Hornblower (1991) 150. Diod. 13.70.3-4; Xen., Hell. 1.5.1-7,2.1.6; Plut., Lys. 5.5-6. Diod. 13.70.1-3.


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expansive about this meeting, and his language is instructive. He says that Cyrus originally refused the Spartan ambassadors' request for more pay, but that after dinner, when he had drunk Lysander's health, Cyrus asked how he could gratify (charizoito) the Spartan.57 Lysander promptly asked for more pay for the troops.58 This is the language of friendship-making and marks only the beginning of the partnership between the two. When on the death of Callicratidas the Chians and the other allies sent ambassadors to Sparta to ask that Lysander be returned as Nauarch, they were accompanied by ambassadors and messengers from Cyrus requesting the same thing.59 Again, when Lysander returned to command the fleet in 405, he went to Cyrus for money, and although Cyrus had already given to the other Nauarchs all the money he had from his father he still gave Lysander what he needed. 60 Then when a message came to Cyrus from his father saying he was ill, Cyrus sent for Lysander, refused to allow him to join battle unless he had more ships, and assigned to him the tribute from the cities which were his personally, reminding him of his philia with the city of the Spartans and his private philia with Lysander himself.61 It was largely through this friendship and the unlimited wealth it provided that Lysander and the Spartans finally won the war. In the next period of Greco-Persian relations, from 404 to 386, Sparta changed in her attitude to the King and pursued a course of open hostility, first of all in 401 by backing Cyrus' attempted coup.62

6.2.4

Cyrus and the Ten Thousand

Cyrus' mercenary army was built upon a web of xenia friendships, as Cyrus enlisted the help of his Greek xenoi.63 To Clearchus, a Spartan exile, he gave ten thousand darics, with which he kept an army in the Chersonese.64 Aristippus, Cyrus' Thessalian xenos, being hard pressed at home, came to Cyrus for three months' pay for two thousand 57 59 60

62

63

58 X e n . , Hell. 1.5.1-7. O n Lysander's response, see Krentz (1989) 136. Xen., Hell 2.1.6-7. X e n . , Hell. 2.1.11; A n d o c . 3.29; Isoc. 8.97. Lysander w a s s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d (epistoleus), although D i o d o r u s says he went as a private citizen (idiotes). Aracus was officially appointed Nauarch, although subordinated to Lysander's c o m m a n d ( X e n . , Hell. 2.1.7; 61 Diod. 13.100.8). Xen., Hell. 2.1.13-14; Diod. 13.104.3-4. Xen., Hell. 3.1.1; Diod. 14.19.2, 4, 21.2; Lewis (1977) 138 and nn. 14, 16; Dandamaev (1989) 286.1 accept the chronology of Funke (1980) for the years 404-386. On Cyrus' army and its recruitment, see Roy (1967) 285-323, esp. 296-309. See also Herman (1987) 45. For an analysis of the social structure of the army on the move, see 64 Nussbaum (1967). Xen., Anab. 1.1.9,3.3.

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mercenaries.65 Proxenus, his Boeotian xenos, came to him with as many men as possible, as did Sophaenetus the Stymphalian and Socrates the Achaean, these men also being his xenoi.66 Others also joined the army or gave their help because of friendship connections. For example, Xenophon himself was there because of his xenia with Proxenus the Boeotian, for Proxenus had sent for him and promised he would make him a philos of Cyrus.67 Similarly, Menon, a Thessalian, was a philos and xenos of Ariaeus, the commander of Cyrus' barbarian troops.68 Ties of friendship bound the members of the army to each other, as well as to Cyrus himself. 6.2.5

Anaxibius and Pharnabazus

With the death of Cyrus, the army of the Ten Thousand were left to wander through Asia, before finally making their own way home to Greece. Xenophon tells how Pharnabazus enlisted the help of the Spartan Nauarch Anaxibius to get rid of this roving army, and promised to do whatever was needful.69 So Anaxibius called the generals to Byzantium, where he happened to be, and promised them regular pay if they would bring their army to the city. On the arrival of the soldiers, however, he refused to pay them, but announced instead that he was sending them home and shut them out of the city. When news came that the army was breaking up after their departure from Byzantium, Xenophon says that Anaxibius was pleased since he thought that this would particularly gratify (charizesthai) Pharnabazus. While Anaxibius was sailing home from Byzantium he met Aristarchus, the successor to Cleander as harmost of Byzantium, at Cyzicus, and Aristarchus reported to him that his own successor to the Nauarchy, Polus, was almost at the Hellespont. Anaxibius then sailed along the Asia Minor coast to Parium, and sent word to Pharnabazus as they had agreed. Yet when Pharnabazus learned that Aristarchus had come as harmost of Byzantium and Anaxibius was no longer Nauarch, he ignored Anaxibius and began negotiations with Aristarchus about the same arrangements for the army. Anaxibius was rather nonplussed when the relationship was disregarded in this way,70 but in typical Greek fashion, proceeded to betray his betrayer. His retaliation followed quickly, as he summoned Xenophon and arranged for him to bring as large a part of the army as he could back into Asia.71 65 68 69

71

66 67 Xtn.y Anab. 1.1.10. Xen.,Anab. I . I . I I . Xen.tAnab. 3.1.4,5.3.5. Xen.3Anab. 2.1.5; for Ariaeus, see XenÂnab 1.8.5,9-3i> 10.1. 70 For the whole episode, see Xen.,Anab. 7.1-2. See however Hirsch (1985) 3 3 - 4 .

Xen.,Anab. 7.2.8.


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Meanwhile, Tissaphernes was sent as satrap to the provinces Cyrus had previously ruled and demanded straight away that all the cities should be subject to him. 72 Consequently, the Spartans sent Thibron in open war against Tissaphernes after an appeal for help by the Asiatic Greeks, but, finding Thibron unsatisfactory, the Spartans sent Dercylidas to take over the command of the army in 399. 73 Perhaps in 397, in reply to this aggressive action, a Rhodian called Timocrates was sent to the Greek cities, probably by Pharnabazus, with gold to incite war against the Spartans.74 In 396 Agesilaus the Spartan king was sent to lead the Spartan forces in Asia when reports reached Sparta that Tissaphernes and the King were assembling a fleet of Phoenician ships.75 6.2.6

Agesilaus and Spithradates

Spithradates was a rebel Persian whom Lysander brought back from the Hellespont to Agesilaus.76 When Agesilaus arrived in Phrygia in 395, Spithradates offered to take Agesilaus to Paphlagonia and to bring the king of the Paphlagonians to a conference to make him an ally, and Xenophon says that Agesilaus went eagerly, as he had long desired that he might detach a state from the King. 77 Accordingly, an alliance with the Paphlagonian king Otys was made, and Otys, on the persuasion of Spithradates, left behind peltasts and cavalry for Agesilaus' use. 78 Agesilaus 'realised the charts of this5 and decided to arrange the marriage of the daughter of Spithradates to Otys, and set about persuading 72

X e n . , Hell. 3.1.3; D i o d . 14.26.4,35.2; see also Lewis (1977) 119 n. 7 8 , 1 3 8 - 9 ; cf. Andrewes (1971) 2 0 8 . O n the status o f Tissaphernes, see Westlake (1981) 2 5 7 - 8 , 2 6 2 and n. 16

73

Thibron: X e n . , Hell. 3.1.4; D i o d . 14.36.1; Lewis (1977) 139. Dercylidas: X e n . , Hell. 3.1.8; D i o d . 14.38.2; Lewis (1977) 1 3 9 - 4 0 . O n why the Spartans went t o the aid o f the Asiatic Greeks, see Hamilton (1979) 107-9, m - 1 2 ; Westlake (1986) 406-10 (=(1989) 240-3). On the Greeks in Asia, see Seager and Tuplin (1980) 141-54. X e n . , Hell. 3.5; Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 7.2, 5 = ( C h a m b e r s ) 10.2, 5, which claims that Pharnabazus sent Timocrates t o Greece with the gold in 397 (not Tithraustes and not in 395, as in Xenophon's account). This finds support at Polyaenus 1.48.3, though Paus. 3.9.7-8 agrees with X e n o p h o n in making Tithraustes the author o f d i e mission: see Bruce (1967) 5 8 - 6 0 . N o t e that the author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia indicates that the cities were already spoiling for war with Sparta: Hell. Oxyrh. (Bartoletti) 7 . 2 = ( C h a m b e r s ) 10.2. Xen., Hell. 3.4.1,3,5; Diod. 14.79.1-3; Lewis (1977) 141-2 and n. 45; Dandamaev (1989) 287. Note also the influence of Lysander in this phase, and his relationship with Agesilaus: Xen., Hell. 3.3.3,4.2, 4.7-10; Plut., Lys. 22; cf. Diod. 14.13; Hamilton (1991) 7-9,16,19-20,27-30,32-7; Gray (1989) 46-9. X e n . , Hell. 3.4.10. Presumably this was a 'gift' to appease Agesilaus after his disgrace. X e n . , Hell. 4.1.2. X e n . , Hell. 4.1.3. O n the difficulty with the name Otys, see Underhill (1900) 118.

74

75

76 77 78

(=(1989) 289-90,293,307 n. 16).

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Otys of the advantages of such a match, arguing that just as Spithradates was a man who could take vengeance on his enemies, he was also a man who could benefit (euergetein) his philoi.19 In this way Agesilaus not only brought Spithradates, a Persian, under the umbrella of the help friends/harm enemies ethos, but also made assumptions for the Persian based on his own understanding of the relationship, and imputed to Spithradates the same value system as his own. Yet it actually took very little for Spithradates to betray his friendship with Agesilaus.80 When Herippidas captured one of Pharnabazus' outposts with the help of Spithradates' men, Herippidas took all the booty Spithradates and the Paphlagonians had seized. Spithradates and the Paphlagonians were angered by this, and feeling they had been wronged and dishonoured went away to Sardis to Ariaeus, another Persian who had revolted from the King. Xenophon claims that nothing more distressing happened to Agesilaus during the campaign than the desertion of Spithradates, his son Megabates, and the Paphlagonians. This is an unexpected ending to this episode. The apparent intimacy between Agesilaus and the Persian suddenly seems rather flat, and the connection does not have the strength Xenophon implies. like Anaxibius, Agesilaus seems to have been caught unawares. 6.2.7

Agesilaus and Pharnabazus

Xenophon recounts as a charming vignette in his Hellenica another attempt of Agesilaus to detach a satrap from the King, this time Pharnabazus, and as Gray points out the theme of this story is friendship.81 Agesilaus, having been encouraged by Tithraustes to lead his army against the country of Pharnabazus, came to Dascyleium.82 ApoUophanes of Cyzicus, who happened to be a hereditary xenos of Pharnabazus and who had just become a xenos of Agesilaus, came to the Spartan king and told him that he thought he could bring Pharnabazus to negotiate about a philia with him. 83 Accordingly, ApoUophanes brought Pharnabazus to Agesilaus at the appointed place where Agesilaus sat waiting with the Thirty Spartan advisers on the grass.84 79

81 83 84

Xen., Hell. 4.1.4-15. For an analysis of the moral theme of this story, see Gray (1989) 80 49-52. For the whole episode, see Xen., Hell. 4.1.20-8. 82 Xen., Hell. 4.1.29-40; Gray (1989) 52,54. Xen., Hell. 3.4.26,4.1.15 X e n . , Hell. 4.1.29. N o t e h o w Pharnabazus seems to collect Cyzicenes: see also T h . 8.6.1. X e n . , Hell. 4.1.30. X e n o p h o n tells u s that Pharnabazus came wearing a robe of great value, and w h e n his attendants began laying rugs d o w n for him, h e was ashamed to indulge himself seeing the simplicity o f Agesilaus. T h e image is striking: the young triumphant Spartan king not requiring the pretensions of the old Persian lord; see also Gray (1989) 56. For an analysis of the preliminaries to the making of a friendship, see Herman

(1987)46-7,51-2.


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There Pharnabazus reminded Agesilaus of his friendship and alliance with the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, comparing his honesty and trustworthiness with the double-dealing of Tissaphernes, and upbraiding the Spartans for their faithlessness in returning favours.85 Xenophon says that Agesilaus' Spartan advisers were ashamed, and remained silent, but Agesilaus replied by pointing out that men in the Greek states also became xenoi of each other, but were forced to fight against one another when their states were at war.86 Pharnabazus replied in turn that if the King sent another as general and subordinated him to this man, he would become a philos of the Spartans; but if the King assigned the command to Pharnabazus himself, he would prosecute the war to the best of his ability.87 Hearing this, Agesilaus took hold of his hand and said: Best of men, since you are such a man, may you be a philos to us. Indeed I know one thing: that now I will go awayfromyour land as fast as I can, and in future, and if there is war, while ever we are able to march against another man, we will keep awayfromyou and your family.88 Agesilaus did not make a xenia with Pharnabazus himself, but when the meeting between the older men had broken up, Pharnabazus' son spontaneously offered himself as Agesilaus' xenos, thus bringing the story to a neat and satisfactory conclusion. 89 We should, of course, not take this too seriously as history, and many of the historical implications of the story are suppressed in favour of the desire to tell a pretty, moralising story which emphasises the kingliness of Agesilaus. Nevertheless, there are a number of points of interest here for us. 90 Much of the charm of the story rests in the contrasts that are made between the two main characters. The lavish display of Pharnabazus is contrasted with the unassuming humility of Agesilaus, despite the fact that Agesilaus is in the socially superior position. As Gray points out, Pharnabazus behaves with the deference appropriate when a lesser man is addressing royalty,91 and an important element in the story is the grace and dignity with which Pharnabazus declines the offer of friendship. The tone of the story is typically Greek, and it is perhaps 85 86

87

89

Xen.,Hell. 4.1.32-3. X e n . , Hell. 4.1.34. S e e also ch. 10. O n the status o f the Spartan advisers, see Pritchett (1974, 1979) 2.37 contra Smith (1953-4) 2 7 9 n - 9> cf. X e n . , Hell. 5.3.8: the Thirty Spartiatae sent with Agesipolis; Plut., Ages. 36.6: thirty symbouloi sent with Agesilaus t o Egypt in 361/0. Xen., Hell. 4.1.37; on the love of war (philonikia) of the Persian, see also Lewis (1977) 88 150-1. Xen., Hell. 4.1.38; compare Homer, Iliad 6.224-31. 90 91 Xen., Hell. 4.1.39-40. See also chs. 1 and 10. Gray (1989) 54-5.

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anomalous or ironic that the egalitarian xenia is discussed between two who are portrayed as unequals in this way.92 Xenophon has also couched the whole story in the language of friendship and xenia. Not only have Agesilaus and Pharnabazus met to discuss a formal friendship, but Pharnabazus recognises that he has given favours which ought to be paid back. The Spartiates are ashamed at this breach of honour, but Agesilaus gently explains the subtleties of a code of practice which needs to balance the responsibilities to friends with the responsibilities to the state. Gray says of Pharnabazus: 'A man so moved by the desire for honour could not properly be called a slave of the king when he so clearly was his own man and had the freedom of choice his reply indicated.'93 Nevertheless, it has to be made clear that in offering friendship, Agesilaus is offering nothing less than rebellion, which Pharnabazus makes plain in his reply when he says that he would accept Agesilaus' offer only if the King removed him from his office. He will dishonour his loyalty to the King only if he is himself dishonoured. Yet Pharnabazus and Agesilaus are not just talking about friendship, they are talking about war. Xenophon does not remind us that, even as he spoke, Pharnabazus was having a fleet prepared which he was to use very effectively against the Spartans in the following year.94 While it is perhaps ironic that a pretty story about friendship is disguising darker political manoeuvring, it ought not to surprise us, since the language and ideology of one were implicated in the other, as friendship and political relations were each tied up together. 6.2.8

Agesilaus andArtaxerxes

Elsewhere, Xenophon tells another story about how his hero Agesilaus received a letter from the King asking for a xenia and philia.95 Xenophon claims Agesilaus' answer as a mark of his high-mindedness, since Agesilaus did not accept the xenia> but was content that the King should be a philos to Sparta and show goodwill to Greece. Although this is a story essentially about the goodness and foresight of Agesilaus in putting the interests of Greece above his own possible gain (that is, Xenophon says, he was not overcome by the desire for gifts (dora) or the strength of the King) and is almost certainly anecdotal, it points again to the xenia relationship, the security that was perceived to be intrinsic to the relationship, and the political motives that were often attached to it. The King himself wanted Agesilaus to be confirmed as his philos through the 92

95

Compare Georges ((1994) 217-21) who overemphasises the real part that equality had to 93 94 play in this scene. Gray (1989) 55-6. See below. Tten..> Ages. 8.3-5; Plutarch gives a version of the anecdote at Mor. 2i3d-e.


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xenia presumably to stabilise relations between Persia and Sparta, but Agesilaus laid aside this private relationship so that he would not be bound by the obligations of the relationship, and could detach as many satraps as possible from the King.96 During the years of Spartan activity in Asia, a series of truces was made in which the Spartans promised to withdraw if the Persians left the Greek cities autonomous, but these came to nothing, and Agesilaus was recalled to the war at home in 394.97 For in 394 Pharnabazus together with Conon the Athenian who was in command of the Persian fleet sailed along the coast of Asia Minor and drove out the Spartan harmosts, and, after defeating the Spartans in a naval battle, crossed to Laconia and made raids along the coast.98 At this point, Sparta looked like winning neither the war in Asia nor the Corinthian War, so tried to get a settlement instead.99 Having discovered that the Persians through Pharnabazus were funding the rebuilding of the walls at Athens and maintaining their fleet, the Spartans decided to send Antalcidas to inform Tiribazus the King's general of this in the hope of bringing him over to their side and making peace between Sparta and the King.100 Ambassadors from the Athenians, Boeotians, Corinthians and Argives also came to the talks, which broke down when the Athenians, Thebans and Argives refused to agree. Tiribazus did not think it was safe to support the Spartans openly without the King's approval, but gave money to Antalcidas in secret so that a fleet might be manned, and he imprisoned Conon. 101 Another attempt at peace was made later the same year in Sparta, but although this time the terms were more favourable for the Greeks the negotiations failed.102 The King, moreover, maintained his anti-Spartan stand, and when Tiribazus went back to the court, he sent Struthas to take care of the places by the sea.103 Athens, although the King was her philos> began sending aid to Euagoras who was now making war on the King, and made an alliance with Egypt.104 96 97

98 99 100

101 102

103 104

N o t e the conflict o f interests that Agesilaus is choosing to avoid. Xen., Hell. 4.2.2. For truces, e.g., 397 - Xen., Hell. 3.2.20; Diod. 14.39.6; 396 - Xen., Hell. 3.4.5. X e n . , Hell. 4 . 8 . 1 , 7 . For Pharnabazus, C o n o n and Euagoras o f Cyprus, see ch. 3. Lewis (1977) 144. X e n . , Hell. 4 . 8 . 1 2 - 1 6 . A s the satrap o f Western Armenia during the retreat o f the T e n Thousand (Xen., Anab. 4.4.4), and one of the royal benefactors (Diod. 15.10.2-4), Tiribazus seems to have succeeded Tithraustes as satrap of Ionia (Xen., Hell. 5.1.28) and as commander of the Persian forces in Asia Minor: see Underhill (1900) 157. Xen. Hell. 4.8.16; Isoc. 4.154; Diod. 14.85.4. A n d o c . 3 passim; Philochorus, FGrHist 3 2 8 F 149; see Ryder (1965) 3 1 - 3 . F o r a different view, see Badian (1991) 25-48, esp. 26-34. Cf. Devoto (1986). Xen., Hell. 4.8.17; Diod. 14.99.1. Xen., Hell. 4.8.24; Ar., Wealth 178; Diod. 14.98.3; see also Lewis (1977) 147 n. 73.

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In 388/7 the Spartans made Antalcidas Nauarch, and sent him on an embassy to the King.105 6.2.9

A ntalcidas and Tiribazus

The Spartans selected Antalcidas as the Nauarch in 388/7 because they thought that in this way they could particularly gratify (charizesthai) Tiribazus,106 a connection which may have originated in the Peace talks of 392. The negotiations at Susa in 388/7 were successful, Antalcidas returned from the King with Tiribazus with an agreement for an alliance if the Athenians and their allies would not come to terms, and with the help of Tiribazus and Antalcidas' hereditary xenos Ariobarzanes he obtained the necessary leverage by gaining control of the Hellespont.107 The Athenians and the Argives were now also eager for peace, and in 386 the King's Peace was made. 108 The cities in Asia, Clazomenae and Cyprus were given up to the King, and all the other Greek cities except Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros were declared independent.109 Sparta had again conceded the Greeks in Asia to the King - this time finally - in order to buy supremacy in Greece.110 In about 380, despite the Common Peace agreement and their new pro-Persian stance, Diodorus says that Sparta made an alliance with Glos the Persian admiral who was in revolt against the King.111 In the second half of the 380s the Egyptian king Acoris fought against Persia, enlisting the services of the Athenian Chabrias.112 Pharnabazus was appointed as the commander of the King's forces and sent ambassadors to Athens denouncing the general and asking to be given Iphicrates.113 The Athenians, according to Diodorus, were eager to gain the favour of the King and Pharnabazus, and so recalled Chabrias from Egypt and despatched Iphicrates.114 105 107 109

110 111

112 113

106 Xen., Hell. 5.1.6; Diod. 14.110.2-3. Xen., Hell. 5.1.6. See also ch. 4. 108 Xen., He//. 5.1.25-32. Xen., Hell. 5.1.29,31; Diod. 14.110.4. X e n . , Hell. 5.1.31. In a recently discovered inscription w e have evidence suggesting that one Ionian state, Erythrae, did not want to be handed over to Persia (SEG 26 1282). See Ryder (1965) 36,39. Diod. 15.9.3.3-5. Glos supposedly offered them large sums of money and made many other great promises (Diod. 15.9.4), a n d m e Spartans, according to Diodorus, were seeking a plausible excuse for making war on Artaxerxes since they were unpopular in Greece for betraying the Asiatic Greeks (Diod. 15.9.5). Glos and his son Tachos soon died, however, and the alliance was never implemented (Diod. 15.18.1, 19.1). Hornblower ((1991) 203) writes that this is *a curious but not incredible episode'; cf. Ryder (1963) 105-9. Cawkwell ((1976a) 70), although he does not seem to doubt Glos made the offer of an alliance, finds it impossible that the Spartans accepted. Diod. 15.29.1-2. Chabrias was back in Athens to be elected general in 379. 114 Diod. 15.29.3 Diod. 15.29.4.


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In 375 another Common Peace was concluded among the Greek states on the initiative of the King, supposedly so that he could acquire Greek mercenaries for his war against Egypt.115

6.2.10 Antalcidas andArtaxerxes Antalcidas played an important part in the negotiations for this Common Peace in 375 as well.116 In fact Plutarch says that as long as the Spartans were pre-eminent in Greece, Artaxerxes made Antalcidas his xenos and called Antalcidas his philos, and tells how Artaxerxes honoured Antalcidas more highly than any other Greek by giving him a garland dipped in perfume.117 After the Spartans had been defeated at Leuctra and were in need of money, they sent Agesilaus to Egypt (in 362) and Antalcidas to Persia (in 367); but Artaxerxes ignored Antalcidas and overlooked him. 118 Plutarch says that Antalcidas was so ashamed and afraid of the ephors that he went home and starved himself to death. Although the anecdote itself may not be true, its sentiments are clear enough. Antalcidas was the xenos of the King and had certain expectations of the relationship. But Artaxerxes did not see the relationship in the same light. As soon as it was no longer serviceable to himself, he simply abandoned his philos, and he had the power to do that. The result for Antalcidas was disgrace and death. In the winter of 369/8 Ariobarzanes sent Philiscus of Abydus to Greece with large amounts of money to make peace.119 When the Thebans would not agree that Messene should be under the control of the Spartans, Philiscus collected a large mercenary army so that he might make war on the Spartan side. 120 Because of this support Sparta's position was improved, and the Spartans remained a threat to Thebes. 121 In 367 another peace conference gathered at Susa.122 115

117 120 121 122

Diod. 15.38.1; Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 151 (see also Jacoby Supp. 1 522-3). Antalcidas, the Spartan, was again involved in the negotiations in Persia (on this, see below). Diodorus (15.50.4) also claims that the King was involved in the peace settlement of 372/1 (cf. Xen., Hell. 6.3.2-20; Plut., Ages. 27.5-8.4), but this is probably a confusion with the peace of 375: see Ryder (1965) 124-5; Jacoby Supp. 1 522-3. On Antalcidas' possible presence at the Persian court in 371 (though this is unlikely), see Ryder (1965) 127. Ryder accepts that the desire for mercenaries may well have been the 116 King's actual motive ((1965) 58). Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 151. 118 119 Plut., Artax. 22.2,6; Pelop. 30.6. Plut., Artax. 22.6-7. Xen., Hell. 7.1.27. Xen., Hell. 7.1.27; see also Ryder (1965) 79-80,134-5. See Hornblower (1991) 229. Xen., Hell. 7.1.33-40; Plut., Pelop. 30.1-8; Diod. 15.76.3; see Ryder (1965) 80-2,136.

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6.2. II

Pelopidas and Artaxerxes

Pelopidas was present at this conference as the representative of Thebes. 123 Xenophon, who only manages to mention the great Theban commander once and is keen to show him and the Thebans generally in the worst light possible, says that Pelopidas won the King's favour because the Thebans alone of the Greeks had fought on the Persian side at Plataea, because they had never yet fought against the King, and because the reason for the Spartans' war with Thebes was the Theban refusal to join them in their campaign against Persia or to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis.124 Plutarch says that the King was pleased with Pelopidas because of his reputation and the fact that he had defeated the Spartans in the Peloponnese, and that he also thought Pelopidas' proposals were more sure than those of the Athenians and simpler than those of the Spartans.125 Plutarch also says the King did not hide his regard for Pelopidas from the other ambassadors, and, although he did not indulge Pelopidas as he had Antalcidas, he sent him the most splendid and greatest of the customary gifts, and yielded to his demands that the Greeks should be autonomous, that Messene should be inhabited, and that the Thebans should be the hereditary friends (patrikot philoi) of the King.126 Plutarch says that Pelopidas went home with these answers, although he had not received any other gifts (dora) than were a token of the charts and the kindness of the King. 127 6.2.12

Timagoras and Artaxerxes

Other ambassadors at this peace conference also received generous gifts from the King. The Athenians had two ambassadors present, Leon and Timagoras, and Xenophon says that Timagoras supported Pelopidas in everything he said, and was put to death on his return home. 128 Plutarch tells a more colourful tale (which is not necessarily true, but well reflects the nature of Persian gift-giving). He recounts how the King gave Timagoras not only gifts of gold and silver, but also an expensive couch and servants to spread it (since Greeks did not know how), eighty cows and cowherds (as he needed cows' milk for an ailment), and, finally, litterbearers and four talents to pay them.129 Elsewhere, Plutarch adds that Timagoras was also sent the most splendid dinner while he was at court, 123 124 126 128

Xen.,ifc#. 7.1.33; Plut., Pelop. 30.1; Artax. 22.8; cf. Diod. 15.76.3. 125 Xen.,Hell. 7.1.34. Plut., Pelop. 30.3-5. 127 Plut., Pelop. 30.7; cf. Xen., Hell. 7.1.36. Plut., Pelop. 30.8. 129 Xen., Hell 7.1.33,35,38; Plut., Pelop. 30.9. Plut., Pelop. 30.10-12.


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so that Ostanes the King's brother said, 'Timagoras, remember this table, for it has not been adorned for you in this way on slight conditions.'130 Plutarch says that this was more a reproach for Timagoras' treachery (he was thought to have sent a secret message to the King) than a reminder of the charts,131 but probably misses the point. The receipt of these gifts caused the death of Timagoras on his return home, 132 and either it was assumed that Timagoras must have done something treacherous in order to be honoured so liberally, or the accusation was invented by his enemies (of whom Leon was one) and was bolstered by the fact that the gifts had been given. But the terms of this peace were unacceptable to most of the Greeks. In 367/6 Athens and Sparta retaliated by joining in support of the rebel satrap Ariobarzanes, although the Athenian general Timotheus was sent with orders not to break the Common Peace.133 Another attempt at peace was made in Greece in 366/5, but despite Diodorus the King was not involved.134 In the following years, Persian involvement in Greece diminished as the focus of attention changed to Macedon. After Mantineia Agesilaus went to Egypt to command the mercenary forces of the Egyptian rebel king Tachos against Artaxerxes III.135 Chabrias the Athenian commanded the naval contingent, but was not sent officially by Athens.136 Greek involvement with dissident satraps continued into the 350s. In 355 Chares joined Artabazus the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia in order to raise money when he revolted from the King, and defeated the King's army.137 Artabazus, paying back the favour (apodidous tes euergesias charites), gave him a large sum of money as a gift (edoresato), from which he bought provisions for the whole army.138 The King, being none too pleased, sent ambassadors to Athens to denounce Chares, and threatened to join the Athenians' allies in their war against them. According to Diodorus, it is this which led the Athenians to bring their war with the allies to an end. 139 In 353, after the retraction of 130 131

133

134

136

139

Plut.,^4rrox. 22.11. Plut., Artax. 22.12. Plutarch says Timagoras had sent a secret message to the King 132 (?\ut., Artax. 22.9). Plut., Pelop. 30.9. Timotheus: Dem. 15.9; Isoc. 15.111; Nepos, Tim. 1.3; Agesilaus: Xen., Ages. 2.26; Nepos, Tim. 1.3; see also Hornblower (1991) 230-2,237; (1982) 172-4,198,201. Xen., Hell. 7.4.6-11. Compare Diod. 15.76.3; see Ryder (1957) 199-205; (1965) 137-9 135 contra Cawkwell (1961) 80-6. Diod. 15.92.2-3. Diod. 15.92.3; see also Hornblower (1991) 237. Note that the Greeks, including the Athenians (the inscription comes from Argos, but the reply to the satraps is in Attic), refused any official help to the satraps in an inscription possibly dating to 362/1 (Tod 137 138 145). Diod. 16.22.1. Diod. 16.22.1-2. Diod. 16.22.2; cf. 34.1; schol. Dem. 3.31,4.19; see Hornblower (1991) 242-5.

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Athenian assistance, Artabazus asked the Thebans for help, and they sent Pammenes and five thousand soldiers.140 In 344 the King once more planned a campaign against Egypt, and sent envoys to all the Greek states inviting them to take part.141 The Athenians and Spartans declined, although they reaffirmed their philia with the King, whereas the Thebans, Argives and Asiatic Greeks despatched troops.142 In 340 Philip of Macedon moved against Perinthus, and besieged the city.143 Perinthus resisted him, receiving reinforcements from Byzantium, and the Persian King ordered his satraps to the assistance of the city.144 In 337 Persia figured again in Greek affairs, although this time as the victim of Philip's imperialism, when the Corinthian League under the leadership of Philip passed a decree for an Asian campaign, and in the following year the advance party was despatched.145 After Philip's death, Alexander resumed the campaign in 334, and stormed through Asia Minor winning major victories at Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, securing the 'freedom' of Asia Minor and declaring himself Lord of Asia although Darius was not yet dead.146 Meanwhile trouble had been brewing in Greece. Among the mainland states only Sparta had taken no part in the Corinthian League,147 and after 335 became the centre of discontent and rebellion against Alexander. In 333 Agis III of Sparta made contact with the Persians at Siphnus, and asked for as much help as they could give him. 148 News had just arrived of the Persian defeat at Issus, so Agis received only thirty talents of silver and ten triremes, with which he headed off to make trouble in Crete.149 Revolt broke out on the mainland possibly in 331, but the Spartan efforts at revolt only provided a temporary distraction on Crete and in the Peloponnese, and Agis was killed in front of Megalopolis, bringing the exercise to an end.150 By this time, Darius was dead at the hands of one of his own commanders, and Alexander was in Bactria seeking Darius' revenge. Persian rule had come to an end, and there was now a new King in Asia. 140 141

142 143 144 146

148 150

Diod. 16.34.1-2; see also Hornblower (1991) 247. Compare Diod. 16.44.1, but Diodorus narrates Persia's successful campaign not at 343, where it belongs, but under 351/0 and 350/49. Philochoms,FGr/frsr328 F 157; [Dem.] 12.6; Diod. 16.44.1-2. Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 54; Diod. 16.74.2; on date, see Jacoby Supp. 1331. 145 Diod. 16.74.3-76.3; Paus. 1.29.10; Arrizn, Anab. 2.14.5. Diod. 16.89,91.1-3. On problems associated with the sources for Alexander's campaign (principally Arrian's Anabasis, Diodorus 17, Quintus Curtius, Justin's Epitome of Pompeius Trogus, and 147 Justin 9.5.3. Plutarch's Life ofAlexander), see Bosworth (1988b). 149 Airian, Anab. 2.13.4 -6. Diod. 17.48.1; Q. C. 4.8.15. Diod. 17.62.6-63.3, 73.5; Q. C. 6.1, Justin 21.1; Aeschin. 3.168; Dein. 1.34; cf. Arrian, Anab. 3.6.3 (on which see Bosworth (1980-95) 1.279). On Agis' revolt in general, see Brunt (1976-83) Appendix VI; and most recently Badian (1994b).


6.3

131

Greek and Persian relationships

A number of points arise from these examples of Greco-Persian relationships. Firstly, interstate relations and diplomatic activity with Persians took place by and large on a personal and individual level: Cyrus and Lysander, Cyrus and Clearchus, Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. Of course, formal and informal friendships on a state level did exist - Cyrus reminded Lysander that he had a philia with the Spartan state151 - yet it was Cyrus' private friendship with Lysander which formed the continuing basis for and drove this state relationship.152 The Greeks also had a formal institution which they could extend to non-Greeks that was essentially based on gift-exchange, xenia, and it seems that the most successful relationships between Greeks and Persians were xeniai.153 For example, Antalcidas was the xenos of Ariobarzanes, Apollophanes was a xenos of Pharnabazus, and Cyrus' mercenary army was built upon xeniai. Alcibiades' attempt to form a xenia with Tissaphernes suggests that it was important to him to formalise and validate their relationship in this way, just as Tissaphernes' rejection and imprisonment of Alcibiades also speaks volumes about the importance of the actual ritual of xenia, as does Callicratidas' refusal to contract xenia at all. Secondly, the Spartans seem to have formed more personal connections with the Persians than the Athenians did, and on the whole were far more successful in dealing with the Persians. This is not surprising in the light of what we have discussed in earlier chapters about the way in which Spartans and Athenians used personal connections in interstate affairs. As Lewis has noted, the Spartans were more 'like' the Persians,154 and yet it may be fairer to say that the Athenians were more unlike the Persians than the Spartans. The Athenians, to a greater extent than other poleis in the Greek world, had in the development of their democratic practices institutionalised many aristocratic practices of earlier periods, and much that had occurred on a private level in former times was translated to a civic level in the classical period.155 This does not mean that they had lost the facility for dealing with other states through individual and personal 151 152

153

154

Xen.,Hell. 2.1.14 On this misconception see Lewis (1989) 227-35; o n a similar misunderstanding in Greco-Macedonian affairs, see ch. 10. T h i s is perhaps n o t surprising considering that xenia was primarily a m o d e o f friendship between individuals who did not belong to the same communities (see Herman (1987) 31). Note also the added significance of the ambiguity of xenos, which can mean 'stranger'. Who was more of a stranger than a Persian? Cf. ch. 1. Lewis (1977) 148-52, esp. 151; cf. Hirsch (1985) 12. See also Cartledge ((1993) 80-2) for Herodotus' depiction of the Spartans as the 'Greek other', who shared many features 155 with the Persians and Scythians. See esp. ch. 2.

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friendships - indeed we have already seen that they did tend to deal with those on the fringes of their world in this way - but they did not always do so. This personal approach was still a stronger feature of Spartan interstate relations, and so perhaps the Spartans had more 'active' personal relationships with Persians which they could call upon, as well as the propensity to create new ones. 156 Yet not even formalised friendships could ensure that the relationship would work.157 Finally and most importantly, for all that was right in Greco-Persian relationships, there was much more that was wrong, and relations between the two were notorious for their failures. This was in large part due to cultural misunderstandings. Persians gave gifts in ways and circumstances that the Greeks did not always fully understand. For although there were sometimes superficial similarities in the kinds of exchange, Persians used a different repertoire of exchanges to the Greeks. The Persian King gave gifts as a normal concomitant of hospitality, but this could be - and was - misunderstood by the Greeks and misinterpreted as bribery. The reason for the failure lies in the differences in the kinds of exchange used by each partner in the relationship. Even subtle variations in the expected 'inputs' for the relationship affected the expected 'outputs' and the results of the exchange. Greek xenia was an egalitarian relationship: equal gift was given for equal gift, equal service for equal service. Persian society, on the other hand, was hierarchical, with structures which were reinforced by an imbalance of power and imbalance of gift-giving. So a Persian did not necessarily view xenia as an equal partnership, or enter it with the expectation of equality.158 He could - and often did - abandon the relationship when it suited him. Although Artaxerxes called Antalcidas his xenos, the King had the power to ignore Antalcidas when the Spartans were no longer a state to be flattered. The King, not having the same understanding of the kind of exchange (or perhaps knowing only too well), seeing himself as being of higher status within the relationship and only being in it for what he could get out of it, left the relationship when he had what he wanted. Moreover, the Persians approached these relationships with a different attitude to the Greeks. While the Greek thought he had drawn the Persian 156

158

Most of the relationships discussed in the previous chapter between various Spartans and communities in the Hellespont must generally have originated with that particular generation, rather than being inherited connections. That such relationships could and did lapse hardly needs to be stated: e.g., Alcibiades' lapsed proxenia with Sparta (Th. 157 5.43.2,6.89.2). Contra Herman (1987) 12. For some insights into this kind of mutual cultural misreading, compare Sahlins (1985) esp.136-56.


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inside his friendship network, and so assumed that he was locking himself and his Persian partner into a set of understood duties and commitments, the Persian did not always appear to share this understanding. The Persian was only in the relationship for as long as he could still get something out of it. The Persian often felt no obligation to keep responding in a positive way; the Greek did. That is not to say that Greco-Persian xeniai could not and did not work. Some even seem to have been hereditary.159 But it is not surprising that relationships between Greeks and Persians often failed, and often ended in disaster for the Greek, as Alcibiades and Antalcidas discovered. This clash of cultures amounted to a clash in different expectations arising out of different kinds of exchange: one simply did not understand what the other was doing. 159

E.g., Apollophanes and Pharnabazus; Antalcidas and Ariobarzanes. See also Humphreys (1977-8) 101 (=(1993) 2 7)-

Athenians and Thracians

A man's gift maketh room for him, and bringeth him before great men. Proverbs 18.16

During the fifth and fourth centuries, the Athenians were greatly concerned with events in the Thraceward region and the Thracian Chersonese. This led them to follow a policy of trying to form close links with members of the Thracian royal households through gifts of citizenship. However, the awarding of such honours did not always produce the desired results, and even placed the Athenians in the embarrassing situation of being openly at war with their own honorands. On the whole, the manner in which the Athenians dealt with the Thracian kings was clumsy and highlighted their own weaknesses and insecurities, and it particularly points to their lack of sensitivity to a culture not like their own. 7.1

The Thracians and gift-receiving

like the Persians', the Thracians' was a gift-giving culture. Just as there was an up-and-down flow of gifts from King to subjects and subjects to King in the Persian kingdom, so it was among the Thracians.1 But despite general similarities between the two cultures, gift-giving as an institution among the Thracians differed in significant ways from gift-giving in Persia, and this affected the way in which relationships flowed from the exchange and expectations were created by the exchange. In a digression describing the extent of the territory and customs of the Thracians, Thucydides says: The tribute from all the barbarian territory and the Greek cities as was paid in the reign of Seuthes,2 who was king after Sitalces and brought it to its peak, was valued at about four hundred talents of silver, paid in gold and silver. Gifts (dora) 1 2

On Thracian gift-giving generally, see Marazov (1989) 90-137. For Persian influence on the Odrysian concept of kingship, see Hoddinott (1981) 101-2. Though note the emendation of Saov npoafjâv TO ootovrrep rjpâv, which Rhodes (1988) includes in his text (see also HCT2.244s).

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in gold and silver no less in value were also contributed and, apart from this, brocaded, plain and other furnishings. These were given not only to the king, but also to the minor kings and nobles of the Odrysians. For they had established a custom opposite to that of the kingdom of the Persians - and this was a custom which existed for the rest of the Thracians as well - to receive rather than to give (it was more shameful for the one who had been asked not to give than for the one who had asked not to receive). But, nevertheless, the Odrysians carried it to greater lengths, for it was impossible to achieve anything unless one gave them gifts. Consequently, the kingdom became great in strength.3

Just as Persians gave gifts, Thracians received them. The question is, how did such a difference in the pattern of exchange affect the exchange itself? We have already seen how gifts were given by the Persian King at banquets and feasts.4 Gifts also featured at Thracian feasts, not as tokens given by the king, but rather as such received by him. Xenophon describes a feast of the Odrysian king, Seuthes, to which he was invited.5 It was suggested to the guests before the dinner that it was customary for Seuthes to be given gifts (doreisthai) by those he invited to dinner.6 The gifts Seuthes was given at this feast included a white horse, a silver bowl and a carpet worth ten minae, and each giver drank the king's health.7 The archaeological record appears to support this pattern. Odrysian graves at Douvlani in European Turkey dating to the fifth century contain Greek jewellery, silver and gold plate and fine Attic pottery, and were probably given by Greek cities to Odrysian chiefs.8 In addition, the socalled Rogozen Treasure was discovered in north-western Bulgaria in what had been the kingdom of the Triballians. Thirteen bowls and one jug are inscribed with anthroponyms which are recognised to be the names of Odrysian kings, including Cotys and Cersobleptes.9 A number of the bowls also have a toponym, which has been identified as the source of the vase or the metal.10 In this hoard there are five different toponyms assigned to bowls belonging to Cotys.11 The Thracian kings did not have one capital city, but several settlements, each of which the king was 3 5

6 7

9

10 11

4 Th. 2.97.3-4. See ch. 6. Xen., Anab. 7.3.21-33. It is interesting to note that Xenophon called the guests at the feast xenoi (22). Xenophon surely cannot mean 'ritualised-friends' in the fullest sense, nor 'strangers'. The implication is certainly hospitality, and the usage provides an indication of the range of meaning between these two extremes: that is, one does not have to be a stranger, nor does one have to be a ritualised-friend, in order to be called a xenos. Xen., Anab. 7.3.18. Xen.,^4na& 7.3.26-7. On the significance of the white horse, see Fol and Marazov (1977) 8 56-7. Hoddinott (1981) 106. E.g., KOTYOZ ES BEO [cat. 28]. On the inscriptions, see Fol (1989) 33-7; Hind (1989) 38-43; Painter (1989) 73-81; Mihailov (1989) 46-71. Fol (1989) 33; Mihailov (1989) 50. Beus: cat. 28,29,40; Aprus: cat. 30,31; Suthaba: cat. 41; Ergiske: cat. 42,43,46; Geistum: car. 45,47.

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required to visit according to an Orphic kind of ritual.12 The hoard may then represent gifts given by locals, such as those Xenophon describes as the first part of a reciprocal relationship perhaps as a form of tribute or tax, or as Marazov rather ingeniously suggests they may have been gifts given to the king, not as the receiver of guests, but as the 'dear guest' himself.13 In either case it is clear that the Thracian kings received gifts from the settlements in their kingdom. Although Thucydides is right in emphasising the receiving of gifts, of course the Thracian kings gave gifts as well.14 Heracleides of Maroneia encouraged Xenophon to give generously, as, he said, it was worthwhile to honour Seuthes most lavishly, since he would then make a return with even more lavish gifts.15 This is perhaps also the best explanation for the presence of the Odrysian gifts among the Triballian hoard: they were given again by the Odrysians to the Triballians as one-half of the reciprocal exchange.16 All the same, the Thracian kings placed the emphasis on receiving gifts in the first instance rather than giving them. This had two main effects on the relationship. Firstly, the relationship was generally prospective: the gift was given in the hope that at some time in the future it would be returned, and returned with interest.17 This had an effect on the power balance within the relationship as it gave the receiver, that is the king, the right to accept or reject the gift, and so accept or reject the relationship. This had a profound effect on the kind of exchange, since it meant that the relationship was unequal, that is it was essentially supplicatory: the gift-giver was asking to be brought into a relationship by offering a gift rather than being brought into a relationship by being given gifts.18 This is the reverse of what we would normally expect from such prospective giving (since 'normally' one would expect that receiving gifts placed one in debt, while giving gifts placed others in one's debt, as was the case in 12

13

14 15

16

18

See Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 31; Fol (1989) 33; Mihailov (1989) 35; Marazov (1989) 105. Marazov (1989) 105. For other interpretations of these inscriptions, see Nikolov (1989); Byvanck-Quarles van Ufford (1990) 53-5. See Hornblower (1991-6) 1.372-3; Briant (1987b) esp. 5-6. Xen., Anab. 7.3.19-20. Thracian forts featured among the gifts Seuthes promised Xenophon (Xen., Anab. 7.3.37; cf. 7.2.36,3.19,5.8,7.50). Marazov (1989) 106, although Marazov's detailed reconstruction of the ritual wherein visiting rulers accompanied the Odrysian rulers on their 'royal rounds' of the settlements and received the gifts as they entered the city is, I think, unnecessary; cf. Hind ((1989) 42) who suggests that the hoard may also have travelled north "as loot, or as possessions of refugees from Philip of Macedon's invasions in 346 or 342'. For other views, see SEG 37 17 Compare here Xen., Mem. 2.3.11-13 (see ch. 1). (1987) 618. An important parallel is supplication in the Greek world as opposed to xenia: again supplication is asking to be brought inside the relationship, while xenia is being brought inside the relationship: see Gould (1973) 74-103.


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Persia), but in the hands of the Thracian kings it became a means of gaining power and control, and so creating social inequalities since those who gave did so in order that they might receive. As a consequence of this inequality, the more powerful partner was then also able to direct the relationship, and (despite the perfidiousness of such a move) to choose when he wished to leave it, whether it had been fulfilled or not. The reason this prospective and supplicatory giving was effective was of course because the Thracians controlled resources that others, such as the Athenians, desperately wanted. We are then left to ask how the Greeks - and especially the Athenians - dealt with this.

7.2

On misunderstanding the Thracians

Athens had a tradition of connections with Thrace and the Thraceward region which began at the end of the seventh century and continued throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, particularly with the Thracian royal families.19 The Athenians' attempts to settle colonies and cleruchies in the region probably began with the capture of Sigeium in about 600 BC. 20 Peisistratus in the sixth century during his second exile from the tyranny is reported by the Athenaion Politeia as having colonised Rhaecelus in Chalcidice and the region about Mt Pangaeus, and Herodotus notes that he was able to draw revenue from the region about the River Strymon.21 The settlement in the Chersonese took place under the control of the Philaidae in the late sixth and early fifth centuries, and cleruchies were also settled in the Chersonese in the later fifth and fourth centuries.22 The mother of Cimon son of Miltiades was a Thracian princess, daughter of king Olorus, and Thucydides son of Olorus the historian was connected with the same family.23 Thucydides also owned gold-mines in Thrace and was known to have influence with the leading men there.24 Hagnon son of Nicias was sent to Thrace as founder of Amphipolis in 437/6, and much of his military career centred on the region.25 Alcibiades son of Cleinias also may have had some kind of ties 19

20

21 22

23 24

25

T h e Thracians themselves claimed t o have Athenian connections, through Tereus, but this was spurious as Thucydides himself makes clear ( T h . 2.29.3; cf. Xen.3Anab. 7.2.31). H d t . 5.94-5; Strabo 13.1.38-9; D . L. 1.74; Page (1955) 152-60; Jeffery (1976) 8 9 - 9 0 ; Boardman (1980) 2 6 4 - 5 . [Aiist.],Ath. Pol. 15.2.; Hdt. 1.64.1; Rhodes (1993) 207-8. Philai'dae in Chersonese: H d t . 6 . 3 4 - 4 1 ; cf. Ehrenberg (1946) 1 1 9 - 2 8 ; Graham (1964) 3 2 - 3 . Cleruchies: see Plut., Per. 19.1; D i o d . 16.34.4; Cawkwell (1978) 7 2 . Plut.,C«w. 4 . 1 - 2 . Plut., Cim. 4 . 2 ; T h . 4.105.1. O n Thucydides' generalship in Thrace in 424/3, see Appendix I: * Athenian Generals'. For selection as founder, see Th. 4.102.3,5.11.1; cf. ch. 2; for generalships, see ch. 5.

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with the Thracian rulers Seuthes and Medocus, as did Thrasybulus son of Lycus, to whom it was allegedly suggested that he should marry the daughter of the Thracian king Seuthes in order to escape trouble at home. 26 Iphicrates son of Timotheus did in fact marry either the daughter or the sister of Cotys the Odrysian king, and may have had family connections with Thrace antedating 393.27 One need not go far to understand the importance of Thrace to Athens and the great Athenian families. In the fifth century, Thrace extended from the River Strymon to the Black Sea and from the Danube to the Aegean, and Thucydides says the kingdom was greater than ever before under Seuthes I the Odrysian king of the Thracians.28 It was an important source of natural resources. Not only was the Strymon Plain rich in timber and metals, but Thrace was also an important source of grain for Athens and the Thracian Chersonese was influential in controlling the passage of grain from the Black Sea.29 Athens also established colonies along the Aegean coast, first at Brea perhaps in 446, then at Amphipolis in 437/6. 30 But this influence was not lasting. In 424, Amphipolis revolted from Athens and set up Brasidas as its founder, and Athens never managed to recover it.31 Amphipolis was finally taken by Philip in 357, being crucial for his own plans in the northeast.32 And yet despite all these connections with Thrace, an important question for the consideration of the Athenians' Thracian policy is how far they understood and could make allowances for a culture which was different from their own. The Athenians held the Thracians in contempt for their wildness, drunkenness and barbarity,33 yet they still awarded their kings the greatest honour that was available to them - citizenship only to see their new Thracian citizens disregard and abuse it. Three episodes in particular serve to highlight some of the ways in 26

27

28

29

30 31

32

33

Alcibiades: see c h . 3 ; Thrasybulus: L y s . 28.5—6, a n d see A p p e n d i x I: 'Athenian Generals'. Dem. 23.129; Anaxandrides ap. Athen. 4.i3ia-f; cf. Nepos, Iph. 3.4; on his relationship to Cotys, see Davies (1971) 249. See also ch. 5. Th. 2.97.1-2; cf. Hdt. 4.99.1; Diod. 12.50.1-3; Th. 2.29; Casson (1926) 194-5; Cawkwell (1978) 43T i m b e r and metals: cf. T h . 4.105.1; H o p p e r (1979) 166; Ellis (1976) 3 2 ; grain: H o p p e r (1979) 7 2 , 7 4 - 7 ; Hornblower (1991) 4 1 , 4 6 . For the fertility of Thrace, see Isoc. 8.24; o n the n e e d for importing grain t o Athens, see D e m . 20.31; Garnsey (1985) 6 2 - 7 5 . Brea: M L 4 9 ; Graham (1964) 3 4 - 5 ; Amphipolis: see schol. Aeschin. 2.31. O n Athens' obsession with Amphipolis and attempts t o recover it: ch. 8; o n Brasidas and Amphipolis: ch. 2. Diod. 16.8.2-3; Dem. 1.5, 20.63. O n m e strategic importance of Amphipolis, see Th. 4.108.1; livy 45.30.3; Cawkwell (1978) 72-6. See, e.g., Anaxandrides ap. Athen. 4.i3ia-f; Dem. 23.114; cf. Xen., Anab. 7.3.21-33; Casson (1926) 203-4.


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which the Athenians managed and mismanaged their Thracian concerns: Thucydides' account of Athenian involvement in Sitalces' campaign in Macedon; Xenophon's dealings with Seuthes; and Iphicrates' support of Cotys against his fellow countrymen. It then remains to consider how Athens dealt with Thrace and tried to keep the Thracian kings loyal through grants of citizenship. From these we should be able to see something of what the Athenians thought they were doing, and where they were going wrong. 7.2.1

Sitalces

The Athenian response to Sitalces highlights the general insecurity intrinsic to Greco-Thracian relationships and the tentative way in which the Athenians approached the Thracians. In 431 the Athenians made an alliance with Sitalces.34 One of the aims of the alliance was to make war on the Chalcidians and on Perdiccas (although Perdiccas himself was in alliance with the Athenians), but the campaign did not actually take place until the winter of 429/8. 35 When the expedition did set out, although Sitalces took with him Athenian ambassadors (who were there for the purpose) and Hagnon the Athenian general as commander,36 the promised Athenian troops did not arrive. Thucydides' explanation is that the Athenians did not believe that the Thracians would come, even though they had sent gifts (dora) and ambassadors to him.37 Gomme excuses the Athenian mistrust not on the grounds that the campaign had been delayed for two years so much as on the fact that Sitalces did not move until winter.38 But despite the delay and the inconvenient timing the campaign did happen, and the Athenians' lack of trust was misplaced. Furthermore, the Athenians seem to have had some kind of indication that the campaign was about to be under way (Hagnon after all was already with the Thracians): perhaps in fact the Athenian mistrust was based rather on the their own insecurity about dealing with Thracians, despite the gifts and the ambassadors. 7.2.2

Xenophon and Seuthes

Xenophon in his Anabasis describes his contact with Seuthes as he was trying to lead the army of the Ten Thousand out of Thrace.39 Anaxibius 34 36 38 39

35 Th. 2.29.4-5. Th. 2.29.4,95-1-2; cf. Hammond and Griffith (1979) 127-8. 37 Th. 2.95.3. On Hagnon's status, see ch. 5. Th. 2.101.1. HCr2.248;cf.Borza (1990) 147. For X e n o p h o n ' s 'hellenising' of Seuthes in the Anabasis, compare his treatment of Cyrus in the Cyropaedeia (see esp. ch. 6).

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the Spartan Nauarch had urged Xenophon to collect together the army that was then scattered around Perinthus and to take it back to Asia, although Seuthes sent a message to Xenophon asking that he bring the army to Thrace.40 In the end Xenophon was forced to accept Seuthes' invitation since the new governor at Byzantium, Aristarchus, refused to allow the army to cross and threatened to sink any ships that set sail.41 Xenophon describes his first introductions to Seuthes with colour and detail. After the negotiations had been completed for the army to fight with Seuthes so that he could recover his ancestral territory, Xenophon relates how he was invited to dinner with the king at a nearby village.42 When they arrived at the house and were about to go in, they noticed Heracleides of Maroneia who was approaching people he thought could give Seuthes a present. He said to Timasion, a Dardanian exile, that it was customary for those invited to dinner by Seuthes to give him a gift, and that if ever Seuthes became great he would make some kind of return.43 When Heracleides came to Xenophon he said to him: You are from the greatest city and your name is very great at Seuthes' court. Perhaps you will think it worthwhile to receive forts and land in this country just as others of your countrymen have done. So it is worth your while to honour Seuthes lavishly. I advise you since I wish you well. I know truly that the more gifts you give (doreiri) him, the more you will experience good things at his hands.44 In a nutshell, Heracleides' message was that one gives things to the Thracian king in order to increase his power, and that once he achieves this desirable position he will repay in kind. Here, as we also saw earlier, the emphasis was upon prospective giving, where one gives so that in the future one may receive much more.45 And yet when Seuthes had regained his kingdom, the relationship between himself and Xenophon had soured and Xenophon accused the king of injustice, saying to him: Before I served you, you received me pleasantly with your eyes and voice and gifts of hospitality (xenid) and you could not make enough promises of how things would be. But when you have achieved what you wanted and have become the greatest I could make you, now do you dare to allow me to be dishonoured among the soldiers in this way? But indeed, I trust that it will seem best to you to repay your debt and that time will teach you and that you yourself will not bear to see those who havefreelygiven to you a benefaction (euergesid) accusing you. So I ask you, when you pay back your debt, to be eager to restore me to the position I had among the soldiers when you found me.46 40 42 45

41 Xen.sAnab. 7.2.8-11. X.en.sAnab. 7.2.12-17; cf. 7.1.5. 43 Xen., Anab. 7.2.15,20-3.14. Xen.,Anab. 7.3.18. ** Xen.,Anab. 7.3.19-20. Compare the way Persians give in order that they may bring people under their control 46 through the excess of their giving; see ch. 6. Xen., Anab. 7.7.46-7.


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Liberally sprinkled with good Greek morality, this speech still serves to highlight the forward perspective of Xenophon's giving, and the reasons for which it was given in advance: so that when Xenophon had made Seuthes great, the king might then make the return he ought. The emphasis was upon an initial giving, and any reward that was ultimately given in return was contingent upon this initial gift.47 More to the point, Xenophon failed to secure his return. Again this is the politics of power. Because the relationship was prospective, Xenophon was putting himself in a vulnerable position and taking the risk that the favour would be repaid. Seuthes held the ascendancy in the relationship. He already had what he wanted, so was able to repay or not as he liked. Morally reprehensible as his failure to reciprocate may have been (with the subsequent loss of honour, which he clearly had little enough regard for), in real terms he lost nothing but gained all.

7.2.3

Iphicrates and Cotys

I see that Cotys was a relative by marriage to Iphicrates in the same way that Cersobleptes was to Charidemus, and I see that the things that have been done are far greater and worthy of a larger charts by Cotys for Iphicrates, than that which has been done by Cersobleptes for Charidemus. Let us consider it thus. You know, of course, men of Athens, that there was a bronze statue of Iphicrates in the city and that he had maintenance in the prytaneion, gifts (doreiai) and other honours, because of which he was fortunate. Nevertheless, he dared to fight on behalf of Cotys' affairs on the opposite side to your generals in the seabattle, and he placed the salvation of Cotys above the honours which existed for himself among you . . . But Cotys, having been saved by Iphicrates and having experienced the philia of this man, when he thought he was securely safe and sound, did not exert himself to repay the charts to Iphicrates, and he did not do any kindness to you through Iphicrates so that he might obtain pardon for what had happened. But quite the contrary he decided that Iphicrates should join him in besieging the rest of your strongholds, although Iphicrates did not want to, and taking a barbarian force and the force collected by Iphicrates, and having taken into his pay this very Charidemus, Cotys attacked your strongholds. Because of this he put Iphicrates in a hopeless position, so that as a result he went away to Antissa to live and later to Drus, thinking that he could not honourably come to you, whom he had placed after Thrace and the barbarian, but that it was not safe to remain with Cotys, who he saw made so small account of his safety.48 T h e case of Iphicrates and Cotys is indicative of the cultural differences and misunderstandings which took place between Athenians and 47

As Gauthier notes ((1973) 13) the relationship between Seuthes and Xenophon is not a 48 xenia in the true (Greek) sense of the word. Dem. 23.129-32.

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Thracians. Since Iphicrates married into Cotys' family,49 it is not altogether surprising that Iphicrates chose the Thracian's side when Cotys became an enemy of Athens, though this undoubtedly placed him in an interesting position: either to betray his philia to his adopted family, who were also barbarians, or to betray his own country. But while Iphicrates may have felt the pull of these familial obligations, Cotys certainly did not. Demosthenes says that having made trial of Iphicrates' philia, Cotys was not eager to pay back the favour, but rather took advantage of Iphicrates' position. Iphicrates was then reduced to such a state that he would not return to Athens, thinking that he could not when he had favoured Thrace and a barbarian, yet feared for his safety among those whose friendship he had chosen to protect. Iphicrates appears to have badly miscalculated. Cotys did not seem to honour the same obligations as him, or feel the same burden towards his philoi. Just as Seuthes proved unreliable in giving his return for Xenophon's services, so Cotys did not make the return that was expected for what had been given or for what was expected by a Greek of a kinship relationship. Although the Greeks felt the great weight of such relationships and obligations, the Thracian kings apparently did not. 7•3

The Thracians and Athenian citizenship

The late fifth and the fourth centuries saw Athens trying to establish new strategies for maintaining contacts with the local monarchs of the Thraceward parts. Despite the family connections that already existed with Thrace, by the late fifth century the Athenians' corporate identity of the polis had developed to such an extent that in terms of general foreign policy the Athenians themselves as a polis made contacts with the Thracian rulers and awarded them civic honours in order to draw these Thracian potentates, however ineffectively, into the Greek network of obligation on a state level.50 The Athenians adopted the policy of awarding citizenship to the kings of the Odrysians, the most powerful of the dynasties which dominated south-eastern Thrace, and occasionally to their commanders or advisers 49

50

T h i s is interesting in its o w n right. F o r Iphicrates' s o n could b e , a n d in fact w a s , maligned for n o t being a true Athenian citizen, that is, with t w o Athenian parents, although Cotys and his family m a y have b e e n granted citizenship before the marriage: see Davies (1971) 250. N o t e also that Iphicrates was the adopted son of the M a c e d o n i a n king, Amyntas (Aeschin. 2 . 2 8 ) , s o h e had strong northern connections: s e e also Davies (1971) 250. Although, as will b e n o t e d from ch. 5, certain magisterial appointments were still influenced by connections in this area.


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as well.51 The first such grant was to Sadocus, son of Sitalces, and heir apparent to the Odrysian throne at the outset of the Peloponnesian War in 431. 52 Having first made the brother-in-law of Sitalces, Nymphodorus of Abdera, a proxenos, the Athenians despatched him to Sitalces to form an alliance, as they wanted him to attack Perdiccas and the neighbouring territory to Thrace.53 Then Nymphodorus came to Athens and concluded the alliance between the Athenians and Sitalces, and had Sitalces' son Sadocus made a citizen.54 The purpose of this grant of citizenship was at least in part to provide Athens with an interest in the north Aegean.55 The grant reaped rewards almost immediately. When in 430 Peloponnesian ambassadors on their way to Persia stopped at the court of Sitalces, two Athenian ambassadors who were there persuaded Sadocus to hand the Peloponnesians over to them.56 Sadocus agreed, and the Peloponnesians were taken to Athens and put to death. From giving such a high honour the Athenians expected a just repayment, which Sadocus respected.57 This award of citizenship was to set a pattern followed throughout the fourth century, though not necessarily with similarly positive results.58 After a period in the last years of thefifthcentury when Thracian interests turned towards Macedon,59 in the 390s the Odrysian kingdom was divided between Medocus (=Amadocus I) the king of the Odrysians and Seuthes 51

52 53 54

55

57 59

Note that Athens also pursued this policy with other royal families in the north, e.g., the kings of the Bosporus and Molossia (Osborne (1981-3) 3.41-4, 49, 80, 85, 87,112-13), although there were differences between the construction of these relationships and those with the kings of Thrace. On the development of Thracian tribes into political groupings, see Fol and Marazov (1977) 149-50. Th. 2.29.4-5,67.2; Ai.,Acharn. 141-50; cf. Osborne (1981-3) 3.26-7. Th. 2.29.1-4. On this proxeny, see ch. 2. Th. 2.29.5; though Osborne ((1981-3) 3.27) notes that it is unclear whether the grant of citizenship influenced Sitalces, or 'whether it merely signifies the conclusion of the pact'. For the suggestion that Sadocus may have actually exercised his citizen rights, see Osborne (1981-3) 3.27 and n. 39. Other reasons included the security of the grain supply, and the assurance of Thracian 56 military assistance: cf. Hopper (1979) 72; Osborne (1981-3) 3.27. Th. 2.67. 58 Osborne (1981-3) 4.188. Ibid. 4.188-9. Sadocus may not have succeeded Sitalces (although Fol ((1989) 33-4) suggests that Sadocus may in fact have held the Thracian throne, however briefly; contra Archibald (1994) 454), and the kingdom went to Sitalces* nephew Seuthes (I) (Th. 4.101.5; on the succession, see Hock (1891a) 82-3; Archibald (1994) 454), who seems to have pursued a more pro-Macedonian policy, marrying Stratonice the sister of Perdiccas (Perdiccas promised Seuthes the hand of his sister complete with a dowry if Seuthes persuaded Sitalces to give up his campaign in Macedon (Th. 2.101.5-6); cf. Casson (1926) 197-8 (although I see no evidence for the claim that Seuthes (I) was awarded Athenian citizenship): cf. Hammond and Griffith (1979) 104,129,153). Although Thucydides says that Seuthes brought his kingdom to a financial peak (Th. 2.29.2), he focused his expansion upon the Thracian Chersonese and away from the south-west and Macedon and the Athenian colonies there (Fol and Marazov (1977) 152).

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(II) the archon in the coastal region, who both becamefiriendsand allies of the Athenians through the efforts of Thrasybulus the Athenian general.60 Cotys succeeded to the throne in 384/3, and was probably awarded citizenship soon after.61 But he was not reliably pro-Athenian, and when he was assassinated in 360, the Athenians honoured the assassins Python and Heracleides of Aenus with citizenship.62 The Athenians had placed themselves in the ridiculous position of honouring with citizenship the men who had killed the man whom they had honoured with citizenship. Furthermore, this points to an important contradiction and hypocrisy in Athenian political practice: while the Athenians supported an ideology that condoned and celebrated the murder of potentates, such as the murder of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, they also needed to support foreign potentates in order to secure important strategic points such as the Chersonese and the Hellespont.63 On Cotys' death, the kingdom was divided into three parts ruled by Berisades, Amadocus (II) and Cersobleptes.64 The Athenians tried to maintain good relations with all three, but paid special attention to Cersobleptes who controlled the all-important Chersonese.65 We know that Cersobleptes was awarded Athenian citizenship in about 360, that Amadocus probably was since Teres (his likely successor) certainly was, and in view of this that Berisades and his successor, Cetriporis, probably were also.66 60

61

62 63

64 66

X e n . , Hell 4.8.26. H a m m o n d ( H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 195) claims that the Odrysian kingdom was divided into three parts at this stage, and ruled b y M e d o c u s (I), Seuthes (II) and Hebryzelmis. However, Osborne ((1981-3) 3.111), following T o d ( c o m m . o n 117) and H o c k ((1891b) 4 5 3 - 6 2 ) , makes Hebryzelmis the successor o f M e d o c u s , as does Archibald ((1994) 458). Casson ((1926) 199) suggests o n the basis of D i o d . 14.94.2, where M e d o c u s and Seuthes are both called kings, that there may have been a dual kingdom. Seuthes and M e d o c u s probably also received grants of citizenship since w h e n Hebryzelmis succeeded t o M e d o c u s ' throne in the 380s the Athenians granted h i m honours which had also b e e n granted to his forefathers, and this is probably referring to citizenship (IG ii 2 31 ( = T o d 117); see also XenÂnab. 7.6.43 for 'AfipoCeXurjs the envoy w h o has been identified b y s o m e scholars as the Thracian king of the inscription (cf. Casson (1926) 199); see esp. Osborne (1981-3) 3.111). Osborne (1981-3) 3.50; for citizenship, see [Dem.] 12.9 (noting also Osborne (1981-3) 3.122); D e m . 23.118. Cf. the award m a d e to Cotys' brother in 330: IG ii 2 349 ( = T o d 193). Dem. 23.127, cf. 119; see also Osborne (1981-3) 3.49-50,58-9 (under Python of Aenus). T h e murder of Hipparchus: for the various accounts, see T h . 6 . 5 4 - 9 . 1 ; [Arist.], Ath. Pol. 18; o n the accounts a n d matters associated with the tyrannicide, see R h o d e s (1993) 2 2 7 - 3 3 . Compare also the assassination o f Phrynichus in 411: T h . 8.92.2; Lys. 13.70-2; IG i 3 1 0 2 ( = M L 85) with Meiggs' and Lewis' commentary. 65 D e m . 23.8; IG ii 2 126 ( = T o d 151). Osborne (1981-3) 3.59. Cersobleptes: [Dem.] 12.8, D e m . 23.141; A m a d o c u s ' citizenship depends u p o n the fact that A m a d o c u s was the father of Teres, a king of Thrace w h o held Athenian citizenship in the 340s, w h o also had a brother, Amadocus. S i m o n and Bianor, generals in the service o f A m a d o c u s (II) were certainly granted citizenship ( D e m . 23.12, cf. 180), which increases the probability that A m a d o c u s was also; for this see Osborne (1981-3) 3.62 (under S i m o n of Thrace), 6 5 - 6 (under Teres s o n o f Amadocus); Berisades and Cetriporis: Osborne (1981-3) 3-59-60.


145

The Athenians laid so much importance on keeping Thrace secure that they even went so far as to award citizenship to the Thracian commanders of these kings. Simon and Bianor, commanders under Amadocus (II), were made naturalised citizens, and Charidemus, Cersobleptes' kinsman and general, had probably already acquired citizenship by the time it was awarded to Cersobleptes himself.67 But Charidemus, although he served as a general on the Athenian board, was notorious for working for the interests of his master Cersobleptes rather than for the interests of the Athenians, and often fought openly against them.68 In 357, despite initial difficulties in coming to an agreement, the Athenians made an alliance with the three Thracian kings.69 But on the death of Berisades, Cersobleptes began to wage war upon the sons of Berisades as well as Amadocus against the interests of Athens in order to unite the three kingdoms into one. 70 After 360 matters became somewhat more complicated with the emergence of Macedon under the leadership of Philip II as a major power with interests in this area. Cersobleptes laid siege to the Thasian colony of Crenides within the territory of Berisades, but this gave Philip the opportunity to come to the aid of the city and take control.71 In 356 Cetriporis the son of Berisades made an alliance with the Athenians and the kings of Paeonia and Illyria against Philip, but while the Thracians, Illyrians and Paeonians were gathering their forces, Philip appeared before they had drawn up their battle lines, and forced them to join the Macedonians.72 In 353 Philip moved east and came to Maroneia in central Thrace, but although Amadocus prevented him moving further eastward he could not prevent him making contact with Cersobleptes.73 In 352 the Athenians took Sestus, killing the adults and enslaving the rest.74 Cersobleptes, now fearful of the Athenians, renewed his alliance with Athens and his hostility to Philip, and turned over the city of Cardia to the Athenians with promises to regain Amphipolis for them. 75 67

69 70 71

72

73

75

S i m o n a n d Bianor: D e m . 23.12; Charidemus: D e m . 23.65, 8 9 , 1 4 1 , 145, 187, 188; 68 T h e o p o m p u s , F G r H i s t 115 F 1 4 3 ; Osborne (1981-3) 3 . 5 7 - 8 , cf. 59. D e m . 23passim. D e m . 23.170-3; IG ii 2 126 ( = T o d 151); cf. Hornblower (1991) 2 4 9 . D e m . 2 3 . 1 - 1 5 , 1 7 9 , cf. 103; H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 248. Steph. Byzant. s.v. &I\UTITOI; D i o d . 16.8.6; cf. 16.3.7. O n the probability that it was Cersobleptes w h o was responsible for the attack o n Crenides, see H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 2 4 7 - 8 ; Archibald (1994) 4 6 5 - 6 . O n Philip's timing in his annexation of the city, see H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 2 4 6 - 7 . Cetriporis and Athens: IG ii 2 127 ( = T o d 157); Thracians, Illyrians and Paeonians and Philip: D i o d . 16.22.3; see also P\ut.3 Alex. 3.8; Justin 12.16.6. Dem. 23.183; though see also Ellis ((1976) 76-7, esp. 77, cf. 80) for his suggestion that Chares' presence in the area may also have acted as a deterrent; cf. Hammond and 74 Griffith (1979) 264-7. Diod. 16.34.3. Diod. 16.34.4; Dem. 23.14; Ellis (1976) 80-1; Hammond and Griffith (1979) 282.

146


However, Amadocus appears to have allied himself with Philip in a war with Perinthus and Byzantium against Cersobleptes.76 Cersobleptes was defeated by Philip and Amadocus, and compelled to send his son to Macedon as a hostage.77 Amadocus and Cetriporis also seem to have been deposed, and Teres (the son of Amadocus) and Cersobleptes were given control of Thrace, although they were reduced to vassal status under Philip.78 In 346 Philip resumed his attack on Thrace and captured a number of key forts along the Aegean coast and the Chersonese.79 Cersobleptes tried to have himself included among the signatories of the Peace of Philocrates, but without success, and was abandoned by the Athenians and left to the mercy of Philip in spite of his citizen status.80 The year 342 saw a concerted attack by Philip on the remainder of Thrace, whom he ordered to pay a tithe to the Macedonians, driving Cersobleptes and Teres out of their kingdoms.81 The Athenians' attempts at controlling the north-east through the Thracian kings had failed, not necessarily through their own fault, but because the policy they had followed had led to insecurity and weakness. Again it came down largely to a problem with the kind of exchange, because the medium of exchange did not have the same value to both parties. The Thracian kings did not always see the award of citizenship as the Athenians expected and wanted them to; it did not bind them to the Athenians as it ought, and they were notorious in their disregard for Athens and Athenian interests. As Demosthenes himself said: Men of Athens, I believe that all who were eager to become citizens because they desired our ways and customs would at the same time obtain these things, live among us and have a share in that which they desired. But for all those for whom neither desire nor zeal for any of these things had any effect, but who love the advantage which they enjoy because they seem to be honoured by you, these people, I believe - rather I know - whenever they see hope of greater advantage from another quarter, will attend to (therapeusein) this without having given you another thought.82 Sadocus accepted the citizenship, and responded as he was expected to, but his father also expected Athenian help for his Macedonian campaign.83 Cersobleptes, on the other hand, only valued his Athenian 76

77 78

79 80 82

Schol. Aeschin. 2.81; T h e o p o m p u s , FGrHist 115 F I O I . O n Amadocus: H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 2 8 2 - 3 . Aeschin. 2.81 and schol; cf. H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 283. A m a d o c u s a n d Cetriporis: D e m . 1.13; Archibald (1994) 4*>7; Teres and Cersobleptes: [Dem.] 12.8; cf. 10; Cawkwell (1978) 44; Archibald (1994) 467. Dem. 8.64,9.15,18.27,19-150,156,334; [Dem.] 7.36-7; Aeschin. 2.90,3.82. 81 Aeschin. 2.82-4; 3.73-4. Diod. 16.71.1-2; [Dem.] 12.10. 83 Dem. 23.126, cf. 114; [Dem.] 12.8-9. See above.


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citizenship when he was being threatened by Philip. This was a problem with the gift itself, since the value of Athenian citizenship depended very much on whether it was useful to the recipient or not.84 Furthermore, although the Athenians were trying to form relationships with the Thracians like xenia or citizenship which were equal and balanced, the power relations were such that they were forced into the position of suppliants. Xenophon was not truly the xenos of Seuthes in any real sense, despite the gifts and xenia, since Seuthes did not keep his side of the exchange. Similarly, in what sense were Cotys or Cersobleptes Athenian citizens, when they barely even attempted to look after the interests of their adopted polis? Philip himself is supposed to have written mockingly to the Athenians: When 85 died, to whom you had given a share in the citizenship, did you straight away make aphilia with the man who killed him, and did you choose to go to war on Cersobleptes' behalf against me? And you did this in the full knowledge that none of those who receive such gifts (doreai) pay any attention to your laws and decrees.86 The weakness of the Athenian position is plain. The loyalty and goodwill of the Thracian kings was important to the Athenians' interests in the north, so they were in the weaker position, and this made them vulnerable to Thracian infidelities. They were forced into the position of suppliants, offering a gift prospectively which the Thracians could accept or not as they chose. The Athenians failed to understand or at least to cope fully with Thracian society and its modes of exchange. Because of this they failed to respond creatively to the problem of Thracian loyalty, but simply repeated the same inadequate policy over again. This failure to appreciate completely the differences between the two cultures produced difficulties - if not disasters - for the Athenians in the fourth century. Although the loss of control in Thrace could be sustained by the Athenians, their general lack of insight into the way non-Greek, or at most marginally Greek, societies worked and differed from their own was to prove their absolute undoing when they also misunderstood and underestimated Philip and the Macedonians. 84 85

Cf. Osborne (1981-3) 3.59. See Osborne (1981-3) 3.49,122 (under Sitalces of Thrace).

86

[Dem.] 12.9.

8

Philip and the Greeks

Philip was a man of broad vision. He drank a great deal and had eight wives. He subdued the Greeks after they had knocked themselves out in the Peloponnesian War and appointed himself Captain General so that he could uphold the ideals of Hellas. The main ideal of Hellas was to get rid of Philip, but he didn't count that one. W. Cuppy, The Decline and Fall of Practically Everybody Odi dolosas munerum et malas artes: imitantur hamos dona: namque quis nescit avidum vorata decipi scarum mused? quotiens amico diviti nihil donat, o Quintiane, liberate est pauper.

Martial, Epigrams 5.18.6

Philip brought himself from being a petty prince with a questionable claim to the throne of a semi-barbarian kingdom to become the most influential man in the Greek world. His growth in strength and influence was dependent not only upon his reforms (both in Macedonian institutions and in the army) and successful conquests in northern and central Greece, but also to a large degree upon his diplomatic tactics and the manner in which he dealt with the Greek states, particularly Athens. Supposedly of Argive descent, he certainly spent three years of his adolescence as a hostage in Thebes.1 There he may well have learned military skills from Epameinondas;2 he certainly learned a great deal about the way the sophisticated and educated southern Greeks thought - not only their philosophy, but also the subtleties of their codes of friendship. It seems that it was not least through his appreciation of these codes of behaviour and his shrewd ability to manipulate and exploit them that he brought the Greek states to their downfall. 1

2

Plut., Pelop. 26.5; Justin 6.9.7, 7-5-2-3; Diod. 15.67.4, cf. 16.2.2; see Hammond and Griffith (1979) 204-5. On the Argeads' descent from Heracles, see ch. 2. Plut., Pelop. 26.7; Diod. 16.2.3.

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8.1

149

Philip and gift-giving

[Philip] was courteous in his dealings with others, and tried to bring the multitudes to the greatest goodwill (eunoid) through both gifts (doreai) and promises, and tried to counteract cleverly the crowd of impending dangers.3 Philip's methods of dealing with others were not untypical of other giftgiving societies: he gave gifts in order to win loyalty, and he did this on both a state and a personal level. There are many examples of Philip giving gifts in one form or another for the purpose of winning individuals and poleis over to himself. Diodorus says that after the capture of Olynthus he held a banquet at which he gave drinking-cups, as well as other gifts, to his guests, and made many promises, gaining returns far greater than what he had given, 'for many were encouraged by hopes of his benefactions (euergesiai) and tried to outstrip each other in devoting themselves to Philip and in handing over their father-lands to him'. 4 Demosthenes recounts how Aeschines, on his way home from Arcadia, met with a certain Atrestidas to whom Philip had given thirty of the Olynthian captives as a gift {doted)? Likewise Olynthus made an alliance with Philip in which he promised to give them Poteidaea and Anthemous, and later the Aetolians seem to have negotiated a treaty with Philip on the understanding that he would give them Naupactus, possibly in exchange for an alliance.6 Demosthenes also writes about the reception of the Theban ambassadors at Philip's court, saying that when the Theban ambassadors arrived: Philip wished to give them money, and a very large sum, they said. But the Theban ambassadors did not accept it or take it. After this, at a sacrifice and banquet, while he was drinking with them and being kindly to them, Philip offered them many other things, such as prisoners and the like, and finally gold and silver cups. They kept on refusing all these things and never giving in. Finally one of the ambassadors, Philo, spoke . . . He said that he was pleased and rejoiced to see Philip being magnanimous and kind to them. They were indeed phUot and xenoi to him even without these gifts (dora)> and the ambassadors called on Philip to direct this kindness towards the affairs of the city [Thebes], in which he was then engaged, and to do something worthy of himself and the Thebans, and they promised that in this way the whole city as well as themselves would be inclined towards him.7 3 6

7

4 5 Diod. 16.3.3. Diod. 16.55. Dem. 19.305-6. Olynthian alliance: Diod. 16.8.3; Tod 158 (Robinson (1934) 103-22); Dem. 2.7; 6.20; 23.107-8. On the pro-Macedonian element and expulsion of the pro-Athenians in Olynthus, see Dem. 9.56, 66,19.265. Note that the pro-Macedonians in Olynthus were supposedly won over by bribes. Aetolian's treaty: Dem. 9.34; Strabo 9.4.7; see Hammond and Griffith (1979) 508-9; Ellis (1976) 158; cf. Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 235. Dem. 19.139-40.

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The Thebans might have required that he direct his benevolence towards a public cause rather than a private one, but it was still a form of exchange. He would have the goodwill of the Thebans, if he gave them what they wanted. Philip was more than happy to comply.8 8.2

Philip, Athens and Amphipolis

In his dealings with the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, Philip skilfully manipulated exchange-relationships in order to secure his own political purposes, and this can be seen from the earliest days of his reign. Philip's first task as king was to consolidate the kingdom he had and try to settle the problems on his borders. Philip executed one of his half-brothers, and later pursued to Olynthus the other two who were also rival claimants for the throne.9 He took an Illyrian bride, probably in 359/8, persuaded the Paeonians to keep peace, 'having corrupted some with gifts, and having persuaded others with benevolent promises', and won over the Thracians in a similar way.10 Philip then dealt with Argaeus, a pretender to the Macedonian throne, and the Athenians by exploiting the Athenian desire to regain control of Amphipolis.11 Founded by the Athenians at the place called Ennea Hodoi on the River Strymon and lost to Sparta in 424,12 the Athenians' lack of influence in Amphipolis remained a matter of grave concern to them into the fourth century, yet despite their best efforts they were unable to win it back.13 Even after Philip had taken the city decisively, the Athenians were still arguing their claims to it in the negotiations of 346 and later in 344.14 In the early 350s the Athenians were so obsessed with the city that they were ready to be taken in. 8

9

10

11

13

Dem. 19.141-2. On the implicit bribery involved, which Demosthenes commends them for declining to accept, see below. It would seem that the Theban ambassadors were not willing to take the risk that Aeschines did; and which did not produce the results he had hoped for. Justin 7.4.5, 8.3.10; Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 27; Ellis (1976) 44-7; Hammond and Griffith (1979) 208 and n. 2, though see Ellis ((1976) 46; (1973) 350-4) who places the death of Archelaus about 352. On Perdiccas' earlier attempt to seize the Macedonian throne, see Aeschin. 2.26-9. Illyrian bride: Satyrus ap. Athen. 13.5570-^; see also Polyaenus 8.60. Ellis ((1976) 47-8) suggests that the marriage sealed the negotiations for an armistice between Philip and the Illyrians, though Griffith (Hammond and Griffith (1979) 211) considers that although there may well have been negotiations 'certainly no treaty was made now'. Both Ellis and Griffith, however, see the need to explain the inactivity of Bardylis and his failure to press home his advantage; Paeonians and Thracians: Diod. 16.3.4. For the importance of Amphipolis to the Athenians' foreign policy throughout the fourth 12 century, see Badian (1995); see also Borza (1990) 137-8. See ch. 2. Cf. Aeschin. 2.31-3; [Dem.] 7.28-9; Cawkwell (1978) 71-2; Hammond and Griffith 14 (1979) 230-3. See below.


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In 359 Amphipolis was garrisoned with Macedonian troops put there by Perdiccas to defend the Amphipolitans against the Athenians.15 The Athenians' backing of Argaeus was centred on their ambitions to recover Amphipolis, and they presumably hoped to obtain it with his help once he was on the throne.16 As a counter-measure Philip withdrew the garrison and gave the city its autonomy, and made overtures for peace with the Athenians.17 The Athenians then prevaricated over their support for Argaeus, and Philip despatched a letter to the Athenians saying that he was ready to make an alliance and renew his hereditary friendship (patrika philia) with them. 18 It was, it seemed, a simple enough exchange: if the Athenians withdrew their support for Argaeus, it was implied, they could have Amphipolis. At first the mere withdrawal of Macedonian troops from Amphipolis was enough for the Athenians to think twice. According to Diodorus, Philip renounced all claim to Amphipolis, and in this way persuaded the Athenians to make peace.19 Philip's methods, however, became more subtle and more duplicitous. In 358/7 he laid siege to Amphipolis, supposedly under provocation by the Amphipolitans.20 Envoys were sent by the people of Amphipolis inviting the Athenians 'to come and receive the city', but the Athenians refused.21 The Olynthians also came to Athens wanting to open negotiations, but Philip won over the Athenians by negotiating in secret with the Athenian ambassadors Antiphon and Charidemus who promised to give up Pydna in return for Amphipolis.22 The advantages for Athens in the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis are clear. They would regain Amphipolis at the cost only of a small allied city and without an expensive northern battle, undoubtedly a popular policy in the political climate of Athens in the 350s and 340s. 23 They must have been convinced, if only through wishful thinking, that the deal with Philip was secure, since they refused the Amphipolitans' offer to give them the city.24 It was a simple and straightforward exchange. Yet Philip did not honour his undertaking. A letter was also sent by Philip to the Athenians 15 16

17

20 21

22

23 24

See Aeschin. 2.29; Diod. 16.3.3; Hammond and Griffith (1979) 187; Cawkwell (1978) 73. This seems to be implicit in Diod. 16.3.3; see also Hammond and Griffith (1979) 236 and n.3. Diod. 16.3.3, 4-I> Polyaenus 4.2.17. On the question of the autonomy of Amphipolis, 18 19 Diod. 16.3.5; Dem. 23.121. Diod. 16.4.1. however, see Ellis (1976) 48-9. D i o d . 16.8.2; see also H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 237. D e m . 1.8; T h e o p o m p u s , FGrHist 115 F 4 2 ; see also H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 238 and n. 1; Ellis (1976) 6 4 , 6 6 . Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 30a-b; Dem. 2.6; see also de Ste Croix (1963) 110-19 ( = (i973)); Hammond and Griffith (1979) 238-42. Compare, e.g., Dem. 1.25; 3.18-20,29. Although if they had accepted this offer they would have undoubtedly c o m e into direct and immediate conflict with Philip.

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during the siege to reassure them that Amphipolis was theirs and that he would restore it to them.25 But when Amphipolis was taken Philip did not hand it over, but immediately reduced Pydna as well, probably through the treachery of some of those within the city.26 The Athenians, not for the last time, were taken in by the hints and promises of the Macedonian: they had no option but to declare war,27 and that when it was too late. 8.3 Philip and the Athenians in 346 Philip used the same strategy for dealing with the Athenians in the peace of 346. He made promises to the Athenians in order to secure their goodwill and inaction, and then used the delay to get what he wanted unopposed. In late 357 or early 356 Philip turned to the Olynthians for an alliance.28 In 355 the Social War between the Athenians and their allies came to an end, and the war was declared against Phocis.29 In 353 trouble also flared up in Thessaly. Philip entered the war by supporting the Thessalians against the Pheraeans, who brought in the Phocians under the command of Onomarchus.30 Initially Onomarchus defeated Philip, who retired to Macedon.31 This encouraged the Olynthians to look towards less threatening allies and to make an approach to Athens.32 In 352 Onomarchus was killed in the battle of the Crocus Field, and was succeeded by his brother Phayllus.33 Philip advanced south, intending to make war on the Phocians, but the Athenians prevented him from coming south through the pass at Thermopylae.34 Unable to get through, Philip returned to Macedon and went to fight against Cersobleptes.35 In 349 Philip attacked Olynthus.36 The Olynthians sent envoys to Athens asking for an alliance, and after some hesitation an alliance was made and forces sent.37 But Philip, having first dealt with problems in 25 26 28 29

30

32 34 35 36 37

[Dem.] 7.27; D e m . 23.116. However, see Ellis (1976) 52. 27 Polyaenus 4.2.17; D i o d . 16.8.3; D e m . 1 . 5 , 8 , 2 0 . 6 3 . Aeschin. 2.70. Diod. 16.8.3; cf. Dem. 6.20. Social War: D i o d . 16.22.1-2; Third Sacred War: for the opening stages o f this nine-year war, see D i o d . 16.23.1-31.5 (on the chronology of the war, I a m following H a m m o n d (1937) 4 4 - 7 8 ( = ( 1 9 7 3 ) 486-533). For a slightly different chronology, see Buckler (1989)). D i o d . 16.35.1-3; although o n the chronology, see H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 2 6 7 - 8 . O n the relations between Philip and the Thessalians prior to the Phocian intervention in 31 Thessalian affairs, see Westlake (1935) 1 6 0 - 8 . D i o d . 16.35.2-3. 33 Dem. 2.6,3.7,23.107-9. Diod. 16.35.3-36.1. Diod. 16.38.1-2; Justin 8.2.8; Dem. 19.84. Diod. 16.38.2; schol. Aeschin. 2.81; cf. ch. 7. Justin 8.3.10; see also Ellis (1973) 3 5 0 - 4 . Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 49-51; Dem. 3.7-8.


153

Thessaly, took Olynthus itself in 348 despite extra relief sent by the Athenians.38 During the siege of Olynthus, ambassadors came from the Euboeans to Athens with the news that Philip wanted to make peace.39 Again, when Ctesiphon was sent to Macedon to recover ransom money for Phrynon of Rhamnous who had been captured by pirates during the Olympic truce, he returned with the report that Philip wanted an end of the war.40 On the proposal of Philocrates, the demos voted that Philip be asked to send a herald and ambassadors to negotiate for peace, although the motion was attacked as unconstitutional.41 Despite this reception to Philip's advances, in 347 Eubulus passed a decree in the Athenian assembly to send ambassadors to the Greek cities to see whether they could organise a common resistance to Philip, although little was achieved.42 Meanwhile in central Greece the Phocians under the command of Phalaecus seized a number of large cities in Boeotia.43 However, the Phocians removed Phalaecus from his command and replaced him with a triumvirate, while the Thebans sent envoys to Philip, who sent a few troops.44 The three Phocian generals decided to hand over to the Athenians and Spartans Alponus, Thronium and Nicaea, and so the control of Thermopylae.45 In addition, the pro-Athenian Thessalian town of Halus on the coast south of the Crocus Field was at war with Pharsalus, and the Athenians were in a position to help it and therefore strengthen their control of Thermopylae. 46 But when the Athenian general Proxenus and the Spartan Archidamus arrived in Phocis to receive the Phocian towns, the Phocians refused to hand them over.47 Aristodemus, an actor, had been sent to Philip concerning the Athenian hostages who had been captured when Olynthus was taken.48 Before Aristodemus reported to the Council on his return, one of the hostages who had been released by Philip returned to Athens with the news that Philip was ready for peace. Aristodemus then gave his report, according to Aeschines, to both the Council and the assembly that Philip even wished to become an ally. Thereupon, Philocrates moved the resolution that ten 38

41

42

43 46 47

Thessaly: D e m . 1.22; Olynthus: D e m . 21.197; Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 5 0 - 1 ; D i o d . 39 40 16.53.2. Aeschin. 2.12; see also Ellis (1976) 99. Aeschin. 2.12-13. Aeschin. 2 . 1 3 - 1 4 , 3 . 6 2 . It should also b e pointed out here that it was D e m o s t h e n e s , w h o was later to vilify Philocrates and his moves for peace, w h o defended h i m at the trial. Aeschin. 2.79; D e m . 1 9 . 1 0 - 1 1 , 3 0 3 - 6 ; on the date of this decree, see Ellis (1976) 265 n. 51; H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 330 and n. 1 contra Cawkwell ( i 9 6 0 ) 4 1 8 - 2 5 . 44 45 D i o d . 16.56.1-2. Diod. 16.56.3,58.2-3. Aeschin. 2.132-3. D e m . 19.36 and schol., 3 9 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 3 , 1 7 4 , 3 3 4 . Aeschin. 2.133. It w o u l d appear that the Phocian Phalaecus h a d regained control o f Phocian affairs; see Cawkwell (i960) 428; Ellis (1976) 105-6, 266 n. 67; Hammond and 48 Griffith (1979) 333 and n. 2,334. Aeschin. 2.15-17.

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ambassadors be sent to Philip to enter into discussions concerning peace and the common interests of Philip and the Athenians.49 8.3.1

Thefirstembassy

The members of the first embassy to Philip included Aeschines, Demosthenes and Philocrates.50 The ambassadors arrived at Pella just as Philip was about to set out on his Thracian campaign, but Philip gave assurances to the ambassadors that he would leave the Chersonese alone.51 On the return of the embassy to Athens, the ambassadors gave a brief report to the Council and delivered a letter from Philip suggesting that there were benefits which would come to the Athenians if or when they made an alliance with him. 52 Demosthenes then proposed that, when the ambassadors came from Philip, the prytaneis should call a meeting about peace and alliance on two successive days.53 It was finally agreed that each party should keep what it held; that there should be peace and alliance with Philip and his descendants; that it should be a defensive alliance; that it should be binding on the allies (although the whole question of who were the allies of each became one of the bones of contention); and that neither party should support the operation of pirates.54 The council of the allies put forward an alternative decree proposing, firstly, that there should be peace without alliance, and, secondly, that within a limit of three months any Greek state that wished could have its name added to the treaty.55 This was not going to be acceptable to Philip, as his ambassadors made clear; there could be no peace without alliance, and no alliance if the Phocians, Halians and Cersobleptes were included.56 After warnings of what would happen if peace was not made, the demos accepted the terms and elected the same ambassadors to return to Macedon and administer the oaths, and the ambassadors were also to do any other good thing they could. 57 8.3.2

The second embassy

It was Philip's policy to keep everyone guessing, and the Athenians were not the only ambassadors waiting on him at Pella.58 When the second 49 51

50 Aeschin. 2.18,3.63; Dem. 19.12. Aeschin. 2.18-19. Aeschin. 2.81-2; see also Ellis (1976) 267 n. 78.

52

A e s c h i n . 2.45) 5OJ D e m . 1 9 . 4 0 : eypa(j>ov 8'av /cat 8iappr)8r)v rjXi)( vîds cv 7TOirjO I74> 3*1,334> Hypoth.

57

Dem. 19.15-17,291; Aeschin. 2.82,104,120.

58

2.5.

Aeschin. 2.120,136-7.


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embassy reported to the assembly, Aeschines claimed that he had persuaded Philip in everything that would benefit the city, both in the matters concerning the Amphictyony and everything else. 59 According to Demosthenes, Aeschines went on to report that within a few days Philip would lay siege to Thebes, repopulate Thespiae and Plataea, exact reparations for the shrine at Delphi from the Thebans not the Phocians, give up Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis, and restore Oropus to the Athenians. 60 A letter from Philip (as Demosthenes reports with disgust) was also read to the assembly, in which Philip, who had previously intimated that there would be great rewards for the Athenians if they made an alliance, now said that he did not know what he could do to gratify (charizesthai) the Athenians.61 Eventually at Pherae the Athenians administered the oaths to Philip, and those of his allies whom he chose to include. 62 Philip's exact plans seem to have been unclear to all except Philip. By the time the embassy had returned to Athens, Philip was at Thermopylae and making assurances to the Phocians. 63 The Athenians extended the peace to Philip's descendants and added in obedience to him that if the Phocians did not do what they ought and hand over the sanctuary to the Amphictyons then the Athenian demos would come to help against those who were preventing this from happening. 64 Most of the same ambassadors were then elected to bear the news of this decree to Philip, although Demosthenes refused to go and Aeschines was left behind on a plea of ill health. 65 Philip sent two letters to the Athenians calling them to take the field against the Phocians. 66 By the time the letters from Philip had arrived, the mood in Athens had changed. Troops were not sent, since according to Aeschines those who were agitating for war were alleging that Philip would take any soldiers as hostages. 67 Philip next made an agreement with Phalaecus, who was to withdraw with his men, and the Phocians surrendered themselves into the hands of the Macedonian. 68 Philip convened a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council and referred the matter to them. 69 The Amphictyonic Council decided that the cities of the Phocians 59 60

61

62 66 68

Dem. 19.20. Dem. 5.10, 19.19-23, 35, 42, 53, 63, 74, 112, 220, 325-7; cf. Aeschin. 2.119-29; on the promises and Aeschines' defence, see Markle (1974) 253-4. Dem. 19.41. One should not, however, acquit Philip too readily here of a charge of duplicity. If he was not in fact deceiving the Athenians, he was certainly manipulating them, contra Markle (1974) 253,256-60; Hammond and Griffith (1979) 345-6. 63 64 65 D e m . 19.158. D e m . 19.58. D e m . 19.48-53. D e m . 19.121-4. 67 Aeschin. 2.137; D e m . 1 9 . 5 0 - 1 . Aeschin. 2.137. D i o d . 16.59.3; D e m . 1 9 . 6 2 - 3 ; see also H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 346; cf. Ellis (1976) 69 120. D i o d . 16.59.4.

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should have their walls removed and that the Phocians would no longer be able to participate in the sanctuary at Delphi or be members of the Amphictyonic Council, and their votes in the Amphictyonic Council were transferred to Philip.70 The Sacred War was brought to an end without a battle being fought. The Council meeting came to an end, Philip was appointed to hold the next Pythian games, and then returned to Macedonia.71 The events of 346 follow a similar pattern to those surrounding Amphipolis: on the basis of suggestions and hints of benefits that would be received, the Athenians let Philip enter central Greece and take the cities of their allies the Phocians. To add further encouragement Philip sent letters back to Athens with the first and second embassies intimating benefits. Aeschines gave substance to these hints by reporting to the Athenians the alleged 'promises' of Philip. Philip himself, it must be noted, was all too careful not to make any definite statements himself of his intentions. He only made suggestions of possibilities; Aeschines was left to make the hints into promises.72 When the promises were left unfulfilled, the responsibility was deflected from Philip on to Aeschines: it was Aeschines who actually told the 'lies'; Philip himself had said nothing firm.73 8.4

Epanorthosis

Even after the disappointment of the Phocian settlement,74 there were some in Athens still willing to believe in Philip. Aeschines attended the celebration banquet to mark the end of the war, and continued to speak of the fulfilment of the promises that had been made,75 and when possibly early in 345 the Delians lodged an appeal at the Amphictyonic Council against Athens' control of the temple of Apollo on the island, the assembly elected Aeschines to defend their claim, although this was vetoed by the Areopagus and Hypereides was sent instead.76 Even Demosthenes urged the Athenians to accept the peace they had and not to give the Amphictyons any cause to declare war, although not in order to gratify Philip.77 70 71

74 75 76

77

Diod. 16.60.1-2; Dem. 19.325-7; Paus. 10.3.3,8.2. Diod. 16.60.3-5; on the meaning of this passage see also Griffith (1939) 71-9; Ryder 72 73 (1965) 145-9. See Dem. 19.38-9,68. See Dem. 19.68-9,328; [Dem.] 7.33. Athens refused to send delegates t o the Pythian games that year ( D e m . 19.128). Dem. 19.111-13,128. Dem.18.134; o n the date (placed variously between 345 and 343): Ellis (1976) 1 3 1 - 2 , 2 7 4 n. 25, puts it in 345; Osborne (1974) 1 7 6 - 7 n. 19 is non-committal; Sealey ((1958) 7 2 - 3 = ( 1 9 6 7 ) 184-5) suggests 340/39 for an episode which precedes this one; o n Aeschines' selection and subsequent termination of his appointment, see Ellis (1976) 131. Dem. 5.13-14,24-5. Ellis ((1976) 274 n. 10) conjectures that this speech was made at the time the Thessalian ambassadors were in Athens from the Amphictyony (Dem. 19.111).


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In 344 Philip possibly interfered in the Peloponnese in a war between Messene, Argos and Sparta.78 In response, the Athenians at the instigation of Demosthenes sent embassies to the Peloponnesians warning them against the Macedonian.79 Philip replied by sending Python of Byzantium and representatives from his allies to Athens to attempt to revise the existing peace settlement and the Athenians were given a free hand to amend any clause they wished.80 The Athenians proposed two amendments. The first required that each side should retain what belonged to them by right, which was aimed specifically at reclaiming Amphipolis; and the second, that there should be a common peace.81 At the same time as some of Philip's ambassadors were in Athens, an embassy was present from the Persian King, requesting support for an Egyptian campaign.82 The Athenians none too politely refused the Persian request and passed a decree that there would be reprisals from Philip and the Greeks if the King attacked any Greek cities.83 The chances of reconciliation between Philip and the Athenians seemed good. The Athenians elected Hegesippus and others to represent them before Philip, but they were not well received.84 Philip was so incensed by the demands of Hegesippus and his colleagues that Xenocleides the poet was banished for entertaining them during their time in Pella, although they were his fellow citizens.85 By 343 the mood in Athens had turned against Philip. Hypereides impeached Philocrates, and Philocrates, assessing public opinion, fled from Athens.86 Demosthenes in the same year also impeached Aeschines, although he was acquitted.87 Also in the same summer before the trial of Aeschines there was internal trouble in Megara and Elis which Demosthenes blamed on Philip's intervention, although this was possibly unjustified.88 78 80 81

82

85 86 87 88

79 D e m . 6.15; see H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 4 7 4 - 8 4 . D e m . 6.19-25,18.79. Dem. 18.136; Pern.] 7.18-23; [Dem.] 12.18. [Dem.] 7.18-23, 30-2; [Dem.] 12.20-2; on the common peace, Ryder (1965) 100-1; cf. Cawkwell (1963a) 132 and n. 5 (=1973): Cawkwell argues wrongly from the supposition that Philip, and not the Athenians, proposed the common peace; see Hammond and Griffith (1979) 490 n. 3; Brunt (1969) 262 n. 2. Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 157; D i o d . 16.44.1; [ D e m . ] 12.6; see Cawkwell (1963a) 133 83 M (=(1973)). [Dem.] 12.6; D e m . 10.34. D e m . 19.331; see also [Dem.] 12.20-2. Dem. 19.331. Hypereides, Euxen. 2 9 - 3 0 ; D e m . 19.114,116, cf. 145; Aeschin. 2 . 6 , 3 . 7 9 . Dem. 19; Aeschin. 2;Plut.,D*m. 15.5; [Plut.j, ViuXOr. 840c. Dem. 19.87, 204, 260, 294-5, 326, 334, 9.17-18, 27; 18.71, 295; Paus. 4.28.4; 5.4.9; see Ellis ((1976) 151), who believes that Philip probably did not intervene either directly or indirectly; Griffith (Hammond and Griffith (1979) 497-501) sees it as opportunism on Philip's part, rather than casting him as the 'arch-initiator'; Cawkwell ((1978) 126), despite Demosthenes' accusations of Philip's directly breaking the peace, suggests that there were a number of occasions such as these when Philip broke the spirit if not the letter of the peace; see also Cawkwell (1963b) 200-5 ( = (i973))-

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Yet despite this apparent negative feeling in Athens (although tempered by Aeschines' acquittal), Philip sent to Athens again at the end of 343 or early 342 for a revision of the peace.89 Although he was not prepared to give up Amphipolis to them as they demanded, he was willing to accept a common peace.90 In addition he was prepared to submit to arbitration the ownership of the forts in Thrace, to compel the Cardians to submit to arbitration over the Chersonese, and to give the Athenians the island of Halonnesus as a gift (doreia), although it had formerly belonged to them, or at least to submit the question of ownership to arbitration.91 He also proposed setting up a commercial treaty between Athens and Macedon, and requested that the Athenians should join him in clearing the sea of pirates.92 What is more, while disclaiming that he had made any promises of benefits in the past, he assured the Athenians that if they trusted his philoi in Athens and punished those who slandered him, he would confer great benefits upon them.93 But again the attempt at reconciliation came to nothing. In late 343, suspecting that there would be an end of the peace, the Athenians contracted alliances with the Achaeans, Mantineians, Argives, Megalopolitans and Messenians.94 The proposed revision of the Peace of Philocrates again demonstrates Philip's skill in manipulating the principles of gift-giving. In 344, Philip found it expedient to patch up the peace with Athens which was still, although only nominally, in operation. Of the two amendments proposed by the Athenians, the one concerning common peace was acceptable to Philip, but the other demanding that each were to have what was their own was not. Philip was to make it abundantly clear that he was not going to relinquish Amphipolis.95 In 343/2 it seems that Philip was prepared to make some concessions. Yet it appears that the main issue, and the one on which the others ultimately hinged, was the question of Halonnesus. 8.4.1

Halonnesus

Halonnesus had been an island port of the Athenians in the central Aegean. It had been occupied by the pirate Sostratus, from whom Philip, in turn, wrested it.96 It was now, Philip claimed, his, 97 so that in the 89

90 91 92 95 96

S e e especially [ D e m . ] 7, where Hegesippus in turn advises the Athenians o n h o w they should respond to the letter from Philip; see also H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 5 1 0 - 1 2 . [Dem.] 7.30-2; [Dem.] 12.20-2. [Dem.] 7.2-7 (on Halonnesus, see below), 36-7,39-44; [Dem.] 12.12-15. 93 94 Pern.] 7.9-15. [Dem.] 7.33-4. Schol. Aeschin. 3.83; /Gii 2 225. [Dem.] 12.20-1. [ D e m . ] 12.13. It was later to b e occupied by Peparethians, from w h o m Philip captured it again. T h e Peparethians then called o n the Athenians t o d e m a n d retribution from Philip 97 (Pern.] 12.12-15). [Dem.] 7.2.


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negotiations of 343/2 he was willing to offer the Athenians Halonnesus as a gift. But the Athenians would not accept it on these terms. They would not receive it as a gift (labeiri), but would only receive back (apolabeiri) what had been their own. 98 Hegesippus, in his speech to the Athenian assembly, exclaimed: It does not escape him that with both terms, whichever you use, you will have the island, whether you take it, or take it back. So what is the difference to him, if he does not use the just expression and 'gives it back' {apodounai) to you, but uses the unjust expression to 'have given you a gift' (doreia dedokenai)} Not so that some benefaction might be credited to you (for this benefaction would be laughable), but so that he might show to all the Greeks that the Athenians are happy to receive naval bases from Macedon."

As Hegesippus was well aware, Philip was offering the Athenians a double-edged sword. The first difficulty had to do with the technicality of receiving the island as a gift or receiving back from him that which was their own. As Hegesippus complains, in either case the Athenians would have the island, so what difference was it going to make? All the difference in the world. For if they received it from Philip as a gift, this would be an admission that it was in fact his own property to give away. By extension, this would mean that all territory which Philip had taken from them and from others was his property. This was not an admission the Athenians could or would want to - make, and it had a direct bearing upon Amphipolis. Philip's justification for holding Amphipolis was that the Peace of Philocrates confirmed his right to keep what he held. 100 Later in the same speech, Hegesippus says: He [Philip] says Amphipolis is his, for you passed a decree that it was his, when you passed the decree that he was to have what he held. You passed this decree, but you did not ever pass a decree that Amphipolis was his. For it is possible to 'hold' that which belongs to others, and not all those who 'hold' have that which is their own, but many are in possession of that which is another's. So this piece of wisdom of his is silly.101

If then the Athenians accepted that Philip had a right to give away Halonnesus, which he held, as a gift, then it followed that they must also give up any claim to Amphipolis as well as any other territory they wished to claim from him. Secondly, if they accepted Philip's gift and took Halonnesus, they would be putting themselves in his debt, despite Hegesippus' ridicule. Peace treaties, like alliances, were a particular kind of balanced relationship where each party gave the other promises which 98 101

[Dem.] 7.5; [Dem.] 12.14. " [Dem.] 7.5-6. [Dem.] 7.26; see also [Dem.] 12.21-2.

10

° [Dem.] 7.24-6.

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were returned promise for promise according to the terms. The stability of such formalised state friendships depended upon the giving and receiving being symmetrically equivalent. Hegesippus realised that if the Athenians did accept the gift, they would be indebted to Philip for a benefaction. What was even more galling was that the acceptance of this gift would mean that the Athenians, who prided themselves on their sea power, would be tacitly accepting Philip's control of the Aegean. Hegesippus claimed that this was Philip's true purpose, that he would be responsible for maintaining Athens' influence in the Aegean. This would not be a balanced relationship. The Athenians would be doubly obligated to Philip, firstly for his gift, and secondly for the control it would restore to them in the central Aegean. But it would only be a nominal control; Philip, as the giver of the gift, would hold the real power. What is more, Philip was in a morally stronger position. Not only was he willing to submit the matter to arbitration, but the Athenians had also refused to go to arbitration and come to terms. As Philip argued over Amphipolis, the Athenian position was not strong in any case. He says, If it [Amphipolis] belongs to those who first gained control of it, how do we not hold it justly, for my ancestor, Alexander, first occupied the place, and also dedicated a golden statue at Delphi as first fruits for the Persian prisoners from there? Or if someone disputes this, and claims it belongs to those who had control of it later, this also is justice in my favour. For I besieged those who cast you out and accepted the Spartans as their founders, and captured the place. Indeed we all dwell in cities either inherited from our forefathers, or conquered in war. You neither acquired it first, nor have it now, but having remained in the place for the least time, you claim the city back, and this after yourselves giving a most secure assurance (Jbebaiotate pistis) in our favour.102

One wonders, as Griffith does,103 how much Philip truly wanted to be reconciled with the Athenians, or indeed how much the Athenians really wanted to be reconciled with him. His attempts to make peace in 344 were probably quite sincere, whatever his reasons, but by 342 the matter appears in quite a different light. Weary with their ridiculous demands for Amphipolis, Philip presented Athens with Halonnesus as a test case. If they accepted the gift, they must relinquish their claims to Amphipolis, Poteidaea, and perhaps the forts in Thrace. 8.5 After Chaeronea In 340 under severe provocation the Athenians declared war on Philip.104 The Fourth Sacred War also broke out, when at a meeting of the 102 104

103 Pern.] 12.21-2. Hammond and Griffith (1979) 513. Philip's activities in the Hellespont: (investment of Perinthus) Philochorus, FGrHist 328


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Amphictyonic Council at Delphi the Amphissans tried to bring a decree against the Athenians claiming that they should be fined for affixing golden shields to the new temple at Delphi and dedicating them before the temple had been consecrated.105 Aeschines, who was one of the Athenian delegates, replied to the charge by claiming that the Amphissans had broken the oath which had been sworn not to till the plain of Cirrha or rebuild the harbour.106 The Council subsequently brought charges against the Amphissans, and it was decreed that all the sacred representatives should assemble at Thermopylae at a designated time with a decree for their punishment.107 When the meeting took place at Thermopylae war was declared on the Amphissans, and they were ordered to pay a fine by the Pylaea of autumn 339. 108 The fine was not paid, and the war was placed in Philip's hands on his return from the Scythian campaign.109 Thebes, as an ally of the Amphissans, sprang to their defence and seized Nicaea, the town which controlled the pass at Thermopylae, but Philip marched south and avoided Thermopylae by fortifying Cytinium and seizing Elateia in Phocis.110 He then sent an embassy to Thebes demanding that they hand over Nicaea to the Locrians.111 Demosthenes urged the Athenians to mobilise all men of military age and to appoint ten envoys to negotiate an alliance with Thebes. 112 Demosthenes xhzproxenos of the Thebans himself went as a member of the embassy.113 Although they found ambassadors from Philip there as well, demanding that the Thebans join Philip in attacking Attica or at least giving the Macedonians the right of passage through Boeotia in order to pay back a favour to him

105

106 107 110

111 113

F 54; Diod. 16.74.2-5, 75.1-76.3 (on the date, see Jacoby Supp. 1331); (Persian involvement) Paus. 1.29.10; Arrian, Anab. 2.14.5; (Philip's first letter) [Dem.] 12; on the two letters (see also below) see esp. Hammond and Griffith (1979) 567 and n. 2, 714-16; (investment of Byzantium and Selymbria) Diod. 16.76.3; schol. Dem. 18.76; Philochorus FGrHist 328 F 54,162; (capture of corn ships) Dem. 18.139; Justin 9.1.5-8; Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 292; (Philip's second letter) [Dem.] 11 (esp. 5-6) with Hammond and Griffith (1979) 567 n. 2. Athenian declaration of war: Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 55a, b; Dem. 18.87-94; Plut., Phoc. 14; schol. Dem. 18.76; contrast Diod. 16.77.2. Aeschin. 3.115-16; on problems with the chronology of the Fourth Sacred War, see Ellis (1976) 291 n. 31; Hammond and Griffith (1979) 585-8,717-19. Aeschin. 3.106-13,116-21; cf. Dem. 149-50. 108 109 Aeschin. 3.124. Aeschin. 3.128-9. Aeschin. 3.129; Dem. 18.152. Dem. 18.152; Aeschin. 3.140; Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 56a, b; Diod. 16.84.1-2; Plut., Dem. 18.1; see also Cawkwell ((1978) 143) for Philip paving the way for entry into Phocis through Elateia by rumours that he would restore and fortify the city. 112 Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 56b. Dem. 18.173-8. Dem. 18.179, 211; Plut., Dem. 18.1; cf. Diod. 16.85.1 (though see Jacoby Supp. 1 332). For the proxenia: Aeschin. 2.141, 143. For the use of this kind of connection on embassies, see chs. 4 and 5.

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(charin apodounai), Demosthenes brought Thebes into an alliance with Athens.114 In 338 a pitched battle was fought with Philip on the plain near Chaeronea and Philip won the day.115 He did not march on against Athens as the Athenians themselves expected, but the prisoners returned to Athens with the news that Philip wanted peace.116 The Athenians sent a return embassy, which included Aeschines, Demades and possibly Phocion, all of whom were favoured at the Macedonian court.117 The settlement was remarkably favourable to the Athenians, but disastrous for Thebes, which was to have a Macedonian garrison, and where Philip installed a government that would be inclined to him from among the Theban exiles.118 Although the Athenian naval league was dissolved, the Athenian ownership of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, as well as Delos and Samos, was confirmed and Oropus was taken from the Boeotians and given to the Athenians.119 Most significantly, the Athenians retained their freedom.120 In 337, Philip summoned ambassadors from the Greek states to attend a meeting at Corinth.121 Representatives came from all over Greece except Sparta.122 Philip called for a common peace, which was accepted.123 Probably at another meeting of the league, Philip himself was elected general with full powers, and plans were discussed for a Persian campaign.124 Philip returned home and began preparations for a Persian War, and 114

Diod. 16.85.1; Dem. 18.211,213-14 (on the speech of the Macedonian ambassadors, see below); Plut., Dem. 18.1-2; Justin 9.3.5. On Philochorus, FGrHist 328 F 56, see Jacoby Supp. 1332-3. The alliance that was formed was advantageous to Thebes: it repudiated all former support for the autonomy of the Boeotian cities; Thebes was given the command by land and shared the command at sea, but only asked to pay a third of the costs, the war council was to be located on the Cadmeia in Thebes (Aeschin. 3.141-5, cf. 106); but see also Mosley (1971a) 508-10. On Demosthenes' attitude to Thebes, see most recently Harris (1995) 84,198-9 n. 15. 115 Diod. 16.86; Polyaenus 4.2.2,7; Plut., Dem. 19.2; P\ut.s Alex. 9.2; on Lebadeia, see Ellis (1976) 294 n. 68. 116 Diod. 16.87; Polybius 5.10.1-5; Justin 9.4.6; cf. [Demades], On the Twelve Years 9. 117 Dem. 18.282-5; Aeschin. 3.227; Suidas s.v. Demades (J 415); [Demades], On the Twelve Years 9-10; see also Hypereides F 76; cf. Justin 9.4.1-5 (on this, see Hammond and Griffith (1979) 605 n. 4). On the reception of this embassy, see Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 236; Plut., Mor. 715c. On Phocion as a possible member of the embassy, see Plut., Phoc. 17.6; Nepos, Phoc. 1.3, but this is not conclusive evidence for the appointment (see 118 Appendix II). Diod. 16.87.3;Justin 9-4-6-9. 119 Paus. 1.25.3, 34.1; [Arist.], Ath. Pol. 61.6, 62.2; Diod. 18.56.6-7; schol. Dem. 18.99; l20 [Demades], On the Twelve Years 9. Paus. 7.10.5. 121 Justin 9.5.1; Diod. 16.89.3; see also Plut., Phoc. 16.5. 122 p i u t a Mor. 2 4 0 a ; Strabo 8.5.5; Justin 9.5.3. 123 Plut., Phoc. 16.5; Justin 9.5.2. For the terms of the peace, see IG ii2 23b (=Tod 177); [Dem.] 17.4,8,10,15,16,19,26. On the common peace, see Ryder (1965) 150-4. 124 Diod. 16.89.3; Justin 9-5-4~5; see also Hammond and Griffith (1979) 626-8.


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took a new Macedonian wife.125 He then married his daughter by Olympias the mother of Alexander to Olympias' brother Alexander king of Epirus at Aegae. 126 At the celebrations after the wedding Philip was assassinated at the entrance to the theatre:127 the untimely end of Philip of Macedon, ruler in deed - if not name - of all mainland Greece. Although his death came too soon to show what he would have made of his position, Philip's settlement of Greece after Chaeronea suggests that he was setting up a situation not unlike that which he had been looking for in 346. The difference was that in 338 Athens was neither in a position to deny him, nor did she want to, so great was the Athenians' relief that they had escaped so lightly. The speech On the Twelve Years, written in the name of Demades, is a late composition, but it is true to fourth-century attitudes when it says: I admit it. I also decreed honours for Philip. I do not deny i t . . . but the bribery (dorodokia) of the Macedonians did not take hold of the hand that drafted it, as those liars say, but the opportunity, the need, the interest of my country and the generosity of the king. For he entered the danger as an enemy {echthros) but has come out of the struggles as a philos, conferring upon the conquered the prize of those who have won. 1 2 8

The echthros had become philos through his benefactions. Philip did not retain his favoured position long. When he summoned the Greeks to form the League of Corinth, the Athenians agreed, although not without the misgivings of some. Plutarch says: Phocion thought that it was necessary to accept the general policy and generosity of Philip, but when Demades decreed that the city should take part in the common peace and the synod of the Greeks, he tried not to allow it before they knew what Philip would demand the Greeks do for him. But his opinion was overridden because of the situation. When he saw that the Athenians were repenting straight away because it was necessary to provide triremes and cavalry units for Philip, he said, 'I feared this and opposed you, but since you have agreed you must not bear it badly nor be down-hearted remembering that your forefathers both ruled and were ruled, but acting nobly in both situations, they saved the city and the Greeks.'129

There was a cost to making Philip a philos. He did not give away gifts for nothing. The cost for the Athenians was high, and on Philip's death Plutarch says the Athenians offered sacrifices for the good tidings.130 This 125 126 128

129

Satyrus ap. Athen. 13. 557b-d;Plut.,Alex. 9.6-7; cf. Beloch G.G.2 3.2.70-1. 127 Diod. 16.91.4. Diod. 16.92-4. [Demades], On the Twelve Years 9-10; compare Diod. 16.89.2, where Diodorus says that through his goodwill (eunoia) - though here it is a promise to punish the Persians for their transgressions against the temples - Philip made the Greeks 'his own' (idiot). 130 Plut., Phoc. 16.5-7. WuuPhoc. 16.8.

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was the man who had 'entered the danger as an echthros but come out of the struggles as a philos\ He did not give away prizes of victory without expecting a just return. 8.6

Balanced and negative reciprocity or An experiment in social dysfunction

But what of Philip? Why did he behave as he did? The simplest explanation is because it worked. The Greeks were taken in time and again by this same ploy of giving gifts to establish a relationship of trust, which Philip could then choose to betray or not as it suited him. So why were the Greeks, and especially the sophisticated Athenians, duped? Were they really so naive? There are a number of reasons why the Athenians were so easily deceived. Firstly, Philip always told the Athenians things they wanted to hear. It would have been easy to believe that Philip would hand over Amphipolis when that is exactly what they wanted. Again in 346 it would have been easy to believe that the Phocians would be saved, the Thebans crushed and the Athenians' place in central Greece secured by their friendship with Philip, since that was the thing they really needed to happen. More importantly, Philip manipulated the Athenians' expectations of reciprocal relationships, and their understanding of what could be expected of philoi. Philip made certain assurances to the Athenians in order to establish what was supposedly an equal and balanced relationship. However, when Philip summoned the Athenians to Thermopylae in 346 'to come with all your forces to give help to those who were just',131 the Athenians decided not to go. Whatever Philip's relations with Aeschines and the actual status of the promises and assurances that were made (and we shall return to that in the final chapter), the Athenians' failure to act could be interpreted as a failure to respond to Philip's assurances with the appropriate gift. As a result, the relationship with Philip collapsed and no return benefits from Philip were forthcoming. This line of argument would appear to lead us to the position held by Markle and Ellis, who see that Philip had two alternative plans: in the first place he made the assurances to the Athenians in all earnestness, but when they failed to respond to his summons he implemented his second plan, which was to defeat the Phocians with the support of Thebes.132 Nevertheless, there is another possibility which is more consistent with Philip's earlier relations with the Athenians. 131

Aeschin. 2.137.

132

Markle (1974) 253-68; Ellis (1976) 113-20.


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When the Athenians hoped to exchange Amphipolis for Pydna, they expected the relationship to work in a balanced and positive way and that Philip too would be committed to the values of the relationship of trust and honour. Philip, on the other hand, set up an expectation of one kind of exchange, which presupposed a balanced positive relationship, but then turned it to his advantage by actually carrying through the relationship as if it were another kind of exchange based upon a negative reciprocity. Again in 346 Philip used the Athenian delay (brought about by their uncertainty) to march against Phocis, then forced the Athenians into a position of further insecurity, on the grounds that they would compromise their honour either if they joined in the attack on their allies the Phocians, or if they failed to support their new ally Philip. In this way Philip skilfully manipulated them into the position of being in a conflict of loyalties. In 342 Philip was once more able to play with the Athenians and their ideas of gift-giving by offering them a gift they did not want to accept since they claimed it was not his to give. Acceptance, or non-acceptance, of his terms would put the Athenians in a position where they did not want to be: either they must give up Halonnesus, the Thracian forts and chances of common peace altogether, or effectively give up all claim to Amphipolis, Poteidaea and the Chersonese. Philip was just mocking them with his power. Any loss of honour Philip himself might suffer was inconsequential because he was always in the superior position. One can afford not to honour one's promises when one has honour in excess of everyone else, or when the loss of a certain amount of personal honour would result in an increase in power. What is more, it must have been very difficult for the Greeks to assess Philip's relative strength at any one time or to know what to make of him. Although we tend to write of Philip as a king, it is uncertain whether Philip himself ever used the title basileus> but although the Macedonian kingship may have been modelled on the Persian monarchy, he was not a king of the same kind as the Persian King, nor were his ancestors, who were never as powerful as Philip became.133 When the Athenians had positive proof of his strength and influence, there was little that they could do to prevent him. Not only was the north too far away for them to react spontaneously,134 but the Athenians did not have the power or resources to stop him. 133

For the debate on how early the Macedonian monarchs took the title basileus, see most recently the exchange between Hammond and Badian: Hammond (1988) 382-91; Badian (1989) 64-70; Hammond (1990) 167-75; Badian (1993a) 131-9; Hammond (1994) 385-7; Badian (1994a) 388-90. For the Persian monarchy as the prototype for the 134 See, e.g., Dem. 4. Macedonian monarchy: see Momigliano (1971) 132.

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It was the Athenians' failure to understand that he would or could do this that led to their undoing. That is not to say that an Athenian could not act in a similar way - in fact it seems that Alcibiades did so in his treatment of Endius in 420 135 - but this was acting in a manner contrary to their general cultural expectations (which is why it worked for Alcibiades as well). What must have been galling for the Athenians was the fact that they were not in a position to retaliate in an equally negative manner. The interaction between Philip and the Greeks, and particularly the Athenians, can be understood in terms of a social dysfunction, that is a misunderstanding of the true nature of their relationship. This was not simply a clash between two different cultures, it was a difference in understanding of kinds of exchange which was engineered and exploited by Philip. He understood the ambiguities of their social constructs and was able to manipulate this for his own ends. Not only did the Athenians fail to appreciate these, but when they did understand it was too late and there was nothing they could do to stop him. 135

See chs. 3 and 10.

Alexander

And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away; and there was no more sea. Revelation 21. i

Even as Philip lay dead, Alexander was acclaimed as Philip's heir and as successor to the Macedonian throne.1 It is a commonplace that this marked the beginning of a new era, as Alexander became the conqueror of his new empire and set himself down in history as Alexander the Great. Alexander's reign is interesting not least because here we capture a moment of change, and from this point on there is a new range of questions to ask. Although many of the patterns we have seen in his father's reign are repeated in Alexander's own (perhaps practised with less subtlety and finesse), from Alexander's conquest of Asia we are dealing less with Macedonian-Greek relations, and more with relations between a Greco-Macedonian elite and their Asiatic subjects. As a result Alexander's reign in many ways foreshadows the new tensions and difficulties that were to present themselves to the Hellenistic world. In this chapter we shall consider Alexander's career, his failing relationship with his Macedonian troops and his new relationships with those within his empire, both looking backwards as well as forwards, and picking up old themes and presenting them in a new light. 9.1 Alexander and gift-giving Like his father, Alexander was well known for his gift-giving, and showed great respect for the institutions of friendship. Plutarch says that he was naturally very generous (megalodorotatos), that he gave gifts to his friends, and that he was generally more displeased with those who refused his gifts than with those who asked for them.2 When Iphicrates the Athenian ambassador to Darius' court was taken by Alexander in 333, Alexander 1

Q. C. 7.1.6; Justin 11.2.2; ArriaiiiAnab. 1.25.2.

2

PhitÂlex. 39.

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gave him special honours according to Arrian because of Alexander's philia for the Athenians and because of the fame of Iphicrates' father.3 He was also known for his generosity towards those who cast themselves upon his benevolence, so that when Alexander was attacking the rock fort of Sisimithres of Sogdiana,4 Alexander's father-in-law Oxyartes was sent to persuade him to surrender, encouraging Sisimithres to try the good faith (pistis) and friendship (philia) of Alexander, and presented his own treatment at Alexander's hands as proof.5 Not surprisingly, Alexander and his court also had personal ties such as xenia with Greeks and non-Greeks across the Aegean: Philip's and Alexander's xenoi and the Macedonian proxenoi were saved from the destruction of Thebes in 335 along with the priests and descendants of Pindar; Demaratus of Corinth was Philip's xenos, one of Philip's political supporters in Corinth, and a member of Alexander's Companion Cavalry (Hetairoi); Artabazus the Persian from Darius' court was received by Alexander after the death of Darius because he was a xenos of Philip and with his sons made a xenos of Alexander himself; and Langarus king of the Agrianians had a personal association with Alexander which moved him to offer to attack the Autariates for him, receiving in return 'as many gifts as are considered greatest at the Macedonian court', including an offer of marriage with Alexander's sister.6 As we would expect, these associations were not just personal but also political. The Agrianians, for instance, feature in Alexander's campaigns, and there were those within Thebes, probably the proxenoi and xenoi, who hoped to bring the city over to Alexander peacefully, since Arrian says that Alexander wanted to win the city through friendship (philia).1 Gifts and ties of friendship also played an important part in diplomacy. For example, the Cyreneans sent to Alexander, on his visit to Siwah, ambassadors bearing gifts, which included war-horses and chariots, and asked for a philia and an alliance.8 Similarly, the Celts from the Ionian 3

4 5 6

7

8

Arrian, Anab. 2.15.4. He was probably also remembering Iphicrates the elder's adoption by Amyntas m of Macedon: see Aeschin. 2.28. Arrian has 'Chorienes': see Brunt (1976-83) 1.407 n. 1. Arriarii Anab. 4.21.1-9 (esp. 7-8); Q. C. 8.2.19-33; cf. Strabo 11.11.4. Destruction of Thebes: Arrian, Anab. 1.9.9-10; Plut., Alex. 11.10. Demaratus of Corinth: Arrian, Anab. 1.15.6; Plut., Alex. 9.12, 37.7, 56; Dem. 18.295; Diod. 17.76.6; cf. Berve (1926) 2.113 (no. 253) and Hamilton ((1969) 24) who identifies all these as the same man, whereas Bosworth ((1980-95) 1.122-3) finds this hard to accept on the grounds that Philip's xenos would have been too old to fight among the Companions at Granicus. Artabazus: Q. C. 6.5.1-5; cf. 5.9.1, 6.5.22; Diod. 16.52.3. Langarus: Arrian, Anab. 1.5.2-4. Agrianians: e.g., Arrian, Anab. 1.5.10, 8.3, 14.1, 18.3, 20.5, 28.5, 2.7.5, 2.9.2; Q. C. 4.13.31. Macedonian support in Thebes: Arrian, Anab. 1.7.10-11. On the alternative tradition (Plut.,^4/ex. 11.7-8; Diod. 17.9.2-6) see Bosworth (1980-95) 1.78-9. Diod. 17.49.2-3; Q. C. 4.7.9.

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Gulf also came to him saying that they desired a philia.9 He exchanged pledges of faith with them (pisteis), and named them his philoi and made them his allies.

9.2

Alexander and the Macedonians

Like Cyrus' army of the Ten Thousand, Alexander's army relied heavily upon a personal connection between their leader and his men.10 At the lowest level, even the ordinary soldier was bound to his king by a personal tie whose nature is reflected in the oath that members of the army swore, that they would have the same friends and enemies as the king.11 His increasingly bad relations with the army were a symptom of the tensions that were created by the clash between an older system where all felt themselves in a personal relationship with their king, and Alexander's evolving style of monarchy which took on many of the features of a more remote oriental kingship. Alexander tried to maintain the loyalty of the army through benefactions. After battles he awarded gifts from the booty to those who fought bravely 'according to their deserts', and when the morale in the army was low, he tried to win them back by giving them lavish gifts, just as he gave placatory gifts to those soldiers he pensioned off in 324 after the trouble at Opis.12 In particular, he rewarded the officers who had done well with higher commands, and, as Diodorus says, he bound them to himself with strong bonds of affection.13 A close relationship also existed between Alexander and the Companion Cavalry (Hetairoi). Chosen on the basis of personal merit and drawn from Macedonians and Greeks, the Companion Cavalry formed the elite corps of Alexander's army and it was with these that most of his waking hours were spent.14 His closest tie was with the inner circle 9 11

12

14

10 Arrian, Anab. 1.4.6-8; cf. Strabo 7.3.8. Cf. Lock (1977) esp. 105-7. Q. C. 7.1.29; cf. Plut., Bum. 12.3; see also Hammond (1989) 65-6. For the relationship between king, Macedonians and the Macedonian state, see esp. Hammond (1989) 49-70. Compare the oath of the Delian League, where members also swore to have the same friends and enemies ([Arist.],Ath. Pol. 23.5), and the alliance between Athens and Bottiaeans (Tod 68.18) where this formula is also restored. What is striking about this oath in connection with Alexander is that it is made with an individual, not a state, and so actually achieves the personal force the other usage is meant to imply. Gifts from booty: Q. C. 5.6.20, 9.1.6; Diod. 17.40.1, 46.6, 89.3 (on military aristeia see Pritchett (1974,1979) 2.278-80); morale boosting: Q. C. 6.6.11; Diod. 17.78.1,94.1; placatory gifts after trouble at Opis: Plut., Alex. 71; cf. Arrian, Anab. 7.12.1; Q. C. 10.2.9-11; 13 Justin 12.11.2-3. Diod. 17.65.3; cf. Q. C. 5.2.2-5. Theopompus, FGrHist 115 F 224-5; Arrian, Indica 18.7-8; Berve (1926) 11-15, 32-7; Hammond and Griffith (1979) 152-3, 162-3, 395-6; Hammond (1981) 16; (1989) 54. There is debate about who was responsible for the formation of this special branch of the Macedonian army revolving around a confused remark of Anaximenes of Lampsacus

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of friends who probably acted as an informal advisory council.15 Alexander's circle, men of roughly the same age as himself, were called hetairoi and, although the Macedonian kingship was autocratic and the king held the final decision-making powers, there was a sense in which Alexander ruled not absolutely, but as 'the first among equals'.16 'Trust' as between philoi was an important element in the relationship between Alexander and the members of his court. For example, Parmenio having warned Alexander that his doctor Philip, a boyhood friend, was trying to poison him, the king not only drank the supposed poison but also rewarded the doctor as a sign of his trust (pistos) as a philos.11 Alexander was also said to have disbelieved Philotas' treachery when it was first reported to him in Egypt because of the length of their friendship (philia), the honour (time) of his father Parmenio, and the loyalty (pistis) of Philotas himself.18 Harpalus was appointed treasurer in 331, whom Arrian says had been sent into exile in 337 because he was loyal (pistos) to Alexander.19 In addition, although there was not equality of power between himself and his court, the king had to remember that he was ruling free men not slaves.20 Curtius says that the Macedonians, although used to the rule of a king, lived more under the shadow of freedom than other people.21 Arrian has Alexander himself berate the soldiers at Opis with the fact that he ate as they did and slept as they did, that is that he was one of them.22 Furthermore, in his role as a man of the people the king was expected to lead by persuasion not by compulsion: just as Alexander persuaded the Macedonians to

15

16

17

18

20 22

(FGrHist 72 F 4) who says that Alexander trained the nobles as cavalry and called them Companions {Hetairoi). The problem is deciding which Alexander, if indeed it was an Alexander, was meant. For a selection of views, see Momigliano (1934) 8-10 (Alexander I); Brunt (1976) 151-3 (a mistaken reference to Alexander I); Cawkwell (1978) 30-2 (Philip II); Hammond and Griffith (1979) 405-6 (Alexander III). Arrian, Anab. 1.25.4; Q- C. 6.8.1-15, 11.9-10; Diod. 17.54.3; cf. Arrian, Anab. 5.28.5, 6.2.1; Q. C. 3.12.2, 10.3.2; Berve (1926) 33-4; Hammond and Griffith (1979) 158; Bosworth (1980-95) 1.160-2; (1988a) 7; Borza (1990) 241. See also Momigliano ((1971) 132) who suggests that the Macedonian Hetairoi were probably modelled on the Persian institution of the King's Friends (e.g., Diod. 17.31.1). On Macedonian assemblies, see Lock (1977); Errington (1978) 77-133; cf. Borza (1990) ch. 10. Cf. Hamilton (1973) 245; Hammond (1989) 57. Arrian, Anab. 2.4.9-11; cf. Diod. 17.31.4-6; Q. C. 3.6.1-16; Justin 11.8.5-9; *P\ut., Alex. 19; P. Oxyrh. 1798=Anon., FGrHist 148 F 44 col i; see also Bosworth (1980-95) 1.191-2. Compare Arrian, Anab. 4.21.7. On Philip's early relationship with Alexander: Q. C. 3.6.1; see also Berve (1926) 2.388-9 (no. 788). Arrian, Anab. 3.26.1. Philotas was probably framed, perhaps even by Alexander himself: Badian (i960); Heckel (1977); Hamilton (1969) 134-5; Bosworth (1980-95) 1.359-61; see also Brunt (1976-83) Appendix xi; cf. Justin 12.5.2-3. For the case against Philotas, see Lane Fox (1973) 287-9 (although Lane Fox admits that, although plausible, Philotas' 19 guilt cannot be proved). Arrian, Anab. 3.6.4-5, cf. 19.7. 21 See Hammond and Griffith (1979) 388. Q. C. 4.7.31. Arrian, Anab. 7.9.9, cf. 4.7.4.

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continue after Gaugamela, Arrian has him say to the mutinous soldiers at the Hyphasis that he wished to lead them by persuasion, or be persuaded by them to turn back, and Coenus later picks up the same theme.23 Yet as Alexander's kingship progressed, he moved further and further away from these principles towards a more absolute monarchy, and the ties of personal relationships were broken down as he became increasingly remote.24 Arrian complains that Alexander was brought under the yoke of Medish and Persian wealth, and of a lifestyle like that of a barbarian king and not equal to that of his subjects.25 In this way he not only offended the Macedonians, but became increasingly alienated from them, a problem compounded by claims of divinity (whether he believed in them himself or not) and the related and offensive experiment in prostration (proskynesis).26 Even Alexander's responses to the gifts given by those who surrendered to him carried too oriental a flavour which his Macedonians did not understand or could not accept. Curtius says that when Taxilas the Indian gave golden crowns to Alexander and his friends as well as eighty talents of silver, Alexander was so pleased that he both returned what the man had given and added one thousand talents from the booty which he was carrying, as well as many gold and silver vases, a large number of Persian robes and thirty of his own horses with the trappings which they wore when he himself rode them. 27 Curtius goes on: This liberality, although it lay the barbarian under an obligation, greatly offended hisfriends.One of them, Meleager, said over dinner when he had drunk too much wine that he congratulated Alexander because he had at all events found a man in India worth one thousand talents.28 It had been the practice of the Persian Kings to give gifts lavishly to their subjects in order to keep them in a perpetual state of debt and always under an obligation which could not be repaid, and this was the strategy for establishing and maintaining the King in his position.29 Alexander 23

25 26

27

29

Gaugamela: Q. C. 6.4.1; see also Hammond ((1981) 242-3), although he does not notice the degeneration in Alexander's willingness to rule by persuasion. Hyphasis: Arrian, Anab. 5.25.3. Despite Bosworth's scepticism about the authenticity of Arrian's speeches in the debate at the Hyphasis ((1988b) 123-34), m e theme is prominent enough elsewhere to make it at least believable in this context. Coenus: Arrian, Anab. 5.27.2. Compare also Errington's analysis of the assemblies convened by Alexander whose primary function was to test Alexander's auctoritas so that he could enforce his potestas 24 See Bosworth (1988a) 174-81; cf. Badian (1962) (=(1964)). ((1978) 107-15). Arrian, Anab. 4.7.4. Q . C . 6.6.2. O n Alexander's divinity a n d proskynesis, see Badian (1981); Bosworth (1988a) 2 7 8 - 9 0 contra Balsdon (1950); H a m i l t o n (1969) 152-3. Q . C . 8.12.15-16. C o m p a r e Alexander's gifts t o t h e Arimaspians, or Benefactors, o f 28 Cyrus: Diod. 17.81.1-2; Q. C. 7.3.3; AiriansAnab. 3.27.4-5. Q. C. 8.12.17. Seech.6.

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adopted the same practice in his treatment of the conquered states of Asia: even though they gave gifts to him, he took care to give them back more than they could ever repay in order to lay them under a continuing obligation to himself. But Alexander's friends were jealous of the gifts because they failed to understand what Alexander was doing, and this contributed to the tensions between Alexander and his Macedonians. Again we return to the problems associated with different kinds of exchange. Used to a particular kind of relationship based upon a particular kind of exchange, the Macedonians did not understand when Alexander changed gear and began to use a different, more unequal, kind of relationship based on a more unequal kind of exchange with his new Asian subjects. The main effect in the breakdown of relations between Alexander and his soldiers was the loss of trust on both sides. Alexander became increasingly watchful and distrustful and reacted violently towards any sign that the links between himself and his Companions were disintegrating.30 And this created an equal and opposite distrust from the Macedonians. One of the first signs of this breakdown was the trial and execution of Philotas, who was accused of leading a conspiracy to murder the king, and the subsequent assassination of Parmenio.31 Whether Alexander too was the victim of someone else's machinations or himself had a hand in the plot, this episode is all the more shocking because Philotas and Parmenio held the first place among Alexander's Companions, that is the place of optimum trust,32 and Curtius has Alexander say that Parmenio was bound closely both to Alexander and to his father by favours.33 Whoever betrayed whom, the complex web of personal relationships that had constituted Alexander's Macedonian monarchy was starting to become unravelled. The Pages' Conspiracy, where a number of Alexander's attendants plotted to kill him, followed by the execution or imprisonment of Callisthenes, who though probably innocent became implicated in the plot, are also symptomatic of the same problem: broken trust.34 The Pages were the sons of leading Macedonians who waited upon the king, a practice which was supposed to bind them and their families more closely to him. 35 Hermolaus, the page leading the conspiracy, justified his actions by saying that Alexander had begun not to rule them as free men, but to 30 32 34

35

31 Q . C . 10.1.39-42. See above. 33 D i o d . 17.80.1; Q. C . 6.11.39; cf. Arrian, Anab. 3.26.4. Q. C . 6.9.4. Arrian, Anab. 4.13-14; Q. C . 8.6-8; Plut., Alex. 55; cf. Bosworth (1988a) 117-18; Lane Fox (1973) 3 2 3 - 3 0 ; Hamilton (1973) 1 0 7 - 8 . AirianyAnab. 4.13.1; Q. C. 5.1.42,8.6.2-6; Hammond and Griffith (1979) 401-2.

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lord it over them as if they were slaves.36 It is no accident that Arrian links thematically this affair and the Cleitus episode, where Alexander in a drunken brawl murdered one of his commanders who objected to Alexander claiming all the credit for his success for himself, with the attempt to introduce proskynesis, an oriental practice that was shocking at least to the Greeks.37 This series of events all contributed to the alienation of Alexander from the Macedonians. After the murder of Cleitus, Curtius says that Alexander saw that the minds of all his friends were struck with terror, and that no one would now dare to speak with him, but that he would have to live in solitude like a wild beast, both terrifying others and being afraid himself.38 Curtius later returns to this same theme when he says on Alexander's marriage to Roxane (of which the Macedonians disapproved) that they pretended assent with their faces since after the death of Cleitus freedom had been taken away.39 Elsewhere he says that towards the end of Alexander's reign the king became over-hasty at performing executions, and also at believing calumnies.40 Even if his account is romanticised and exaggerated, Curtius highlights the tone of increasing alienation of the king.41 The final test was the so-called mutiny at Opis in 324. 42 The Macedonian troops, having become increasingly suspicious of Alexander's new oriental ways and pretensions to divinity, rebelled when Alexander planned to send the oldest and most infirm of the Macedonians home as they felt they were being rejected by him in favour of the newly arrived Iranian troops. Alexander responded to the complaints of the Macedonians by executing the ringleaders, accusing them of ingratitude and taking himself off to his palace and refusing to receive any Macedonian, including the Companions, but only giving audience to the Iranian soldiers.43 These he divided up into battalions, and named 36

37

38

40 41

43

Q. C . 8.7.1. For the Greek c o m m o n p l a c e that barbarians were slaves, see for example Arist.jPo/. 1,125205-9. Arrian, Anab. 4.8.1-9.4, 14.3-4; Q. C . 8.1.19-2.12; Justin 12.6.1-14; Plut., Alex. 50.1-52.7; o n the different accounts, see Brown (1949); Hamilton (1969) 139-45; Bosworth (1977) 6 2 - 4 ; (1980-95) 2.51-2; more generally see Bosworth (1988a) 114-15; Lane Fox (1973) 311-13; Berve (1926) 2 . 2 0 6 - 8 (no. 427); Carney (1981). Q. C. 8.2.7. Compare Harpalus, w h o m Plutarch says had fallen into bad ways so ran away because Alexander had b e c o m e harsh to his friends (Plut. Dem. 25.1; cf. Q. C . 10.2.2-3; 39 D i o d . 17.108.6-8). Q. C . 8.4.30; cf. Badian (1962) ( = ( 1 9 6 4 ) ) . Q.C.10.1.39. On the reliability of the vulgate tradition, and its relationship to the work of Cleitarchus, see Hamilton (1977); note also Hammond (1983) who is critical of the vulgate (although this is pre-Bosworth). For critical assessments of Arrian, see Bosworth (1988b) and 42 See also above. Brunt (1976-83) Appendix XXVIII. Q. C. 10.3.1-5; Arrian, Anab. 7.11.1-4; Plut., Alex. 71; Diod. 17.109.2-3; cf. Diod. 17.108.3. See also Bosworth (1988a) 159.

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some as his Kinsmen who were allowed to kiss him in the Persian custom.44 Curtius says that the Macedonians then went about the camp crying mournfully that they would rather die than have the king remain angry with them.45 Arrian says that the Macedonians lamented the fact that the Iranians had become Kinsmen and were allowed to kiss Alexander, while no Macedonian had ever been given this honour.46 Alexander then relented, and made them all his Kinsmen, and held a banquet to celebrate the fact.47 As we have already noted, one of the key elements that made Alexander's army work was the soldiers' personal relationship with Alexander himself. When this relationship had broken down almost completely at Opis, Alexander exploited the fact of its breakdown in order to establish a new relationship between king and subjects which required complete submission.48 The irony is that the token of submission was the Macedonians' insistence that they be named as Kinsmen, implying as it did closeness and intimacy, but in fact signifying everything but this. They were now all his Kinsmen: there were to be no distinctions between Iranians and Macedonians. By submitting at Opis and insisting on being placed on a par with the Iranians, the Macedonians lost any chance of retaining the privileged position they had had before. This was now a new style of kingship in which the king enforced his will, and a new relationship between king and subjects amongst whom there might have been little cultural connection, and this was to provide a pattern for the kingdoms that were to emerge in Alexander's wake.49 9.3

Alexander and empire

In his conquest of Asia, Alexander was trying to create a new vision for his empire where the old distinctions of Greek and barbarian were broken down in favour of new patterns, using kinship and gift-exchange as two powerful forces to bind his new subjects to himself. Not only did he recognise and reinforce his kinship (syngeneia) through Heracles with the Sibii, who said they would help him eagerly on the basis of their syngeneia and gave him lavish gifts,50 but Alexander also tried to create new ties of kinship. The most obvious way was through marriage, so it is not particularly surprising to find him marrying not only Roxane, but also Darius' daughter Barsine and Parysatis the daughter of Ochus (Artaxerxes III), 44

45 48

50

Arrian, Anak 7.11.1-4, 6; Q. C . 10.3.5. Cf. Hdt. 1.134.1; X e n . , Cyrop. 1.4.27-8; Kuhrt (1995) 2 . 6 8 7 - 8 . See also H a m m o n d (1989) 230; Bosworth (1980-95) 2 . 8 1 , 8 9 . 46 47 Q . C . 10.3.5. Arrian, Anab. j.11.6. Arrian, Anak 7.11.7-9. 49 Bosworth (1988a) 1 6 0 - 1 . Ibid. 179.

Diod. 17.96.2-3; cf. Q. C. 9.4.1-3; Justin 12.9.2.

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although the mass wedding at Susa where he married his Companions to Iranian brides smacks more of eccentricity than rational strategic planning.51 Curtius has his Alexander say that the point of these marriages was to reduce the arrogance of the victors and the shame of the vanquished, and to remove every distinction between conquered and conqueror.52 These marriages softened the blow of the conquest and were an attempt to put the relationship between Alexander and his new subjects on a different footing: to bring them, like his Macedonians, into a personal relationship with himself. But marriage was not the only kind of kinship link Alexander made use of. Not only did he marry Darius' daughter, but also he virtually adopted the whole family.53 In particular he honoured Darius' mother as his mother, and she responded in kind.54 Likewise Ada of Caria surrendered the fortress of Alinda to Alexander and adopted him as her son; both Arrian and Plutarch say he accepted the title and made her the satrap of Caria.55 By creating and reinforcing kinship links such as these Alexander was not only tying individuals to himself by very powerful bonds, but also legitimising his rule in Asia: he was not conqueror, he was kin. Gift-giving also played an important part in Alexander's relationship with his empire. Many of the cities, satraps, kings and queens who surrendered to Alexander offered him gifts, sometimes including the offer of a bride to cement the connection.56 These gifts were clearly given to Alexander in the spirit of supplication, that is they were given in order to establish a relationship with him. We noticed a similar phenomenon among the Thracians, where the Thracian kings received gifts in the first instance. With the gifts given to Alexander, however, there is again a subtle but important difference. Gifts were given to the Thracians in order to provoke a return, the power of the king being established by the prospective nature of the gift. Alexander on the other hand came as the 51

52

53 54 55 56

Roxane: Q. C. 8.4.21-30 (esp. 25); cf. Arrian, Anab. 4.19.5; Plut., Alex. 47.7; see also Bosworth (1980-95) 2.130-2; on the problems with the sources (which place the marriage variously in 327 and 328), see Bosworth (1980) 10 n. 76; Barsine (Stateira), Parysatis and the mass wedding at Susa: Arrian, Anab. 3.22.6, 7.4.4-8; Diod. 17.107.6; Flut., Alex. 70.3; Justin 12.10.9-10; Q. C. 10.3.12. Q. C. 8.4.25,10.3.12 (although see esp. Bosworth (1980) 10-11); cf. Plut., deAlex.f. 329c (on which see Brunt (1977) 45-7; Hamilton (1969) xxix-xxxiii; Badian (1958b)). E.g., Airian,Anab. 3.22.6; Diod. 17.67.1; Q. C. 4.10.19-23. Q. C. 3.12.17* 24-5,4.15.10-11,5.2.17-22; Diod. 17.37.6-38.2,59.7. Arrian, Anab. 1.23.7-8; T*\ut.3 Alex. 22.7; see also Bosworth ( 1 9 8 0 - 9 5 ) 1.154. E.g., Arrian, Anab. 1.24.5-6, 2.13.7-8, 3-16.3, 4.15.1-6, 4.21.10, 5.3.5, 8.3, 20.5, 29.4, 6.14.1 (the Oxydracae brought the greatest gifts among the Indians), 15.5-6 (Musicanus also gave gifts of the greatest value among the Indians); Q. C. 5.1.21,2.9,6.5.23, 8.12.11, 15 (Omphis is the Taxilas of Arrian and the Mophis of Diodorus), 9.8.1,10.1.22-6; Diod. 17.84.1, 92.1, 93.1, 102.4. On the status of the Indian kings, see Brunt (1976-83) Appendix XV.

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Alexander

conqueror, and already stood in a position of greater power in regard to the giver. The uncertainty between the two parties was not whether there would be a relationship, but what kind of relationship it would be, that is whether it would be a positive or negative relationship. Gifts were given to Alexander in order to secure a positive response, where a negative one might well be expected. The point is made by Alexander's conquest of Tyre.57 When Alexander approached the city, Curtius describes how the people of Tyre wanted an alliance with Alexander rather than submission, so envoys were sent with a gold crown as a gift as well as provisions in the spirit of hospitality.58 Alexander gave orders that the gifts should be received as from friends, and said that he wished to sacrifice at the temple of Heracles within the city. The Tyrenians for their part apparently saw the entry of Macedonian soldiers into the city as an acceptance of vassalage.59 They refused Alexander entry, and decided to try to outlast him in a siege. The rest, of course, is history. The city was finally taken, although not without difficulty, and Tyre was sacked. The Tyrenians had given their gifts in order to establish a relationship of equality. Alexander received gifts from the Tyrenians as a token of friendship, but he did not intend it to be a relationship between equal partners. Both understood the rules of the game, but determinedly placed a different significance upon the pieces, a question which could only be resolved by conflict. Alexander's victory sealed the issue.60 Alexander's vision of empire was one where the old distinctions of friends and enemies were realigned. Whether by kinship or friendship, Alexander was refocusing the boundaries of what defined insiders and who were outsiders. As Curtius has him say to the Iranian troops at Opis: Asia and Europe belong to one and the same king. I gave you Macedonian arms, I have given age to your foreign newness; you are both my citizens and my soldiers. All things take on the same colour. It is neither ignoble for Persians to copy the ways of the Macedonians, nor for Macedonians to imitate Persians. There ought to be the same laws for those who live under the same king.61 Alexander was trying to create a kingdom where all were bound to him, and where he became the defining feature of 'belonging'. This is not to say that he was following a policy of cultural fusion or that he had a grand vision of the unity of mankind,62 but that just as Alexander had been the 57

58 60

62

The siege of Tyre is described by the sources with varying amounts of detail: Q. C. 4.2.2-4.18;Justin 11.io.io-14'iPlut.,Alex. 24.4-25.3;Arrian,Anab. 2.16-24. 59 Q. C. 4.2.2; cf. Justin 11.10.10. See Bosworth (1980-95) 1.235. Compare Cambyses' approaches to the king of the Ethiopians: Hdt. 3.20-1; Sancisi61 Weerdenburg (1989) I35> 138-9. Q. C. 10.3.13-14. Contra (most notoriously) Tarn (1948) 1.134-48,2.399-449 (esp. 434-49).

Alexander

177

focus of the Macedonian state, where the Macedonians' primary loyalty as Macedonians had been to Alexander as king, so now he personally became the focus for the loyalty of the empire.63 This had the result that 'to belong', to be an insider, was not just to be Greek (and here he would have included himself), but to be a subject of Alexander. The cost of this was high, not least for Alexander himself. Whether he was really aware of the full implications of what he was doing or not, he was breaking apart established social boundaries and trying to reforge them in a new way. But Alexander did not live long enough to see the results of his experiments in social engineering, and it was left to the Successors to make the best (or not, as the case may be) of the new patterns which Alexander had established. 63

So also Ehrenberg (1938) 109.

10

Friendship and ideology

I hate the idea of causes, and if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray E. M. Forster, Two Cheers for Democracy my country.

The values and principles of any given society as we are all aware (in the sense that we are all 'specialists' at living within our own society) are both multifarious and mutable. And yet in open contradiction to this we often make generalisations about our own society and the societies of others, simplifying complex behaviours into basic and sometimes apparently simplistic principles in order to try to understand and interpret them. This book has been about friendship, phllla, and interstate relations. It has been suggested that the models of friendship in classical Greece were based at least in part upon patterns of exchange which were themselves governed by the status of individuals as 'insiders' or 'outsiders', friends or enemies, creating expectations of the way relationships should work. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that this was true both for personal and inter-polls relations, and that in fact the models for one sphere were copied and adapted for the other. Many of the types of exchange-relationships current in the classical period grew out of and were inextricably linked with the relationships of an older age, and were modernised by the polls into forms which could be used for and by the polls. This entailed not only the updating of existing patterns of relationship such as xenla and the hetalrelal so that they could be universalised to a more heterogeneous society, but also the creation of new types of relationship like proxenla. There were in fact almost infinite combinations of relationship (not all of which were friendship relationships) which could be used for the state, but could also conflict with each other, and a recurring theme in this book has been the conflict of interests that could arise between competing loyalties. In this concluding chapter we shall consider this important issue, and try to come to an understanding of the larger ideological framework within which these friendship relationships were set. 178


10.1

179

Polis ideology

First we need to wrestle with the question of ideology itself, which is here defined as the set of principles that delimits the boundaries of values and integrity and informs the patterns of behaviour of most people within a society, and which is an ever-evolving and complex matrix of ideas and beliefs which grows out of a society's experience and is coloured by its history.1 On this basis ideology should not be seen as a univocal entity, but as a constantly negotiated position which could encompass a number of competing and conflicting ideas, justifying and reconciling them to each other and to the history of their development. In recent years polis ideology has come under close scrutiny, and has been seen as emphasising the corporate and centralising nature of ih^ polis and as being directed towards securing the best interests of the polis. It has then been contrasted with the so-called aristocratic ideology which is seen as individual and competitive with an emphasis on personal (rather than group) virtue, and it has been argued that the ideology of the polis was in conflict with, and eventually superseded, aristocratic ideology.2 There is a certain kind of evidence which would suggest this was true. For example, when Aeschines accused Demosthenes of indicting on a charge punishable with death and torturing his own philos and xenos Anaxinus of Oreus (Anaxinus according to Demosthenes was a spy of Philip), Demosthenes allegedly replied that the salt of the city was of more value than the table of his xenos.3 But when Demosthenes defines patriotism in this way he appears to be walking where angels fear to tread, and the murder of his xenos would have been truly shocking both to religious as well as to moral sensibilities. There were also other interpretations of patriotism which would have seemed equally as strange to the Greek mind, although still maintaining a certain odd consistency within the overall framework of Greek political thought. Alcibiades said in Sparta in 415: 1

2

3

The difficulty of defining the term 'ideology' is a problem that has rather muddied the waters of the discourse. On the various usages of 'ideology', see Eagleton (1991) ch. 1. Here I am using a looser sense (cf. the discussions of Finley (1982) esp. 17; (1983) 122-41; (1985) 4-5; Ober (1989) 38-40; Goldhill (1990) 97; Seaford (1994) 6 n. 29; Griffith (1995) 69 n. 31. However, this usage is itself problematic because of the inconsistencies between definitions, which tend to obscure the debate. See also a helpful new discussion of ideology as statement, command and question: Pelling (1997) esp. 218-19). Compare Loraux ((1986) esp. 330-7), who defends a more rigidly Marxist application of ideology. Gouldner (1965) 15; Goldhill (1986) 57-78, esp. 73-4; Herman (1987) esp. ch. 5; Kurke (1991) esp. n and in; Seaford (1994) esp. 204-5; von Reden (1995) esp. 2-8; cf. Adkins (i960) esp. chs. 9 and 10; Gernet (1981) esp. 288; Vernant (1981) 1-6. Aeschin. 3.223-4; cf. Dem. 18.137.

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I feel the love of polis (to philopoli) not for the one where I was wronged, but for the one where I may exercise my citizen rights safely. I do not think that I am now marching against that which is my fatherland, but much more that I am recovering that which is no longer my fatherland. This is truly love of polis, not when one does not attack it although one has lost it unjustly, but when one eagerly uses every means to try to recover it.4

Here we return to something approaching the participatory model of citizenship discussed in chapter three, where the individual is implicated in the polis to the extent that the polis is where he can participate uninterrupted in the active life of the community and whose best interests are seen to be coextensive with his own. However, it is just as dangerous to rely on only the rhetoric of Alcibiades, who had his own jaundiced agenda, as it is to rely on Demosthenes' claims for a definition of what constituted patriotism and who was patriotic. But there was no strict dichotomy between the ideology of the elite and traditionally elitist relationships on the one hand, and the ideology of the polis on the other.5 The polis was a creation of its past and many of the features of the pre-polis world were transferred, transformed and given a polis identity.6 For example, the polis took on in its corporate identity the cooperative and competitive values associated with the traditional aristocracy. In democratic Athens, the aristocratic competition (agon) was adapted for corporate use. 7 Dramatic festivals allowed tribal competition, as well as competition among individual choregoi, and there was also a competition for the best bouleutic prytany.8 The festival games still remained the preserve of the wealthy and noble, but the glory of victory not only reflected on the state, but also was taken over as a state honour as Alcibiades claimed.9 But contained within this competitive drive was the discourse of cooperation and equality (even if this may have been sometimes more of a theoretical than an actual equality within the context of the real class differences that always existed). Again in Athens this meant equality before the law and equality through the law (isonomia) as well as freedom of speech (isegoria) for all citizens.10 In the law courts as well, where orators competed with each other for dominance, aristocratic language 4 5

6 8 9 10

Th. 6.92.4; see also Finley's discussion of the passage ((1983) 122-3). See also Pelling (1997) who argues that tensions thus created within civic ideology, especially as portrayed in tragedy, were an integral part of civic ideology. He says (235): Tart of civic ideology, in fact, was to feel worried about civic ideology, in the right place and the right setting. And the tragic theatre was the right place.' Cf. Arnheim (1977) 156. 7 See esp. Griffith (1995); cf. Donlan (1980) 287-8. Cf. Osborne (1993). Meritt and Traill (1974) 29 [5]; cf. 28 [3,4]. Th. 6.16.2; cf. Isoc. 16.31-4; see also Morgan (1990) 219. See Sinclair (1988) 14-16; Brock (1991).


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was made to conform to the needs of the egalitarian democratic state and a new distinction was drawn between citizens and non-citizens (foreigners, metics and slaves), so that now conceptually all citizens could partake of elitism, the kaloi kagathol, even if the reality was different.11 Even warfare was no longer the province of the hero who gained individual distinction, but the heroic experience was made universal and appropriate for all citizens through the funeral speech (epltaphlos), where all the individuals were anonymous, and instead the corporate identity of the democracy was celebrated.12 Even in Sparta the ruling elite called themselves 'equals' (homoioi) despite their lack of true economic homogeneity.13 In addition we have already seen how many of the relationships which were traditionally confined to use by the elite were necessary for the maintenance and continuance of political processes in the classical age and were also important in the formation of policy. What was best for the polls was decided by the political groups which could gather enough support to make theirs the dominant view. Others in the polls might disagree and often did. 10.2

Bribery: Philip and Aeschines

This ambiguity over what was best for the state had implications for charges of treason, and was all part of political manoeuvring as were allegations that members of opposing political groups had received bribes. This kind of political tactic was particularly prevalent in Athens in the 340s and 330s in the Athenians' entanglements with Philip of Macedon. Philip was well known for his gifts to ambassadors, and allegations of bribery were rife against those who lent their assistance to Philip.14 Not only were Philocrates and Aeschines charged with bribery at Athens, but Demosthenes alleges that the Olynthians, Lasthenes and Euthycrates, also received gifts in return for betraying their city.15 Mecyberna, Torone, and later Megara and Elis, were also allegedly won through bribery, and, in his speech On the Crown, Demosthenes put together a blacklist of traitors among the cities.16 Diodorus sums up the situation when he says: 11 13 14

15 16

12 See esp. Ober (1989) 259-92. Loraux (1986); Ober (1989) 291. See Hodkinson (1993). Although as de Ste Croix notes ((1981) 298-9), following Markle ((1976) 80-99, esp. 98-9), there were others, such as the oligarchs and intellectuals in Athens, who would have been ready to support Philip without any persuasion. Dem. 19.265; cf. Diod. 16.53.2. Diod. 16.53.2; Dem. 18.295 (the 'blacklist'), 19.260; Paus. 4.28.4.

18 2


Not even the city [of Demosthenes] was able to keep in check the citizens in their impulse for treachery; for such a rush of traitors appeared at that time in Greece. Thus they say that whenever Philip wished to take a city excelling in its strength and one of the inhabitants said it could not be taken by force, he asked if not even gold would be able to scale the wall. For he had learned by experience that what was impossible to subdue with arms, was easy to conquer with gold. So, cultivating traitors in the cities by gift-receiving (dorodokiai) and calling those who received the gold xenoi and philoi, he corrupted the morals of men by his wicked dealings.17 This raises two issues: the relationship between gift-giving and bribery; and their relationship to xenia and philia. First of all, the language of bribery and gift-exchange was continuous, since down and its cognates could mean both a 'gift5 and a 'bribe'.18 As Perlman has shown, in the Greek world receiving gifts is really only seen as a crime 'when it is connected with activity detrimental to the city', so that: 'Accusations of bribery are, therefore, always connected with accusations of treachery, thus turning into political trials in which the accusation of bribery serves to bring forward conflicting political views and to decide political conflicts between opposing political parties.'19 What is more, Harvey points to the major weakness in this view of 'catapolitical' bribery: that it relies upon a subjective judgement of what is the best for the state.20 In sum, what may be seen as legitimately receiving gifts by one man may be condemned as bribery by another. This identification of receiving gifts with bribery represented the intersection of two kinds of exchange, which although similar in format were different in other respects, not the least that one was a proper form of exchange while the other was improper. This became a particular problem when gifts received as part of the normal diplomatic processes could later be used as an excuse for allegations of ambassadors receiving bribes.21 As a corollary of this, the connection between receiving gifts and receiving bribes also complicated the establishment of a relationship based upon a gift-exchange, such as xenia, which might be seen as either 17 18

19

20 21

Diod. 16.54.2-4. Harvey (1985) 82-3; Herman (1987) 73-81, esp. 75-9. For a discussion of bribery in elections and in the law courts, see Staveley (1972) 108-13. Perlman (1976) 224; cf. Harvey (1985) 76-117, esp. 112. See also Dem. 19.7, 21.113. For the Athenians' willingness to interpret failure of their magistrates as guilt, especially of bribery, see Roberts (1982) 9-10. On the punishment for bribery, see [Arist.] ,Ath. Pol. 54.2; Dein. 1.60,2.17; Hypereides, Contra Dem. col. 24-7; see also Rhodes (1993) 599. Harvey (1985) 112-13; see also H e r m a n (1987) 7 6 - 8 . Perlman (1976) 228; for the Persian attitude t o gifts in relation to the Greek attitude to bribery, see Lewis (1989) 2 2 7 - 3 5 . This should not surprise us too much; caution is exercised today w h e n diplomats are given gifts in the course of their duties: cf. Lynn and Jay

(1984) 400-22.


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innocent or treacherous, depending on whether or not it was perceived to be against the interests of the community.22 The problem was further compounded when the gift took the form of bullion or currency, which could be viewed as having either an economic or a symbolic value depending on one's viewpoint or one's prejudices.23 The relationship between Philip and Aeschines demonstrates how kinds of exchange could be deliberately misinterpreted on a number of levels.24 Diodorus says that those who received bribes from Philip were called his philoi and xenoi.25 Demosthenes also refers to those who are the traitors in the poleis as those who consider themselves worthy to be called philoi and xenoi of Philip, and brags that he himself did not ever prefer the gifts (dora) and xenia of Philip to the common advantage of the Greeks.26 But by the act of receiving gifts from Philip and entering into a xenia relationship, these supposed traitors were also signalling their involvement in the rights, duties and obligations of xenoi. Just as Philip could expect certain things from them on the basis of this relationship, they could also have similar expectations of him. This leads to the question of Aeschines' conduct in 346: was Aeschines duped, or was he bribed and party to the whole plot?27 The answer seems to lie somewhere in between. Although Demosthenes can produce little positive evidence, and even this is probably worthless, it would appear that Aeschines did receive gifts from Philip.28 The strongest evidence for this is the references by Demosthenes to the bribes themselves being 22 24 25

27

28

23 T h o u g h compare D e m . 19.7. See also Bosworth (1988a) 9. See ch. 1. Cf. Harris (1995) 8 6 - 7 . Diod. 16.54.4; see also [Dem.] 7.17; Dem. 19.294-5. Compare Phocion, who was admired by Philip according to Plutarch and made the phibs and xenos of Alexander (Plut o Phoc. 17.6—9), but was said to have refused money (munera magnae pecuniae) offered to him by the ambassadors of Philip (Nepos, Phoc. 1.3). On Philip's use of xenia, 26 see also McQueen (1995b) 330-4. Dem. 18.109. Griffith (Hammond and Griffith (1979) 344-6): 'Of actual duplicity in the conduct of the formal exchanges with the demos Philip must certainly be acquitted', though he does concede that Philip sent the ambassadors back home ignorant of his plans. Ellis ((1976) 101-3): Philip was serious (see also Markle (1974) 254 and n. 1); Cawkwell ((1978) 105-6, 123): Aeschines was not bribed nor did he actually make any 'promises', though he reported to the assembly Various encouraging conversations' (see also Cawkwell (1963b) 204: 'there is no reason to believe that Aeschines' policy was in any way due to corruption'). Philocrates was also impeached for bribery, and fled before the case came to trial, thus condemning himself to death (Dem. 19.114, 116-19; Hypereides, Euxen. 29-30; Aeschin. 2.6,3.79, 81). Demosthenes claims that Philocrates openly admitted to accepting 'bribes', and Aeschines implies that he did; although this possibly holds little weight since both had formerly approved the Peace of Philocrates, and were now trying desperately to distance themselves from him and it. D e m . 19.145 refers t o houses, grain, timber (on this as 'unreliable evidence' for bribery, see Harvey (1985) 9 4 ) a n d an estate in Thrace worth thirty minas a year, which, as Griffith points out, is at least specific ( H a m m o n d and Griffith (1979) 337 n. 4 ) . C o m p a r e Cawkwell (1978) 123.

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given as xenia and to the xenia between Aeschines and Philip.29 First of all, Demosthenes says of the second embassy: While we were there sitting about in Pella, consider what each of us chose to do. I to seek out and rescue the prisoners, and both to spend my own money and to ask Philip to ransom the prisonersfromthe xenia (gifts of hospitality and xenia) he gave us. But you will hear now what Aeschines kept on trying to bring off. And what was this? For Philip to give us money all together in common! So that you may not be ignorant of this, this man sounded us all out. In what way? By sending to each one in private, men of Athens, and giving much gold. And since he was unlucky in some cases (for it is not necessary for me to speak of myself, but the deeds themselves and what has been done will make it clear), he considered that the common gift could be received good-naturedly. Thus there would be security for those who had sold themselves in private, if we all shared even a little of what had been received in common. It was given for this reason, using xenia as the pretext! When I prevented this, they divided it up again among themselves.30 The important point to gain from this is that the 'bribes' were (even notionally) offered as xenia. As the giving of gifts to ambassadors was a customary part of the ritual associated with receiving ambassadors at the Macedonian court, it was not unusual that Philip should give gifts to the Athenian ambassadors. Ambassadors to Athens also received xenia, though this was only a state dinner party in the prytaneion, and Demosthenes arranged for front-row seats in the theatre for the Macedonian ambassadors.31 The difficulty lies in the spirit in which the ambassadors received them, and this is essentially what Demosthenes is attacking. He has no objection to the xenia, he says, if they are to be used for the ransoming of the prisoners, but if the ambassadors are to become paid informants of Philip (and this is what he claims they are to be) and act in his interests and not in the interests of the Athenians, then they are traitors, and the xenia are not gifts, but bribes. Secondly, Aeschines himself claimed to have a xenia with Alexander, and complained that Demosthenes taunted him with this.32 Demosthenes' reply is telling. He says in his speech On the Crown: Indeed he [Aeschines] calls it philia and xenia> and just now spoke of'the man who reproaches me for my xenia with Alexander'. I reproach you for a xenia with Alexander? Where did you get it? Or how were you worthy of it? I would not say you are the xenos or philos of Philip and Alexander - 1 am not so crazy - unless I must also call the harvesters and those who do something for pay phibi and xenoi of those who hire them. But this is impossible. How could it be? Farfromit. But I 29 30

32

See also M c Q u e e n (1995a) 125-6. D e m . 19.166-8. N o t i c e that this is one of the accusations for which D e m o s t h e n e s is able 31 to produce witnesses. Aeschin. 2.110-11,3.76. Aeschin. 3.66; cf. D e m . 18.284.


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call you the hired-hand first of Philip and now of Alexander, and all these men do as well. And if you don't believe me, ask them, or rather, I will do it for you. Men of Athens, do you think that Aeschines is the hired-hand of Alexander or his xenos? You hear what they say.33 Demosthenes claims that there is a clear difference between a xenos and a paid traitor. Again in the same speech he says: As soon as news of the battle was announced, thinking nothing of what had gone before, you admitted straight away and pretended that there was a philia and xenia between yourself and Philip, having swapped these names for 'paid labour' (mistharnia). For by what excuse of equality or justice was Philip the xenos, philos or even acquaintance (gnorimos) of Aeschines the son of Glaucothea, the drummer-girl? I do not see it, but you were paid to destroy the best interests of these men.34 In both these passages the idea of xenia is contrasted with payment to harm the interests of the state. Yet again in his speech On the False Embassy Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of valuing his xenia and philia with Philip above the state.35 As Demosthenes makes plain, one of the main issues is whether or not Aeschines received the gifts against the interest of the state. Demosthenes also points to another important factor in such xenia relationships, that is that they should have been based upon equality, since one of the hallmarks of xenia at all levels was its equality. In respect of their status alone, this was manifestly not the case between Philip and Aeschines, and Demosthenes emphasises Aeschines' social 'unworthiness' as a friend of Philip, an argument which he clearly knew would have rhetorical impact.36 Aeschines was a man of no status, Demosthenes jeers, so how could he presume to say that he could form a xenia relationship with the king? And yet the point is that Aeschines did form a xenia with Philip, and himself believed in the integrity of the relationship, or at least believed he could further his own interests at Athens by ignoring any apparent inequalities and difficulties. This highlights the tension in Athenian polis ideology which allowed one the freedom to step ouside one's own social milieu, although it also required that one face the consequences of doing so. But what were the implications of Aeschines' xenia for the events of 346? As well as giving him gifts, Philip also gave Aeschines certain assurances in secret, of which he seems to have had other confirmation, 33 36

34 35 Dem. 18.51-2. Dem. 18.284. Dem. 19.248. This is particularly pointed when one considers that Demosthenes was not just appealing to members of his own social class, but that the argument would have had wide general appeal. For attendance by the 'poor' at jury-courts and assemblies, see Markle (1985).

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that Thebes would be diminished and the Phocians saved.37 All the indications would have been that Philip was going to do as he said. Not only had Philip told him that things would be so, but some of Philip's companions (hetalroi) had confirmed it, and even the Thebans were unsure what was happening.38 As Philip's xenos, it was Aeschines' obligation to look after the interests of Philip, just as it was Philip's to look after his. This does not mean that Aeschines would, or in fact did, put the interests of his xenos before the interests of his polls, as Demosthenes claimed he did. It may have seemed that he could advantage both xenos and polls through the relationship. This is the risk that Aeschines took, based upon the reciprocal obligation of his xenos to do as he had said he would. For if things did not work out as they should, and the assurances Aeschines made to the Athenians for his xenos were not actually fulfilled, then he could face charges of bribery; which he did. Aeschines took a calculated risk that his xenos would keep his word, a risk that may have seemed very remote at the time. But Philip did not keep his word, and did not attack Thebes or save the Phocians. Nevertheless, Philip still got exactly what he wanted. The agreement for peace and alliance with the Athenians allowed him to enter southern Greece unmolested, so that when the Athenian embassy arrived back in Athens after receiving Philip's oaths he was already at Thermopylae, and by the time they had decided that his motives were more sinister and his promises were not going to be kept, it was too late and the Phocians had already given themselves up into his hands.39 In his xenla with Aeschines, Philip set up the expectation of an equal relationship, by the very fact that it was xenla. Yet it was not truly an equal relationship and Philip did not conduct it on equal terms. Aeschines had every reason to expect that Philip would keep up his side of the bargain, but Philip simply did not. Philip played with the interval between the different kinds of exchange. He manipulated the trust that Aeschines placed in his xenos in order to feed the Athenians assurances that would ensure their inactivity and Philip's ultimate success. 10.3

A conflict of interests

Aeschines had established a xenla with Philip. Demosthenes called it bribery and treason, but even after the disappointment of the Phocian 37

39

Aeschines rather unconvincingly denied the charge that he had held secret talks with Philip, which Demosthenes declares the ambassadors had been forbidden to do, though such secret private negotiations may have been interpreted as doing 'whatever good thing 38 they could' (Dem. 19.175-6,278; Aeschin. 2.124-7). Aeschin. 2.137. Seech. 8.


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settlement in 346 there were still many within Athens who clearly approved of Aeschines and his policies. He attended the banquet to celebrate the end of the Sacred War, and was elected to represent the Athenians at the Amphictyonic Council in 345 (although this was vetoed by the Areopagus). 40 He also represented the Athenians at the meeting of the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi in 340, and managed to block the decree of the Amphissans against the Athenians by attacking the Amphissans in the Council for breaking oath. 41 The upshot of this was that the Council brought charges against the Amphissans, which finally brought Greece to the Fourth Sacred War and Chaeronea in 338. In other circumstances Aeschines' xenia with Philip could have worked to the advantage of the Athenians. In the general messiness of things, one understood that it was good to have xenoi, but that one also had other loyalties and commitments - other kinds of relationships - and that there could be complications when these came into conflict with each other. One intriguing example of this tension is the episode in 420 involving Endius of Sparta and his Athenian xenos Alcibiades when ambassadors came to Athens to try to prevent an Athenian alliance with Argos.42 Although one of the ambassadors was Endius, Alcibiades still tricked the Spartans so that they did not reveal their full powers to the Athenian assembly (although they had already told the Council that they came with full powers), and then were denounced by Alcibiades, so that the Athenians decided to go ahead with the Argive alliance instead. There appear to be problems with the story as Thucydides tells it, but despite all the scholarly debate about why Alcibiades was able to get away with this trick,43 Alcibiades himself knew quite well and was willing to admit later to the Spartans that what he had done was a breach of good faith, although he claims he did it justly.44 Perhaps what is more surprising than his later friendship with Endius is his later friendship with the Spartans, and the ease with which they seem to accept his explanation. Situations could easily arise when one loyalty was brought into open confrontation with another. Agesilaus the Spartan king made the point to the Persian Pharnabazus on the lawns of Dascyleium in 395.45 Once they had exchanged greetings, Xenophon reports that Pharnabazus began (for he was the elder): 40

41

43

44

D e m . 18.134,19.128, cf. 111-13. O n Aeschines' selection and subsequent termination o f his appointment, see Ellis (1976) 131. See also Wankel (1976) 2 . 7 2 7 - 3 0 . Aeschin. 3 . 1 0 6 - 2 4 ; cf. D e m . 149-53. On problems with the chronology of the Fourth 42 Sacred War, see Ellis (1976) 291 n. 31. See ch. 3. S e e Hatzfeld (1951) 8 9 - 9 3 ; HCT 4.51-3; Ellis (1989) 3 9 - 4 0 ; Kebric (1976) 7 2 - 8 ( = ( 1 9 7 6 ) 2 4 9 - 5 2 ) ; Brunt (1952) 6 5 - 9 ( = ( 1 9 9 3 ) 2 2 - 5 ) . See also Rhodes (1984a). 45 Th.6.89.3. Seech.6.

18 8


'Agesilaus and all you Spartans who are present, I was your philos and ally when you made war on the Athenians, and by providing money I made your fleet strong, and on land I myself fought on horseback with you and pursued the enemy into the sea. And you could not ever accuse me of treachery as you did Tissaphernes in either what I have done or said for you. Although I was such a man, I am now brought to this pass at your hands that I cannot have a meal in my own land unless I pick up some of what you leave like the wild beasts. And the beautiful houses and parks full of trees and animals which my father left me and in which I took pleasure, all these things I see have been cut down and burnt. So if I do not know what is holy and just, you teach me how these things are the deeds of men who know how to pay back charites? Thus he spoke. And all the Thirty [Spartiates] were ashamed before him and were silent. But after a time Agesilaus said, 'I think you know, Pharnabazus, that even among the Greek cities there are men who are xenoi of each other. And these men, when the cities are at war, fight with their fatherland even against those who were their xenoi, and sometimes, so it would chance, they even kill each other. We now are at war with your King and are forced to consider everything of his as hostile. Nevertheless, we would value being your philoi above all things.'46 Agesilaus here sums up the perennial Greek problem. Sometimes there was an intersection of different kinds of relationship, all of which were legitimate and acceptable in their own right, so that private friends became public enemies, and xenoi were forced to fight against xenoi. But xenos and polis was not the only area of conflict; other loyalties could also collide headlong with each other. Clearchus, the Spartan xenos of Cyrus and commander of one of the mercenary armies, was forced to choose between xenos and Greek. When Clearchus' army discovered that the true purpose of the campaign was to fight against the Persian King, they rebelled and wished to leave Cyrus 5 employ, saying that they had not been hired to fight the King. 4 7 Clearchus tried to force them to go on, but they refused, so Clearchus called them together and said to them: Men, do not be amazed that I bear these present troubles badly. For Cyrus was my xenos, and when I was an exile from my fatherland he both honoured me in other respects and gave me ten thousand darics, which I did not put aside for my private use, or squander on myself, but spent on you . . . And when Cyrus summoned me, I went to him with you, so that if he needed anything, I might help him in return for the ways in which I was well-treated at his hands. But since you do not want to journey with me, I must either betray you and have his philia, or be deceitful to him and be with you. I do not know whether I will act justly, but I will indeed choose you and I will comply with you in whatever you ask. And no one will ever say that, having led you among the barbarians, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the philia of the barbarians. But since you do not wish to comply with me, I will follow you, and I will comply with you in whatever you ask. For I consider you to be my fatherland, my philoi, and my allies, and I think that with you I would be 46

Xen., JfcflL 4.1.32-4.

47

Xen.,Anah. 1.3.3-6.


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honoured wherever I am, but if you are lost to me, I would not be strong enough either to help aphilos, nor to defend myself against an echthros.*8 This was again the old problem of conflicting loyalties, but with the added complication that one of the parties was also a barbarian. Clearchus' response to this followed conventional Greek morality. In the first place, he had a conflict of duty between the dues owed to fellow countrymen and those owed to a xenos, and he says his fellow countrymen can claim ties of country and friendship (they may not all have been Spartan, but were at least all Greek). To leave his xenos is deception, but abandoning the Greeks is betrayal of countrymen for a mere barbarian, and Clearchus asserts that no one will say that he betrayed Greeks for the philia of a barbarian. Yet the story does not end here. Cyrus did not understand what was happening and kept sending to Clearchus,49 since he was well aware what was due to him. Clearchus refused to go to him himself, but sent to him in secret, telling him not to be discouraged, but that he would settle the matter, and giving instructions for Cyrus to continue sending for him, although he would keep refusing to go. By means of this ruse, Clearchus was able to persuade the Greeks to remain, although still not openly against the King, while at the same time, despite his claims to the contrary, remaining faithful to his xenos.50 Far more difficult even than this conflict of loyalties was the knowledge that there was often no clear-cut distinction between friends and enemies. Sophocles' Ajax utters a cry from the heart when he says: How shall we not come to be wise? I shall. For I know so much that an enemy (echthros) must be hated as one who will some day be a philos, and so much in assisting a philos, will I wish to help him as one who will not always remain a philos. For to many among mortal men the harbour of companionship (hetaireia) is faithless (apistos).51

This sentiment echoes down through Greek history, and although only rarely finding direct expression, the general concern with the conflicts that ties of friendship could produce was amply played out on the Athenian stage.52 Inevitably, as a principle for living the help friends/harm enemies ethic was not adequate: life and relationships could not be reduced to so simple a platitude. Loyalties were brought into conflict, old friends could become new enemies, xenoi could fight xenoi and sometimes it happened that they killed one another. 48 51 52

49 50 Xen.,Anab. 1.3.5-6. Xen.sAnab. 1.3.8,10. Seeesp. Xcn.,Anah 1.3.15-21. Soph., Ajax 677-83; cf. [Dem.] 58.39-40. On this passage, see Blundell (1989) 82-8.

See especially the excellent article of Griffith (1995) esp. 1 0 7 - 2 4 .

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Relationships between states could be equally problematic. The Corinthians, for example, made much of an old favour despite a newer enmity in their speech to the Athenians in 433 when they tried to persuade the Athenians to remain neutral rather than support the Corcyraeans. The Corinthians cannot claim to be friends of Athens (indeed Thucydides says that the Corinthians had harboured a bitter hatred for the Athenians since the revolt of Megara in the late 460s), 53 but state that they were at least under treaty (enspondoi) with the Athenians, while the Corcyraeans had never had any diplomatic relationship with Athens.54 They then refer to their help to Athens against Aegina before the Persian Wars (when the Corinthians and the Athenians were friends) and claim that they have benefited the Athenians more recently by voting against Sparta's proposal to support Samos in 440. 55 In the light of this, they demand that the Athenians make an equal return (to . . . Ison antapodote) in the knowledge that at times like these men show themselves particularly as friends or enemies.56 The essential hypocrisy of their position does not seem to concern them, and they sum up the ambiguity of the situation when they say: So we have a perfectrightto these thingsfromyou according to the customs of the Greeks, and we have a recommendation and claim for this kind of charts, which, though we are not echthroi so as to do you harm, nor philoi so as to be of use to you, we say you need to make a return to us in the present circumstances . . . For men consider both him who is of service a philos> even if he was formerly an echthros, and him who stands in opposition as hostile, even if he happened to be a phttos, since even their close concerns are down-graded because of the present struggle.57 In order to score political points, the Corinthians try to argue there is a debt which must be paid back, a moral obligation which must be met, skirting around the difficulty of a present enmity by emphasising a past benefaction and the rights which could be demanded from this. In short, they were deliberately trying to create a conflict of interest in order to provoke a response in their favour. Ultimately it was the role of ideology to mask these tensions and to ease the processes of friendships, relationships and loyalties. Polls ideology dictated that both friends and state be served by the simple fact that to help one generally meant helping the other, for polls ideology encompassed and validated many kinds of relationship, not all of which were consistent with each other all of the time. Nevertheless, while there was a range of conflicts, there was also a range of ideological solutions. Alcibiades was 53 57

Th. 1.103.4. Th. 1.41.1,3.

54

Th. 1.40.4; cf. 31.2.

55

Th. 1.40.5.

56

Th. 1.43.2.


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willing to betray Athens in 415, and then to desert the Spartans in 412, although he seems to have been thinking of his own interests rather than those of any xenoi. Pericles in 431 had ostentatiously put his loyalty to Athens above his xenia with Archidamus. But it is easy for people to persuade themselves that what they want to do is what is right for them to do, and that what is best for them is best for their country and their friends too. Perhaps even Alcibiades in 420 believed that his trickery would be good for Athens and yet would not be bad for Endius. However, the essential point is clear. Because the Greek political world was, at least in part, built upon friendship networks and ideas of repaying favours, and because the alliances and relationships between states were constantly shifting and changing, friends could be forced to become enemies. Old loyalties could be challenged and superseded by new ones; old obligations manipulated in order to score new points. It was a game that could not be played by consistent rules. For some it was easy to evade the issue altogether. Others had to find the best compromise they could. But in whatever way the situation was dealt with on each occasion, it is important for our understanding of what was happening in the world of the fifth and fourth centuries to realise that this was one of the issues that had to be taken into account. In the Greek world, and especially in interstate relations, philoi and philia were important. But the questions of who one's friends were and how one should respond to them were not always so obvious. Beware of Greeks bearing gifts? Let the Greeks themselves beware.

Magistrates with connections

I. SPARTAN MAGISTRATES A. Spartan ambassadors Agesilaus son of Archidamus (PL 9) Sent as ambassador to Mantineia in 371 because he seemed to be a patrikos phifos (Xen., Hell. 6.5.4): see especially ch. 3. Aneristus son of Sperthias (PL 95) See discussion in ch. 4. Antalcidas son of Leon See discussion in ch. 6. Aristomenidas (PL i34=Aristomelidas) See discussion in ch. 4. Athenaeus son of Pericleidas (PL 32) Apart from his suggestive name (see HCT 3.604; compare Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, who was named for his father's philo-Laconian persuasion (Plut., dm. 16.1); cf. Kagan (1969) 267-8), Athenaeus son of Pericleidas had other links with Athens as his father had been the ambassador sent to Athens in the third Messenian war to ask for help (Plut., Cim. 16.8; Ar., Lysis. 1138-41). Then in 423 Athenaeus appeared himself as an oath-taker (Th. 4.119.2), and was the Spartan representative sent to Brasidas in Thrace with the terms of the agreement (Th. 4.122.1). Endius son of Alcibiades (PL 264) See discussion in ch. 4. Etymocles (PL 287) Ambassador to Athens in 378/7 (Xen., Hell. 5.4.22) and in 370/69 (Xen., Hell. 6.533). Euthycles (PL 30i=?302) He was ambassador to Persia in 367 (Xen., Hell. 7.1.33) and is perhaps the same man who went to Persia again in 333 (Arrizn, Anab. 2.15.2). Gylippus son of Cleandridas (PL 196) He was sent on a mission to Thurii in summer 414 and renewed the citizenship rights of his father (Th. 6.104.2; although note the textual difficulties: of the M.SS only B has the reading /cat TTJV TOV iraTpos dvaveajaafievos 7roAtT€tav; the rest have /cara TTJV TOV naTpos TTOTC TToXiTclav. O n this, see HCT 4.376; see also

Badham (1875) 244; Wade-Gery (1958) 267 n. 5. With either reading of the text, Gylippus has a connection with Thurii through his father). A heroon of 192


193

Cleandridas on Thurii confirms the family link (see Hornblower (1995) 68 and n.91). Ischagoras (PL 400) Sent to Brasidas in Thrace, probably as adviser in 423 (Th. 4.132.3; on his status, see Westlake (1986) 417 n. 33 (=(1989) 257 n. 33); (1968) 160). He returned to Chalcidice in winter 422/1 to tell Clearidas to give up Amphipolis (Th. 5.21.1). This at least shows a degree of continuity in appointments. Leon son of Anticleidas (PL 482) One of three men selected to go to Athens in spring 420 to prevent an Athens-Argos alliance on the grounds that he and his fellow-ambassadors seemed to be epitedeioi to the Athenians (Th. 5.44.3). lichas son of Arcesilaus (PL 492) See discussion in ch. 4. PLysander son of Aristocritus (PL 504) Sometime before his death in 395, he was supposedly sent gifts by Dionysius of Syracuse, then later despatched to Dionysius as ambassador (Plut., Lys. 2.5), although Cartledge suggests that the embassy 'may be simply an anecdotal invention' ((1987) 320; but compare Hornblower (1991) 188). Megillus (PL 5i3=?5i4) He is probably to be identified with the Athenian proxenos in Sparta (Plato, Laws 1,642b-d); an appropriate choice for the embassy in 408/7 concerning the repatriation of Spartan prisoners in Athens (Androtion, FGrHist 324 F 44; on the emendation, see Jacoby Supp. 1152-3); see also Mosley (1973) 52. Melesippus son of Diacritas (PL 522) Melesippus was sent to Athens in 432/1 with Ramphias and Agesander to offer peace if the Athenians agreed to leave the Greeks autonomous (Th. 1.139.3), and was sent again by Archidamus to issue a final warning (Th. 2.12.1), although this may have been as a herald (keryx) rather than an ambassador. Nicolaus son of Bulis (PL 562) See discussion in ch. 4. Ocyllus (PL 770) Ambassador to Athens both in 378/7 (Xen., Hell. 5.4.22) and in 370/69 (Xen., Hell. 6.5.33). Pasippidas (PL 591) He was accused of having colluded with Tissaphernes to bring about the downfall of Thasos, which entailed the expulsion of the harmost Eteonicus and those who were laconising, and was subsequently expelled from Sparta in 410 (Xen., Hell. 1.1.3 2). Nevertheless, Pasippidas was sent in 408 as an ambassador to the Persian King (presumably he had been recalled (Underhill (1900) 14; Krentz (1989) 121)) when the Athenian embassy set off with Pharnabazus (Xen., Hell. 1.3.13). If indeed this was an official embassy, which the use of the term presbeis (ambassadors) should signify (Krentz (1989) 121; cf. Underhill (1900) 14), then it is possible that earlier Persian contacts influenced his selection. Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas (PL 731) He was thought to be epitedeios to the Athenians (Th. 5.44.3; see also discussion of Nicias son of Niceratus in ch. 5, and note the rather tentative suggestion that Philocharidas and Nicias may have had some kind of personal connection). He was also one of the oath-takers for the armistice between Athens and Sparta in

194

Appendix I

423 (Th. 4.119.2)3 and was an oath-taker for the Peace of Nicias and alliance with Athens (Th. 5.19.2,24.1; Diod. 12.75.4), and possibly also an envoy in the negotiations for this peace (see note on 422/1 in Appendix II). He also went to Thrace in winter 422/1 to see that Amphipolis was restored to the Athenians (Th. 5.21.1: see also Harding (1994) 163), as well as on an embassy to Athens in 421/0 (Th. 5.44.3), and perhaps also in 408/7 (Androtion, FGrH 324 F 44; on the emendation: Jacoby Supp. 1152-3). B. Spartan harmosts and archons ?Agesandridas son of Agesander (PL 5) Agesandridas held a command on the Thracian coast in 408 (Xen., Hell. 1.3.17), and was probably the brother of Pasitelidas (Th. 8.91.2; HCT 1.451; PL: see under Pasitelidas (592) and Agesandridas; on Agesander, see Th. 1.139.3) the archon of Torone in 423 and 422 (Th. 4.132.3; 5.3.1-2). This may be merely coincidental, but it may suggest family connections in the Thraceward parts. Brasidas son of Tellis {PL 177) See discussion in ch. 4. Clearchus son of Ramphias {PL 425) See discussion in ch. 4. Dercylidas {PL 228) See discussion in ch. 4. Eteonicus {PL 283) See discussion in ch. 4. ??Herippidas {PL 349) He was sent to Heracleia Trachinia to restore order in 399 (Diod. 14.38.4-5). He was also one of the harmosts in Thebes in the period during which the Spartans held the Cadmeia (Plut., Pelop. 12-13), and given Theban interests in Heracleia Trachinia (see on Xenares son of Cnidis under 420/19), there is a possibility that his selection to both these commands was the result of some Theban connection. ?Leon ?son of Anticleidas {PL 482) See entry for Pedaritus. PPasitelidas son of Agesander (PL 592) See under Agesandridas above. PPedaritus son of Leon {PL 599) Pedaritus son of Leon was the harmost at Chios in summer 412 (Th. 8.28.5), and a Leon took over the command of Pedaritus at Chios in 411 (Th. 8.61.2). Thucydides does not point out a family connection, and Leon is too common a name for it to be sure. Poralla sees the connection as possible, but Andrewes {HCT5.69) thinks it unlikely. Lewis ((1977) 35 n. 65) doubts that this Leon is the father of Pedaritus, as do Whitehead ((1979)) 192) and Cartledge ((1987) 145). PXenares son of Cnidis {PL 567) He was involved with the Boeotians during his ephorate of 421 (Th. 5.36.1, 37.1, 38.3, 46.4; Plut., Me. 10.8), and then harmost of Heracleia Trachinia in 420 (Th. 5.51.2). The Boeotians had an interest in Heracleia Trachinia as evidenced in their expulsion of the harmost of 419, Hagesippidas (Th. 5.52.1).


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There is a possibility he was selected for this command because of his Boeotian sympathies in what was evidently a sensitive area. C. Spartan Nauarchs Antalcidas (PL 97) Antalcidas was appointed Nauarch in 388/7, as the Spartans thought this would gratify (charizesthai) Tiribazus (Xen., Hell. 5.1.6). See ch. 6. (Lysander as second-in-command (epistoleus) in 405/4 (PL 504) See discussions in chs. 4 and 6.) II. A T H E N I A N M A G I S T R A T E S A. Athenian ambassadors Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae (PA 354) A member of the peace embassies in 347/6 (Aeschin. 2 passim, Dem. 19 passim), he became the philos and xenos of Philip (see ch. 10). In 346/5 he was elected again for a mission to Macedon, but claimed he was ill, so Aphobetus his brother went in his place (see Aeschin. 2.94-5; Dem. 19.124). He was also sent to negotiate with Philip in 338/7 (Dem. 18.282-4; Aeschin. 3.227). Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae (PA 600) Ambassador to Argos in 419/18 (Th. 5.61.2). For his Argive connections, see esp. discussion of Athenian generals in ch. 5. Antiphon ?son of Lysonides (PA 1283) Plutarch (Mor. 832f-833a) says that Antiphon was sent on every embassy to Sparta during the period of the 400 in 411. This at least demonstrates a consistency in the appointment. Archedemus of Peleces (PA 2326) Among those who Aeschines says were intimate with the Thebans and went on embassies to Thebes (Aeschin. 3.138-9). Probably the nearest that his embassy can be dated is before Demosthenes' embassy to Thebes in 338/9. Archeptolemus son of Hippodamus of Agryle (PA 2384) He appealed for peace with Sparta after Pylos (Ar., Knights 794; cf. Peace 665-6); a member of the 400, he was an envoy to Sparta in 411 under the 400 (Plut.,Afor. 8321). Aristodemus of Metapontum Aeschines says that he was sent to Philip as ambassador in 348/7 because he was in favour with Philip (see Aeschin. 2.15, 17). He was also a member of the two embassies to Philip in 347/6 (Aeschin. 2.19; cf. Dem. 19 Hypoth. 2; Aeschin. 2 Hypoth.). He also went on an embassy to Thessaly and Magnesia (Aeschin. 3.83), which Develin ((1989) 327) guesses may have had something to do with the quarrel with Philip over Halonessus (for the year, see Appendix II under 343/2). Aristophanes son of Nicophemus (PA 2082) See discussion in ch. 5. Aristophon son of Aristophanes of Azenia (PA 2108) Although the embassies cannot be dated he was one of those noted by Aeschines (Aeschin. 3.138-9) for Theban connections on embassies to Thebes.

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Appendix I

Aristoteles ?son of Timocrates of Thorae (PA 2055=2057) He was an Athenian exile in Lysander's service (Xen., Hell. 2.2.18), became a member of the Thirty on the installation of the oligarchy in 404/3 (Xen., Hell. 2.3.2)3 and was sent by them to Lysander to ask for a garrison (Xen., Hell. 2.3.18). Callias son of Hipponicus of Alopece (PA 7825) See discussion in ch. 5. Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus (PA 8707) He commanded the fleet of Greek mercenaries under Pharnabazus from 398 (Diod. 14.39.1-4) to 393 (see also Timotheus under 'Athenian Generals' below). After his return to Athens he was sent on an embassy in 393/2 to the Persian Tiribazus (Xen., Hell. 4.8.13), who seized and imprisoned him (Xen., Hell. 4.8.16). In all likelihood he was sent because he was one of the few Athenians ever to deal successfully with a Persian. Ctesiphon (PA 8893) He was involved in the negotiations with Philip over the ransom for Phrynon in 348/7 (Aeschin. 2.12-13; cf. Dem. 19.12), and was then a member of the tenman embassy which went to Macedon twice in 347/6 (Aeschin. 2.42, 47, 52; Dem 19.12,18; cf. Dem. 19 Hypoth. 2; Aeschin. 2 Hypoth.). Demades son of Demeas of Paeania (PA 3263) Demades was taken captive by the Macedonians after Chaeronea, and was said to have charmed Philip into releasing the prisoners (Diod. 16.87; Justin 9.4.6; [Demades], On the Twelve Years 9; cf. Polybius 5.10.4). In any case he was sent back to Philip in order to negotiate for peace in 338/7 (Dem. 18.285; cfAeschin. 3.227; [Demades], On the Twelve Years 9-10). He was also certainly involved in one embassy to Philip in 335/4, but may have been involved in two: Demades proposed the first embassy to Alexander after the destruction of Thebes and may have been a member of it (Arrian, Anab. 1.10.3; see also 'Athenian Generals' in Appendix II under 335/4). Diodorus says that Demades also proposed the second embassy to Alexander, and attributes to him the success of the mission (Diod. 17.15.4-5; cf. Airizn, Anab. 1.10.6). Diodorus and Plutarch both claim that Demades was bribed to support the embassy (Diod. I I 7' 5-3> Plut., Dem. 23.6), and Plutarch says he may have agreed to go on the mission trusting in his philia with Alexander (Plut., Dem. 23.6; contrast Plut., Phoc. 17.7-9 where Phocion appears to be given the credit for soothing Alexander). Like Phocion, Demades was said to have been the friend of Anipater as well, and continued to serve on embassies to Macedon, although letters were discovered that implicated Demades in a plot with Perdiccas and he and his son were executed while in Macedon on an embassy (Plut., Phoc. 30; Dem. 31.4-6;Diod. 18.48.2-3). Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania (PA 3597) He was proxenos of the Thebans (Aeschin. 2.141,143), so an easy choice for the embassy to Thebes for an alliance in 339/8 (although it is not so clear however that Demosthenes himself was consistently pro-Theban; see Harris (1995) 84 and esp. 198-9 n. 15). Demus son of Pyrilampes (PA 3573) Demus' father Pyrilampes was a xenos of the King of Persia, was sent on at least one embassy to him (Plato, Charm. 158a) and was possibly given a pair of peacocks (Plut., Per. 13.15; cf. Antiphon ap. Athen. 9.397c; see esp. Cartledge


197

(1990) 41-61). MacDowell ((1971) 144) infers that Demus was later chosen for another embassy to the King on the grounds that he was presented with a gold bowl (Lys. 19.25); see also Badian (1987) 14 (= (1993b) 20-1). Eunomus (PA 5861) Philos and xenos of Dionysus of Syracuse, Eunomus was sent to the tyrant in 394/3 (Lys. 19.19). Euryptolemus ?son of Peisianax ?of Sunium (PA 5981=5985) He received the oaths of Pharnabazus on Alcibiades' behalf for a private friendship with the Persian in 409/8 (Xen., Hell. 1.3.12; cf. Thompson (1969) 586 n. 21), and then was part of the embassy which accompanied Pharnabazus to the Persian King (Xen., Hell. 1.3.13). He was presumably the cousin of Alcibiades (Krentz (1989) 121), although according to Xenophon the embassy did not return for three years (Xen., Hell. 1.4.7). This would apparently bar him from being the Euryptolemus who greeted Alcibiades on his return to Athens in 407, as Euryptolemus the cousin of Alcibiades did (Xen., Hell. 1.4.19). Krentz ((1989) 127) finds the emendation (see Andrewes (1953) 2 n. 1) of prjvcs for ZviavroL very attractive, although Davies ((1971) 377), following the chronology of Beloch (G.G.2 11 2.274) and Ferguson ((1958) 483-4), thinks that 'Euryptolemus could have returned from Persia well before Alkibiades reached Athens.' Nevertheless, the point for our purposes is, given that Alcibiades had just exchanged oaths with Pharnabazus (Xen., Hell. 1.3.12), Euryptolemus the ambassador, whether he was the cousin of Alcibiades or not, was one of Alcibiades' men. His selection for the embassy may well have been based upon this double connection: his friendship with Alcibiades, who, in turn had a friendship with Pharnabazus. Iatrocles son of Pasiphon (PA 7442) He was an Athenian prisoner taken by Philip at Olynthus, then released without ransom to bring the news back to Athens that Philip wanted peace (Aeschin. 2.16). He was later a member of the two embassies despatched to Philip for peace in 347/6 (Aeschin. 2.20, 126; Dem. 19.197-8; cf. Dem. 19 Hypoth. 2; Aeschin. 2 Hypoth.). PLaches son of Melanopus of Aexone (PA 9019) He was a proposer of the armistice with the Spartans in 423 (Th. 4.118.11), and an oath-swearer to the Peace of Nicias in 421 (Th. 5.19.2). He also negotiated the Peace with Nicias (Th. 5.43.2), and this may have been an official position as ambassador (although see Appendix II under 422/1). For his activities as general at Argos which may also be linked to his Spartan connection (although I am sceptical), see below. Leodamas ?son of Eristratus of Acharnae (PA 9077) Although the embassies cannot be dated he was one of those noted by Aeschines (Aeschin. 3.138-9) for Theban connections on embassies to Thebes. Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae (PA 10808) See discussion in ch. 5. Phocion son of Phocus (PA 15076) Phocian was probably sent on the second embassy to Alexander in 335/4 after the king demanded the surrender of the Athenians implicated in the Theban revolt (Plut., Phoc. 17.2-8). He was said to be admired by Philip (Plut., Phoc. 17.6; cf. Nepos, Phoc. 1.3); Alexander listened to him and made him his philos

198

Appendix I

and xenos (Plut., Phoc. 17.9 (although see also Phit.,Alex. 39.4 where Plutarch has Alexander warning Phocion that he will not treat him as a philos in future if he continues to refuse his charites); cf. Arrian,^4w Princeton, 97-129 GOMME, A. w., ANDREWES, A. and DOVER, K. j. (1945-81) A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 5 vols., Oxford GOODWIN, w. w. (1901) Demosthenes. On the Crown, Cambridge GOULD, j. p. (1973) 'Hiketeia', J//.S93:74-103 (1989) Herodotus, London GOULDNER, A. w. (1965) Enter Plato. Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory, London (1977) 'The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement', Friends, Followers and Factions (S. W. Schmidt, L. Guast, C. H. Lande and J. C. Scott (edd.)), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 280-9 (=(1960) American Sociological Review 25: 161-78) GRAHAM, A. J. (1964) Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece, Manchester (1992) 'Abdera and Teos', JHS112:44-73 GRANT, j. R. (1965) 'A note on the tone of Greek diplomacy', CQ2 15:261-6 GRAY, v. j. (1987) 'The value of Diodorus Siculus for the years 411-386 BC', Hermes 115:72-89 (1989) The Character ofXenophon's Hellenica, London GREENBERG, N. (1962) 'Euripides' Orestes: an interpretation', HSCP 66:157-92 GREENWALT, w. (1985) 'The introduction of Caranus into the Argead king list', GR&BS 26:43-9 GREGORY, c. A. (1982) Gifts and Commodities, London

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(1989) 'Secretaries, Charidemos, Poteidaia: the date (and personnel) of IG ii2 n%\ AHB 3.5:102-6 WILL, E. (1956) Doriens etloniens, Strasburg WILSON, j. R. (1989) 'Shifting and permanent Philia in Thucydides', G&R2 36: 147-51 WOLF, E. R. (1966) 'Kinship, friendship, and patron-client relations in complex societies', The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies (M. Banton (ed.))>

London WOODMAN, A. j. (1988) Rhetoric in Classical Historiography, London

Index of principal passages

AESCHINES ARISTOTLE Eudemian Ethics 7,1236815-33:3 n. 11; 2.8,12:198; 2.12-13:196; 2.15,17> 19: 1236314-15:4 n. 17; 1236333-4:7 195; 2.16,20:197; 2.26-9:103 n. 93; n. 39; i238b2O-i: 6 n. 30; i242ai-2:10 2.27:103 n. 92; 2.28:103 n. 88; 2.42: 196; 2.45:154 n. 52; 2.47:196; 2.50: n.55 154 n. 52; 2.52:196; 2.78: 215; 2.82-4: Nicomachean Ethics 5,113333-5:19 146 n. 80; 2.94-5:195; 2.126:197; n. 120; 8,115531-31:3 n. 10; 2.137:186 n. 38; 2.141,143: 75 n. 18, H55b32~4:4 n. 18; H56a6-io: 3 n. 11; 196; 3.66:184 n. 32; 3.73-4:146 n. 80; 1156314-19: 8 n. 40; 1156319-24: 8 3.83:195; 3.138:67 n. 162,92 nn. 15, n. 41; 1156314-30: 7 n. 39; ii56b6-7:3 17,198; 3-138-9: 75 n. 18,195,197, n. 12; H56b24-9:4 n. 14; 198; 3.223-4:179 n. 3; 3.227:195 1157*533-115831:6 n. 28; H58bi: 6 ANAXIMENES OF LAMPSACUS n. 28; H 5 8 b n - i 9 : 6 n. 29; H58b2O-i:

FGrHist 72 F 16:37 n. 89

6 n. 31; H58b2i-3:10 n. 62; H58b23-8:6 n. 31; 1159327-33:10 n. 61; ii59b27-9:9 n. 53; 116038-14: ap. Athen. 4.i3ia-f: 103 n. 88 10 n. 56; 116039-30: 7 n. 38; ANDOCIDES 1161325-7:11 n. 65,12 n. 71; n 6 i b u : 2.20-1:68 n. 170; 3.29:115 n. 27,119 n. 60 [ANDOCIDES] 7 n. 37; I i 6 i b n - i 6 : 1 0 n. 56; 4.30:48 n. 47 116^14-15:7 n. 37; n 6 i b i 6 - 3 o : 10 ANDROTION n. 60; n6ib3O-2:11 n. 66; FGrHist 324 F 44: 77 n. 29,193,194 Ii6ib33-n623i: 11 n. 65,12 n. 71; ARRIAN 116231-4:11 n. 67; 116234-15:10 Anab. 1.4.6-8:169 n. 9; 1.5.2-4:168 n. 6; n. 60; 116239-15:11 n. 65; n62b27-8: 1.7.1-3:47 n. 38; 1.7.10-11:168 n. 7; 8 n. 43; n62b3i~3: 8 n. 44; 116331-8: 8 1.9.9-10:168 n. 6; 1.10.3:196,212; n. 45; n63bi5:11 n. 68; n63bi8-2i: 1.15.6:168 n. 6; 1.23.7-8:175 n. 55; 10 n. 63 1.25.4:170 n. 15; 2.4.9-11:170 n. 17; Pol. 1,125231-7:41 n. 1; 3,1276M6-29: 2.15.4:168 n. 3; 2.16-24:176 n. 57; 41 n. 2; i28ob38-9:41 n. 4; 5, 3.6.4-5:170 n. 19; 3.22.6:175 n. 51; 130439-10: 29 n. 43 3.24.4: 205; 3.26.1:170 n. 18; 4.21.1-9: [ARISTOTLE] ANAXANDRIDES

168 n. 5; 4.7.4:171 n. 25; 4.8.1-9.4: 173 n. 37; 4.13-14:172 n. 34; 4.14.3-4: 173 n. 37; 5-25.3:171 n. 23; 5.27.2:171 n. 23; 7.4.4-8:175 n. 51; 79.9:170 n. 22; 7.11:173-4 Indica 18.7-8:169 n. 14 ARISTOPHANES

Acharn. 141-50:143 n. 52; 145-7: 38 n. 101

Knights 794:195 Lysis. 1138-41:192 Wealth 178:125 n. 104 234

Ath. Pol. 13.4:47 n. 38; 27.3:42 n. 7; 44.4: 9611.34; 61.1:9611.34 CTESIAS

FGrHist 688 F 15.49:112 nn. 5,6 DEINARCHUS

1.38:198; 1.38-9:67 n. 161; 1.76:67 n. 164 [DEMADES]

On the Twelve Years 9:196; 9-10:163 n. 128

Index of principal passages DEMOSTHENES

1.5:152 n. 26; 1.8:151 n. 21,152 n. 26; 2.6:151 n. 22; 2.7:149 n. 6; 3.5:104 n. 101; 5.10:155 n. 60; 6.20:149 n. 6; 15.15:46 n. 37; 18.51-2:185 n. 33; 18.109:183 n. 26; 18.282-4:195; 18.284:185 n. 34; 18.285:196; 18.295: 168 n. 6,181 n. 16; 19.12,18:196; 19.19-23:155 n. 60; 19.35:155 n. 60; 19.40:154 n. 52; 19.41:155 n. 61; 19.42: 155 n. 60; 19.53:155 n. 60; 19.63:155 n. 60; 19.74:155 n. 60; 19.112:155 n. 60; 19.124:195; 19.139-40:149 n. 7; 19.140:75 n. 18; 19.141-2:150 n. 8; 19.166-8:184 n. 30; 19.189:198; 19.197-8:197; 19.220:155 n. 60; 19.225:213; 19.229,230,233:198; 19.248:185 n. 35; 19.260:181 n. 16; 19.265:181 n. 15; 19.305-6:149 n. 5; J 9.325-7:155 n. 60; 20.63:152 n. 26; 20.68-70:68 n. 174; 21.no: 36 n. 85; 21.200:36 n. 85; 23.12:145 n. 67; 23.65: 145 n. 67; 23.89:145 n. 67; 23.107-8: 149 n. 6; 23.116:152 n. 25; 23.118:144 n. 61; 23.121:151 n. 18; 23.126:146 n. 82; 23.127:144 n. 62; 23.129:103 n. 88; 23.129-32:141 n. 48; 23.130:103 n. 94; 23.141:144 n. 66,145 n. 67; 23.145:145 n. 67; 23.149:103 nn. 92,94; 23.187,8: 145 n. 67; 23.213:104 n. 96; 24.134:92 n. 16; 29.23:15 n. 97; 39.17:30 n. 48; 40.34:30 n. 48; 40.36-7:30 n. 48 [DEMOSTHENES] 7.2-7:158-9; 7.26:159; 7.27:152 n. 25; 7.33-4:158 n. 93; 7.36-7:158 n. 91; 7.39-44:158 n. 91; 12.6:130 n. 142; 12.8:144 n. 66; 12.9:144 n. 61,147 n. 86; 12.12-15:158 n. 91; 12.14:159 n. 98; 12.20-1:158 n. 95; 12.21-2:160 n. 102; 53.1:1511.98 DIODORUS SICULUS 12.7.1:91 n. 13; 12.53.2:74 n. 7; 12.59.4: 27 n. 32; 12.75.4:194; 13.27.3:68 n. 168,199; 13.38.5: 56 n. 88; 13.48.6: 198; 13.52.2:77 n. 27; 13.66.4: 70 n. 191; 13.66.5-6: 83 n. 70; 13.70.1-3: 118 n. 56; 13.70.4: 87 n. 96; 13.76.2: 87 n. 99; 1383.1-4:73 n. 6; 13.93.1-4: 207; 13.104.3-4:119 n. 61; 13.105.3:70 n. 192; 13.106.6:68 n. 172; 14.n.1-4: 70 n. 189; 14.12: 83 n. 74; 14.12.6: 209; 14.38.4-5:194; 14.39.1-4:196; 14.98.3: 125 n. 104; 15.20.2:66 n. 157; 15.25.4-26.4:67 n. 160; 15.36.5:200; 15.55.5: 62 n. 131; 15.67.1: 73 n. 5; 16.3.3:149 n. 3,151 n. 17; 16.3.4:150

235 n. 10; 16.3.5:151 n. 18; 16.4.1:151 nn. 17,19; 16.8.2:151 n. 20; 16.8.3:149 n. 6,152 n. 26; 16.22.1-2:129 n. 138; 16.27.3:74 n. 7; 16.44.1-2:130 n. 142; 16.53.2:181 n. 16; 16.54.2-4:182 n. 17; 16.54.4:183 n. 25; 16.55:149 n. 4; 16.87:196; 17.14.2:112 n. 8; 17.15.4-5: 196; 17.37.6-38.2:175 n. 54; 17.40.1: 169 n. 12; 17.46.6:169 n. 12; 17.49.2-3:168 n. 8; 17.54-3:170 n. 15; 17.59.7:175 n. 54; 17.65.3:169 n. 13; 17.76.6:168 n. 6; 17.78.1:169 n. 12; 17.80.1:172 n. 32; 17.89.3:169 n. 12; 17.94.1:169 n. 12; 17.96.2-3:174 n. 50; 17.107.6:175 n. 51; 17.109.2-3:173 n. 43; 18.48.2-3:196 EURIPIDES Ale. 339:10 n. 58 77497-8:12 n. 72 Med. 765-7:15 n. 95 Or. 449-55:19 n. 118; 642-57: 5 n. 21; 735:12 n. 75; 740:16 n. 100; 802-3:12 n. 76; 804-6:12 n. 73; 805:12 n. 74; 1129-30, ii43-5> 1191-351296-310, 1323-48:16 n. 100 HELLENIC A

OXYRHYNCHIA

6.1 (Bartoletti) = 9.1 (Chambers): 215; 6.3,8 (Bartoletti) = 9.3, n (Chambers): 215; 17.1 (Bartoletti) = 20.1 (Chambers): 49 n. 52 HERODOTUS 1.59.1,3:47 n. 38; 1.69-70: 22 n. 2; 3-49-53: 24 n .12; 389-97:112 n. 9; 3.139-41,154.1,160.1-2:112 n. 7; 3.160.2:112 n. 8; 4.150-8: 27 n. 30; 5.17.1:73 n. 5; 5.22: 26 n. 23; 5.71.1:43 n. 17; 6.30.1:112 n. 7; 6.57.2:32 n. 65; 6.100:47 n. 38; 7.26.2:112 n. 5; 7.106.1:112 nn. 5,8; 7.116:112 n. 5; 7.133-6:76 n. 22; 7.I34-2:73 n. 6; 7.137.2-3:76 n. 21; 7.1733:76 n. 24; 8.10.3:112 n. 5; 8.85.3,90.4:112 n. 7; 8.120:112 n. 5; 8.137-9: 26 n. 23; 9.45.2: 26 n. 23; 9.80:113 n. 17; 9.110.2:112 nn. 5,6 HESIOD W^ 349-51:6 n. 32 HOMER //. 6.213-31:13 n. 80; 234-6: 20 n. 129 HYPEREIDES F 77:37 n. 89,212-13 ION FGrHist 392 F 6: 65 n. 148

236


ISAEUS 1.6-7:16 n. 104 ISOCRATES 1.26:15 n. 91; 4.144: 208; 8.97:119 n. 60; 9.56-7: 68 n. 174; 12.164:73 n. 4 JUSTIN 9.4.6:196; 11.10.10-14:176 n. 57; 12.6.1-14:173 n. 37; 12.10.9-10:175 n. LYSIAS 4.3-4:16 n. 102; 4.3.5:16 n. 103; 6.28: 68 n. 170; 16.14:42 n. 8; 18.10:90 n. 3; 18.10-12: 59 n. 105; 19.7: 91 n. 11; 19.19:197; 19.19-20:68 n. 175,91 n. 8; 19.21:91 n. 9; 19.23: 91 n. 10; 19.25: 197; 19.27: 91 n. 9; 19.36: 68 n. 173,91 n. 7; 19.43: 91 n. 9; 19.44: 9 n. 7; 19.56-7:45 n. 30; 26.23: 92 n. 17; 31.15-16:4211. 8 [LYSIAS]

8.2:16 n. 101 NEPOS Ale. 9.3:7011.188 Iph. 1.3-4: 200; 2.1:103 n. 91; 3.2:103 n. 92; 23.4:103 n. 88 NICOLAUS OF DAMASCUS FGrHist 90 F 59: 24 n. 12 PAUSANIAS 1.3.2:68 n. 174; 3.9.3:77 n. 33; 4.28.4: 181 n. 16; 7.10.1:47 n. 39 PHILOCHORUS FGrHist 328 F 50:104 n. 102; F 54:130 n. 143; F 151:127 n. 116 PLATO Charm. 158a: 196 Hipp, maior 282b: 74 n. 7 Laws 1,642b-d: 30 n. 50,74 n. 9,193 Parm. 126b, I27a-d: 200 PLUTARCH

Ages. 7.1-2:59 n. 108; 7.4-8: 59 n. 109; 17.1: 204; 21.1: 81 n. 58 Ale. 12.1:48 n. 47; 13.4-7:46 n. 34; 39.1-7:7011.189 Alex. 9.12:168 n. 6; 11.10:168 n. 6; 22.7: 175 n. 55; 24.4-25.3:176 n. 57; 37.7: 168 n. 6; 39:167 n. 2; 50.1-52.7:173 n. 37; 55:172 n. 34; 56:168 n. 6; 70.3: 175 n. 51; 71:169 n. 12,173 n. 43 Arist. 7 3 - 4 : 4 6 n . 3 4 Artax. 22.1-2:112 n. 5; 22.2:127 n. 117; 22.6-7:127 n. 118; 22.9-12:112 n. 6; 22.11:129 n. 30; 22.12:129 n. 131; 26.5:112 n. 6

dm. 4.1-2: 200; 16.i, 8:192 Dem. 23.6:196; 31.4-6:196 Lys. 2.5:193; 24.1: 204 Me. 10.8:194; 10.9:102 n. 78,213; 11.1-5:4611.34 Pelop. 5:66 n. 156; 7-12: 66 n. 158; 12-13: 194; 30:127,128-9; 30.7:112 n. 8; 30.9-12:112 n. 6 Per. 7.5:44 n. 22; 13.15:196; 20.1-2:199; 29.1-2:3611. 83 Phoc. 1.3: 213; 13.7:36 n. 85; 14.6-8: 200; 16.5-7:163 n. 129; 17.2-8: 197; 17.6:197; 17.9:198; 30:196, 198 Mor. 222e: 88 n. 102; 819c: 74 n. 7; 832f: I95;832f-833a:i95 [PLUTARCH] VitaeXOrat. 851a: 200 POLYAENUS 4.2.I7: 152 11.26 QUINTUS CURTIUS 3.12.17,24-5:175 n. 54; 3.13.15: 205; 4.2.2:176 n. 58; 4.2.2-4.18:176 n. 57; 4.7.9:168 n. 8; 4.7.31:170 n. 21; 4.15.10-11:175 n. 54; 5.2.17-22:175 n. 54; 5.6.20:169 n. 12; 6.4.1:171 n. 23; 6.5.1-5:168 n. 6; 6.6.2:171 n. 26; 6.6.11:169 n. 12; 6.8.1-15:170 n. 15; 6.9.4:172 n. 33; 6.11.9-10:170 n. 15; 6.11.39:172 n. 32; 7.1.29:169 n. 11; 7.8.29:6 n. 27; 8.1.19-2.12:173 n. 37; 8.2.7:173 n. 38; 8.2.19-33:168 n. 5; 8.4.21-30:175 n. 51; 8.4.25:175 n. 52; 8.4.30:173 n. 39; 8.6-8:172 n. 34; 8.7.1:173 n. 36; 8.12.15-17:171; 9.1.6: 169 n. 12; 10.1.39:173 n. 40; 10.1.39-42:172 n. 30; 10.3.1-5:173-4; 10.3.5:174 n. 44; 10.3.12:175 nn. 51, 52; 10.3.13-14:176 n. 61 SATYRUS ap. Athen. 12.543d: 48 n. 47 SCHOL. AESCHINES

I.64: 198 SCHOL. ARISTOPHANES

Clouds 386: 25 n. 19 SOLON

13.3-6 (West): 14 n. 89 SOPHOCLES

Ajax 677-83:189 n. 51 STRABO 15.3.17:112 11.5 [THEOGNIS]

341-50:15 n. 94

Index of principal passages THEOPOMPUS FGrHUt 115 F 3oa-b: 151 n. 22; F 42:151 n. 21; F 143:145 n. 67; F 224-5:169 n. 14 THUCYDIDES 1.24:24 n. 9; 1.40.4:190 n. 54; 1.40.5: 190 n. 55; 1.43.2:190 n. 56; 1.95.1: 25 n. 18; 1.103.3,1.108.5:108 n. 111; 1.129.3:112 n. 7; 1.139.3:193; 2.1.16: 215; 2.12.1:193; 2.13.1:63 n. 132; 2.18.1-2:63 n. 133; 2.18.3-5:63 n. 134; 2.29.1:31 n. 52; 2.29.2-3: 27 n. 26; 2.29.4-5:139 n. 34,143 n. 52; 2.29.6: 31 n. 53; 2.58.1:98 n. 52; 2.67.1: 76 n. 21; 2.67.2-4:76 n. 24; 2.68.1: 97 n. 42; 2.68.6-8:97 n. 40; 2.69.1:97 n. 43; 2.81.1:97 n. 45; 2.85.5:30 n. 46; 2.95.1-2:139 n. 35; 2.95.3:98 n. 54, 139 n. 36; 2.97.3-4:134-5 n. 3; 2-97.4: 112 n. 5; 2.99.3,5: 26 n. 23; 2.101.1: 139 n. 37; 2.102.1,103.1: 97 n. 46; 3.2.3: 29 n. 43; 3.4.4:36 n. 86; 3.7.1:98 n. 47; 336.5:68 n. 167; 352.5:3* n. 56; 3.70.1: 29 n. 43; 3-70.3:35 n. 80; 382.5, 6:43 n. 18; 3.86.3-4:25 n. 14; 3.94-8: 99-100; 3.102.3-7:100 n. 63; 3105.3: 100 n. 64; 3.107.1:100 n. 65; 3.107.2: 100 n. 64; 4.2:100 n. 67; 4.3.1-3:100 n. 68; 4.3.2:101 n. 72; 4.3.3:100 n. 70, 101 n. 72; 4.9.1:100 n. 71; 4.41.2:100 n. 70; 4.51.1:65 n. 149; 4.61,64.3:25 n. 15; 4.66-73:49 n. 51; 4.70.1: 82 n. 63; 4.76.1-2,77:100 n. 66; 4.78.1: 31 n. 54,57 n. 93,82 n. 67; 4.81.1: 82 n. 65; 4.85.1,86.1: 82 n. 64; 4.102.3: 28 n. 35,98 n. 51; 4104.4,105.1: 200; 4.106: 28 n. 34; 4.118.11:197,199; 4.119.2:90 n. 2,192,194; 4.122.1:192; 4.123.4: 80 n. 48; 4.129.3: 80 n. 48; 4.132.3:193,194; 5.3.1-2:194; 5-II. 1: 28 nn. 35,36; 5.19.2:194,197,199, 211; 5.21.1:193> 194; 521.1-2: 57 n. 94; 5.22.2:31 n. 56,77 n. 32; 5.241:194, 199,211; 542.1:194; 5.25.1-48.1:51-5; 5.36.1,37.1,38.3:194; 540.3: 75 n. 17; 5.43.1:69 n. 184; 543-2:34 n. 77,90 n. 4,109 n. 113,197,199,210-11; 5-44-3: 76 n. 25,193,194; 5.453:90 n. 3; 5.46.2:91 n. 5; 5-46.4* 512,52.1:194; 5.52.2:102 n. 79; 5.53:102 n. 80; 5.61.2:102 n. 81,195,213; 5.64-74:55 n. 80; 5.76.2-3:33 n. 66,56 n. 81; 5.76.3:31 n. 56,77 nn. 30,32,102 n. 82; 5.78-80.1:56 n. 82; 5.80.2: 26 n. 23,27 n. 25; 5.84.1:102 n. 83; 6.8.2: 199; 6.16.2:180 n. 9; 6.20.3: 24 n. 11;

237 6.29.3:69 n. 183,102 n. 83; 6.46.2: 24 n. 11; 6.61.3:69 n. 183,101 n. 77; 6.88.7:24 n. 10; 6.88.9:70 n. 185; 6.89.2:69 n. 184; 6.89.3:187 n. 44; 6.92.4:180 n. 4; 6.104.2:192; 7.1.4:31 n. 55; 7.16.2:199; 7291:198; 7 3 1 2 : 101 n. 74; 7.31.4-5:198; 7.48.2:68 n. 168,199; 7-5710:101 n. 75; 7-73-3: 68 n. 168,199; 8.5.1-2: 80 n. 48; 8.6.3: 13 n. 82,69 n. 184,70 n. 186,74 n. 9, 116 n. 34; 8.8.2: 83 n. 69; 8.12.1:48 n. 45; 8.14.1-2:48 n. 44; 8.17.2:48 n. 47; 8.23.4: 80 n. 49; 8.28.5:194; 8.35.1:56 n. 83; 8.38.3:65 n. 147; 8.39.2: 83 n. 69; 8.44.2-3: 56 n. 85; 8.45-6:116 n. 39; 8.46.5:116 n. 40; 8.47-54:47 n. 38; 8.47.1:116 n. 36; 8.47.2:116; 8.48.3-4:43 n. 17; 8.49: 211; 8.50.2-4: 87 n. 93; 8.52:116 n. 41; 8.54.2: 211; 8.54.4:43 n. 17,46 n. 35; 8.56:47 n. 38; 8.56.2:116 n. 38; 8.61.1: 84 n. 79; 8.61.2:194; 8.63.3-77:47

n. 38; 8.65.2:43 n. 17; 8.80.1: 83 n. 69; 8.81-2:47 n. 38; 8.81.2:116 n. 37; 8.82.2-3:116 n. 36; 8.83.3: 87 n. 93; 8.86:47 n. 38; 8.86.9:102 n. 84; 8.89-98:47 n. 38; 8.91.2:194; 8.92.4: 43 n. 17; 8.100.3: 24 n. 10 TIMAEUS

FGrHist 566 F 98:199 XENOPHON Ages. 2.21:61 n. 120; 8.3-5:124 n. 95 Anab. 1.1.9:119 n. 64; 1.1.10:120 n. 65; 1.1.11:120 n. 66; 1.3.3:119 n. 64; 1.3.3-6:188-9; 1.3.8:10,189 n. 49; 2.1.5:120 n. 68; 2.6.2-5: 83 n. 71; 2.5.27-6.1:114 n. 18; 3.1.4:120 n. 67; 3.2.4:114 n. 18; 5.3.5:120 n. 67; 7.1-2: 120 n. 69; 7.1.2:114 n. 18; 7.1.12,20: 207; 7.2.7:114 n. 18; 7.2.15:140 n. 42; 7.2.20-3.14:140 n. 42; 7.2.31:27 n. 27; 7.3.16:18 n. 115; 7.3.18:135 n. 6,140 n. 43; 7.3.19-20:136 n. 15,140 n. 44; 7.3.21-33:135 n. 5; 7.7.46-7:18 n. 116, 140 n. 46 Hell. 1.1.2:56 n. 87; 1.1.9:117 n. 43; 1.1.10:118 n. 51; 1.1.31: 87 n. 94; 1.1.32: 84 n. 83,193; 1.1.35: 83 nn. 68, 69; 1.3.12:6 n. 27,70 n. 187,118 n. 49, 197; 1.3.13:118 n. 50,193,197; 1.3.15-19: 83 n. 70; 1.3.17:194; 13.18: 39 n. 104; 1.4.2:109 n. 114; 1.4.7:197; 1.4.9:200; 1.4.18-19:9 n. 50; 1.4.19: 197; 1.51-7:119 n. 57; 1.5-19: 56 n. 84; 1.6.4:86 n. 90,87 n. 97,88 n. 100;

23 8


XENOPHON, Hell, (com.) 1.6.5: 81 n. 53; 1.6.7: 88 n. 101; 1.6.26: 80 n. 49; 1.7.8:42 n. 11; 2.1.6: 87 n. 97; 2.1.6-7:19 n. 59; 2.1.7: 86 n. 89; 2.1.11: 119 n. 60; 2.1.13-14:119 n. 61; 2.1.14: 131 n. 151; 2.1.16: 201; 2.1.25: 70 n. 191; 2.1.29:68 n. 171; 2.2.1:39 n. 104; 2.2.5: 84 n. 85; 2.2.16,17: 211; 2.2.18:196; 2.3.2:196; 2.3.18:196; 2.3.13: 212; 2.3.46:43 n. 17; 2.4.28: 81 n. 58; 2.4.28-35: 58 n. 103; 2.4.38: 78

n. 37; 3.1.8: 84 n. 80; 3.1.9: 84 n. 79; 3.2.6: 84 n. 80; 3.2.11: 208; 3.2.21-31: 58 n. 101; 3.4.6: 84 n. 80; 3.4.10:121 n. 76,204; 3.4.27: 80 n. 51,209-10; 3.4.28:60 n. n o ; 3.4.29: 209-10; 3.5.16:92 n. 16; 4.1.4-15:122 n. 79; 4.1.20-8:122 n. 80; 4.1.29-40:122-4; 4.1.32-4:188 n. 46; 4.1.39-40:14 n. 85; 4-3.1-3: 84 n. 81; 4.3.2: 84 n. 78; 4.5.13:30 n. 49,215; 4.8.3-6: 84 n. 81; 4.8.4: 6 n. 24; 4.8.13,16:196; 4.8.20: 210; 4.8.24:91 n. n , 125 n. 104; 4.8.25-7: 200; 4.8.26:69 n. 180; 4.8.32: 81 n. 52; 4.8.33-9:103 n. 90; 5.1.3: 210; 5.1.6: 86 n. 88,126 n. 106, 195; 5.1.13:210; 5.1.25-32:126 n. 107; 5.2.3:60 n. in; 5.2.6:60 n. 113; 5.2.8-10: 61 n. 119; 5.2.24: 81 n. 52; 5.2.25:43 n. 18; 5.2.25-36:66 n. 156; 5.3.8-9: 60 n. 114; 5.3.10: 61 n. 121; 5.3.11-17: 61 n. 122; 5.3.13:61 nn. 120, 123; 5.3.16:62 n. 125; 5.3.17: 62 n. 126; 5.3.21-5:61 n. 122; 5.3.24:61 n. 124; 5.3.25:62 n. 126; 5.4.2-9:66 n. 158; 5.4.13-16: 62 n. 127; 5.4.22: 29 n. 44, 91 nn. 12,13,192,193; 5 4 4 9 : 56 n. 89; 5.4.58-9: 62 n. 129; 5.4.64: 200;

6.1.2-19:30 n. 46; 6.2.9-n: 200; 6.3.2: 92 n. 14,212; 6.3.2-17:95 n. 29; 6.3.4: 32 n. 64,91 n. 12; 6.3.4-6:92 n. 14; 6.3.6: 26 n. 20; 6.4.3-4: 62 n. 130; 6.4.5-6,13-14:62 n. 131; 6.4.18: 56 n. 90; 6.4.20-5:30 n. 51; 6.4.24:30 n. 51; 6.5.3-5:60 n. 115; 6.5.4:192; 6.5.6-9: 61 n. 117; 6.5.6-10:57 n. 91; 6.5.10:61 n. 118; 6.5.33:192,193; 7-I.33* 35> 38: 128 n. 128; 7.4.15:47 n. 41 Hieron 3:6 n. 25 Lac. Pol. 13.10:79 n. 38 Mem. 2.2.3: n n. 64; 2.3.11-4:4 n. 19; 2.6.35:15 n. 90; 2.9-10:42 n. 6 INSCRIPTIONS

Corpus Inscriptionum Regni Bosporani (1965) 1:37 n. 94 Hornblower (1982) M7 = Labraunda ill 40: 29 n. 41 IG i3 70:65 n. 151; 75: 210; 113:37 n. 92, 68 n. 169; 182: 200 /Gii 2 1 9 : 3 9 ^ n o ; 20:68 n. 174; 32:31 n « 55> 43:9 2 n -18,198; 102: 212; 106: 33 n. 69; i n : 198; 118:216; 150:216; 237:39 n. 108,98 n. 48; 1628: 200; 1629:200 7Gv (1)4:33^69; 5 : 3 3 ^ 7 2 IG vii 2418: 30 n. 47 /Gxii (5)1542:198 IvO 10:31 n. 58; 13:31 n. 59 ML 4: 28 n. 39; 10: 22 n. 2 Olympia Bericht 4.164:33 n. 69 Tod 147: 212; 158:149 n. 6 W. 49:33 n. 73; 78:32 n. 63; 86:32 n. 63

General index

Abydus, 84 Acarnania/Acarnanians, 97-8,99-101,107, 108 Achaea/Achaeans, 158 Ada (Carian), 175 Aegina/Aeginetans, 26 Aeschines son of Atrometus (Athenian), 51, 93>94 impeachment, 157-8,181 and outbreak of Fourth Sacred War, 161, 187 and Philip, 14,154-6,162,183-7,195 Aeschines (Athenian), 211-12 Aeson (Argive), 75 Aetolia/Aetolians, 149 Agacles (of Halieis) ,210 Agesander (Spartan), 202 Agesandridas son of Agesander (Spartan), 85,194,206,207 Agesilaus II son of Archidamus II (Eurypontid king of Sparta), 64,80, 129 and Artaxerxes, 124-5 campaign in Asia Minor, 85,121-5 and Lysander, 57-8,59-60 and Mantineia, 60-1,78,192,204 and patronage networks, 42,81 and Pharnabazus, 74,122-4,187-8 and Pharnabazus' son, 14,123 and Phleius, 61-2 political group of, 57-8,59-60 and Spithradates, 121-2 and Teleutias, 81 Agesipolis I son of Pausanias (Agiad king of Sparta), 60,61 Agis II son of Archidamus II (Eurypontid king of Sparta), 58,80 Agis III son of Archidamus III (Eurypontid king of Sparta), 130 Agrianians, 168 Ajax,189 Alcamenes son of Sthenelaidas (Spartan), 80,206

Alcetas (Spartan), 209 Alcibiades son of Cleinias (Athenian), 46, 55> 79> 86,179-80,213-14 and Argives, 53-4,69,70 n. 185, 71,94, 101-2,105,195 and Chians, 47-9,116 and Endius, 13,69-71,74,166,187 and Milesians, 48 and Pharnabazus, 6,70-1,114,117-18 proxenia with Sparta, 34,36, 53,69, 109 and the Spartan embassy of 420,34,53, 187,191 and Thracians, 70-1,137-8 and Tissaphernes, 71,115-17,131 Alcidas (Spartan), 27-8,88 Alcimachus (Macedonian), 37 Alcinadas (Spartan), 202 Alcisthenes (Spartan), 208 Alexander III son of Philip II ('the Great', king of Macedon) army of, 169-74 becomes 'babarised', 171-2 and Darius' family, 175 as focus of empire, 176-7 and gift-giving, 167-9,171-2,175~6 and his hetairoi, 169-70 and kinship, 174-5 Lord of Asia, 130 and mass wedding at Susa, 174—5 move towards absolute monarchy, 169, 171 and mutiny at Opis, 173—4 and Pages' Consipracy, 172-3 rule by persuasion, 170-1 Alexander (Spartan), 208 alliances, 23 n. 3,159-60 altruism, 8,10,11 Amadocus I (king of the Odrysian Thracians), see Medocus Amadocus II son of Medocus-Amadocus (king of the Odrysian Thracians), 144-6

239

240

General index

ambassadors criteria for selection, 75,92-5 iteration of appointment, 76 and personal connections, 53,54,75-9, 90-5,109-10 tribally based elections, 92-3 n. 19 Ameiniades son of Philemon (Athenian), 95 amicitia, 8,9 n. 50 Ampelidas (Spartan), 203 Amphictyonic Council, 155-6,160-1,187 Amphipolis/Amphipolitans and Athens, 103,104,107,138,145, 150-2,157-8,164,165 and Brasidas, 28,138 and Hagnon, 28,98,137 and Philip, 138,150-2,156,158,159-60 Amphissa/Amphissans, 161,187 Amyntas III (king of Macedon), 103 Anaeti, 31 Anaxarchus (Theban), 24 Anaxibius (Spartan), 80-1,103,114,120, 139-40,208 Anaxicrates (Byzantine), 39 Anaxinus (of Oreus), 179 Andromenes (Spartan), 203 Aneristus son of Sperthias (Spartan), 76, 78,202 Antalcidas son of Leon (Spartan), 78,125, 131,204 and Artaxerxes, 127,132 Nauarch, 86,126 and Tiribazus, 86,126,195 Anthemous, 149 Antimenidas (Spartan), 203 Antipater (Macedonian), 37 Antiphon son of Lysonides (Athenian), 94, 195 Antiphon (Athenian), 151 Antippus (Spartan), 202 Antisthenes (Spartan), 206 Apollodorus son of Empedus (Selymbrian), 32 Apollonides (Mytilenean), 30 Apollophanes (of Cyzicus), 122,131 Aracus (Spartan), 204 Arcadia, 56-7,61 Archedemus (Athenian), 94,195 Archeptolemus son of Hippodamus (Athenian), 94,195 Archidamus II son of Zeuxidamus (Eurypontid king of Sparta), 62-4,114 Archidamus III son of Agesilaus (Eurypontid king of Sparta), 56,153 Archonides (king of the Sicels), 31 Arcissus (Spartan), 209 Argaeus (Macedonian), 150-1

Argeius (Eleian), 47 Argos/Argives, 26-7,52-4,55-^, 130,157, 158, see also Alcibiades, Lichas Ariaeus (Persian), 120,122 Ariobarzanes (Persian), 126,127,129,131 Aristarchus (Spartan), 120,140,207 Aristippus (Thessalian), 119-20 Aristocrates son of Scellias (Athenian), 211 Aristodemus (of Metapontum), 94,153, 195,212 Aristolochus (Spartan), 204 Aristomenidas (Spartan), 77, 78,204 Ariston (Byzantine), 39 Aristophanes son of Nicophemus (Athenian), 91,94 Aristophon son of Aristophanes (Athenian), 94,105,195,198 Aristophon (Athenian), 95,212 Aristoteles son of Timocrates (Athenian), 94,196,211,213 Aristus (Spartan), 207 Artabazus son of Pharnabazus (Persian), 104,129-30,168 Artaphernes (Persian), 115 Artaxerxes II son of Darius II (Great King of Persia) and Agesilaus, 124-5 and Antalcidas, 127,132 and Pelopidas, 128 and Timagoras, 128-9 Artaxerxes III (Ochus) son of Artaxerxes II (Great King of Persia), 129 Asia Minor, cities of, 115,117,121,126,130 and Callicratidas, 87-8 and Lysander, 87,118 Asopius son of Phormio (Athenian), 97-8, 105,107 association, see koinonia Astyochus (Spartan), 80,86-7,88,115 Asteas (Alean), 33-4 Athenaeus son of Pericleidas (Spartan), 192,202 Athens/Athenians alliance with Acarnania, 97 alliance with Argos in 420,101-2,187 alliance with Thebes in 339,161-2 ambassadors, 90-5 appointment of proxenoi, 33-5 and the Chians, 65—6 and Euagoras, 125 and fringes of Greek world, 108,132 formalisation of aristocratic practices, 131 generals, 96-108,109 ideology of equality, 180-1 involvement in satrap's revolt, 126,129 joint expedition with Sitalces, 139

General index and liberation of the Cadmeia, 66-7 'mother-city' of the Ionians, 25 naturalisation part of foreign policy, 37, 138,142-7 oligarchic coup in 411,43,46,47 oligarchic coup in 404,43 Peace of Epilycus, 115 and Philip, 152-66 political activity, 44,71, n o political groups, 45-6,92-5,199 relations with Persia, 114-15,115-17,118, 125,126,129-30,131-2 relations with Sparta in 420,52-4 relations with Thrace connections with Thrace, 137-8 contempt for Thracians, 138 restoration of democracy in 403,58-9 in Sicily, 24,25 support of Argaeus, 150-1 support of foreign kings, 144 theatres of war, 107-8 use of personal connections, 65-71,101, 106,110 Atrestidas (Mantineian), 149 Autocles son of Strombichides (Athenian), 95 Barsine daughter of Darius III (wife of Alexander the Great; Persian), 174 Battus (oikist of Cyrene), 27 Berisades (king of the Odrysian Thracians), 144-5 Bianor (Thracian), 145 Bion (Spartan), 207 Boeotia/Boeotians, 24,52—5, see also Thebes/Thebans Boeotius (Spartan), 109,118,203 Bosporus, kings of, 37, 39 Brasidas son of Tellis (Spartan) harmost, 80,82,85,205,206 hero-cult at Amphipolis, 28 and Megara, 49 Pharsalian epitedeioi, 31,57,79,82 as symbouloSi 82,88 Brea, 138 bribery, 20,128-9,132,181-6 brothers, relationship between, n , 12 Bulis son of Nicolaus (Spartan), 73,76 Byzantium/Byzantines, 83 Callias (Spartan), 204 Callias son of Hipponicus (Athenian), 26 n. 20,95 proxenos of the Spartans, 29,32,91-2,94 Callibius (Spartan), 207 Callibius (Tegean), 56-7

241 Callicratidas (Spartan), 80,86, 87-8,119, 131 Callicratidas (Spartan), 204 Callisthenes (Olynthian), 172 Callistratus son of Callicrates (Athenian), 95.212 Cammys (tyrant of Mytilene), 30 Cardia/Cardians, 145,158 Carphinas (Acarnanian), 39 Catana, 24 Celts, 168-9 Cephallenia/Cephallenians, 99,101 Cephalus (Athenian), 67,71 Cephisodotus (Athenian), 215 Cersobleptes son of Cotys (king of the Odrysian Thracians), 104,135,144-7, 152,154 Cetriporis son of Berisades (king of the Odrysian Thracians), 144-6 Chabrias son of Ctesippus (Athenian), 126, 129,216 Chaeronea, battle of, 162,187 Chalcideus (Spartan), 47-8,79,203,206 Chalcidice/Chalcidians, 52,57,82 Chalcis/Chalcidians (Euboea), 24 Chares son of Theochares (Athenian), 106, 129 Charidemus (Athenian), 151,216 Charidemus son of Philoxenus (of Oreus; naturalised Athenian), 38,104,105,145 charts/charites (favour/s), 18-19,20,113, see also gifts Charminus (Spartan), 207 Charopus (Eleian), 47 Cheilon (Spartan), 210,215 Chersonese, 137,158,165 Chios/Chians, 47-9,65-6,70 Cimon son of Miltiades (Athenian), 42, 137 citizenship, 23, 37-40 and loyalty to pohs, 16,37-8 naturalisation, 37-40,142-7 and participation, 39,41,180 privileges and duties of, 38 and proxenia, 39—40 renewal, 39 value of in exchange, 146-7 Cleander (Spartan), 207 Clearchus son of Ramphias (Spartan), 206, 207 and Byzantium, 75,82-3, 85 and Cyrus, 119,131,188-9 Clearidas son of Cleonymus (Spartan), 57, 206 Cleisthenes son of Megacles (Athenian), 45 n.27

242

General index

Cleitus Othe Black'; Macedonian), 173 Cleobulus son of Glaucus (Athenian), 215 Cleobulus (Spartan), 52-3, 55, 64 Cleombrotus I son of Pausanias (Agiad king of Sparta), 62 Cleon son of Cleaentus (Athenian), 44, 213 Cnemus (Spartan), 88 colonisation, 27 relations between mother-city and colony, 24 commodities, 19-20 common peace treaties, 125,126,127-9, I57>158 Companion Cavalry (Hetairoi), 169 comrades/comradeship, 10,11-12 politicised, 43 see also hetairoi conflict of interests, 50-1,60,62,71-2,123, 165,186-91 Conon son of Timotheus (Athenian), 68, 91,94,105,125,196,198 Corinth/Corinthians, 24,52,125,190 proxenoi in 427,29 Corinthian League, 130,162,163 Corinthian War, 125 Corcyra/Corcyraeans, 35,99,107-8 civil war, 43 as colony of Corinth, 24 hostages taken at Sybota, 29 mother-city of Epidamnus, 24 Coroebus (Spartan), 33 Cotys son of Seuthes (king of the Odrysian Thracians), 103,104,135,141-2,144> 147 cousins, relationship between, 11 Croesus (king of Lydia), 22 Ctesiphon (Athenian), 94,153,196 cultural misunderstandings, 132-3,138-9, 147,164-6,171-2 Cydon (Byzantine), 39 Cylon (Athenian), 43 Cyniscus (Spartan), 207 Cyrene/Cyreneans, 27,168 Cyrus son of Darius II ('the Younger', Persian) and Callicratidas, 88 and Clearchus, 83 and Lysander, 87,89,118-19,131 philia with Spartan state, 131 and the Ten Thousand, 119-20 Daithus (Spartan), 202 Darius III (Great King of Persia), 130 Deiniadas (perioecus of Sparta), 206 Delian League, 75, n o

Demades son of Demeas (Athenian), 94, 162,163,196,212-13 Demaenetus son of Demeas (Athenian), 215 Demaratus (Corinthian), 168 Demochares son of Demon (Athenian), 212 democracy, 47, n o democratisation, 180-1 Demophon (Athenian), 67 Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes (Athenian), 51,213 and Acarnanians and Messenians, 79, 99-101,105 Demosthenes son of Demosthenes (Athenian) and Aeschines, 157,183-4 and Anaxinus, 179-80 and Peace of Philocrates, 154-5 political group of, 93 proxenos of the Thebans, 75,94,95,161, 196 Demus son of Pyrilampes (Athenian), 94, 196-7 Dercylidas (Spartan), 80,84,85,121,206, 207,208 Dexippus (Spartan), 207 Dieitrephes son of Nicostratus (Athenian), 105,107,198-9 Diodotus son of Eucrates (Athenian), 67-8 Diognetus son of Niceratus (Athenian), 59 Dionysius (tyrant of Syracuse), 68,91 Diotimus son of Strombichus (Athenian), 105,199 Diphilus (Athenian), 214 Diphridas (Spartan), 204,208 doronldora (gift/s), 18,19,20,182, see also gifts Dorians, 24-5 Dorieus son of Diagoreus (Rhodian; naturalised Thurian), 56 Dracon (of Pellene), 208 Eccritus (Spartan), 206 ecthra, see enmity Elis/Eleians, 47,52,56,58,157,181 Empedias (Spartan), 202 Empedus (Athenian), 212 Endius son of Alcibiades (Spartan), 203 and Alcibiades, 13,35-6,53,69,74,166, 187 and the Athenians, 76-7,78 enmity (echthra), 14-16 Epicles (Spartan), 206 Epicydidas (Spartan), 204 Epidamnus/Epidamnians, 24

General index Epitadas son of Melobrius (Spartan), 205 epitedeioslepitedeioi, 11 Eretria, 47 Eteonicus (Spartan), 80,84,85,206,207, 208,209 ethnic divisions, 24-5 Etymocles (Spartan), 78,192,204 Euagoras (king of Salamis, Cyprus), 37,68, 91,125 Eualas (Spartan), 206 Eualcas (Eleian), 47 Eubulus son of Spintharus (Athenian), 153 Eucleidas (Spartan), 209 Eudamidas (Spartan), 80,208 Eunomus (Athenian), 91,94,197 Euphratas (Spartan), 209 Eurylochus (Spartan), 205 Eurymedon son of Thucles (Athenian), 100-1,105,107,199 Euryptolemus son of Peisianax (Athenian), 94,118,197 Eustophus (Argive), 75 Eurymachus son of Leontiades (Theban), 49n.53 Euthycles (Spartan), 78,192,204 Euthycrates (Olynthian), 181 Euxenus (Spartan), 208 exchange and Alexander the Great, 167-9, 174, 175-6 and bribery, 182-3 gift-giving, 19-21,165 gift-receiving, 135-7, MO* 175-6 incremental giving, 6-7 inequalities in, 113,132,136-7,165,141 kinds of, 1-2,21,132-3,136,146,165-6, 172,182-3,186 as means of generating features of affection, 9 media of, 18-21 Persian, 111-14,134,171-2 and Philip of Macedon, 149-50 prospective, 37,136-7,140-1 repertoires, 2, 21, 22,111 supplicatory, 136-7,175-6 temporality, 5 n. 23 Thracian, 134-7 and xenia> 13-14,20 see also reciprocity friends-enemies, 14-16,22-3,163-4, J 69, 176,178,188-91 friendship, modern western, 3,9 gifts, 18-21,113, see also doron, charts gift-giving, see exchange

243 Gorgias (Leontine), 73 Gorgopas (Spartan), 208 Gylippus son of Cleandridas (Spartan), 78, 192-3,203,206 Hagesippidas (Spartan), 206 Hagnon son of Nicias (Athenian), 98-9, 105,107,137,139,211 Halonnesus, 158-60 Halus/Halians, 153,154 Harpalus (Macedonian), 170 Hebryzelmis son of Seuthes (king of the Odrysian Thracians), 144 n. 60 Hegesippus son of Hegesias (Athenian), 157,159,212 Heracleia Trachinia, 27-8 Heracleides (of Aenus), 144 Heracleides (of Maroneia), 136,140 Herippidas (Spartan), 85,122,194,207, 209 Hermocrates son of Hermon (Syracusan), 25,87 Hermolaus (Macedonian), 172-3 hero-cult, 27-8 hetaireiaii 43-4,46 hetairos/hetairoi, 11-12, see also comrades Hieron (Spartan), 209 Hierophon son of Antimnestus (Athenian), 213 Hippagretas (Spartan), 205 Hippias (Eleian), 47 Hippocrates (Spartan), 56,206,207 horizontal axis (in society), 41-2,46-51 hospitium, 13 n. 84 Hypatodorus (Tanagran), 56 Hyperbolus son of Antiphanes (Athenian), 46,213 Hypereides son of Glaucippus (Athenian), I565157 Iatrocles son of Pasiphon (Athenian), 94, 197 ideology, 124,144,179-81,185,190-1 insiders-outsiders, 16-17,32,176,178 Iolcius (Athenian), 211 Ionians, 24—5 Iphicrates son of Timotheus (Athenian), 51,104,126,215 and Cotys, 103,138,141-2 and Thrace, 102-3,105 Iphicrates son of Iphicrates (Athenian), 167-8 Ischagoras (Spartan), 57,78,193,202, 203 Ischolaus (Spartan), 209 Ismenias (Theban), 43,49-50,66

244

General index

Jason (of Pherae, Thessaly), 29-30 kin/kinship, 10-11, 23-8,41,42,174-5 koinonia (association), 7,10 Labotas (Spartan), 207 Lacedaemonius son of Cimon (Athenian), 36,192 Laches son of Melanopus (Athenian), 90, 94,105,197,199 Lacon son of Aiemnestus (Plataean), 31 Lamachus son of Xenophanes (Athenian), 105,199,213 Langarus (king of the Agrianians), 168 Laphilus (Spartan), 202 Lasthenes (Olynthian), 181 Leodamas son of Eristratus (Athenian), 94, 197 Leon (Athenian), 128-9,211,214-15 Leon son of Anticleidas (Spartan), 76,78, 85,193> I94> 203,206 Leontiades (I) (Theban), 49 n. 53 Leontiades (II) (Theban), 43,49-50,66 Leontini/Leontines, 24,25 Libys son of Aristocritus (Spartan), 57 n. 95> 81 lichas son of Arcesilaus (Spartan), 203 negotiates treaty in 411,115,117 and the Argives, 31,33,56,77,78,102 symboulos, 77,88 liturgies, 45 Lycaethus (Athenian), 95 Lycurgus (Byzantine), 39 Lycurgus son of Lycophron (Athenian), 95 Lysander son of Aristocritus (Spartan), 57 n. 95> 78,193» 205,207,208 and Agesilaus, 57-8,59,81,121,204 andAgis, 81 and Asia Minor, 57,59, 85,87 and Cyrus, 87,89,118-19,131,204 Nauarch, 86,87,88-9,195,204 Lysanoridas (Spartan), 209 Lysippus (Spartan), 208 Macarius (Spartan), 205 Macedon/Macedonians Argive descent of kings, 26-7,148 as 'free men', 170,172-3 magistrates Athens and Sparta compared, 109-110 criteria for selection, 73-4 as face of corporate polis, 74 and personal connections, 60-1,75-7, 82-5,86-9,90-2,94-5,96-106, 108-110 Mantineia/Mantineians, 52,56,69,158

Mantitheus (Athenian), 118 Mantitheus son of Mantius (Athenian), 30 Mecyberna, 181 Medea, 15 Medocus (Amadocus I) (king of the Odrysian Thracicans), 69,70,143 Megabazus (Persian), 73 Megalopolis/Magalopolitans, 158 Megara/Megarians, 49,157,181 Megillus (Spartan), 30,74, 77, 78,193,203 Meidias son of Cephisodorus (Athenian), 36 Melanopus son of Laches (Athenian), 216 Melanthus (Spartan), 80,206 Meleas (Spartan), 202 Melesippus son of Diacritas (Spartan), 78, 193,202 Menander (Athenian), 215 Menas (Spartan), 57,202,203 Menedaius (Spartan), 205 Menon (Thessalian), 120 Messene/Messenians, 157,158 Messenians (of Naupactus), 99-101 Metapii, 31 Methymna/Methymnians, 24 Milon (Spartan), 208,215 Mindarus (Spartan), 56,117 Monimus (Spartan), 205 Myrtilus son of Lysis (Athenian), 211 myth, 26-8 Mytilene/Mytileneans, 29,36 naturalisation, see citizenship Naucleidas (Spartan), 207 Naucles (Spartan), 209 Naupactus, 97,100,107-8,149 Nausicles son of Clearchus (Athenian), 93 Naxos/Naxians, 24 Nicander (Spartan), 207 Nicaea, 161 Nicias (of Gortyn), 29 Nicias, Peace of, 33-4 events after, 51-5,90-1,187 Nicias son of Niceratus (Athenian), 46,93, 210-11,213 and Pausanias, 59 and Philocharidas, 90 n. 4 and the Spartans, 54,90-1,94 and the Syracusans, 68,79,105,199-200 Nicolaus son of Bulis (Spartan), 76,78,202 Nymphodorus (Abderite), 30-1,34-5,143 oaths, 6 oath-takers, 211 Ocyllus (Spartan), 78,193,204

General index Odrysians (tribe of Thracians) descent of kings from Tereus, 27 kings receive Athenian citizenship, 37,39, 142-7 oligarchy, 47 Olontheus (Spartan), 204 Olynthus/Olynthians, 149,151,152-3 Onomarchus (Phocian), 152 Onomastorides (Spartan), 205 oratory, 44 n. 24 Orestes and Menelaus, 16 andPylades, 12 Ostanes (Persian), 129 Otys (king of the Paphlagonians), 121-2 Oxyartes (Bactrian), 168 Pancalus (Spartan), 208 panhellenic games, 75 Panthoidas (Spartan), 83,207,209 parent-child relationship, 10-11 Parmenio (Macedonian), 170,172 Parysatis daughter of Ochus (wife of Alexander the Great; Persian), 174 Pasippidas (Spartan), 78,193,203 Pasitelidas son of Agesander (Spartan), 85, 194,206 patriotism, 179-80 patronage, 42, see also Sparta Pausanias son of Pleistoanax (Agiad king of Sparta), 58-9,60,90 Pausippus (Spartan), 205 peace treaties, 159-60 Pedaritus son of Leon (Spartan), 85,86, 194,206 Peisander son of Glaucetes (Athenian), 211 Peisander (Spartan), 209-10 Peithias (Corcyraean), 35 n. 80 Peisistratus son of Hippocrates (Athenian), 47* 137 Pelopidas (Theban), 128 Perdiccas II (king of Macedon), 26-7,31, 139 Pericles son of Xanthippus (Athenian), 44-5 and Archidamus, 62-4,191 citizenship law, 37-8 Persia/Persians failure of relationships with Greeks, 113-14,132-3 faithlessness, 114 gift-giving, 111-14,171-2 inequalities among, i n , 113-14,132 involvement in the Peloponnesian War, 114-19 Phaeax son of Erasistratus (Athenian), 46

245 Phaedimus (Spartan), 203 Phalaecus (Phocian), 153,155 Phanosthenes (Andrian; naturalised Athenian), 38,105,200 Pharax (Spartan), 204 Pharnabazus (Persian), 131 and Agesilaus, 13-14,74,187-8 and Alcibiades, 6,70,114,117-18 and Anaxibius, 114,120 appointed commander of King's forces in 380s, 126 and Conon, 68,125 funds rebuilding of walls at Athens, 125 incites war against Spartans, 121 and the Spartans in 411,115 Pharnabazus' son, 13-14 Pharsalus, 153 Phayllus (Phocian), 152 Pherae/Pheraeans, 152,155 Philaidae, 137 philia and affection, 4,7,8-9,14,21 in Aristotle, 3-4,6-8,9-10,11,12,41 and companionship, 11-12,21 and equality, 6,21 and exchange, 4-9,13-14 inequalities in, 6 as instrumental/utilitarian relationship, 7-9,21,41 as kind of exchange, 2-3 kinds of, 9-14 and kinship, 10-11,21 relational, 7 and trust (pistis), 5-6 and xenia, 12-14, 2 I Philip II son of Amyntas (king of Macedon) and Aeschines, 14,181-6 and Amphipolis, 150-2 assassination, 162-3 and Athens, 164-6 and epanorthosis, 156-60 and gift-giving, 149-50,151,156,158-60, 183-5 and Peace of Philocrates, 152-6 and settlement of Greece, 160-4 and Thrace, 145-7 Philip (Macedonian), 170 Philippus (Spartan), 203,206 Philiscus (Abyderite), 127 Philotas son of Parmenio (Macedonian), 170,172 Philocharidas son of Eryxilaidas (Spartan), 57, 76,77, 78,90 n. 4,193-4,202, 203 Philocrates, Peace of, 146,152-6 epanorthostSy 156-60

246

General index

Philocrates son of Pythodorus (Athenian), 93,153-4,157,181 Philomelus (Phocian), 73-4 Phleius/Phleiasians, 61-2 Phocion son of Phocus (Athenian), 36,94, 105,162,163,197-8,200,213 Phocis/Phocians, 152-3,154-6,164,165 Phoebidas (Spartan), 66,80,208,209 Phormio (Acarnanian), 39,98 Phormio son of Asopius (Athenian), 51, 74-5,97-8,105,107,108 Phrixus (Spartan), 204 Phrynon (Athenian), 94,153,198 Phylopidas (Spartan), 208 Podanemus (Spartan), 89 polls as corporate citizen, 23,34,40,74,142 conflict within, 50-1 ideology, 179-81,190-1 as koinonia.) 41 models of, 23 n. 5 modernising relationships, 178 and personal relationships, 23 political activity, 43-6,71-2 Athens and Sparta compared, 109-110 factional nature of, 36,47-51,181 diplomatic activity with Persia, 131 and individuals, 55,131 networking, 81,110-11 political groups, 43-6, 56-8,71 in Athens, 44-6,92-4,106,199 'bridging* between, 46,54 policies, 44,47-51 in Sparta, 57-8,64 political leaders, 43-5,59-60 Pollis (Spartan), 89,204 Polyalces (Spartan), 202 Polybiades (Spartan), 209 Polydamas (ofPharsalus,Thessaly), 29-30 Polydamidas (Spartan), 80,206 Polynicus (Spartan), 207 Polytropus (Spartan), 209 Poteidaea, 149,160,165 Pratodamas (Spartan), 202 Procles son of Euonymon (Athenian), 211 Procles son of Theodorus (Athenian), 99, 213 proxenia, 23 and citizenship, 39-40 as civic institution, 28-9,30-2,35 as diplomatic strategy, 30-1,35-6, n o and exchange, 29-30,34-5 as honorific award, 36-7 personal nature of, 30,32-4 and xenia, 28-9,31-2,34-5

proxenos/proxenoi appointment, 32-4 as 'magistrates', 31-2 and political groups, 36 privileges and duties, 29-31 relationship to natal state, 31,39-40 Proxenus son of Harmodius (Athenian), 153 Proxenus (Boeotian), 120 Proxenus (Tegean), 56-7 public-private, 22-3,15-18,40,47-51,109 and Athens, 71-2 and proxenia, 28-9,32,36 and Sparta, 65 Pylos, 100-1 Pydna, 151-2,165 Pyrrhander (Athenian), 94,198 Pythocles son of Pythodorus (Athenian), 213

Pythodorus son of Epizelus (Athenian), 211 Pythodorus son of Isolochus (Athenian), 105,200 Python (of Aenus), 144 Python (Byzantine), 157 Ramphias (Spartan), 202 reciprocity balanced, 1 n. 1,164-5 generalised, 1 n. 1 negative, 1 n. 1,15,165,176 positive, 15,17,165,176 see also exchange Rhegium/Rhegians, 24 Rhodes/Rhodians, 56 ritualised-friendship, see xenia Rogozen Treasure, 135-6 Roxane daughter of Oxyartes (wife of Alexander the Great; Bactrian), 173, 174 Sacred War, Third, 152,156,187 Sacred War, Fourth, 160-1,187 Sadocus son of Sitalces (Odrysian), 38,39, 76,143 Salaethus (Spartan), 205 Scythes (Spartan), 204 Serdaei, 22 Seuthes I son of Sparadocus (king of Odrysian Thracians), 134,143 n. 59, 138 Seuthes II son of Seuthes (king of Odyrsian Thracians), 27,69,70,103,135-6, 139-41,143-4,147 Sibii, 174 Sicily, 107 Sigeium, 137

General index Simon (Thracian), 145 Sisimithres (Sogdianian), 168 Sitalces son of Teres (king of Odrysian Thracians), 98,115,139,143 social dysfunction, 166 Socrates (Achaean), 120 Sophaenetus (Stymphalian), 120 Sophocles son of Sostratides (Athenian), 99-100 Sparta/Spartans ambassadors, 76-9 appointment of proxenoi, 32-3 and Corinthian League, 130 and Cyrus' coup, 119 ephors, 64-5,78-9,80-1 foreign policy, 64-5,85 harmosts/archons, 80-5,109 and Heracleia Trachinia, 27-8 as homoioi, 181 involvement in satrap's revolt, 126,129 kings appoint ambassadors, 78-9 and personal connections, 57-65 and political groups, 57-8 and xenia, 58 liberators of Greece, 115 Nauarchs, 86-9 negotiations with Persia, 114-15,117, 118-19,125,126,127,130 non-royal military commands, 80-9 patronage networks, 42,81 personal relations with Persians, 131 political activity, 109-10,131-2 political groups, 52-4,57-8,59-60 relationship with Doris, 27 relations with Athens in 420,52-4 use of personal connections in interstate affairs, 55-65,71, 81-2,131-2 Sperthias son of Aneristus (Spartan), 73, 76 Sphodrias (Spartan), n o , 209 Spithradates (Persian), 121-2 Stasippus (Tegean), 56-7 Sthenelaus (Spartan), 207 Sthorys (Thasian?), 32 Stratolas (Eleian), 47 Strombichides (Athenian), 212 Strombichides son of Diotimus (Athenian), 214 Strophacus (of Pharsalus, Thessaly), 31 Struthas (Persian), 125 Styphon son of Pharax (Spartan), 205 suppliants/supplication, 24 n. 9,136 n. 18, H7> 175 Sybaris, 22 syngeneia, see kin/kinship

247 synomosiaii 43, 46, see also hetaireiai Syracuse/Syracusans, 24 Tantalus son of Patrocles (Spartan), 205 Taxilas (Indian king), 171 Teleutias son of Agis (Spartan), 81,89,91, 208,210 Tellias (of Acragas), 73 Tellis (Spartan), 202 Tegea/Tegeans, 52,55,56,61 Tenedos/Tenedians, 30 Ten Thousand, army of, 119-20,131,139, 169 Teres II son of Amadocus (king of the Odrysian Thracians), 144,146 Thasos/Thasians, 84 Theaetetus (Athenian), 212 Thebes/Thebans alliance with Aegina, 26 ambassadors at Philip's court, 75, 149-50 and attempted peace of 367/6,127-9 and Cleombrotus, 62 destruction of Thebes, 168 and Fourth Sacred War, 161-2 involvement in satrap's revolt, 129-30 liberation of the Cadmeia, 66-7 negotiations with Persia, 127-9,130 and political groups, 49-50 proxenoi of the Macedonians, 168 settlement after Chaeronea, 162 xenoi of Philip (and Alexander), 75, 149-50,168 see also Boeotia/Boeotians Theogenes (Athenian), 211 Theotimus (Athenian), 216 Theramenes son of Hagnon (Athenian), 42-3> 935 94> 211, 214 Therimenes (Spartan), 203,206 Therimachus (Spartan), 208 Therippidas (Spartan), 209 Thermon (Spartan), 206 Thermopylae, 152,153,155,161 Thessaly/Thessalians, 152 Thibron (Spartan), 121,207,208 Thorax (Spartan), 207 Thrace/Thracians, 107-8,138 and Athenian foreign policy, 134,142-7 and gift-giving, 134-7 see also Odrysians, Triballians Thrason (Athenian), 67,71,92,94,198 Thrasonides (Eleian), 47 Thrasybulus son of Lycus (Athenian), 68-9,105,138,200,214 Thrasybulus son of Thrason (Athenian), 67,92,94

248

General index

Thrasycles (Athenian), 33-4,211 Thrasydaeus (Eleian), 58 Thucydides son of Olorus (Athenian), 34-5,105,107,108,137,200 Timagoras (Athenian), 128-9 Timocrates (Athenian), 211 Timocrates (Rhodian), 121 Timocrates (Spartan), 204 Timotheus son of Conon (Athenian), 104, 105,129,200-1 Tiribazus (Persian), 125,126 Tissaphernes ?son of Hydarnes (Persian), 114 and Alcibiades, 70,115-17,131 and Astyochus, 86-7 and the Spartans in 411,115,117 Torone, 181 treason, 47,185 Triballians (Thracian tribe), 135-6 trust (pistis), 5-6,8,170,172 trade, 75 Tydeus son of Ion (Chian), 65-6 Tydeus son of Lamachus (Athenian), 66 n. 155,105,201,215 Tyre/Tyrenians, 176

xenia (ritualised-friendship), 10,12-14, 16-18 and Alexander the Great, 168 and army of Ten Thousand, 119-20,131 and bribery, 182-6 in epic, 12-13 equality in, 12-14,20,132,185 and interstate relations, 35-6,46-7,71, 110,124-5,131 and name-exchange, 98 and non-Greeks, 21,131,147 resembling kinship, 13 and supplication, 136,147 xenia (gifts of xenia), 18 Xenias (Elean), 58 Xenocleides (Athenian; resident in Pella), 157 Xenocles (Spartan), 204 Xenophon son of Gryllus (Athenian), 120 and Seuthes, 27,136,139-41,147 xenos/xenoi, 137 n. 5 form links between political groups, as outsider, 16-18 potential threat to polis, 18 religious functions of, 31

vertical axis (in society), 41,42-6 Xenares son of Cnidis (Spartan), 52-3, 54, 55, 64, 85, 206

Zacynthus/Zacynthians, 99,101 Zeus xenios, 17 Zeuxidas (Spartan), 202

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