Canada and the Arab World

Canada and the Arab World

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Canada and the Arab World edited by Tareq Y. Ismael

The University of Alberta Press

First published by The University of Alberta Press Athabasca Hall Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E8 Copyright © The University of Alberta Press 1985 ISBN 0-88864-085-4 (cloth) 0-88864-086-2 (paperback) Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Canada and the Arab world ISBN 0-88864-085-4 (bound).—ISBN 0-88864-086-2 (pbk.) 1. Canada - Relations - Arab countries - Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Arab countries - Relations Canada - Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Ismael, Tareq Y. DS63.2.C2C36 1985 327.71017'4927 C85-091130-3 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of the copyright owner. Typesetting by The Typeworks, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada Printed by John Deyell Company, Lindsay, Ontario, Canada

Contents Preface

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Contributors

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Introduction Dr. Heath Macquarrie

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1 Canadian foreign policy in the Arab world: an overview Dr. Tareq Y. Ismael

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2 Canada's national interest and the Middle East Dr. Peyton Lyon

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3 Canada's peacekeeping role in the Middle East Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns

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4 Canada's economic relations with the Arab world: patterns and prospects Dr. Atif Kubursi 5 Religious elements in the Canadian perception of Arabs Dr. Antonio R. Gualtieri 6 From refugees to a people? Canada and the Palestinians 1967-1973 Dr. Paul C. Noble 7 Where angels fear to tread: Canada and the status of the Palestinian people 1973-1983 Dr. Paul C. Noble

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8 Zionist interest groups and Canadian foreign policy Alan Bones

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9 Reflections on the Stanfield Report The Honourable Robert Stanfield

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Appendix The Stanfield Report

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Preface IN 1981, the Canadian-Arab Relations Conference, at The University of Calgary, brought together scholars from a variety of disciplines, policy-makers, and policy practitioners in a unique forum organized for the purpose of examining the problems and prospects of Canadian relations with the Arab world. The conference was sponsored by a number of departments and faculties at The University of Calgary under the auspices of the university's Middle East Studies Committee, the Union of Arab Historians, and the International Association of Middle Eastern Studies. The conference was unique because it brought together participants from diverse backgrounds and perspectives to examine a controversial and politically sensitive issue in Canadian foreign policy. This book is an outcome of that conference. It reflects the diversity of perspectives of the conference participants and the unity of purpose that brought them into dynamic interaction. The collection of articles included in this book were solicited from conference participants. The Honourable Robert Stanfield's contribution is the only paper taken from the conference proceedings. The others were prepared specifically for this volume following the conference. The book, then, represents a continuation rather than a summary of the examination initiated at the conference. While it is impossible to acknowledge individually all the participants who contributed so much to this endeavor, I do wish to express my special appreciation to Senator Heath Macquarrie, Dr. John Sigler of Carleton University, Dr. Peyton Lyon of Carleton University, and Dr. Paul Noble of McGill University who served on the National Advisory Board and spent two years organizing the conference. The members of the Middle East Studies Committee of The University of Calgary, Dr. P.C. Craigie, Dr. F. Terentiuk, and Dr. R.S. Chapman, also warrant special mention. Without their patient and persistent efforts, this entire endeavor would not have been realized. The support of the cosponsoring units of The University of Calgary, the Union of Arab Historians, and the International Association of Middle Eastern Studies made this entire enterprise possible. In addition, the International Association of Middle Eastern Studies provided support for the publication of this volume.

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Contributors ALAN BONES recently received his M.A. from the Norman Paterson School of International Studies, Carleton University. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL E.L.M. BURNS commanded the First Canadian Corps in Italy during 1944. His experience as Chairman of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and Commander of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East from 1954 to 1959 is described in his book Between Arab and Israeli (1962). He was Professor of Strategic Studies in the Norman Paterson School of International Studies, Carleton University, 1972-1975. ANTONIO R. GUALTIERI is Professor of Religion, Carleton University, with special interests in problems of religious diversity and comparative religious ethics. Previously, he served as a minister of The United Church of Canada and taught in the Religion Department at Vassar College. Among the journals in which his articles have appeared are: SR Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, Scottish Journal of Theology, Religious Studies, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Theological Studies, Encounter, Religion and Society, Journal ofDharma, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Canadian Ethnic Studies, and Dalhousie Review. TAREQ Y. ISMAEL is Professor of Political Science, The University of Calgary. He is the author of Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East (1970); The U.A.R. in Africa: Egypt's Policy Under Nasser (\97\);The Middle East in World Politics (1973); Canada and the Middle East (1973); The Arab Left (1976); The Iraq-Iran War: Roots of Conflict (1982); Government and Politics in Islam (1985). He is also co-editor of Canada and the Third World (1976) and editor of Canadian Arab Relations: Policy and Perspectives (1984). His articles have appeared in The Middle East Journal, Current History, Journal of Modern African Studies, The Middle East Forum, Arab Studies, Europa Archiv, the Arab Historian, Palestine Affairs, the Canadian Journal of African Studies, Social Problems, the International Journal and International Perspectives.

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ATIF ABDALLAH KUBURSI is Professor of Economics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. He is the author of The Economic Consequence of the Camp David Accords (1981) and The Calculus of Israeli Peace (1982). He is also the co-author of Input-Output Analyses of Fiscal Policy in Ontario (1978). His articles have appeared in the Canadian Journal of Economics, Journal of Regional Science, Public Finance, Public Finance Quarterly, Journal of Development Studies, Journal of Developing Areas, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Energy Economics, Journal of Macroeconomics, Ontario Economic Review, Shoun Falastiniah, AL Arabi, Fikr, and ALNoadwah. PEYTON v. LYON is Professor of Political Science, Carleton University. He is the author of The Policy Question: A Critical Appraisal of Canada's Role in World Affairs (1963); Canada in World Affairs, 1961-63 (1968); NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument (1971), Canada-US Free Trade (CUFTA) and Canadian Independence (1975); co-author of Canada as an International Actor (1979); and co-editor of Continental Community: Independence and Integration in North America (1974) and Canada and the Third World (1976). His articles have appeared in the International Journal, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Canadian Annual Review, Journal of Canadian Studies, International Perspectives, and Roundtable. HEATH MACQUARRIE is a political scientist, who before commencing his political career, taught at the University of New Brunswick, McGill, Acadia, Mount Allison, Manitoba, and Brandon; he served in the House of Commons from 1951 until 1979, when he was called to the Senate of Canada. He is a member of the Senate's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. Senator Macquarrie is Public Affairs Chairman of the International Association of Middle Eastern Studies. In addition, he is co-author of Canada and the Third World (1976); and the author of The Conservative Party (1965). PAUL c. NOBLE is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Middle East Studies Program, McGill University. His articles in this volume are part of a larger study on Canada and the Palestinian Question Since 1967. He is also engaged in a study of the Arab state system, a portion of which is to be published in a forthcoming volume on The Foreign Policies of Arab States. Professor Noble is a frequent commentator on Middle Eastern developments for Canadian T.V. and radio networks.

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ROBERT STANFIELD was first elected to the Legislature of Nova Scotia in 1949, served as Premier and Minister of Education from 1956 to 1967, Leader of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada 1967 to 1975. In 1979 he was asked by the Canadian Government to investigate the feasibility of moving Canada's embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and to examine Canadian Middle East policy. After extensive consultations in the area he recommended against such a move and made perceptive and valuable observations on Canada's broader policy issues.

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Introduction Dr. Heath MacQuarrie

ALTHOUGH the Middle East has been one of the world's major areas of tension since the end of World War II, with wars and threats of wars prevalent and frightening, Canada has not given the area a high priority in its foreign policy formulation. However, Canada did play a significant role in the early phases of the establishment of the state of Israel and in peacekeeping operations a few years later. But in the assumption of these roles Canada was not motivated by any great conviction about the Middle East situation; rather, these responsibilities were undertaken primarily because of obligations as a United Nations member. In 1956 Lester Pearson indicated that Canadian leadership in the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping force resulted not from a strong desire to assist the people locked in conflict in the Middle East, but from a wish to extricate Canada's traditional friends and allies, Britain and France, from their folly. Nor has the Canadian public, except for the ardent pro-Israeli groups, shown much sustained interest in the striferidden Middle East. Reflecting this popular view, Canadian politicians have not devoted much time or attention to Middle East matters except in times of serious international crises or partisan domestic controversy. Nor has there been in the academic community any widespread indication of intense interest. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons why Canada's government and people should give a much higher priority to the formulation and development of a realistic policy towards the Middle East. The unfortunate proposal of 1979 to move the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem with all its unhelpful ramifications did serve to dramatize the importance of the Arab world to the Canadian economy. The possibilities for increased commercial contacts are enormous and should not be diminished or foreshortened by inept diplomacy. Even more serious is that Canada has been painfully slow in recog-

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nizing the true inwardness of the so-called Palestinian problem. Canadian political leaders are given to disquisitions on human rights at international fora. In Parliament and in many private organizations of the brightest and best in the land there is recurring concern for the loss of civil rights by people in far-flung countries where freedom is abridged or denied. But compassion seems to be selective. There have been few litanies of complaint about the treatment of the Palestinian people who for over thirty-five years have been the victims of an egregious and sustained repression. For years spokesmen for the Canadian government apparently even found it impossible to use the expression "Palestinians," preferring to designate these unfortunate people as "refugees." Although the character of the United Nations enshrines self-determination of peoples, Canada, one of the founders and most conscientious members of the organization, for many years gave no indication that this right should be for the Palestinians as well as other peoples of the globe. In many parts of the western world there was a slow awakening to the needs of the longsuffering Palestinians, but there is reason for concern and regret that Canada should be among those most reluctant to advocate and support the restoration of rights and the amelioration of wrongs. While primarily an academic gathering in a university setting, the Calgary Conference drew speakers from a wide spectrum of informed and interested Middle East experts. There were inter alia bankers, economists, political scientists, theologians, historians, politicians, and communications experts. Tareq Ismael, in a penetrating analysis of Canadian Foreign Policy since the creation of Israel, discusses the contradictions between our professions of evenhandedness and our constant pro-Israel bias. This is demonstrated in the utterances of Canadian political leaders and by our votes at the United Nations. The Clark Government's proposal to move our embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was not a departure from Canada's long-term policy, but part of our continuing pattern of orientation towards the Arab-Israeli crisis. What was different was the growth of Canada's economic interest in the Arab world. Canadian businessmen, aware of the economic realities, were deeply concerned at the enormity of the losses which could follow such a move. A positive outcome of the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem imbroglio was the quickened public interest and discussion of Canadian policy towards the Middle East. This was cut off by the returned Liberal government's shelving of the Stanfield Report which brought new dimensions to our Middle East analyses and perceptions. Peyton Lyon examines Canada's Mid-East policy against the

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Trudeau Doctrine set out in the Government White Paper of 1970. He argues that our pro-Israel tilt has not served our economic well-being, peace and security, social justice, or the sovereignty and independence of Canada. At the United Nations, Canada is seen as one of Israel's most predictable supporters. On occasion we have outdistanced the United States in our solicitude for Tel Aviv's declared objectives. Lyon, not surprisingly, finds Canada's diplomatic posture to be contrary to our interests and he examines those forces and attitudes in our domestic politics which contribute to this regrettable position. His analysis of our perceptions and performance in reference to the vital Palestinian question is succinct and revealing. It was the crisis of the 1956 Middle East war which brought Canada into its first United Nations peacekeeping role. In his paper, Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns, Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force, presents a clear analysis of the purpose and value of such forces. Reflecting on the aftermath of the highly successful UNEF performance in the region, he notes "we had peacekeeping without peacemaking," an apt comment on most U.N. operations of the kind. Although the need for Canada to diversify its trade patterns is wellknown we have not shown alacrity in developing contacts with the large and expanding Arab economies. As a source for the export of our products, both natural and processed, and the utilization of Canadian technology the Arab world offers much. Dr. Kubursi documents the significant expansion of Canada—Arab trade, but his analysis of concordance indices and trade ratios leads him to conclude that a larger volume is supportable. In the achievement of this along with a better competitive posture there is needed an articulation of a clear political understanding of Arab national aspirations consistent with their new economic reality. At the present time there is throughout the western world a widespread misunderstanding and anxiety about expressions of thought and action in some areas of the Moslem world. Professor Gualtieri carefully examines some of the myths and unfair generalizations which have helped to becloud the issues and diminish the capacity for understanding of Islam. Selecting four areas: the Jihad or Holy war, the penal system, the status of women, and Moslem-Jewish historical relations, he exposes many of the distortions which have proliferated under the aegis of ulterior political motives. Paul Noble, rightfully determining that the solution of the Palestinian question is the essential prerequisite to the achievement of a lasting settlement between the Arab world and Israel, presents the most perceptive and realistic analysis so far of the Canadian approach to this vital aspect of the issue since 1967. In chapters 6 and 7, he documents the slow

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evolution from the perception of the Palestinian problem as essentially a question of refugee disposition to viewing it as a political issue demanding not a humanitarian solution but international political action. Ottawa's slowly growing awareness of the Palestinian fact never did overcome or seriously threaten its pro-Israeli bias. As Noble points out, the Canadian government was never prepared to accord the Palestinians the same basic right which it insisted upon for the Israelis, namely the right to a secure national existence in a state of their own. Alan Bones has produced an insightful account of the immensely powerful and highly efficient pro-Israeli lobby in Canada. In its efforts to prevent the holding of the United Nations Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders scheduled for Toronto in 1975, the Zionist lobby was totally successful. In this they were powerfully aided by Ontario political parties who were not unmindful of the impending provincial elections. Less effective were the lobby's efforts to prevent the U.N.'s Habitat Conference which went ahead as scheduled in Vancouver in 1976. Perhaps the success of their campaign against the Toronto meeting marred their efforts to prevent the Vancouver gathering to which PLO representatives had also been invited by the United Nations. Bones quotes a cabinet minister who after the campaign against the Toronto meeting expressed misgivings at the government of Canada having been "almost dictated to" by an ethnic lobby. In a careful, dispassionate account of the Jerusalem embassy imbroglio which plagued the short-lived Clark government, Bones notes that the Progressive Conservatives were trying harder to influence the Canadian Zionists than the Zionists were trying to influence the Progressive Conservative Party. Although the proposal to move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem proved painful to the new Prime Minister and his government, Mr. Clark made early and wise remedial efforts. In appointing his predecessor, Robert Stanfield, as Ambassador Extraordinary to visit the region and study the broader questions of Canada's relations with the Middle East, he called the best possible person to take on the difficult task. In promptly accepting Stanfield's interim report, Mr. Clark raised the level of his own government's perception of the Middle East issue. The final Stanfield Report is a most mature and balanced statement and one wonders why the Trudeau government did not adopt it and give it the status it deserves as the minimum intellectual and moral commitment on the Middle East issue to which Canada subscribes. Robert Stanfield, former Progressive Conservative leader and acknowledged elder statesman, participated in the Calgary conference

INTRODUCTION

5

and his usual reasoned and sensitive analysis of recent events constitutes valuable updating of the report submitted to the government which utilized his services in the course of Middle East policy evolution. Since the Calgary conference a number of traumatic and portentous events have occurred in the Middle East; Israel's massive invasion of Lebanon, the horrors of Sabra and Chatila, the Reagan plan, the Fez summit, the decline of oil prices, the sustained Iraq-Iran war, to name a few. But the basic elements of the continuing Middle East crisis are with us still and the analysis of the situation presented at the conference remains essentially valid and valuable.

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CHAPTER 1

Canadian foreign policy in the Arab world: an overview Dr. Tareq Y. Ismael

PRIME MINISTER Joe Clark, in his first news conference in June 1979, affirmed his election promise to move Canada's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He did not anticipate the strong reactions both in the Middle East and in Canada and subsequently admitted that he did not comprehend the magnitude of the issues involved. Surprisingly enough, however, this was not Canada's first time to be singed by blundering too close to the Arab-Israeli fires, not recognizing its own systematic bias and insensitivity to the issues involved. This was shown when war broke out in the Middle East on 6 October 1973. Canada's policy-makers were faced with a situation they neither expected nor for which they had any contingency plans. Canada's position was one of ambivalence; on one hand much of the mass media accused the Arabs of unprovoked aggression; while on the other, Canadian diplomats in the United Nations and in Ottawa made pious statements of Canada's neutrality and offered once again to participate in any Middle East peacekeeping force. The questions surrounding Canada's participation in the October War are many. However, the main issues seemed to be: what was Canada's position on the fighting, should or could a Canadian peacekeeping force be sent, how did oil affect Canada's position vis-a-vis the Arab world and, finally, was Canada what she claimed to be—a neutral in thought, word, and deed?

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In order to understand Canada's position at the time, Canada's pre1973 Middle Eastern policy should be reviewed. When the Palestine issue was brought to the attention of the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on 28 April 1947, the under-secretary of External Affairs, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, headed the Canadian delegation and was the Chairman of the Political Committee, thus beginning a long-time Canadian involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. From that point on, Canada was involved in every United Nations effort to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. This role was summarized by Mr. Paul Martin, then secretary of state for External Affairs, when he spoke before the 5th Emergency Special Session of the U.N. on 23 June 1967: My country has been closely associated with United Nations efforts to mediate in Palestine. A Canadian served on the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine in 1947. Canada was associated with negotiations which subsequently took place at the third session of the Assembly and which led to the resolution of November 29, 1947. We served on the Security Council in 1948-49, when the Palestine question was among the most important to be considered and when the armistice agreements were arranged. We provided one of the early directors general of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and, a little later, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, to which we have contributed observers since 1954. The present Prime Minister of Canada, Lester Pearson, took an intimate part in the negotiations which led to the establishment of UNEF. Canada supplied the first Commander, General Burns, and a sizeable contingent to the Force. 1

Canada was on the original 1948 United Nations Commission whose job it was to partition Palestine. Later, Canada was among the first to recognize the new state of Israel which incorporated much of the Arab portion of Palestine. Canada shipped large quantities of arms to the Middle East; however, 95 per cent of the sales were to Israel. While in the Commons there was considerable debate over the shipment of ancient Harvard trainers to Egypt in 1955, the proposed sale of 24 F-86 jet fighters to Israel received scarcely any notice. In 1956, Canada voted with the United States and the Soviet Union in condemning the action of Britain and France in Egypt, and it was Lester Pearson who devised a plan to establish a United Nations peacekeeping force to maintain the truce. Egypt welcomed the Canadians and Canadian prestige in the Middle East was never higher. In 1967, however, Canada resisted the demand of President Nasser to pull UNEF forces out of Egypt. It was this action which cast doubt on Canadian's neutrality. During the following war, Canada's politicians and press overwhelmingly supported the Israeli side. Af-

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ter the war, the Canadian press invariably presented the Israeli side of affairs as the truth while much doubt was cast on Arab press releases.2 Throughout the period from 1968 to 1973, Arab oil became more important to eastern Canada. By 1973, it accounted for 25 per cent of Canadian oil imports and 46 per cent by 1975. In those years, Canada publicly expressed its continuing interest in the area; yet there were no Canadian embassies or even consulates in the oil-producing Arab states. When the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war broke out, Canada attempted to apply the formulas and strategies developed through the previous Middle East crises. Immediately following the outbreak of war, Mitchell Sharp, then secretary of state for External Affairs, issued a statement calling for a ceasefire and expressing the hope that the dispute would be submitted to the United Nations. He further stated that a settlement should be based on Resolution 242 of the Security Council. On 8 October he stated that reports indicated that the fighting was started by the Egyptians and Syrians; however, he noted the important issue was to stop the fighting. Canada, he announced, was contacting the great powers in an attempt to use United Nations machinery to stop the war. On 10 October, a Department of External Affairs spokesman was reported to have stated that Canada would take part in any peacekeeping operation in the area—this only four days after the war had started and without being asked.3 Press opinion in this period appeared strongly pro-Israeli. Much of this opinion reached the Arab embassies and provided an indication of Canada's pro-Israeli sympathies. Meanwhile, on 11 October, Mr. Sharp issued a statement denying the report that Canada would send troops to the area and said a peacekeeping force would only be dispatched if both sides would agree to a definite peace. By the 15th of October, the smoke of battle had more or less cleared with Israel poised to defeat Syria in the north and a bloody stalemate in Sinai. In the Commons, Robert Stanfield, leader of the Opposition, raised the question whether or not Canada would be willing to send a peacekeeping force. Mr. Sharp replied Canada would participate in a U.N. operation; he also said he would not wish to exaggerate the part Canada would play in any such settlement. Also on the 15th, Egypt reacted to statements in the Canadian press by issuing an angry statement condemning Canada's biased stand. Apparently anticipating a significant Canadian role in accordance with Canada's role in the past Middle East crises, on the 16th of October the House of Commons met for a special debate on the Middle East. Mr. Sharp opened the debate by noting it was the government's policy that any lasting settlement must be based on Resolution 242 of the Security Council as it alone had received wide acceptance; it was the Government's policy that Israel had the right to

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exist behind secure and recognized boundaries. On peacekeeping, he stated: "we could envisage a contribution to peacekeeping if desired and required by the parties as well as the continuation of peace observation operations." M.P. Claude Wagner, the Conservative Party foreign affairs critic, stated that policy must be based on the principle of Israel's right to exist, and he maintained that it would be impossible for Canada to maintain a perfect balance between the two warring sides. The spokesman for the New Democratic party, Mr. Brewin, concurred with Mr. Sharp that only Resolution 242 could form a basis for peace. Meanwhile in the press, speculation had begun on what form the inevitable peacekeeping force would take. It should be noted that Canada had not yet been asked to contribute to a peacekeeping force and a cease-fire was not yet in effect. By 22 October, the initiative for peace was clearly in the hands of the big powers who succeeded in arranging a cease-fire between the states. The war could not have continued much longer in any case owing to the extreme depletion of the arms of both sides. Ottawa apparently assumed that with the cease-fire would come peacekeeping with automatic Canadian participation. A debate was scheduled in the House for that same day. The debate began with the secretary of state for External Affairs stating how much he welcomed the call for a cease-fire by the Security Council. Mr. Sharp stated that Canada would consider participation in any force that could in his view play a useful role. He had dropped his earlier demand that such a force would only be sent if profitable negotiations were undertaken. M.P. Macquarrie (Conservative, P.E.I.) noted that the Conservatives would welcome the creation of such a force. This feeling was affirmed by spokesmen for the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.) and the Social Credit Party. On the 25th of October the leader of the opposition asked if Canada would participate in a U.N. peacekeeping operation. In fact, the External Affairs Department was struggling to "get Canada in." On the 26th it became clear in the House that Canada had not been asked to contribute to the force and that Egypt had probably objected to Canada's participation. Outside the House, the press was raising serious objections of its own to sending a Canadian contingent. The Globe and Mail stated in an editorial that the experience of Vietnam and the damage done to Canada's reputation there should surely have dampened Canadian enthusiasm for peacekeeping.4 Finally on the 28th of October, after Canada's public announcement that an airborne brigade was ready to be sent, the secretary general forwarded a request to Canada for troops.5 Canada announced it would give the request the "most urgent consideration." On the 30th of October Mitchell Sharp reported in the House that Canada would participate on the following:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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Full backing of the Security Council. Full cooperation of the parties involved. Function as an integrated and efficient military unit. Enjoy full freedom of movement and communication. Be granted all relevant privileges and immunities.

The minister added that the government had agreed to participate for the initial six-month period. On 9 November a news analysis of the situation by a noted foreign affairs expert, John Gellner, criticized the government for allowing itself to become involved in yet another peacekeeping effort. 6 He said, however, that it would be difficult to break with such a long and distinguished tradition of involvement. In mid-November it became apparent that Canada was not wanted by Egypt partly as a result of its performance in 1967 and partly because it felt Canada was an extension of the United States. Throughout November, it became more apparent that Canada had to talk the U.N. into including her. 7 On the ninth, for example, it was reported that only a personal call from the secretary general to President Sadat had saved Canada's international face. 8 Articles in the Globe entitled "Canada Goes Abegging" and "Begging for UNEF Role" in the Calgary Herald reflected this view. The Government was also attacked severely in the House by Tory critic Claude Wagner who argued that the government had tarnished Canada's image. He further charged that submitting it to scrutiny by the USSR and Egypt was demeaning in the utmost.9 Poland, it was later announced, had been included to balance the supposedly pro-Western influence of Canada. Canada's problem in securing inclusion in peacekeeping operations with the attendant charges of External Affairs bungling were mirrored in another major controversy which emerged as a result of the war: was Canada the victim of an oil embargo or was it not? If Canada was on an Arab League blacklist, why was it? The first questions were raised in Parliament on 17 October, shortly after the first announcements of oil embargoes on nations friendly to Israel. Mr. Stanfield asked whether the government had contingency plans to cope with the prospect of an Arab embargo against Canada. Energy Minister Macdonald replied that Canada had a 45 day supply of crude oil and a 100 day supply of heating oil. He noted that the market for oil was tight and Canadian buyers had encountered difficulty. He further announced that he would attempt to secure Venezuelan oil on a short-term agreement; but he had no success and warned of possible rationing. Following announcements by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) that

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countries friendly to Israel could expect to be cut off from oil shipments, the government attempted to get clarification. On the 24th of October it was reported that American companies were diverting tankers of Arab oil to New York.10 Mr. Macdonald responded to queries from the press and parliamentarians that he could not confirm the report, although coincidentally he had met with U.S. Energy Advisor John Love on the same day. 11 On the 25th it was reported in the Globe and Mail that Abu Dhabi had stopped a shipment of oil to Canada. Mr. Macdonald commented, there was no reason to expect a cutback. "Our people take the line that Canada does not take an anti-Arab line. We were very friendly to Israel but that does not mean we are against the Arabs."12 Later that day, in the House, Mr. Stanfield accused the government of misleading the people by telling them that the oil boycott was not directed against Canada. On 26 October the government said that it had heard varying reports about the state of affairs in Saudi Arabia, but that it was now confirmed that Abu Dhabi had stopped a shipment of oil. Mr. Sharp expressed in the House his inability to comprehend the Arab states' action. The following day the Arab Information Centre in Ottawa, in response to queries by reporters, replied that the Canadian government had taken the same stand as that of Holland which had been cut off from oil shipments.13 On the same day the Egyptian ambassador to Canada, Ahmed Sabri Kamal, complained of the pro-Israeli bias of the Canadian press and stated the Arabs merely wished to see Canada become what it claimed to be, namely, neutral. 14 On 29 October, Mr. Macdonald repeated that he did not know of any Arab state other than Abu Dhabi which was cutting off oil supplies to Canada. However, on 1 November, the Egyptian ambassador to the United Nations, Neguid Said, stated that unless Canada took positive steps to change its policy it could expect continuing disruption of oil shipments.15 Mr. Sharp initially thought that the suspension of oil shipments was a mistake because their destination was Portland, Maine, where the Canadian pipeline is located. Arthur Blakely, in an article published on 7 November, aptly summed it up when he referred to Canadian Ostrich Diplomacy. Canada had no representation in any of the oil producing nations with the exception of Iran; furthermore, Mr. Sharp was unable to fathom how the Arab states could view Canada as anything but neutral. In fact, in Arab eyes Canada was a fence-sitting neutral that tried to duck the whole issue. 16 The granting of permanent observer status in the U.N. to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) set the stage for a major controversy in Canada the following year. Canada was scheduled to host a United Nations crime conference in Toronto in September 1975. The accordance of observer status to the PLO gave it the right to attend United

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Nations conferences in an official capacity. Nonetheless, Premier William Davis of Ontario, in an obvious effort to win Jewish votes in a forthcoming provincial election, challenged the PLO's attendance at the conference. The Ontario government and Jewish organizations brought pressure on the federal government to bar entry of PLO delegates to the conference. However, acceptance to host a United Nations conference is unconditional, with neither the conference agenda nor participants subject to the host country's discretion. The Canadian cabinet, in a transparent attempt to forestall any policy decision, requested that the conference be postponed for one year. This was in effect a cancellation of the conference since it was recognized that the United Nations was unlikely to accept such a postponement. Indeed, the United Nations Committee on Conferences did not even vote on the Canadian request for postponement. Rather, the original conference schedule was maintained and the site was changed to Geneva. The postponement strategy, however, did serve to allay domestic pressures to exclude the PLO, while at the same time preserving Canada's right to host a United Nations conference on housing (Habitat) scheduled to be held in Vancouver in 1976. Had Canada opted to either bar the PLO or cancel the conference, such a move would have abrogated the scheduling of the Vancouver meeting. As a Globe and Mail editorial of 23 June 1975 pointedly asked, however, if the PLO decides to come to Vancouver, will the government be any more prepared to take a stand then? The Canada-Israel Committee (the main Zionist lobby on foreign policy founded in 1967 by the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canadian Zionist Federation, and the B'nai B'rith) and the Canadian Jewish Congress, (CJC, founded in 1919 to co-ordinate Jewish community organizations and fund-raising and to act as a pressure group for Jewish interests) again put intense pressure on the government to deny the PLO entrance into Canada to attend Habitat. But the campaign was not successful. Fearing public backlash against the CJC for attempting to undermine Canada's commitment to the United Nations, the chairman of the board of the CJC announced that "we have made our representations, and have found that the government is on a course from which there is no turning back, that Habitat will be held and the PLO will attend, it's pointless to keep arguing against it."17 The government's acquiescence to domestic pressures vis-a-vis the Toronto conference revealed clearly Canada's inability to come to terms with its brokerage role in the Middle East as a neutral mediator supporting United Nations efforts in the area. While newspaper editorialists lamented this undermining of Canadian support for the United Nations and senior diplomats in the Department of External Affairs regarded the

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decision to effectively cancel the crime conference as a betrayal of Canada's 30-year commitment to the United Nations, the decision actually reflected the consistency of the Canadian approach to the Middle East, based as it is on pragmatism rather than policy and embodying a clear support for one side orientation rather than neutrality. Further confirming the basic Canadian commitment to the cause of Zionism was the government's consternation over the United Nations resolution calling Zionism a form of racism, passed by the General Assembly on 11 November 1975. The resolution passed by a vote of 73 to 35 with 35 abstentions and three absences, in effect reflecting Third World support and Western rejection of the resolution. Canadian and United States representatives in the United Nations denounced the resolution in (strongly worded) speeches. In an unprecedented move, the Canadian House of Commons on 12 November unanimously condemned the resolution as dangerous to the survival of the world organization and charged the "ganging-up of countries—notably African—to pass resolutions contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter."18 In January 1976, the secretary of state for External Affairs, Allan J. MacEachen, toured the following countries in the Middle East: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and Israel. The purpose of the trip was to reaffirm ties with Israel while attempting to strengthen relations with the Arab countries. MacEachen took the position that Canada could pursue bilateral relations with Arab countries "independently of the Middle East conflict, a conflict which may in the past have clouded our perception of the general willingness and the opportunities that exist to expand and strengthen our relations with that part of the world."19 However, in an interview this author had with a high-ranking official of the Iraqi Foreign Office, it appears that Iraq, for one, did not consider that bilateral relations could be separated from Canada's position on Middle East conflict. Nor did Iraq accept Canada's contention that its policy "aims at balance and objectivity."20 Rather, to the progressive Arab countries Canada's position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict was closely allied with that of the United States and was highly partisan toward Israel. Canada's desire to improve bilateral relations with Arab countries was directly related to the rapidly increasing economic potential of these nations as a result of petrodollar accumulation and to Canada's growing dependence on Arab oil. Writing in 1973 on Canada's relations with the Middle East, I noted that Canada had no compelling economic interests in the Middle East. 21 Rather, Canadian involvement in the area since 1947 had focussed directly on the Arab-Israeli conflict due to Canada's role in the United Nations. Since 1947, the Canadian position on the ArabIsraeli conflict has been neither neutral nor objective, but fundamentally

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Table 1 Canadian trade with Arab countries, 1970-1978 in million U.S. dollars YEAR

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

EXPORTS

24.6 49.5 135.3 240.0 912.1 1100.7 997.9 756.9 896.9

IMPORTS

59.7 133.5 87.6 113.8 276.8 239.0 271.9 645.9 734.7

Source: General Secretariat, League of Arab States; Total Value of Exports and Imports of Individual Arab Countries to Each Country of North and South America and the World, 1970-1979. (Tunis: General Department for Economic Affairs, Statistics Division, 1980).

partisan to Zionism. Canadian neutrality, then, was more an artifact of the lack of pursuit of national interests in the Middle East than objectivity vis-a-vis the conflict. This changed rapidly in the mid-seventies, however. By 1979, Canada was heavily dependent on Arab oil and had a growing economic interest in the Arab countries. This is reflected in Table 1. Returning from a tour of the Middle East in May 1973, the minister of finance, John Turner, noted that Canadian businessmen were missing great opportunities in the Middle East.22 By the mid-seventies, an increasing number of Canadian economic and trade missions were going to the Arab world to tap further the tremendous economic resources of the area. Between 1970 and 1980, trade between Canada and the Arab world increased twentyfold and was predicted to double again by 1985. Responding to growing interest, Canada opened new embassies in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Today Canada has real national interests at stake in the Middle East, and a repetition of either the 1973 oil boycott or an Arab-Israeli war that would disrupt trade relations would affect the Canadian economy significantly. In fact, the Canadian business community has become increasingly sensitive to the Arab blacklist (companies dealing with Israel are blacklisted from dealing in the Arab world). With real interests involved, Canada can ill afford to pursue so-called principles with the apparent disinterest for Middle East outcomes that prior to 1973 were the hallmark of her policy. By 1978 it was a moot question whether Canada could indeed strengthen bilateral relations with Arab nations while supporting Israel's position on questions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The process of increasing interaction with the Arab world and the better communications that were a result provided Canada with a broader perspective on

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the issues involved and a greater understanding of the Arab position. Also, as Canadian economic interests in the Arab world increased, it appeared that Canada would pursue policies more protective of national interests than abstract causes. On the other hand, for Arab nations, the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be so easily separated from issues of bilateral relations. For many of the Arab nations, the issues involved are at the very core of national survival, political stability, and economic development. How these nations view Canada's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict will affect their willingness to improve bilateral relations. Increasingly, Arab nations are looking to attitudes manifest in a nation's political leaders and assessing whether there is bias or balance, rather than to the platitudes of foreign office officials. Every day Canada's political leaders and press document the nation's prejudice against the Arab peoples, ignorance of the basic issues involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the strength of the Zionist lobby in consolidating a negative image of the Arab world. In a study of Arab images in Canadian media, Marie Choquet, a communciations consultant, observed that the mass media in Canada has created a pro-Israeli bias in the reporting of Middle East news events. Attributing this to a powerful Jewish lobby, heavy reliance on American news reporting, and journalistic ignorance of the Arab world, Ms. Choquet concluded that the media reduce the complex issues of the Middle East to black-and-white, simplistic, good-and-bad-guy stories.23 Only a few examples need be cited here. In 1976 the newly elected leader of the opposition, Joe Clark, in a speech to the annual conference of the Canada-Israel Committee, strongly condemned the Moslem block and its Communist allies for trying to oust Israel from the United Nations. He accused the Arabs and the Soviet Union of an unending barrage of racist and narrow-minded diplomatic maneuvering at the U.N. 24 Arab embassies in Ottawa would report to their governments Clark's ignorance and prejudice towards the Arab peoples. The cancellation of the crime conference scheduled for Toronto in September 1975 because of PLO representation, the Globe and Mail false headline story on 27 October 1975 about Arab terriorist plans to sabotage the Montreal Olympics, and the unprecedented House of Commons unanimous condemnation on 12 November 1975 of the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism are further examples that within Canada there has been little balance or objectivity regarding issues vital to the Arab world. As Canada intensified its efforts to strengthen relations with the Arab nations, they in return showed more interest in Canada's position on these issues. Arab diplomats in Ottawa and the Middle East capitals, whom I interviewed in 1978 and 1982, expressed scepticism regarding

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Canada's ability to be balanced and neutral in the Middle East when there was clear evidence of strong partisanship expressed at home. Thus, Prime Minister Clark's commitment to move Canada's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem did not mark a departure from Canada's long-term policy. Rather, it emerged from a continuous pattern of Canada's orientation toward the Arab-Israeli crisis. What had changed, however, was the scope of Canadian economic interests in the Arab world. One official in the Canadian Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce estimated that Arab economic retaliation would cost Canada 55,700 jobs and 1.6 billion dollars worth of petroleum imports.25 The total cost in lost economic opportunities and cancelled contracts is unknown but estimates range from three to five billion dollars. In addition, Canadian prestige has certainly suffered among nonaligned nations, as expressed at their summit meeting in Havana in September 1979, where a resolution was passed that nonaligned nations take firm measures against any country that transfers its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 26 The reverberations of the embassy issue, then, were felt directly in Canada's economic community, which in turn brought intensive pressure to bear on the Conservative government. Prime Minister Clark attempted to defuse the controversy by appointing Robert Stanfield, a respected statesman, politician, and former leader of the Conservative party, to investigate the feasibility of the embassy move and make recommendations to the government. After touring the area for a month, Mr. Stanfield recommended on 29 October 1979 that the government drop the proposed move. The Prime Minister accepted the recommendation, on the same day stating that no action would be taken on the location of the Canadian embassy until the status of Jerusalem was clarified within a comprehensive agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. 27 In his final report, submitted on 20 February 1980, Mr. Stanfield recommended: In my view, to play a useful role in the Middle East and exercise what influence we can, commensurate with our resources, we must have the respect of the governments and peoples of the region. To encourage moderation and conciliation we must be regarded as fair-minded by the parties. This means primarily that positions we take should have as their objective the goals of justice and reconciliation.28

In fact, the issue may have helped to clear the air. For the first time, the Canadian public had a direct input into Canada's Middle East policy, Canadian foreign policy-makers were forced to address the real issues in

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the area and to frame Canadian policy in terms of national interest. As Robert Stanfield's final report stated: Trade between Canada and the Middle East and North Africa has grown rapidly in recent years. In view of increasing wealth and development in that region based on oil and gas it offers good prospects for further growth. Widespread Canadian interest in doing business in these countries is for the most part relatively recent, but even at present the area represents the fifth largest market for our exports. In percentage terms the region has been our highest growth area for exports during the past decade. In the first ten months of 1979 our merchandise exports alone totalled over $850 million. In addition during the same period Canadian corporations were involved in service contracts valued at over $400 million. Already a significant number of Canadian firms, aided by the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, are active in market development in the region. Most of this effort is in sophisticated manufactured products and services, the export of which is of special significance to the Canadian economy. Many Middle Eastern and North African countries have launched a concerted program of infrastructure development. There is, as a result, good export potential for Canadian managerial, design and engineering skills.29

The government of Joe Clark was shortlived, and the Liberals returned to power in February 1980. Pierre Trudeau, again prime minister, continued the tradition that characterized Canadian policy in the Middle East for the previous fourteen years. The Stanfield Report was buried and Middle East policy was relegated to closed door politics. This is typified by External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan's response to a reporter's query as to whether he thought the Palestinians should have a homeland: "our position is that we don't have a position on that as such. We believe that, um, the um, that Israel's right to self-determination should be guaranteed and, uh, and to its, and to its boundaries and its independence as a state and that, um, uh, the Camp David process should be followed to its logical conclusion."30 The reversion to policy goals that are not directly related to Middle East outcomes but are formulated to enhance objectives in other spheres—principally Europe and the United States—is exemplified in the disjunction between policy statements and action. In an address before the 36th regular session of the United Nations on 21 September 1981, for example, MacGuigan stated: In the Middle East, there is also conflict, and at its centre the Arab-Israeli dispute, as old as the U.N. itself. We cannot afford further delay in moving towards a negotiated settlement to this generations-old conflict, in which all the interested parties must participate. Israelis and Palestinians have

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19

legitimate rights and concerns which must be taken into account. Israel's quest for security and recognized boundaries, and the right to be fully accepted by its neighbours, can be met only in a political, not a military, framework. The same holds true for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland within a clearly-defined territory, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. I therefore urge all the parties concerned to summon the vision and will required to make decisions which are as necessary as they are difficult. Among the areas where progress is urgently needed, none is more pressing than measures to ensure that the Middle East will remain free of nuclear weapons.31

In spite of the official pronouncements, Canada voted against a United Nations General Assembly nonbinding resolution on 5 February 1982 calling for sanctions against Israel's annexation of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. Three months later, on 28 April 1982, Canada again voted against a United Nations resolution that urged all governments to recognize the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, to condemn Israel as an aggressor with regard to its treatment of the Arab population in occupied territories and its annexation of occupied Arab territory, and to renounce governments providing Israel with military, economic, and political assistance to carry out its aggressive policies. In October 1983, Exernal Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen made a ten-day trip to the Middle East. During the course of that trip he reiterated the Canadian policy that "Israel shouldn't have invaded Lebanon and should withdraw unilaterally now. . . . Israeli settlement on the West Bank should be stopped and negotiations launched for a Palestinian homeland."32 The Zionist lobby in Canada was so incensed by MacEachen's comments that MacEachen had to request an urgent meeting with the Canada-Israel Committee to alleviate their concerns.33 Before questioning in the House of Commons, MacEachen revealed that Canadian government officials had had contacts from time to time with PLO representatives. Furthermore, he reported, "I was considering the possibility of upgrading those contacts," but noted that "with the struggle which is currently going on within the PLO . . . the time is not quite propitious to give implementation to that particular policy question."34 By March 1984, MacEachen had considerably modified his position. Speaking to a Canada-Israel Committee meeting, he was careful not to criticize Israel. Commenting on this presentation, the distinguished Canadian journalist John R. Walker of Southam News observed: "MacEachen was at his ambiguous best, having listened earlier to many Jewish complaints about his frank talk during his Mid-East trip last November."35

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The Jerusalem episode during Prime Minister Joe Clark's administration made explicit and public the orientation of Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East. The prime minister's commitment to move the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem represented a logical extension of Canadian policy in the area over the last three decades. However, such an extension threw off the facade of Canadian neutrality that had always covered the orientation of Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East. This occurred at a time when Canadian interests in the area were rapidly expanding. As a result of this contradiction, the administration faced strong domestic opposition to the intended move and the policy entered the arena of public debate. Ambassador Robert Stanfield's mission re-examined Canadian Middle East policy in the light of Middle East issues and Canadian interests. Whether or not the Clark administration would have changed the direction of Canadian policy in the area in line with Stanfield's recommendations or reverted to the traditional disguise of neutrality is an academic question. The return of the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau in February 1980 resulted in the shelving of the Stanfield Report and the reversion to traditional policy. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, brought the issue of Middle East policy to the forefront of national attention. While Prime Minister Trudeau responded to the spectacle of Israel's devastation of Lebanon with letters of cautious condemnation to Prime Minister Begin, Canadian MPs from all parties began to publicly question the apparent bias in Canadian policy and to demand concrete action on the part of the government in opposing the invasion and recognizing Palestinian rights.36 The party leaders, like the government, carefully avoided the controversial issue of Palestinian rights. Nevertheless, the increasing alarm of many MPs over Israel's flagrant aggression and Canada's flagrant evasion of action motivated lively debate in the House of Commons. For example, Liberal MP Ron Irwin, filling in for External Affairs Minister Mark MacGuigan in the House on 30 July 1982, responded to a question from Conservative MP Robert Wenman regarding the government's position on Palestinian rights: "I think Canadians would want us to show the same compassion to Palestinians that we have traditionally shown to Israelis. We, therefore, do support a homeland for Palestinians. That, I think, is what Canadians would want this government to do and that is what the government is doing."37 But it was not what the government was doing. In fact, the government was simply waiting out the crisis. While the pro-Israel bias of Canadian policy was being debated in the House, it was being defended in the cabinet by four ministers—Solicitor-General Bob Kaplan, Industry

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21

Minister Herb Gray (both prominent Canadian Zionists), Environment Minister John Roberts, and Minister of State Jack Austin.38 This bias prevented the government from taking any unequivocal public position on the issue of Palestinian rights and any concrete action in protest of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, even in the face of substantial pressure within its own party. Liberal MP Ian Watson observed that all but two or three of the 73 members of the Liberal Party's Quebec caucus and between 60 and 70 percent of Ontario Liberal MPs were sympathetic to the Palestinians.39 The massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps in September 1982 could not even elicit a unanimous expression from the House of "its disgust for those forces that were responsible for this slaughter and urge upon them a policy of restraint so as to ensure that the innocent lives of men, women, children and babies will not again be taken in either revenge or malice."40 Even the simple expression of humanitarian concern for the Palestinian people had intense partisan dimensions. In the Globe and Mail on 16 March 1985, Sheldon E. Gordan, a foreign affairs analyst for the Globe editorial board, discussed Israel's well-organized propaganda strategy on the Canadian media accordingly: "After the Lebanon War, a succession of Israeli academics and journalists descended on, among others, the Globe and Mail, to try to limit the damage done to Israel's image by Begin and former defence minister Ariel Sharon. Most of the Israeli visitors had prominent anti-Government credentials, which they used to reinforce their credibility in background sessions with editors and writers. This is a democratic subtlety which authoritarian Arab states do not dare to duplicate." Nevertheless, there is open debate about Canadian Middle East policy. It is now perhaps possible to question Israeli policy in the occupied Arab territories and to support Palestinian rights without being labelled anti-Semitic. Some prominent Canadians like Robert Stanfield have taken public positions in support of the rights of Palestinians. A Middle East Studies Group, made up of parliamentarians, academics, ex-diplomats, journalists, and other Canadians, has organized to provide information and policy advice on the Middle East to counter Zionist propaganda. In late 1982, the Standing Senate committee on Foreign Affairs initiated hearings on Canadian Middle East policy. For two years the committee held hearings, accepted submissions, and invited testimony, culminating its investigation with a visit to five countries in the Middle East—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Israel—from 11 November to 18 November 1983. In its final hearing, the committee in-

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vited the PLO Permanent Observer to the United Nations, Zehdi Terzi, to be the final witness. The invitation caused a furor of protest in the Canadian Zionist community and the Canadian press, focussing public attention on the committee for the first time. There were subsequent efforts by several members of Parliament to pressure the committee to cancel the invitation. An editorial in The Citizen (Ottawa) on 5 April 1984, described this as a "self-serving cheap shot" aimed at stifling "testimony to be delivered to a Parliamentary committee just because it's being given by the representative of a body that Jewish people everywhere detest." According to the Toronto Star (5 April 1984), Tory leader, Brian Mulroney, called the invitation "most inappropriate" and "insensitive" to the feelings of Canadian Jews; Pierre Trudeau, on the other hand, defended the invitation on the grounds that it was not possible to draw any conclusions about problems in the Middle East "without at least listening to one representative from one Palestinian organization." In contrast to the coverage given to the invitation, Terzi's testimony went virtually unnoticed, like most of the proceedings of the committee. The committee's final report, made public on 5 June 1985, advocated a more evenhanded policy in the Middle East and an active Canadian role in the peace process. The Globe and Mail of 6 June outlined the following recommendations made as part of the peace proposal: withdrawal of Jewish settlements from Israeli-occupied territories; an end to the PLO's "use of terrorism" and an end to "anti-Arab violence by Jewish extremist groups"; an international peace conference at a later date involving Israel, neighboring Arab states, the Soviet Union, and the United States; the easing of Israel government restrictions on Palestinians; informal talks between Israel and the PLO; and an end to harsh and provocative declarations by both Israel and the PLO. The committee's final report did not make any recommendations for radical departure from current Canadian policy. Nevertheless, the committee process reflects that the wall of silence and fac. ade of consensus on Canadian policy in the Middle East is no longer a tenable policy tool. Furthermore, the influence of powerful pressure groups in hindering open debate of the fundamental issues in the Middle East conflict— Palestinian rights, West Bank occupation, and colonization, the Lebanese invasion—are matters of public record. The September 1984 elections brought Progressive Conservative leader, Brian Mulroney, to power with a massive majority in Parliament. Joe Clark, the new government's minister of state for External Affairs, made his first major foreign policy statement before the U.N. General Assembly on 25 September 1984. He did not signal any substantive changes or new initiatives in Canada's policy in the Middle East. How-

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ever, it is noteworthy that the issue of Palestinian rights was clearly articulated along side the issue of Israeli rights as fundamental policy premises. The Palestinian problem had at least established a clear recognition in Canadian policy. Clark declared: We strongly support a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute based on Security Council Resolution 242, which provides for the right of all states, including Israel, to live within secure and recognized boundaries. We also support the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland within a clearly-defined territory, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.41

Shortly thereafter, former Ontario N.D.P. leader, Stephen Lewis, was appointed Canadian ambassador to the United Nations. Because Lewis was considered an active and ardent Zionist among Arab diplomats in Ottawa and at the U.N., this appointment was viewed as an affirmation to Israel of continuing Canadian support as Mulroney promised in his election campaign. In mid-March 1985, Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzak Shamir visited Canada. After talks with Prime Minister Mulroney, Shamir suggested to the press that an embassy move to Jerusalem was being entertained. In a subsequent news conference, Mulroney strongly denied any consideration by the government of such a move. As a result, the Council of Arab Ambassadors in Ottawa issued a press release on 18 March 1985, expressing appreciation for the prime minister's statement of a clear position regarding the relocation of the Canadian Embassy in Israel, stating: "This position reflects a sound and fair awareness of the legal status of the City of Jerusalem in conformity with the international law and the United Nations resolutions." In May 1985, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark released an External Affairs discussion paper, "Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations," to initiate a review of Canadian foreign policy. The paper noted that Canadian policy in the Middle East is based upon the following (p. 9): —Canadians have a profound interest in peace in the Middle East, for reasons of general international security, including security of oil supply, the welfare of the state of Israel and of its Arab neighbours and Canadians' extensive family ties with communities in the region. —For these reasons, we have persisted in seeking to persuade parties to regional conflicts to negotiate settlements of their differences. —Much as we cannot hope to exercise decisive influence, our willingness in

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the past to contribute to peace efforts has provided a basis for a mediating role. -Canada strongly supports a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute based on Security Council Resolution 242, which provides for the right of all states, including Israel, to live within secure and recognized boundaries. We also support the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland within a clearly-defined territory, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. -Total Canadian exports to the Middle East are in the order of $3 billion annually, but our share of the market remains very small. Substantial expansion of exports should be attainable. -Our major markets have been the oil-producing states. Important commercial exchanges have followed from the CIDA development co-operation program in Egypt. With adequate financing, it should be possible to develop markets in other countries. -The Canadian share of Arab investment abroad is small. There is scope for improvement. Notes 1. External Affairs (published by Canada's Department of External Affairs), XIX (August 1967): 310. 2. See T. Y. Ismael, "Canada and the Middle East," in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (eds.), Canada and the Third World (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 240276. 3. Globe and Mail, 10 October 1973. 4. Globe and Mail, 26 October 1973. Editorial. 5. Globe and Mail, 24 October 1973 and 29 October 1973. 6. Globe and Mail, 9 November 1973. 7. Globe and Mail, 7 November 1973 and Calgary Herald, 15 November 1973. 8. Globe and Mail, 9 November 1973. 9. Globe and Mail, 15 November 1973. 10. Globe and Mail, 24 October 1973. 11. Ibid. 12. Globe and Mail, 27 October 1973. 13. Ibid. 14. Globe and Mail, 29 October 1973. 15. Calgary Herald, 7 November 1973. 16. Ibid. 17. Vancouver Sun, 6 February 1976. 18. Globe and Mail, 13 November 1975. 19. From an address delivered to the Tenth Annual Convention of the Canadian Arab Federation, Edmonton, Alberta, 16 May 1976. 20. Ibid. 21. "Canada and the Middle East," in Behind the Headlines, 32, No. 5 (December, 1973): 1-2 22. Globe and Mail, 3 May 1975. 23. Globe and Mail, 24 June 1981.

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE ARAB WORLD 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

25

Globe and Mail, 30 April 1976. Calgary Herald, 8 June 1979. Globe and Mail, 10 September 1979. Globe and Mail, 30 October 1979. Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa (Ottawa: 1980), p. 14. Ibid., p. 21. Ottawa Journal, 18 June 1980. Statements and Speeches, No. 81/27, Bureau of Information, Department of External Affairs. International Perspectives, January/February 1984, p. 10. Department of External Affairs Communique #148, 4 November 1983. International Perspectives, January/February 1984, p.10. The Citizen (Ottawa), 22 March 1984. For details, see International Perspectives, June/July 1982, pp. 17—18. Toronto Star, 31 July 1982. Toronto Star, 3 August 1982. International Perspectives, January/February 1983, p. 13. Commons Debates, 9 November 1982, p. 20540. Secretary of State for External Affairs, Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, secretary of state for External Affairs, to the 39th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 25 September 1984.

CHAPTER 2

Canada's national interest and the Middle East Dr. Peyton Lyon

CANADIANS are becoming more aware of their nation's stake in the Middle East, and less oblivious to the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs. At the same time, however, Canada's diplomatic role in the area has become less imaginative and constructive, and it remains flawed by its bias in favor of Israel. Writing in 19761, Tareq Ismael irritated many Canadian readers by stressing the discrepancy between Canada's active and influential diplomacy in dealing with the Middle East, and the apparent paucity of its direct interest in the area. Indeed, he observed, Canadians had been more influential in the Middle East than anywhere else in the Third World, and had on occasion exercised genuine leadership; Pearson's role in the Suez Crisis of 1956, which earned the Nobel Prize for peace, marked the apex of Canada's global diplomacy. On the other hand, Canadian spokesmen had revealed little awareness of any direct national interest in the area, or serious concern for the well-being of the majority of its people. Too often their words and deeds had betrayed partiality for Israel. Canada's Middle East diplomacy was largely a by-product of its strong commitment to the United Nations and its concern to preserve the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance and the Commonwealth. It also reflected the sympathy of most Canadians for the much abused Jewish people, a sentiment fostered by the media and the skillful lobbying of the Jewish-Canadian community. What is Canada's national interest in the Middle East? "National interest," a concept suggesting something tangible and enduring, in practice often turns out to be as slippery and subjective as most of our political

CANADA'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE MIDDLE EAST

27

vocabulary. There is something to be said for the proposition in the Trudeau foreign policy doctrine of 19702 that the national interest is whatever the elected government of the day says it is. Central to the Trudeau Doctrine was also the belief that foreign policy should flow from the national interest as defined in terms of six "themes": economic growth, social justice, quality of life, peace and security, sovereignty and independence, and harmonious natural environment. The Trudeau Doctrine provides as good a framework as any for an analysis of Canada's stake in the Middle East. We shall ignore "harmonious natural environment," and the nebulous "quality of life," as the Doctrine itself largely does, and focus on the other four themes. "Economic growth" was assigned top priority in the Trudeau formulation, and seems to be so in the Mulroney government. A broad consensus holds that Canada's high living standard is exceptionally dependent upon international trade. Almost as broad is the further consensus that Canada's independence requires that its trade be diversified; the concentration of two-thirds of its exports in the United States market, including a high proportion of its manufactures, is widely regarded as one of the weakest features of the Canadian economy. Prospects exist for increased exports to other developed countries, notably Japan, but their interest is largely confined to raw materials; the less developed countries have a greater appetite for Canada's manufactures but can rarely afford to buy them. The Middle East is an outstanding exception; it combines need for manufactured goods with abundant wealth. From the perspective of increased trade of the preferred kind, qualitatively and politically, it is Canada's most promising market. Furthermore, although less dependent than most countries upon imported oil, Canada's energy security would be enhanced if its relations with the Arab producers were firm and friendly. One cannot predict with precision the increased trade that might result if the Arabs came to perceive Canada in a more positive political light. We do know that Canada was a target of the politically motivated oil embargo of 1973, and also that contracts to purchase Canadian goods were cancelled or suspended during the months that the Clark regime was committed to moving our embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Alternative sources exist for almost everything the Arabs import from Canada. Furthermore, Canada's trade with Israel is modest and unlikely ever to be very great. Canada's economic need of good political relations is thus greater with the Arabs than with the Israelis. And it should be noted that Canada needs the goodwill of the Arabs more than the Arabs need Canada's. In the mid-seventies, when Ottawa was considering tough measures to combat Arab restrictions on purchases from firms dealing with Israel,

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it was often asserted that the Arabs would not retaliate against Canada since they had not done so against the United States when it took antiboycott measures. However, this overlooked the obvious fact that the Arabs could more easily survive without Canadian exports, and might well welcome the opportunity to make an example of a secondary trading partner such as Canada. 3 Since the Jerusalem embassy fiasco of 1980, little has been heard in Ottawa about anti-boycott measures. Economic considerations are not in themselves conclusive. Canadians should be prepared to pay a price in economic well-being if this would promote other vital interests, notably peace, justice, and independence. Fortunately, the necessity for choice does not arise in relations with the Middle East; all four of Canada's most vital interests call for policies that would improve political relations with the Arab countries. Although all-out nuclear war may seem improbable, the possibility cannot be excluded. If the world does stumble into Armageddon, the initial spark seems more likely to be lit in the Middle East than anywhere else. At stake are core values, and the two superpowers are backing opposing forces. Most of the world's exportable energy is found in the area, and several of the regional actors are close to becoming members of the nuclear club. Anything Canada can contribute to peace in the Middle East would foster its own interest in survival. Promoting peace, however, calls for an image of impartiality, and good relations with all the contending elements. Peace in the Middle East, moreover, is closely related to social justice. Having been dispossessed of their homeland, and denied civil rights within Israeli occupied territory, it is difficult to imagine the four and one-half million Palestinians ever accepting the existing situation. Furthermore, the large majority of their fellow Arabs, and Muslims, support their claims and share their sense of humiliation and injustice. They not only vastly outnumber the Israelis but are gaining in economic and military strength. The achievement of perfect justice is no more likely in the Middle East than in other regions of the world, and there is now a widespread consensus that Israel is not only a historic fact but entitled to develop in its own way within secure borders. It seems improbable that this security can be attained unless and until comparable rights to a national home are granted to the Palestinians. That this would also be just is now recognized by a substantial majority in the international community. Canadian representatives, most notably Lester Pearson and Justice Ivan Rand, bear an important responsibility for the creation of Israel and the consequent denial of justice to the Palestinians. As Canadians, we claim that the promotion of social justice is a vital Canadian objective and

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can scarcely deny responsibility for seeking a more equitable distribution of land and rights within Palestine. The issue is complicated by strong Canadian compassion for the Jews. Not only were they the victims, at the hands of the Nazis, of one of the grossest crimes in history, but they suffered discrimination in many other lands, including Canada. Concern to promote justice might have led Canadians to offer the Jews part of their ample territory as a national home. Instead the Canadian government sought to restrict Jewish immigration. In a form of unconscious apartheid, it appears that Canadians preferred that justice be done the Jews far away from Canada at the expense of the Arabs. A state of their own in Palestine corresponded to the deepest longing of most Jews, but this sentiment, however understandable, could scarcely be expected to persuade the Palestinian Arabs that they should meekly surrender territory they had occupied for many centuries. It would now offend the Canadian sense of justice if the Jews were to be deprived of their national home in Israel as contained within its 1967 borders. It is also reasonable that those borders be secured by effective international guarantees. Our interest in justice, however, as well as in peace, dictates recognition of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs to a national home in the West Bank and Gaza, one in which they too can determine their own future. Whenever Canadians speak of "sovereignty and independence" they are almost always thinking of their relations with the United States. Most foreigners, and many Canadians, see in Canada's Middle East policy evidence of subservience to its superpower neighbor. This is a misreading of the situation. Although Canada's policy resembles the policy of the United States, it is not because either country dictates to the other. Rather it is because both are subject to similar domestic pressures and political processes. Canada could adopt a Middle East policy at least as different from Washington's as those of its European allies without placing great strain on its continental relations. Instead, it has on occasion been more pro-Israel than Washington, 4 while in 1981 it ignored with impunity American suggestions that our troops would be welcome in the multinational peacekeeping force being set up in the Sinai. More decisive evidence of Canada's foreign policy independence, especially in matters regarding diplomatic relations, is to be found in its earlier recognition of the People's Republic of China and its maintenance of relations with Castro's Cuba. Even though it is inaccurate to attribute Canada's Middle East policy to U.S. pressure, for example, Canada's international reputation for independence would be enhanced if it did not appear to be following the lead of the United States.

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Canada's interests in economic well-being, peace, social justice, and independence all argue in favor of an active foreign policy in the Middle East, one stressing good political relations with the Arab countries as well as Israel. What in fact is the current Canadian policy? Largely economic considerations have led to the establishment of embassies in a number of Arab countries, the latest being in Jordan in 1982. The number of ministerial visits has also increased. In 1981, moreover, Ottawa indicated that it was willing to sell the Candu nuclear reactor to several Arab countries. The greater sales effort has contributed to a significant increase in exports to the Middle East, including Israel, from twenty million dollars in 1961 to three billion in 1980. In the period 1961-73 this trade represented 0.36% of all Canada's exports; by 1974-1980 it had grown to 1.05%. Sales to Arab countries in 1980 were approximately ten times as great as those to Israel, and growing faster; 78% of the sales were of secondary manufactures. Of Canada's imports of oil in 1980, 43.9% came from Arab producers, compared to 30% from Venezuela, 22% from the United States, and less than 2% from Mexico. The increase in Canadian trade with the Middle East owes little to any change in Arab perceptions of Canada as a friendly power. Canadian statements in the U.N. and elsewhere have stressed that we have not taken sides in the Middle East conflict, that our posture is "balanced" in accordance with our peacekeeping function. In fact we have long been categorized by U.N. observers as one of Israel's most predictable supporters, second only to the United States in recent years. Our spokesmen have criticized such Israeli actions as the bombing in 1980 of the Iraqi nuclear facility; the extension in 1981 of Israel's jurisdiction to the Golan Heights; the establishment of new settlements on the West Bank, and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. They have also become more explicit in supporting Palestinian rights to a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza, and Canada's voting record in the U.N. has become somewhat more balanced. Compared to most of its allies, however, its condemnation of Israeli behavior has been muted, its votes biased in favor of Israel, and its dealings with the Palestine Liberation Organization limited. The Canadian economic interest would be enhanced if our political posture was in fact as evenhanded as we have always claimed. Our ability to contribute to the peace process also might be enhanced with a neutral political posture. Canada continues to provide troops for the U.N. observation force on the Golan Heights (UNDOF), and can draw on the prestige and experience gained in a quarter century of active peackeeping in the area. Its soldiers, typified by LieutenantGeneral E.L.M. Burns, the first Commander of UNEF, have served with

CANADA'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE MIDDLE EAST 31 competence and fairness. As early as the Suez Crisis of 1956, however, President Nasser of Egypt raised doubts about Canada's objectivity, and in 1967 he invited the Canadians to lead the retreat of UNEF. In 1973 a number of Arab states questioned Canada's participation in the reconstituted UNEF, and they were accepted only when balanced with a comparable contingent of Poles. Canada itself declined to serve permanently on the U.N. force in the Lebanon (UNIFIL), or to serve at all on the non-U.N. multinational force in the Sinai. This last decision was in line with the preference of most of the Arabs, with the notable exception of Egypt. Canada's decision did little, however, to alter the impression that Canada's contribution to the Middle East peace process has become uncharacteristically cautious, unduly supportive of U.S. positions, and tilted in favor of Israel. During 1983, in sharp contrast to its performance in 1956, Canada had nothing to suggest in the way of an expanded U.N. presence to assist in the restoration of peace and sovereignty in strife-torn Lebanon. Canada continues to be one of the major supporters of the U.N. program to assist refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA), and it maintains modest programs of development assistance in such poor Middle Eastern countries as Somalia and Egypt. However, the bigger test of concern about social justice in the area is a country's attitude towards the rights of the displaced Palestinians, and here Canada's stand leaves much to be desired. Canadian statements have become firmer in their support of Palestinian claims to a homeland, but stop short of acknowledging their right to self determination. Similarly, while privately conceding that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is representative of the Palestinian people, and that there is no feasible alternative, Canadian spokesmen deny that the PLO is "the sole legitimate" spokesman, or even a necessary party to the peace dialogue. Low-level contacts occur between Canadian and PLO representatives, and social encounters are tolerated with more senior PLO leaders. These leaders are not permitted, however, to enter Canadian government offices, and Canadian diplomats are less active than their European counterparts in talks with the PLO. This reserve is resented by the Arabs, especially by the Palestinians themselves, who overwhelmingly support the PLO.5 Some Arabs still recall the way Canada reneged on its commitment in 1975 to host a U.N. conference on crime on the grounds the U.N. insisted that PLO observers be present, since the PLO is present at U.N. meetings in New York, Geneva, and elsewhere. Canadians often fail to realize that dealing with the PLO need no more imply approval of its early use of terror tactics than dealing with Israel implies approval of the terrorism practiced by Menachem Begin

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and his associates during the turbulent birth of Israel. In recent years, PLO policy has been to curtail violence, while Israel has inflicted death, injury, imprisonment, or dispossession on thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. The PLO political structure is remarkably democratic, especially when one considers the restrictions under which it has been forced to function, 6 and until 1982 it had been providing its people with many of the services of a modern welfare state. To treat the PLO simply as a terrorist organization is not only ignorant and unjust but diminishes Canada's opportunity to encourage its moderate elements, or to contribute in other ways to the peace process.

Why is Canada's diplomatic posture so contrary to its interests, as developed in the Trudeau Doctrine, in economic well-being, peace, justice, and independence? A clue is found in another central proposition in the same doctrine: Canada's external policies should be an extension abroad of domestic interests. Too often this is interpreted as an invitation to minority groups to ensure that their concerns are reflected in national policies, even when these run counter to the national interest, broadly defined. In the case of the Middle East, the result has been to diminish Canadian independence by giving in its policies undue weight to the interests of a foreign power, Israel. The pro-Israel tilt of Canada's diplomacy appears to be inconsistent with the convictions of most of Canada's diplomats.7 In 1975-76 the Canadian International Image Study invited over 300 federal decisionmakers to evaluate the impact of 20 international actors on a scale of 1 (positive) to 7 (negative). Although this was before the Sadat peace initiative, or the election of the Begin government, Egypt emerged at close to mid-point, while Israel was rated close to the bottom; only North Vietnam, South Africa, and the PLO were judged to be more negative in impact; the USSR, Warsaw Pact, and China were seen to be more positive.8 Other responses tended to confirm that most Ottawa mandarins consider Israeli policies to be disruptive, and the pressure within Canada of the Zionist lobby to be contrary to sound Canadian policies. It appears likely that since 1976 the images of Egypt and the PLO have improved in the eyes of official Ottawa. The same can scarcely be claimed for Israel. Canadian diplomats are inclined to be especially critical of Canada's proIsrael tilt while they are posted to the Middle East or theU.N., but few of them deny the tilt, or express agreement with it. After World War II, the Christian churches in Canada were overwhelmingly sympathetic to Israel. Their bible, as Lester Pearson has observed, fosters the conviction that the Jews belong in Palestine, and

CANADA'S NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE MIDDLE EAST 33 churchmen were especially conscious of both the monstrous crimes of the Nazis, and also the discrimination practiced against Jews in many Christian countries. The Vatican, however, has always had reservations about the political claims of the state of Israel, and it is increasingly sympathetic to the plight of the displaced Palestinians. Senior Roman Catholic prelates maintain contact with the PLO. For years the most prominent Canadian advocate of the Palestinian cause was Rev. A.C. Forrest, editor of the United Church's widely circulated periodical, The Observer. He won considerable support among other church leaders but, as on most political issues, they appear to have had only a modest impact on the church rank and file. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that institutional Christianity is no longer a major factor in determining Canada's Middle East policy. A similar conclusion should probably be drawn about the media. Its anti-Arab bias has at times been blatant. Despite a recent improvement in objectivity, and frequent editorials critical of Israeli expansionism, the bias remains significant. The question remains whether the media lead public opinion, or simply cater to it. The second hypothesis seems more plausible. Certainly public opinion polls have from the start revealed a consistently pro-Israel bias. This may be eroding in view of the wellpublicized Israeli excesses during 1982 and the forbidding personality of Menachem Begin. It seems probable that the government would not now encounter strong public resistance if it chose to modify its Middle East posture. Nevertheless, the basic sympathy for Israel of most Canadians, coupled with the concern of opinion leaders to avoid the risk of appearing anti-Jewish, 9 are necessary components of an adequate explanation of the success of the Zionist lobby in influencing Canada's external policies. Many Canadian politicians and officials, including Prime Minister Trudeau when he initially thought he was retiring from public life, have testified to the resources, efficiency, and impact of the Canada-Israel Committee (C-IC), the foreign policy arm of the well-organized Jewish community. Not all Jews are Zionists, and even among the Zionists are to be found vigorous critics of current Israeli policies. Nevertheless, Canadian Jewry appears to be more homogeneous than that of some other countries, notably that of the United States, in its identification with Israel. The C-IC has persuasive credentials to speak for a large majority of Canadian Jews. Even though they comprise a small minority (1.4%) in the country, their apparent cohesiveness and wealth gives weight to the representations of their designated spokesmen. As well, the tactics of their organizations have generally been superb. Indeed the C-IC has been described as not only the most influential lobby in shaping Canadian foreign policy, but a model for all the others in

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its professionalism and skill; this tribute was from an official of the Department of External Affairs at an open conference on pressure groups. Other authorities detailed for the conference the monetary and informational resources at the disposal of the C-IC, the rapid communications net linking almost all Canadian Jews, and the intelligent, seemingly co-operative approach to politicians and officials adopted by C-IC spokesmen. One reported that they are in daily communication with relevant DEA officials, and on occasion are able to provide information on Middle East developments more rapidly than Canadian embassies in the area. The C-IC works closely with the Israeli Embassy in Ottawa and organized Jewry in other countries, especially the United States. Despite its resources and skill, however, the C-IC could not exercise its considerable influence over Canada's policies without the basic sympathy, or indifference, of the Canadian public and the opportunism, or ignorance, of Canadian politicians. The parties probably exaggerate the significance of the Jewish vote. In several Toronto and Montreal seats it ranges between 15% and 35%; even where much smaller, it may be decisive in a close vote. It is less clear, however, that the Jewish vote can be swung in its entirety on any foreign policy issue, and Canadians of Arabic origin are more numerous than is popularly supposed; Arabic is now the third language in the Ottawa area and non-Arab Muslims, such as Pakistanis, tend to identify with their co-religionists in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Arab community is faction-ridden and poorly organized; compared to Canadian Jewry, its lobbying is amateurish. Some Arab-Canadians, notably many of the Lebanese Christians, are unsympathetic to the cause of the Palestinians. The second generation Arab and Muslim-Canadians, however, tend not only to be more attuned to the Canadian political culture but also more committed to political action. It appears significant that whereas the Progressive Conservatives may have secured one or two seats in Toronto by Joe Clark's 1979 promise to move Canada's embassy to Jerusalem, the only seat won by the Liberals west of Manitoba was one in a part of Vancouver containing a large number of Pakistani immigrants. The Jerusalem issue was not an instance of C-IC initiative or pressure. The Committee was greatly concerned about Jews in Russia, and antiboycott legislation, but only a minority believed it would be wise to lobby for the Embassy move. Clark's promise was widely seen within the Jewish community as an attempt to buy their votes, and many resented it. Clark appears to have believed that opportunism and principle coincided, and that the gesture would not only win votes but improve the consistency of Canada's Middle East policy; Canada had long proclaimed its

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support for Israel, he thought, without ever doing a thing to demonstrate it. Anyone in the U.N. or the Department of the External Affairs, could have told him that the opposite was closer to the truth—Canada had been proclaiming its objectivity but acting in a pro-Israel manner. Clark's ignorance of the Middle East, and opportunism, are widely shared by Canadian politicians and account in large part for their susceptibility to pressure from the Zionist lobby. As of 1985, however, attitudes appear to be changing. MP's from all parties have been critical of Israeli policies, especially the attempt to exterminate the PLO in Lebanon, and object to the bias in Canada's offical posture. A loosely structured group of parliamentarians, academics, ex-diplomats, journalists, and other Canadians has occasionally provided the government with an alternative to the C-IC as a source of information on the Middle East, and policy advice. The Canadian public's outrage at the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, a sentiment shared by a large number of Jews in Israel and Canada, seems likely to have accelerated the slow evolution towards a more balanced and effective Middle East policy, one implied both by the Trudeau foreign policy doctrine and by the report to the Clark government by Robert Stanfield.10 The issue, however, played almost no part in the elections of 1984 and the new Mulroney government, as of early 1985, is adhering closely to the Middle East policy inherited from its Liberal predecessor. Notes 1. See T.Y. Ismael, "Canada and the Middle East," in Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Ismael, (eds.) Canada and the Third World (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 240-77. 2. Foreign Policy for Canadians, Information Canada (Ottawa, 1970). 3. Canada itself found it advantageous in 1968 to suspend diplomatic relations with Gabon as a warning to more significant countries, notably France, of the probable consequences of granting Quebec international status. See Louis Sabourin, "Canada and Francophone Africa," in Lyon and Ismael, Canada and the Third World, pp. 142-3. 4. For example, when the Clark government promised to move Canada's embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Washington displayed surprise and dismay. 5. A survey conducted for Time on 24 May 1982, revealed that 80% of the Palestinians on the West Bank supported the PLO. A similar conclusion was drawn from a survey by the Jerusalem Post. 6. Since it is a crime under Israeli law to support the PLO, normal elections are scarcely feasible. Available evidence, however, suggests that the PLO enjoys greater popular support than do most governments. 7. The passages that follow are drawn largely from my paper on "Canada's Middle East Tilt," International Perspectives (September-October 1982): 3 — 5. 8. R.B. Byers and David Leyton-Brown, "Canadian Elite Images of the International System," International Journal (1977): 625. 9. It is not only the politicians who display little courage in speaking out on the Middle

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East question. Several academic colleagues have told me that they soft pedal their criticism of Israeli policies, and the Zionist lobby, for fear of prejudicing their relations with Jewish colleagues; few Canadians worry about the consequences of offending Arab-Canadians. 10. "Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada respecting the Middle East and North Africa," (Ottawa: 20 February 1980).

CHAPTER 3

Canada's peacekeeping role in the Middle East Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns

IN DISCUSSIONS of international affairs, the term "role" is often imprecise. In this paper it will be taken to mean what Canada tried to effect in relation to the conflict in the Middle East, and what functions Canada performed in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956 — 67, and in later forces. How Canada's policies and circumstances led us into this activity will be outlined. What we did, or tried to do, has to be seen in connection with our general policy on defense. Shortly after the United Nations was formed, our government declared that support of the new organization, and the tenets of its charter would form the basis of Canadian international policy. It was not long, however, before events in Europe and Korea made us realize that the United Nations would not be any more able to protect the sovereignty of small democratic powers (Canada included) than had been its predecessor, the League of Nations. Historically, small powers have had to become allies of great powers for their defense. As a result, their freedom of action in international affairs is limited. "Peacekeeping," as it is now practiced by the United Nations, had its inception in the Suez War of 1956. Israel, France, and Britain had invaded

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Egypt in clear violation of their obligations under the United Nations Charter. The Canadian government decided that we should not take the side of our "motherlands," France and Britain, in their quarrel with Egypt. Lester Pearson was secretary of state for External Affairs when the Suez crisis erupted. He wrote in his memoirs: .. .we had been actively concerned as a member of the U.N. with events leading up to, and following, the establishment of the State of Israel...We did not seek this involvement, but when circumstances brought it about, Mr. St. Laurent was willing to accept it as part of the responsibility of U.N. Membership. ...when the fighting began, and the U.N. Assembly was called to deal with the situation, I believed that we would become actively engaged in the activities and would be asked to take on new responsibilities. 1

Because the Security Council was unable to act on the Suez question as a result of vetoes by Britain and France, it was referred to the General Assembly. Mr. Pearson, in his statement about the U.S. resolution calling for a cease-fire had the following to say: "...I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution...authorizing the Secretary-General to make arrangements with member governments for a United Nations force...."2 John Foster Dulles, then U.S. secretary of state, said he welcomed this statement and he asked the Canadian representative to formulate and introduce a concrete proposal for an international force. Mr. Pearson also had said, "We'll go through all this again if we do not take advantage of the crisis.. .to do something about a political settlement."3 There he spoke prophetically. Looking back to the causes of the 1956 Israeli-British-French offensive, the Soviet Union's supply of arms to Egypt in 1955 had made Israel fear for her safety, and was her reason for taking preemptive action by invading the Sinai in October 1956. The British and French pretended that they were intervening because as the Israeli forces moved rapidly towards the Suez Canal, the important international waterway could be blocked, with disruptive effects on the world economy. The collusive arrangements between the three invading countries came to light later. Anglo-French forces began landing near Port Said during the night of 4/5 November 1956. A Soviet proposal in the Security Council that all member states, especially the U.S.A. and the USSR, should give military and other assistance to Egypt was vetoed. The Soviet Union then sent notes to Britain, France, and Israel, warning that the USSR was prepared to resort to force if necessary to halt the "aggression" against Egypt. The notes hinted at the possibility of their using long-range missiles, which, at that time, were ahead of the western powers.

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In a note to the United States, the Soviet Union proposed that the two superpowers should unite their forces to halt Anglo-French operations in the Middle East. President Eisenhower immediately rejected this proposal as "unthinkable"—although he had been infuriated by the British and French action which had been taken without informing the U.S.A., on which they and other NATO nations depended basically for their security. Compare this situation with the latter stages of the "Yom Kippur" war of October 1973. President Brezhnev proposed that the USSR and the United States should both send troops into the theater to stop the hostilities. This was summarily rejected by President Nixon, who ordered an alert for American forces, including some "strategic" elements (i.e. those capable of hitting the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.) The parallel situations of 1956 and 1973 illustrate the special danger of hostilities in the Middle East developing into a confrontation between the superpowers, a fearful possibility which has been present during the thirty years of intermittent war between Israel and her neighbors. No way has yet been found to extinguish this sputtering fuse which could detonate a third World War. It is fear of this world disaster which basically moves Canada and other secondary powers to contribute to the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East.

At this point it seems desirable to indicate Canada's position as to how the Middle East question might be settled. Generally, Canada has supported the principles set out in Security Council Resolution No. 242, of November 1967, passed after the Six-Day War but with no progress towards the implementation of its provisions until the Camp David meetings. A more extensive statement of Canada's view on what is needed to bring peace to the Middle East was made in the U.N. General Assembly on 15 December 1980, extracts of which follow: If there is to be a just and lasting peace, it must be based on the recognition of the legitimate rights and concerns of both sides. The right of all states to live within secure and recognized boundaries must be openly and clearly accepted. Israel has the right to live at peace within boundaries that are accepted by her neighbours. Equally, it is essential that we respect the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Unless their identity as a people is recognized, unless the

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Palestinians play their full part in negotiations to determine their future, and unless their right to a homeland is recognized, there will not be peace. What form such a homeland should take, however, including its geographic extent, its status and its relationship to its neighbours must, we believe, be determined in negotiations between the parties directly involved in the dispute.

This sounds fair and reasonable, until we ask ourselves: Are the several conditions compatible? And if the geographic limits of a Palestinian homeland and Israel's "secure and recognized boundaries" are to be determined in negotiations between the parties directly involved, Israel and the PLO, for example, is there a prospect for a real peace in the foreseeable future? It hardly needs saying that all elements of a peacekeeping force must preserve a strict neutrality—impartiality—in their attitude towards the combatants between whom they are trying to "keep the peace." Furthermore, no contingent for a peacekeeping force would be acceptable if it came from a country which had espoused the cause of one side or the other. The extract from Canada's statement, given above, shows our government's desire not to compromise our generally nonpartisan position on the question. Let us consider an important tactic of the 1956 operation. By interposing the U.N. troops between the Egyptians and the invaders, a neutral zone was formed. When the cease-fire demanded by the U.N. General Assembly had been accepted, and fighting ceased, the two sides were facing each other in positions on the narrow strips of land bordering the canal between Port Said and Qantara. The Israeli forces were in the Sinai, about 15 kilometers from the canal, having halted on a demand from the French and British. It was obvious that no military force that the United Nations could organize would be capable of driving out the British and French, should they choose to resist. But by the time the contingents of UNEF were assembling in the Canal Zone, political and financial pressures on France and Britain had made withdrawal of their forces inevitable. The problem was how UNEF could act to usher them out, avoiding renewal of the fighting or incidents which might delay the evacuation. After negotiations with the command of the Anglo-French force and the Egyptians, it was agreed that the invading forces would withdraw by stages to a beachhead surrounding Port Said. The Egyptians would stay where they were, and the gap between the hostile forces would be occupied by UNEF troops. The idea of a neutral zone between enemy troops with U.N. obser-

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vers to watch over it was not new; it had been suggested to UNTSO (United Nation Truce Supervisory Organization) but had never been put into effect. The plan worked well for the withdrawal from the Canal Zone. The evacuation was completed by 21 December 1956. After the U.N. troops had been interposed between the combatants there had been no serious incidents. The Israelis began their withdrawal from the Sinai in December. Thereafter there were successive withdrawals followed up by U.N. troops, until in March 1957 the final pullout of Israel forces from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Shaikh took place. Heavy political pressure, mainly by the United States, obliged the Israelis to relinquish the territory they had occupied in the brief war. When the Israeli withdrawal was completed, UNEF was disposed along the Armistice Demarcation Line around the Gaza Strip, and in posts on the recognized boundary between Egypt and Palestine, established during the Turkish suzerainty. For ten years, the truce, or "peaceful conditions," was maintained. Through cooperation between UNEF and the Egyptian authorities controlling the Gaza Strip, attempts by the Palestinian Arabs to renew incursions into Israel were stopped. The experimental U.N. Force seemed to have been successful. Unfortunately, the interval of peaceful conditions was not used to devise terms on which a continuing peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors could be established. We had peacekeeping without peacemaking.

In addition to Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, India, Indonesia, Finland, Colombia, and Brazil contributed contingents to UNEF I. Canada's role could be said to differ from these other countries, because we were able to supply detachments for engineering, supply, transportation, intercommunication, and air transport. At first, Canada had the most numerous contingent, numbering over 1,000. Our contribution was mainly in the technical and logistical elements which the force needed to operate in the theater. Later Canada also furnished an armored reconnaissance squadron which patrolled along the boundary East of Queseima. The Indian contingent, comprising an infantry battalion and transport and intercommunication detachments, later became the largest. When UNEF was formed in 1956, the total strength of the Canadian Armed Forces was about 180,000. Now their strength is about 80,000. For some time, it has been difficult for the Department of National

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Defence to spare the specialist personnel for peacekeeping that it provided in the beginning, while maintaining our other commitments for defense, especially in NATO.

After ten years of peacekeeping, sad to say, hostilities opened again in 1967. Pressures on Egypt by Jordan and Syria, and other Arab countries led President Nasser to decide to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. He demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Force, which was accomplished with some difficulty. Egyptian forces were moved up towards the border in Sinai. Syria and Jordan also moved troops towards their border with Israel. Israel saw these moves as a threat to her survival, struck first, and rapidly overcame the resistance of the Egyptian forces in Sinai, and advanced to the Suez Canal. With the Egyptian strength shattered, Israel was able to strike against Jordan, eventually occupying the "West Bank" up to the Jordan River. On the Syrian front, the Israeli forces crossed the Jordan and moved over the Golan Heights towards Damascus. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria overestimated their military strength and so lost territory. Peacekeeping seemed to be discredited, and there were many voices in Canada calling for abandonment of our efforts in this field. The situation did not change until 1973, when Egypt mounted an attack across the Suez Canal, and gained a considerable success against the Israeli forces disposed along the East Bank. The Israelis had become overconfident and careless. However, in a few days they recovered, and appeared likely to inflict a severe defeat on Egyptian formations which had crossed the canal. The great powers intervened—and once again the United Nations created a force, "UNEF II," to help maintain peaceful conditions. Canada took part in this force, which differed from UNEF I in having a representative of the Warsaw Pact, Poland, provide a contingent. Canada worked with Poland in the supply and transport part of the organization. The negotiations at Camp David in 1978 and 1979 between Egypt and Israel under U.S. auspices have proved to be the most effective effort at peacemaking since the Middle East wars began in 1948. By the end of April 1982 Israel was to complete its withdrawal beyond the demarcation line which existed in 1967—the old boundary line between Egypt and Palestine under the Turkish regime. The second United Nations Emergency Force was then to be replaced by a multinational observation

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force, supplied mainly by the United States, with contributions from Fiji, Colombia, Uruguay, and elements from other countries. Encouraging as the results of Camp David have been, they do not establish a stable peace, as outbursts of fighting between Israel and Lebanon-Syria have shown.

Canadian troops have also taken part in other peacekeeping forces in the Middle East, namely the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); U.N. Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights; and briefly, in the U.N. Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Nothing in these operations differentiated the Canadian role from that established when UNEF I was organized. Towards the end of 1981 dangerous tension built up between Israel and Syria, and both countries have intervened in the civil war between Moslems and Christians which has torn Lebanon apart. In this crisis, there was a glimmer of hope. The United States and the Soviet Union both sent diplomatic representatives to Israel and Syria to try to dissuade them from following their inflammatory oratory and minor military actions by outright war. Since then, Israel's declaration of jurisdiction over the occupied Golan Heights part of Syria has provoked the U.S. administration into suspending the curious "strategic cooperation agreement" concluded only three weeks before—another element of instability in the region. No peacekeeping in the Middle East will be effective for long unless the superpowers insist that the quarrelling nations stop short of shooting, and refrain from supplying their client states with masses of armament.

Notes 1. Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 243. 2. Ibid., p. 247. 3. Ibid.

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CHAPTER 4

Canada's economic relations with the Arab world: patterns and prospects Dr. Atif Kubursi

Introduction With foreign trade (imports plus exports) measuring over 50 per cent of Canada's gross national product, Canadians have an understandable interest in the viability of the foreign trade sector. Britain's entry into the Common Market and Canada's heavy dependence on the United States market—Canada sold 61.2% of her exports to the U.S. and bought over 68.2% of her total imports from the U.S. in 1980—have caused considerable concern about the future patterns of trade with traditional partners. * Wider economic interactions with the Arab World coincide with Canada's pursuit of balanced and diversified trade relationships. It is also well-timed given Canada's recent balance of payments troubles, persistent domestic unemployment, and dwindling energy supplies. The Arabs also stand to benefit from closer ties with Canada in the short and long term. Canada has ample natural resources (i.e., food, pulp and paper, and many metals) and sophisticated technological skills and equipment (world renowned technology in the fields of nuclear reactors, communications, and transportation). It is also clear that the resources Canada possesses are precisely those that the Arab World requires and is

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A. KUBURSI

able to purchase. Furthermore, for political and economic reasons widening the supply base of Arab requirements is of vital importance to the Arab World. To this can be added the fact that trade with Canada need not carry the usual stigma and complications which arise from trading with old colonialists or new imperialists. Indeed, the Arabs could feel more comfortable trading with countries comparable in size to their own than with other trading giants and unequal trade partners (e.g., U.S., EEC, and USSR).

Canadian-Arab Trade Merchandise Exports From admittedly modest beginnings, Canada's trade with the Arab World has in recent years grown at unprecedented rates. Canadian exports to the Arab World increased from a negligible $37 million in 1968 to $739 million in 1978. (See Table 1.) This represents a 20-fold increase in ten years which translates itself into a compound average annual increase of 34.9%. In 1980, the export figures indicate a record high value of $1429 million. This latter figure represents about 2% of total Canadian exports and about 3% of Canadian exports to the U.S., 45% of U.K., and over 69% of its exports to the oil developing economies in 1980. (See Table 2.) Canada's exports have largely consisted of agricultural products (wheat, wheat flour, barley, and sugar) and semi-processed raw materials (lumber, wood, pulp, and metals). Inroads have been made into the markets for manufactured products. In 1974, for instance, half of Canada's exports to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Libya, and the United Arab Emirates consisted of manufactured products such as engines, construction machinery, automobiles, heating and refrigeration equipment, and telecommunications equipment. 2 This trend has continued and the proportions of manufactured exports have dominated other types of exports to most Arab countries. More recently, Canadians have sold locomotives to Iraq and Algeria, aircrafts to Saudi Arabia, and prefabricated houses to most of the Gulf states. In 1968, Canadian exports to the Arab World were thinly spread over almost all Arab countries. The largest share was directed to Algeria which accounted then for 19.5% of total Canadian exports to the Arab World. Syria, Morocco, and Saudi-Arabia each received about 12%. Mauritania, Yemen, Somalia, Jordan, Qatar, and Bahrain showed very small shares that fell short of one percent. The pattern in 1978 was drastically different with Saudi Arabia alone accounting for over 32%, and together with Algeria for 54% of total Canadian exports to the Arab World. (See Table 3.)

Table 1 Exports of Canada to the Arab World 1968-1978 (000 Canadian Dollars)

BAHRAIN QATAR EMIRATES IRAQ JORDAN KUWAIT LEBANON LIBYA S.A.

SOMALIA YEMEN SUDAN SYRIA EGYPT ALGERIA MAURITANIA MOROCCO TUNISIA TOTAL ARAB TOTAL CAN. ISRAEL

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

221.

133. 746. 940. 307. 2571. 3506. 873. 4168. 17. 99. 2081. 4727. 3307. 7312. 305. 4634. 1561.

87. 158. 4208. 2835. 647. 1734. 3759. 2398. 3776. 38. 22. 524. 938. 3001. 3919. 607. 1470. 2598.

85. 82. 324. 4212. 387. 1124. 4986. 3350. 7254. 22. 4. 1449. 18647. 37798. 19148. 481. 5425. 6940.

160. 195. 1679. 32475. 144. 1206. 5049. 1668. 5368. 77. 13. 1234. 20275. 10216. 31468. 184. 5120. 5698.

447. 234. 787. 3619. 407. 2750. 14095. 4704. 7120. 266. 26. 2359. 7771. 5746. 29178. 443. 5864. 7506.

789. 436. 1919. 1055. 580. 1848. 21386. 12898. 13350. 833. 851. 3234. 2054. 3068. 27609. 100. 3291. 13538.

1139. 3523. 4896. 19354. 5416. 4943. 45148. 5870. 17972. 733. 8077. 2809. 13838. 14028. 157675. 145. 2596. 12797.

1383. 1543. 4954. 67677. 2669. 16127. 41456. 26193. 40602. 1427. 7868. 4407. 5082. 6670. 101280. 2718. 19129. 10629.

1476. 4161. 12057. 56554. 5875. 22564. 3141. 12775. 110629. 3901. 2947. 3135. 13106. 35449. 114991. 919. 2963. 19853.

1595. 3351. 20429. 58884. 7846. 37299. 27531. 19091. 109964. 59. 4061. 2398. 50456. 50810. 186463. 4613. 30841. 11455.

2491. 2671. 38835. 13892. 10959. 41489. 29791. 20167. 237620. 2344. 12099. 23788. 22174. 57001. 161288. 4141. 29387. 28051.

37508.

32719.

111718.

122229.

93322.

108839.

320959.

361814.

426496.

627146.

738188.

13679044. 14871004. 16820066. 17820095. 20149974. 25420705. 32442488. 33328314. 38396594. 44375478. 52641688. 10435.

17725.

15045.

Source: Statistics Canada, Candum, External Trade.

20870.

25435.

37216.

52508.

65691.

60847.

52200.

81861.

Table 2 Canadian Exports to the Arab World: Some Comparative Statistics, 1960-1980 (million U.S.S)

TOTAL WORLD

INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

5494 5865 5932 6473 7699 8107 9553 10556 13132 14351 16745 18370 21165 26435 34511 34074 40515 43077 47944 58183 67085

4817

3204

4981 5124 5440 6215 6800 7931 9212 11118 12388 14071 15571 17745 22376 28378 27511 33354 36277 39791 48559 54738

3110 3510 3643 4129 4672 5786 6799 8527 9799 10437 12060 14061 17116 21713 21168 26037 29080 32470 37652 41065

943 920 863 941 1119 1097 1047 1090 1134 1030 1418 135T

EXPORTS TO

1960

1961

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Source: U.N. Direction of Trade, Various Issues.

1325 1589 1916 1709 1867 1830 1760 2240 2713

OIL ov EXPORTING ARAB CTYS, COUNTRIES

CANADIAN CANADIAN ARAB ARAB EXPORTS EXPORTS AS % OF AS % OF TOTAL INDUSTRIAL

U.S.

CANADIAN ARAB EXPORTS AS % OF U.K.

CANADIAN ARAB EXPORTS AS % OF OIL EXP. CTYS.

30.00 26.66 18.18 28.38 15.73 17.92 18.97 16.81 23.08 26.28 53.77 51.74 36.22 42.02 61.51 49.28 48.21 50.87 50.23 61.52 69.56

CANADIAN ARAB EXPORTS AS % OF

60

18

.33

.37

.56

1.90

64

17

12 21 14 19 22

.34 .23 ,39 .23 .28 .28 .21

.55

66 74 89

.29 ,20 .32 .IS

1.80 1.39 2.23 1.25 1.73 2,10 1.74 2.91 3.50 7.55 8.81 6.94 6.80 16.60 19.89

106 116 113 143 137 199 230 254

257 517 690 784 1154 1290 1341 1741

19

33 36 107 119 92 108

318 340 378 587 648 825 1211

.23 .23 ,18 ,25 .25 .64 .65 .43 .41 .92 1.00 .93 1.36 1.35 1.42 1.81

.30 .29 .76 .76 .52 .48 1.12 1.24 1.13 1.62 1.63 1.70 2.20

.34 ,58 .34 .41

.38 .28 .39 .37

1.03 .99 .65 .63 1.46 1.61 1.45 2.02 2.CO 2,19 2.95

20.25 32.08 36.82 36.83 44.64

CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

49

Another dominant and related characteristic of Canadian exports to the Arab World is the wide swings in the magnitudes and proportions of these exports to the individual countries. In 1969, the United Arab Emirates showed a share of 12.86% of the total Canadian Arab exports. A year later this share fell to less than one per cent. Recent percentages indicate a rising share which stood at 5.25% in 1978. Iraq's share has undergone even wider fluctuations. In 1971, Iraq's share of Canadian Arab exports was 26.57%, in 1973, 0.97%, in 1975, 18.70%, whereas in 1978 it fell again to 1.88%. Egypt's share, on the other hand, was relatively stable at about 8% of the total throughout the period between 1968-1978. Algeria's share fluctuated but maintained a large percentage throughout this period. In 1980, however, Algeria accounted for the largest share of the Canadian Arab exports in that year with a value exceeding $329 million U.S. dollars.3 It is worth noting that Canada's exports to Israel fall far below its exports to the Arab World. In 1960, Canadian exports to Israel amounted to only a third of Canadian exports to the Arab World, and in 1980, Canadian exports to Israel were less than 7.3%. The picture that emerges from this cursory examination yields the following basic observations: (1) Canada's exports to the Arab World have increased at very high rates since 1968. The fact that they also represent increasing ratios of Canadian exports to the U.S. suggests that they are growing at faster rates than Canadian exports to the U.S. and are therefore reducing Canada's heavy dependence on the U.S. The same conclusions hold for Canada's other traditional trading partners, for example, the U.K. (2) Canadian exports to the Arab World suffer from high rates of instability. This problem deserves special consideration to identify and deal with its causes. (3) There is a strong concentration of Canadian exports to the Arab World among a few countries. Saudi Arabia and Algeria together accounted for over 50% of these exports throughout the period between 1968 and 1980. (4) The commodity composition of Canadian exports to the Arab World suggests that manufacturing products dominate other types of exports. This is a welcome development to Canada in view of the high share of resources in Canadian exports to the U.S., Japan, and Europe. (5) Arab markets dominate by far the Israeli market as an outlet for Canadian exports.

Table 3 Exports as percent of: A) Total Exports to Arab Countries B) Total Canadian Exports 1968

BAHRAIN QATAR EMIRATES IRAQ

JORDAN KUWAIT

LEBANON LIBYA

S.A. SOMALIA YEMEN

SUDAN SYRIA

.59 .00 .35 .00 1.99 .01 2.51 .01 .82 .00 6.85 .02 9.35 .03 2.33 .01 11.11 .03 .05 .00 .26 .00 5.55 .02 12.60

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

.27 .00 .48 .00 12.86 .03 8.66 .02 1.98 .00 5.30 .01 11.49 .03 7.33 .02 11.54 .03 .12 .00 .07 .00 1.60 .00 2.87

.08 .00 .07 .00 .29 .00 3.77 .03 .35 .00 1.01 .01 4.46 .03 3.00 .02 6.49 .04 .02 .00 .00 .00 1.30 .01 16.69

.13 .00 .16 .00 1.37 .01 26.57 .18 .12 .00 .99 .01 4.13 .03 1.36 .01 4.39 .03 .06 .00 .01 .00 1.01 .01 16.59

.48 .00 .25 .00 .84 .00 3.88 .02 .44 .00 2.95 .01 15.10 .07 5.04 .02 7.63 .04 .29 .00 .03 .00 2.53 .01 8.33

.72 .00 .40 .00 1.76 .01 .97 .00 .53 .00 1.70 .01 19.65 .08 11.85 .05 12.27 .05 .77 .00 .78 .00 2.97 .01 1.89

.35 .00 1.10 .01 1.53 .02 6.03 .06 1.69 .02 1.54 .02 14.07 .14 1.83 .02 5.60 .06 .23 .00 2.52 .02 .88 .01 4.31

.38 .00 .43 .00 1.37 .01 18.70 .20 .74 .01 4.46 .05 11.46 .12 7.24 .08 11.22 .12 .39 .00 2.17 .02 1.22 .01 1.40

.35 .00 .98 .01 2.83 .03 13.26 .15 1.38 .02 5.29 .06 .74 .01 3.00 .03 25.94 .29 .91 .01 .69 .01 .74 .01 3.07

.25 .00 .53 .01 3.26 .05 9.39 .13 1.25 .02 5.95 .08 4.39 .06 3.04 .04 17.53 .25 .01 .00 .65 .01 .38 .01 8.05

.34 .00 .36 .01 5.26 .07 1.88 .03 1.48 .02 5.62 .08 4.04 .06 2.73 .04 32.19 .45 .32 .00 1.64 .02 3.22 .05 3.00

.

Table 3 Continued

EGYPT

ALGERIA

MAURITANIA

MOROCCO

TUNISIA

TOTAL ARAB

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

.03 8.82 .02 19.49 .05 .81 .00 12.35 .03 4.16 .01

.01 9.17 .02 11.98 .03 1.86 .00 4.49 .01 7.94 .02

.11 33.83 .22 17.14 .11 .43 .00 4.86 .03 6.21 .04

.11 8.36 .06 25.75 .18 .15 .00 4.19 .03 4.66 .03

.04 6.16 .03 31.27 .14 .47 .00 6.28 .03 8.04 .04

.01 2.82 .01 25.37 .11 .09 .00 3.02 .01 12.44 .05

.04 4.37 .04 49.13 .49 .05 .00 .81 .01 3.99 .04

.02 1.84 .02 27.99 .30 .75 .01 5.29 .06 2.94 .03

.03 8.31 .09 26.96 .30 .22 .00 .69 .01 4.65 .05

.11 8.10 .11 29.73 .42 .74 .01 4.92 .07 1.83 .03

.04 7.72 .11 21.85 .31 .56 .01 3.98 .06 3.80 .05

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

_

.27

.22

.66

.69

.46

.43

.99

1.09

1.11

1.41

1.40

Table 4 Imports of Canada From the Arab World (000 Canadian Dollars) 1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

TUNISIA

5. 0. 4626. 554. 5. 3865. 409. 0. 36187. 0. 19. 191. 42. 380. 139. 0. 968. 185.

0. 0. 14923. 8838. 0. 6071. 853. 8872. 26751. 0. 404. 304. 5. 1144. 43. 291. 447. 19.

0. 0. 7163. 14410. 1. 7039. 911. 10. 24074. 0. 28. 155. 9. 422. 195. 0. 342. 5.

593. 4. 4879. 17118. 0. 16. 994. 6196. 27215. 0. 1430. 144. 250. 272. 347. 0. 525. 6.

5263. 640. 27063. 12857. 3. 2592. 3303. 40620. 54634. 1. 603. 161. 427. 402. 1194. 4. 726. 18.

749. 0. 50256. 20549. 0. 3693. 1945. 41637. 60381. 1. 23864. 163. 20. 493. 1428. 4780. 1801. 51.

264. 0. 86386. 36671. 0. 64729. 22501. 30557. 318906. 2. 104262. 532. 90. 688. 6767. 7206. 1056. 126.

8. 6411. 140590. 133957. 7. 110522. 1320. 36149. 745963. 56. 196655. 179. 1210. 334. 1706. 14. 2114. 111.

1. 1. 61982. 133629. 11. 22439. 447. 107322. 481607. 0. 201715. 533. 51. 10300. 65420. 0. 2769. 59.

1. 0. 14192. 111317. 18. 20064. 298. 10. 712283. 4. 5853. 123. 99. 33840. 47823. 1. 3504. 130.

0. 4. 109. 131104. 0. 46. 339. 1. 749411. 0. 43. 322. 72. 81965. 62089. 3. 2777. 61.

TOTAL ARAB

47575.

68965.

54764.

59989.

150511.

211811.

680743.

1377306.

1088286.

949560.

1028346.

BAHRAIN QATAR EMIRATES IRAQ JORDAN KUWAIT LEBANON LIBYA S.A.

SOMALIA YEMEN SUDAN SYRIA EGYPT ALGERIA MAURITANIA MOROCCO

TOTAL CAN. ISRAEL

12360188. 14130376. 13951903. 15618106. 18669426. 23323494. 31722126. 34715708. 37444388. 42155972. 49683997. 12889.

15067.

14468.

Source: Statistics Canada, Cansim, External Trade.

15419.

16701.

22493.

24778.

28212.

38397.

42548.

44881.

CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

53

Merchandise Imports The value of Canadian imports from the Arab World has also increased very substantially since 1960, from as low as $66 million (U.S. dollars) in 1960 to over $2511 million (U.S. dollars) in 1980—an increase of over 38 times in 20 years.4 The principal Canadian import from the Arab World is oil. By 1975, the bulk of Canada's oil imports came from the Arab World. The latest trade figures show that Canada imported over $2.087 billion (U.S. dollars) worth of oil from Saudi Arabia alone in 1980.5 Imports from the Arab World now (1980) account for over 56.9% of total Canadian imports from OPEC countries combined. This ratio was only 23% in 1973 and less than 10.3% as recently as 1971. Similar changes are also observed in the ratio of Canadian imports from the Arab World to her total imports. In 1971, this ratio was 0.42%, whereas it stood at 4.15% in 1980. It is worth noting that in 1980 Canada imported more goods— actually 1.5 times as much—from the Arab World than it did from Britain. (See Table 5.) Again, as with exports, Canadian imports from the Arab World come principally from two countries, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. In 1978, the latter two countries accounted for about 86% of total Canadian Arab imports. In 1980, Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 83.1% of this total. Table 6, which represents the shares of Arab countries in Canadian Arab imports between 1968 and 1978, has a large number of zeros or numbers close to zero as well as ratios that in one year spring up with high values only to fall back in the next year or so to negligible values. In other words, Canadian imports from the Arab World are heavily concentrated among a few countries and are subject generally to wide swings. Israel's share of Canadian imports which was as high as a quarter of Canadian imports from the Arab World in 1968, has fallen in recent years (1980) to as low as 1.9%. Balance of Trade The excessive fluctuations in Canadian-Arab trade and its concentration in a few countries are reflected in the individual Arab countries' balances of trade with Canada. In 1978, Canada had a favorable balance of trade with every Arab country except Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. A similar picture held in 1968, with the United Arab Emirate replacing Egypt in that year. The total balance of trade of Canada with the Arab countries as a group is negative for most of the period between 1968 and 1978, the only exceptional years being 1970 and 1971. (See Table 7.)

Table 5 Canadian Imports from the Arab Worlc^ Some Comparative Statistics, 1960-1980 (million U.S. $)

IMPORTS FROM

1960

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

WORLD

5590 5786 5851 6082 6945 7987 9128 10251 11942 13684 13992 15976 19414 24028 33424 35157 39130 40827 44806 55126 60438

INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

4845

3770 3876 4025 4124 4792 5595 6605 7426 8380 9544 9465 10850 13056 16511 21649 23074 26142 27834 30688 38607 41201

597

5007 5065 5153 5982 7009 8126 9116 10188 11727 11795 13729 16707 20405 26713 28031 31506 33485 37331 46678 50031

Source: U.N. Direction of Trade, Various Issues.

620

526 488 532 573 596 623 644 732 705 829 958 1C06 1148 1197 1169 1205 1399 1650 1682

OIL EXPORTING CTYS.

344 362 340 374 363 379 343 410 485 492 506 563 691 917 2530 3073 3076 2697 2506 2906 4416

TOTAL OF ARAB COUNTRIES

66 76 54 63 32 71 64 43 48 63 48 58 152 211 668 1352 1129

892 897 1338 2511

CANADIAN ARAB IMPORTS AS % Of

WORLD

1.18 1.31

.92 1.04

.46 .89 .70 .42 .40 .46 .34 .36 .95 .88 2.00 3.85 2.89 2.18 2.0C 2.43 4.15

CANADIAN ARAB LM POSTS AS % OF INDUSTRIAL

CANADIAN ARAB IMPORTS AS % OF U.S.

CANADIAN ARAB IMPORTS AS % OF U.K.

CANADIAN ARAB IMPOSTS AS % OF OIL EXI>. CTVS.

1.36 1.52 1.07 1.22

1.75 1.96 1.34 1.53

11.06 12.26 10.27 12.91 6.02 12.39 10.74 6.90 7.45 8.61 6.81 7.00 15.87 20.97 58.19 112.95 96.58 74.02 64.12 81.09 149.29

19.19 20.99 15.88 16.84 8.82 18.73 18.66 10.49 9.90 12.80 9.49 10.30 22.00 23.01 26.40 44.00 36.70 33.07 35.79 46.04 56.86

.53

.67

1.01

1.27

.79 .47 .47 .54 .41 .42

.97 .58 .57 .66 .51 .53

1.11 1.03 2.50 4.82 3.58 2.66 2.40 2.87 5.02

1.16 1.28 3.09 5.86 4.32 3.20 2.92 3.47 6.09

Table 6 Imports as Percent of A) Total Imports from Arab Countries B) Total Canadian Imports

BAHRAIN QATAR EMIRATES IRAQ JORDAN

KUWAIT

LEBANON LIBYA

S.A.

SOMALIA YEMEN SUDAN

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

.01 .00 .00 .00 9.72 .04 1.16 .00 .01 .00 8.12 .03 .86 .00 .00 .00 76.06 .29 .00 .00 .04 .00 .40 .00

.00 .00 .00 .00 21.64 .11 12.82 .06 .00 .00 8.80 .04 1.24 .01 12.86 .06 38.79 .19 .00 .00 .59 .00 .44 .00

.00 .00 .00 .00 13.08 .05 26.31 .10 .00 .00 12.85 .05 1.66 .01 .02 .00 43.96 .17 .00 .00 .05 .00 .28 .00

.99 .00 .01 .00 8.13 .03 28.54 .11 .00 .00 .03 .00 1.66 .01 10.33 .04 45.37 .17 .00 .00 2.38 .01 .24 .00

3.50 .03 .43 .00 17.98 .14 8.54 .07 .00 .00 1.72 .01 2.19 .02 26.99 .22 36.30 .29 .00 .00 .40 .00 .11 .00

.35 .00 .00 .00 23.73 .22 9.70 .09 .00 .00 1.74 .02 .92 .01 19.66 .18 28.51 .26 .00 .00 11.27 .10 .08 .00

.04 .00 .00 .00 12.69 .27 5.39 .12 .00 .00 9.51 .20 3.31 .07 4.49 .10 46.85 1.01 .00 .00 15.32 .33 .08 .00

.00 .00 .47 .02 10.21 .40 9.73 .39 .00 .00 8.02 .32 .10 .00 2.62 .10 54.16 2.15 .00 .00 14.28 .57 .01 .00

.00 .00 .00 .00 5.70 .17 12.28 .36 .00 .00 2.06 .06 .04 .00 9.86 .29 44.25 1.29 .00 .00 18.54 .54 .05 .00

.00 .00 .00 .00 1.49 .03 11.72 .26 .00 .00 2.11 .05 .03 .00 .00 .00 75.01 1.69 .00 .00 .62 .01 .01 .00

.00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 12.75 .26 .00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00 .00 .00 72.88 1.51 .00 .00 .00 .00 .03 .00

Table 6 Continued

SYRIA

EGYPT

ALGERIA

MAURITANIA

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

.09 .00 .80 .00 .29 .00 .00

.01 .00 1.66 .01 .06 .00 .42 .00 .65 .00 .03 .00

.02 .00 .77 .00 .36 .00 .00 .00 .62 .00 .01 .00

.42 .00 ,45 .00 .58 .00 .00 .00 .88 .00 .01 .00

.28 .00 .27 .00 .79 .01 .00 .00 .48 .00 .01 .00

.01 .00 .23 .00 .67 .01 2.26 .02 .85 .01 .02 .00

.01 .00 .10 .00 .99 .02 1.06 .02 .16 .00 .02 .00

.09 .00 .02 .00 .12 .00 .00 .00 .15 .01 .01 .00

.00 .00 ,95 .03 6.01 .17 .00 .00 .25 .01 .01 .00

.01 .00 3.56 .08 5.04 .11 .00 ,00 .37 .01 .01 .00

.01 .00 7.97 .16 6.04 .12 .00 .00 .27 .01 .01 .00

.00 MOROCCO

TUNISIA

2.03 .01 .39 .00

CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

57

Exports of Services and Capital Inflows What is missing from the trade statistics on exports is the value of services exports. The recorded, great increase in the value of Canadian exports to the Arab World between 1960 and 1980 would be even higher if we were to add to the exports of goods the enormous increase in Canadian exports of services. A recent illustration is the contract secured by Bell Canada from Saudi Arabia which amounts to several billion dollars. Other examples include the substantial contracts awarded to Canadian construction companies to build King Abdul Aziz University in Riyadh, the cement factory in Algeria, the shoe factory in Baghdad, the pulp and paper mill in Basra, the gas-liquefication plant in Dubai, and the ICARDA project in Aleppo-Syria.6 These projects are but a small subset of large projects awarded to Canadian concerns. It is difficult to quantify the total value of these contracts, but informed guesses place a value of $7 billion on them over the period 1975-1980.7 In addition to these contracts there are large capital inflows from the Arab oil-producing countries into Canada. The large financial surpluses of this group are estimated to have reached over $250 billion (in U.S. dollars) in 1980, and it is widely known that a large portion of this has come to Canada. Although the confidential nature of these transactions makes it difficult to estimate the amounts involved with any accuracy, occasional press reports do provide some clues to the magnitude of these flows. For instance, a report published by Maclean's magazine in 1975 claims that "...the word in the investment and banking communities is that Arab oil money is very much a factor in the Canadian economy. More than $1.5 billion have been invested here during the past 18 months and investment bankers are hoping for at least that much in the next 12 months."8 And those were the estimates in 1975 when Arab "petrofunds" were below $100 billion! Surely a larger volume can be expected to have surfaced in Canada since then given a number of considerations: the desire of Arab portfolio managers to diversify their placements of capital; the security Canada provides; the active Canadian International banks in the Arab World; and the active pursuit of sources of international finance by provincial governments or their corporations (e.g., Ontario Hydro and Quebec Hydro—several reports indicate that provincial public utilities sold more than $500 million worth of bonds in the Arabian Peninsula in 1974-1975.)9 Whatever the exact amounts, it is clear that several Arab oil-producing countries are emerging as supplementary or alternative sources of capital for Canadian enterprises, thus reducing to some extent Canada's traditional dependence on the U.S. capital and money markets.

Table 7 Canada's Balance of Trade with Arab Countries (000 Canadian Dollars)

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

TUNISIA

133. -3880. 386. 302. -1294. 3097. 873. -32019. 17. 80. 1890. 4685. 2927. 7173. 305. 3666. 1376.

87. 158. -10715. -6003. 647. -4337. 2906. -6474. -22975. 38. -382. 220. 933. 1857. 3876. 316. 1023. 2579.

85. 82. -6839. -10198. 386. -5915. 4075. 3340. -16820. 22. -24. 1294. 18638. 37376. 18953. 481. 5083. 6935.

-433. 191. -3200. 15357. 144. 1190. 4055. -4528. -21847. 77. -1417. 1090. 20025. 9944. 31121. 184. 4595. 5692.

-4816. -406. -26276. -9238. 404. 158. 10792. -35916. -47514. 265. -577. 2198. 7344. 5344. 27984. 439. 5138. 7488.

TOTAL ARAB

-10067.

-36246.

56954.

62240.

-57189.

- 102972. -359784. -1015492.

CAN.

1318855.

740628.

2868163.

2201989.

1480548.

2097211.

-2454.

2658.

577.

5451.

8734.

14723.

BAHRAIN QATAR EMIRATES IRAQ JORDAN KUWAIT LEBANON LIBYA S.A. SOMALIA YEMEN SUDAN SYRIA EGYPT ALGERIA MAURITANIA MOROCCO

ISRAEL

216.

Source: Tables 1 and 2.

1976

1977

1978

875. 40. 1375. 1475. 1594. 2491. 436. -4868. 3523. 3351. 2667. 4160. -48337. -81490. -135636. -49925. 6237. 38726. - 19494. -17317. -66280. -77075. -52433. -117212. 5416. 2662. 5864. 10959. 580. 7828. -1845. -59786. -94395. 125. 17235. 41443. 19441. 22647. 40136. 2694. 27233. 29452. -28739. -24687. -9956. -94547. 19081. 20166. -47031. -300934. -705361. -370978. -602319. -511791. 1371. 832. 55. 2344. 731. 3901. -23013. -96185. -188787. -198768. -1792. 12056. 2277. 3071. 4228. 2602. 2275. 23466. 3872. 2034. 13748. 13055. 50357. 22102. 13340. 6336. 2575. 25149. 16970. -24964. 99574. 49571. 138640. 99199. 26181. 150908. 919. -4680. 2704. 4612. 4138. -7061. 1540. 27337. 1490. 17015. 194. 26610. 13487. 12671. 10518. 19794. 11325. 27990. -661790.

-322414.

-290158.

720362. -1387394.

952206.

2219506.

2957690.

37479.

22450.

9652.

36980.

27730.

CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

59

Future Prospects of Canadian-Arab Economic Relations It is difficult to quantify the potential of the Arab countries as an export market for Canadian products and services in the short and medium terms. Differences in economic cycles of the countries concerned, price fluctuations in world commodity markets, currency fluctuations, political tensions, and a host of other variables tend to render forecasting a hazardous exercise. On the other hand, there are a number of factors that suggest that a greater volume of trade could be realized than has hitherto been the case between Canada and the Arab World. First, Canada and the Arab World are major trading countries. Canada's exports and imports were about 4.2% of world trade in 1979, whereas the corresponding Arab World trade share exceeded 7.5%.10 Furthermore, Canada and all the Arab countries show fairly high foreign trade percentages (exports plus imports divided by GNP). In fact, for some Arab countries, foreign trade percentages exceed their GNPs. (See Table 8.) These observations indicate that the size of mutual trade between Canada and the Arab states could be expected to be very substantial; each being a large trading country, they could be expected to be major partners in each other's trade. Another factor which must be taken into consideration is the structure of each country's trade—a structure derived, in turn, from the specific attributes of each country, such as its level of development and its human and physical resources. Trade structures may make Canada and any Arab country particularly fit, or particularly unfit, to trade with each other. If Canada happens to specialize in just the range of goods that the Arab World tends to concentrate its imports, whereas the Arab World exports particularly heavily those goods which Canada tends to buy abroad in large volumes, then the size of mutual trade would tend to be substantial and would reinforce the expectations based on sheer size in world trade. To investigate this possibility, an index has been developed and applied to the trade of Canada and each Arab country. The index is designed to estimate the degree of proximity of these flows: that is, the proximity of the commodity structure of Canada's exports to that of the Arab countries' imports, and of the Arab countries' exports and Canada's imports. The index for country j's exports and country k's imports used is constructed as follows:

Table 8 Arab Foreign Trade, 1970-1977 (Million U.S.$)

IM-

COUNTRY JORDAN

YEAR 1970 1977

UAE

BAHRAIN TUNISIA ALGERIA DJIBUTI SAUDI ARABIA SUDAN SYRIA SOMALIA IRAQ OMAN QATAR KUWAIT LEBANON LIBYA EGYPT MOROCCO MAURITANIA NORTH YEMEN SOUTH YEMEN

1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1974 1970 1977 1970 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1976 1970 1976 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977

GDP

IMPORTS

587 1536 1470 13288 244 354 1444 4957 5132 19412 104 166 3866 58170 2672 1684 6615 187 311 3591 15662 278 2527 302 2864 2691 13013 1489 2523 3991 19360 7034 18168 3828 10397 176 444 426 1239 170 359

1232 243 4094 221 1772 271 1560 1164 6595 629 12635 257 333 2461 39 198 454 4481 781 57 742 544 2891 605 1570 504 3438 715 4378 624 3814 49 183 30 945 179 544

165

GDP%

EXPORTS

28.1 80.2 16.5 30.8 90.6 500.6 18.8 31.5 22.7 34.0 16.3 21.7 9.6 19.8 37.2 20.8 63.7 12.6 28.6 30.9 18.9 25.9 20.2 22.2 40.6 62.2 12.6 17.8 10.2 24.1 16.3 36.7 27.8 41.2 7.0 76.3 105.3 151.5

34 249 550 9476 212 1845 183 928 1008 5927 2173 41207 298 203 1063 31 63 1094 9664 1573 258 2209 1693 9830 192 626 2832 9761 762 1708 488 1301 89 157 3 11 145 135

PORTS

EX-

FOREIGN

PORTS

TRADE

GDP% (%) RATIO 5.8

16.2

37.4 71.3 86.9 521.2 12.7 18.7 19.6 30.5 56.2 70.8 11.2 12.1 16.1 16.5 20.7 30.5 61.7 62.2 85.4 77.1 62.9 75.5 12.9 24.8 71.0 50.4 10.8 9.4 12.7 12.5 50.5 35.4 0.7 0.8 85.3 37.6

33.9 96.4 53.9 102.1 177.5 1021.8 31.5 50.2 42.3 64.5 72.5 92.5 20.8 31.9 53.3 37.3 84.2 43.2 90.3 93.1 104.3 103.0 83.1 97.7 53.5 87.0 82.6 68.2 21.0 33.5 29.0 49.2 78.3 76.6 7.7 77.1 190.6 189.1

Sources: (1) IMF: International Financial Statistics, April, 1980. (2) Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of the Arab Countries (Abu Dhabi, February 1980). (3) Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.

CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD 61 where, ik

M ;k

= index of concordance of country j's exports with country k's imports; = share of exports of good i in country j's total exports; and = share of imports of good i in country j's total imports

It should be noted that, under the summation sign, absolute differences (regardless of sign) between export and import shares are aggregated. In an identical way Smjex^ is the index of concordance of country j's import structure with that of country k's exports.11 It is defined as follows:

The potential range of these indices lies between 0 and 1. Should the structure of j's exports be completely identical (in terms of the relative share of each good in the aggregate) with that of country k's imports; the term under the summation would be zero, and the value of the index i would be unity. In the other extreme, should country j export exclusively goods of which country k imports nothing, the value of the term under the summation sign would be 1, and the value of the index of concordance would be zero. Hence, given the aggregate sizes of the trade flows of the two countries, an index of unity would indicate the highest potential trade between the two, while a zero value would mean no potential for trading exists. In general, the higher the value of the indices between the trade flows of any pair of countries, the greater is the potential of trade between the two. As the results of Table 9 indicate, Canada's Arab trade indices of concordance show that the Arab countries' imports structure is generally favorable to Canada's exports. On the other hand, the index of concordance of Canada's imports with Arab exports is low (with the exception of Lebanon). On this evidence, admittedly very tentative, Canada's exports to the Arab World are below potential and less than expected from the countries, respective trade sizes and trade flows' structure. On a country by country basis, Canada's structure of exports aligns fairly well with the imports of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. It is also consistent, although to a lesser extent, with the imports of Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, and Tunisia. Given that Canada has limited trade with those Arab countries whose trade structure best fits Canada's, it is possible that greater trade flows could be established with these coun-

Table 9 Index of Concordance (Sj k ) of Trade Flows 1977

Canadian Exports with Imports of:

ALGERIA

.501

ISRAEL

.413

IRAQ

.319 .512 .488 .401 .501 .325 .357 .378 .375 .424 .373

JORDAN LEBANON LIBYA MOROCCO QATAR SAUDI ARABIA SUDAN SYRIA TUNISIA UNITED ARAB EMIRATE

Canadian Imports with Exports of:

.415

EGYPT

ALGERIA EGYPT ISRAEL IRAQ JORDAN KUWAIT LEBANON LIBYA MOROCCO QATAR SAUDI ARABIA SUDAN SYRIA TUNISIA UNITED ARAB EMIRATE

.109 .239 .330 .090 .376 .158 .573 .085 .184 .085 .085 .065 .209 .260 .097

Source: Trade Data for 2-digit SITC drawn from U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1980.

CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

63

tries. However, the magnitudes of these flows should not be exaggerated, as this set of Arab countries is relatively poor and has limited resources. On the Arab exports side, the low indices of concordance are a reflection of the concentrated structure of the exports of most Arab countries. If oil were to be removed, these indices would fall to zero for the majority of the countries. Lebanon stands alone with a significantly positive index, but this index is for Lebanon before the destruction of its export capabilities during the Civil War and consequently is of limited value. Two important questions remain unanswered. What about the magnitudes of the commodity flows? Is it possible to develop a forecast of the volume of trade between Canada and the Arab World? The first question may be answered indirectly by examining the proportions of Canadian exports in total Arab imports by commodity. It is clear from the data in Table 10 that Canada could at best (directing all its exports of the commodity to the Arab World) supply 53.6% of the food and live animals imports of the Arab World. If cereals were considered separately, Canada could satisfy 96.2% of Arab import needs. Canada could satisfy all Arab imports of crude metals by directing only 25% of her exports of these materials to the Arab states. In wood and lumber, the ratio of Canadian exports to Arab imports is 2.3 times. In pulp and paper, the ratio is 35.6 times. Even in the case of mineral fuels, especially coal, Canada could easily meet Arab demands. Chemical and chemical products are not in abundant supply in Canada, and yet Canada could have supplied 52.6% of Arab imports in 1977. Manufactured exports are not a major item of Canadian exports but represent a major item of Arab imports. Canada's exports, however, could have supplied 47.7% of the Arab imports of these products in 1977. In particular, Canada could easily have supplied all the Arab import needs for paper products and nonferrous metals with about 25% of her exports of these products in 1977. Transport equipment and machinery account for about 42% of total Arab imports and Canada could have supplied 55.7% of these requirements. In the case of transport equipment Canada's exports were 1.25 times the total Arab imports of this product in 1977. The ratios of Canadian exports to Arab imports by commodities substantiate the earlier contention that trade between Canada and the Arab World could be further increased. But the real question is by how much? Here only the broadest of estimates can be made. One such estimate would be to forecast total Arab imports and to project the share of Canada in these imports, based on the existing structure of trade. Such a simple calculation leads to an estimate of over $1.5 billion per year

Table 10 The Proportions of Canada's Exports of Total Arab Imports By Commodity in 1977

COMMODITY

TOTAL IMPORTS

CANADA'S

RATIO

OF ARAB

EXPORTS

(3)/(2)

(2)

(3)

(4)

7303348. 545748. 742083. 41216. 2372601. 882456. 766387. 906525. 271003. 98739. 574690. 118632. 420479. 2324131. 81942. 224650. 40599. 1024024. 57381. 333930. 291969. 40557. 27927. 2639160. 101151. 2459508. 35244. 509170. 70126. 353673. 19240. 3222854. 663207. 24703. 269514. 666303. 252954. 139264. 512829. 462217. 15100829. 32818.

3917900. 211468. 0. 748275. 2281336. 158827. 0. 0. 150003. 0. 356172. 290898. 0. 8557004. 151126. 414382. 141039. 2356819. 2045884. 0. 766381. 2545276. 0. 5170928. 6044075. 1884743. 2327804. 122958. 0. 0. 0. 1695532. 802827. 1008. 0. 0. 0. 620316. 98475. 0. 7196658. 0.

53.65 38.75 0.00 1815.50 96.15 18.00 0.00 0.00 55.35 0.00 61.98 245.21 0.00 368.18 184.43 184.46 347.40 230.15 3565.44 0.00 262.49 6275.80 0.00 195.93 5975.30 76.63 6604.82 24.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.61 121.05 4.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 445.42 19.20 0.00 47.66 0.00

COUNTRIES (I)

FOOD AND LIVE ANIMALS MEAT AND PREPARATIONS DAIRY PRODUCTS AND EGGS FISH AND PREPARATIONS CEREALS AND PREPARATIONS FRUIT AND VEGETABLES SUGAR AND PREPS HONEY COFFEE, TEA, COCOA, SPICES ANIMAL FEEDING STUFF MISC. FOOD PREPARATIONS BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO BEVERAGES TOBACCO AND MFRS. CRUDE MATLS EXCL. FUEL HIDES, SKIN, FURS, UNDRSSD OIL SEEDS, NUTS, KERNELS RUBBER CRUDE, SYN, NATURAL WOOD LUMBER AND CORK PULP AND WASTE PAPER TEXTILE FIBRES CRUDE FERTLZR, MINRLS NES METALLIFEROUS ORES, SCRAP CRUDE ANIMAL, VEG MAT NES MINERAL FUELS ETC. COAL, COKE, BRIQUETTES PETROLEUM AND PRODUCTS GAS NATURAL AND MANUFCT ANIMAL, VEGETABLE OIL, FAT ANIMAL OILS AND FATS FIXED VEGETABLE OIL, FAT PROCESD ANML VEG OIL, FAT CHEMICALS CHEM ELEMENTS, COMPOUNDS COAL, PETROLEUM ETC. CHEM DYES, TANNING, COLOUR PROD MEDICINAL ETC. PRODUCTS PERFUME, CLEANING ETC. PRO. FERTILIZERS

MANUFACTUR

PLASTIC MATERIALS CHEMICALS NES BASIC MANUFACTURES LEATHER, DRESSED FUR, ETC

Table 10 Continued TOTAL IMPORTS

CANADA'S

RATIO

OF ARAB

EXPORTS

(3)/(2)

(2)

(3)

(4)

SPECIAL TRANSACTIONS

578918. 761783. 681330. 2610615. 3169422. 3211089. 523344. 3498849. 24277254. 10544612. 5421606. 7700649. 4916734. 332707. 560315. 91828. 1092012. 134876. 1078819. 1522340. 310299. 3611. 91439.

160742. 384945. 2668456. 143520. 182710. 996504. 2122005. 502745. 13522456. 3375489. 825245. 9321721. 668619. 0. 0. 0. 124253. 0. 148301. 253504. 84854. 0. 70899.

27.77 50.53 391.65 5.50 5.76 31.03 405.47 14.37 55.70 32.01 15.22 121.05 13.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.38 0.00 13.75 16.65 27.35 0.00 77.54

Total*

58961763.

45322001.

COMMODITY

COUNTRIES (I)

RUBBER MANUFACTURES NES WOOD, CORK, MANUFACTRS NES PAPER, PAPERBOARD AND MFR TEXTILE YARN, FABRIC ETC. NONMETAL MINERAL MFS NES IRON AND STEEL NON-FERROUS METALS METAL MANUFACTURES NES MACHINES, TRANSPORT EQUIP MACHINERY, NON-ELECTRIC ELECTRICAL MACHINERY TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT MISC MANUFACTURED GOODS PLUMBING, HEATING, LGHTNG EQU FURNITURE TRAVEL GOODS, HANDBAGS CLOTHING FOOTWEAR INSRMNTS, WATCHES, CLOCKS MISC MANUFCTRD GOODS NES GOODS NOT CLASSD BY KIND MAIL NOT CLASSED BY KIND

Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1979. *Total of all components of imports of Arab countries or exports of Canada, including components not shown in this table.

66

A. KUBURSI

extending to $3 billion by 1985. This in itself would make the Arab World a significant market for Canada. There are reasons to believe that Canada can augment its share of the Arab market in the next few years since: (1) Canadian firms are often thought to be politically neutral and therefore free of negative political designs; (2) Canadian firms are constantly acquiring more experience and expertise in doing business in the Arab World; (3) the Canadian Government is now devoting far greater resources than in the past to trade promotion in Arab countries. Steps have been taken to help Canadian firms compete with larger international corporations to secure contracts for major projects, especially those requiring wide ranges of skills and huge outlays of capital. The recent creation of the Centre for Joint Ventures in the Federal Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce is a step in this direction. Moreover, the Federal and Provincial governments organize frequent trade missions to the Arab World and defray part of the cost of travel of businessmen to the area.12 (4) Canada has reoriented its international development assistance to provide an "outward-looking expression of the bi-lingual character of Canada." Canada's bilateral economic assistance efforts until very recently were concentrated almost exclusively in Commonwealth countries. The practical results of this policy have been the initiation of aid programs in several French-speaking, NorthAfrican Arab countries. These programs are expected to initiate trade flows.13 These efforts have already begun to pay, and are expected to promote further the trade flows between Canada and the Arab World. There are, however, some negative aspects that may have worked to limit the expansion of Arab-Canadian trade: (1) Several Arab governments and business concerns perceive or are led to perceive Canada as a branch-plant economy where major economic decisions are made in the United States rather than in Canada. The foreign ownership statistics for Canada lend credence to such perceptions. (2) The Canadian market is characterized by the dominance of small firms often with less than the minimum efficient scale of production and catering primarily to a highly protected and differentiated market. This situation is responsible for (a) significantly higher costs of production than is true in the United States, and (b) a lack of interest and experience in marketing abroad. (3) Arab requirements are often big and bulky, and require heavy

CANADA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD

67

initial costs be borne by the contractors. Canadian contractors often lack the size and the resources to compete with large U.S. and European competitors. (4) Regionalism and the multiplicity of governments in Canada confuses the Arabs and complicates their dealings with Canada. (5) The Canadian government has approached economic relations with the Arab World on the premise that economics can be separated from political influences. This is viewed by the Arabs as unrealistic. It is a widely-held principle in the Arab World that economic power is one of the diplomatic tools of international relations. These tools must and should be used to pursue national interests and assert national rights. Canada's indifference in the past and at times flagrant disregard of Arab aspirations and interests were considered by the Arabs as hostile acts, and these attitudes were often translated into reduced purchases. Canadian assertions of political neutrality in the Middle East have not been backed by overt actions. The latter are needed to persuade the hesitant Arabs. (6) Trade in the Arab World is generally handled by government agencies which necessitates government to government dealings. Canada has not as of yet developed extensive ties with Arab governments.14 Conclusions Canadian-Arab economic relations have undergone significant changes in the past decade. The Arab World today represents a major market for a host of Canadian products and Arab oil comprises over half of Canadian oil imports. The rate of change of exports and imports between the two partners indicates that this trade will become increasingly important. To this commodity trade should be added the export of Canadian services, especially those of construction and industrial plant development which often involve several billion dollar contracts. Trade between Canada and the Arab World, however high the growth of its components, is still not as high as it should or could be. The analysis of concordance indices and trade ratios suggest that a larger volume of trade is supportable. For this to take place, a number of positive steps must be taken to ensure a better competitive posture for Canadian firms vis-a-vis other competitors. In addition, Canada is called upon to articulate a clear political understanding of Arab national aspirations consistent with their new economic reality. Arabs and Canadians have a lot to gain from each other. The potential is great but so too are the challenges.

68

A. KUBURSI

Acknowledgement The author wishes to thank Karen Scott and Pang Poon for excellent research assistance and Peter George and David Butterfield for helpful criticism and comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of Calgary Conference on Canadian-Arab Relations, 24 June 1981. Notes 1. Samuel P.S. Ho and R.W. Huenemann, Canada's Trade With China: Patterns and Prospects (Montreal: Private Planning Association of Canada, 1972), p. 1. 2. Statistics Canada, Exports: Merchandise Trade, Catalogue 65-202, Various Issues. 3. Algeria has also become the major trading partner of Canada in Africa. 4. United Nations, Direction of Trade (April, 1981). 5. Ibid. 6. L. A. Delvoie, "Growth in economic relations of Canada and the Arab World," International Perspective (November, December 1976): 32. 7. Estimates of the General Directorate of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Beirut. 8. As quoted by L. A. Delvoie, "Growth in economic relations of Canada and the Arab World": 32. 9. Ibid. 10. United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (1980). 11. These indices are similar to those used by M. Michaely, "Multilateral balancing in international trade, "American Economic Review, LII (September, 1962): 685-702. 12. The Export Development Corporation is known to underwrite the nonbusiness risks of Canadian corporations in the Middle East. 13. Starting with a few modest programs launched in the 1900s Canada's aid to Arab North-African countries in the 1970s has become more diversified and financially more significant. A number of fields are now covered: agriculture, fisheries, public health, education and communications. Disbursements for the Maghreb from CIDA increased from $14.3 million in 1970/71 to over $30.4 million in 1978/79. See CIDA, "Canada and Development Cooperation," Annual Reports, Various Issues. 14. Robert L. Stanfield, "Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa" (February, 1980), pp. 24 and 25 (see pp. 205-06 in this book).

CHAPTER 5

Religious elements in the Canadian perception of Arabs Dr. Antonio R. Gualtieri IN CONTEMPORARY religious studies the term "religion" is used in different senses. For some it denotes a relation to a personal supreme being or, at least, to an otherworldly reality and power; others understand by religion, participation in an observable historical tradition that expresses and induces the faith or identity of its participants; yet others use the term in a very wide sense to indicate any ultimate value or meaning to which persons are unreservedly committed. In this presentation, religion is used in the second sense; that is, it signifies engagement with a historical accumulation of doctrines, rituals, and social patterns that are symbolic expressions of a sacred cosmos, and, at the same time, convey values and norms for the devotees' life. In short, by religion I mean perceptible historical traditions and communities like those of Jews, Christians, and Muslims. In enquiring into the religious elements in the perception of Arabs by Canadians I am, in effect, asking how Canadians perception of Islam colors their attitude towards Arabs.' The assumption that underlies this project is the identification of Muslim with Arab. The fusion of "Arab" and "Muslim" is confirmed by Robert Betts: "During the inter-war years, and particularly after 1945, a religious connotation came to be implied, so that in the past twenty-five years adherence to Islam has been added as a usually unspoken but tacitly understood criterion for full membership in the Arab community."2 In spite of the ongoing communal tension in Lebanon between Christian and Muslim Arabs, and of the Christian background of some of the radical Palestinian leadership, it is my judgment that most Canadians (and in this respect they are like most Westerners) continue to coalesce Muslim identity and Arab identity. So close is the identification that it

70

A . R . GUALTIERI

even appears to have required some effort on the part of commentators to grasp that Iranian Muslims were not Arabs! Easy as it is to ridicule such ignorance, it is not entirely irrational. As H.A.R. Gibb pointed out in Mohammedanism* (at one time probably the most widely used introductory text on Islam in English), Islam continues to bear the stamp of the Arab milieu of its provenance. The "speech" character of the Islamic revelation, that is, the conviction that the Qur'an embodies God's eternal kalam or attribute of communicative speech; the fact that the revelations were mediated in the Arabic language; the subsequent resistance to translation of the Qur'an—all these contribute to the enduring Arabic impress upon Islam. This conflation of Muslim and Arab identity has been fostered within the Arab world itself. Robert Betts claims that Nasser's widespread appeal among the masses came about "by closely linking Muslim values and identity with Arab Nationalist goals...."4 The question addressed in this paper is: How have Canadians tended to view Islam and, derivatively, the Arabs? The hypothesis that controls this presentation is that a pejorative view of Islam spills over into a derogation of Arabs. The subjective grounding for this hypothesis is my encounter with this way of thinking during almost three decades of debate and discussion on the Palestine question. The evidence profferred here is admittedly circumscribed, some of it anecdotal. This connection has, however, been well documented by Edward Said's monitoring of the press and television in the United States, reported in his book Orientalism5 and Covering Islam.6 There is every reason to suppose that the same holds true of Canadian consciousness as this is generated by and reflected in the newspapers Canadians read. 7 It remains my conviction that a sustained content analysis of Canadian popular media would confirm my extrapolations from the selected items—mainly, but not only, journalistic—that are adduced here. Denigrating Islam In a piece carried in The Ottawa Citizen on 10 April 1980 Milton Viorst of The Washington Post exposits the popular image of Muslims: "For decades, the contrast in character between Israel and the Muslim world was a fact, at least to the West. Israel was modern, democratic, ruled by reason; the Muslims were medieval, autocratic, ruled by passion."8 Although Viorst goes on to characterize the "Judaic resurgence," epitomized by the Gush Emunim, in the same pejorative terms as the "anti-rational Islamic resurgence," it is noteworthy that he sees the latter, not as an aberration, but as consistent with the prevailing ethos of the Muslim world.

R E L I G I O U S ELEMENTS IN THE P E R C E P T I O N OF ARABS

71

We can isolate four specific areas whose treatment by Western popular interpreters has caused grave and damaging distortion of the Islamic tradition and civilization as a whole. These are: (1) jihad or holy war; (2) the Islamic penal system; (3) the status of women in Islam; and (4) Muslim-Jewish historical relations. (1) Jihad One of my first encounters with a censorious assessment of Islam was in a sermon delivered about twenty-five years ago by a well-regarded Protestant preacher. In it, Islam was compared with Christianity in order to demonstrate Christianity's superiority. Whereas Muhammad sought to attain converts through compulsion at the point of the sword, Jesus, by contrast won disciples by gentle persuasion. The myth that the rapid expansion of Islam as a religion, especially during the first two centuries after the hijra, was a result of holy war and physical compulsion, dies hard in Western consciousness. This misunderstanding of jihad, this truncation of the concept into an exclusive reliance on violent coercion that ignores the dimensions of verbal witness and moral struggle, continues to the present time and constitutes a readily exploited means of vilifying the adherents of Islam. On this construction, the culture generated by the Prophet's revelations is intrinsically exclusivist, intolerant, belligerent, and cruel. The modern conflict between Israel and the Arabs tends to be perceived in terms of an intrinsic Muslim thrust for hegemony, epitomized by the doctrine of jihad. For example, a Globe and Mail editorial of 2 November 1956, characterizes Nasser as pledged to annihilate Israel, ambitious to lead the Arab states into Holy War, puffed up by his seeming defeat of Western Powers.9 Edward Said claims that, "lurking behind all of these images [of news photos and cinema, e.g., "maurauders, pirates, 'native' insurgents"] is the menace of jihad." Said also confirms the popular equation of Muslim and Arab. "Consequence: a fear that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take over the world."10 (2) Penology The following citation could be replicated numerous times. It refers to Arab application of the Qur'anic penal system and is intended to evoke a sense of censure and even contempt for its proponents. Dr. Charles Siegel, writing sarcastically in The Globe and Mail on 24 March 1979 about opposition to Ontario's anti-boycott legislation says, "I fear our Arab friends will demand the hacking off of Bill Davis's hand and Pierre Trudeau's head for their transgressions."11

72

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There can be little doubt that the execution of the Saudi princess and her lover which was widely and maliciously reported, generated a good deal of negative sentiment about Arab culture. Witness the purple prose of David Lancashire: "In a public square in Jeddah more than a year ago, a young woman in a black robe stepped from a police van and knelt in the dust; a curved sword flashed in the sun and cut off her head. The woman was a Saudi Arabian princess, convicted by a Sharia (Islamic law) court of adultery." 12 In the same vein, The Globe and Mail reported on 17 February 1979: "In Pakistan last week, President Mohammad Zia al-Haq announced laws ruling that drinkers will be flogged, thieves will have a hand chopped off, adulterers will be stoned to death."13 There can be little doubt that the residual impression of Muslims and Arabs left by the press has been one of bumbling incompetence, or, more negatively, of barbaric cruelty. Rarely is an alternative, positive image allowed to decisively challenge the negative one. For example, Norman Webster in an article about the cultural program of the Sultan of Oman in The Globe and Mail on 13 December 1980 wrote: The old Sultan was not a man for modern notions Some of his rules make comical reading. After dark, anyone walking the streets of Oman could be locked up if he wasn't carrying a lantern. Bicycles were forbidden, slaves (a quaint household institution) could not lift their eyes from the ground when walking in public. More serious were the old boy's suspicion of education and medicine...Oman remained what it had been for centuries—a land of disease, donkey paths,...ignorance and picturesque slaughter. When victors felt generous, they only cut off noses and ears.14

(3) The Status of Women The perceived Islamic subjugation of women, epitomized by the custom of purdah and the 'aba'a (the cloak-like covering equivalent to the Iranian chadour] has evoked much condemnatory comment on the social backwardness of Muslims, the effect of which is to call Arab character and culture into general disrepute. Not only purdah—the sequestering of women from public life—but also Islamic regulation of marriage providing for polygamy, and of divorce allowing unilateral repudiation by the husband, are condemned as inequitable and injurious to women. The Globe and Mail of 24 March 1979 carries a cartoon depicting three veiled and chadour clad women standing behind an Ayatollah figure. One of the women lifts her veil, sticks out her tongue and utters a contemptuous "Braaaaaaack!"15 Thus is the presumptive oppressive treatment of women in Islamic societies held up to ridicule. In a piece entitled "Saudis torn between old and new" in The Globe and Mail, on 27 August 1979, Stan McDowell perpetuates the popular

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image of Islamic subjugation of women. He writes: The Islamic guardians of public morals, old men with heavy sticks and beards rusty with henna, walk the streets driving the faithful and faithless alike to obligatory public prayer, and chasing women from public sight unless they are veiled from head to toe.16

In reviewing "Death of a Princess" mThe Globe and Mail of 13 May 1980, Debra Sharp refers to its "depiction of Saudi Arabian royal life, which keeps its women caged in palaces, bored to tears, looking for sexual flirtation as a solution to their predicament, and chastises those foolish enough to get caught."17 An even more damning piece of evidence adduced in support of the view that Islam intrinsically mistreats women was the reported debate about female circumcision. In reacting against this, some third world delegates at the UNO women's conference in Copenhagen in July, 1980, complained that the Western attention to the "barbaric practice" of clitorectomy and infibulation was motivated by sensationalism. The cumulative effect of these reports of subjugation of women has undoubtedly shaped the way outsiders assess Islam and its adherents. Gloria Steinem called Saudi Arabia "a Nazi Germany of sexual rights." (4) Muslim—Jewish Relations An intriguing development has been the emergence of revisionist history which challenges the delivered view that Jews and Muslims lived not only in relative toleration but in creative symbiosis for long periods of their joint history—most notably during what has been called by some Jewish scholars the Judaeo-Islamic age in Spain especially in the ninth and tenth centuries. My encounter with this revised perspective is partly personal, and I have as yet no way of knowing how widespread it is. The motivations of some of its proponents seems clear enough. If the view can be disseminated that Islam is inherently characterized by anti-Judaic sentiment, then the present conflict in the Middle East takes on a coloration useful to Israeli interests. Rather than seeing the causes of Arab resistance to Israel in the legitimate response of a people to the intrusion of an alien state into their midst without their consent, the contemporary struggle is presented as the continuation of an age-long Muslim antipathy to Jews. In other words, the conflict is projected as a racial and religious war, and not as a political struggle for legitimate Palestinian national rights. To this revision of Muslim history are usually added, by way of corroboration and explanation, passages from Qur'an judged to be antipathetic towards Jews.

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Because this issue of Muslim-Jewish relations is of particular interest to me, I return to it in the conclusion and deal with it more fully. What is most distressing about it is its status, in Said's words, "as an instance of how a learned perspective can support the caricatures propagated in the popular culture."18 Vindicating Islam In the face of these censured practices one may attempt a number of lines of defense, including (1) denial; (2) re-interpretation; (3) cultural relativism; (4) reformation; and (5) unfair generalization. (1) Denial The charges may be rejected, i.e., the occurrence of the condemned acts may be denied. Clearly, in some reported instances, this would only add the accusation of falsehood to that of cruelty, since the reported facts are correct. Yet, in the face of the historical animus against Islam, one must insist on asking whether the beliefs and practices of Muslims have been correctly grasped. Further, what needs frequently to be denied is the allegation or implication that such practices are widespread throughout the Islamic world or that they occur frequently in any one place. To this point we shall return. (2) Re-interpretation The accuracy of the facts in question may be affirmed but the pejorative moral assessment placed upon them may be dismissed. The death penalty for adultery or demanuition for theft—to take extreme examples—may be in sincerity held to be the appropriate moral response to culpable criminal acts. This view may not be as absurd as might at first glance appear to many. It receives some corroboration from those contemporary penological discussions where it is asserted that punishment as a deterrent does not work, witness the extremely high recidivism rate of criminals. Nor should punishment be motivated by the crude desire for revenge. Nevertheless, punishment serves an expressive function in which the community witnesses its repugnance with certain deeds and reinforces certain social values. I am not at all sure how many Muslims would want to argue this way. It is not a position I should want to defend, though in the face of our society's increasing rape, robbery, and gratuitous violence, I am compelled to acknowledge a certain force in this view. An easier instance of alternative interpretation is the status of women. While conceding that the normative role for women is the domestic one—the exercise of wifely obligations, the nurture of children, the maintenance of a home—the construction Muslims put upon this is

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radically different than Gloria Steinem's. Instead of seeing it as evidence of a belief in the fundamental inferiority and inequality of women, it is viewed as the divinely ordained division of labor between the sexes. Religious belief in different somatic and psychic natures, and correspondingly different social roles for men and women, does not mean the subjugation of women, but rather the assignment of equally valuable, different but complementary, duties in society. (3) Cultural Relativism It is possible in decrying the dissemination of unfavorable images of Arabs to fall back on an argument of cultural relativism. Particular acts, so the argument runs, cannot be assessed in isolation from the cultural matrix from which they emerge. It may be argued that within its cultural home base, an act like execution for adultery, acquires its validation. For within its own cultural context, the death penalty for adultery functions to express and reinforce the community's high valuation of family life and its repugnance at deeds which violate it. I have important reservations about this argument from cultural relativism. True, it explains and justifies certain peculiar ways of life, but it cannot, without further argument, be used to legitimate all repugnant social behavior. At certain points there is a universality of moral judgment upon certain acts. For Western audiences, the most compelling evidence for this position might well be the Holocaust. The Holocaust results from a racist way of thinking, and a correlative demonic way of acting, that stands under universal condemnation. What about the death penalty for adultery? The fact that the vast majority of Muslim societies shun this practice indicates that it is a widely rejected moral position even within the Islamic world. Accordingly, I do not believe the cultural relativist route is the best line of defense in rebutting such denigrations of Islam. Moreover, it is probable that a cultural/relativist vindication would contradict Muslim self-understanding of its own moral perspective. Qur'anic revelation of God's straight path for mankind and the social legal system inferred from the divine disclosure, are not viewed simply as historically and geographically determined creations. Rather, they are viewed—in significant measure, at least—as universal principles of conduct binding on all persons. Even within Islam this leaves the problem of discriminating between that which is eternal and universally binding, and that which is morally neutral, or ephemeral, because only culturally specific. But there must be great caution in escalating prematurely to a relativist position which would undercut the absolute quality of God's moral law.

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(4) Reformation Yet another line of vindication for Islam is that of reformist humility. In the face of specific criticisms, the rejoinder may be made that while some practices of Muslims are defective, they are not intrinsic to the Qur'anic revelation and constitute a challenge to the community to purge itself of such non-Qur'anic accretions. One hears this argument frequently with respect to the use of the woman's veil or covering and the general custom of purdah. These, so the argument runs, are not divinely revealed norms, but non-Islamic practices assimilated by Islam during its geographical expansion. Accordingly, it is manifestly unfair to condemn a tradition which is involved in the process of constant purification and reform in the light of its revealed principles. A case in point is to be found in Jane Smith's study of the place of women in Islam. She declares: "Even the most ardent defenders of the Islamic system emphasize the vast difference between what they see as the favorable circumstances outlined by the Qur'an and the serious decline that set in relative to women."19 (5) Unfair Generalization Finally, one must object to the condemnatory generalizations about an entire society and its underlying ideological ethos on the basis of isolated historical or geographical instances. To abstract such dramatic but isolated episodes of social retribution (like the execution of the Saudi princess and her lover) and to project them as typical of that society, is both scientifically objectionable and morally intolerable. Derogations of Islam may be often effectively rebutted by exposing them for what they frequently are, namely, maliciously inspired misrepresentations of the whole tradition on the basis of unfair extrapolations from particular, perhaps justly censured, practices or instances. To revert to the instance of polygamy: in the Middle East it is practiced in only two to eight percent of marriages and is abolished in places. A further instance of unfair generalization may be seen in the illegitimate extension of the rigid social control of women's dress and behavior which Stan McDowell writes about in Saudi Arabia, compared to other Arab countries. While such patriarchal regimentation may be true of Riyadh, it would not be true of Cairo, Damascus, or Baghdad. In the present day, it seems the aim of some of the perpetrators of such unfair and inaccurate characterization of Muslims has been to invalidate legitimate Arab (especially Palestinian) claims, by portraying Arabs, as a people and culture, as benighted, cruel, barbaric, and immoral, whose opposition to Israel must of necessity be seen in the light of this regressive, national character. It should be obvious that one need not make choices among these

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strategies of defense of Islam. In some cases one approach will be the appropriate one, and in others, a different sort of response will be right. Sometimes one will want to deny calumnies; in others, insist that the diverse cultural milieu justifies a practice that might well appear odd, or even wicked in another. Again, certain situations will call forth the plea that the tradition is in process of internal transformation. Yet again, the rebuttal may take the form of a defiant affirmation of a faith stance that holds to the goodness and obligation of a revealed norm, offensive as it might seem to those outside the system who remain in error of the divinely ingrained cosmic pattern. Or one might simply bewail the fact that not everything in the historical tradition is as it should be, but insist that the totality of a religious culture should not be condemned on the basis of isolated aberrant practices. But, in any case, what must be resisted is the malevolently motivated, or culpably ignorant, misrepresentation of a world-wide symbol system, and its correlative civilization and peoples. Jewish-Muslim Relations: Traditional Symbiosis or Revisionist Anti-Judaism? What I termed the revisionist treatment or Muslim-Jewish affords a good example of the need for multiple approaches in the vindication of Islam (and, consequently, the Arabs maligned in the process). An attempt to perceive accurately the quality of Muslim-Jewish historical relations, in the light of the move to discredit a positive view of them, will entail elements of denial, re-interpretation, historical perspective, recognition of reform, and the rejection of unfounded generalization. I conclude by sketching a defense of the, until recently, generally accepted favorable view of the Muslim-Jewish historical encounter. In teaching an introductory survey course on Judaism I have used as a text Leo W. Schwarz's Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People20 which, incidentally, is also used by the Jewish instructor of our department's Judaica courses. It contains an enlightening section on the JudeoIslamic age by Abraham S. Halkin. He refers to "the great fusion" and "a new historic pattern" that emerged among Jews as a result of the fecundating encounter with Islam. Arabic became the vernacular language of Jews as a result of their assimilation of Muslim civilization and, as a consequence, "there arose an atmosphere congenial to new values and new doctrines."21 Halkin concludes that, "No contact of the Jews with a foreign environment had effects which were comparable in character, or as enduring."22 The names of Maimonides and Judah Halevi, amongst others, testify to this burgeoning of Jewish creativity in a Muslim environment. The attainments of Jews under Islam are thus

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summarized by Halkin: "The fact remains that if we are looking for distinction of thought, for sentiment and diction, to say nothing of techniques or the crystallization of ancient lore, we shall find them in a large part of the poetic output of Islamic Jewry; just as we shall find depth, clear thinking, and honest scholarship in its prose."23 This Jewish cultural creativity results not only from the intellectual fertilization mediated by Islam, but also from the generous social arrangements Islam allowed to Jews and Christians as Peoples of the Book. In spite of the indignities and burdens of the head-tax on Jews and Christians, the fact remains that the high degree of communal autonomy allowed under Islamic rule enabled the florescence of Jewish life and letters. Halkin states that "Until modern times, Islamic administrative policy was generally determined by practical considerations which led to toleration and, on occasion, privilege."24 The consequence of these conditions was that "the Jews under Islam created a rich and varied Hebrew literature, one so noteworthy that the period has been called 'The Golden Age,' while the modern Western world has nothing comparable to its credit."25 It is disturbing to see how the historical record gets distorted in Zionist revisionism. In a book by Julian J. Landau, Israel and The Arabs: A Handbook of Basic Information distributed by the Embassy of Israel in Ottawa, in a chapter on "Arab Hate Propaganda" we read that "The Jews were characterized as 'People of the Book' and were forced to pay a special head tax."26 Any unwary and uninformed reader, taking these words at face value, would conclude that there was something inherently offensive in being so characterized, as a result of which the Jews were subjected to the head tax. The reality, of course, is the opposite: only the acknowledgement of Jews as Peoples of the Book—indicating that they too, like the Christians, had, along with the followers of Muhammad, received a prophetic revelation from God—gained for them that preferential social treatment that spared them the lamentable fate of, say, Buddhists in Afghanistan or the North-West Frontier Province. Since the book in question was explicitly intended for "the student of current events, the debater, and the writer,"27 one can only assume that it received wide distribution and contributed to the formation of Canadian attitudes towards Muslims and Arabs. Most distressing is Landau's uncritical imputation of Islamic antiJudaism to the sacred scripture of the Qur'an. That such passages exist (e.g., Surah 2, verse 59) is not contested, but it is necessary to insist that they receive their proper contemporary interpretation only by being seen within the context of the history of religions. The fact is that such polemical passages against other religious traditions are especially typical

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of the biblical or Hebraic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.28 In ancient Israel, in certain strands if not in the whole tradition, the enemies of Israel are the enemies of God, and terrible retribution is wreaked upon them. A case in point is the terrible fate of the Amalekites: Thus says the Lord of hosts, 'I will punish what Am'alek did to Israel in opposing them on the way, when they came up out of Egypt. Now go and smite Am'alek, and utterly destroy all that they have; do not spare them, but kill both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.'29 The New Testament contains anti-Judaic passages and affirms the sole salvific efficacy of Christ: "There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved."30 The Qur'an appropriates a similar ethos. It seems that all three "Western" monotheistic religions are characterized by absolutist truth claims that result in communal exclusiveness of a greater or lesser degree. So threatening is such an exclusivist attitude to human community and peace that it has undergone alteration or supplementing by alternative, more accommodating views. Thus rabbinic Judaism evolved a theory of the two Mosaic tablets, with the distinctive ceremonial obligations devolving only upon Jews, while the gentiles are obliged to obey only God's universal moral commands. Christianity, at various times, has had recourse to some sort of logos theory to justify a universal disclosure of divine truth in addition to the distinctively Christian one. Islam, as we have noted, formulated the doctrine of Peoples of the Book to accommodate the antecedent prophetic experience of Jews and Christians. The possession of imperial power serves to put these accommodative doctrines to the test. Since the Jews have not, until recent times, exercised political hegemony since the Maccabean period, their tolerance has not been sorely tried. The emergence, however, of the modern state of Israel, especially of Begin's Judaic "fundamentalism," and the maltreatment and even massacre of the Palestinian inhabitants of the land suggests that exclusiveness has prevailed over tolerance. The Christian record of response to other traditions, given Christianity's long social domination and political power, is well-known and, in the main, unhappy. Islam's deportment towards others—Jews and Christians, at least—emerges as quite remarkable, especially in the light of Islam's long

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temporal power which provided opportunity for persecution or extirpation of dissenters. Its accommodative device of Peoples of the Book seems to have worked tolerably well—a view corroborated by both Halkin and Goitein. Goitein points out that in spite of Islam's militant posture towards the unfaithful world: Muhammad never entirely gave up his original belief that all religions contained essentially the same truth. Therefore lovers of peace and cooperation between the various religious communities could find support for their aims in some very liberal verses in the Koran, and something of that large hearted spirit of early Islam has always been alive in the hearts of many of its followers. Consequently—and this is a very important point—Muslim law guarantees to Jews and Christians the free exercise of their religion provided that it is not offensive to Muslims.31

One tragic result of Israel's modern aggression and expansion among Arab peoples has been the resurrection by some Arabs of such polemical, anti-Judaic passages in the Qur'an from the relative dormancy into which they had historically fallen, in order to exploit them as ideological reinforcement in the struggle against Israel. Zionist apologists have alertly taken advantage of this lamentable use of Qur'anic texts by transforming a Palestinian political struggle against Israeli imperialism into an Islamic theological vendetta against Jews. Thus a book distributed by the Embassy of Israel in Ottawa introduced and edited by D.F. Green, Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel, purports to contain photographic extracts from the published proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research held at al-Azhar University in Cairo during September 1968. Assuming their authenticity (as I do, at least provisionally, while remaining disturbed by an interpretation for which 62 pages of text out of 935 are adduced in evidence), it is still necessary to protest the political use to which Green puts this material by way of unfair generalization. His argument is that because the Islamic theologians in question have so delivered themselves, then all Muslims must share similar antiJudaic attitudes and must act on them. Green speculates: "If the picture of the Jews and Judaism as portrayed by the venerable participants of this conference, is in fact, as they contend, the traditional image of the Jews in the eyes of Arab Islam, it is unthinkable that it would not have affected the feelings and behaviour of the Arabs towards the Jews. For it to have been otherwise would have amounted to a schizophrenia which is very unplausible."32 It may be unthinkable and unplausible to Green, but the historical fact, as I suggested, is that it is so: Muslims have not generally acted in

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accord with these polemical sentiments. They have not done so, first of all, because the canonical text includes within itself a countervailing instruction, namely, regard for Peoples of the Book. Secondly, it is a curious but widespread religious phenomenon for devotees not to act in terms of what outsiders might consider strict logical consistency with their sacred injunctions. I do not mean only the ordinary human trait of hypocrisy. It seems that evolving religious traditions arrive at a consensus, often implicit, regarding the appropriate application or implementation of canonical norms. The vast majority of Theravada Buddhists, for example, do not withdraw from the world and meditate. Zealous orthodox Zionist Jews within Israel have not rebuilt the Temple or reinstituted animal sacrifice. Christians, apart from some sectarians, do not turn the other cheek and refrain from resisting evil. Similarily, Muslims, as Halkin points out, have not typically applied anti-Jewish or anti-Christian Qur'anic passages in the way Green supposes they logically should. It is malicious to suggest otherwise. The absolutist and superiority claims that are endemic to putative revealed religions makes it unlikely that the interrelations of religions will be ideally harmonious. In fact, the historical record displays deviations from the moral ideal. But the absence of completely tolerant and respectful relations, does not mean we should not recognize and applaud partial and relative achievements. We may conclude with Goitein's declaration that: When the known facts are weighed, I believe it is correct to say that as a whole the position of the non-Muslims under Arab/Islam was far better than that of the Jews in Medieval Christian Europe. 33

No contemporary attempts to distort this history for whatever ulterior political motives should remain unchallenged.

Notes 1. It would be interesting to know whether this conflation of religion and nationality also occurs in the Arab perception of Canadians. Does the Arabs' image of Christianity tilt them towards a particular assessment of Canadian identity? This would be a useful question to pursue on another occasion. 2. Robert Betts, Christians in the Arab East (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978), p. xv. 3. H.A.R. Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 4. Robert Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p. xvii. 5. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books of Random House, 1978). In this book, Said argues that "Orientalism"—that Western created cultural, ideological, and institutional system of domination—is, in effect, "the history of popular anti-Arab and anti-Islamic prejudice in the West," p. 26.

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6. Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media, and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books of Random House, 1981). 7. Janice Monti Belkaoui, in her M. A. thesis for Carleton University, Image Creation in the Prestige Press: A Case Study of Arab and Israeli Images (1976), analyses the process by which a society's controlling interests and ideological elites relate to the press according to a "mass manipulative model," shaping (and hence reflecting) public images of reality that legitimate the value system of the elites. She does not, however, deal with religious elements in the popular press-fostered perception of Arabs. A study entitled, "The New Anti-Semitism: The Arab as a Scapegoat" by Mary Y. Mouammar, a York University graduate student in Political Science, was recently drawn to my attention. It is an analysis of cartoons mainly from editorial pages of daily newspapers. Some of them from The Toronto Star, containing Islamic motifs, are so offensive to religious sensibilites that I wonder how The Toronto Star avoids widespread censure and even prosecution. A Macpherson cartoon in 1974 shows a stereotypically ugly Arab in native dress kneeling in ritual prayer position on a prayer rug—really a currency bill—on which is embroidered "Ransom Money." The cartoon caption says "Moolah Be Praised." In the light of Islam's radical monotheism which entails the judgment that "association" with God or idolatry is the greatest of sins, this portrayal of a Muslim Arab worshipping money is unbelievably sacrilegious. The Neubecker cartoon in the Toronto Star of 13 December 1981 is embedded in an astonishing article by Raphael Patai. The cartoon depicts four robed and kafiya clad Arabs marching in line each with his dagger plunged in the back of the person ahead. The article's headlines warn "Violence mars the way of Islam" and draws our attention to "the streak of violence that seems to run so deep in the Arab world." Patai's article is confused: it does not know whether to blame pre-Islamic Arab character or Islamic doctrine—jihad especially—for Middle East violence. It decides to play it safe and strike at both race and religion. In language that in any other context would be a satire on racism, Patai finds the cause of violence in "The Moslem proclivity to settling differences with the dagger—..." and in "the Arab proclivity toward conflict" (author's italics). 8. Milton Voist, The Ottawa Citizen, 10 April 1980. 9. Editorial, Globe and Mail, 2 November 1956. 10. Said, Orientalism, p. 287. 11. Dr. Charles Siegel, Globe and Mail, 24 March 1979. 12. In fact, Princess Misha'il was shot; only her lover was beheaded. 13. Globe and Mail, 17 February 1979. 14. Norman Webster, Globe and Mail, 13 December 1980. 15. Editorial Cartoon, Globe and Mail, 24 March 1979. 16. Stan McDowell, "Saudis torn between old and new," Globe and Mail, 27 August 1979. 17. Debra Sharp, review, Globe and Mail, 13 May 1980. 18. Said, Orientalism, p. 290. 19. See Jane Smith's fine article: "Women in Islam: Equality, and the Search for the Natural Order," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XLVII, no. 4 (December, 1979). 20. Leo W. Schwarz, editor, Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People (New York: Random House (Modern Library), 1956). 21. AbrahamS. Halkin, "The Judeo-Islamic Age," mGreat Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People, p. 218. 22. Ibid., p. 218. 23. Ibid., p. 260.

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24. Ibid., p. 217. As recently as ten days before the final revision of this paper an Iraqi Jew—now a Canadian citizen—related to me the political and social prominence his family had enjoyed in Baghdad before the modern Israel/Arab conflict soured relations. 25. Ibid., p. 262. 26. Julian J. Landau, Israel and The Arabs: A Handbook of Basic Information (Jerusalem: Israel Communications, 1971) p. 169. 27. Ibid., p. 5. 28. I write this fully aware that it may be offensive for Muslims for whom the Qur'an is a divine deliverance of the prophet Muhammad and not a reflection of the historical and social milieu of seventh century Arabia. I adopt the conventional scholarly view that Jewish and Christian antecedents contributed to the formation of Muhammad's religious vision. 29. I Samuel 15:2-3. 30. Acts 4:12. 31. S.D. Goitein, Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through the Ages (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 66. 32. D.F. Green, Arab Theologians on Jews and Israel: Extracts from the proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research (Geneve: Editions de 1'Avenir, 1971) p. 3. 33. Goiten, Jews and Arabs, p. 84.

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CHAPTER 6

From refugees to a people? Canada and the Palestinians 1967-1973 Dr. Paul C Noble

IN RECENT YEARS, the Palestinian question has increasingly been viewed as the central issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the major stumbling block to the resolution of that conflict. This was not always the case. After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent assumption of control by neighboring Arab states over the remnant of Palestinian territory, the "Question of Palestine" faded into the background. Partition was perceived as having resolved the status of the territory definitively. What had begun as a Palestinian-Zionist conflict now came to be viewed as basically an Arab-Israeli conflict. In their weak and fragmented condition, the Palestinians ceased to be treated as a major force or even as a distinct entity. The Palestinian question was no longer regarded as a national problem; instead it came to be viewed as simply a refugee problem. These same perceptions prevailed in the Western world at the time of the 1967 war. By the early 1970s, however, the situation changed dramatically. The Palestinians, under the leadership of the PLO, had re-emerged as a significant political force. Their activities forcefully drew the attention of the Arab states, Israel, and the whole world to the fact

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that the Palestinian question was indeed a national problem which required a political, rather than simply a humanitarian, solution. What was the reaction of Canada to these developments? This chapter will explore the evolution of Canadian perceptions and policy regarding the Palestinian question in its formative stages between 1967 and 1973. Prior to the 1973 war, Canada had little in the way of a policy on the Palestinian question. Moreover, such policy as it had was based on a very restrictive definition of the nature of the problem and a consequent lack of sympathy for any attempts to have the international community deal with the issue in broader terms. To understand the limited nature of the policy and the lack of responsiveness to emerging Palestinian aspirations, it is necessary to examine the underlying factors shaping Canada's approach to Middle Eastern issues. Factors Shaping Policy To begin with, the Middle East was not a major area of foreign policy concern for Canada. This was due mainly to the virtual absence of direct Canadian interests in the area and the limited character of Canadian influence there. Canada had no historic presence that might have provided a basis for involvement. As a medium power, its range of activity was inevitably limited and other areas were of more direct strategic and political concern. Furthermore, Canada's economic interests in the region were relatively minor at this stage, given its limited dependence on Middle Eastern oil. This limited involvement, combined with Canada's modest capabilities, appeared to provide little opportunity to influence developments. As a result, Canada was not disposed to assume an active role in Middle East diplomacy or even to develop a detailed policy with respect to regional issues. While Canada had no direct interests of its own in the Middle East at this stage, it did have certain broad concerns and collective interests stemming from its membership in the United Nations and the Western alliance, as well as its close ties with the United States. Given the particular character of Canadian interests, it is not surprising that it was only in times of crisis that Canada paid any serious attention to developments in the area. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was one of those occasions. In addition to the crisis conditions, Canada's role in the Sinai peacekeeping force as well as its membership on the Security Council during 1967 and 1968 contributed to significant Canadian involvement in efforts at conflict-management and conflict resolution. This culminated in its participation in the drafting of Resolution 242, which became the basis for subsequent attempts at a settlement. Once this period passed, however, Canadian concerns and diplomatic activity declined considerably.

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Several factors contributed to this resumption of a relatively passive role. In the first place, Canada's peacekeeping role ceased with the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in May 1967 although she still participated in the Truce Supervision Organization. Futhermore, her membership on the Security Council ended in December 1968. More importantly, though, the greater intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1967 as compared to the pre-1967 period led to a shift in emphasis from peacekeeping activities alone to an active search for a substantive settlement. As a result, responsibility for regulatory activity increasingly devolved upon the superpowers who were the only states with sufficient leverage over the parties to bring about a settlement. For this reason, the potential role of lesser powers, like Canada, declined. Moreover, the fact that the U.S., the leader of the Western alliance and Canada's closest ally, had assumed a prominent role in conflictmanagement made Canada wary of engaging in any diplomatic activity that might complicate matters for the U.S. or harm U.S.-Canada relations. Contributing also to Canada's passive role after 1967 was the fact that, while the Arab-Israeli conflict remained a source of continuing tension and periodically erupted into violence on a limited scale, there seemed to be little urgency about the situation. Given the military imbalance, it was thought that the Arabs were in no position to engage in large-scale hostilities against Israel in the foreseeable future. Moreover, there appeared to be no immediate threat of Arab action against Western interests. In short, from 1967 to 1973 there appeared to be a certain "stable" instability about the Middle East situation. Overall, the Middle East did not loom large on Canada's foreign policy agenda then. In view of her limited experience, involvement, and influence in the area, Canada was not disposed to assume an active role in Middle East diplomacy or even to develop a detailed policy of her own. Inaction and ambiguity thus became the main characteristics of Canada's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that Canadian policy with respect to the Palestinian problem remained extremely limited. Canada's basic approach to the settlement process constituted a further constraint on the development of a Palestinian policy. Canadian policymakers believed that the international community had a role to play in the Arab-Israeli conflict but they also thought that the solution to the conflict would ultimately have to come from the parties themselves. The role of the international community was to formulate certain general principles that would serve as guidelines for a settlement; these were eventually set forth in Security Council Resolution 242, a resolution

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which Canada, as a member of the Security Council at the time, had a significant role in drafting. The basic provisions of this resolution were Arab recognition of Israel's existence and acceptance of satisfactory arrangements to ensure her security in return for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the 1967 war. The resolution also made reference to the need for a "just solution" to the "refugee problem." Since there existed only a minimum consensus among the major powers regarding terms for the settlement of the conflict and since Resolution 242 was intended simply as a framework for negotiations rather than a detailed peace plan, the guidelines contained in the resolution were expressed in general terms. As a result, they were ambiguous and allowed for a range of possible solutions and concrete arrangements. (The provisions concerning Israeli territorial withdrawal are the best example of this.) It would be up to the parties themselves to work out the actual terms of settlement within the limits established by these guidelines. The U.N. could still play a supporting role in this connection by encouraging the parties to negotiate on the basis of Resolution 242 and by appointing a mediator to facilitate such negotiations. It would also retain a potential role in the limitation of hostilities. In short, the Canadian government believed that once the basic guidelines were established in Resolution 242, the U.N. should play only a limited role in the settlement process (as distinct from the management of hostilities). Above all, no attempt should be made to modify Resolution 242. It had been agreed to by the major powers, including the principal supporters of the parties in conflict, and had been tacitly acquiesced in by most of the parties themselves. It represented a carefully worked out compromise covering all the major elements that ought to be included in a settlement. It therefore constituted a balanced and interrelated package of obligations whose components ought not to be changed. 1 Any attempt by the U.N. to go beyond its terms and add to, subtract from, or interpret the guidelines would undermine the fragile consensus.2 Specifically, it was likely to antagonize one or another of the parties and thereby hamper the possibilities for negotiation. The unwillingness to go beyond the terms of, or to accept any modification of, Resolution 242 made Canada's approach to the ArabIsraeli conflict rather static. It tended to impede diplomatic creativity by leading it to oppose the addition of any new elements to the basic guidelines contained in Resolution 242 even where these dealt with issues that had not even arisen when Resolution 242 was formulated. Also, no distinction was made between modifications which might contradict the basic guidelines and those which might supplement them. While this approach was not the basic cause of Canada's lack of responsiveness to

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the Palestinians, it certainly tended to reinforce it. As a result, Canada found itself squarely in opposition to the Palestinians and to the efforts to gain recognition of their legitimate concerns and aspirations, particularly within the U.N. Apart from the generally passive character of her Middle Eastern policy, there were several substantive reasons for Canada's lack of responsiveness toward the Palestinians during this period. The first was the perceptions of legitimacy held by Canadians regarding the conflict. Given their familiarity with the biblical promise and the desperate plight of the Jews in Hitler's Europe, Canada's politicians and public alike were convinced of the intrinsic legitimacy of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. This was strengthened by a sense of circumstantial legitimacy arising from twenty years of national existence as well as recognition by most of the international community. Since Canadian decisionmakers believed firmly in Israel's right to existence, they were totally unsympathetic to Palestinian demands for her disappearance and replacement by a "secular, democratic" Palestinian state. They also developed a very negative impression of the Palestinians and Arabs generally for what was viewed as their persistent hostile activity toward Israel. This was intensified in the late 1960s when the newly emergent commando organizations engaged in acts of violence as a means of asserting their national claims. Thus, there was a general disposition to view Israel as the innocent, aggrieved party that was merely trying to protect what was hers. The Palestinians and Arabs, for their part, were perceived not only as seeking to destroy Israel but also as the initiators or aggressors in the clashes which occurred in the region. In Canada's view, then, the U.N. partition resolution and the subsequent establishment of the state of Israel had definitely resolved the problem of Palestine. Since Palestinian national aspirations were regarded as illegitimate, there was no genuine Palestine issue as such in the national or political sense. There was only the issue of the Palestinians which was viewed simply as a refugee question, for which a humanitarian solution would have to be found. A second contributing factor was the basic structure of interests within which Canadian governments operated. The most important element in this was the presence of a modest-sized but nevertheless influential Jewish community. By virtue of its numbers and strategic concentration in Canada's major cities, its affluence, its political organization, and its access to community leaders and the media, this community was a political force to be reckoned with. By its untiring activity in defining issues and supplying information, the Jewish community was able to influence the perceptions and judgments of Canada's politicians,

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opinion-makers, and public alike. Although decision-makers and politicians were favorably disposed to Israel anyway, the views of the Jewish community on current issues in the conflict were nevertheless constantly brought to their attention. This served not only to reinforce, and possibly even shape, their conceptions of legitimacy but also to make governments aware of the possible political costs involved in adopting positions contrary to those of the Jewish community. These might range from criticism in the media or by other politicians to loss of campaign contributions or of electoral support in certain ridings. Naturally this would cause any politician, and especially a government leader, to think seriously before taking such a step. Between 1967 and 1973 there was little in the way of countervailing pressure on the Canadian government. The Canadian Arab community was relatively small as well as dispersed and many of its members were newcomers to the country; so it enjoyed little influence. More importantly, since Canada had virtually no direct interests of its own in the Middle East, there was little sense of vulnerability to possible pressures from the Arab world as a consequence of a pro-Israeli stance. For the same reason, there were no domestic interests with an important stake in the Arab world which could serve as a pressure group to warn governments of the potentially harmful consequences of their policies. Theviews of other Western countries were a further factor. Given the political and economic significance of the Middle East to the Western alliance, the Canadian government was anxious to keep in step with her key allies, particularly the U.S. This was deemed necessary both in the interests of the alliance itself and of Canada's relations with those powers. In the late 1960s, there existed a general consensus among Western governments and public opinion in support of Israel and its policies. Only France adopted a somewhat critical posture. By the early 1970s, however, some divisions began to appear. While U.S. policy remained strongly pro-Israel, several Western governments (particularly France, Britain, and Japan) were displaying increasing skepticism about Israeli intentions and behavior and were moving toward a more evenhanded stance. The attitudes of Canadian decision-makers at this point were very similar to those of their American counterparts. Even if this had not been the case, however, the Canadian government would have been reluctant to adopt positions on Middle East issues which differed from those of the U.S. It realized the importance which the U.S. government placed on the region and was unwilling to complicate the task of or antagonize its principal ally. Consequently, throughout this period Canada used the U.S. as its point of reference on Middle Eastern matters 3 and thus maintained a pro-Israeli orientation.

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Certain domestic factors also shaped Canadian perceptions of the Palestinian issue. One was the fact that throughout the years Canada had accepted large numbers of immigrants, many of whom were refugees. This may have made it harder for Canadians to understand the Arab refusal to accept resettlement of the refugees as the solution to the Palestinian problem and their persistence in pressing for the achievement of Palestinian national rights. This was at most a subconscious factor, however, and too much importance should not be placed on it. The other, more important, factor involved Quebec. Here the late 1960s witnessed the growth of Quebecois nationalism and the emergence of a strong "separatist" party favoring self-determination and independence for Quebec. Canadian political leaders were undoubtedly aware of the possible domestic ramifications of their stance on the issue of Palestinian "national rights" and "self-determination." In this connection, the resort to terrorist methods by some elements of the Quebec nationalist movement, which culminated in the October crisis of 1970, and the strong reaction within Canada to this, may very well have influenced Canadian perceptions of the Palestinian nationalist movement. It certainly did not create a favorable climate for responsiveness to Palestinian national aspirations on behalf of which similar methods had been periodically employed. During this period, then, the conceptions of legitimacy held by the politicians, the structure of interests of the government, the views of allies and the domestic climate all basically pointed in the same direction. The resulting pro-Israeli orientation meant a much greater responsiveness to the concerns, interests, and sensitivities of the Israelis than to those of the Arabs. This constituted an important constraint on the development of Canadian policy toward the Palestinians. Perceptions and Policy in 1967: The Pearson-Martin Period In the wake of the 1967 war, Canadian policymakers and parliamentarians generally considered the recognition of Israel's right to existence, the territorial question, and security arrangements to be central issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict.4 Nevertheless, some attention was also paid to the Palestinian problem. There was considerable awareness of the sad plight of the Palestinian refugees and a genuine desire to do something to alleviate their sufferings. However, they were perceived simply as a collection of unfortunate individuals for whom a humanitarian solution, in the form of resettlement and compensation, would have to be found. There was little or no awareness of the Palestinians as a people with legitimate collective aspirations and consequently of the need for some form of political solution.

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Virtually every speaker in the 1967 parliamentary debates referred to the refugee problem. While little mention was made of the reasons for the original flight,5 the issue of responsibility for their continuing plight was raised by several speakers. The dominant theme in these interventions was that the continued existence of the refugee camps represented an attempt by the Arab governments to keep the conflict alive and to use the Palestinians as pawns in their struggle with Israel. Prime Minister Pearson gave expression to this view: They have tragically been used as pawns in the game of Middle East politics....Insofar as the refugees are concerned, I think the feeling ...among many of the Arab governments was that they wanted to keep these refugees and send them back to form a Palestinian Arab state if Israel were to disappear. They felt that if these refugees were scattered all over the world, they might be happier individually but they would not be available for the day when Israel disappears and they move in. This has frustrated, in part at least, the efforts to deal with the refugee problem. 6

In short, it was assumed that the Arab governments could have resolved the refugee problem without much difficulty by disbanding the camps and integrating the Palestinians into their own societies.7 Regardless of where responsibility lay for the creation and continuation of the refugee problem, there was general agreement about the need for a serious effort to find a solution. This concern was motivated above all by humanitarian considerations. Many M.P.s were genuinely moved by the unfortunate plight of the refugees and in particular by the deplorable conditions under which they lived.8 Over and above the humanitarian concern, however, there was also a strong awareness of the political consequences of the refugee problem. Numerous speakers pointed out that the desperate plight of the refugees constantly reminded Palestinians and Arabs generally of their grievances against Israel and thus served to fuel the fires of conflict.9 Supporters of Israel, in particular, believed that the disbanding of the camps and the dispersal of the refugees would eliminate the main hotbeds of anti-Israeli feeling and make it more difficult for the Palestinians to organize and act against Israel. In the interests of peace and stability in the area, therefore, a solution would have to be found to the refugee problem.10 A distinction was made between short-term and long-term approaches. In the short run, Canadian decision-makers and M.P.s believed that the international community should provide more aid to alleviate the sufferings of the original refugees as well as the substantial

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number of new refugees created by the June War. There was general agreement that Canada, which was already one of the leading contributors to the United Nations' Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA),11 should increase its aid in view of the new demands on this agency. This consensus was quickly translated into action, as Prime Minister Pearson announced on 26 June 1967 that Canada was prepared to provide additional funds for the refugees. 12 However, such financial aid, while regarded as necessary, was viewed as merely a palliative. Emphasis continued to be placed, as it had been prior to 1967, on the need for a permanent solution to the problem.13 Such a solution, it was thought, would require the disbanding of the camps and the resettlement of the refugees. Some of these, it was acknowledged, ought to be allowed to return to their homes in Israel (repatriation) but government spokesmen made it clear that the number involved would be very limited. Thus, Prime Minister Pearson noted in the House "...perhaps a sufficient effort has never been made to get at least some of them back to their homes in Israel."14 The only realistic solution in Canada's view lay in the resettlement of the vast majority of the refugees, with compensation, in the Arab world and, in some cases even outside the region. External Affairs Minister Martin made this clear when he stated in an address to the U.N. General Assembly that "It would be an illusion...to go on believing that the problem of the refugees will be solved simply on the basis of their return to Israel."15 Prime Minister Pearson elaborated on this saying: A real opportunity has never been given to these refugees to decide whether they could or would be willing to locate in other countries.16

To facilitate the absorption of the refugees into the economies and societies of the Arab states, the Canadian government proposed that a large-scale regional development program be undertaken with substantial financial assistance from the international community.17 While resettlement of the refugees within the Arab world was clearly the preferred solution, Canadian parliamentarians and the Canadian government were also prepared to accept some immigration of Palestinians to Canada. This suggestion was made both by NDP foreign affairs spokesman Andrew Brewin 18 and Conservative leader John Diefenbaker.19 However, while reports in the Toronto Globe and Mail suggested that the government was prepared to accept up to 40,000 refugees,20 Prime Minister Pearson remained very cautious in his public statements.

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It is impossible at the moment to say how many refugees would be taken, because that would depend on the international arrangements by which the problem could be liquidated. Indeed, it would depend primarily, or very importantly, on the attitude of the Arab governments toward the urgency of the problem. When this matter was mentioned the other day, there were reports in Arab newspapers criticizing Canada because we were trying to take away from those countries Arab refugees whose only desire was to go back to their families in Palestine." 21

Mr. Pearson's latter remarks point to an important underlying difficulty. The resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the Arab states or elsewhere in the world might bring about an improvement in their standard of living, but it would also be very helpful to Israel both symbolically and practically. At the symbolic level, the existence of the refugee camps represented both the continued Palestinian claim to their homeland and an affirmation of their collective existence as a people. Consequently, the elimination of the camps would have signalled an end to their claims to Palestine and would also have symbolized in many ways their dissolution as a "people." Moreover, from a practical viewpoint, the elimination of the camps would have eliminated the main centers of anti-Israeli feeling and made it more difficult for the Palestinians to organize and act against Israel. For these reasons, Canada's policy towards the Palestinian refugees was viewed in the Arab world as a political stance rather than simply a humanitarian approach. While conscious of their unfortunate situation, in 1967 Canadians displayed no awareness of the Palestinians as anything other than refugees and consequently had no disposition to seek anything other than a humanitarian solution. Twenty years earlier, the perceptions had been rather different. In 1947, Canadian policymakers, through their support for the United Nations partition resolution, which envisaged the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, had acknowledged the distinctiveness and national aspirations of the Palestinians. Since then, however, the assumption of control by Jordan over most of the territory of the proposed Palestinian state, the dispersion of the Palestinians and their subordination everywhere to the jurisdiction of others, as well as the absence of any authoritative body to act on their behalf, contributed to the impression that they had disintegrated as a national community. These developments, combined with the linguistic, cultural, and religious similarities between Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world, caused Canada's political leadership, as well as most of the international community, to lose sight of the Palestinians as a people with an identity and national consciousness distinct from that of their fellow Arabs. In Canadian eyes, Palestinian identity had become submerged either in a

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larger Arab identity or in the particular national identities of their country of residence. This limited awareness of a distinct Palestinian identity and national consciousness was manifested in several ways. One was the terms in which the Palestinians were described. During the 1967 parliamentary debates, there were no references to the Palestinians as a people or collectivity of any kind (e.g., "the Palestinians" or "the Palestinian people"). Rather, they were referred to simply as refugees and even in this context, mention was rarely made of their national identity. Thus, they were invariably described as "Arab refugees" or else simply as "refugees." 22 Prime Minister Pearson and External Affairs Minister Martin generally used the same terminology23 although periodically they did make reference to the refugees' Palestinian identity. 24 Their lengthy experience in dealing with the conflict, particularly at the U.N., had undoubtedly sensitized them to its Palestinian dimension to some extent. 25 In addition to the limited awareness of a Palestinian national identity, there was also a tendency to underestimate the strength and durability of Palestinian national consciousness. It was generally assumed that the continued existence of the refugee camps was due primarily to the desire of Arab governments to use the Palestinians as pawns in their struggle against Israel. It was further assumed that the refugees, if assured of satisfactory living conditions, would agree to integration within other Arab societies. No mention was made of the possibility that the Palestinians themselves might regard the camps as an expression of their continued claim to their homeland as well as an affirmation of their collective existence as a people, and consequently might object to their elimination. Nor was there any real awareness of Palestinian national consciousness vis-a-vis other Arabs. Policymakers realized that the Palestinians had grievances but there was no sense of any Palestinian desire to assert themselves against their fellow Arabs to the extent of pressing for a political entity of their own. The Palestinians were viewed as simply another unfortunate and discontented minority within the Arab world that had neither the desire nor the means to challenge the existing state framework. In short, Palestinian national aspirations were perceived as either illegitimate (vis-a-vis Israel) or else weak to nonexistent (vis-a-vis other Arabs). As a result, there was no disposition to view the Palestinian problem as one requiring a political solution in the form of the creation of a Palestinian political entity. It was simply taken for granted that, if and when Israel withdrew from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, these territories would be returned to their former trustees (Jordan and

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Egypt) and their Palestinian inhabitants would once more come under the jurisdiction of these neighboring Arab states. If the Palestinian component of the eventual solution was extremely limited, the possible Palestinian role in the settlement process was regarded as virtually nonexistent. After 1948, as a result of their weakness, fragmentation, loss of autonomy, and lack of any effective organization, the Palestinians ceased to be viewed as a major force or even as a distinct actor in the conflict. The Arab states, for their part, not only adopted the Palestinian cause as their own and transformed it into an overall Arab cause but also assumed the leadership of the struggle against Israel. While Palestinian activities might help trigger violence, the Arab states, with their vastly greater demographic, economic, and military resources, were the only ones who posed any real threat to Israel. Since the Palestinians were not regarded either as a major force or even as a distinct actor in the conflict, Canadian policymakers did not perceive any need for them to be represented in negotiations leading to a settlement. It was thought that their interests and views would be adequately represented by the governments of the front-line Arab states, in which the vast majority of the Palestinians resided. Since these frontline states were the principal actors on the Arab side, working out a settlement between them and Israel was the main task. In such negotiations, the central issues would be those of recognition and security for Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. If a basic settlement could be worked out between the front-line Arab states and Israel, the Palestinian dimension of the problem would be resolved as a by-product. The Palestinians would be obliged to go along with this, since they were neither strong enough nor autonomous enough to block a settlement. The Trudeau-Sharp Period (1968-1973) In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a significant change occurred in the nature of the Palestinian problem. The sweeping Israeli victory in the June War led Palestinians to lose confidence in the ability of the Arab states to promote or even defend their interests. This gave rise to an emphasis on self-reliance and the need to develop their own forces and instruments of pressure against Israel. As a result, a number of Palestinian commando organizations emerged and became increasingly active in the struggle. Through this activity, they attracted growing support from Palestinians everywhere and contributed generally to a strengthening of Palestinian national consciousness. The heightened national consciousness and new assertiveness of the Palestinians, together with the diplomatic support they received from the Arab states, forcefully drew the

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attention of the world to the fact that the Palestinian problem was not simply a refugee problem but a national problem as well. This renewed Palestinian assertiveness coincided with the advent of a new government in Canada in 1968. Under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp, a change of emphasis occurred in Canadian foreign policy. Developing an international role for Canada now received less attention than the promotion of Canadian national interests. This tended to limit the new government's involvement in the Middle East given the extremely limited character of Canada's interests in the region.26 At another level, however, domestic electoral concerns increased the government's interest since, unlike Mr. Pearson and Mr. Martin, Prime Minister Trudeau and External Affairs Minister Sharp both represented constituencies containing substantial Jewish populations. This factor was particularly important in the case of Mr. Sharp, as we shall see below. As far as their basic outlook on the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned, there were differences between Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Sharp. While Mr. Trudeau clearly supported Israel's right to existence and had little patience with those who sought to question this,27 he also had some sympathy for Arab concerns and grievances. This was reflected in the critical comments he made concerning Israeli policies and behavior in private conversations from time to time.28 Furthermore, he resented pressure from the Jewish community on Middle Eastern issues and consequently restricted his encounters with community representatives on such questions.29 This relatively balanced outlook on the Arab-Israeli conflict earned him respect in Arab circles although this was coupled with disappointment that it was not translated directly into policy.30 With respect to the Palestinian issue proper, there were several factors which limited Prime Minister Trudeau's responsiveness. One was the Palestinian refusal to accept the existence of Israel. Even if this had not been the case, however, Mr. Trudeau's views on nationalism and selfdetermination, stemming from his analysis of the Quebec problem within Canada, posed intellectual obstacles to the acceptance of Palestinian claims. Thus, while he certainly regarded ethnic-linguistic communities as sociological entities or "peoples," he did not feel that every "people" had to become a "nation" in the political sense.31 Hence, he was skeptical of the notion that every people should have the right to political self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state. His lukewarm attitude toward this view was, of course, clearly reinforced by the domestic political situation within Canada, specifically the growing strength of Quebec nationalism and the accompanying demands for a separate state. A further contributing factor to Prime Minister Trudeau's

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caution on the Palestinian issue was undoubtedly his own personal electoral situation, representing as he did a constituency with a substantial Jewish population. He was presumably also concerned about possible opposition from the Canadian Jewish Community in general, which had traditionally been a strong supporter of his Liberal party. Finally, Mr. Trudeau was disposed to limit his public involvement in foreign policy matters to one or two key issues, in particular NATO and the European link and, to a lesser extent, China, and the Commonwealth. 32 The remaining issues, including those in the sensitive Middle East, were left almost entirely to his Minister of External Affairs. One of the main reasons for the Prime Minister not becoming involved in Middle Eastern issues was undoubtedly their sensitive character domestically. External Affairs Minister Sharp, for his part, had a somewhat different perspective on the Arab-Israeli conflict than Prime Minister Trudeau. His approach was characterized by a definite pro-Israeli leaning that stemmed in large measure from traditional Western perceptions of the issues and the behavior of the parties. This was strongly reinforced by concern about his personal political situation, since the constituency he represented (Toronto-Eglinton) had a substantial Jewish population.33 He also found himself in a much more competitive electoral situation in his own constituency than the Prime Minister did in his. Mr. Sharp was very much aware of this and was determined not to do or say anything with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would antagonize this segment of his electorate.34 For these reasons, under Mr. Sharp, Canada's Middle East policy, although generally expressed in ambiguous terms and carefully measured language, had a strong underlying pro-Israeli leaning. Under Mr. Sharp's direction, Canada's Palestinian policy remained relatively static between 1968 and 1973 in spite of developments at the regional level and within the U.N. Two main elements were carried over from the previous government. The first of these was that the main task was to settle the issues directly at stake between the Arab states and Israel. The Palestinian problem was secondary and would be resolved once the basic terms of settlement had been agreed to by the principal parties to the conflict. The second element was that the Palestinian question was simply a refugee problem which would require no more than a humanitarian solution. These two assumptions were set forth clearly by Mr. Sharp in his first address to the U.N. General Assembly. "A solution to the refugee problem will be feasible in the context of an agreed settlement between the Arab states and Israel."35 In one respect, namely the question of Palestinian identity, there was initially some regression in Canada's approach to the problem. As

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mentioned previously, Prime Minister Pearson and External Affairs Minister Martin had periodically identified the Palestinians as such, even if only in the context of their status as refugees. Under Mitchell Sharp, however, even this limited acknowledgement of Palestinian identity was called into question. During his first five years in office (Spring 1968 —Spring 1973), Mr. Sharp never once identified the Palestinians as such, even in discussing the refugee problem.36 Rather, he referred to them as the "Arab refugees" or simply as "the refugees." 37 This omission was deliberate. Mr. Sharp apparently concluded, based on discussions with his officials, that since Resolution 242 referred simply to "the refugee problem," it would be wise to stick to this formulation. Specific references to "the Palestinians" or even to "the Palestinian refugees," it was thought, might be regarded as implicit acceptance of a change in the guidelines for a settlement contained in Resolution 242.38 The initial Canadian statements at the U.N. during Mr. Sharp's tenure reflected this extremely timid approach. Thus, whereas at the 1967 General Assembly session, the Canadian spokesman had spoken of "the Palestinian refugees,"39 at the 1968 session Canada's spokesman referred only to "the refugees" and "the refugee problem."40 By the 1969 session, the situation had changed somewhat. External Affairs officials, including the minister, were by now becoming increasingly aware of the extent of Palestinian national consciousness. Moreover, they were now faced with resolutions within the General Assembly calling for the recognition of the "inalienable rights" of the Palestinian people. While the minister continued to avoid the use of the term "Palestinian," Canadian spokesmen in the U.N. began to employ new terminology in discussing the problem. Thus in 1969 the Canadian delegate to the General Assembly's Special Political Committee spoke of "the Palestinians" and referred to them as a "people" possessing "rights" rather than simply as refugees without a national identity.41 During the 1970 session, the Canadian representative in the Special Political Committee spoke in a similar vein, acknowledging even more clearly the existence of a distinct Palestinian identity: "...That did not mean that his delegation doubted that the principle oithe equal rights of peoples applied to die Palestinians."42 No further statements were made on this subject, however, by Canadian delegates to the 1971 and 1972 General Assembly sessions. This was due in part to an unwillingness to restate Canada's position on the same resolutions year after year. In addition to this increased awareness of a Palestinian identity, the renewed assertiveness of the Palestinians also made the Canadian government more conscious of the importance of the Palestinian dimension of the conflict. Thus, during his trip to the Middle East in November

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1969, Mr. Sharp was questioned on several occasions about Canada's attitude toward the Palestinian commando movements. At one point, he acknowledged that their emergence and increasing strength was "one of the many complicating factors in the situation now as compared to November 1967."43 A few days later, after a visit to Egypt and conversations with President Nasser as well as with the secretary general of the Arab League, Mr. Sharp apparently concluded that the Palestinian issue was more central to the settlement of the conflict than he had originally believed. Mr. Sharp.. .pointed out that he continued to believe that there could be no lasting peace without settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem. 'This is the central issue,' he said.44

In spite of this increased awareness of the importance of the Palestinian issue, there was no change in Canadian policy concerning the status of the Palestinians during this period. The manifestations of increased Palestinian national consciousness, as reflected in the emergence of a vigorous and autonomous Palestinian national movement, were not sufficient to convince Mr. Sharp that the Palestinian issue should be treated as a national problem for which a political solution would have to be found. While he acknowledged that the emergence of the Palestinian commando movements was a new and complicating factor in the Middle East situation, he refused to modify Canada's approach to the Palestinian issue. "We do not take any position on this [the Palestinian commando movements] except to seek some way to settle the refugee problem."45 The question of a Palestinian entity or even Palestinian representation in any peace negotiations did not arise therefore. Nevertheless, the question of a political solution and the possible forms it might take were apparently discussed within the Department of External Affairs in the early 1970s.46 In the absence of the political will to move forward, however, no steps were taken to change Canadian policy. The unwillingness to consider the Palestinian issue as anything more than a refugee problem can also be seen clearly in Canada's stance on various proposals to recognize Palestinian "rights" which were put forward in the U.N. General Assembly. This issue was raised for the first time in 1969 during the Special Political Committee debate on the report of the United Nations' Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). From this point on, a resolution was presented annually dealing specifically with the question of Palestinian rights. In 1969, the resolution simply affirmed "the inalienable rights of the people of

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Palestine."47 In 1970 and subsequent years, this was expanded to include a reference to the right of self-determination. 48 At each General Assembly session, Canada was faced with a divergence of views within the Western Alliance regarding these resolutions. Thus the U.S. voted against the resolution on all four occasions. Britain and the members of the EEC, for their part, abstained on the 1969 resolution. From 1970 to 1972, when the resolution made reference to the right of self-determination, the Europeans were divided. Britain and France continued to abstain; Italy and the Benelux countries joined the U.S. in voting;O against the resolutions. \)lapan abstained from 1969 to 1971 CJ A but, significantly, voted for the resolution in 1972. Since, in addition to considering the content and general tenor of resolutions, Mr. Sharp tended to use the U.S. as Canada's main point of reference on Middle Eastern issues, the Canadian delegation voted against all four of these resolutions recognizing Palestinian "rights."49 Several explanations were offered by Canadian spokesmen for their opposition. To begin with, they argued that the affirmation of Palestinian rights and, in particular, the right of self-determination, was ambiguous since it did not spell out the precise scope of such rights. This was troubling in view of the fact that Palestinian organizations had refused to acknowledge Israel's right to existence and continued to maintain that their right to self-determination should apply within the whole of the former territory of Palestine. Hence the ambiguity of the resolution placed into question the existence of the state of Israel: Palestinians should enjoy the same rights as all the other people: however, the rights of the Palestinians should not threaten the rights of the Israelis and in that connection he regretted that paragraph 1 of Draft Resolution B [1969] was ambiguous and cast doubt on Israel's right of existence.50

The implication of this argument was that Canada might be prepared to accept a resolution affirming Palestinian rights if a provision were added which recognized Israel's right to existence. However, even this possibility was ruled out by a Canadian spokesman at the 1970 General Assembly session. He argued that Resolution 242 provided the basic framework for the settlement of the Middle East conflict. It contained a balanced and interrelated set of proposals which dealt with all major aspects of the conflict. Any attempt either to deal with one aspect in isolation or to modify the provisions of Resolution 242 would be unwise since it would be bound to antagonize at least one of the parties and thus make it more difficult to achieve a settlement.

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...the various aspects of the Middle East question, including an equitable solution on the problem of the Palestinian refugees, formed a single whole whose elements could not be separated. Any attempt to settle some without the others was doomed to failure and could only aggravate the situation. That was implicit in Security Council Resolution 242. Any course of action other than that called for by Resolution 242 would make it more difficult to settle the Middle East crisis. Consequently, his delegation would vote against the draft resolution.51

In other words, Canada opposed any attempt to single out the Palestinian problem for separate treatment as well as any solution which went beyond that envisaged in Resolution 242. The effect of this would be to leave the Palestinian problem frozen in its 1967 state. In spite of the negative vote on these resolutions, Canadian spokesmen in the Special Political Committee emphasized, as noted above, that their government believed that Palestinians did have rights. 52 It is hard to escape the conclusion, however, that what the Canadian government had in mind was individual rights. For Canada was not prepared at this stage to recognize any collective rights for the Palestinians and in particular not the right of self-determination. Although there was no change in policy, by the early 1970s there was clearly a growing awareness not only of a Palestinian national identity but also of the importance of the Palestinian problem. Now that the Palestinians had become an important force in their own right, they came to be seen as a serious obstacle to a potential settlement. Consequently, emphasis began to be placed on the need to work out some solution to the Palestinian problem in order that an overall settlement might be achieved. This apparent reversal of emphasis was evident in remarks Mr. Sharp made to the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defence a few months prior to the October War. Canada.. .is one of the major supporters of the relief to refugees... .But we do not think that this is enough....We are doing this because we have to take a humanitarian view and that of course is not a political solution. Indeed the whole question of the refugees and the Palestinian movement is central to the conflict in the Middle East. As far as I can see, it is the main issue in the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries. 53

What was noteworthy about these remarks was not only Mr. Sharp's recognition of the importance of the Palestinian issue but also his identification of the Palestinians as such for the first time, his reference to the Palestinian movement, and finally his distinction between a humanitarian and apolitical solution. By "political solution" he did not

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mean, however, that the Palestinian question ought to be treated as a national problem which should be settled through the establishment of some type of Palestinian political structure. Rather, he was referring simply to the fact that the Palestinian problem could only be resolved in the context of an overall settlement between the Arab states and Israel.54 Nevertheless, he did introduce a potentially significant distinction which would take on new meaning in the following years. Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank the Centre Quebecois des Relations Internationales for its financial assistance in carrying out the research on which this chapter is based. He is also grateful for the assistance of the staff of the Department of External Affairs Library and the research section of the Canada-Israel Committee. Finally, the willingness of a number of officials, both past and present, of the Department of External Affairs to spend some time guiding the author through the intricacies of Canada's Middle-Eastern policy is greatly appreciated.

Notes 1. See supra, p. 102. 2. See External Affairs Minister Sharp's remarks: Canada has supported Resolution 242 since its adoption in 1967. Our adherence has been total but strictly limited to the terms of the resolution itself and we have always refused to add anything to it or subtract anything from it. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 16 October 1973, p. 6925. ...we accept Resolution 242 in its entirety,...we resist any efforts to interpret it,...we believe it does provide a framework for settlement and therefore we do not accept any particular interpretation....we believe it was very carefully drafted and that any attempts to interpret it publicly and to get acceptance of a particular interpretation is only going to interfere with the prospects for peace. Ibid., 25 October 1973, pp. 7207-7208. 3. Interview with a senior official, Department of External Affairs. See infra, footnote 49. 4. See for example the statements of Prime Minister Pearson, Canada, House of Commons Debates, 24 May 1967, p. 531; 8 June 1967, p. 1296. See also the comments of External Affairs Minister Martin, General Assembly Official Records (hereinafter cited as G.A.O.R.), Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plenary, 1533rd meeting, p. 11. 5. See, however, the observations of Colin Cameron: While undoubtedly there are many Arabs who left voluntarily and while undoubtedly many of them have been urged to do so, others nevertheless—this is an undeniable fact were driven out of the country under conditions of savage brutality. Today they remain rotting away in full sight of the lands from which they were expelled or fled. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 6 June 1967, p. 1199. 6. Ibid., 8 June 1967, pp. 1295-1296. See also the comments of the Conservative leader, Mr. Diefenbaker, ibid., p. 1300; as well as Conservative M.P. Nesbitt, ibid. p. 1332 and Conservative M.P. Harkness, ibid., 23 May 1967, p. 511. 7. Colin Cameron pointed out, however, that this argument overestimated the absorptive capacity of the neighboring Arab states, ibid., 6 June 1967, p. 1199.

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8. See, for example, the remarks of Conservative leader Diefenbaker, ibid., 8 June 1967, p. 1300, and of Colin Cameron, ibid., 6 June 1967, p. 1201. 9. See, for example, the observations of former Conservative Defence Minister, Douglas Harkness: As long as you have the Palestinian refugee problem with these people living in miserable surroundings in camps along the perimeter of Israel, you are going to have the threat of war I believe that until these people are dispersed...the extremely strong feelings of hatred which exist throughout these areas will continue and will be reinforced by the existence of these refugee camps. Ibid., 23 May 1967, p. 511; 24 May 1967, p. 526. 10. Speaking on behalf of the government, External Affairs Minister Martin stated: ... we have got to meet the terrible problem of the dislocated families and peoples in the Gaza and wherever the refugees are and to see to it that they are given the opportunity for a full life, thereby removing one of the temptations of the excessive nationalism. Ibid., 8 June 1967, p. 1321. 11. See the figures on Canadian aid to UNRWA, ibid., 14 December 1970, p. 1996. 12. Ibid., 26 June 1967, p. 1928. 13. See Prime Minister Pearson's statement in the House, ibid., p. 1929. 14. Ibid., 8 June 1967, p. 1295. 15. G.A.O.R., Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plenary, 1533rd Meeting, p. 12. 16. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 June 1967, p. 1295. 17. G.A.O.R. Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plenary, 1533rd Meeting, p. 12, also G.A.O.R., 22nd Session, Special Political Committee, 589th meeting, p. 270. 18. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 June 1967, p. 1303. 19. Ibid., 19 June 1967, p. 1650. 20. Toronto Globe and Mail, 23 June 1967. 21. Ibid., 19 June 1967, p. 1651. 22. See, for example, the remarks of NDP leader Tommy Douglas, ibid., 6 June 1967, p. 1186; Mr. Diefenbaker, ibid., 8 June 1967, p. 1300; Mr. Nesbitt, ibid., p. 1326; Mr. Olson, ibid., p. 1324; Mr. Starr, ibid., 23 June 1967, p. 1870; and Mr. Patterson, ibid., 26 June 1967, p. 1929. 23. See Mr. Pearson's speech of 8 June 1967, ibid., p. 1296 and Mr. Martin's address to the 22nd Session of the U.N. General Assembly (1967), Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 67/30. 24. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 June 1967, p. 1295, G.A.O.R. Fifth Emergency Special Session, 1533rd meeting, p. 12. 25. Prime Minister Pearson, as an old U.N. hand, was familiar with the original label for the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely "The Question of Palestine" and used it occasionally even in 1967. See ibid., 8 June 1967, p. 1289. See also External Affairs Minister Martin, G.A.O.R., Fifth Emergency Special Session, 1533rd meeting, p. 10. 26. See, for example, Mr. Sharp's response to Heath Macquarrie's question as to what Canada was doing to improve its contacts with the Arab countries: We tend to look upon representation as being proportional to Canadian interests. That is in trade, in cultural matters and in places and in real terms. We do not generally open embassies for purposes of prestige or for purposes of indicating a political interest in that sense. I can make the general answer that we have not singled out the Middle East in any way for special treatment. Canada, House of Commons, Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 5 May 1973. 27. Interview with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs. 28. See, for example, his reported comments about Israeli expansionist tendencies to Foreign Minister Riad of Egypt, Christian Science Monitor, 9 January 1969. The report was denied by Mr. Trudeau in the House, Canada, House of Commons

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Debates, 30 January 1969, p. 4935. See also his discussions with Prime Minister Rabin during a private visit to Israel in September 1976. According to one External Affairs official, these were very intense. For a brief report, see Toronto Star, 3 September 1976. After Mr. Trudeau lost the 1979 election and concluded that he should retire as Liberal leader, he expressed his criticisms of Israel and domestic Jewish pressures openly in an interview with the Toronto Star, 24 October 1979: Trudeau predicted war in the Middle East will continue 'as long as Israel maintains its hard stand on the West Bank of Jordan. This position by Israel....made impossible any settlement of the Palestinian question....Zionists in the United States, who are more zealous than in Israel, have made it difficult for Carter to aid negotiations by telling Israel they must be more flexible or risk losing American support' said Trudeau. He said similar pressure groups in Canada were responsible for convincing Conservatives, while they were in opposition, to 'support boycott legislation tougher than ours and the embassy transfer.' These promises said Trudeau, had hurt Canada economically, and risked stirring up anti-semitic feeling. Interview with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. P.E. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968). See in particular the chapters on "The New Treason of the Intellectuals" and "Federalism, Nationalism and Reason." Interview with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs. See, for example, the reports on Mr. Sharp's visit to Israel in November 1969. "Several times he mentioned the fact that 40% of his Eglinton riding voters are Jewish." Toronto Telegram, 22 November 1969. Interview with a senior official, Department of External Affairs. Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 68/15, p. 4. One possible exception to this was the remarks attributed to him by the Montreal Star during his trip to the Middle East in November 1969. See supra, p. 100. This may simply have been the terminology used by the reporter, however. See, for example, his address to the 1968 General Assembly Session, cited above. Also, Canada, House of Commons Debates, 19 November 1969, p. 983. Interview with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs. G.AO./?.,22ndSession,SpecialPoliticalCommittee, 589thMeeting, pp. 269,270. G.A.O.R., 23rd Session, Special Political Committee, 618th Meeting, p. 1. G.A.O.R., 24th Session, Special Political Committe, 686th Meeting, p. 241. G.A.O.R. 25th Session, Special Political Committee, 743rd Meeting, p. 300, (author's italics). Ottawa Citizen, 12 November 1969. Montreal Star, 17 November 1969. Toronto Star, 17 November 1969. Interview with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs. G.A.O.R., 24th Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/7630), Resolutions of the General Assembly, Resolution 25355. G.A.O.R., 25th Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/2808), Resolutions of the General Assembly, Resolution 2672C. See also Resolutions 2792D (1971), Paragraph 1 and 2963 (1972), Paragraph 11. Interview with a senior official, Department of External Affairs. This official stated that Mr. Sharp was absent from Ottawa at the time of the vote on some Middle Eastern issues in 1972. When contacted, his instructions were to find out how the U.S. was voting and do likewise. G.A.O.R. 24th Session, Special Political Committee, 686th Meeting, p. 241. For a similar argument, see the statement of the Canadian delegate the following year,

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ibid., 25th Session, Special Political Committee, 743rd Meeting, p. 300. 51. Ibid., 25th Session, Special Political Committee, 743rd Meeting, p. 300. 52. "Palestinians should enjoy the same rights as all other peoples." Ibid., 24th Session Special Political Committee, 686th meeting, p. 241. 53. Canada, House of Commons, Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 5 May 1973, p. 14. 54. Interview with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs.

CHAPTER 7

Where angels fear to tread: Canada and the status of the Palestinian people 1973-1983 Dr. Paul C Noble

BETWEEN the June War of 1967 and the October War of 1973, the international community treated the Palestinian question as a secondary issue. The principal task in the Middle East, it was thought, was to work out a settlement between the front-line Arab states and Israel. If this were done the Palestinian dimension of the conflict would be resolved as a by-product. By the early 1970s, however, the Palestinians, under the leadership of the PLO had emerged as a significant political force. Thus, when prospects for a diplomatic solution to the conflict began to develop after the 1973 war, Arab governments felt obliged to insist that there could be no settlement without satisfaction of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. Israel, for its part, strongly resisted any concessions to the Palestinians since it seriously questioned Palestinian, and more particularly PLO, intentions towards itself. After 1973 then, the Palestinian question ceased to be a marginal issue and emerged instead as the major stumbling block to an overall settlement. From the mid-1970s on, it increasingly became the focus of attention and negotiations. In fact, the resolution of the Palestinian

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problem cannot be widely viewed as a prerequisite to the achievement of a lasting settlement between the Arab world and Israel. Given the prominence of this issue and the potentially serious consequences for the region, for the West, and indeed for the entire world of a failure to resolve it, it is instructive to analyze the evolution of Canadian policy in this area. What changes, if any, have taken place since the 1973 war? Where has Canada stood in recent years? It should be noted that the Palestinian question, as it emerged in the 1970s, involved a multiplicity of issues. Some of these were of an immediate character, e.g., the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territories as well as the methods used by Palestinians and Israelis in their continuing struggle. The issue of Palestinian representation in negotiations concerning a settlement also fell into this category. Other issues were of a long-term character. Here there were two basic problems. One was the scope of Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories. The other and undoubtedly more fundamental question concerned the ultimate status of the Palestinian people. While all of these are deserving of attention, this chapter will concentrate on Canadian policy with regard to the core issue, namely the status of the Palestinian people. Was the Palestinian problem to be treated simply as one of refugees for whom a humanitarian solution was to be found or the problem of a people for which a political solution, in the form of a Palestinian homeland, would have to be found? If the latter, what form should such a political solution take? Would the Palestinians continue to be placed under the jurisdiction of others (i.e., in some sort of federal or confederal arrangement) or would they finally become masters in their own house through the establishment of an independent state? What conditions should be attached to whatever solution is proposed? Factors Shaping Policy The October War of 1973 and the developments which it generated modified a number of the parameters of Canadian policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. This in turn had an impact on Canada's policy toward the Palestinians. To begin with, the outbreak and dynamics of the 1973 war clearly showed the instability of the Middle East and the dangers that this posed to the world. The front-line Arab states demonstrated that they had a significant capacity, as well as a willingness, to wage war and consequently that the United States and other Western countries could no longer count on military "stability" in the area. In its final days, the war had also brought the superpowers close to a direct confrontation. Needless to say, the perception of the increased danger of war resulting from

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the growth of Arab military strength generated a greater sense of urgency. This led Western countries, including Canada, to accord greater importance to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Middle East problems generally, on their foreign policy agenda. It also led them to pay a little more attention to Arab views, since the Arab states now appeared to be in a position to disturb the peace if their dissatisfaction became too great. Secondly, the developments during the October War revealed that the Western countries were open to substantial economic pressures from the Arab world. Arab oil producing states on this occasion imposed an embargo on deliveries of oil to specific countries as well as a general production cutback, with a view to inducing the Western powers to press for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Now, for the first time, Canada found itself with tangible national interests at stake in the region. Although its degree of dependence on external energy supplies was substantially less than any other Western country, Canada was by now importing a modest but growing amount of oil from Arab sources. Rumors that Canada had been included on the embargo list or that she would suffer indirectly from the embargo on the U.S. because a considerable portion of her imported Arab oil came in transit through the northeastern United States, caused considerable concern for a time in Ottawa.1 Even though these rumors proved unfounded, they made the government and public alike aware of Canada's vulnerability to Arab pressures. This awareness, in turn, brought about an important modification in the structure of interests within which the government operated in formulating its Middle East policy. Until 1973, this had been highly unbalanced in Israel's favor, given the substantial influence which the Canadian Jewish community was able to exert and the lack of any counter-pressure. As a result, while the government was faced with potentially significant domestic political costs if it attempted to move to meet Arab concerns, there were few, if any, costs attached to a policy of inaction or even a pro-Israeli stance. Now that the Arab states had some leverage over Canada, the structure of interests was much less unbalanced. There were now potential costs involved in a lack of responsive ness to Arab concerns. These might not have posed as much of a direct threat to the government in the mid-1970s as the opposition of the Jewish community but they were sufficient to give the government some cause for concern. In fact, in the period immediately following the October War, they were probably the most important factor causing the government to move toward a more evenhanded posture on the Palestinian question.2 From the mid-1970s on, Canada's economic interests in the Arab

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world grew considerably. 3 Canada not only imported more Arab oil but also began to develop markets there for some of its goods and services. Moreover, as the oil-producing countries acquired substantial amounts of petrodollars, Canada also benefited from a modest inflow of Arab funds for various purposes. These new economic ties in turn created domestic interests which had a direct stake in good relations with the Arab world. These interests were still far too weak in the mid-1970s to offset the influence of the Canadian Jewish community. This was evident in the Canadian government's decision in 1975 to "postpone" the holding of the U.N. Crime Conference in Toronto in order not to have to allow a PLO delegation to attend. 4 By the late 1970s, however, they were sufficiently strong to have a decisive influence on the Clark government's decision not to go ahead with the proposed move of the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to West Jerusalem.5 Although these interests were still, in overall terms, much less influential than the Jewish community on issues relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict, they were clearly now a force to be reckoned with. The third area of change was in regard to perceptions of legitimacy. Canadian decision-makers continued to support Israel's right to existence unconditionally. However, there were some changes, particularly in the perception of Arab intentions and behavior, that led to a more nuanced judgment about the legitimacy of the positions of the opposing sides. Thus, in the wake of the 1973 war, it became clear that Egypt and Jordan were willing to reach a settlement with Israel; Syria was much more hesitant but appeared to be moving in the same direction. Moreover, the key Arab oil-producing state, Saudi Arabia, and the other conservative oil-producing states were supporting these moves. This considerably improved the image which Canadian officials, decisionmakers, and parliamentarians had of the Arab world and made them somewhat more attentive and responsive to Arab concerns and views.6 At the same time, many of this group became more critical of Israel's intentions and behavior, particularly after the advent of the Begin government to power in the spring of 1977. This shift in the perceptions of legitimacy was important. Although it might not have constituted the main stimulus or motivation for the initial moves toward a more evenhanded policy in the fall of 1973, it was a basic prerequisite for these moves and for any subsequent evolution of policy. In particular, it tended to remove some of the constraints on government actions arising from the perceptions and attitudes of members of the media, community leaders, and the public at large. While there was clearly an evolution in this sphere with respect to the Arab-Israeli

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conflict in general, it was much more limited in regard to the PalestinianIsraeli conflict. The fourth area of change was in the outlook and policies of other Western governments. The above-mentioned evolution in perceptions and attitudes which occurred among Canadian officials and decisionmakers after 1973, had begun earlier and proceeded farther in Western Europe. It applied not only to the Arab-Israeli conflict in general but also more particularly to the Palestinian question. This shift was manifested in votes at the United Nations and, to some extent, in policy declarations as well. In any case, the evolution of European views and policies had some impact on Canada's position after the 1973 war. One important contributing factor to this was the fact that Canada now placed some emphasis on the development of a "contractual link" with the Common Market as a means of implementing its "Third Option" policy of lessening dependence on the U.S. Another was that some officials in the Department of External Affairs made the case, particularly during Mr. MacEachen's tenure (1974 — 1976), that the Western European states were a more appropriate point of reference for Canada on Middle Eastern issues than the U.S., given the latter's special role as superpower ally and protector of Israel.7 In this connection, under President Carter there was even some evolution of U.S. policy on the Palestinian question. These developments in outlook and policy on the part of her allies contributed to a changing climate in the West, which made a shift in Canadian policy easier. Although changes in the above four areas certainly facilitated movement in Canadian policy on the Palestinian question, there were still important constraints in this regard. For one thing, there were serious questions about Palestinian intentions and behavior. In spite of some indications from 1974 on that the mainstream of the PLO might be prepared to reach a settlement with Israel as long as this provided for an independent Palestinian state, Canadian decision-makers and officials remained very skeptical. Over and above this, there were important subnational considerations. The Jewish community was hostile to any move on Canada's part toward greater recognition of the Palestinians or the PLO. It enjoyed considerable access to policy-makers and parliamentarians which enabled it to get across its views. It also monitored Canadian policy very closely and was in a position to stir up considerable opposition to any action by the Canadian government with which it disagreed (e.g., the Crime Conference issue in 1975). Since existing Canadian policy on the Palestinian question corresponded fairly closely to the views of the Jewish

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community, its task was simply one of deterrence, that is of ensuring that no change in policy occurred. As in most situations of this kind, it is much easier for an interest group to succeed in deterring a government from making a change than it is in compelling it to make some change which it favors.8 The Quebec situation was a further subnational factor that served as a constraint on Canada's Palestinian policy, although it was nowhere near as significant as the influence of the Jewish community. In the early 1970s, the pro-independence party, the Parti Quebecois, had suffered two major defeats at the polls. Consequently, the problem of Quebec "separatism" was thought to have receded. However, in November 1976, the Parti Quebecois emerged as the clear victor in the Quebec election, a development which sent shock-waves throughout Canada, nowhere more so than in Ottawa. The threat of Quebec independence and the struggle to preserve the unity of the country now became a major preoccupation of the federal government. In this context, it had to be rather careful about the stand which it took internationally on the issues of "self-determination" and "national independence," most notably in the Palestinian case. At the international level, the position and policy of the U.S. remained a constraint on Canadian policy. As noted above, in the years immediately following the October War the Canadian government decided that there was no need for it to adopt the same policies as the U.S. vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. This led to an evolution of Canadian policy on the Palestinian question while the U.S. largely stood pat. However, the government was not prepared to push this divergence too far for fear of undermining American mediation efforts and causing serious strains within the Atlantic Alliance. Hence Canada was still influenced by U.S. Palestinian policy. Later, during the first year of the Carter administration (1977), the U.S. caught up with and perhaps even moved ahead of Canada on the Palestinian issue. However, as a result of President Sadat's peace initiative in November 1977, President Carter was forced to drop his attempt to promote a comprehensive settlement that would give priority to the Palestinian question, in favor of a quasi-separate peace between Egypt and Israel which relegated the resolution of the Palestinian problem to a much later date. Because of the political capital which it had invested, the American government now placed considerable importance on the Camp David accords and the Canadian government was extremely reluctant to question these. In fact, it decided to associate itself wholeheartedly with them. Finally, Canada's fundamental approach to the settlement process

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remained the same. Resolution 242 was still viewed as providing the basic framework for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While there continued to be strong opposition to any attempt to modify this resolution, there were some indications of an implicit and grudging acceptance of a two-track approach. This involved leaving Resolution 242 intact while occasionally tolerating, at least in the form of an abstention, separate resolutions dealing specifically with the Palestinian problem.9 In view of these constraints it is not surprising that Canadian policy on the Palestinian question remained very cautious. The Concluding Trudeau-Sharp Period (1973-1974) Policy In October 1973, the attention of Canadian policy-makers and parliamentarians centered on the ongoing war in the Middle East as well as on the selective embargo and production cutbacks imposed by the Arab oil-producing states. At the same time, a somewhat greater sensitivity to the Palestinian issue was manifested. This developed not so much because of any new appreciation of the merits of the question but rather because of an awareness that Canada was perceived by the Arabs as being less than evenhanded, with consequent damage to her interests and image. Prior to the October War, the government apparently believed that it had been evenhanded on Middle Eastern issues and was, in fact, perceived as such by the Arab world.10 Developments during and immediately after the war raised serious doubts about this assumption. For one thing, problems were raised initially by the Egyptian government about Canadian participation in a new peacekeeping force.11 These apparently stemmed from Egyptian concern about past and present Canadian policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. More importantly, rumors began circulating that Canada had been included among the countries that would be subjected to an oil embargo because of her alleged pro-Israel orientation.12 To establish an image of evenhandedness and thus protect both Canada's international position and her economic interests, the government decided on the need for some gestures toward the Arab world.13 These occurred principally on the Palestinian issue, where it was thought that some limited movement was possible without antagonizing Israel. An added consideration was that the European Community had already taken a step forward in this area.14 One indication of the government's new sensitivity to the Palestinian question can be seen in the terminology employed by External Affairs Minister Sharp. Previously he had deliberately avoided the use of the term "Palestinian" in public statements except during his testimony

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before the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defence in the spring of 1973. He maintained this practice in the initial parliamentary debates during the October War. 15 However, by November 1973 a change took place. Mr. Sharp began by referring to the "Palestinian refugees,''' then "the Palestinians" and ultimately spoke of "the Palestinian people. "16 The simple acknowledgment of the Palestinian identity was not felt to be sufficient, however. With the prospect of initiation of peace talks between some Arab governments and Israel, pressure began to build up for the inclusion of the Palestinians in these negotiations. This was reflected in the action of the Arab Summit Conference in Algiers in November 1973, which recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This theme of the need for Palestinian participation in peace negotiations was also taken up by the Soviet leadership during Mr. Sharp's visit to the Soviet Union in late November. Evidently aware that this issue would be raised and having decided on the need for some initiative toward the Arab world, Mr. Sharp agreed to the idea in principle. Sharp, talking to reporters after his talks with Kosygin, said Canada is generally sympathetic to the suggestion that Palestinians be represented in the Middle East peace negotiations scheduled to get underway in Geneva. 17

This statement was repeated a few days later in the House of Commons. 18 Canada's acceptance of the principle of Palestinian representation was significant primarily in a symbolic sense. It constituted an acknowledgement that the Palestinians had become a political force in their own right and had some legitimate collective interests that would have to be taken into consideration in any peace negotiations. It also implied, for the first time, that the Palestinian problem was more than just a refugee problem and that some political rather than merely humanitarian arrangements might have to be worked out. However, Mr. Sharp was deliberately vague about the form Palestinian representation might take. In short, it was a diplomatic gesture that had little, if any, concrete content and could easily be emptied of any practical meaning by the introduction of numerous restrictions. While there was some movement on Canada's part on this procedural issue, Mr. Sharp had nothing new to say on the major substantive issue, namely the political future of the Palestinian people. As in the previous period, the assumption appeared to be that any Palestinian territories from which Israel withdrew would be returned to the jurisdiction of Jordan and Egypt. However, given the increased awareness of

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Palestinian identity and national consciousness at this point, the links which were to be re-established were apparently expected to be looser than before. U.N. Voting Behavior Although no policy declarations were made on the subject, the Canadian government in an additional gesture to the Arab world in the fall of 1973, did attempt to convey an impression of increased flexibility regarding the future political status of the Palestinian people. The occasion was the annual UNRWA debate at the 1973 session of the U.N. General Assembly. As was the case every year since 1969, a resolution was presented during this debate affirming the rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination. The 1973 resolution (Resolution 3089D) was virtually identical to that presented in 1972 except for the addition of a provision that the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and property in Israel was "indispensable" not only for "the achievement of a just settlement of the refugee problem" but also for "the exercise by the people of Palestine of its right to self-determination."19 This seemed to leave open the possibility that the right of Palestinian self-determination might apply to the area of Israel proper and not simply to the Palestinian territory under Arab control after 1948. As in previous years, the Western countries differed in their approach to the resolution. The U.S., as usual, opposed it. However, all the EEC countries including West Germany, which had just been admitted to the U.N., chose to abstain. Canada, which had previously voted against this resolution, now switched to an abstention, thereby aligning itself with Western Europe. This occurred in spite of the fact that Canada's previous objections, notably the absence of any reference to Resolution 242, had not been met. In fact, if anything, the resolution may have been a little bit stronger. No explanation of this shift in voting behavior was offered. The Canadian delegate indicated simply that he could not support the resolution because "such political declarations were not relevant to UNRWA" and "could affect the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338."20 It is also possible, however, that Canada was responding to indications that the notion of "Palestinian rights" was in the process of being redefined within the Arab world, as evidenced by the statement of the Egyptian foreign minister to the Security Council in June 1973. In this vote, the Canadian government went beyond its declared policy on the Palestinian question. Up to this point, the only legitimate collective interest of the Palestinians it had acknowledged was the claim

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to be represented in some manner in any negotiations for a Middle East settlement. Now, by its abstention, Canada was implying that it no longer ruled out self-determination for the Palestinians, although this was clearly not its preferred solution. It would be unwise to read too much into this vote insofar as any evolution of Canadian thinking on the Palestinian question was concerned. The vote was primarily a gesture to convey to the Arab world an impression of Canadian evenhandedness, rather than a reflection of any new Canadian policy concerning the shape of an eventual settlement. In the months following the October War, attention centered largely on the efforts to initiate negotiations between the front-line Arab states and Israel. Initially the focus was on the Geneva Conference, which met briefly in December 1973 and was attended by Egypt, Jordan, and Israel as well as by the U.S. and USSR. Then attention shifted to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's efforts to arrange bilateral disengagement agreements, first of all between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and then between Syria and Israel in May 1974. Since the Palestinian issue had temporarily been left to one side and since, during the latter part of this period, the government found itself involved in an election campaign from May until July 1974, there were no further policy developments during the remainder of Mr. Sharp's term as minister of External Affairs. The Trudeau-MacEachen Period (July 1974—September 1976) Once the disengagement agreements had been finalized, attention turned to the search for a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab governments now insisted that real progress toward a settlement would require the recognition of Palestinian national rights and the direct participation of Palestinian spokesmen in any negotiations. One important move in this direction was the recognition of the PLO as the "sole, legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people by the Arab heads of state at the Rabat summit meeting in October 1974. This was quickly followed by a major campaign to secure international recognition for the Palestinian people and, in particular, the PLO. This campaign for international recognition was accompanied by an apparent modification in PLO policy designed to make Palestinian claims more acceptable to the international community. Thus in June 1974, the Palestinian National Council decided to modify its previous all or nothing policy and set instead as its immediate aim the establishment of an "independent national authority" on any portion of Palestinian territory from which Israel withdrew. From this point on, the creation of an independent Palestinian state encompassing the West Bank and Gaza became a central element in Arab proposals for a settlement. This appeared to open up

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genuine prospects for an honorable settlement. In any case, these twin developments in the latter part of 1974 thrust the Palestinian issue to the forefront both regionally and at the global level. The increasing importance of the issue was reflected in the 1974 session of the U.N. General Assembly where a special debate was held on "the Question of Palestine," highlighted by the participation of the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Consequently, Canada and the rest of the international community were now obliged to confront the issue directly. The Canadian government which faced this new situation was different in some respects from the previous one. Prime Minister Trudeau remained at the helm but he now headed a majority rather than a minority government as a result of his victory in the July 1974 election. This placed his government in a stronger position since it no longer had to worry about the possibility of being defeated in the House because of some misstep. Moreover, partly as an extension of his attempt to lessen dependence on the U.S. through the diversification of international contacts and relationships, Prime Minister Trudeau now apparently favored the pursuit of a more active policy by Canada toward the Third World. In this connection, the Middle East in general, and the Arab world in particular, assumed greater importance because of its actual, as well as potential, economic significance for Canada. 21 Canada also had a new minister of External Affairs in the person of Allan MacEachen. As a former academic with a considerable concern for social issues, he tended to be more open to the concerns of developing countries than his predecessor, whose background had been in business and the civil service. More particularly, insofar as Middle East policy was concerned, Mr. MacEachen, unlike his predecessor, did not represent a constituency with a substantial Jewish population. Since his personal political position was not endangerd by his stand on Middle Eastern issues, Mr. MacEachen was freer to consider such issues on their merits and on the basis of Canada's national interests. He did remain constrained, however, by the desire of the government to avoid antagonizing the Jewish community to any significant extent. Policy When Mr. MacEachen assumed the direction of the Department of External Affairs, he found a concern among some of his officials that Canadian policy with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict had been less than evenhanded and a belief that this policy was in need of review. 22 This belief was reinforced by the increased importance being placed on the Palestinian issue in the international arena and indications that it would figure prominently on the agenda of the fall session of the U.N. General

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Assembly. Like it or not, Canada would be obliged to confront the issue squarely, with the knowledge that the Arab states would look upon the position of other countries on this question as a litmus-test of their policy toward the Arab world. During the ensuing policy review, the Palestinian issue was examined not only from the viewpoint of the implications for Canadian interests and Canadian relations with other countries but also in its own right. In the course of the discussion, several officials argued that further movement on this issue was necessary on the grounds of the merits of the case and Canadian interests. It was also argued that there was no need for Canada to adopt the same position as the U.S., since the latter had a special role as Israel's superpower protector and principal ally.23 The Western European states would be a more appropriate point of reference for Canada. Mr. MacEachen proved receptive to many of these arguments. Consequently, in the fall of 1974, Canada emerged with the outlines of a new Palestinian policy which, in one area at least, involved a significant advance on the previous one. This policy, although more sympathetic to Palestinian aspirations than in the past, was still relatively cautious and made ample provision for the safeguarding of Israel's interest. This new approach was outlined in what was billed as a "major statement of Canadian policy"24 delivered by the minister during the special debate on the "Question of Palestine" at the fall session of the General Assembly. The themes developed here were elaborated on by Mr. MacEachen on subsequent occasions both in the House of Commons and elsewhere. In his address to the General Assembly, Mr. MacEachen began by acknowledging, in an indirect manner, that the Palestinian issue had now become much more central to the Middle East conflict. ...recent developments have placed new emphasis on certain elements among the numerous factors that must be taken into account in any realistic move toward a peace settlement. 25

He then implied clearly that the Palestinians should figure prominently in the search for a settlement. Canada's fundamental concern has always been to help bring about a just and durable peace. To be just it must take full account of the legitimate interests of all the peoples and to be durable it must be developed and accepted by all.26 This was made more explicit a few moments later.

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Recent developments, including this debate, testify to the growing acknowledgement that cognizance must be taken of the need for the Palestinian people to be represented and heard in negotiations involving their destiny. Canada is fully in accord with the view that any enduring peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute must take account of the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians.27

Here the minister recognized clearly not only that the Palestinians constituted a distinct people but also that they had become a significant force in their own right and consequently would have to be given a say in any peace negotiations. More importantly, though, he acknowledged that the Palestinians had collective interests and aspirations which would have to be taken into account in any settlement. This meant, by implication, that the Palestinian problem had become more than just a refugee problem and that a humanitarian solution would no longer be sufficient. While Mr. MacEachen was more forthright than his predecessor in recognizing the identity and collective aspirations of the Palestinians, he was relatively cautious when it came to defining the precise content of their "legitimate interests." Thus on the subject of possible Palestinian participation in peace negotiations, he declared Canada's support for "the right of the Palestinian people to be heard and participate in negotiations involving their destiny."28 At the same time, however, he laid down a number of conditions, both substantive and procedural, which effectively limited the exercise of this "right."29 If the changes made by Mr. MacEachen in Canada's position regarding Palestinian representation in peace negotiations were only cosmetic in character, the same was not the case for Canada's policy concerning the future status of the Palestinian people. The switch in Canada's vote from opposition to abstention on the 1973 General Assembly resolution affirming the right of the Palestinians to selfdetermination was presumably an indication that this position was being reconsidered. However, nothing had been said publicly on the subject. In his General Assembly speech, Mr. MacEachen declared explicitly for the first time Canada's support for apolitical, rather than simply a humanitarian, solution to the Palestinian problem. Thus, after noting "the declared aspiration of the PLO to establish an independent national authority," he went on to raise the prospect of the emergence of a "Palestinian entity."30 The formula employed was deliberately vague but it implied the establishment of some type of distinct Palestinian political structural with a meaningful degree of autonomy. There were many possible forms such a political structure could take, ranging from a limited home-rule arrangement to a federation, or even, as Mr.

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MacEachen admitted afterwards in an interview, an independent Palestinian state. External Affairs Minister MacEachen addressing the U.N. General Assembly Wednesday night, cautiously expressed Canada's belief that an independent Palestinian nation might come into existence. Carefully choosing his words—using the term entity rather than 'state' or 'nation'—Mr. MacEachen responded affirmatively to a reporter's question for clarification that Canada—in the calibrated language of diplomacy— was in fact accepting the "possibility" of an independent Palestinian state. 31

Although Mr. MacEachen was certainly not indicating here that an independent Palestinian state was Canada's preferred solution, it is interesting to note that he did mention the possibility of such an outcome and referred to it in neutral rather than negative terms. At the same time, he set important conditions on the establishment of any Palestinian political structure. If the emergence of any Palestinian entity were to be envisaged at some stage, it would be essential that this should be the result of agreement among the parties directly involved, which, of course, include Israel. In this respect, the establishment, evolution and existence of any such entity should in no way prejudice the continued existence of the state of Israel.32

The second condition, namely that any Palestinian entity would be subject to various obligations and restrictions which would limit its ability to threaten Israel, was readily understandable. The other basic condition, however, was more questionable. It effectively gave Israel the right to determine how much, if any, political self-expression would be accorded to the Palestinians. While this might have reflected the power realities of the situation, it was perhaps unwise to have stipulated this principle in an unqualified form. In any case, even though some of the accompanying conditions limited the practical significance of Mr. MacEachen's gesture, his willingness to give favorable consideration to the establishment of a Palestinian entity marked an important step in the evolution of Canadian thinking on the Palestinian problem. Over the next year (1975), little more was said by the government regarding the future status of the Palestinians. Attention was concentrated instead on the more immediate issue of Palestinian representation and, in particular, Canada's policy toward the PLO.33 Mr. MacEachen found himself confronted with the issue of the future status of the Palestinians once again in January 1976 during his visit to the Middle East. The subject apparently came up in discussions with government

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leaders in every country he visited (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Israel). In his public statements, the Minister reiterated his government's awareness of the existence of a distinct Palestinian identity and the need to take into account in any settlement what were variously described as the legitimate concerns, interests, or aspirations of the Palestinians.34 He shied away, however, from any public reference to the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians because of the uncertain and potentially unacceptable connotations of this term. Mr. MacEachen and his officials had two main concerns. 35 The first involved the openendedness of the term. Unless one qualified one's support by limiting it to certain specific rights, it could amount to a blank check since the list of rights was potentially unlimited. The qualifying adjective "legitimate" was apparently not thought to be a sufficient safeguard. The second concern centered on the connotations of nonnegotiability attached to the term "rights." Underlying these concerns, however, was the fear that the term "legitimate rights" did have a very specific meaning, namely the right of self-determination, including the creation of an independent state, which Canada was not prepared to commit itself to as the only or even the preferred solution to the Palestinian problem. Mr. MacEachen was prepared, however, to reiterate publicly that a humanitarian solution was insufficient and that a political solution, presumably involving the creation of some sort of Palestinian political structure, would have to be found: I believe that Canada sees the Palestinian question as a political one that needs a political solution and not a problem of refugees. We have been supporting U.N. efforts to help the refugees for years. But the problem clearly goes beyond that.36

Although the public position taken by Canada remained fairly cautious, the minister and his officials were somewhat more forthright in private. Thus, one senior official remarked to Canadian reporters during the tour: We always sustained the rights of the Palestinians as individuals. [Now] we recognize their collective rights. 37

Mr. MacEachen apparently used similar language in discussions with Israeli officials: Mr. MacEachen was firm in stating [to the Israelis] that Palestinian collective rights must be recognized. 38

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He also indicated what the Canadian government meant by this in more concrete terms. The government of Yitzak Rabin is going to find External Affairs Minister MacEachen sympathetic to some of the more moderate views of new Arab friends about the emergence of a Palestinian political entity.39

U.N. Voting Behavior The evolution of Canada's Palestinian policy under Mr. MacEachen was reflected to some extent in Canada's votes on Palestinian issues in the U.N. during this period. However, a country's votes in the U.N. are based not only on its policy. The content of the resolutions presented, the signals the country wants to send to others, and the voting intentions of friendly states all enter into the picture. Consequently, the correlation between changes in policy and shifts in voting behavior is frequently imperfect. At the 1974 session of the General Assembly, the political future of the Palestinian people ceased to be treated as just one of the several topics in the annual UNRWA debate and became instead the subject of a separate and extended debate in plenary session. In the course of this debate, a resolution was presented which went somewhat beyond the UNRWA resolutions of previous years. Thus, in the key operative paragraphs, the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people were explicitly stated to include the right to national independence and sovereignty and the right to return to their homes.40 In addition, the resolution attempted to confer some measure of legitimacy and recognition on the PLO.41 As noted earlier, at the 1973 General Assembly session Canada had switched from its negative vote of previous years to an abstention on the Palestinian rights resolution. This vote was not consistent with Canadian policy at that time, since none of the objections it had raised in previous years had been met and there had been no public indication up to that point that Canada considered the Palestinian problem to be anything more than a refugee problem. As we saw, it was primarily a diplomatic gesture to the Arab world designed to convey an impression of evenhandedness. In 1974, Canada maintained the stance which it had adopted in 1973, once again in spite of the fact that its earlier objections had not been met and that the resolution went a little beyond those of previous years. This time, however, its vote was more logical because of the evolution in policy which had occurred since 1973. External Affairs Minister MacEachen had emphasized in his speech to the 1974 Assembly that the Palestinians had a right to be represented in any peace negotiations and also that a political solution to the problem, in the form of the creation of

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a Palestinian entity, should be considered seriously. Canada refused to take a stand on the form such an entity might take, saying that this should be left to negotiations between the parties. However, it did not rule out the possibility that the Palestinians might eventually obtain an independent state. Nor did it rule out the possibility that the PLO might be accepted as the representative of the Palestinians. Hence, even with the additions to the resolution, abstention was a much more plausible stance now than it had been in 1973. A further factor contributing to Canada's abstention on this resolution was a changed perception of Arab and, to a lesser extent, Palestinian aims. We may be witnessing a fundamental change of appreciation of existing realities on the part of both sides to the dispute....Arab governments appear more disposed to recognize Israel's right to exist.42

Since Canadian fears about Arab intentions had diminished, the references to Palestinian rights and Palestinian self-determination may very well have seemed less menacing, even if unaccompanied by a reference to Resolution 242. It seemed possible to interpret these references in a more restrictive manner as applying simply to the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967 rather than to the whole of the former mandate territory. Mr. MacEachen seemed to imply as much when he referred to "the declared aspiration of the PLO to establish an independent national authority in the region."43 A final consideration prompting an abstention was the voting intentions of its friends and allies. As in 1973, while the U.S. opposed the resolution, the nine members of the EEC all decided to abstain. Mr. MacEachen concurred with the judgment of his officials that there was no need to vote automatically with the U.S. on Middle Eastern issues given the latter's special role as superpower protector and ally of Israel. Moreover, the Minister was interested in strengthening Canada's links with Europe and the Third World as a means of implementing the government's "Third Option" policy. Since all the EEC countries were in agreement on abstention and Japan had adopted a similar position, Canada felt that it would be in "good company" in its decision to abstain. While the Canadian government was no longer opposed in principle to such "Palestinian rights" resolutions, it nevertheless had important reservations about this one. In the first place, in spite of Canada's apparently dimished fear of Arab intentions, the absence in the resolution of any mention of Resolution 242 or of Israel's right to existence did cause some concern.

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Canada cannot support a resolution which ignores the existence of the state of Israel and its role as an essential party in any search for an eventual negotiated peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In this context the resolution makes no reference to the principles enunciated in Resolution 242 which Canada continues to believe provides a valid and available framework for such a settlement.44

Even if this resolution had contained a reference to Resolution 242 or to Israel's right to existence, it is still extremely doubtful that Canada would have supported it. For, while the government was prepared to accept the need for some type of Palestinian political structure, it was not convinced that an independent Palestinian state was the only or even the best solution.45 Moreover, whatever its own views on the matter, it did not believe that the U.N. should endorse a specific solution. The precise terms of settlement of the conflict should be left to negotiations between the parties. The resolution before the Assembly, in Canada's view, prejudged the outcome of such negotiations.46 At a more general level, the Canadian Government believed that Palestinian rights resolutions, and others of this type, modified the basic balance of obligations contained in Resolution 242, either by adding new elements or by stressing one aspect of the solution, however valid, in isolation from others. Consequently, it could not see its way clear to support them, no matter how moderate they might become. The integrity of the Security Council resolutions must be maintained, in particular by refraining from any action that would tend to emphasize one aspect to the exclusion of other equally valid principles. This applies, of course, to the Palestinian issue as to all the others involved. While important and indeed fundamental to the Arab-Israeli conflict, this issue evidently cannot be resolved separately and without consideration for other elements of the problem. We should be opposed to any unilateral actions that could be prejudicial to the comprehensive negotiated settlement that is being sought. 47

Beginning with the 1975 session of the General Assembly, Canada entered a new phase in its voting behavior on the Palestinian question at the U.N. This phase was characterized by a reversion to the pattern of negative votes which had existed prior to 1973. This shift did not represent any hardening of policy on the Palestinian question, however, at least not in 1975. Rather, it stemmed primarily from the presentation by the Arab states of more ambitious resolutions on this subject as well as adverse reaction to what was regarded as the increasing assertiveness of the Arab states within the U.N. This stiffening of Canada's voting behavior was manifested most clearly in the position it adopted on the annual Palestinian rights resolu-

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tion at the 1975 session of the General Assembly. The resolution presented on this occasion differed little from that which had been passed the previous year. It began by expressing concern that no progress had been made toward the achievement of the rights mentioned in the previous year's resolution.48 It then went on to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (Paragraph 3) and requested it to recommend a plan designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise the above-mentioned rights recognized by the General Assembly. It also authorized the Committee to establish contact with the PLO in the course of its work (Paragraph 5). Finally, it requested the Security Council to consider the question of "the inalienable rights" of the Palestinian people after the submission of the Committee's report (Paragraph 8). In short, this resolution made no substantive proposals beyond those already contained in the previous year's resolution. The only real difference had to do withprocedures for tackling the Palestinian problem, namely, the establishment of a Committee to recommend plans for the implementation of Palestinian rights. Nevertheless, Canada switched its vote from abstention to opposition. In an explanation of the vote, the Canadian delegate raised two objections to the resolution. The first involved the absence of any reference to Israel's right to existence or to Resolution 242. By its direct linkage and re-endorsement of Resolution 3236 [1974]...this resolution ignores the right of existence of the state of Israel and its role as an essential party in the search for a negotiated settlement.49

The second objection centered on the proposed Committee on Palestinian Rights. The Canadian delegation argued that a framework for negotiation had already been established by the U.N. (i.e., the Geneva Conference) and that the creation of a new committee would undermine it. Furthermore, Canada cannot support the establishment of a U.N. Special Committee on Palestine. If such a Committee fully complied with the proposed mandate, it would perforce be prejudging the activities of another body responsible for the ongoing process of negotiation already established by the U.N. and which Canada has endorsed and continues to support. Such a Committee would both complicate and interfere with existing arrangements without itself contributing to the resolution of basic problems.50

The Canadian delegate might have added that the real fear of the minister and his officials was that the Committee would be heavily weighted in

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favor of the Palestinians and consequently would not be evenhanded in its recommendations.51 In other words, what was at stake was the creation of a U.N. body which would give added legitimacy to the Palestinian cause and serve as a pressure group on its behalf. Regarding these objections, the first, namely the failure of the resolution to make any reference to Resolution 242 or Israel's right to existence, had applied to the 1973 and 1974 Palestinian rights resolutions as well. Yet this had not prevented Canada from abstaining on both resolutions. Consequently, it is hard to see how this could have been the decisive factor in Canada's change of vote. The second objection, namely the impact of the proposed committee on the peace process, had some merit, particularly when combined with the unstated argument about the likely composition and orientation of this Committee. However, the argument was perhaps not as weighty as it might appear. To begin with, the Geneva Conference framework had not been able to function at all since December 1973 and there was no prospect of it reconvening in the near future, mainly because of the failure to resolve the Palestinian representation issue. It had in fact been replaced, at least temporarily, by Henry Kissinger's "one by one" diplomacy. Hence the proposed Committee would not be hampering the work of a successfully functioning body. Furthermore, the resolution involved only a procedural step, the establishment of a committee to make recommendations. There might be good reason to suspect that the committee's proposals would be unbalanced, but if this proved to be the case, one could always vote against them when the time came (i.e., if they were incorporated in future General Assembly resolutions). The counter argument, of course, would be that once the Committee was established, even if one's worst fears about it proved well-founded, it would be next to impossible to terminate. As a result, it would go on churning out unbalanced, unproductive, if not counterproductive, resolutions. While the objections presented had some merit, they do not seem powerful enough in themselves to explain the switch to a negative vote. The factor which may very well have tipped the balance was the concern of various Western governments about the increasing assertiveness of Arab and Third World states on Middle Eastern issues within the U.N. Preceding this session there had been talk of attempting to suspend or expel Israel from U.N. membership. During this session, too, the highly contentious resolution equating Zionism with racism had been passed. All of this created a negative climate within Western countries and generated a disposition to signal to the Palestinians and the Arab states generally that they were attempting to go too far too fast. 52 How far this view was shared by Canada is not clear, however, it was undoubtedly

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influenced by it to some extent. Consequently, when not only the U.S. but also the majority of the EEC countries decided to oppose this resolution, Canada did likewise. The Trudeau-Jamieson Period (September 1976-May 1979) After the signing of the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in September 1975, efforts to promote a settlement of the ArabIsraeli conflict bogged down for a time. The stumbling block proved to be the Palestinian question and, more particularly, the problem of Palestinian representation in the peace negotiations. The U.S. had promised Israel it would not talk to the PLO unless they accepted Resolution 242 and Israel's right to existence. The PLO, for its part, refused to accept Resolution 242 unless it was amended to recognize the Palestinians' right to existence in the form of an independent state, which the U.S. was not prepared to do. Reinforcing this deadlock was the fact that most of the key actors were preoccupied with political problems of their own. Thus, the U.S. found itself in an election year in 1976, during which time the possibilities for a diplomatic initiative were sharply limited. The Israeli government realized this and consequently did not feel under pressure to undertake any initiatives of its own; this disposition toward inaction was reinforced by an awareness that elections were upcoming in Israel in 1977. Finally, the Arab states in general and the Palestinians in particular had become seriously bogged down in the Lebanese "civil" war, which intensified sharply in early 1976. It was not until the fall of 1976 that some movement became possible once more. With the Lebanese conflict provisionally under control as a result of the Riyadh summit of October and the U.S. Presidential elections out of the way in November, the leading Arab states embarked on a major effort to achieve a settlement of the conflict. An important part of this campaign, which was directed largely at the new American administration and at the Western countries generally, was the attempt to promote a breakthrough on the Palestinian question. In this they enjoyed some degree of success. In June 1977, the members of the EEC moved beyond their previous endorsement of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians (November 1973) to support the establishment of a Palestinian "homeland" (patrie).53 More importantly, though, the new Carter administration decided to shift from the "step by step" (or "one by one") approach of the previous administration, which left the consideration of the Palestinian problem to the end, to a "comprehensive" approach that gave priority to the Palestinian question. In this connection, the U.S. government also began to display greater openness toward the Palestinians, referring in particular to the need for a Palestinian "homeland."

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Because of these developments, a sense of movement developed among the Western countries. But, by the fall of 1977, a change of direction occurred. As a result of President Sadat's peace initiative, President Carter was forced to drop his comprehensive aproach to a settlement in favor of a quasi-separate peace between Egypt and Israel which relegated the resolution of the Palestinian problem to a much later date. This transformed the situation for the Palestinians and for the other Western countries. A newspaper report in the Toronto Star appeared in late August 1976 which suggested that significant elements in the Department of External Affairs favored some shift in policy toward the Middle East and in particular toward the Palestinians. ...There is now in the External Affairs Department an influential group that favors "tilting" toward the Arabs and that favors "leaning on Israel" now and then to induce it to make concessions. Some members of this band of activists have been angered by the cancellation of the U.N. Conference on Crime in Toronto, in part because of Jewish objections to the presence of representatives of the PLO. A few have been impressed by arguments of the Trade department that being pro-Arab is as good as cash in the till. And some officials are influenced by the "gurus"—retired senior diplomats, some of whom are strongly anti-Israel. 54 This report was denied both by Ivan Head, who was responsible for international affairs in the prime minister's office, and by External Affairs Minister MacEachen. 55 Nevertheless, although exaggerated, it did contain some element of truth. In view of her likely membership on the Security Council beginning in January 1977, some officials thought that Canada should now place greater importance on certain global developments, such as the increased weight of the Third World in general and the Arab states in particular, in the formulation of her policy. This was especially true with respect to Middle Eastern policy, where many believed that Canada was still less than evenhanded. Since Canada, as a member of the Security Council, would probably be called upon to deal extensively with Middle Eastern issues, it was felt that there was a need for greater Canadian responsiveness to legitimate Arab and Palestinian concerns, if she were to play an effective role there. 56 While these suggestions were being made at the official level, they apparently had not, at this point, been approved at the ministerial level. Whether or not they ever would have been is debatable. In any case, any expectations along these lines were dashed by the appointment of a new minister of External Affairs very shortly afterwards. 57 The new minister,

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Don Jamieson, had a very different outlook on Middle Eastern issues than Mr. MacEachen. For one thing, he appeared to be quite sympathetic to Israel personally. More importantly, he was very much a politician, ever alert to the domestic political situation and the views of significant elements within the community. Hence, even though he had virtually no Jewish constituents himself, he was strongly inclined to cultivate the support of the Jewish community for the political benefits it might bring to the Liberal party. As a result, he approached Middle Eastern issues with a definite pro-Israeli leaning. In fact, he was the most outspokenly pro-Israeli of any of Canada's foreign ministers during this period. This was evident in a number of statements and comments he made, frequently off the cuff. Thus, for example, two weeks after assuming office, he ended his speech at a reception for visiting Foreign Minister Allon of Israel with the words "Next year in Jerusalem," to the dismay of External Affairs officials in the audience. 58 Shortly afterwards, it was reported in a newspaper interview: [Jamieson's] natural inclination is to sympathize with Israel. He claims to be evenhanded on Middle East issues, but he interprets them with a pro-Israeli emphasis. "The Israelis can only lose one war" he said quoting [Israeli Foreign Minister] Allon, with obvious agreement. He readily conceded that this is good politics in Canada where "there isn't much of any Arab vote" but insisted that it goes much deeper than that.59

During his trip to Israel in October 1977, he commented When we get back and take part in international gatherings, we shall speak in support of Israel... .1 make no bones about it, we have a very soft spot for Israel.60

The irony of the situation was that some of the very factors that led him to sympathize with Israel applied equally to the Palestinians. I have a great attachment to this concept of a group of very deprived and terribly badly treated people seeking to establish some kind of a state [! !].61

As a result of Mr. Jamieson's orientation, although Canada's Palestinian policy formally remained the same during this period, it was approached in a more critical spirit and occasionally enunciated in a more negative tone. This difference in spirit and tone was significant since the ambiguity of the policy created considerable scope for interpretation.

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Policy However, even under Mr. Jamieson, the symbolic aspects of Canada's policy remained unchanged. The distinct identity of the Palestinians as well as the existence of some legitimate collective aspirations on their part continued to be recognized. Consequently, the need for a political, as well as a humanitarian, solution was acknowledged. We have recognized...that the Palestinian people have legitimate aspirations which require apolitical solution.62

On one occasion, Mr. Jamieson even spoke of "rights" in connection with Palestinian claims.63 However, like Mr. MacEachen, he was extremely wary of the use of this term for reasons already mentioned. From Canada's viewpoint, these issues should not become polarized by the rhetoric, especially by the risky use of such code words as "legitimate rights" The Canadian government is concerned that the issues become too heated up either by the misinterpretation or the misuse of language. 64

Symbolic acknowledgment of the existence of a Palestinian identity and of the legitimacy of certain unspecified Palestinian aspirations was not sufficient for the Arab world. As noted above, in late 1976 several Arab states embarked on a major effort to promote a breakthrough on the Palestinian question. The ultimate objective of this campaign was to secure recognition of the Palestinians' right to form an independent state and, more directly, their right to self-determination, that is to say, the ability to decide their future political status by themselves. At the outset of this Arab diplomatic campaign, the Canadian government felt that it detected some signs of flexibility on the part of Israel's Labor government in this area. During his visit to Ottawa in September 1976, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Yigael Allon told the newly appointed Mr. Jamieson in private discussions that his government now viewed the Palestinians as a "nation in the making."65 At a subsequent press conference, he spoke of the need for Palestinian "selfexpression."66 As a result, Mr. Jamieson and his officials concluded that the time was ripe for a new statement of Canadian policy concerning the political future of the Palestinians, a statement which would take into account the issue of self-determination. The situation was complicated, however, by developments within Canada. The advent to power in Quebec in November 1976 of the Parti Quebecois, which was dedicated to selfdetermination and political independence for Quebec, crystallized a domestic threat which had been latent for nearly a decade. The Canadian government now had to be very careful about addressing itself to the issue

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of self-determination internationally, for fear of repercussions on the internal political scene. The minister of External Affairs and his officials were certainly very much aware of the possible domestic implications of the issue. Although, there apparently was some informal communication between a member of the Privy Council (Cabinet) office and one or more External Affairs' officials on the subject. 67 The gist of the comments was that External Affairs should avoid talking about the problem as much as possible but that, if it were obliged to do so, it should find some other formula than "self-determination." The new formula developed by External Affairs regarding the future status of the Palestinians was first outlined at the 1976 session of the General Assembly. It consisted of two parts. The first part addressed itself to the process whereby a political solution to the Palestinian question would be arrived at, i.e., the issue of self-determination. In words reminiscent of Mr. Allon's Ottawa press conference, a Canadian spokesman declared during the UNRWA debate: It is recognized by everyone that a crucial aspect of the Middle East problem and an essential element that any solution must have if it is to endure is the finding by the Palestinian people of a means of self-expression, including political self-expression, consistent with the principle of selfdetermination. It is surely also clear that the Palestinian people must participate in the process of developing an appropriate structure for such self-expression...68

In other words, Canada acknowledged that the Palestinians were entitled to some form of political self-expression and also to participate in the determination of their political future. However, it was unwilling to recognize the right of self-determination in their case, in the sense of the right to decide upon their political future by themselves. The ultimate say on their future status would rest with the other parties to the conflict, and in particular with Israel, which would effectively retain a veto power in this regard. The second part of the new formula dealt with the nature of the ultimate political solution itself. Here the phrasing seemed to imply a more limited type of political arrangement than that envisaged by Mr. MacEachen. The latter, as we have seen, had referred to the possible creation of a "Palestinian entity" and, in discussions with Israeli officials in January 1976, had apparently spoken of a "Palestinian political entity." Now, at the 1976 session of the General Assembly, a Canadian spokesman referred to the need for "an appropriate structure for their political self-expression, within a suitable territorial framework."^ This formula was repeated frequently by Mr. Jamieson and other Canadian spokesmen over the next two and a half years. 70

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Whatever the differences in the connotations of the two formulas, there was nevertheless a common denominator, namely the need for some type of distinct governmental structure, directed by Palestinians. The extent of its jurisdiction and the degree of its autonomy might vary considerably, however. The reference to a "territorial foundation" was intended to indicate that an arrangement whereby another power, whether Israel or Jordan, simply provided for Palestinian representation in its government or for Palestinian political parties, would not be sufficient to satisfy the Palestinians' right to political self-expression.71 There would have to be a distinct governmental structure exercising jurisdiction over a specified territory. While the mention of a "territorial foundation" was not devised as a response to any specific proposals, it certainly took on added meaning after the advent to power of Menachem Begin and his Likud government in May 1977. Clearly, his plan for Palestinian "autonomy" under Israeli control ran counter to this formula, since it involved some jurisdiction over people but not over territory.72 The Canadian formula, however, did not logically exclude continued Israeli control over the occupied territories providing there was a distinct Palestinian governmental structure which exercised jurisdiction over a specified territory. Nevertheless, the totality of Canadian policy, especially the provisions concerning Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, did seem to rule out this possibility. 73 Apart from ruling out arrangements which were not territorially based and apparently also those which involved continued control by Israel, the Canadian policy on the future status of the Palestinians remained ambiguous. Mr. Jamieson's formula, like Mr. MacEachen's, covered a very wide range of possibilities, from some form of home rule under Jordan to federation with Jordan or even an independent Palestinian state. That the latter was at least a possible outcome was admitted at one point by Mr. Jamieson: I do not think it would serve any purpose for us to try to construct our own scenario for how the West Bank is going to be resolved, whether it be an independent Palestinian state or one with affiliation or that will have some links to Jordan.74

Mr. Jamieson was very cool to such a possibility, however. Certainly, the Canadian government rejected out of hand Palestinian demands that their right to an independent state be recognized formally from the outset, prior to any negotiations. ...the parties concerned must be prepared to abandon extreme positions and to examine all reasonable solutions that imagination and good will can devise...we cannot help but be concerned at efforts to predetermine the

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nature of a solution, whether in the form of demographic changes, or by insistence, as the precondition of any negotiation, that only one form of political self-expression could be acceptable.75

At a deeper level, while Mr. MacEachen had maintained a neutral tone in discussing the possibility of an independent Palestinian state, Mr. Jamieson conveyed an impression of lack of sympathy for such a solution. For one thing, he deliberately refrained from following the example of President Carter or the European Community in using more attractive terms such as "homeland" or "patrie' in describing Canada's vision of the future status of the Palestinians. Beyond this, he tended to downplay an independent Palestinian state as a solution and emphasize other types of solution. There must be a territorial base for any settlement. I do not mean the establishment of a separate Palestinian state. I have studiously avoided getting into either a Palestinian homeland or separate Palestinian state because all of these expressions are like a red flag to a bull.76

An article in the Toronto Star, dated 27 October 1977, stated: While he can be expected to avoid President Carter's phrase about the need for a "Palestinian homeland", Jamieson will argue that any peace agreement must have a territorial foundation. He insists that this formula does not prejudge the shape of things to come on the West Bank—that it might well provide for tomorrow's West Bank as part of a union with Jordan. 77

Finally, by insisting, like his predecessor, that an eventual solution to the Palestinian problem was dependent on the agreement of other interested parties, and particularly Israel, he was effectively eliminating this as a solution. After 1976, while other Western countries moved forward in the recognition of Palestinian aspirations, Canadian policy basically remained static. This reluctance to make any changes was even more pronounced after President Sadat's peace initiative in the fall of 1977 and the ensuing Egyptian-Israeli negotiations which culminated in the Camp David Agreements in September 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979. Mr. Jamieson and several of his top officials were firmly convinced that this was an important breakthrough in the ArabIsraeli conflict and a significant step toward a comprehensive peace. 78 Moreover, they realized that the Carter administration placed a great deal of importance on the Camp David process and would be very annoyed at any allies who undermined this by supporting a different approach. Consequently, the Canadian government threw its support solidly be

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hind U.S. efforts and refrained from making further comments or policy declarations on the Palestinian issue while the process was underway. There was some irony in the situation, however, for up till this point Canada had tended to oppose moves which involved treating the Palestinian issue separately from other aspects of the conflict and had emphasized the interrelated character of the issues.79 However, Canada was giving its full support to diplomatic efforts which seemed to involve elements of the very approach which it had criticized in the past. Only this time, it was the Egyptian-Israeli question that was being treated separately from the other issues. U.N. Voting Behavior To understand Canadian voting behavior in the U.N. during this period on resolutions dealing with the political future of the Palestinians, it is useful to begin by examining certain basic components of Mr. Jamieson's approach to activities in this sphere. In the first place, he was strongly opposed to the passage of resolutions on the same subject year after year, an activity which served no useful purpose in his view.80 Since this tendency was particularly strong with respect to Middle Eastern issues, it was toward U.N. activity in this area that he directed his criticism. This opposition to U.N. activity was greatly reinforced by the fact that it was Israel which was the principal target of criticism. We shall...continue to oppose barren exercises in propaganda or resolutions full of exaggerated and intemperate criticism of Israel with unsubstantiated allegations and unreasonable recommendations that do not in any way serve the cause of peace in the Middle East.81

Mr. Jamieson incorporated some of his criticisms of U.N. activity, particularly with respect to the Middle East, in his address to the General Assembly in 1977. This antagonized a number of Arab states and nearly resulted in the cancellation of his projected visit to Egypt later in the fall.82 A second element in Mr. Jamieson's approach to the U.N. was his belief that abstention was an inappropriate stance on issues since, in his view, it represented an unwillingness to stand up and be counted. "When you cannot make up your mind one way or another, then, of course, in my opinion, you have copped out on the issue."83 Most new ministers of External Affairs assumed office with a similar outlook. However they were generally persuaded by their officials that it was a valid stand in a U.N. context when dealing with resolutions that contained provisions that one agreed with as well as provisions that one disagreed with, as long as the latter were not too significant. Mr.

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Jamieson continued to maintain his original views, though. Finally, Mr. Jamieson was convinced that, in considering Canada's vote on resolutions, much more weight should be assigned to U.S. voting intentions, particularly on Middle Eastern issues, than to those of any other friendly countries, including the members of the European community. 84 Consequently, the notion of what constituted "good company" in U.N. voting was modified somewhat from that which prevailed under Mr. MacEachen. ...I often wonder why we [i.e., some members of parliament] make the kinds of observations that we say we are at odds with our good friends the Japanese, or at odds with our good friends the Europeans and forget that we were not at odds with our best friend, the U.S. In other words, it is rather assumed in some form or other that to be on the side of the U.S. in any of these [resolutions] is to be in the wrong pew.85

As a result, Mr. Jamieson instructed his officials that Canada should vote as much as possible with the U.S. on Middle Eastern issues.86 For these reasons, as well as Mr. Jamieson's distinct pro-Israeli leaning, there was a further stiffening of Canadian voting behavior on Middle Eastern issues during this period. This became evident particularly in 1977 and 1978. Insofar as the annual Palestinian rights resolutions were concerned, however, Canada's voting behavior owed much more to the far-reaching character of the resolutions than to the above-mentioned factors. In 1976, 1977, and 1978, these resolutions endorsed fully the proposals contained in the first report of the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which was presented in 1976. These proposals, which were not specifically listed in the resolutions, envisaged, first of all, complete and unconditional Israeli evacuation within one year of former Palestinian territories which had been occupied by Israel during the 1967 war. These territories were to be administered temporarily by the U.N., with the assistance of the Arab League, and then turned over to the PLO, as the representative of the Palestinian people. Only after an "independent Palestinian entity" had been established under PLO leadership, would an effort be made to reach some sort of negotiated settlement with Israel. These proposals also affirmed the unconditional right of the Palestinians to return to their homes in Palestine, a right which was to be implemented in two stages. In the first stage, all Palestinians who had been displaced from their homes in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 would be allowed to return without delay. A little later (presumably after the "independent Palestinian entity" had been established), all Palestinians who had been displaced from their homes in Israel between 1948 and 1967 would have an unconditional right to return. Those who chose

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not to would be properly compensated.87 In short, then, these resolutions went much farther than previous resolutions on Palestinian rights. They went beyond a simple statement of principle recognizing certain rights for the Palestinian people and instead endorsed a specific set of proposals, complete with a timetable for their implementation. In all three years, Canada joined the U.S., Britain, West Germany, and the Benelux countries in voting against these resolutions. France, Italy, and Japan abstained, except in 1978, when Italy switched to a negative vote. The reasons for Canada's opposition were twofold. In the first place, although it was only hinted at in the explanations of vote, there was strong Canadian opposition to the actual contents of the proposals themselves. These, it was felt, were very one-sided, especially with respect to the timing of the steps recommended.88 More generally, though, Canada voiced strong opposition to any attempt by the General Assembly to endorse a detailed peace plan. It felt that such a move not only undermined the basic framework for negotiation established by the Security Council in Resolution 242 but also ran counter to the principle that the ultimate terms of settlement should be arrived at through negotiations between the parties to the conflict themselves, as stipulated in Resolution 338. In short, Canada was opposed to any attempt by the U.N. to prejudge the terms of settlement.89 The 1978 resolution differed slightly from the two preceding ones. It, too, contained a blanket endorsement of the above-mentioned proposals of the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. In addition, it affirmed the general rights of the Palestinians which had previously been recognized by the General Assembly (i.e., the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine) and called for PLO participation "on an equal footing with other parties" in any deliberations or negotiations concerning a settlement which were held under U.N. auspices.90 Finally, the resolution also contained a provision implicitly criticizing the Camp David agreements of September 1978 as being contrary to the principles recognized by the General Assembly as essential to a just settlement of the Palestinian problem.91 The general references to Palestinian rights and to PLO participation in negotiations would not have constituted grounds for Canada's opposition to this resolution since she had abstained on similar resolutions in the past. Mr. Jamieson did take exception, however, to the criticism of the Camp David agreements since, as noted earlier, the government regarded these as a significant step toward a comprehensive peace.

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The Conservative Interlude and the Return of the Trudeau Government (1979-1982) The election of May 1979 resulted in the defeat of the Trudeau government and the advent to power of a minority Conservative government for the first time in 16 years. During the election campaign, the Conservative leader, Joe Clark, in an effort to win seats in the Toronto area, where there was a significant Jewish vote, had promised to move the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. At his first press conference after taking office, Mr. Clark sought to convey an image of decisiveness and effective leadership by announcing that he would be going ahead with this move.92 This announcement produced a very strong reaction from Arab governments. The Clark government was informed in no uncertain terms that such a move would seriously jeopardize Canada's relations with the Arab world. Canadian firms doing business with Arab states were told bluntly that all dealings would be halted if the embassy were moved. These companies in turn strongly urged the government to drop its plans for the move. In the face of this massive pressure, the Clark government decided to back down as gracefully as possible. This was accomplished by appointing a distinguished former leader of the Conservative party, Robert Stanfield, as Special Representative of the Government with a mandate to conduct a thorough study not only of the embassy issue but also of the totality of Canada's Middle East policy. While this inquiry was underway, Canadian policy toward the area, including her votes at the U.N., remained unchanged. Mr. Stanfield presented an interim report on the embassy issue in October 1979 in which he recommended that the government should not go ahead with the move. In his final report, in February 1980, he addressed the larger issues in Canada's Middle East policy, including the Palestinian question. With reference to the latter, he began by noting the transformation which had occurred in the situation of the Palestinians and in Canadian awareness of the problem. I think there is an increasing awareness in Canada of the Palestinian predicament.. .Unified by a feeling of dispossession and defeat, the Palestinians now have emerged fully conscious of their identity and anxious to give that identity political expression.93

Consequently, while Mr. Stanfield supported Resolution 242 as the best framework for negotiations, he acknowledged that its treatment of the Palestinian problem was inadequate and required further development: One area in which Resolution 242 has generally come to be considered

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lacking is in its treatment of the Palestinians, who are referred to in the Resolution only as refugees. The increasing emergence of ^.Palestinian national consciousness since 1967 has made it clear that the political future of the Palestinian people is an issue which must be directly addressed in negotiations. Indeed, a solution of this issue is basic to a solution of the Middle East dispute as a whole 94

Then, after pointing out that the Camp David accords recognized the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people, he concluded by recommending that: ...Canada should support the Palestinians' right to a.homeland as well as their rights to be heard and to participate in the determination of their own future....What form this homeland should take, its precise boundaries and whether it would constitute an independent state or a federated or other part of an existing state is not for Canada to decide but it is for the Palestinians themselves and their neighbours including Israel, to determine in negotiations.95

The substance of Mr. Stanfield's recommendations concerning the future of the Palestinians corresponded very closely to existing Canadian policy. That is to say, he believed that Canada should support the creation of some type of Palestinian political structure but refused to endorse any particular one. Moreover, he indicated that the choice of structures should not be left to the Palestinians alone (i.e. he did not accept the notion of self-determination) but rather should be determined through negotiations between Palestinians, Israel, and the neighboring states. If the substance was similar, however, the phraseology and above all the underlying tone represented a clear advance on Mr. Jamieson's position. Thus, while Mr. Jamieson had deliberately avoided the terms, Mr. Stanfield did not hesitate to refer to the "rights" of the Palestinians, and in particular their "right to a homeland." Moreover, while Mr. Jamieson had tended to downplay independent statehood as a solution and emphasize others instead, Mr. Stanfield not only mentioned it as a possible outcome but also did so in neutral, not pejorative, terms. By so doing, he was presumably indicating that it was a legitimate solution although he did not actually endorse it. There was no official follow-up to the Stanfield Report since, just prior to its presentation, Mr. Clark's government was defeated in a general election precipitated by its minority position in the House of Commons. The Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau, which returned to power, saw no need to act on a report commissioned by its predecessor. Nevertheless, this report had a definite impact on the manner in

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which Canada's Palestinian policy was articulated by the new Government. Both Prime Minister Trudeau and the new External Affairs Minister, Mark MacGuigan, were aware of the need to improve Canada's image in the Arab world after the Jerusalem embassy fiasco. 96 This was undoubtedly an important consideration behind the Prime Minister's first official visit to the Arab world, principally to Saudi Arabia, in the fall of 1980. Nevertheless, with respect to the Palestinian question, the government remained relatively cautious. This was due partly to the fact that it was not under any serious pressure to shift its policy. While Arab governments certainly urged Canada to be more forthcoming on the Palestinian issue, they (in particular Saudi Arabia) did not appear to make the further development of economic relations contingent upon Canadian movement on this issue. 97 More importantly though, there were perceived to be significant constraints on any policy shift. One such constraint was the fact that negotiations were still in progress between Egypt and Israel regarding the implementation of the autonomy agreement for the West Bank and Gaza. In these circumstances it was felt that it would be presumptuous of Canada to make any new pronouncements about the Palestinian question. Such a justification for inaction became less and less valid, however, as time passed with diminishing prospects of any agreement being reached. A second and more important consideration was the major role played by the U.S. in settlement efforts and in the Middle East generally. Given the pre-eminent position and responsibilities of the U.S., Mr. MacGuigan, like Mr. Jamieson, was disposed to defer to its efforts in the area and not to say or do anything that might interfere with these.98 Finally, with the various problems the government was facing in the constitutional and economic spheres and the ensuing decline in its popularity, it was not anxious to create new enemies by antagonizing the Jewish community. In view of these perceived constraints, it is not surprising that Canadian policy toward the Palestinians remained very cautious during this period. At the outset the issue came to the fore as the result of an initiative by the European community (the Venice Declaration in June 1980) which, among other things, supported the principle of selfdetermination for the Palestinians. Questioned about this in a television interview with French journalists, Prime Minister Trudeau responded that he "agreed with the notion that the Palestinians have the right to determine their own future."99 He then muddied the issue, however, by leaving it unclear whether or not others too had a right to determine the

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Palestinians' future and whether the options offered to them should include independent statehood. What will this future be? Will it be in a federation of states or in an alliance with others? I simply don't know... 100

Whatever hopes might have been raised about a possible shift in Canadian policy were soon dashed by the cool reception which External Affairs Minister MacGuigan gave this European initiative. 101 Mr. Trudeau for his part, did not make any further public statements about the Palestinian question during this period, not even during his trip to the Middle East in the fall. Instead, he left the subject to Mr. MacGuigan and the Department of External Affairs. Nor was anything further said about selfdetermination. Rather, Canadian spokesmen limited themselves, as before, to the term "political self-expression" and maintained that the ultimate status of the Palestinians would have to be determined by negotiations. While there was no movement at all on the question of selfdetermination, more appealing language was gradually introduced, along the lines of the Stanfield Report, to describe the claims and future status of the Palestinians. Thus, in July 1980, during the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on the Palestinian question, the Canadian spokesman referred to the need to take account of the development of "Palestinian national consciousness" and to recognize the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people.102 He then went on to say that "...the Palestinians, like other peoples, are entitled to political self-expression in a defined territory" with the precise status and extent of this territory dependent on negotiations with their neighbors.103 Mr. MacGuigan spoke in similar terms in his address to the General Assembly that fall. 104 Following Mr. Trudeau's return from Saudi Arabia and Egypt in November, another modest advance occurred in the terminology employed by Canada to depict the political future of the Palestinians. During the plenary debate in the General Assembly on the Question of Palestine in December 1980, the Canadian delegate, in words reminiscent of the Stanfield Report, spoke of the need for recognition of the Palestinians' "right to a homeland." 105 A further refinement was introduced by Mr. MacGuigan in a statement to the House of Commons in June 1981, when he referred to the Palestinians' "right to a homeland within a clearly defined territory and by that I mean the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."106 This was subsequently repeated on several occasions and has become the new Canadian formula for the Palestinian question. 107 In short, although there was some improvement in the language as

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well as the tone of Canadian policy statements dealing with the Palestinian issue, it is questionable whether this reflected any change in policy. There remained a clear unwillingness to endorse the "right" of the Palestinians to self-determination or to an independent state. Prime Minister Trudeau, whatever his private views, did not appear willing to become publicly involved in this issue. Mr. MacGuigan, for his part, did not appear to be personally sympathetic to either of these possibilities.108 This is reflected in the fact that, unlike Mr. Stanfield, he did not explicitly mention independent statehood as a possible outcome. Moreover, when questioned about the term "homeland" he emphasized that it had no implications of sovereignty.109 Israel's controversial war againt the Palestinians (and the Lebanese) in the summer of 1982, and the criticism which ensued, generated a little greater Canadian responsiveness to Palestinian aspirations. This was particularly true after Allan MacEachen returned to the helm of External Affairs in September. Just prior to this, President Reagan had outlined his plan for a Middle-East settlement, which involved Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories and the creation of a self-governing Palestinian entity in association with Jordan. At the same time, he declared that the United States did not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Commenting on these proposals, Minister of State for External Relations Pierre DeBane stated: We have a somewhat different approach on some of the U.S. proposals. While we would have no problem with self-governing Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, we would not rule out the possibility of a Palestinian state. For Canada, the key is that we do not want to prejudge the outcome of eventual negotiations among the participants when they sit down to talk. 110

This formula was subsequently repeated on several occasions.111 While not constituting a Canadian endorsement of a Palestinian state, it did indicate that this could constitute a legitimate solution. On the related issue of self-determination, Minister of State DeBane, in a speech in October 1982, repeated Prime Minister Trudeau's statement of June 1980,112 but, there was no follow-up to this.

Conclusion Since 1967 there has been a considerable change in Canadian perceptions of the Palestinian question and the Palestinians themselves. What was viewed at the outset as a secondary problem to be resolved as a byproduct of a settlement between the neighboring Arab states and Israel is now seen as the major stumbling block to a comprehensive settlement.

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Moreover, the initial limited awareness of any Palestinian identity has given way to a realization that the Palestinians are a distinct people with a national consciousness and aspirations of their own. As a result, the Palestinian question has ceased to be regarded simply as a refugee problem for which a humanitarian solution (resettlement with compensation) has to be found. Instead, it has come to be viewed more and more as a "national" problem which requires some type of political solution. As we have seen, however, it took more than simply an evolution in perceptions to bring about a change in Canadian policy. An awareness of the importance placed by Arab governments on a satisfactory resolution of the Palestinian problem, of the increased danger to Western interests, including newly developed Canadian interests, should a comprehensive settlement not be achieved and, finally, a shift in the policies of other Western governments, all played an important role in the evolution of Canadian policy toward the Palestinians. In spite of this evolution, Canadian policy on the Palestinian issue is still somewhat less than evenhanded. The Canadian government has not been prepared to accord to the Palestinians the same basic right which it insists on for the Israelis, namely the right to a secure national existence in a state of their own, contingent, of course, on respect for the national existence of the other party. While Canadian policy makers have devised formulas that imply that they are open to the full range of possible solutions, including an independent Palestinian state, their omissions and comments as well as Canadian votes at the U.N. tend to convey a different signal. These indicate that Canada is prepared to give serious consideration only to a more limited range of alternatives. The adoption of a fully evenhanded position, in the sense of the actual endorsement of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and an independent state, is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Four factors continue to stand in the way of such a shift. Firstly, in view of Canada's limited involvement and limited leverage in the area, policy makers believe that it would be unwise and indeed presumptuous on Canada's part to take a position on the shape of a final settlement. 113 Secondly, Canadian policy makers remain more sensitive to Israeli than to Palestinian views or concerns and believe that a Palestinian state would pose a threat not only to Israel but also to stability in the area. They also believe that most of the moderate Arab governments (particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia), for whom they have some sympathy, are opposed to a Palestinian state.114 Thirdly, these same policy makers are conscious of the probable domestic political costs, in the form of strong opposition from the Jewish community, which such a shift would entail. Such considerations are particularly significant for a government which finds

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itself in considerable trouble domestically and faces an election in the near future. Finally, given Canada's acceptance of the pre-eminent role of the U.S. in the Middle East and the importance for Canada of good relations with the U.S., the government will probably remain reluctant to take a divergent stand on the Palestinian issue. It is concerned that such a move would be viewed by the U.S. as interference in its settlement efforts and consequently could harm Canada-U.S. relations. These concerns are likely to persist and constitute important constraints on any shift in Canadian policy. Nevertheless, these are circumstances in which some further movement might occur. One such stimulus might be a much clearer indication from the Palestinian leadership of a willingness to accept an historic compromise and recognize the existence of Israel. This would serve to diminish fears about any possible threat to Israel and to regional stability which a Palestinian state might pose. It would also greatly reduce any constraints on the freedom of action of the government emanating from public opinion. Alternatively, a shift might occur as a reaction to irresponsible Israeli behavior or continuing manifestations of Israeli expansionist aims. This is a less likely scenario. Changes in perceptions of legitimacy alone will probably be insufficient to stimulate changes in Canadian policy. For any such shift to occur, there would undoubtedly have to be an increased awareness on the part of Canadian policy makers that inaction has its costs too. These costs could take several forms. One would be the damage to the peace process arising from the failure of the U.S., as well as countries like Canada, to support an equitable settlement of the Palestinian problem. Such failure would in all probability strengthen the position of the hardliners among the Palestinian community and the Arab states and lead to a radicalization of attitudes and behavior. This in turn would prolong and intensify the Arab-Israeli conflict and create a danger of renewed hostilities. A second possible cost of Western failure to support an equitable settlement would be damage to Western interests. The likely prolongation and aggravation of the conflict would make it difficult for otherwise friendly regimes to work closely with the West and would tend to reinforce relations between other Arab regimes and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it would be an important contributing factor to instability and radicalization in the Arab world with unpredictable consequences for a variety of Arab regimes but especially those associated with the West. Together, these developments would create a climate in which there was an increased danger of Arab action against Western economic, political, and strategic interests. Finally, since policy toward the Palestinians has generally been viewed as a litmus test of a country's attitude toward the

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Arab world, failure to support an equitable settlement could seriously harm Canada's image and Canada's interests in the region. The extent to which such costs will actually materialize is a matter of conjecture. If the past is any guide, however, an awareness of costs would have to emerge before the U.S. or Canada would be prepared to adopt a more evenhanded posture on the Palestinian issue. In any case, the Canadian government will probably not undertake such a shift unless the United States moves first. Acknowledgements In addition to the institutions mentioned in the preceding chapter, the author wishes to thank the Social Science Research Committee of McGill University for its financial assistance in carrying out the research on which this chapter is based. Notes 1. See supra, p. 113. 2. Ibid. 3. L.A. Delvoie "Growth in Economic Relations of Canada and the Arab World," International Perspectives (November—December 1976). For further information about Canadian-Arab economic relations in various spheres, see the Financial Post, 30 June 1979. 4. See the article by Michael Benedict in The Toronto Star, 26 July 1975. 5. See the fascinating thesis on this subject by George Takach, "Clark and the Jerusalem Embassy Affair," unpublished M.A. thesis, Norman Paterson School of International Relations, Carleton University, 1980. 6. See, for example, the study of the images of Canada's foreign policy elite (Senior Officials, M.P.s, and Academics), which found that in 1975 — 76 this group's image of Israel was less favorable than that of Egypt and only a little better than that of the PLO; R.E. Byars, D. Leyton-Brown, P. Lyon, "The Canadian International Image Study" International Journal, XXXII, No. 3, (Summer 1977): 625, 628-629. 7. Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. 8. This became obvious during the Jerusalem Embassy episode in the summer of 1979. 9. See supra p. 115, 119, 122, 123-124. 10. Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. 11. Interview with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs. See Ottawa Citizen, 27 October 1973, Ottawa Journal, 29 October 1973, Toronto Star, 2 November 1973. 12. See Canada, House of Commons Debates, 25 October 1973, p. 7209. 13. Interview with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs. 14. See the declaration by the nine governments of the European Community regarding the situation in the Middle East in Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 10 (1973): 105-106. 15. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 16 October 1973, p. 6927. 16. Statement of Mr. Sharp in the House of Commons, 14 November 1973, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 73/23, p. 8; Toronto Star, 22 November 1973; Canada, House of Commons Debates, 27 November 1973, p. 8174. It is interesting to note that prior to 1973, there was no separate heading for the PLO or Palestinians in the Department of External Affairs Library newspaper clipping file. Material on the PLO and Palestinians was placed either under the general Middle East heading, individual country headings, or under the Terrorism heading. From 1974 on a separate PLO heading was created.

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17. Toronto Star, 22 November 1973. 18. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 27 November 1973, p. 8174. 19. General Assembly Official Records (hereinafter cited as G.A.O.R.), 28th Session, Supplement No. 30 (A/9030) Resolutions of the General Assembly, p. 27, Resolution 3089D 20. Ibid., 28th Session, Special Political Committee, 889th Meeting, p. 173. 21. L.A. Delvoie, "Growth in Economic Relations of Canada and the Arab World," International Perspectives (November—December 1976). See also the Financial Post, 30 June 1979. 22. Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. 23. Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. 24. Winnipeg Free Press, 21 November 1974. 25. Speech by Mr. MacEachen to the U.N. General Assembly, during the debate on the Question of Palestine, 20 November 1974, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 74/16. Referring to this paragraph, the Winnipeg Free Press, 21 November 1974, noted that: ...one diplomatic source said the Minister's carefully worded reference was to the fact that Resolution 242 speaks of the Palestinians merely as refugees...According to the diplomat, Canada apparently believes that Resolution 242— while a good framework on which to build—must now be amended to allow the Palestinians some voice in Middle East negotiations. 26. Statement by Mr. MacEachen to the U.N. General Assembly, 20 November 1974, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 74116 (author's italics). 27. Ibid, (author's italics). 28. Statement by the Canadian representative to the U.N. General Assembly during the debate on the question of Palestine, 22 November 1974, Press Release No. 35, Canadian delegation to the United Nations. 29. See, for example, Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1 November 1974, p. 967. See also Mr. MacEachen's speech to the General Assembly, 20 November 1974, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 74/16; the statement by the Canadian representative during the same debate, ibid., Mr. MacEachen's speech to the Canada-Israel Committee, 30 April 1975, Statements and Speeches, No. 75/12; and Canada, House of Commons Debates, 26 November 1974, p. 1662. 30. Speech by Mr. MacEachen to the U.N. General Assembly, 20 November 1974, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 74/16. 31. Winnipeg Free Press, 21 November 1974. 32. Speech by Mr. MacEachen to the U.N. General Assembly, 20 November 1974, Department of External Affairs, Statement and Speeches, No. 74/16. 33. This issue became a source of considerable debate in view of the PLO's proposed participation in two major U.N. sponsored conferences which were to be held in Canada—the Crime Conference scheduled for Toronto in September 1975 and the Habitat Conference scheduled for Vancouver in June 1976. 34. See Mr. MacEachen's statement in Egypt, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 76/1, in Saudi Arabia, Department of External Affairs, Statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 15 January 1976, and in Israel, Statements and Speeches No. 76/6. 35. Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. 36. Interview, Cairo Radio, 14 January 1976, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Volume V, 15 January 1976, P.D4 (National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce). 37. Ottawa Citizen, 13 January 1976. 38. Montreal Gazette, 23 January 1976.

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39. Ottawa Citizen, 19 January 1976. 40. G.A.O.R., 29th Session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9631), Resolutions of the General Assembly, p. 4. Resolution 3236. 41. "7) Requests the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine." 42. Speech by Mr. MacEachen to the General Assembly, 20 November 1974, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 74/16. 43. Ibid. 44. Statement by the Canadian representative to the U.N. General Assembly during the debate on the question of Palestine, 22 November 1974, Press Release No. 35, Canadian delegation to the United Nations. 45. Interviews with senior officials and officials, Department of External Affairs. 46. ...there is no mention of the requirements for negotiations among the parties directly involved in this dispute, as called for by Security Council Resolution 338, which Canada believes is the only way in which the Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved. Statement by the Canadian representative during the debate on the question of Palestine, 22 November 1974, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 74/16. 47. Ibid. 48. G.A.O.R., 30th session, Supplement No. 34 (A/10034), Resolutions of the General Assembly, p. 3; Resolution 3376, Paragraph 2. 49. G.A.O.R., 30th Session, Plenary, 18 November 1975. 50. Ibid. 51. Interview with official, Department of External Affairs. 52. See, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's speech to the Milwaukee Institute of World Affairs, New York Times, 15 July 1975. See also the article by Jeff Endrst in the Ottawa Journal, 28 July 1975, and by Charles Lynch in the Ottawa Citizen, 24 September 1975. 53. Bulletin of the European Communities, 1977, No. 6, p. 62. 54. Article by Mark Gayn, Toronto Star, 30 August 1976. 55. For Mr. Head's denial see the Toronto Star, 1 September 1976. For Mr. MacEachen's denial, see the Montreal Gazette, 13 September 1976. 56. Interview with a senior official, Department of External Affairs. Another official indicated that some consideration was being given at the time to a move toward greater recognition of the PLO in the Minister's speech at the fall session of the General Assembly. 57. A few months after his appointment, Mr. Jamieson declared in a speech to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Toronto (3 December 1976): ...there will be many who will say, as has already been said, that by joining the Security Council in some way or the other Canada's policy toward the Middle East is going to change in some direction, there is going to be some perceptible shift. Let me reassure you on that point. Our policy will continue to be as I have outlined it. Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 76/32, p. 6. 58. Interview with officials and senior officials, Department of External Affairs. 59. Toronto Star, 12 October 1976. 60. Toronto Star, 28 October 1977. See also Mr. Jamieson's comments to the Annual Conference of the Canada-Israel Committee: It is unreasonable to lean on Israel to make concessions just because it takes a little longer to make peace....Israel is an increasingly valuable ally of the west and Jews and non-Jews alike should see to it that Israel remains in the future a democratic society, an example for other nations and an ally of the western world—we in Canada must see to it that when Israel is making such tremendous sacrifices, we should stand ready to help Israel with oil and material assistance.

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Jewish Telegraph Agency (JTA) Daily News Bulletin, 15 February 1979. 61. Toronto Star, 12 October 1976. 62. Speech by Mr. Fernand Leblanc, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs to the Eighth National Public Affairs Seminar of Hadassah-WlZO, Montreal, 15 June 1977, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches No. 77/12 (author's italics). 63. .. .there are those hundreds and thousands of people who have rights which again have been recognized by the world community and that we must see as an essential part of the equation and of the solution. Speech to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 3 December 1976, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 76/32, p. 6 (author's italics). 64. Ottawa Journal, 27 October 1977. 65. Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. 66. Toronto Globe and Mail, 29 September 1976. 67. Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. However, two other officials said they had no recollection of any communication, informal or otherwise, between any member of the Privy Council Office and the Department of External Affairs on this subject. 68. Speech by Mr. Stanbury, U.N. General Assembly, Special Political Committee, 3 November 1976, Canadian delegation to the United Nations, Press Release No. 31, p. 2 (author's italics). 69. Speech by Mr. Stanbury to the General Assembly on the Middle East Situation, 6 December 1976, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Press Release No. 49, p. 2 (author's italics). 70. See, for example, Mr. Jamieson's statement during his visit to Israel, 27 October 1977, Department of External Affairs, Statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, p. 2, and the Toronto Star, 28 October 1977. See also Mr. Jamieson's interview with the Toronto Star, 10 March 1978 and his testimony before the Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Canada, House of Commons, 13 April 1978, pp. 33-34. 71. Interview with a senior official, Department of External Affairs. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Canada, House of Commons, Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 13 April 1978, p. 34. 75. Speech by Mr. Stanbury, Special Political Committee, 3 November 1976, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Press Release No. 31, p. 2. 76. Interview of Mr. Jamieson with the Toronto Star, 10 March 1978. 77. Toronto Star, 27 October 1977. 78. Interview with a senior official, Department of External Affairs. See also Mr. Jamieson's statement in 1978: As to what we are doing I hope there will be no doubt...that we are fully supportive of the initiative which President Sadat undertook last November. House of Commons, Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes Proceedings and Evidence, 13 April 1978, p. 33. 79. While important and indeed fundamental to the Arab-Israeli conflict, this issue [the Palestinian question] evidently cannot be resolved separately and without consideration for other elements of the problem. We should be opposed to any unilateral actions that could be prejudicial to the comprehensive negotiated settlement that is being sought. Speech by Mr. MacEachen to the General Assembly, 20 November 1974, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 74/16. 80. Canada, House of Commons, Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 29 November 1977, p. 15.

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81. Speech by Mr. Jamiesonto theB'naiBrith, Toronto, 13 March 1977, Department of External Affairs, Statements of the Minister of External Affairs, p. 5. 82. Interview with an official, Department of External Affairs. 83. Canada, House of Commons, Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 29 November 1977, p. 15. 84. Interview with a senior official, Department of External Affairs. 85. Testimony by Mr. Jamieson to the Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 29 November 1977, p. 15. 86. Interview with a senior official, Department of External Affairs. 87. Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, G.A.O.R., 31st Session, Supplement No. 35 (A/31/35), pp. 13-15. For the texts of the 1976 and 1977 resolutions, see G.A.O.R., 31st Session, Supplement No. 39 (A/31/39). Resolutions of the General Assembly, Resolution 31/20 and G.A.O.R., 32nd Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/32/45), Resolution 32/40. 88. G.A.O.R., 31st Session, Plenary, 77th Meeting, p. 1191. 89. These recommendations, by laying down the details of, and even a timetable for, the implementation of measures that have not yet been agreed upon by the parties concerned, run directly contrary to the agreed framework for Middle East negotiations laid down in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is that framework which has found general acceptance and it is that framework which continues to offer, in our view, the best hope for resolving the Middle East conflict. In the Canadian view, the effect of the present draft resolution is simply to endorse the substitution of an imposed solution for negotiations between the parties as called for in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Ibid. 90. G.A.O.R., 33rd Session, Supplement No. 45 (A/33/45), Resolution 33/28A. 91. Ibid., Paragraph 4. 92. For a step by step account of the Jerusalem embassy episode, see George Takach, "Clark and the Jerusalem Affair." 93. Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa, pp. 4—5. 94. Ibid., p. 7 (author's italics). 95. Ibid, (author's italics). 96. See, for example, Norman Webster's report on the views of Canadian businessmen dealing with Saudi Arabia in the Toronto Globe and Mail, 17 November 1980. 97. The Saudis, too, in their talks with Mr. Trudeau, have stated their case. They believe the PLO must be recognized, something Canada has refused to do, if there are to be meaningful discussions about peace in the Middle East. This is not, however, a policy they insist on with their trading partners—in distinct contrast to the outrage over the Jerusalem decision. Ibid. 98. Conversation with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs. See also the interview of Mr. MacGuigan with Andre Dionne, Le Soleil, 31 January 1981; and the report of an interview with Mr. MacGuigan in the Toronto Globe and Mail, 27 June 1981: Canada's position as a middle-level power with relatively little clout in the game of big power diplomacy leaves it in a different position. On issues where its direct interest is minimal, it seldom voices open differences with its much more powerful allies, no matter what private misgivings its leaders may have with policy as enunciated in Washington...And when Canada's stance on the larger issues of the day is different from the U.S. position, it tends not to shout it from the rooftops. Taking public exception with allies, particularly the U.S., is something that Canada largely reserves for bilateral issues. 99. The interview took place in Europe on 15 June 1980. Excerpts were contained in La Presse, 20 June 1980.

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100. Ibid. 101. Ottawa Journal, 17 June 1980. See also earlier remarks by Mr. MacGuigan about a European initiative with respect to the Middle East in an interview with Michel Vastel, Le Devoir, 9 April 1980. 102. G.A.O.R., 7th Emergency Special Session, A/ES-7/Meeting of 30 July 1980, p. 32. 103. Ibid. 104. Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 80/17, p. 3. 105. Canadian Mission to the U.N., Press Release, 15 December 1980. 106. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 15 June 1981, p. 10608. 107. See, for example, Mr. MacGuigan's address to the 36th Session of the General Assembly (1981), Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 81/22, P.S.; also his speech to the Canada-Israel Committee, 31 March 1982; ibid., No. 82/8, p. 3. 108. Conversation with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs. 109. See his reply to a question following the above-mentioned speech to the CanadaIsrael Committee, Toronto Globe and Mail, 1 April 1982. 110. Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 82/28, 30 September 1982. 111. See, for example, the speech of Mr. DeBane to the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) annual conference held in Montreal, October 1982, and External Affairs Minister MacEachen's statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 17 February 1983, p. 11. 112. Speech to the AAUG, October 1982. 113. See Mr. MacGuigan's comments in an interview with Michel Vastel, Le Devoir, 9 April 1980: 'I don't believe that this [the Middle East] is a region in which Canada can exercise much influence', confided the new Secretary of State for External Affairs who has no intention of playing an active role there... .In fact, since Canada has few interests in the region, it should stay out of the problems which the region faces" [translated from French]. 114. Conversation with a high-ranking official, Department of External Affairs.

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CHAPTER 8

Zionist interest groups and Canadian foreign policy Alan Bones

SEVERAL authorities on Canadian foreign policy, including Tareq Ismael, Zachariah Kay, Peter Dobell, and Peyton Lyon, have commented on the distinct pro-Israeli bias in Canadian Middle East policy, both historical and contemporary. A variety of reasons have been suggested to explain this phenomenon; most cluster around the generally favorable image of Israel, and the correspondingly negative image of the Arab states, held by both government decision-makers (particularly those in Cabinet), and the general public. Another factor is the effectiveness of the Zionist lobby in Canada, and the ineffectiveness of the pro-Arab groups, in influencing Canadian foreign policy. Much of the effectiveness of the Zionist groups stems from the structure and organization of the Canadian Jewish Community. Outsiders tend to see this community as a monolith, united in action and in substantial agreement about the strategy to deal with the non-Jewish community in general, and the government in particular. Although true in some circumstances, it is not entirely accurate. There is a multiplicity of organizations dealing with various specialized areas of concern within the community; at the national level, these include the B'nai Brith, a service organization similar to the Kiwanis or Rotary International; the Canadian Zionist Federation, whose functions are the financing and co-ordination of bilateral programs on cultural or social matters; and the

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Canada-Israel Committee (C-IC), which deals with Canadian foreign policy. At the local level, numerous groups concern themselves with community activities or fund-raising. The overall co-ordinating body is the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), which operates as a federation, with a national office in Montreal and six regional offices that are reasonably autonomous within the broad outlines of policy established at the CJC's triennial Plenary Assembly. 1 In matters that concern only the Jewish community, dissent and competition between groups—either between local groups, or the national and regional offices of the same group—is common. Even when a high degree of agreement is lacking, however, a very dense and complex communications network exists. The dissent common on internal matters is rarely apparent in matters that touch the outside community. For centuries Jews have been fighting against assimilation into other cultures, fearing the loss not only of their spiritual values, but also their distinctively Jewish customs and the Hebrew language. This, combined with centuries of persecution, especially by the Christians, has led to a "siege mentality": whenever a threat is perceived from the outside, rivalries are set aside and a united front presented. Jews in Canada, like Jews throughout the world, are particularly sensitive to any threat to the state of Israel. This is much more than a simple fraternal affection for co-religionists; with the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, a millenia-old goal had been fulfilled—a homeland to which Jews could return. Israel has been described as something tangible and visible and near enough to religious aspiration to provide a substitute for traditional piety. "Holy Land" is not just an expression with Canadian Jews; it carries a sanctified aura as a haven for the persecuted. 2

Convictions this strong make it possible temporarily to override rivalries when faced with an outside threat. As Rabbi Reuben Slonim comments, Canadian synagogues and rabbis generally cling to Jewish establishment patterns of thought and behavior. This makes it easier to close ranks and discourage dissent in disputes with non-Jewish groups. 3

By no means are all Jews "Zionists."4 Anti-Zionist groups within the Jewish community tend to fall into two broad categories: certain ultra-orthodox Jews who believe that Zion, the promised land, will be given to the Jews on Judgment Day and has no business existing here and now; and those who object to the displacement and treatment of the

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Palestinian refugees to the point that they can no longer support the State of Israel. Although no statistics exist, both groups appear to be a very small minority within the Canadian Jewish community. In view of Israel's central role in the Jewish identity, a separate body was established in 1967 to deal exclusively with Canadian-Israeli bilateral relations, the Canada-Israel Committee. Founded jointly by the Canadian Jewish Congress, the Canadian Zionist Federation, and B'nai Brith, its stated objective is increasing understanding and friendship between Canada and Israel In particular, the C-IC seeks to present to Canadians the most reasonable and objective case for the maintenance of a Canadian foreign policy that will support measures to insure the right of Israel to live in peace and security as an independent Middle Eastern state side by side with her Arab neighbours.5

The Canada-Israel Committee employs several full-time staff members in its three offices—the national office in Ottawa, a Quebec regional office in Montreal, and a communications and research department in Toronto. As the sole official representative of the Jewish community to the government on matters concerning Israel and Canada's foreign policy, and as the main co-ordinating body amongst the various Jewish/Zionist groups, and between them and the community at large, it is in a unique position to aggregate and articulate the interests of the Jewish community on foreign policy. The C-IC includes a research and publications department which publishes papers on subjects falling into the C-IC's mandate, and periodicals such as the Canadian Middle-East Digest. A "Communications Resource Service" operates out of the C-IC's Toronto office and supplies the media with information, news features, and audio-visual materials that are, of course, favorable to Israel. Additionally, a speakers service for church groups, service clubs, and universities is maintained, and visits to Israel for professional, media, political, and other specialized groups are arranged. The most visible level of the Zionist interest groups in Canada in reference to foreign policy is the C-IC. It must not be forgotten, however, that this committee has the full weight of organized Jewry behind it. In mobilizing support from the community at large on any given issue, it has the full use of the complex infrastructure of its sponsors, the three largest Jewish groups in Canada. The superb organization of the Canadian Jewish community generally enables them to reach virtually every practicing Jew in Canada. Because of the highly

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organized nature of the community, maximum efficiency in the use of resources is ensured by eliminating duplication and channeling effort into the coordinating bodies, such as the C-IC. The result of this remarkable organization, and the vital interest in Israel on the part of the vast majority of Canadian Jews, is a highly politicized and aware community. In addition to its organization, the C-IC has pursued a very successful strategy to establish credibility and win friends among foreign policy decision-makers. Frequent, and persistent, contact is made with the civil service and elected representatives in Ottawa, to ensure a high level of awareness on Middle East issues. Contact with the political community is spread across all political parties, and presentations to foreign policy decision-makers are always well-informed and comprehensive. Three major events in the last decade, falling mostly in the domain of foreign affairs, have vitally affected the Canadian Zionist community: the controversy over the admission of observers of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the fifth United Nations Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of the Offenders (COPCTO), which was scheduled to be held in Toronto in 1975; the similar controversy that arose concerning the United Nations Habitat conference held in Vancouver the following year; and the 1979 election commitment of the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, Joe Clark, to move the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. These three events can be used as case studies to evaluate the influence of the Zionist lobby on Canadian foreign policy.

copcro The COPCTO was scheduled to be held in Toronto, Ontario, from 1 September to 12 September 1975; the invitation to the United Nations had been submitted jointly by the Canadian federal and the Ontario provincial governments at the fourth conference at Kyoto, Japan, in 1970. Seeds of controversy were planted four years after the invitation was extended; in November 1974, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 3237 which invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to attend as an observer all sessions of the General Assembly and also conferences convened under the authority of the General Assembly or the various agencies of the United Nations. Although Canada, with sixteen other nations, voted against this resolution, it passed with 95 votes in favor, and 19 abstentions. Consequently, the PLO, although widely perceived in Canada as a terrorist organization, was invited by the United Nations in January 1975 to send representatives to the COPCTO in Toronto. This was not the first time that Canada was faced with the issue of

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PLO representation in international bodies. It was encountered at the 1973 meeting of the International Telecommunications Union in Spain, when a vote was taken as to whether representatives of liberation groups recognized by the Arab League or the Organization of African Unity (the PLO meets both these criteria) should be invited to attend as observers. A majority voted in favor of the resolution; Canada abstained. In cases where the decision to admit observer groups was made by consensus rather than by vote, Canada generally went along with the consensus, invariably in favor of admission. This was the case on four occasions: the 1973 International Red Cross conference in Teheran; the Rome World Food Conference and the Bucharest World Population Conference, both held in 1974; and the Law of the Sea conference. On four other occasions Canada voted in favor of inviting liberation movements: at the World Health Organization and the Universal Postal Union in 1974; at the 1974 Vienna Conference on the Relations Between States and Organizations; and at the 1975 Conference on the Status of Women at Mexico City. In all cases, Canada maintained that, while it supported admission of these groups as observers, it opposed granting the same diplomatic privileges as representatives of states. It was on this point that Canada abstained in 1974 from a vote on a resolution passed by the UNESCO executive board; Canada considered that the resolution came too close to recognizing the PLO as a state; and in 1974 Canada voted against General Assembly Resolution 3237, contending that the resolution would grant the PLO a status that up to that point had been granted only to states or associations of states. It appears that the government originally had every intention of allowing the PLO delegates into Canada to attend the COPCTO; in previous years, the federal government had issued "Minister's Permits" to PLO members, providing they had no personal record of terrorism, for limited periods to allow them to fulfill speaking engagements. The responsible DEA officials strongly favored the admission of the PLO observers, believing that Canada must fulfill her international obligations to the United Nations if it hoped to maintain credibility in that body and with the Third World members in particular. Furthermore, Canada had always claimed to have a balanced position with reference to the two sides in the Middle East conflict; the refusal of entry to the United Nationssanctioned PLO observers would not only refute this claim, but might also damage our trade relations with the Arab countries, and jeopardize our role as peacekeepers, especially in the Middle East. Although as far back as January 1975 a Toronto Sun article had warned that a controversy might arise out of the invitation of PLO observers to the COPCTO, no official action about admission was taken

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by the federal government until mid-July. However, the matter had come to the attention of the Canada-Israel Committee almost immediately. Although the C-IC mobilized itself to deal with the situation "behind-the-scenes" by writing letters and meeting with cabinet ministers and key bureaucrats, it did not want to become involved in a high-profile public demonstration. Instead, it encouraged the establishment of CAPLOT (Canadians Against PLO Terrorists), believing that a nondenominational, issue-oriented pressure group would be more effective in exerting high-profile public pressure than a strictly ethnic or religious pressure group. Otherwise the C-IC feared that it would be perceived as seeking to make the government respond to its own parochial concerns, rather than to the general national interest as expressed by "ordinary" people. CAPLOT was organized in Toronto, the site of the conference, in mid-March, almost three months before any corresponding action by leaders of the Arab-Canadians. Although intended to be nondenominational, all three of CAPLOT's organizers were Jewish: Norman May, of Osgoode Hall and future president of the C-IC; Louis Silver, a Toronto lawyer; and David Sakowski, director of youth services for the Canadian Jewish Congress. Silver was the titular head of the new organization. As the issue had not been noticed by the Canadian public, it was decided that the first priority was to focus attention on it. After the controversy was over, David Sakowski stated that "We wanted to make this strictly a Canadian issue."6 The strategy apparently was to make it one of Canadian conscience (i.e. "Should we let these murderers into our country?") rather than one of support (or nonsupport) of the United Nations (i.e. "Should we do what the U.N. directs us to do, even though we don't really agree with it?"). As a result, there was a much higher degree of opposition to the conference amongst the non-Jewish public. To pressure the federal government to refuse admission to the PLO delegates, CAPLOT organized a letter-writing campaign; it used the well-organized structures of the highly politicized Jewish community, and also placed newspaper advertisements. According to statistics supplied by the Toronto Star, by the day the decision was made the prime minister had received 1500 letters and telegrams, and DEA 800, running fourteen to one, and thirty to one respectively, against allowing PLO representatives into the country. 7 Realizing that public opinion was running strongly against admission, Mr. William Davis, premier in the minority Progressive Conservative government of Ontario that was facing an imminent election, became involved in the controversy. In a letter dated 9 May 1975 to Prime Minister Trudeau and released to the public at the end of that month,

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Davis referred to the admission of PLO delegates as an "affront and a provocation." After the public release of the letter, the leaders of the provincial Liberal and New Democratic parties, both very aware of the ridings (particularly in Metro Toronto) which contained significant numbers of Jewish voters, made statements supporting Davis's stand. After all, with an election pending, no politician could afford to be perceived by the public as supporting the PLO. In keeping with the prime minister's instructions to the bureaucracy that Cabinet was to be informed of all feasible options in any given situation, DEA submitted to the cabinet four alternative plans of action: 1) cancel the conference altogether; 2) ask the United Nations for a postponement; 3) go ahead with the conference, but on a "no frills" basis, with no entertainment, parties or receptions; this would make clear the government's disapproval of the PLO; or 4) continue with the conference as if there was no controversy, with full PLO participation. DEA officials lobbied for the third option; cancelling the conference would have caused severe repercussions at the United Nations, casting doubt on Canada's commitment to the organization, as well as jeopardizing our UNEF role and trade with the Arab nations. Asking for postponement would accomplish little; it would, on the contrary, annoy and inconvenience the United Nations and many of its members, put Canada's reliability in doubt, and the question would still have to be faced later on. The fourth option was clearly unpalatable politically, given the hue and cry against PLO entry that was being raised by Canadians of most religious and political persuasions; the third option was seen as the solution that would be the most palatable face-saving device, and cause the government to tread on the fewest toes. Furthermore, it would have the fewest side effects on Canada's international involvements, including not just trade with the Arab states, and the UNEF, but the upcoming Habitat conference, the 1976 Montreal Olympics, and the International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nation's only Canadian-based body, and one that would be required to admit PLO representatives as General Assembly-sanctioned observers. DEA officials, feeling that the longer matters dragged out the more harm would be done to Canada's international reputation, campaigned hard for a quick decision. External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen was in Japan during mid-June, and the Cabinet was reluctant to make a firm decision until after his 27 June return to Ottawa. The debate became

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so intense, however, that despite the deep divisions within the Cabinet, it was decided on 26 June to allow PLO observers to attend the Toronto conference. This decision did not end the controversy. Originally, the Cabinet had decided not to entertain, either individually or collectively, any formal submissions by pressure groups. However, on 24 June 1975 acting External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp met with a group of C-IC executives and other leaders of the Jewish community. When the cabinet's decision was announced on 26 June 1975 the Zionist lobby, instead of giving up, augmented its activities; it was encouraged by the knowledge that the Conservative and New Democratic opposition, a number of Liberal caucus members, and several cabinet ministers were opposed to PLO presence at the conference. Meyer Bick, the national director of the C-IC, personally lobbied several cabinet members, as did the well-known Rabbi GunterPlaut of Toronto. In early July, CAPLOT launched legal action to keep the PLO delegates out, and threatened massive but peaceful demonstrations. Albert Applebaum, a representative of the militant (and predominantly American) Jewish Defence League stated that some of the PLO delegates "may not make it back home"8—a comment that went down badly with both the Canadian public at large, and the Canadian Jewish community. On 9 July 1975, the cabinet met for an hour with several members of the Jewish community, including Fred Lepkin, the Pacific Region chairman of the C-IC; David Sakowski; Phillip Givens, former mayor of Toronto; and Rabbi Plaut. Rabbi Plaut had previously received two telephone calls from Prime Minister Trudeau seeking advice. The announcement of the reconsideration of the 26 June 1975 decision was scheduled for 10 July, but Arab groups insisted on equal time before the Cabinet; accordingly a meeting was arranged for 14 July. Intense pressure, from both the Zionist lobby and the Ontario and Toronto governments, continued to be placed on Cabinet ministers, many of whom felt that they were on the horns of a dilemma, torn between living up to Canada's international responsibilities on the one hand, and their moral revulsion at the PLO on the other. 9 Two events in July helped to push the Cabinet into making the decision to ask the United Nations to postpone the conference for one year. A PLO bombing so appalled the Cabinet that, it was reported,10 the majority for admitting the PLO slipped away; furthermore, Israeli retaliatory raids caused the international atmosphere to deteriorate to the point that Cabinet feared the conference would degenerate into an exercise in finger-pointing and arm-waving on the part of the combatants.

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The second event was a press release by the Canadian Arab Federation following its 14 July meeting with Cabinet; this referred to Israel as a "racialist [sic], exclusivist and fascist state."11 The release was augmented by inflammatory comments by Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) spokesman George Haggar, who had attended the meeting with MacEachen; he threatened: "We'll do our utmost to destroy trade with the Arab states if the PLO can't attend the conference."12 Both the release and the commentary had a very negative impact on the Cabinet and public opinion. The statement in effect painted the Cabinet into a corner; to come out in favor of PLO admission would now appear to be a submission to Arab economic blackmail. Faced with intense pressure from the Zionist lobby, and threats of trade embargoes, the Cabinet could see no easy solution. On 21 July, External Affairs Minister MacEachen made public what he had three days earlier told United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim—that Canada had asked the United Nations to postpone the conference until the following year. He stated in the House of Commons that ...we concluded that it would not be possible, in present circumstances, to hold a successful congress on crime prevention in Canada or anywhere else....in the final analysis, two factors dominated in our discussions. The first was the inevitable intrusion of unrelated political considerations into the proceedings of the Congress. The second was the re-escalation of violence in the Middle East and the consequent spread of its bitterness into Canada and subsequently into the Congress itself. It is obvious that such intrusion of the Middle East conflict...would distort and subvert the purposes of what essentially had been up to now, and should remain, a technical meeting....13

Instead of postponing the meeting, the United Nations moved it to Geneva, where it went ahead without Israeli participation or exceptional disturbance. Reaction to MacEachen's statement was somewhat mixed. The PLO was surprisingly mild: We are sad that Canada is behaving like a colonialist country, however the decision has provided an opportunity for many people to hear about the PLO and the Palestinian cause and to debate the issue.14

There was little effect on trade relations with the Middle East; Frederick Farha, a co-founder of the Canadian Arab Federation and member of the 14 July delegation, heard the announcement while on his way to discuss with Manitoba premier, Edward Schreyer, the sale of Manitoba-made

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buses to Arab countries, but saw no reason to cancel the meeting. 15 While the most frequent public reaction was to regard the government announcement as a "cop-out," the Zionist groups were initially delighted. There were dissenting opinions; Rabbi Reuben Slonim, for example, made an unusual public criticism of the Jewish organizations: 16 The federal government yielded to the pressures of Jewish organizations and Ontario politicians, and thereby violated its international responsibility, sullying its world image in the process.17

The Department of External Affairs held much the same opinion; in general, DEA officials were angry that they had been overruled by politicians who, by their actions, had made Canada appear to be buckling under pressure by the Zionist lobby. The Zionist groups were less delighted with their victory when evidence surfaced of a backlash against their lobby within Cabinet, and even more within the Department of External Affairs. This was caused by the damage to Canada's international reputation; one Cabinet minister was quoted as saying, I know all the arguments in favour of the Israeli position, but can we really have the Government of Canada almost dictated to by an ethnic lobby ? 1 8

Consideration of this backlash caused the C-IC to adopt a different strategy when dealing with the Habitat Conference. Habitat Habitat, the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, was held in Vancouver between 31 May and 11 June 1976—eleven months after the COPCTO controversy. As with the Toronto conference, the invitation to hold the conference was extended before the PLO had been given observer status at the United Nations. 19 Although the Habitat conference took place shortly after the COPCTO controversy, and the issue was in many ways similar, the attitude and strategy of the Canada-Israel Committee were markedly different. Since Habitat was not about the prevention of crime, the anomaly of the presence of what was generally perceived as a terrorist group was not nearly as unpalatable, nor was there any need to reestablish a one-issue, mass level pressure group because the public was reasonably well informed about the issue of PLO participation as a result of the Crime Conference controversy. Moreover, the C-IC was aware of

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the residual ill-feeling amongst DEA officials, and some Cabinet ministers, created by the enormous pressure put on them the previous year. It appears that the C-IC initially repeated its demand that the Cabinet refuse entry to PLO participants, but this was kept out of the public eye. The focus of the pressure was Barney Danson, minister of Urban Affairs, who was co-chairman (with Allan MacEachen) of the Habitat conference, and the only Jew in the Cabinet. A liberal Jew, and one who supported PLO participation in Habitat as an obligation to the United Nations, he was particularly torn by the C-IC pressure. In a letter dated 23 May 1976, to CJC President Sydney Harris, Rabbi Slonim mentioned that ...I am privy to his [Barney Danson's] struggles with the Jewish community and his agmat nefresh [anguish] in working out the formula of "non-politicization" in order to play down opposition to Habitat. 20

The intense pressure to which Danson was subjected is clear from a previous personal, but not confidential, letter to Rabbi Slonim in which Danson stated that: You are the only voice of which I am aware that is calling for the values which are basic to my Judaism.21

Rabbi Slonim, though a Zionist,22 seldom hesitates to criticize in a very public manner either the government of Israel, or the various Jewish organizations in Canada. He has published books and articles censuring the Israeli government for their treatment of the Palestinian refugees, and his criticism of the pressure put on the Canadian government during the Crime Conference controversy was widely quoted in the Canadian press. This public "breaking of ranks" has earned Rabbi Slonim a reputation as a maverick within the Jewish community. Zionist lobbying was not directed exclusively at Danson; the entire cabinet and DEA officials were also targeted. Slonim, in the same letter, tells Harris We are all aware of the meetings between Jewish leaders and officials of External Affairs, and the telephone calls between Toronto and the Prime Minister's office. 23

Harris did not deny the implication of this statement in his reply of 2 June. DEA and the Cabinet, both generally unreceptive to the C-IC

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requests to disallow PLO participation, worked out a compromise whereby the Government would make every effort to ensure that the conference would not be "politicized," and in return the C-IC, and also the bodies it represents, would publicly support the conference. The national office of the CJC agreed to this, and it actually participated in the conference with a display showing the Jewish contribution to Canadian society. The agreement, however, prompted a rift within the C-IC. A small group of Vancouver district representatives accused the national office of taking a political, rather than a moral stand on the issue, implying that the national office of the C-IC had moderated its opposition to PLO participation not because of the different circumstances, but because the backlash against the C-IC arising out of the events of July 1975 had made it expedient. The Vancouver group felt that a continued campaign would again force the Federal Government to refuse admittance into Canada of the PLO delegates.24 The response to this local protest came from Sol Kanee, Chairman of the Board of the CJC: We have made our representations, and have found that the government is on a course from which there is no turning back, that Habitat will be held and the PLO will attend and so will the Israelis; it's pointless to keep arguing against it... .if the Vancouver Jewish community doesn't moderate its view...they have to understand that they are not in a position to veto the point of view of the overall Jewish community. 25

Nonetheless, the opposition did continue. Lobbying the British Columbia provincial government proved fruitless, especially as there had just been a provincial election, but they did persuade the Vancouver City Council to ask the federal government to cancel Habitat, a suggestion that was, to put it mildly, not well received in Ottawa. The Pacific Region Chairman of the C-IC, Fred Lepkin, expressed a position shared by Sol Buchwald, the C-IC's Western Region Chairman, that his personal preference was for the conference not to take place at all, but "I recognize that it's important for Canada to fulfill its U.N. commitments as it sees them."26 Lepkin urged that Pacific regional C-IC members not dwell on the negative aspects of the PLO, but rather emphasize the positive aspects of Israel. In the end, the Vancouver revolt fizzled, and the conference took place even though Canada's efforts to avoid "politicization" were unsuccessful. This bitterly disappointed Barney Danson, who had risked his reputation in the Jewish community in his efforts to save the conference.

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Because of the anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli sentiments expressed in the document, Canada, in the person of Mr. Danson, voted against the adoption of the final communique. The Jerusalem Embassy Controversy The 1947-48 United Nations partition plan for Palestine proposed that Jerusalem become an international city. However, the 1948 Israeli-Arab war, and the subsequent Israeli-Jordanian truce agreement, resulted in a city divided between Israel and Jordan. Although the Israeli government had declared in 1950 that Jerusalem was the capital of Israel, only a handful of countries established embassies there;27 most preferred the less controversial Tel Aviv. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel occupied the entire West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and integrated East Jerusalem into Israel proper, a move that neither Canada nor any other member of the United Nations recognized. It has been a matter of both pride and strategy on the part of the Israeli Government to convince other governments to move their embassies to Jerusalem, and it wastes no opportunity to convince Jewish communities around the world to lobby their governments to make this move. During Prime Minister Menachem Begin's visit to Canada in 1978, the matter was brought up both with Prime Minister Trudeau and the executives of the various national Jewish groups in Canada. By the end of November 1978, the Canadian Zionist Federation had passed a resolution calling for the embassy move; the C-IC had debated the subject and agreed to debate it again. However, these actions were, by and large, lip service to the Israelis; the embassy move has never been high on the Canadian Jewish community's list of priorities, and the general attitude within it was to leave well enough alone—to let the Canadian embassy stay in Tel Aviv. Prime Minister Trudeau had flatly refused to consider the move, his most recent rejection coming during Begin's visit of 1978. Opposition Leader Joe Clark visited Israel during his January 1979 around-theworld trip, and was warned by Embassy officials (as was the Conservative's foreign affairs critic, Douglas Roche, on a previous visit to Israel) that the Israeli government would raise the issue. The officials listed several reasons why the move should not be made: lost contracts with Arab countries and consequently fewer Canadian jobs; possible economic boycotts (including oil shipments); strained diplomatic relations with Arab countries; possible interference with the American Camp David initiative; and perhaps even reprisals against Canadians visiting or resident in Arab countries.

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Accompanying Clark during his visit to Israel were two Torontoarea Members of Parliament from ridings with large Jewish populations: Rob Parker of Eglington-St. Lawrence (35% Jewish), and Ron Atkey of St. Paul's (25% Jewish); and two of Clark's personal friends who were both Jewish: Irving Gerstein, president of People's Jewellers, and Jeffrey Lyons, a friend from university days, and now a Toronto lawyer who had supported Clark during the 1976 Progressive Conservative leadership convention. Parker preceded Clark, and was briefed by Israeli officials who urged consideration of the move. Atkey had visited Israel in 1978 with Ontario Premier William Davis. Except Davis, all of these party associates urged Clark to move the embassy; however, in a report Atkey gave Clark prior to leaving for Israel, it was indicated that it was a fairly low priority amongst Canadian Jews, and that it would be unwise for Canada to make any commitment regarding transference of the embassy until after the conclusion of the peace talks and the signing of the treaty. 28

Clark announced at a press conference during the visit that any commitment would be premature. The C-IC continued to lobby for one, but only half-heartedly; issues such as the Arab economic boycott, the Egypt-Israel peace negotiations, and the predicament of Soviet Jewry, were of significantly greater concern to the C-IC. In examining the circumstances behind the decision to make the move, it seems clear that the Progressive Conservative party was trying much harder to influence the Canadian Zionists than the Zionists were trying to influence the Progressive Conservative party. The policy was announced in the middle of the 1979 election campaign at a meeting with the Canada-Israel Committee on the afternoon of 25 April. Because of the public's disenchantment with the government of Pierre Trudeau, it appeared likely that Clark would win the election, possibly even with a majority. Metropolitan Toronto was of central importance because of its large number of ridings, two of which contained particularly sizeable Jewish populations. Jeffrey Simpson, a reporter for the Toronto Globe and Mail, maintains that it was the strategy of the Progressive Conservatives to initiate policies designed to appeal to a number of narrowly defined groups; by allying itself with enough of these groups, it was hoped a majority government would result. Consequently, such policies as the mortgage tax deductibility scheme, and higher veterans allowances, were aimed at homeowners and war veterans. Similarly, the Jerusalem embassy move was aimed at the Jews. Not only was it hoped

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that this would be useful in the Metro Toronto area, but that enough Jews would be lured from their traditionally Liberal leanings to tip the balance in favor of the Progressive Conservatives in a number of tight two and three way races throughout the country. It was Progressive Conservative executive advisors Bill Neville and Lowell Murray who, according to Simpson, convinced Clark that the embassy move should become part of the Progressive Conservative election platform if for no other reason that it would help Atkey and Parker to get elected in Toronto. Despite intensive pressure by the Israeli Government to persuade the Canadian Jewish organizations to lobby for the embassy move, 29 the C-IC was divided over appropriate action. Though there was unanimous sympathy for such a move, members of the committee from the CJC and B'nai Brith wanted to keep the issue nonpartisan, and out of the election campaign, while representatives of the CZF advocated taking full and public advantage of Clark's proposal. The Canadian Zionist lobby in general, and the C-IC in particular, eventually rallied behind the proposal, though more out of a sense of duty than genuine enthusiasm. Support was kept fairly low key for a number of reasons, most importantly the split within the C-IC. CJC and B'nai Brith representatives, dismayed because the politicization of the issue appeared to tie the fortunes of the Jews to the fortunes of the Progressive Conservative Party, worked out a compromise with the CZF representatives whereby C-IC public support for the proposal would be limited to an educational program, through the use of speakers, publications, and liaison with Christian churches. This strategy was designed to disassociate the C-IC from the Progressive Conservatives so that the Zionist lobby would not appear to be in their debt. As one member of the C-IC put it, however, the strategy also meant that the C-IC "could not support Clark to the extent that he deserved."30 Support for Clark's proposal was kept low-key for three further reasons: firstly, the move was not popular with the media or the general public; there was a perception that Canada looked a little silly, especially in light of implicit or explicit accusations of meddling, particularly from the Arab countries and the United States; Washington indicated concern about preserving the momentum of the floundering Camp David peace initiative. Secondly, many Liberal leaders, and even more DEA officials, had not forgiven the C-IC for its role in the Crime Conference controversy; thirdly, Clark did not require much lobbying, at least until after the election, to encourage him to fulfill his promise. Immediately after the election, Clark refused to reconsider his decision for fear of reinforcing his image as a weak and inconsistent

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leader. After DEA officials had strongly and repeatedly urged him to change his mind, he delivered a strongly-worded public rebuke at his first press conference after the swearing in of the new Cabinet: We certainly intend to do that [move the embassy]. Miss MacDonald [the new secretary of state for External Affairs] will be indicating to officials in External Affairs that we will be expecting from them recommendations fairly directly as to how it can be accomplished.... I say that simply...those questions are now beyond discussion as to their appropriateness and what we will be seeking from the public service will be indications as to how we can accomplish what we have undertaken to do.31

The C-IC was appalled that Clark had chosen this particular issue to reprimand the Department of External Affairs and to demonstrate his determination to be "boss."32 The outcry from the Arab world and the business community (the latter as a rule strong backers of the Progressive Conservative Party) overwhelmed the pro-move voice of the C-IC, virtually the only group in Canada, aside from Clark and his executive advisors, who still favored the move. Press reports, such as one in the Globe and Mail on 16 October to the effect that Canada had already lost at least $4.5 million worth of contracts in the Arab world, complaints from executives of such prominent firms as ATCO, Westinghouse Canada, and Bell Canada, and a parade of polite but firm Arab diplomats protesting the move, all combined to force Clark to reconsider. Additional pressure in favor of reconsideration came from such diverse groups as the media, Church groups, the United Nations Association, academics, and the public at large. Clark commissioned Robert Stanfield, former leader of the Progressive Conservative party, to make recommendations on the issue. Members of the Zionist lobby met with Stanfield several times while he was preparing his report; both the C-IC and Stanfield have indicated that these were for informational purposes only,33 and were not designed to sway him one way or another. After several weeks of study, Stanfield concluded that the move would be disastrous for Canadian interests. He unexpectedly released a short preliminary report urging a prompt reversal of policy, and consequently the proposal to move the embassy was withdrawn.

The evidence gathered in the three case studies indicates that the Zionist interest groups have indeed had a substantial effect on Canadian

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foreign policy towards the Middle East; by no means, however, has this influence been entirely decisive. There is a fine line between seeking to convince government of the validity of a point of view, and attempting to impose a minority's demands on the majority. The Zionist lobby has not crossed this line. Certainly the Canadian Zionists have been effective in informing the Government of their point of view, and they are very good at pointing out that public opinion is generally on their side. This effectiveness is a product, in part, of the superb organization of both the lobby and the entire Canadian Jewish Community. It is also aided by the lack of an effective counter-lobby by supporters of the Arab cause. David Taras has suggested several reasons for this ineffectiveness, including the fact that many Arab Canadians are recent immigrants who would prefer, in adapting to their new country, to avoid involvement in the conflicts they left behind. Also, many Arab groups, unfamiliar with the Canadian political process and the customs of political interchange in Canada, used inappropriate tactics (such as rhetoric that could best be termed "extravagant"); thirdly, the Canadian Arab community is far from homogeneous: there are considerable differences in attitude between, for example, the recent Palestinian immigrants and the better established Christian Lebanese community. 34 The net result has been weak, fragmented lobbying, with interest groups frequently at cross-purposes. Louis Azzaria, a former president of the Canadian Arab Federation, paid tribute to the remarkable organization of the Jewish community, and acknowledged the weakness of his own, when he stated that Not all Arabs are politicized on Mideastern politics; most Jewish citizens are. We just couldn't mobilize all kinds of other groups: we didn't have the resources.35

The Zionist lobby has carefully selected its targets to ensure maximum effectiveness; concentrating on the key foreign policy decision-makers—officials of the Department of External Affairs, and the Cabinet—they spend little time on backbench Members of Parliament and the public at large, though they are shrewd enough not to ignore them altogether. All Members of Parliament are contacted at least once a year, for the annual C-IC dinner; this helps the C-IC maintain a high profile. The C-IC is careful to cultivate the Canadian media through its Toronto-based resources center, and the Canadian media is seen to reflect the pro-Israeli bias that is held by the Canadian public. In confidential interviews, DEA officials admit to being "acutely aware" of the pressures of the Zionist lobby, and maintain that every

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effort is made to accommodate Israel's position at international bodies; one official describes Canada's position as that of an "Irish neutral," that is, allegedly neutral, but leaning to one side. This is a situation that most DEA officials would like to see changed; they contend that a more balanced policy would be more in the national interest, especially in light of the economic power of the Arab OPEC nations. In only one of the three cases studied, the postponement of the 1975 Crime Conference, did the Zionist lobby succeed in getting the government to do something that it did not really want to do. A number of unique circumstances contributed to this outcome, ones not likely to be repeated. Firstly, the Crime Conference controversy was the first time in many years that a major foreign policy lobbying effort was launched by the Zionists; the nearest comparisons would be the 1956 campaign for arms sales to Israel, or the 1939 effort against the British White Paper on Palestine. There was little need for strong lobbying in the interval because the successive cabinets were friendly to Israel, and the Arabs held little leverage prior to the muscle flexing of the OPEC cartel after 1973. Thus, out of practice, the Zionists pushed the government too hard, and lost some friends. This was a mistake they recognized immediately, and did not repeat. Secondly, the nature of the issue—especially the idea of a "terrorist" organization attending a conference on crime prevention— seems to have struck the public as so obscene that it was exceptionally easy to mobilize opinion on the Zionist side. Thirdly, the pressure from the Ontario Government was crucial. Governmental observers, both in the Department of External Affairs and in the Cabinet, have indicated that Ottawa could have withstood the opposition to the admission of the PLO delegates if it had not been for the pressure applied by Toronto. This was a case where the provincial Progressive Conservative party was trying to exploit Zionist sentiment rather than one where the Zionist groups employed secondary lobbying, that is, the use of the Ontario Government to lobby the Federal Government on their behalf. With a provincial election pending, and Premier William Davis eager to obtain a majority government, it seems plausible that Davis supported the C-IC because it was expedient to do so, and not because he was against the admission of PLO observers on moral grounds. In the case of the Habitat conference, the C-IC appears to have accomplished all it wanted except for the disallowance of PLO participation, something it did not seriously expect to achieve after the events of 1975. The Government's promise to oppose politicization in return for Jewish participation in the conference, and the fact that Canada voted against the anti-Zionist final communique, indicates that the Zionist lobby can still be effective whenever its demands are realistic.

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The proposed move of the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was not a high priority for the Canadian Zionist lobby; rather it was seen as mostly an Israeli concern. Indeed, Canadian Jewish reaction to the proposal was decidedly lukewarm, and the C-IC was less than delighted at becoming embroiled in what was widely perceived as a national embarrassment. The episode actually hurt the Zionist cause; after Pierre Trudeau's 1980 re-election, the Liberals allowed the proposal quietly to die rather than risk irritating the Arabs any further. It was a case of the Progressive Conservative Party trying to exploit Zionist sentiment to win the election, not the Zionist lobby seeking to influence the Progressive Conservatives. The controversy did disprove the myth that the Zionist lobby is all-powerful, but the Embassy proposal had little chance of acceptance in the face of the vehement opposition from the Arab countries, the United Nations Association in Canada, the business community, the media, and the public. However, it did indicate the extent to which many politicians perceive the Jewish community as having extraordinary clout. Peter Dobell has pointed out that this element generally receives a sympathetic hearing for its concerns from the Liberal party because of its tendency to vote Liberal,36 but it is interesting to note that the Progressive Conservatives, instead of "writing off" this bloc of votes, have actively courted it. The Zionist interest groups in Canada, particularly the CanadaIsrael Committee, have had a substantial impact on Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East. Interest group behavior is an integral part of the democratic process, and there is nothing inherently wrong with the Zionist lobby attempting to influence Canadian foreign policy, nor with the government listening to such a lobby. As a rule, the Canadian Zionist lobby is not powerful enough to force the Cabinet to do something against its perception of the national interest. DEA officials, because they do not represent constituents with pro-Israeli views, conceive the "national interest" in a way that differs from the Cabinet, and consequently contend that Canada's markedly pro-Israel stance is detrimental to the national interest. Canada's stance is attributed by DEA officers to Cabinet's perception of the strength of the Zionist lobby, and Cabinet's consequent reluctance to steer a more neutral course; this situation is a source of considerable unhappiness to many in the Department of External Affairs. The Zionist lobby faces many new challenges in trying to maintain its influence in Canadian foreign policy. Increasing disenchantment from the public at large, and even within the Jewish community itself, with the Israeli government's policy on Jewish settlements in the West Bank, improved lobbying from the pro-Arab groups, and increased pressure

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from current and former foreign service officers, academics, and Members of Parliament to moderate Canada's pro-Israeli policy stance will make the task of the C-IC more difficult in future years. However, unless the mood of the Canadian political parties and public changes markedly, or the Arab groups develop a lobby equal in sophistication to that of the Zionists, the considerable influence of the Zionist lobby on Canadian foreign policy is likely to remain. Notes 1. Canadian Jewish Congress (information pamphlet published by the Canadian Jewish Congress), p. 6. 2. Reuben Slonim,Family Quarrel: The United Church and the Jews (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1977), p. 22. 3. Ibid., p. 23. 4. Although many definitions of the word exist, the one used in this paper will be, simply, a person who supports the continued existence of the State of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people. The source of this definition is not a scholarly or religious work, but, rather, the context within which most of the sources for this paper, particularly those within the Jewish community, have explicitly or implicitly used the word. 5. Canada-Israel Committee (information pamphlet published by the Canada-Israel Committee), p. 1. 6. Cited in Stephen Handelman, "How Arab, Jewish Leaders Pressured Ottawa Cabinet Over U.N. Crime Conference" in Toronto Star, 6 September 1975. 7. Ibid. 8. Cited in "Jews Say PLO Delegates .'May Not Make It Back Home,' " in Toronto Globe and Mail, 17 July 1975. 9. Confidential interview. 10. Michael Benedict, "PLO Raid Turned Ottawa Against U.N. Conference" in Toronto Star, 26 July 1975. 11. Handelman, "How Arab, Jewish Leaders Pressured Ottawa Cabinet Over U.N. Crime Conference." 12. Ibid. 13. Department of External Affairs Statement, 21 July 1975, pp. 4—5. 14. "Copping Out of a Dilemma, "Time (Canadian edition), 4 August 1975, pp. 7 —8. 15. Handelman, "How Arab, Jewish Leaders Pressured Ottawa Cabinet Over U.N. Crime Conference." 16. See infra p. 161 for an account of Rabbi Slonim's position on Zionist lobbying. 17. Reuben Slonim, "Jewish Lobby Misguided on PLO Issue, Rabbi Argues," Ottawa Citizen, 25 July 1975. 18. Benedict, "PLO Raid Turned Ottawa Against U.N. Conference." 19. In this case, the invitation had been extended at the 1972 Conference on the Environment in Stockholm. 20. Slonim papers (National Archives of Canada, Ottawa). 21. Ibid. 22. As defined in this paper. 23. Slonim papers. 24. Harvey Oberfeld, "Canadian Jews Plan to Expose PLO," Vancouver Sun, 6 February 1972. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid.

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27. By 1955 only El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, and the Netherlands had based their diplomatic representatives in Jerusalem; several other African and South American countries followed suit in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 28. Jeffrey Simpson, Discipline of Power (Toronto: Personal Library, Publishers, 1980), p. 149. 29. As one member of the Ottawa Jewish community stated in a confidential interview, during his 1978 visit to Canada, Menachem Begin "pleaded Jerusalem's cause at every possible opportunity." 30. Confidential interview. 31. Simpson, Discipline of Power, p. 154. 32. Confidential interview. 33. Interview with Robert Stanfield, former leader of the Progressive Conservative party, Ottawa, 22 December 1980. 34. David Taras, "Parliament and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Politics and Compromise During the Yom Kippur War," paper presented to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs conference on Domestic Groups and Foreign Policy, Ottawa, 11 June 1982. 35. Handelman, "How Arab, Jewish Leaders Pressured Ottawa Cabinet Over U.N. Crime Conference." 36. Peter Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 52.

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CHAPTER 9

Reflections on the Stanfield Report The Honourable Robert Stanfield

MY CONSIDERED opinions and recommendations concerning Canadian-Arab relations are contained in my report to the Government of Canada made in February of 1980. Much has happened since, but nothing to change my views as to appropriate Canadian policy in the Middle East. It is dangerous to summarize one's views on a subject of such complexity and sensitivity, but in view of the limited familiarity of many with my report I should perhaps reiterate some of its principal points. My terms of reference included not only the location of the Canadian Embassy in Israel, but the broad questions of Canada's relations with Israel and with Arab countries and how Canada could best contribute to the peace process in the Middle East. In my report I recognized the importance of commercial and cultural relations with Arab countries, and I made a number of recommendations in those areas, but I emphasize in my report and still believe, that the achievement of peace is the most basic Canadian interest in the Middle East. It is natural that each side to this dispute would want Canada's full and unqualified support for its position, but I did not recommend that Canada give its entire support to one side or the other, because neither side is entirely right. I reiterated Canada's friendship with Israel, but also expressed the growing concern of Canadians for the lot of the Palestinians. I recommended support for a homeland for the Palestinians. Perhaps my overwhelming impression after my discussions in the Middle East was the depth of the distrust between Israel and the Arab countries. The consequence of this distrust was that each side to

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the dispute tended to regard the views of extremists as the accepted aims of the other side, which in turn enhanced the degree of distrust. This distrust impedes progress towards peace. It is in part at least the result of lack of communication between Israelis and Arabs over many years. I suggested that one role for Canada would be to try to reduce the barriers to communication. To do this Canada would need the respect and trust of both sides and be seen by both sides to be fair-minded. As to achievement of peace, I could see no substitute for negotiation. "Real talks around a table are surely the only means by which satisfactory territorial and other arrangements can be worked out." For this to be effective there must be a willingness to negotiate. The Camp David process has been opposed by most Arab governments. While I believe those governments are genuine in their opposition, I must say again as I said in my report, that "general statements of position by those governments together with their hope that American influence will induce Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and recognize Palestinian rights are not a substitute for negotiations." If there are to be negotiations, there must be not only a willingness to negotiate, but some acceptable form of representation of the Palestinians must be found. Israel refuses to deal with the PLO and Palestinians say that no other body can represent them. I recommended that Canada broaden its contacts with the PLO with a view "to encouraging that organization towards greater moderation and realism and towards open acceptance of the legitimacy of the State of Israel." Far from improving during the past year, the prospects for peace in the Middle East have deteriorated. The bombing of Iraq nuclear facilities by Israel is only the most striking and disturbing indication of deterioration and the increasing depth of distrust. This must be a matter of very deep concern to Canadians. The conference held at The University of Calgary in 1981 was therefore of special importance to Canadians. There has been no widespread discussion of the Middle East among Canadians. No organized group in Canada has been pressing for any discussion of Canada's Middle Eastern policies. Canadians of Jewish or Arab descent tend to be even more hawkish and rigid than general opinion in the countries they support. One can understand their reluctance to undermine the side they support, but they have not been very helpful in reducing distrust or bringing the two sides closer together. Canadian businessmen want good commercial relations with all countries. Therefore, they were interested in having the embassy and boycott questions settled, but seem to feel that the larger questions involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute are beyond their domain. Canadian

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politicians have not felt any pressure to examine or question traditional Canadian policies in the Middle East. I have already referred to the longstanding friendship between Canada and Israel. But, as I said in my report, "our respect and affection for the Israelis is not diminished by our concern for the Palestinians." When the Israelis do something we consider wrong we should be prepared to say so. This is necessary both to preserve the respect of the Arabs and fulfill the duties of friendship. As to the bombing of Iraq nuclear facilities by Israel I agree with the editorial in the New York Times on 9 June 1981: Israel's ever-widening definition of self-defense is illusory. It is bound to unify a challenged Arab world. It keeps eroding the support of Israel's fastest friends. Such conduct argues that Israeli behavior is irrelevant to Middle East events. It argues for unrelenting attack in pursuit of an unsustainable superiority. It argues for a policy that will make it impossible to augment Israel's formidable defenses with diplomacy. Israel risks becoming its own worst enemy.

But the Arab people and the Arab governments must recognize that many Canadians feel inhibited in expressing their compassion for the Palestinians or criticism of certain Israeli behavior because of their fear that the ultimate aim of Arabs is to liquidate Israel. Arab governments have insisted to me that they have no such intention; that they accept Resolution 242 of the United Nations and that this shows their willingness to accept Israel within her pre-1967 borders. However, the covenant of the PLO does not accept such an Israel; and Arab governments support the PLO. I know the reasons the PLO gives for not abandoning its refusal to accept and recognize Israel without Israel recognizing the PLO. But we are discussing Canadian-Arab relations here. Canadian policies necessarily reflect Canadian opinion, and the feeling is widespread in Canada that Arabs in general and the PLO in particular want to liquidate Israel. This belief, this fear, inhibits Canada's willingness to condemn immoderate Israeli positions or actions. These Canadian fears are reinforced by what many Canadians perceive as an unwillingness of Arab governments, with the exception of Egypt, to even talk to Israelis. Canadians may question how far Israel is prepared to go in negotiation, but they see Arab countries as being quite unwilling to negotiate with Israel at all. I am not referring simply to the general Arab rejection of the Camp David process. The general impression in Canada is that Arab governments will not have anything to do with Israel. This impression reinforces the fear that Arab governments

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will not recognize Israel nor accept her under any conditions Israelis could be reasonably expected to accept. It has been suggested to me that Canadian leaders have a duty to support truth and justice, and to correct what Arabs believe to be distorted impressions Canadians have of the Middle East, and of Arab efforts to achieve a just peace. The Canadian Government cannot, however, be expected to speak for Arab governments. It is one thing for a Canadian minister to express sympathy for the Palestinians, or to condemn the bombing of the nuclear plant in Iraq, but a Canadian minister can hardly vouch for the aims and intentions of Arab or any other foreign governments. Arabs and their friends suggest that such beliefs and impressions among Canadians are the fault of the media. However, as an old politician I have never found that it helped very much to blame the media. If one's position is not being presented adequately by the media there is usually some reason other than simply media hostility. In the past at least the Arab position in general and the Palestinian case in particular have not been well presented in Canada. I am not suggesting that a massive Arab propaganda campaign would help, or be desirable. I do believe, however, that the Arab neighbors of Israel ought to be able to convey to Canadians a clearer picture of their intentions towards Israel. I am speaking very frankly. I feel a warm friendship towards the Arab people. I am speaking as a friend. I express my views frankly about Israel and I want to be equally frank towards Arabs. Arab governments probably feel that Canadian policies are biased toward Israel, but Canadian governments will continue to respect deeply held beliefs and fears among the Canadian people. Arab governments should recognize those widespread fears in Canada. It should be possible for Arab governments to reassure Canadians. I wish to see friendship strengthened between Canadians and Arabs. This is in our mutual interest, and it is necessary if Canada is to play a useful, although modest role in easing tensions in the Middle East.

This is an edited version of an address given on 22 June 1981 by The Honourable Robert Stanfield to the Canadian-Arab Relations Conference, held at The University of Calgary in 1981.

APPENDIX

The Stanfield Report

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Representant Special du Gouvernement du Canada et

Special Representative of the Government of Canada and Ambassador-at-large

Ambassadeur itincrant

CANADA

Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa

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Representant Special du Gouvernement du Canada et Ambassadeur itincrant

Special Representative of the Government of Canada and Ambassador-at-large CANADA

February 20, 1980

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY

I as Special Representative of the Government of Canada and Ambassador-at-Large appointed by Order in Council of 5 July 1979, P.C. 1979 — 1843, to study the whole spectrum of Canada's relationship with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, BEG TO SUBMIT TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ACCOMPANYING REPORT

Special Representative of the Government of Canada

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Final Report of the Special Representative of the Government of Canada Respecting the Middle East and North Africa

Since the submission of my interim report in October of last year on the location of the Canadian Embassy in Israel, I have continued to examine the other areas of my mandate. To facilitate my work, in addition to my first trip to the Middle East which preceded my recommendation on the Embassy, I have visited Algeria, Morocco, France, Italy, The Vatican and the United States as well as United Nations Headquarters in New York and several of the Canadian provinces. I have also met the representatives of other Arab governments whose countries time did not permit me to visit. With the benefit of these wider consultations I am now reporting on the fuller range of subjects falling within my terms of reference concerning the Middle East and North Africa. For purposes of my work I have defined the Middle East and North Africa as being limited to the Arab states and Israel because it was in the context of Canada's relations with these countries that my appointment was made. I do not believe, however, that the Arab-Israeli dispute exists in a vacuum. Events in Afghanistan and Iran, for example, clearly make a solution of this dispute still more urgent. I have divided this final report into two main sections according to the remaining areas of my mandate. The first deals with the peace process between Israel and the Arab states, and the second with reciprocal relations between Canada and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa in the political, economic, technological and cultural areas, including the implications for Canada of the Arab boycott of Israel. In discussing the Middle East conflict I have tried to assess the attitudes, concerns and approaches of the parties of the Arab-Israeli dispute in order to suggest how Canada might best be able to contribute to a peace settlement based on mutual understanding and compromise. I have approached this task along three lines: (1) the attitude Canada might take to basic issues in the dispute, (2) the material contributions that we can make from our own resources to such activities as peacekeeping, refugee relief and economic development and (3) methods by which we can retain and enhance our influence in bringing the parties closer together. The Peace Process The Basis of My Approach I have continued to base my approach to Middle East questions on the premise stated in my interim report—that while Canada has important

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economic interests in the area, our most fundamental goal there is to contribute to a just and lasting peace. My reasons for adopting this attitude are straight forward. The dispute between Arabs and Israelis has resulted in the disruption and uprooting of peoples and an immense and wasteful diversion of scarce resources to military expenditures. It has caused great suffering on both sides. It has also been a source of continuing world tension and uncertainty, and carries the threat of wider conflict which could engulf the entire international community. In reporting I have not presumed to outline the specifics of a settlement of this very complex and sensitive issue. I do not think that anyone can foresee the exact shape of a settlement. Rather, I have tried to put forward positions and recommendations which could be considered by the Government as a basis for Canadian policy in the area. In doing so I have borne in mind that Canada is not a major world power like the United States. The Americans have had and will continue to have a particular responsibility in fostering the peace process in the Middle East. While Canada's influence on events is necessarily limited this does not mean that we cannot be effective. My discussions with Middle East leaders have convinced me we can make a real contribution to peace if we have the respect and friendship of the governments and peoples of the area. In considering what Canadian policy should be, I have seen no need to hide our sympathies. We have had a longstanding and close relationship with Israel since the country's birth. Canadians continue to have an abiding admiration for the Jewish people who have made so many significant contributions across the field of human endeavour. They have suffered much over the centuries, and most recently in the terrible events of the Holocaust, but throughout they have maintained deep emotional links to their ancient homeland. The Israelis, in little over 30 years, and against formidable odds, have established vigorous democratic institutions and through them have done much to make their new country prosper. Canada's commitment to friendship with Israel and to that country's well-being cannot be subject to question. Our close ties with Israel should remain a fundamental cornerstone of Canadian Middle East policy. The Israeli leaders I met affirmed to me the importance and value they attach to these ties between our governments and, equally important, between our peoples. Our strong support for Israel does not mean that we cannot maintain and further develop good relations with the Arab peoples, who themselves have made such major contributions to our civilization. Those Arab countries I have visited, and those others whose representatives I have met, have expressed a strong desire for friendship with Canada.

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They have said this is so because we are a highly developed Western country with a tradition of close relations with the Third World but without a history of colonial activity. Our dual linguistic heritage is also of interest to these nations, some of which use English and others French to exchange ideas with the Western world. With their geopolitical importance at the crossroads of three continents and with their new found economic strength the Arab states have emerged as increasingly important members of the international community. In a world of growing interdependence the importance of mutual understanding and co-operation is self evident. I believe Canadians appreciate this. On their side, the Arab leaders I met did not expect that Canadian policies would parallel their own, nor did they expect that we would move away from our traditional friendship with Israel. They did ask, however, that when we take positions affecting the Middle East, we should bear in mind basic Arab aspirations and concerns. This attitude, in my view, is both understandable and reasonable. I think there is an increasing awareness in Canada of the Palestinian predicament/1" As a result of the conflict of 1948—49 many of the Palestinian people, who only thirty years earlier had constituted the great majority in the territitories that subsequently became Israel, left their homes and property and took refuge in neighbouring Arab states. More fol:;

~Before proceeding further I believe a note of explanation would be helpful. Until the 1920—22 period Palestine was not a clearly defined unit. Under Ottoman rule the area had been divided into a number of administrative districts whose boundaries bore little relationship to subsequent political entities. At the San Remo Conference in 1920 the victorious World War I Allies made Britain the Mandatory power for the territories known today as Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jordan, giving the area the name Palestine. This decision was recognized by the League of Nations in 1922, as was the British creation in 1921 of the Arab Emirate of Transjordan which has since become the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Transjordan in 1922 had a total population of about 300,000 Arabs over half of whom were nomadic. The Palestine Mandate west of the Jordan River, had a population at the same time of about 750,000, of whom approximately 84,000 were Jews, with almost all the remainder being Arabs, whose decendants today are commonly referred to as Palestinians. Together these refugees and their descendants now number about two million. As a further consequence of the 1967 conflict, approximately one million Palestinians who remained in the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli rule. Unified by a feeling of dispossession and defeat, the Palestinians now have emerged fully conscious of their identity and anxious to give that identity political expression. Our respect and affection for Israel and Israelis is not diminished by concern for the lot of the Palestinians.

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lowed as a result of the 1967 war when Israel took control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from Jordan and Egypt. Arab-Israeli Perceptions and Canada's Role The fluctuating tensions, violence and wars of the past fifty years in the Middle East have clouded perceptions among Arabs and Israelis and fostered mistrust. It is not surprising that few in the area can think dispassionately about the situation. The search for peace has been further complicated by the prolonged lack of communication between the parties. Until the recent negotiations between Egypt and Israel, Arab and Israeli governments had never talked to each other on any continuing basis during the past thirty years. Even now the dialogue is along narrow channels. As a result, Arab and Israeli perceptions of each other sometimes lack realism and understanding. Arabs, for instance, often fail to realize that the grim historical experience of Jews in the Holocaust and earlier naturally creates a profound concern about security on the part of Israelis. On the other hand, it seems difficult for the Israelis to appreciate fully the depth of feeling among the Palestinians about their plight as a dispossessed people despite the parallels with some aspects of previous Jewish experience. With such gaps in mutual understanding, it is not unnatural for those on one side of the dispute to believe that the positions taken by extremists constitute the accepted aims of the other side. Israelis sometimes tend to believe that for Arabs in general, any settlement must provide for a secular state composed of Israel as well as the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a position that would negate the concept of Israel as it now exists. They perhaps question that the more moderate attitude towards Israel expressed by many Arab governments in recent years is sincere. At the same time, a number of Arabs with whom I spoke referred to the extreme claims for a greater Israel which are expressed by some Israelis, and argued that expansion was the real objective of that country. This problem of perception is further complicated by the fact that Arab countries and even the Palestinians are frequently in sharp disagreement among themselves on objectives and methods. Within Israel there are also widely divergent views, and national policy formation is a complex and intricate process. A useful contribution to peace which Canada can make, both on its own and with others, is to help the sides overcome the barriers to communication which have developed. For example, Arab governments and the Palestinians should be urged to remove ambiguities, where they exist, about the terms and conditions affecting their willingness to

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recognize and accept the State of Israel as part of an agreed settlement. On the other hand if Israel's policies in the occupied territories hinder the negotiating process by creating distrust among Arabs we should be prepared to say so. We also should encourage the two sides to talk directly to each other. We should discourage their placing undue emphasis on formal mechanisms for such discussions and on questions of formal representation and formal recognition before even talks can take place. Progress towards a settlement requires that meaningful compromise by both sides be seen as attainable. Canada should encourage this. Perceptions that the basic aspirations of one or the other of the parties cannot be met through negotiations could weaken the position of moderates and encourage belief in the necessity of violence to achieve objectives. While no just solution which will meet the demands of extremists on either side is obtainable, compromise which will satisfy the requirements of the moderates is achievable, I believe, with goodwill and perseverance. In Canada a dialogue between Jewish and Arab groups would be highly desirable. No Canadians are more anxious to see a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, but they like the peoples of the Middle East often seem far apart in their perceptions of the area's problems. Both Jewish and Arab Canadians share a strong emotional attachment to that region and a strong love of Canada. Any success they might have in enhancing understanding, trust and goodwill among themselves could have a number of significant consequences. It could have some effect in promoting understanding in the Middle East itself. It could lead to a greater understanding of the Middle East by Canadians generally. It could further strengthen our policy in the area, which could then be formulated on a broad base of consensus within Canada rather than against a background of contending and contradictory domestic attitudes. This would provide a sounder and healthier foundation for Canadian foreign policy. This kind of dialogue between Canadian Jewish and Arab groups would require patience and a willingness to persist in discussion even in the face of basic misunderstandings which could arise between the participants. Such a dialogue seems to me nevertheless to be an important contribution that these groups of Canadians can make to the Middle East and to Canada. The Basis for Negotiations Canada has traditionally and rightly supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 as the best basis for the achievement of a comprehensive peace. The Resolution was passed unanimously by the

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Council following the 1967 war in the Middle East and has served as the basis for negotiations ever since. Its basic principles are: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii)Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. The Resolution is accepted by Israel and by all her neighbours although interpretations as to its precise meaning vary significantly. The Arab governments see it as calling pre-eminently for Israeli evacuation of the entirety of the territories occupied in 1967 which include the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. The Israelis argue that the extent of withdrawal is left very open by the Resolution and they interpret the reference to secure boundaries as meaning, above all, the physical security of borders in military terms. These differences do not negate, however, the Resolution's usefulness as the basis for negotiations. It would serve no useful purpose for Canada to adopt a specific interpretation of Resolution 242. The precise details of any peace settlement including what borders will eventually emerge and the extent of relations between the states concerned is for the parties themselves to decide in negotiations. This I understand is what the Resolution's authors intended. At the same time it seems clear to me that they also intended the Resolution to be seen as a whole—that Israel's withdrawal from territories would balance her neighbours' recognition of her as a legitimate state in the area within clear and defined boundaries. It is not enough to say, as some Arab governments still do, that Israel should unilaterally withdraw to the pre-1967 lines and recognize Palestinian rights without concurrent agreement on boundaries and recognition. On the other hand, it is questionable how far Israel's concern for security would justify territorial claims that effectively negated a Palestinian homeland. If the arrangements ultimately made in negotiations are to be durable and lasting they must not only adequately reflect territorial and defence considerations, important as these are, but even more significantly, they must be such as to obtain the general and genuine acceptance of the peoples affected. One area in which Resolution 242 has generally come to be consi-

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dered lacking is in its treatment of the Palestinians, who are referred to in the Resolution only as refugees. The increasing emergence of a Palestinian national consciousness since 1967 has made it clear that the political future of the Palestinian people is an issue which must be directly addressed in negotiations. Indeed a solution of this issue is basic to the solution of the Middle East dispute as a whole, and thus to Israel's own well-being and security. Representatives of all Arab governments I met were categorical in asserting that there cannot be peace in the area until the rights of the Palestinians are recognized. The Camp David Accords reflect the importance of the Palestinian question. They state that the solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute evolving from the negotiations envisaged in the Accords must "recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements". I believe Canada should support the Palestinians' right to a homeland as well as their rights to be heard and participate in the determination of their own future. Successive Canadian governments have agreed to communiques to this effect at Commonwealth and NATO meetings. Canadian support for this position should be manifest. What form this homeland should take, its precise boundaries and whether it would constitute an independent state or a federated or other part of an existing state, is not for Canada to decide, but is for the Palestinians themselves and their neighbours, including Israel, to determine in negotiations. Mechanisms for Negotiations Several sets of negotiations between Israel and Arab states have taken place since Resolution 242 was adopted in 1967. Attempts were made beginning in 1969 with the American "Rogers Plan" to establish the foundation for a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and her neighbours, but talks were finally deadlocked in 1971. Following the 1973 war negotiations began for the purposes of concluding limited disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Syria. This "step by step" approach, aimed at achieving eventually a comprehensive peace through a series of limited settlements, also resulted in a second Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement in 1975 but no further partial accords were concluded. Attempts were then made to reconvene the multinational Geneva Conference as a full peace conference to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. These efforts were frustrated because of the inability of the parties to agree on questions of Palestinian representation. It took President Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem to initiate the process which resulted in the successful conclusion of the Camp David Accords in 1978 between Israel, Egypt and the United States. On this

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basis Israel and Egypt, in accordance with the principles of Resolution 242, have signed a peace treaty providing for full normalization of relations between them and for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula. The Accords also established a mechanism for negotiations aimed at resolving the Palestinian question on the basis of Resolution 242. The Camp David process has been opposed by most Arab governments. They see it as a bilateral arrangement only between Egypt and Israel which has complicated rather than assisted movement toward the goal of a comprehensive peace. In particular they assert that the Accords do not provide the basis for just settlement because they make no satisfactory provision for solving the Palestinian question. But the Accords do not pretend to do this. Instead they put in place a mechanism by which basic issues can be negotiated if the parties are willing to join in negotiations. While I believe the Arab governments whose representatives I met are quite genuine in their reservations about Camp David, general statements of position by these governments together with their hope that American influence will induce Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and recognize Palestinian rights are not a substitute for negotiations. Real talks around a table are surely the only means by which satisfactory territorial and other arrangements can be worked out. But if such talks are to be successful it is essential that the Palestinians be encouraged to join. To do this, they themselves must be given reason to believe that Camp David can give them a very substantial measure of control over their own affairs during the five year interim period established in the Accords, preparatory to the negotiation of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Actions which appear to prejudge the nature of an eventual settlement of the status of the West Bank and Gaza necessarily discourage Palestinians from involvement in the Camp David process. The establishment of Israeli settlements, Israeli exploitation of these territories' natural resources such as water, and the increasing integration of basic infrastructure with Israel generate suspicion among the Palestinians that the Government of Israel intends to effect practical integration of these territories with Israel itself and to preclude their return to Arab rule. Even the most moderate of Palestinians whom I met will not accept any solution giving Israel and its citizens this kind of control of the West Bank and Gaza. These two areas together constitute much less than the Palestinians have traditionally claimed. The willingness of many of them now to accept these diminished territories is in their eyes a considerable concession. I recognize that strongly held positions and attitudes have developed

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over the course of the long struggle between Arabs and Israelis. I do not wish to diminish their importance or the sincerity with which they are held. After the Jewish fate in the Holocaust, four wars in little over thirty years with their neighbours and frequent terrorist activity directed against them, the Israelis' concern about security is fully understandable. It is natural, too, that Arabs, including the Palestinians, should have vivid memories of their sufferings in those same four wars and in more recent Israeli military actions in Lebanon. Yet without a real willingness by both Arabs and Israelis to make serious compromises to attain peace, progress achieved to date through Camp David may well be jeopardized, and the potential for renewed conflict will be increased. While it is not for Canada to suggest how these compromises should be made, we do have, it seems to me, as a country whose objective is peace, some responsibility to stress to the parties that difficult decisions cannot be indefinitely postponed or abandoned. If in the coming months these decisions were not made and, as a consequence, the present negotiations were to fail, another mechanism to facilitate the search for peace would ultimately have to be developed. Although then, of necessity, this would take place in an atmosphere of renewed mistrust which Camp David's failure would have created. Negotiations and the Palestinians For negotiations to be successful an acceptable form of representation for the Palestinian people must be found. All Palestinians whom I met affirmed that the Palestine Liberation Organization was the only body which could speak for them. I was told categorically by Palestinians on the West Bank that their local leadership would not negotiate in any way without at least tacit concurrence of the PLO. This clearly constitutes a difficult problem. On the one hand, the Palestinians will be represented only in a manner they accept; on the other, Israeli concern about the PLO cannot be dismissed as irrelevant as some tend to do. Israeli refusal to agree to negotiations including the PLO may stem in part from fear that this could imply possible willingness to consider a principal goal of the PLO, the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza. This is a concept which Israeli governments have stated they are not prepared to accept. My discussions with Israelis convinced me, however, that their antipathy also springs from the bitter and brutal experience of terrorist activities which many have felt in their own lives; from the PLO's formally professed goal of establishing a secular state which would include Israel; and from what they see as the Organization's menacing ties with the Soviet bloc. The PLO's representative and its supporters with whom I spoke said

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that while the majority in the Organization are prepared to accept the State of Israel within its pre-1967 borders in the context of a settlement, the PLO could not unilaterally renounce its traditional objective of a secular state including Israel without any quid pro quo. The PLO argues that if it were to agree to recognize Israel without at the same time achieving recognition itself by Israel its bargaining power, as by far the weaker party, would be even further diminished. The shift in views within the PLO away from earlier total rejection of Israel is an encouraging development, but it is of comparatively recent vintage, and hardline groups within that organization continue to reject moderation. A much more definitive change in attitude is needed. In addressing these issues the question of Canada's attitude toward the PLO must be considered. In doing so I have borne in mind on the one hand, the PLO's important leadership role among Palestinians and on the other its still ambiguous attitude towards Israel and its involvement in terrorism. In my view Canada should broaden contacts with the PLO on issues affecting negotiations and the peace process, with a view to encouraging that Organization towards greater moderation and realism and towards open acceptance of the legitimacy of the State of Israel. This will require frank communication and discussion. To play such a role there is no requirement that Canada formally recognize the PLO's claim to be "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians." Increasingly, however, the PLO has emerged not only in the perception of the Arab states but in much of the rest of the world as the only spokesman for the Palestinian people which enjoys the support of a large and significant body of Palestinian opinion. We should also bear in mind that while the PLO has had long and close relations with the Soviets its avenues to dialogue with the West have been traditionally quite limited. More recently when openings to the Western European countries have been possible the PLO has not hesitated to respond. There is no doubt that this is in part because such contacts enhance the PLO's own international standing. At the same time the value of communication with the West as an influence toward moderation cannot be dismissed. Discussions with the PLO should in no way affect a firm stand by Canada against any terrorist activities perpetrated by armed sub-groups of that organization. Such activities cannot be condoned and should be condemned. Canada should urge the termination of these activities, pointing out that they do nothing to facilitate the return to Arab rule of Palestinian territory, which is the stated goal of such action. Rather they reinforce the suspicions of many Israelis that the PLO is a body which cannot be trusted to respect a peace settlement with Israel and therefore

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cannot be an acceptable representative of the Palestinians in negotiations. Such activities tend to create a cycle of violence and counter violence in the area, making it still more difficult for negotiations to take place in an atmosphere free from rancour. The Effect on Lebanon Israeli actions in South Lebanon either in response to armed Palestinian actions or as pre-emptive strikes against targets in that country also contribute to the cycle of violence. Evidence indicates they cause numerous civilian casualties and thus build up further resentment among the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as well as among the Lebanese themselves. The Lebanese leaders whom I met were emphatic that the damage inflicted on their country by these actions was out of all proportion to any terrorist activities emanating from Lebanon. I recognize that recently there has been a considerable decline in both PLO and Israeli activities and this is to be welcomed. But if the situation were to deteriorate again we should clearly express our disapproval of the responsible party, whoever that might be. To assist Lebanon where we can we should continue to give our full support to international efforts, including the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, to return South Lebanon to the authority and control of the Lebanese government. The continuing activity of armed Palestinian groups and of the Israeli supported militias fosters a continuation of uncertainty and tension. So also does the reported arrival of contingents from Iran. We should remain ready to associate ourselves with constructive international efforts to help restore that country's territorial integrity and release its citizens from the hardship and suffering of recent years. Jerusalem I have not yet commented in this document on the question of Jerusalem. In my interim report I recommended that our Embassy in Israel remain in Tel Aviv pending the resolution of Jerusalem's status as part of a just and lasting comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbours. Once this is achieved, I said, the Embassy question could be reviewed in light of the provisions made in such a settlement. I now wish to make some comments on the future of Jerusalem in terms of my broader mandate. In brief, it is my view that the future of the City should be resolved by agreement in the course of a negotiated comprehensive peace settlement. I do not believe the future of Jerusalem can be separated from the Arab-Israeli dispute or from Jerusalem's own unique religious status. The City has particular features distinct from the other disputed

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territories occupied in 1967. It is an emotional and political symbol to Israelis, Palestinians and other Arabs. It has intense religious and historical significance to Jews, Muslims and Christians. This has led Israelis to claim the City in its entirety as their capital, Arabs (Muslim and Christian) to insist with strong feeling that East (Arab) Jerusalem must be returned to Arab rule, and important Christian bodies to call for an international presence. It was in reaction to such deeply held views that the United Nations General Assembly included in its Palestine Partition Plan of 1947, which was the basis for the creation of the State of Israel, provisions for the internationalization of the City as a whole. While this concept of a corpus separatum under the United Nations would no longer seem to be realistic, as it is opposed by both Iraelis and Arabs, the purposes it was designed to serve are still important. I believe that the religious dimension of the City as a centre of the three great monotheistic religions must be fully considered when Jerusalem's future is discussed in negotiations. Canada should support efforts to this end. In doing so we must bear in mind that between 1948 and 1967 when the West Bank was under Arab rule Israelis were denied access to their sacred shrines in East Jerusalem. Since then, in marked contrast and to their credit, the Israeli authorities have sought to be scrupulously fair in permitting access to the Christian and Muslim Holy Places. Nevertheless, while the present situation appears to meet the concerns of the Jewish religious authorities, this is not the case for all Christians and Muslims. No Muslims I met would accept the status quo in Jerusalem as a satisfactory alternative to a return to Arab sovereignty of their shrines. The importance of the City to Islam as its third holiest site after Mecca and Medina was stressed to me throughout my travels in Arab countries. Concern also was expressed by Christians I met that the law which guarantees free access to the Holy Places is limited to a simple act of the Israeli Knesset which could be altered by a simple majority of that parliament if there should be in future the political will in Israel to do so. They also expressed concern that urban development and demographic changes in East Jerusalem since 1967 are fundamentally altering the City which in their view should be a living centre for all three faiths and their religious communities. The authorities at the Holy See reiterated to me the position taken by the Pope at the United Nations in 1979 that a special statute providing for international guarantees be established to assure that the unique religious character of the City is maintained. Although the status of Jerusalem may be one of the most difficult problems to resolve in the Arab-Israeli conflict, I am confident that if sufficient will exists on all sides to solve the other sensitive and complex

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issues in dispute, agreement can also be reached on the City's future. I therefore recommend that pending a comprehensive solution to the dispute Canada should continue its traditional policy of non-recognition of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and its suburbs, in accordance with United Nations Resolution 242 and other UN resolutions which we, as a country, supported following the Israeli annexation in 1967. Material Assistance Our most visible efforts towards alleviating the hardships inflicted by the Arab-Israeli conflict and towards reducing tensions between parties to the dispute have been through our contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and through United Nations peacekeeping. Beginning with Canadian participation in the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in 1948 Canada has since been continuously involved in UN peacekeeping activities. Members of our armed forces have served weary months and years in inhospitable conditions, seeking to ensure the respect of armistice and disengagement agreements between Israel and her neighbours. This is a role in which Canadians have developed expertise and which is appreciated by the countries of the area. It is a responsibility we should continue to assume when we believe that peacekeeping can be helpful in preventing the outbreak of hostilities, reducing tensions or establishing an environment on the ground conducive to dialogue between the countries in dispute. Since its establishment in 1950 Canada has also given generous financial support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in its effort. UNRWA now assists over 600,000 refugees in camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israeli occupied territories by providing them education, training and health services as well as basic food rations. We have traditionally been one of UNRWA's largest contributors. During my visit to Jordan I was able to tour a major refugee camp and discuss the Agency's activities with its officials there. There is no doubt in my mind that UNRWA has played an essential role in alleviating the hardship of the Palestinian refugees and providing them with educational opportunities which have enabled them both to sustain themselves better and to make a significant contribution to the development of many of the Arab states. I believe Canada should continue its contributions to UNRWA, whose activities are also an important reminder to the Palestinians that the international community has accepted a responsibility for the refugees of 1948 and 1967. If a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute can be achieved in the Middle East which would require the support of the international

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community, I believe that Canada, within the limits of its resources and capabilities, should be ready to play its part in assisting in the implementation of such a peace. This would be a logical and consistent role for our country to play, given our traditional concern for the area, dating back more than 30 years, and our interest in seeing a dispute which has caused so much hardship and disruption resolved to the benefit of all. Such Canadian assistance could, for example, take the form of participation in some kind of peacekeeping presence or international economic effort if either of these were to be an element in a settlement. Canada's Position In my view, to play a useful role in the Middle East and exercise what influence we can, commensurate with our resources, we must have the respect of the governments and peoples of the region. To encourage moderation and conciliation we must be regarded as fair-minded by the parties. This means primarily that positions we take should have as their objective the goals of justice and reconciliation. It also means, however, that we must be prepared to express our disapproval when actions are taken by one or other of the parties which we believe are counterproductive to the peace process. This will mean communicating our views through diplomatic channels when we believe this will be useful. It will mean speaking out sometimes clearly in public. It also will mean our adopting an equally forthright approach at the United Nations on issues dealing with the Middle East. To this end we should discourage UN resolutions which seek to condemn unfairly one party involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute or which demand of one of the parties immediate action which it could not reasonably be expected to undertake unilaterally without any provision for a comprehensive peace settlement. Such resolutions are particularly counterproductive because in practice Israel alone is cited in them. Canada also should discourage the introduction of politically motivated resolutions in the UN specialized agencies and should oppose vigorously attempts to suspend or expel Israel from these international bodies. Such attempts heighten tensions and create barriers to communication. They create an impression among Israelis that they cannot rely on the international community for any degree of understanding of their situation. At the same time if we are to have respect we must avoid total identification with one party when there is also a case on the other side of the question. When resolutions arise at the UN we should judge the issues they address on their merits. If they criticize one party for specific actions, and these are criticisms with which we concur, we should

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support them. When we are not satisfied with certain aspects of particular resolutions but favour other parts we should consider abstaining on votes, as otherwise we will be perceived as rejecting totally viewpoints which we do not in fact reject. In contrast to Canadian parliamentary practice abstention is a definite voting position in the UN, most frequently reflecting support for some elements of a resolution and opposition to others. Our credibility requires such an approach. Without credibility any contribution we are able to make toward peace will be severely diminished. Conclusions on the Peace Process In discussing the Arab-Israeli dispute and the contribution Canada might make to assist in its resolution, I have stressed that goals of mutual understanding and compromise can only be achieved through goodwill, moderation and the willingness to make difficult compromises. The history of the Middle East in this century has shown that these goals are not easily obtainable because convictions are deeply held and emotions run high. However, the change in Arab attitudes toward Israel in the past decade and the more recent transformation of relations between Israel and Egypt demonstrate that very real progress can be made. Even a comprehensive peace between Israel and her Arab neighbours will not result in perfect stability in that region. Internal stresses and strains will continue in various countries, as will regional rivalries and global pressures on energy resources. But an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute would do much to release the considerable human and economic resources of the peoples involved. It would permit them to concentrate their energies on the growth and prosperity of their region. It is the responsibility of friendly governments such as Canada to influence the parties to the dispute to take initiatives for peace. Such a role may seem at times unrewarding and frustrating when results are not immediately forthcoming but I am convinced that the desire for peace exists among the peoples of the region. It is the responsibility of countries like Canada to help them achieve it. Reciprocal Relations The Arab Boycott of Israel In any discussion of Canadian relations with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa the implications of the Arab economic boycott of Israel must be considered. The boycott has been practised in varying degrees by Arab governments for over thirty years but it did not receive wide international attention until the dramatic increase in oil prices in 1973 — 74 made certain Arab countries a major market for Western exports.

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While practices are far from standard as between one country and another, there are generally three levels in the Arab boycott: primary, secondary and tertiary. The primary boycott prohibits importing Israeli products into Arab countries and exporting Arab products to Israel. This kind of boycott, akin to a trade embargo, has parallels elsewhere in the world. The secondary boycott is directed against firms, in Canada or elsewhere, which are considered by the boycotting authorities to be helping Israel in various loosely defined ways. Such a firm may be blacklisted and thereby prevented from doing business in those Arab countries which observe the boycott. The tertiary boycott is designed to increase the adverse consequences of being blacklisted and of aiding Israel. It may involve, for example, an undertaking not to deal with blacklisted firms in one's own country or others as a condition of doing business in an Arab country. Arab governments insist that the boycott is not racist; and that it is directed, not against Jews, but against a country, Israel, with which they have been in a state of war for some 30 years. They assert that the boycott is a legitimate economic means of putting pressure upon Israel to recognize Palestinian rights and withdraw from occupied territories. Some forms of the boycott, in particular aspects of the tertiary boycott, have been strongly criticized in both North America and Western Europe, especially in recent years, on the grounds that they impose unacceptable restrictions on the freedom of businesses to deal with those whom they wish, and on the ground that they constitute racial and religious discrimination. Of the OECD countries, which include the major trading countries of the western world and Japan, only the United States has adopted legislation restricting compliance with boycotts. This legislation provides sanctions including fines and imprisonment for compliance with a range of defined foreign boycott practices. While France has legislation which might appear to restrict compliance with boycotts, in practice French firms are permitted to accept clauses if they so choose. Restrictions on complying with the boycott have been discussed elsewhere in Western Europe, but none has been adopted by any government there. In Britain the government has said it deplores all boycotts that lack international support and authority but believes that it is for each individual firm to decide in the light of its own commercial interest what its attitude would be. In 1978 a Committee of the House of Lords conducted hearings on an anti-boycott bill and recommended it should not proceed. In 1976 Canada introduced guidelines on compliance with boycotts. The policy denies federal government services in aid of any transaction in which unacceptable boycott clauses are included. The assumption behind

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this policy was that it would be an effective deterrent because it imposes very serious handicaps on Canadian firms in a difficult and unfamiliar environment. Unacceptable boycott clauses under the guidelines include any which involve discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin or religion, or require an undertaking not to deal with another firm or any country. The policy also requires periodic public reports by the Government regarding breaches of the guidelines. This policy has been criticized by some Canadians as inadequate and the Government has been urged by them to sponsor legislation in its place. A bill was introduced into Parliament in 1978 but was not proceeded with. This bill would have made it mandatory for firms to report to the government any boycott request of a sort prescribed by the bill and any compliance with such a request. It would also have required publication of instances of such compliance. The government has also been urged to sponsor legislation making compliance with prescribed boycott requests not only reportable, but illegal, as the United States has done. On the other hand, some Canadians argue that anti-boycott legislation would be against the best interests of Canada. These Canadians assert that Arab governments might well close their markets to Canadian exports, or conceivably even cut off oil sales to Canada. They insist that the United States, which has passed legislation, has a different political and strategic relationship with the area than does Canada, and that leading American firms are so large and have such unique technological capabilities that the boycott is not seriously applied against them. In contrast they say that Canada supplies little to the region that could not conveniently be obtained elsewhere. They also argue that the current policy is largely effective in inhibiting unacceptable compliance with the boycott by Canadian firms. A number of Arab governments have asserted emphatically that they would regard legislation against the boycott by Canada as a specifically "anti-Arab" and "pro-Israeli" political initiative directed against their basic interests and their right to use economic sanctions against a country with which they are in a state of war. They have said it would seriously affect economic, financial and commercial relations with Canada. The administrative guidelines adopted by Canada in 1976 do not appear to evoke strong reaction from Arab governments, perhaps because this administrative approach seems to them less formally and symbolically hostile than would legislation by the Canadian Parliament. I have the impression, too, that legislation against boycotts by a province is not regarded by Arab governments as representing a political act of foreign policy, as would legislation by the Canadian parliament.

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Proponents of anti-boycott legislation in Canada may assert that Arab governments are bluffing, but I must report the position those governments have taken. I could not conscientiously say that boycott legislation by the Canadian Parliament would not involve substantial economic risks for Canada in terms of reduced exports to important markets and perhaps also reduced oil supplies. This is so whether we can call it Arab blackmail or Arab reaction to a Canadian political measure that Arabs consider to be hostile to them. If, however, boycott compliance by Canadian firms violates fundamental Canadian principles we should be prepared to prohibit such violations and suffer the consequence. There are two levels of concern about the boycott. Some boycott requirements are contrary to Canadian concepts of desirable business conduct because they involve Canadian firms accepting restrictions on dealing with other firms. Such restrictions are considered commercially undesirable and contrary to sound commercial practice. In addition, however, the charge is made that boycott requirements involve racial or religious discrimination. Such a charge raises a question of fundamental human rights: a concern therefore of a much higher and different order than a restriction on trade. I do not suggest that measures to prevent trade restrictions are unimportant, but they are utilitarian rather than moral in nature. The degree of their application in any given circumstances involves a question of judgement as to what produces the best results for the Canadian economy. If the boycotts raise only a question of commercial policy and no higher moral considerations the government would seem entitled to pursue policies considered to be in the best economic interest of Canada. It has been suggested, however, that the current guideline policy is inherently discriminatory because it favours Canadian companies that are able to forego government assistance and accept prohibited boycott clauses to obtain contracts. To suggest that the policy is inherently discriminatory even if strictly implemented seems to me, however, to ignore the very real costs involved in foregoing the government's services in that region of the world. A withdrawal of government services usually creates great difficulty and always creates a considerable risk even for the most substantial of firms. The fact that trading restrictions which would be imposed on Canadian firms by the acceptance of boycott clauses, are the result of demands made by foreign countries does not appear to elevate the principle involved insofar as commercial policy is concerned. Foreign countries are not telling Canadian firms they cannot do certain kinds of business, as the United States has sometimes done in the case of Canadian

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subsidiaries of American firms. Rather, Arab countries are telling Canadian firms that they cannot do certain kinds of business (or must undertake not to) if they wish to do business with them. This is a form of pressure we do not like, but it is not the imposition of foreign law within Canada. Racial or religious discrimination, however, goes beyond questions of commercial policy and involves a moral principle of the highest order. Proponents of legislation against boycotts assert that boycott requirements are sometimes openly anti-Jewish in form and inherently antiJewish in practice. I hasten to say that I have not been in a position to make a thorough inquiry. I have no authority to examine company records. But I have questioned Canadians doing business in Arab countries and they have told me they have not been asked to boycott others on grounds of race or religion. The officials of the federal government who have been administering compliance with its boycott guidelines since 1976 state that they have not seen any boycott requirements which on their face seem to involve racial or religious discrimination. Those officials have, however, not seen boycott requirements made of Canadian firms that do not use the services of the federal government. I have asked proponents of boycott legislation for examples of Arab boycott requirements involving racial or religious discrimination and have been told that the application of the boycott has become more sophisticated and subtle and that overt discrimination is now rare. Statements from Herzl onward indicate that Zionism is a political belief not a religion. But it has been suggested that discrimination against Zionists exists and that it is de facto racist because the greatest preponderance of Jews are Zionists; that Zionist is a code word for Jew. Such generalizations are open to wide argument. One can be anti-Zionist without being anti-Jewish. Some Jews are in fact anti-Zionist and some Zionists are not Jews. The boycott authorities in Arab states insist that the boycott does not discriminate among persons on the basis of their religion. Whether the Arab boycott is anti-Jewish in purpose could be proven only by Arab admission or by an Arab country conducting its boycott policy in a manner clearly indicating such is the case. I believe it would not be appropriate for the government of Canada to base a finding of racism or religious discrimination on anything but clear and unambiguous evidence. Belief or gut feeling that Zionist is a code word for Jew is an insufficient basis to take measures which stigmatize the Arab world as racist. Actual proof of racism in the administration of the boycott would be something very different, something which Canadians would not wish to accept regardless of consequences. I should point out however that the Canadian Human Rights Act as it now stands prohibits discrimination in

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only a limited range of commercial transactions: the provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation customarily available to the general public. The Act does not ban discrimination in the buying or acquisition even of items customarily available to the general public. It does not prohibit discrimination against corporations. In sum, the Act does not encompass commercial transactions generally. The question for the Parliament of Canada is not therefore whether or not commercial transactions should be banned when there is a discriminatory boycott but whether or not commercial transactions in general within the federal jurisdiction should be banned when there is discrimination on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex or marital status. It would be regarded as discriminatory to require a higher standard of conduct on commercial transactions involving foreign countries than in other commercial transactions within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada. Even as the Act now stands the government could request the Canadian Human Rights Commission to initiate an investigation of possible racial or religious discrimination by Canadian firms in complying with foreign boycotts although the government may wish to review the Act before considering such an investigation. In addition to the question of racial and religious discrimination there is the question of discrimination on grounds of political belief, namely Zionism. I have seen statements made by authorities administering the Arab boycott which are not clear but which suggest that the boycott may discriminate against those who believe in Zionism whether or not they engage in specific activities in support of Israel. There is a clear difference between discrimination against a person simply because of his political belief and discrimination against a person because he is actively supporting Israel, which is the claimed purpose of the Arab boycott. The Canadian Human Rights Act, however, does not prohibit discrimination based on political belief, although some Canadian provinces do. The question to be asked at present therefore is not whether Canadians should be prohibited from discriminating on grounds of political belief in accepting boycott clauses, but whether Canadians should be prohibited from discriminating on grounds of political belief in commercial transactions generally. If Parliament were to take such action the question of whether Canadian firms were accepting boycott clauses involving discrimination on this ground would then be within the jurisdiction of the Canadian Human Rights Commission. Bilateral Relations After concluding my visits to the Middle East and North Africa I am convinced that bilateral relations between Canada and the countries of these areas can be broadened substantially. As I have mentioned earlier,

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both in Israel and in the Arab countries a desire for greater friendship with Canada was expressed frequently, as was an appreciation of our technological and managerial abilities. Our francophone associations are also valuable throughout the region, but especially so in North Africa. I have stated this positive view on the future of our bilateral relations on the assumption that the problems concerning the Arab boycott will be resolved in such a manner as to sustain a favourable climate in which to pursue such relations. I am not adopting this approach because I have taken answers to the boycott question for granted. Indeed, I have emphasized earlier when discussing the boycott that if questions of moral principle are involved Canadians would wish to take a strong stand despite any economic risk. Rather I am adopting this assumption of continuing friendship with the Arab states because it is only on such an assumption that a discussion of broadening bilateral relations with them has relevance. In discussing our bilateral relations it has not been my intention to supplant studies on export promotions, cultural relations and the like which have been or may be undertaken as part of global reviews of particular Canadian activities abroad. Rather I have attempted to suggest ways of strengthening our ties with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, recognizing that the implementation of my recommendations in the area would not take place in isolation from the formulation and development of Canada's general policies abroad. Trade between Canada and the Middle East and North Africa has grown rapidly in recent years. In view of increasing wealth and development in that region based on oil and gas it offers good prospects for further growth. Widespread Canadian interest in doing business in these countries is for the most part relatively recent, but even at present the area represents the fifth largest market for our exports. In percentage terms the region has been our highest growth area for exports during the past decade. In the first ten months of 1979 our merchandise exports alone totalled over $850 million. In addition during the same period Canadian corporations were involved in service contracts valued at over $400 million. Already a significant number of Canadian firms, aided by the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, are active in market development in the region. Most of this effort is in sophisticated manufactured products and services, the export of which is of special significance to the Canadian economy. Many Middle Eastern and North African countries have launched a concerted program of infrastructure development. There is, as a result, good export potential for Canadian managerial, design and engineering skills. The important Israeli market differs from those in Arab countries.

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Unlike other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, where there are opportunities for sales of a broad range of Canadian goods and services in the areas of infrastructure and high technology, Israel is highly developed economically with a well-educated population and a considerable level of indigenous technological capacity. While opportunities do exist in infrastructure development most markets open to Canada in Israel are oriented to the sale of grains and items required in production such as machinery and minerals. The Israeli market, however, offers the advantage of being relatively easy for Canadian firms to operate in if they are competitive in price and quality. Israel has an open market system and longstanding ties exist between the peoples of our two countries. As a result our trade with Israel traditionally has been generated largely within the private sector of the economy. Nevertheless, governments of Canada and Israel have facilitated and fostered commercial contacts and in 1976 a Joint Economic Committee was established to develop further trade ties. In 1978 our two-way trade with Israel totalled about $122 million and in the first 11 months of 1979 this had risen to over $150 million. This trade is important for both Canada and Israel and should be fostered within Canada by continued government encouragement. As to the markets in Arab countries, some economic sectors offer opportunities which were particularly stressed to me during my discussions. In the energy field we have important interests. The Middle East will probably continue to be a significant source of our foreign oil imports until we attain energy self-sufficiency. In a world short of energy in which we will be competing for essential supplies, adequate access to energy in the Middle East is not something which can be taken for granted by a government discharging its responsibility to its people. The emphasis in our relationship in the area of energy should not, however, be one of dependence. Our technical and managerial competence in the exploration and development of oil and gas in related industries is widely recognized. There is opportunity for further technological exchanges and mutual cooperation in energy development in the Middle East and North Africa. Canadian firms are already active in some countries there, but the future possibilities and the opportunities for cooperation on the government-to-government and on the private level were stressed to me in a number of countries. Canadian agricultural expertise is also recognized throughout the region. Virtually all countries in the Arab world face serious difficulties in food production. Shortage of water is frequently an acute problem and consequently improved systems of dry-land farming are of great importance. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is already involved in the search for improved techniques and the Canadian

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International Development Agency (CIDA) is assisting in the application of existing techniques. Some countries which have good land and adequate water appear nevertheless to have serious production problems. Arab countries are virtually all importers of grain. Pressure to improve production will increase because of rapid population growth resulting from high birth rates and improved health services. There would seem to be both a growing market for our grain and a need for Canadian agricultural skills. In addition to being an important market for Canadian skills and products the region is an important source of capital. Arab wealth can aid Canadian development necessary for employment. Some Arab countries have accumulated large sums of investment. Some already have large sums deposited in Canadian banks and invested in Canadian securities. The indications are that we will need access to vast amounts of capital to carry out projects contemplated in our own country in this decade. A source of funds for Canada in addition to our traditional sources is presumably important for us and might be further developed. Peoples of the Middle East and North Africa wish not only to benefit from our skills, but also to acquire those skills themselves. This sometimes involves establishing vocational and technical schools within the country with the help of outside expertise. Sometimes it involves students going abroad to study. Canadians can help meet both needs. We have a broad experience in planning and developing schools and this is increasingly recognized in the region. For students seeking training abroad our universities and institutes of technology are respected. It is my impression that a number of countries in the region would like to send more students to Canadian institutions at their own expense. In expanding our effort here we could help countries acquire trained manpower required for their development and modernization. We also could impart to these students, many of whom will in future hold responsible positions in their country, an awareness of Canada and things Canadian which over the years could strengthen our bilateral relations with the regions. Such a program for foreign students cannot be undertaken by the federal government alone. It must rather be a joint effort supported by the provinces, who have responsibility for education. I have discussed such a program with a number of provincial ministers. All agreed that it could well be beneficial to Canada as well as useful to the students and countries concerned. At the same time they stressed the necessity of full provincial participation in the planning and operating of such a program to avoid serious embarrassments, such as an effort to place more foreign students in faculties like medicine which do not now have the capacity to accept all high quality Canadian applicants. I understand that federal and

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provincial officials are currently developing a policy for cooperation on what programs could be undertaken and methods of implementation. To foster and enhance economic and technological links with the region we must put our minds to it and develop a comprehensive strategy. We are competing with other OECD countries which are aggressive and experienced and anxious to earn foreign exchange to pay for the oil they must import. The financing terms we are offering the less affluent countries of the area should be studied to determine whether changes in our practices could enable us to compete successfully. Of basic importance, however, is the recognition that in Arab countries generally the role of government in the economy is more extensive than in Canada and that Arabs like to meet and know the people they are dealing with. We need frequent visits by ministers and officials of our government and a greater exchange of well prepared trade missions. These efforts must be underpinned by the ongoing work of our Embassies in the region. Our approach must be more systematic than it has been in the past. We have already established joint economic committees with Israel, Saudi Arabia and Algeria. I believe the government could usefully investigate whether the use of this and other consultative mechanisms could be extended to other countries. This, however, would not be a substitute for frequent personal contact at high levels. In addition to strictly commercial activities Canadians have traditionally had concerns for countries less materially fortunate than themselves. We could consider, as resources permit, some expansion in our development assistance programmes in the Middle East and North Africa. In doing so we must define Canada's role in the continuing economic development of countries whose recent economic growth has moved them from the low to middle income category but who still require development assistance from the industrialized countries. Our role, however, should not be related strictly to the amount of money we can contribute directly but also to the technical and managerial skills we can make available in the area. The Middle East has a number of well-financed aid agencies which may for the time being be short of technical expertise that Canadians have. The possibility of expanding co-operation between Canada and these aid agencies could usefully be examined. We could thus expand the scope and usefulness of our development efforts in the region considerably beyond what would be possible from our own financial resources alone. In most of the region, there is little information and cultural exchange with Canada. While we already have a vigorous flow of talent and resources between Israel and Canada this is in large part the result of the close affinity between our two peoples. As a consequence activities have

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not required a high degree of direct government involvement. However, I believe the government should continue to encourage these rich interchanges with Israel. Our involvement in the Arab countries has been much less extensive in information and cultural exchanges but I am convinced the opportunity exists there to foster better knowledge and understanding. In a number of countries and especially in North Africa our French-speaking heritage and our links with other parts of the francophone world constitute an important asset. As to the region as a whole, better mutual knowledge of the region and of Canada can help to reduce the misunderstandings that come from vague and perhaps distorted impressions. But if we are to undertake cultural and information programs successfully we must have sufficient funds available to continue such activities over a period of years. Spasmodic efforts are a waste of money and effort. A continued effort is essential if such programs are to have any lasting influence. Canada can benefit from enhanced economic, cultural and other relations with the entire region. This requires resourcefulness from ministers, parliamentarians, businessmen and government officials and others who have an interest in an expanding relationship. Our efforts should include a more systematic program of visits—both ways—of government ministers and officials, academics and journalists, as well as businessmen. Such efforts must also include continuing day to day efforts by our Embassies in the area so that Canada is well known in the region and so that mutual problems can be discussed and the potential for enhanced co-operation be developed. Without such work a program of visits is unlikely to be effective in sustaining a growing relationship. In this context Canadian diplomatic representation in the region could usefully be strengthened as finances permit. I was well served by our embassies throughout my visits, but I was able to see that their resources are sometimes thinly stretched when a single embassy is responsible for representing Canada in two or more countries. Broad and systematic contact must be maintained between the Governments and peoples of the region and of Canada if we are to pursue our commercial interests, develop closer relations in areas of cultural understanding and technological and development assistance, and contribute fully to the resolution of disputes and conflicts: our most basic interest in the region. Robert L. Stanfield 20 February 1980