An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology

AN I NTR OD UCTI ON T O BU DDH I ST PSYCHOLOGY

An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology Padmasiri de Silva Forewo rd by J ohn Hick

© M . W. Padmasiri de Silva

J 979

All rights reserved . No part of this publicati on ma y bt= reproduced or tra nsmitted , in an y form or by an y means, without permission

First published 1979 by T HE MACMI LLAN PR ESS LTD London and Basingstoke Published in the U.SA. 1979 by HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS, INC. BARNES & NOBLE IMPORT DiVISION

Printed in Great Britain

Library

or~. CataloPai

ill Pv..blicatioa Data

W Padm asiri , 1 933~ r. An introdu ction to Buddhi st psych ology.

De Silva, M

(Library of philosoph y a nd religion) Bibliograph y: P: Includ es ind ex. 1 . Buddhism-Psych ology. I. Title.

BQ457o.P76D47 ISBN 0-06- 49,666- 9

294·3'4'2

T O T HOSE WHO LIKE ' the simple things in life'

Contents FOREWORD BYJ O HN HICK PREFACE 1

BASI C FEATURES OF BUDDH IST PSYCHOLOGY

2

TH E PSYCHOLOGY OF COG NITION

21

3 MOTIVATION A. DE MOT IONS

35

4 PERSO NALITY

80

5 BUDDH IST PSYCHOLOGY AND T HE WEST , AN ENCO UNTE R BEnVEEN THERAPEUTIC SYSTEMS

99

./fOTES

' 23

BIBLlOGRAPHr

' 3'

I/I DEX

' 33

...il

Foreword Buddhism is th e most psycho logically interes ted of th e great wor ld religions. For when , some twent y-five cent uries ago, Ootarna the Buddha experi enced the ultimate liberation which is niroaM and beca me one of mankind 's supreme teac hers, he did not point upwards or outwa rds to God or gods but inwards to the intricate dynamics of our mental and spiri tual life. For Bud dhi sm ' the p rop er stud y of mankind is man' : it is throug h corning to rea lise what we are and -eq ually importantly -wha t we are not, that we may eventua lly a ttain to that which the east calls liberation and the west aalva tion . T hro ug h its founder's teac hing, treasured and a mp lified. by generations of his followers, Budd hism has developed the extrao rdinarily astute and penetra ting ana lysis of hu man na ture and the hum a n cond ition on which its guidance towards liberation is based . Its central no-soul (anollo) doctri ne, accord ing to which a huma n self is nor an enduring psychic entity or substance but a karmic process, a pa tterned flow of change through time, rema ins one of the great options for thought, a nd one which we dare not write off. Agai n, we cannot ignore the Buddhi st account of the 'gras ping' or incessant desiring .....hich keeps the ind ividual ka rmic process going, not only through a lifetime but , according to the Buddha's teaching, through a long succession of lives. l n additi on to this, the Buddhi st tradition has importa nt thin gs to say about the wa ys in which we perceive our world ; about our emotional and volitiona l lire; about our sexuality, our social na ture , and our agg ressiveness; a bc ur the thin facad e of the surface personality; and a bout the very important ethi cal impli cations of this Buddhist und erstanding of man . These topics a re ofcourse discussed - some more extensively than others - in the litera tu re on Buddhism. But it is surp rising that there has been no book in English covering the field of Buddhi st psychology as such since the early wor k of M rs C. A. F . Rhys Davids, Buddhist PsyclwllJO (London, 19 14) . There is thus a gap in the available literature at this point, a gap which Dr de Silva has i.

x

Foreword

filled in the p resent boo k.T his will not be th e las t word on Budd hist psychology; but it opens the subject up aga in, an d in doing so it pro vides a much-needed poin t ofentry for the st ud ent of Bud d hism . Dr Pad masiri de Silva is the Head of the Department of Philosophy a t the Pered eniya ca mpus, near K a nd y, of the Universi ty of Sr i Lanka (Ceylon ). He is himself a Buddhist, tho rough ly versed in the Pali literat ure, as well as ha ving stud ied the various western schoolso f psychology . H e is the a uthor of a stud y of Buddhist and Freudian Psycho/OD (Colom bo, 1973), a nd of T angles and W ebs:

Comparative studies in Exutouiaiism, Ps)'dWDJla{ysis and Buddhism (K an d y, 1974). He sta nds withi n the T heravada tradition, which claims ( 0 represent o rigina l Buddhism in its d istinction from the M ahayana movem ent which started to develop at abou t th e beg inn ing of the C h ristia n era and which eleva ted the figu re of the Budd ha h imself from a grea t human teacher to th e level of cosmic sa viou r . Dr d e Silva bases his d iscussion o n th e Pali script ures of rbe Thera vada tradition rather tha n th e Sanscrit lit erature of the M ah ayan a; a nd so we find in his pages, for exa mp le, th e word nibbana, which is the Pal i equival ent of the (to most of us in the west] more fami liar Sa nscrit term nirvana. O r d e Silva 's boo k will be a valuable resource for the co mpara tive stu d y of religion , a nd in particu lar t he study of Bud d hism , in both west a nd eas t.

Preface T he d isco urses of th e Buddha provid e apparentl y simp le but in fact sophisticated a nd sti mulatin g d iscussions rela ting to di verse facets of man 's life: his codes of personal cond uct, th e id ea l of the virt uous life. the nature of man a nd th e universe , the riddle orJife a nd death, th e nature of huma n reaso ning a nd sensory experie nce, and man 's Karch for wisdom , knowledge and t ru th . Above a ll, th e d iscourses d elve into a yet more fascin ating sp here of th e huma n mi nd - t he underworld of man 's su bmerged and co nflicti ng d esires, the na ture of his emotions a nd th e paths of human personality develo pment, and it is upon this group of issues ce ntring on the psycho logy of 8uddhism that this book focuses . For over len years I have made stud ies of diverse aspects of the psychology of Bud dhism . I t was at the invita tion of Pro fessor J oh n Hick, the Ed itor of this series , th a t some attem pt was mad e to put together a ll the materi al co llected over th e yea rs and weld th em to mor e recen t find in gs. The presen t work is thus co nce rn ed with th e Iyste matisa tio n and interpretation of th e psychological questions raised wit hin the d iscou rses of the Budd ha. Am ong serious stud en ts of Bud dhism psychology is a badly neg lected field , and I ho pe th is ventu re will stim ula te a greater degree of in terest in th e psycho logica l fou ndations of Bud d hism . Amo ng the more clinical ly orien ted psycho logists and psychia tris ts in th e west, th ere is a growing interest in wha t ma y be ca lled 'As.ia n peycbciogy'. It would be necessary to br eak throug h the m ist y at mosp here t hat surrou nds thi s term , and presen t in pr osaic terms, and if possible in a mod ern id iom , some spec ific schools of tradi tion al psycho logica l enq uiry . T h us th is boo k is addressed to both th e stud en t of Buddhism and t he studen t of psych ology int erested in Asian th ought. I ant gra tefu l to all th ose who assisted m e by valua blc.d iscussi0r:'. 1 owe a spec ia l debt of gra ti tude to th e Venerable Nyanaponi ka M ah a T hera, who wem rhrou g h th e fi rst draft and mad e important suggesdons. J am also grat efu l to my friend s M r P . D . Premasir i and Mr G . Sam araram c for their comment s.

Preface When Dr J err y D , Boucher ofthe East-West Cent er invited me to pa rticipate in the collaborativ e research project on emotion and culture, a fresh breeze of life invigorated my attempt to work out a Buddhist theory of emotions. While I ha ve writt en here a fairly long account of Buddhist thinking in tha t area, the unexpected encounter with the work ofJ erry Boucher has alread y provided me with a challenging base for future research . I a m gra teful to him for ha ving opened out these exciting horizons for me. Finally, this work would never have reached happy comple tion bu t for the warm encouragemen t I received from my wife. Kal yani . But she has done more - she has given sha pe and substance to those 'simple things in life' which feature on th e dedication page of this volume. xu

University of Sri /....a.nka &pumhn 1977

P A DM A SJR I DE SI L VA

1

Basic Features of Buddhist Psychology

Though the d iscipline of psychology is a well developed empirica l science in the wes t toda y, few psyc hologists have dipped into the rtligiow and philosophical literature of the east. Yet the a nalysis of p:ychologica1 ph enomena in the discourses of the Buddha offers aignificam insights into the na ture of consciousness and th e p'ychology of human behaviou r. In fact Robert H . Thouless, the Ca mbridge psychologist, distinctl y comments on the contempo rary relevan ce of the psychological reflections of the Budd ha: •Across th e kUlf of twent y-five centuries we seem to hea r in the voice of the Buddha the expression of a n essent ially mod em mind .'! T hough the discou rses of the Buddh a a re very rich in the use of p'ychological terminology as well as psychological a nalysis, this tacet of the doctrine has been a badl y neglected field , except for th e pioneering work done by Mrs C . A. F. Rh ys Davids.' In more recent times, a western psychologist who made a stud y of th e psychology of .1fllQ1I4 says: Anybod y with a good knowledge of psychology and its history who reads the Pa li nika yas must be struck by the fact that the psychological terminology is richer in th is than a ny other a ncient litera ture a nd tha t more space is devoted to psychological ..nalysis a nd explana tions in this th an in a ny other religious literature." Apa rt from the contemporar y significa nce of the psychological . nalysis in Buddhi sm, a comprehensive grasp of the ent ire doctri ne ur lhe Buddha ca nnot be arrived a t without extensive study of th e 8 udd hist concepts of mind , cognition and motiva tion, a nd of th e IIlcure of emotion and persona lity. l t will also be seen that the Plychk at the blemishes of the face , so should one look a t o ne's psychological trai ts a nd q ual ities. Words like soli (mind fulness) and y onim mlllUJSikara (wise auen lion) convey the development of one's powers of introspection a nd clarity, a nd lucid ity of thought . M rs Rhys Da vids 53r-;:

Sati, an im po rta nt ter m in Buddhiscetbical rraining, is no t who lly covered by memo ry, and is on the whole, best rend ered by min d fu lness, inasmuch as it denotes rather the requisite co nd ition for efficient remem bra nce, o r thou ght of a ny kind , na mely, lucidi ty a nd ale rtness of co nscio usness.'! O ther compo unds of this term , such as anussati, a re used fo r

,8

An Introdud iOTl to Buddhist Psychology

The P!Jehology rif Cognition

reiterated recollec tion and palissati for vivid reinst at ement . I II SampajoMQ is a word for d ear co nsciousness (whereas asampajan;ja

are makin g a tte mpts to clarify their position in the lig ht of recent expe rim ent a l wor k.T he Buddha has accepted the following for ms ?f knowledge in the su uas: psycho kinesis, cla ira ud ience, telepathic kno wledge, retrocogniuve kno wledge, cla irvoya nce, a nd , finally, destruction of the defiling impu lsea." Anyone exploring th e psychology of cogn ition in Budd hism ca nnot omit these higher reaches of the mind . But the psychology of cogn ition in rela tion to high er knowledge lacks an idiom throu gh which it can be comm unicated to th e West. Our d iscussion in this volume will therefore be direct ed more to the anal ysis of the psycholog y of be ha viour as co mmo nly encountered in every da y life, an d the study of moti va tion , emo tion, personal ity development a nd therapy will be worked OU I within that dimension .joh a nsson's work on the psych ology of the supra -mundane sho uld pro ve to be a useful su ppleme nt 10 our work, especia lly for those who arc a nxiou s to understand the psychology of the rranscend emal."

im plies a lack of'awareness) . II is th e d evelopment of these powers of introspection an d methodica l mental culture that provid es the base for the develo pment of high er cognitive powers .

H I GHER K N O W L E D G E

Ver bal testimo ny, ana logical reasoning, logical reasoning, etc., a re no t completely satisfactory as mea ns of knowledge. Percept ions, bot h norma l and parano rmal , alo ng with inferences based on them, are the va lid mca na of'knowledge in Budd hism .w Dessana is used to refer to visual as well as to extra-sensory perception . The term nDrJodassana is used 10 deno te the ' knowled ge and insigh t of salv a lion ' (vimulli-niiTJodassana) as dist inct from knowledge of'thin gs as they ar e

29

(yaihO.bhiita-niiTJadassann). Aga inst the ba ckground of weste rn psychology , where conce pts a re delinea ted in ter ms of experimenta l tech niq ues, is it possible to give a meaningful rendering of the psycho logica l bases of the concept of high er knowledge o r para norma l cognitive po wers? T he strongest a rguments for the non -metaphysica l na tu re of these concepts have been presented by K .N .j aya tilteke, who says: ' Ea rly Buddhism should therefore be regarded not as a system of me. rapb ysics but as a ver ifia ble hypothesis discovered by the Bud d ha in the course of his " tri al and. erro r" experimeru'cn j aya tilleke' s a rgu me nt is tha t the Bud d ha tried out va rious tech niq ues which were current a t the time - penance , self-mo rtifica tion, a voida nce a nd seclusion - a nd then evolved his own." J ayatilleke also feels tha t the development of high er powe rs was not some thing mysterious but a na tural development of certai n po tentia ls wit hin man . It was a lso no t a sudde n emergence of a m ysteri ous po wer bu t a gradual development . The grad ual developme nt is traced to the three stages of sila (morality), samadJt.i (co ncentration) and panna (spiritual knowledge). As an experime nt this involves a person's who le life tim e, and the testing of the hypo thesis involves a cert ain person al commitme nt. W estern psychology with its own methodo logical frame work will find it d iff icu h tc absorb a hypothesis of this sort. The field of ex tra -sensory percep tion accepted by the Bud dh a has, of course, interested certa in psycho logists in the west a nd they

COG NIT I O N A N D MO TI VA TI O N

The psychology of cognition ca nno t be separa ted from the stud y of moti vati on . It ma y be: a good idea to remind ourselves ag ain tha t the main objective of the Buddha in a na lysing the psychology of ~ he human mind was to uncover the main springs of human suffering an d search out ways in which to a llevia te it. Delusion is one of the roots of h uma n discon tent a nd righ t beliefs are a very import a nt part of the eightfold path . T his req uir es one to sharpen and ~~ne one's cognitive faculties, whether th ey relate to ~ry cogmuon, thi nkin g, memory, imaginatio n or knowledge gamed throug h insigh t. . .. Man 's desires influence his cognitive powers and his cog ruuons hav e an im pact o n his desires . There is both a cog nitive and emotion al co mpo nent to man's suffering, and these arise from his craving and ignorance: There are, in fact , two tap-roo ts from which existence and, with it suffering spring: craving (taTJhii) and ignorance (avijjiI). To weaken them first and finally erad ica te them is th e difficult task before us which, however, we ca n face courageously if guided by the methods of the Dh amma whic h are realistic as well as

radical."

30

An Introduction to Buddhist Psyclwlogy

Crav ing is relat ed to the root ca uses riiga (passion) and dosa (ha tred) , whereas ignora nce is related to the root ca use mOM (delusion). In the therapeu tic situa tion we get two character types, one dominated by a craving tem peram ent (riiga carita) and the other by the delud ed tem perament (diUhU:an"ta) . Therapeuticall y, 'quiet' is advoca ted for the man bound to cra ving a nd 'insight' for the man cloaked in 'ignora nce'. Lack of contro l and restrai nt as well as lack of aw areness a nd knowledge of one's motives are responsible for tensions and disco ntent . T he emphasis on the unguard ed senses a nd the need for restraint brings out the importance ol th e motiva tional aspect , and emphasis on insight a nd self-knowledge brings out the significance of cognition . This ana lysis throws a n int eresting light on to the higher reaches of knowledge which we have discussed. T he Dightmikiiya" makes a reference to seven types of person ; and mention is made of the different wa ys in which peop le obtain freedo m: Those freed both wa ys (llbhawbMga-uimlltto), those freed by insight (ptziriw-uimutto), and those freed by faith (saddhii-uimulto). 'Freed both wa ys' reall y refers to the combination of panniivimuUi and u tooimurti. Cetouimutti is derived from ca lm (samatlra) , which is the ca lming down of the passions, panMvimutti is derived from vipassan4 (insight) and is the ceasing of ignorance . T his would suggest a significant link between the psychology of cog nition a nd that of motivation . Buddhi sm has been misund erstood as a system of psychology which advocates the 'cutting olp of the senses. In the Discourse on tlu Dewlopmml of tlu Sensa (Indriyabhiivaniisulta),'f1 the Buddha says if he la ys down the mere CUlling down of the senses, then a blind man or a deaf man could achieve his ideal. Rather he advoca tes th e training of the senses, so that externa l stimuli will not disturb them . The Buddha does not tea ch the at rophy of the senses, but their developmen t and refin emen t. Here is a passage from the suttas which descri bes the co ntro l of the senses well: Eye, ea r, nose, longue a nd body, a nd also the mind , if a bhikku keep the ga tes guard ed well, in ea ting with restraint and control, in the sense faculties he meets with ease, with ease of body and with ease of mind . With a body rhat does not burn , with a mind that does not burn , he lives a t ease by day and nigh1.28

Tire Psychology

of Cognition

3\

COGNITION A N D TH ER AP Y

The analysis of the psychology of mot ivation , emotions a nd personali ty in this work will be concluded with a d esc ~i ption of th.e thera peutic fram ework of the psychology of Buddhism, for this dominates and directl y colours the role of man 's cognitive functions. Both our emotional and our intellectu al lives a re coloured by the limit ed perspec tives from which we view phenomena . It issaid tha t partiality, enmi ty, stupidity and fea r are the cau ses of evil acuons." Both stro ng emotions and dogmati c ad herence to a ' view' prevent a person from getting a clear enough pictu re ofan object to be able to discern its tr ue nature, whcther that o bj ect be a ma terial one, a psychologica l quality within oneself or in someone else, or a Jignificant social or historical event which needs to be examinee. T o set witho ut pr ej udice, without partiality and uninfluenced by personal interest is a di fficult task. O ur minds are cloudy and d isturbed , we are the slaves of strong dispositions which cannot be easily bro ken. T o break completely through such limitations ca lls for the gradual elimination of the obst ructing factors. The Buddha has clearly said tha t both the emergence of proper insight as well as the non-emergence of insight are causally conditioned . What are the factors responsible for the non-emergence of insight? According to the teachings of the Buddha there are two ways of achieving spiritual development: throu gh tranq uillity and th roug h in~i ~h t. There are five factors tha t disturb the develop men t of tra nquillity, and it is only when these a re cleared a way that the powers of meditation ca n be developed . According to the suttas, these five factors (sense desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, restlessnessa nd worry , and sceptica l doubt) condition our ability to see thin gs as they are and in their wholeness. Along with the elimination of these impedimen ts, the Buddha recommends the seven factors of enlightenmen t which foster knowledge and insight, na mely: mind fulln ess (satl), investigation of the la w (dham'rla), energy (vIrg a), rapture (pHI), tra nquillity (passaddhil , conce ntra tion (samadhl) and eq uanim ity (upekkha) . In this connec tion, K. N. J a yatill eke obser ves: We note her e th e operation of'a ca usal process. The elimination of the impediments makes th e mind concentra ted in meditat ion and this in turn mak es it possible for it to have knowledge a nd insight of things as they are (yalha-hhiitana1JildasSarultrl ).30

32

An Introduction

to

Buddhist Psychology

He also points out a statement from the suttas: 'menta l concentration is the ca use of knowing and seeing things as they ar e' . 31 Now it may be observed tha t while the psychology of Buddhism speaks ofthese high er reachesof mind , th e term 'cognition' is used in a different way when it occurs in, for instance, a text book on psychology; SO tha t it becomes extremely difficult at this point to convey th e Buddh ist concepts of 'insight' a nd ' understanding' within the idiom and the technical vocabulary of western psychology. J ohansson, too, who raises the same issue, finds an ana logical resemblance in the Gesta lt concept of intuition , which he sees as a n act of und erstanding when the str ucture of things become clear: T he Gestalt psychology of our time has recognized that the laws of thi nking are very similar to the laws of perception and that they may per haps be derived from the la tter. In the same way,panizii is sometimes described as a process similar to visua l perception, a nd indeed,panizii a nd nann are often comb ined with verbs like passati (see}." T here is a passage in the suttas which conveys the kind of a na logical resemblance which he cites: Monks, it is like a pure, limpid , serene pool of water in which a man with vision standing on the ban k might see oysters and shells, also grave ) and pebb les, a nd shoals offis h are moving about and keeping still."

It is in this ma nner that a monk comprehends the nature of anguis h, 'as it is'. However, in the fina l ana lysis, it is difficult to grasp the conce pt of higher knowledge in terms of th e analysis of perception. T he psychological processes tha t opera te in th e emerge nce of higher knowledge a re different from those of visual perception . T he ability to transcend pa rtial and biased viewpoints had a certai n immedia te significance to the Buddha, who attempted to make his way thro ugh the j ungle of metaphysical theories that pervaded the int ellectu al horizons of his time. He condemned the dogm ati c adh erence to views of people who thought tha t only they had found the truth . This type of dogma tic adherence to partial

T he Psycfwlogy of Cognition

33

intellectual standpoi nts, ideologies a nd life perspectives is not limited to individuals. T here can be 'collectively oriented ' gro ups who accept dogm atic viewpoints, and since such peop le somet imes feel that th ey are fighting for ends which transcen d the individu al, things can take a rather millta~t turn . . T he futility of such ideological battl es has been graphically presen ted in th e Alagaddiipama sutta (T he Snake Simiu).34 H ere the ma n who does not have a correct grasp of the doctrine is compared to the man who does not hold the wate r-snake properl y. If a man goes in search of a wate r-snake and after seeing it takes hold. of it.by the coil or the tail, the water -snake will turn round a nd bite him, thu s bringing abo ut his destru ction . He who holds it properly is I!ke the man who has a n intuitive and correct grasp of the doctrine (dluz mma). Thus, qui te apart from wordy warfare with peop le who have rival doctrines, even with in one 's own doc trine dogmatism is to be discouraged . T he man engulfed in pu rely intellectu al battles is compared to the man who carries the raft on his head , when it was on ly meant for crossing the river. .. T he claim that the 'cognitions' ofa gro up mind ca n be distorted IS interesting, whether we are dealing with na tions, s,:".a1l groups or mobs. Instead of falling prey to the stereotyped cogmnve structures buill up over the years, it is necessary to bre ak th rough any forms of collective ignoran ce and prejudice. T he Budd ha himself first cut himself away from the tangled netwo rk of intcrpersonal relations and the masks and mirrors of his own society, and in seclusion refined his powers of in~ight to '~ee' things afresh and clearly. It was after he had cleared his own mind and found a techn ique of doing so, a technique which could be recommended to others, that he came back to society to present the dhamma. It was then tha t he described the man free of the ta ngle of par tial viewpoints: T here are no knots for him There are no errors for th e But they who both surmise T hey wayfare in the world

loosed from surmise, wisdom freed: and view accep t, a t odd s with folk."

T he refinement of man 's cogr uuve powers which we have discussed, whethe r of perception, thinking, int rospection or pa ranormal insight, are in this man ner presented within the framewor k of the psychology of a therap y. T heir im plica tions can be developed

3",,"

An IntrodUd ion to Buddllist PsyclloWD

in relatio n to the extern al world. as well as in the a rea of selfknowledge, I?erception of others and und erstand ing the wor kings of the group mind . T he psychology of cogn ition has a central place in the system of therapy advoca ted by the Buddha .

3 Motivation and Emotions T he term 'motiva tion' is a general one tha t covers three aspects of beha viour: sta tes that motivat e behav iour , behaviour motivated by these sta tes a nd the goals of such beha viour. All three aspects may be regarded as stages in a cycle. Hunger as a motivational sta te would impe l a person to seek food , appropri a te behaviour which is instigated by this need would be the seeking of means to a ttai n w e end , and the allevia tion of hunger would be the final goal. The motiva tion cycle then terminates until the need for food emerges aga in.' Thus terms like need, want, motive, dri ve, etc., refer to some inner condition of the organism that init iates and di rects its behaviour toward s a goal . Some of the goals are of a positive natu re, goals that individ uals approach; others of a negati ve nature, which indi vidu als tr y to avoid . Where the moti vating sta tes ha ve a clea r ph ysiological base, th e goals are rela tively fixed - as in the need for sleep or food - whereas there will be a greater degree of flexibility and var iation in the case ofthe desire for fam e, status, position, ere. In this chapter, we hope to examine and analyse the early Buddh ist theory of motivation . Most of the significant theor ies of moti vation a re the result of a need to exa mine and.explain a sense of puzzlement relating to some facet of huma n behaviour. The focus of the ph ilosophical and psychological investigations of the Buddha being the predicament of hum an suffering (dukklla), Buddhi st psychology of motivation is directly concern ed with th e factors tha t lead 10 human unrest, tension , anxi ety and suffering in general. The psychological a nalysis found in the discourses of the Buddha, especially in relation to moti vation , is deeply embedded in the desire to uncover the roots of unrest a nd 10 depict a positive path towa rds happiness. In this sense, the framework of the psychology of motivation in Budd hism is therapeut ic. As has alread y been said in the west today, the word 'thera py' is used in a general sense to mean methods oftreating mental sickness, while in the Buddhist contex t it refers to the deeper predicament of unrest and psychological conflict. The psychological di tch between the thera peutically 35

36

An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology

'wholesome' and 'unwholesome' cuts through the whole srructure of motivational theory in Buddhism . The unending nature of the motivation cycle is emphasised by the Buddha in a number of contexts. Desires find temporary satisfaction , but they surge up again and again, sometimes seeking new objec ts of exploration . In fact, the Pi li word ta,y,lI (craving) etymologically conno tes 'thirst', and the metaphor of thirst can well be applied to the diverse manifestation of desires that spring from the root greed . The basic springs of moti vation are accordingly analysed into thr ee wholesome roots (kluala mUla) and three unwholesome ones {akusala mula)i ofth e un wholesome roots, IohluJ rendered as greed or tuse, generates the positive 'a pproach desires'; dosa generates the 'avoidance desires' in the form of hatred and resentment: and wwluJ • • rendered as delusion, creates confusion in the mind .! While the unwholesome springs of action genera te unrest and conflict, their opposites charity (alohluJ), compassionate love (adosa) and wisdom (amoAa) .lead to inner happiness within the individual and harmony at the interperso na l level. Within this framework the Buddha f~uses ~ttention more on the drives wi th a dear psychological one nta uon and lesson those with a dear physiological base. Even in the cast: of certain basic ph ysiological needs, und er certain circum. stances a need could take the form of a greed . When basic needs go beyond their biological function and take possession of the whole personality, such obsessions and attachmen ts overpower man and cri pple his personality. However, the bulk of the discourses are ? evoted to anal ysing the psychologicaUy oriented dri ves; for Instan ce, man 's acq uisitive drive to am ass wealth, hoard and possess it, his inord inat e am bition for power and desire to outdo others, ~x u a l infatuation , and in genera l all those pseudo-life-styles which In the long run create human misery and discontent . The Buddh a does n~t anal yse the needs and desires of man for its own sake, bu t ra ther In terms of the valuationa l structure which generat es and directs the satisfaction of human driv es. According to the psychology of motivation in Buddism, the approach desires generated by greed take a dual form - the dri ve for sel ~- preserva t ion (bhalJa-tafJnii ) and th e drive for sensuous gratification (kii ma.lafJlzii) - while th e avoida nce desires like hatred generate the drive for annihilation and aggressive tend encies (lJibJuJva~t11!M ) . Though needs like thirst, hunger and sleep can be explained m terms of self-preservatio n, hluJva-ta"Juj is also linked with th e need

Motivation and Emotions

37

for self-assertion, power, fame, wealth , recogn ition , etc . The drive for sensuous grauficadcn goes beyond genital or sexual pleasure, and explains th e need for excitement , d iversion, exposure te:- novel stimuli and a wide variety of other pleasures. T he dri ve for an nihilation involves aggressive behaviour, suicide and violent short-curs to remove painful stimuli. Needs like affection, love and sympathy have to be analysed in the light of situation and context. There are clear cases of altruistic loving kind ness, compassion and sympathetic joy, but they have to be d ifferenti ated from q uasisexual love, expressions of worldl y sorrow, attachment a~d pass. essivelove an d tender emotions wi th an ambivalent affective tone. A certain 'd egree of semantic study an d persistent self-analysis is necessary to differentiate between ' l~v ~' a?d 'lust', . .. T he arousal of these drives to ecu vtry 15 due to stimuli In the sensory field or at the ideational level. Such a st i mu ~us excit~ a person's feelings. Pleasant feelings (sukJlou dQna)alld pamfu l feehngs (dukntWtdanii ) are affective reactions to sensa ~ions . T hus, d ue to the stimulation of the five sense organs and the mind organ , there result six kinds of feelings based on eye-impressions, ear-impressions, body-impressions, nose-impressions, mout~-impn::ss i~ns and mi ~­ impressions. These f~di ngs have a certam h~OOlC tone which differentiates them mto pleasan t (sukha), pamful (dukkka) or ind ifferent (adukkkaY aJlI.klra) experiences. Pleasa nt feelings stimulate the impulse toward s pl easur~-gi ving objects, and thus t ~e d rive for sensuous gra tification is kindled. Pleasura ble experiences also stabilise the yearning for continued existence and thus feed the desire for self-preservation. Pain ful feelings can aro use a sense of resentm ent (pa#gha) and thus feed the drive for aggression and annihilation. Thus we see that feeling is cond itioned by contact and craving is conditioned by feeling. The objec ts of pleasure are referred to as, 'delightful, dear, passion-fraught and inciting to lust' , I Wh en a person's passi?lls are roused by oncoming stimuli, clinging (lI.piidanii), which IS conditioned by craving, emerges and th e objec t of pleasur e is held on to tenacio usly. Unlessclinging persists, excitat ion of the sense organs is nor suffici ent to rouse the individual to activity. In the context of painful sensations, upiidiinii may be more correctly rendered , as 'entanglement' ra th er than 'clinging', referrin g to an obsession with what we like as well as what we dislike. Apar t from the notion of 'entanglement ', there arc other concepts which account for the persistence of certain patterns of behav iour.

An /ntrodud ion so Buddhist Psych% lJ

M otilJQ1Um and Emotions

OUT at titudes a nd beliefs which ha ve been formed in the past influence O UT p r~n t reactions to o ncoming stimuli , and these a tt itudes a TC often roo ted in d ynamic personali ty trai ts. Accord ing to the Buddh a, these a ltitudes are not the resu lt of delibera tion a t a conscious level, but emerge on dee p-roo ted a nd do rmant proclivities referred to as flnusqyfl.

types th at can be analysed against the background of~tiv~tional theory . The way of sensuality and th e wa y of self-mortifica tion a re both life_perspectives condemned by the Budd ha, fo~ they e~erge on unwholesome roo ts a nd are a ma nifesta tion o~cravlllg; while the wa y of sensuality is a clear mani festati on of ~ravl ng, the ",:,ay of ~lf. mortificati on is a subtle manifestation of displaced craving. Sl~ce the way of sensuality has been conde mned by the Buddha as leadl~g 10 unr est tension and boredom, some peo ple go to the oppoSIte extre me ~d follow the way of self-mor tifica tion . T he de~,berate at tempt to live th rough pai nful experiences a nd the tech niqu e f? r burn ing up the effects of karma' has bee n .criticised by the Buddh a III his discourses on the philosophy ot the j ains. T he way ? f the Bud? ha goes beyond the opposites of pleasure-pain, atlraCbon-re:pu~ attach ment-shunning and greed-ha tred . Wh~t has ~n disc in terms of life_perspective can also be discussed III te rms ~f character type - raga anita (the person ality type w~ose cond uc t IS dominated by greed ) and dosa casita (the persona hty type whos,e cond uct is domi na ted by hatr ed) . The middle way of'the Buddha IS not within th e reach of those who 'walk in greed ' and those who ' wa lk in ha te' . . T he pr eceding ana lysiswill have shown the dose hn~ berween the B dd hist psycho logy of motiva tion an d the therapeutic fram ework wi thin which it is cast. Now we shall exami ne in detai l some of the significant facets of its theory of mo tivation.

38

Pleasu rable feel ings ind uce an attachment to p leasant obj ects, for th ey rou se la tent se nsuo us sreed (rtigQnusay a); pain fu l feelings ro use la tent anger and ha tred (p a#ghiinusay a) . T he 'a pproach desires'

eme rge o n the roo t greed and excite the riigiinusQya; the 'a voidance desires' emerge o n th e roo t hate and excite the pa{ighllnwttya. The Toot 'delusion' is relat ed to leaning an d to a ttac hme nt to one's ego, wh ich finds direct expression in th e la tent proclivity towards conceit a nd ignorance (tliuhi-miiniinusaYil). It is only when the three roots of unwholesome beha viour a re properl y comprehended a nd the addiction to these lat ent manifesta tions of a ttachm en t, ha tred , conceit and ignora nce elimina ted, that a person is rega rd ed as a n 'end-ma ker of anguish'." W hile we ha ve discussed some of the psycho logica l mecha nisms with reference to the arousal a nd ,,"sisttnet of moti vat ional sta tes in relation to springs of mo tivation such as greed, hatred an d delusion, the diverse forms of ac tivit y in relation 10 the tliuction of behaviour a re also of significance . These are often d isc ussed in the co ntext of mora ls a nd ethical reflect ions. Facets of ideational (mano), vocal (lItUi) a nd bod ily (kaya) behaviour rooted in greed , ha tr ed a nd delusion are discussed in ethica l contexts, as what a person should not do; a nd forms ofbehaviour roo ted in non-greed, non-ha tr ed and non-delusion a re prescribed as wha t a person oug ht to do . For instan ce, assaults on o thers, stealing, sexua l misconduct, ha rsh speec h, covetousness a nd wra th are forms of behav iour which a re unw holesome, while kindness to anima ls, nursing the sick, chari ty, self-restraint, truthfulness, etc., a re th e kinds of acti vities recommend ed for the man bent on lead ing a virtuous life. In general, if we take a bird's-eye view of the discussion of the ramifications of human beha viour , the Buddha a t times an alyses ac tual situa tions, a t o thers possible situat ions, and sometimes specifies which actions a re suitable an d which unsuita ble. This link bet ween the ethica l a nd the psychological cuts across the a nalysis of psychological phenomena in Buddhism . Apa rt from the spec ific forms of be ha viour which ca n be tr aced to the six motivationa l roots , there are life-perspe cti ves an d character

39

F E ELI NG S

f acets of th e psych ologica l process we have briefly ?utl i n~ m~y be summarised in the following man ner : eye and objects ~ Ive rise to eye-co nsciousness; the coming together of the th~ee ~s con ~ct~ dependen t on con tact is feeling; depend ent on feehn,g IS. cra vmg; dependent on craving is grasping; dependent on grasplOg IS corning to be.' Wh at is said of the eye ma y also be said of the ea r and so~nds, the nose an d scents, the tongue a nd savo urs, the ~ y and.ta nglbles and the mind and men tal sta tes. Certain sensory stimula tions would be associa ted with pleasantness: the fragra nce ofa perfu me, the taste of a chocola te o r the sound of music may be pleasan t, whereas a bad odour, a vegeta ble that tastes sta le or an irri ta ting sound ma y. be painful. T he stimulus could also emerge from the internal orgamsm

40

Motivatwn and Emotions

An Introduction to Buddhist PfJchology

in the form of hunger pangs, a parched throat, fatigue, etc., and there will be corresponding pleasa nt organic sensations when they a re allevia ted . while 'contact' is merely a reaction to stimuli, the eme rgence of the hedon ic tone only appea rs at the level of feeling. With the emergence of craving a nd grasping we disce rn the transition from tbe state of'a feeling into the experience ofa n emo tion. While feeling (vedonii) comes und er the standard psychological ca tegories of Budd hism, there is no generic term for emo tion . Specific emotions a re discussed in a variety of conte xts, and the integration of the material on the psychology of emotions in the discourses of the Buddha is an impcrtanr task . We shal l deal with the nature of emotions in the nex t section. Vtdonii as one of the five tJrandJras (groups) com prises five types of possible feelings: bodily agreeable feelings, bodil y pai nful feelings, menially agreeable feelings, men tally pai nful feelings an d feelin gs of indifference . Though this is one of the most centra l classifica tions of feeling , the Budd ha says that different types of classifications are possible dependi ng on the context: there is a twofold classification in which the reference is to bodi ly a nd mental feelings; the threefold classification makes refere nce 10 pleasa nt , painful and neu tral; the fivefold o ne makes reference 10 the five sense organs; and the sixfold one is based on sensory impingements by way of the doo rs of the senses. Feelings are a lso put into an eighteenfold group which is agai n divided into three sub-groups -six ways of a ttending to ma teria l shapes based on hap pin ess, six founded on grief and six on eq uanimity; the thirty-sixfold classificati on refers to six forms of happiness con nec ted with do mestic life, six with renunciation , six forms of misery connected with domestic life, six with renunciation the six ind ifferences of a ho useholder a nd the six indifferences of renunciation ; finall y, the hundred-and-eightfold grouping refers to the same thirty-six feelings as manifest in the past, pr esent and futu re . T hese classifications of feelings are found in th e BahuvedanlJ'a Sutta1 , a sutta which compa res the kind of pleasure derived from the ~ensory organs with the hig~er pleasures a~tained at various slages to the dev elopment of meditational experience. For insta nce , the Middle Length Sqyings describe the first stage of medi ati on in th e followin g way Here, Ananda, a monk, aloof from pleasures of the senses, a loof

41

from unskilled states of mind, en ters and ab ides in the f irst meditation th at is accompanied by ini tial thought and discursive thought, is born of aloofness a nd is ra pturous a nd joyful. T his Ananda, is the other happiness th at is more excellent and exquisite than that happiness.' In this contex t, the gross pleasures derived from the sense o rgans and the experience ofj oy derived from the medita tional exercises are differenti ated by the Buddha, the grosser pleasures contai ning a latency to a ttachme nt, repugnance and ignorance . The grosser pleasur es excite the dorman t drive to engage in lustful and aggressive activity . The ques tio n is raised of whether there is a tendency to att achment in every pleasa nt feeling, a tend ency to repugnan ce in every painful feeling and whe ther all neutral feelings are roo ted in a tendency to igno ra nce .' To this qu estion it is replied that a sta te aloof from th e pleasu res of the senses does not have such la tencies. This ethica l and spirit ual dimension tha t cuts across the analysis of feeling, making subtle distinctions betw een different qualita tive levels ofpleasure , is ofcourse something alien to mod ern western psychology. In the context ofme et hico-psychologi cal tea chi ngs of Budd hism, it is this potentia l to rouse a ttachment an d obsession or repugnance and animosity that is importa nt. Wh en a person has eliminated the tend encies to attac hmen t a nd repugnance, ' he does not deligh t in th at feeling, he does not welcom e it o r persist in cleaving to it' .IO Sorrow, la men tation and despair do not necessarily follow the end of the process of attachmen t an d clinging . For exa mple, Assaji, who was striken with a sore disease, said that both pleasant and pa inful feelings hav e to be experienced without any a ttachment : ' If he feels a pleasant feeling, he knows it as impermanen t, he knows it as not clun g to, he kno ws it has no lure for him.'!' T he implications of the pleasure-pain dicho tom y ar e not limited to the eme rgence of unhealthy mental sta tes, but even whole lifeperspectives such as the way ofsensuality a nd the way of asceticism, and broad cha racter Iypes like the lustful and the hateful have to be understood against the psychological ca tegory of hedoni c tones

(vtdanii) ,

An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology

MolilJalum and Emotions

A deeper understanding of the psychology of feeling in Buddhism ca n only be a rrived a t by studying the rela ted concept of emoti ons. O ne reason perhaps why this facet of the psychology of Buddhism has been neglected is tha t there is no generic term for emotions with in the discourses. In this section we shall put together the material on specific emotions d iscussed by the Budd ha, in the hope of working out a Buddh ist theory of emotions. In the English language, the word emotion, as accepted by most psychologists, is th e term used to describe basic affective processes, feelings being genera lly restricted to pleasan tnessor unpleasantness. In line with a recent psychological analysis, feelings ma y be considered as 'affective rea ctions to sensations'; it is also said tha t in feeling the reference is to the reaction on the subject, whereas in emotion, there are diverse types of relation to an obj ect. IS Emotion or an affectca n be considered as a 'felt tendency towards an object j udged suita ble, or away from an obj ect judged unsuitable, reinforced by specific bodil y changes according to the type of emotion'.u T ha t emotions involve dispositions to act by way of approach or withdrawal is a quali ty of emotional phenom ena that fits in well with the Buddhist analysis. There is a felt tend ency impe lling people towa rds suita ble objects a nd impe lling them to move awa y from unsuit a ble or harmful objects. The ind ividu al also perce ives and judges the situa tion in rela tion to himself as attractive or repellent. Whil e a person feels a ttrac tion (siVajia!J) for agree able mat erial sha pes, he feels repugnan ce (byiipajjatJ) for disagreeab le ones. An individual thu s possessed of like (afWrodha) and dislike (lJirodha) a pproac hes pleasure-giving objects or avoids painful objects." Pleasant feelings (m ha IJtdana) a nd painful feelings (duHlzo. tltdana) are affective reactions to sensa tions. When we make a j udgement in term s of the hedonic tone of these affective reactions, there are excited in us certain dispositions to possess the object (greed) , to destroy it (ha tred) , flee from it (fear ), get obsessed and worried over it (a nxiety), a nd so on. An emotional response occurs when a situa tion has been per ceived and evaluated in relation to its effect on the ind ividual. T he emergence of emotions depends on the evaluation of the situa tion and its meaning for the individual. Estim at ion of the situa tion brings abo ut somatic expressions and orga nic cha nges.

Buddhism accepts the position tha t there are emotions drawing people to suitable objects and emotions tendin g to d raw them away from harmful objects. But these ca n occ ur .under favourable conditions' or ' under unfavourable condi tions' . Under favoura ble cond itions, desire will be genera ted to obtain the pleasure-giving object, a nd there wi.ll be pleasure a nd delight in the auainment of the object. lfunsuita ble objects int rude into a person's se~so ry or ideational field there will be aversion, d islike and un ha pp iness. However when condi tions are not favoura ble, our norma l emotions e:nerge not as 'impulse emotions', bu t as 'co~tending emotions' . In spite of obstructions, if we feel tha t th ~ objects are a ttaina ble we have ' bope' , but if we feel that the objects are not attainable we succumb to 'despair' . In the case of negati ve objects (which we do not want ) , courage, anger and fear will emerge depending on the contexr." T hough the depicting of impulse emotions is given a centra l pla ce in the psychology of Buddhism, cont ending emotions are also discussed in a nu mber of contexts. In this manner certai n emotions a re interlocked with other emotions. Emotions are also dynamically fed by our drives and d ispositions. T he a ttitudes tha t ~'e h ~ve formed in the past will influence our response to the stimuli of the present, and these a tti tudes will be rooted in dyna mic persona lity trai ts. According to the Buddh a, these at titud es a re no t always the result of conscious decision, but emerge on deep-rooted proclivities (referred ~ as aJ'Iusay a). Pleasant feelings ind uce a n a ttachment to pleasant obJ~ts, for they rouse la tent sensuous greed (raglinust!Ya), a nd painful feelings will rouse latent a nger and ha tred . ( pa/~'ghanu.sa7a) . ~ t~l es like pride, jealousy, envy, etc., ca n be explained III terms of SImilar (anuJt!)·a). . \\'e have already referr ed to the six motivational roots which a re rela ted to emotions. An interestin g fea ture in this a nalysis is the imp act of beliefs on the affec tive life of man : ~c1 u si~ n as a root genera tes the wrong beliefs tha t colour our emo~o na l lt fe a nd n?ndelusion provides the base for wholesome emotions. Wrong beliefs exist at the level of dorman t dispositions (diUhlinwq}'a) and account for the unconscious roots of prejudices and strong biases which colour our emotiona l life. The most persistent ideological compon ent that sta nds behind the i~pac~ of ~liefs on em~tion is the false concept of a pure ego, which gIves m e to a variety of eg~ illusions. In a deeper sense man is prone to some form of basic

E MOT I O NS

43

44

An lntreduction to Buddhist Psychology

a nxiety: anxiet y is caused by a n attac hment to the belief in ' I' and ' me', which instead of giving us a feeling of security, crea tes worry and a nxiety (padtassana). T hough the ego psychology of Budd hism savours of meta-empirica l theorising, a deep und erstanding of the sources a nd man ifestati ons of the ego-illusions pr ovides a fascina ting study for psychologists. Some of our observa tions on the thera peu tic va lue of the Buddhist doctrine ofegolessness' will be taken up in the concluding cha pter. In general the. link between emotion a nd beli efs in Buddhi sm is significa nt, a point that has entered into some of the recen t writ ings in the area of philosophica l psychology." Before we. exa mine some of the. specific emo tions, there is one more facet of the concept of emotions to be. discussed. In the religious a nd ethica l context, emotions are often regard ed as states tha t interfere with the spiritual development of a person. Good reasoning is consid ered to be thinki ng which is not coloured by emotion . In psychological contexts, emotions are regarded as states of 'im ba lance' and 'agita tion' . But emotions need not always be considered as the source of irrationa lities. Emotions are forms of appraisa l a nd there is a cognitive component in them . T his mea ns tha t we can have good reasons for certain emotions - to fed fear when we see a situa tion as dan gerous or to feel envious when someone else possesses what I wish to have, etc. If emotions have a logic of their own, then ed uca tion of the emotions is possible. When we speak of edu ca tion of the emotions in the Buddhist context, we ha ve to look for emo tions which a re 'ethica lly wholesome'. An interesting comment mad e in this context by Spinoza is tha t 'it takes a n emotion to cont rol a nother emotion' v'" R . S. Peters observes that love, respect , a sense ofj ustice and a concern for truth, which a re 'self-tra nscending emotions' ra ther tha n 'self-referen t ia l emo tions', a re of this positive kind . 18 Thus it ma y be said tha t though there are emotions tha t d istort reasonin g, feed one's prej udices a nd da rken the vision , there are others which brea k through one's egotism a nd expa nd one's mental hori zons. In the Buddh ist context th ere a re emotions that sha rpen a health y sense of the tragic a nd others tha t evoke the ennobling emotions of sympathy a nd compassion for one's fellow-men . In keepin g with the search for positive a nd crea tive emotions in the psychology of Buddhi sm, non-gr eed, non-h at red a nd nondelusion may be regarded as the roots of wholesome emotions. Rega rd ing the impact of the wholesome roots on the forms of

Motivation and Emotions

45

wholesome consciousness, the following observations have been made by the Venerable Nyana ponika : Non-greed and non-hate ma y, accord ing to the part icular case, have either a mainly nega tive meaning signifying abse nce of greed a nd ha te, or they ma y (X)SSe5S a distinctive positive cha rac ter, for exam ple: non-greed as renu ncia tion, libera lity; non-ha te as a mity, kindness, for bea ra nce. Non-de lusion has a lways a positive mea ning: for it rep resenlS the knowledge which mou vares the respec tive sta te of consciousness. In their positive aspects, non-greed a nd non -bat e are likewise strong motives of good actions. They supply the non-ra tional, volitio nal or emotional motives, while non -delusion represents the rational moti ve of a good thought or ac tion .1I In the light of these observations non-greed a nd non-hatred may be regarded as the springs of heal thy, positive and creative

emoti ons. 1n fact non-delusion may be conside red as a basis for formi ng affective dispositions arising from well-grou nded beliefs and sound reasoning . The psychology of Buddhism accepts that actions ma y be based on ra tional mot ives as well as on ra tiona lisations influenced by desires. Because of desire there is clinging (la1!1tii-/HUcayd tii((hi-up6damHrf), a nd clingi ng is said to be. of fou r forms, one of which is clinging to metaphysical beliefs. lfboth good reasons as well as rationalisations a re featu res of our emotio na l life, there should be. a basis for healthy and creative emotions gro unded in good reasons, a nd good reasons fed by healthy emo tions. 1t must be emphasised in this context tha t feelings need not be followed by unwholesome emotions (greed, hate) but can be followed by wholesome (kILSa/a) emotions or neu tral feeling; a pleasan t feeling ma y evoke the wish to share the.pleasure-giving obj ect with others (a/ohha), an unpleasa nt feeling may evoke pa tience and compassion (adosa). The clai m tha t Buddhist psychology provides a basis for a crea tive emotional respon se is a significa nt clai m with interesting implicat ions for the development of a Buddhist ethics, socia l theory and even art and aesthetics. Whil e we sha ll take up the role of the crea tive emotions as we proceed , it is now necessary to examine in detail some of the specific emotions discussed by the Buddh a .

An Introduction 10 Buddhist Ps.;'chology

Motivation and E motions

Fear l f'wc glance through the discourses of the Budd ha as preserved in the Pali ca non, th e ava ilable mat eria l on the nature of emotions a ppears to be dispersed , as well as coloured by the na tu re of the diverse contextual situa tions where emo tions arc d iscussed . However, in genera l discussion cent res on four groups of emotions: those which obstruct th e ideal of the vir tuous life sought by the la yman, emo tions that interfere with the recluse seeking the pat h of perfection, emotions enha ncing the la yma n's ideal of the vir tuous life and emotions developed by the recluse seeking the path of perfection . T he grou ping of emotions in this manner brings a n ethical and spiritua l dim ension to the psychology of emo tions in Budd hism. In the context of the psychology of the west, the und esira ble emotions are those that crea te adjustive problems and imp air our mental health , and the desira ble ones are valua ble as an adaptive resource. T he delineation of mental health merely in terms of adj ustment is being qu estioned in some psychological gro ups in the west, a nd new horizons have emerged, a trend which might help to bridge the gap between the psychology of Budd hism a nd the currently dom inant psychology of th e west. Fear genera lly ari ses as a response to a specific- da nger , whereas a nxiety arises as a reaction to a danger which is not clearly seen. In a nxiety, both the na ture of the obj ec t and one's att itude to it are obscured. However , these states fade off into each other in certain contexts. Bhay a in Pal i ca n be rendered as fear, fright or dread. Rega rding the genesis of the emotion offear, there art a t least two clea r types of situa tion which ca use fear. Fear is often caused by strong desires (ta1}hiiy a j iiy ati blUlya Trt ).20 Strong desires and a ttac hment to either persons or things cause fea r beca use if we cling to some precious and valuable object, we have to defend it against loss or theft; thieves ca n even be a threa t to one's life. If one is deeply a ttac hed to a person , and if the person is struck by a serious sickness, concern for his well-being turns into fea r. The possibility of dea th ca uses anguish and a nxiety. It is the sa me with the a ttac hment to one 's own self, a th reat to one's life, sickness, the threa t of losing one'sjob or reputation - all situa tions leading up to thc eme rgence of fear . It is beca use of the strong drive towards self-preserva tion (bhauatQ'lhii) which in turn is fed by the bhauariigiinusaya (th e lurking tendency to crave for existence) that fea r becomes such an agitating condition . In addition to the instinct for self-preserva tion, the desire for power, lust, jealousy a nd pride is intimat ely rela ted to the

emerge nce of fear . As we mention ed earlier, some emotions are int erlocked with other emotions, as is the case, for instance, with jealousy, prid e and fear . The second type of fear is the consequence of leadin g an und esirabl e life. Here the emotion of fear is related to the emotion of guilt . In this context the emotion of fear has an unh ealthy destructive aspect a nd a positive healthy aspect. If a person is burdened with a hea vy sense of pa thological remorse, it has a bad effect, for it crea tes worry and restlessness. O n the other ha nd a lively sense of moral dread and sha me (hiri-ottappa) prevenu ma n from taking to an evil life and forms the basis of responsibility and a civic sense. The damaging aspect of a bad conscience in respect to morals has been the subject of discussion since the work of Sigmund Freud . In admonishing both th e layman and the recluse regarding the bad effects of a pathological sense of guilt , th e Buddh a refers to a person who is subject to anxiety, fear a nd dejection : a person who has done the wrong thing fears that other people ta lk abo ut him, and if he is in a place where peop le congregate, he fears tha t that is what they are doin g. Wh en he sees others being punished by th e king, he thinks that the sa me will hap pen to him and is disturbed by this possibility. Fin ally, when he is resting on a chair or the bed , thought s of th is kind come to him and he fears that he will be born in a bad place. 'Monks, as at eventide the shadows of the grea t mountain peaks rest, lie and settle on th e earth, so, monks, do these evil deeds . . . lie and settle on him .' 21 T he kind of fear and guilt tha t disturbs the ma n here isd ifferent from a health y, produ ctive sense of sha me and fear ( h iri~ o ttappa) . In the Angultara N ikiiya there is a reference to four types of fea r: of self-reproac h (atliinuvadabhay a), fear of others' rep roach (parfinuvfidabluJy a), fear of punishment (da1}dabhay a) and fear of lower worlds (duggalibhay a). Fears of this kind will have a good effect on the person: 'he a bando ns evil', and 'develops the practice of good'. Fea r is often found mixed with ha tred (even self-bate) and discontent , a nd this is often so in the emergence of pa thological guil t. Kukkuu a, which can be rendered as uneasinessof conscience, remorse or worry, is considered a hin dran ce to spiritual development. It is associated with a hateful a nd discontented consciousness, similar to the Freudian super-ego and consisting of aggressive elements. Among people who a re disappointed with the way tha t they have lived in the past. some ca n become bett er mor e

47

48

An Introduction to Buddhist PfYchology

Motivation and Emotions

produ ctive men; bu t others take a more unrewarding line and disfll,a y a complex admixture of fear , ha tred a nd guilt ,lI T he religious melancholy, the self-punishing ascetic, and similar types have a n unprodu ctive sense of fear a nd dread . Restlessness and worry are described in the Nikayas with an apt a nalogy: if a pot of water were sha ken by the wind so that the water trembles eddies a nd rippl es, a nd a man were to look there for his own reflection he would not see it. T hus restlessnessa nd wor ry obscure one's vision of oneself and form a n obstruction to the developm en t oftranquiUity and insight.1I Hiri-lJlIappa (sha me and dr ead ), however, is a positive and healthy sense which must be cultivated a nd developed . In the words of M~ Rhys Da vids, 'taken together they give us th e emotional and cona tive ~peclS of the mode rn notion of conscience, just as sati represents II on its intellectual side'.u H e who lacks these positive emotions lacks a conscience. In a recent study, under the title 'Moral ity and Emotions' I i Bernard Willia ms says tha t if we grasp the distinction mad e 'in Kleinia n psychoanalytical work between 'persecutary guilt ' and 'repa ra tive gui lt' we do not neglect the possibility for a crea tive aspect for remorse or guilt:

feelings than has Judaism or Christianiry'c" T he principle of ca thars is of emo tions has certainly ca ught the eyes of contemporary students of Budd hism in the west.

He who thinks he has done wrong may not just torm ent himself, he ma y seek to pu t things together agai n. In this rather evident possibility, we not only ha ve in general a connexion between the emotions an d the moral life, we also ha ve something tha t illustrat es the point abo ut the interpretation of a set of actions in terms of an emot ional struc ture. I t is also of interest to note tha t a student of Buddh ism in the west has made an ana lysis of the 'Dyna mics of Confession in Early Buddhism'.u Teresina Havens, too, says that in place of the externa l rites of pu rificat ion like ba thing in the river , a nd so on, which are ad voca ted by existing religions, the Buddha advoca ted a radical inner transforma tion of the affective side of man . According to Ha vens, the Buddha was as realistic as Freud or St Paul in accepting and 'recognising the egocen tric, lustful, hostile and gra sping proclivities in unawakened ma n"." Whil e ad vocating a method to up root these traits, the Buddha 'condemned wor ry over pas.t0O:cnces as a hindra nce to concentra tion a nd fou nded a religion which III general seems to have produ ced far fewer neurotic guilt

49

Fear and Anxit!)' As. has been said, we often make a distinction between fea r and anxiety, fear being response to a specific situa tion or a pa rticula r obj ect, a nd as such both specific a nd demonstrable, whereas dread is obj ectless, diffuse a nd vague, since in anxie ty both the na tu re of the obj ect and one's a tt itude to it a re not clea rly recognised. Anxiety isgenerally bom out ofego-centred desires of one kind or ano th er . Some forms of anxi ety or vague apprehension under clear an alysis can be seen to be specific fears. For instance, a person a pproaching the possibility of ma rriage may feel some a nxiety regard ing financial problems, 01" a sense of app rehension as to whether the marriage will be a success, but when analysed such vague a pprehensions can be explained as arising from specific causes. The Buddha says that a mor e basic type of anxiety arises from our deep-rooted attachment to the ego. In the words ofConze, a 'concealed suffering'" lies behind many everyd ay ap pre hensions. These emerge from the na ture of the basic human condition. Somethi ng can be both pleasant and yet tied up with anxiety , since one is afraid to lose it. Here-anxiety is insepar abl e from a tta chment , in which something pleasant , like the possession ofa body, binds us to conditions which will inevita bly entail a great dea l of suffering. And , finally, the five aggregates (khandluJ ) ha ve their own form of built- in anxiety. Inability to face the inner vacu ity of the so-called ego results in flight from a nxiety . Compulsive grega riousness, frant ic club-joining, filling one's leisure hours with feverish activity - all these a re facets of cover t a nxiety, all help people to avoid being alone.w The love ofsolitude a nd the wa y ofsilence advocated by the Buddha is a nathema to large num bers of people who live in the 'lonely crowd'! The Buddha tra ces this predilection of the 'a nxious ma n' to his inab ility to grasp the basic tr uth of egolessness, which is the key to und erstanding any form of anxiety, T he belief in ' I' and 'mine', though it gives a superficial feeling of security, is the ca use of anx iety, fear and WOITy. The discou rse on The SnakeSimile refers to anxiety (pa rilassana) abo ut unrealities that are external an d those that a re internal; external unrealiti es refer to houses, gold a nd other

An Introduction to Buddhisl Psychology

Motivation and Emotions

possessions, or to children a nd friends; the inte rnal to the non-

distance. This kind of ambivalent nature is reflected in behaviour where a mild degree of fea r crea ted by situa tions helps to break through monorom y and bored om . Also, d isgust with their lives a nd their own selves ca n make people court situa tions which are pot entially dangerous to them . Freud '~ st u~y of the ~eat~ instinct (which we ha ve elsewhere compa red with l1IbhaDQ tatYitJ ) m lghlSh~ some ligh t on this rath er dar k facer of hu man nature. Even In ancient Rome it was said tha t people wanted both bread and circuses. 11 is possible tha t situa tions of disorder, tur moil a nd violence etc., ar e fed by this ambivalen t natu re. Another facet ofthis compulsion to 'flirt with fear' is found in the stra nge d elight people find in violating taboos , laws and comma nds. When desires a re curbed thro ugh fear, they are repr essed a nd emerge through other channels. T he co-exisrence ofs ta tes Which.are condemn ed a t the conscious level and approved at the unconscious level partly explains this compulsion to viola te taboos. O ther types of irrational fears are presentl y being unearthed in the field of abnorma l psycbology'" which stress tha t an und esirable situation has to be avoided on the basis of understa nding ra ther than by an irrational fear or a process of drilling oneself.

exisung "!'. T he Bhaya Bh~TarJa Sulla (Discourse on Fear and Dread) says that pu re.lysu bjective conditions ca n ca use fear in a recluse who has gone off to live alone in the fores t. If a recluse who has gone to the fO~ 1 has not mastered such emotions as lust a nd covetousness, is corru pt in hear t, etc., the rustling of fallen lea ves by the wind or the " bre aking of a twig by a n a nima l ca n cause fear and dr ead . T hus, \ whether we a re dealing with the fears of a man attached to his possessions, the anxi eties of one torn between conflicting desires, the fear and dread of a recluse living in the wildern ess, or the fea rs consequent on leading a bad life - in all these senses rhe Buddh a is for US a 'dispeller cf'fear, dread and pani c' .31 Now the most natural qu estion is, Is th ere no crea tive, existent ial stirring tha t awa kens man 10 his real predicam ent? There are references to a ut hentic religious emotions caused by the contemplation of the miseries of the world. T he emotion of sa1?luega, translated as 'stirring' or 'deeply moving', ca n be an invigorating experience which enhances one's faith and und erstanding of the dhamma31 -a concept which must of course be distingui shed from paritossana, which is a kind of anxie ty. T he doctrine of the Buddha is compared to a lion's roar. In the forest, when the lesser crea tures hear the roa r of the king of the beasts, they tremble. In the same way, when the devas, who are long-lived and blissful, hear the doctrin e of conditio ned origina tion they tremble, bu t they yet understa nd the Buddha's doctrine of impermanence. This should be compared with rhe stale of parilQJsana, where a person finds his erern alism challenged , bu t sees the doctrin e of the Buddh a thro ugh the eyes of an annihilati on ist, a nd laments, '" I" will be anni hila ted.' When sa'?luga is kindled in a person, he sticks 10 the doctrin e with more ea rnestness. F~Qr

and Emotional Amb;vauntt: Fear is something which by its very na tu re entails 'a voida nce', but there is a stra nge phenomenon which ma y be described as 'fli rting with fear '. There ar e peop le who sea rch for for ms of ente rtainment and sports which excite a mild degr ee of fea r, like participating in hazardous moun tain climbing, motor sports, fire walking etc. T here are others who like to read, see a nd talk a bout gruesome inciden ts, and man y of those who go on wild-life safaris a re looking for a little excitement ra ther than j ust wanting to look at a nimals from a

51

TIrL Cl)nlTol and Exprusion of Fear This brings us to the final aspect of the emotion offear. The Buddh a was not often di rectly concerned with the qu estion of whether the sponta neous expression of an emotion is good or wheth er it should be inh ibited . He held, rather , thai by a pTOCes5 of selfuaderstanding, dil igent self-analysisand insight one ca n come to the point where emotions will not overwhel m one. . .. A recent study which a ttempts to work out a technique or living based on Buddhist prin ciples has something significa nt 10 say on this problem ." Leona rd Bullen says that there a re three as~ts to the disciplin ing of emotions: first, the d evelopm en~ of a ha bl ~ ?f selfobservation with regard to one's own emotional cond ition (a detailed observation of the mental sta te); second , the cont rol of emotional manifestations as th ey a rise; and , finally, the development of a new set of values, so tha t the situa tions which earlier elicited responses of fea r or anger will fail todo so. As Bull,en ~ i ~self points out, the disciplining of emotions a t the level of the individual has social imp licati ons. l f we begin with ourselves, we do not excite emotions of fear , hatred.jealousy and pride in others . If others do not excite them in

An lntroduaio n to Buddhist Psydw/ogy

Motivatwn and Emotwns

us, we are not impelled to see the shadows of our own fears and jea lousies in their hearts. Self-analysis a nd und erstanding when practised within a comm unity has a recip roca l effect. The emotion of fear when it is genera ted a t the social level crea tes mutual mistru st, suspicion an d ha tred . The roots of racial pr ejudice, for instan ce, can be understood in the light of this phen omenon of mutual fear.

think of a ny positi ve form that it ma y take, such as 'rig hteous ind igna tion' o r a 'j ust war' . Due to certai n forms of develo pm ent that the human being has undergone, often peo ple do not spea k out and express their feelings, but by a process of repression and concea lment acc um ulate them . Accu mulat ed a nger of this sort ca n explode in ver y man y subtle forms, for suc h anger exists at a subterra nea n level in the form of pa,ighiinusay a. A baby who is angry with the mo ther will d irec t th is on to a doll - this is ca lled 'd isplacemen t'. If a perso n takes pleasu re in bea ring a child, he will say it will do the child good - a form of rationalisation . A person who unconsciously hates a person can be over-solicitous a bout his hea lth - this is reaction forma tion. If someo ne suspects, without grounds, tha t a nothe r pe rson is harbou r. ing a grieva nce aga inst him, he is merely proj ecting his own ha tr ed on to someon e else. If a person starv es himself to de a th beca use of a socia l grieva nce it may be a wa y of direc ting th e accumula ted hatr ed on to himself. \Ve have elsew here discussed this concept of self-deception, but it is relevan t directl y to the emotion of hatred , too. Then there is a classic case of the child who refused to take med icine, and finally through compulsion , drank it with a vengea nce. It is in the und erstanding of the deceptive spell of th e aggressive urges in mao that the Budd ha condemned both suicide a nd the path ofself-mort ification (aJlaJciJamathafJI!]oga). 1t is a wa y of life that ge nera tes suffering (duJcJcha), a nnoya nce (upagkata), tro uble (upa.lQsa) a nd fret (par1'Laha). The Buddha ad vocated a middle pat h tha t will d ry up th e roots of both greed and hatred , and of delusion also. In an era closer to ours Sigmund Freud, lOO, rema rked tha t the voice of egressio n is some times subtle, invisible and difficult to unravel. Wi th deep apprecia tio n of the psychologica l mechanisms in Budd hism, M rs R hys Da vids says that 'compa red with the ascetic excesses of the times, the Buddhis t standpoint was markedl y hygienic' c" No t o nly does the Buddha grasp the subtle mechanism throu gh which the aggressive urge ma nifests itself, but he presen ts the finest a ntido te to the springs of batred in ma n in th e form of the doctrin e of the four sublime states. If the genius for both good a nd evil rests withi n ourselves the Buddha has given us a sense of optim ism to dea l with the turmoi l both within and arou nd us. T hough the Budd ha a ttempted to d eal with the emergence of ha tred both at the social an d ind ivid ual level, it is through the inner

52

Hatred Emotions ofte n create a kind of fog betwee n the subject a nd the o bject . In 'approach desires', like greed, there is an infatua tion d ue to ,,;,hich th e person is blind to the undesirable aspects of the object which he lo ngs to possess. In the case of 'avoidance desires', genera ted by fear, and more so by hatred , the subject pr ojects his ha tred in perceiving the o bject; in extreme anger his vision is blind ed , like the fury of a serpe nt. Thus th ere is a positive attitude towards things we like and a negative aversion for those we dislike. If we wish to avoid a situation or a person tha t we dislike, a nd we ca nno t do so, there is excited in us a n urge to d estroy, harm, fight , etc. In the case of response to peo ple, the situa tion is a little more com plicated, for sometim es one attribute will attract us, while another aspec t of the same person repels us, and when this is so, unde r certai n co nditions wha t is lo va ble will turn out to be repellent . T he kind of emotiona l a mbivale nce that exists betw een parents a nd child ren is a case in point . T he n there a re things that we consciously like bu t unconsciously detest. In the ethico-peychological a na lysis of emotions that we find in Buddhism, a n umber of terms are used to describe the existence and ex p r~io n of anger a nd hatred : dosa (hate), lJ}iipiida (ill will),pa{igluJ (a version) , Jcodha (a nger) , an d so o n. Ha tred is also related to sta tes such as issa (en vy) , mauhariya (jea lo usy) an d hi1U1mlma (sense of inferiori ty) . Dosa (hate) is o ne ofthe basic roou ofimmo ral ac tion, along with greed a nd de lusion . Someti mes in a pa rticu la r situa tion a ll the roots of .immora l ac tion ma y be excited : a person is longing to obtain o bject B, but A sta nds on his way. Thus greed for B is followed by a h atre~ for A, a nd the desire for B is in turn nour ished by the roo t d e~u s~on . Ha tred can manifest itself in var ious wa ys: by though ts (wishing the person dead ), by harsh words, by aggressive beha viou r. In fac t, ha tred is an emotion whic h has been so generall y condemned by the Budd ha, that it is d ifficult for the Budd hist to

53

An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology

MotivaJion and Emotions

transformation of th e individual that th e urge to aggression can be tam ed. Thus in working out the different levels of spiritual developm ent, there are referen ces to the forms or anger, hatred and ill will that obstruc t man . Hatred in the form of lfYiipiida (ill will ) is referred to as one of the hindrances (nivaralJa). along with sensua lity, slo th and torpor, restlessness and remor se and doubt . It is one of th e fett ers that bind beings to the wheel of existence, and with kodha (anger) and upaniiha (malice), issii (envy) and ~riya is considered as one of the sixteen defilements (upakkilesii). These

Is he whom anger dogs. Som eone a man in anger hurts; But, when his ang er is later spent With difficulty or with ease, H e suffers as if scared by fire His look betrays the sulkiness Of some dim smoky smouldering glow, Whence may flare up an anger-blaze That sets the world of man aflame He ha s no shame or conscience cur b No kindly words come forth from him, There is no island refuge for The man whom ang er dogs. Such ac ts as will ensure remorse Such as are far from True Id eals: It is of these that I would tell, So hark en to my word s Anger makes man a patri cide Anger ma kes him a matricide Anger can mak e him slay th e saint As he would kill the common man Nu rsed a nd rear ed by a mother's ca re He comes to look upon th e world , Yet the common man in anger kills The being who gave him life. No being but seeks his own self's good None dearer to him than himself Yet men in anger kill themselves, Distraught for reasons manifold: For crazed they sta b themselves with daggers, In desperation swallow poison, Perish han ged by ropes, or fling T hemselves over a precipice. Yet how their life-destroyin g acts Bring death imo themselves as well, T hat they ca nnot discern , and tha t Is th e ruin anger breeds. This secret place, with an ger's aid Is where Mortali ty sets the snare, T o blot it out with disciplin e With vision, strength, a nd understanding,

54

d efilements have to be eliminated befor e insight ca n be d eveloped.

These sta tes work in significant combina tions; for instance, in contempt there is a combina tion of aversion and conceit, and denigration is a stro nger form of this contempr.s! Envy is fed by greed and aversion. If we succumb to the last defilement of negligence, th en these defilements will form iura a layer which is hard to break through, when it has hardened int o habit. It is in this way that we can account for the emer gence of certain personality types, and the typ e referred. to as the dosa carita will be the very embodiment of hatred. There is a graphic description of th e angr y man in thc Angulla ra Nikii.Ja, some of which we shall reproduce here: When ang er does possess a man ; He looks ugly; hc lies in pain : What benefit he ma y come by He misconstrues as a mischan ce; He loses property (through fines) Becau se he has been working harm Through acts of body a nd of speech By angr y passion overwhelmed: The wrath and rage tha t madden him Cain him a nam e of ill repute; His fellows, relati ves a nd kin Will seek to shun him from afar ; And anger fath ers misery: T hus fury docs so cloud the mind Of man that he ca nnot discern This fearful inn er danger . An angry man no meaning knows, No angry man sees an idea, So wr app ed in darkness, as if blind ,

55

An Introduction 10 Buddhist PsycJwlogy

T o blot ea ch fault ou t one by one, T he wise man should apply himself Training likewise in True Ideal s: 'Let smouldering be far from us' , Then rid of wra th a nd free from anger, And rid of lust a nd free from envy, Tamed , and with anger left behind , Taintless, they reach Nlb bana. " On the th era peutic side there are ma ny contexts where the Buddha offers us advi ce to help us to face situa tions in such a way that our anger, wrath and ill will will not be excited; a nd if we become agitated there are techniques to get rid of this. T his is not a process of repression by which one pushes hostile feelings down int o a lower level of consciousness, but one which uses und erstanding, insight, and mindfu lness to control and restra in them. While the Budd hist a nalysis of the genesis of emotional sta tes help s one to understand their emergence, positive techniqu es are advocated to deal with them, a nd this is done in the case of ang er, fear , greed, jealousy or other unwh olesome emot iona l states. The Vitukkasu1J.lhiinu suua recommends five such tcchniques.w Grief and Sorrow Grief is a universal ph enomenon . It is basically a reaction to bereavement, but it is also consequent on other types of losses. If there has been a close identifica tion with the person or the thing lost, the person concerne d feels as if a part of himself has been lost. T he most significa nt observa tions on the nat ure of 'mourning and melancholy' were made by Sigmund Fre ud." When an object is cha rged with a stro ng emot ional ca thexis, or in Buddhist terminology 'clinging' (upiidiina), a sudden loss or separation crea tes a distur bing vacuum . Feelings of guilt, depr ession a nd Self-pity ma y colour the emotion of grief in various situations. It is said tha t sometimes people will not be able to distinguish bet ween sorrow and compassion; but while the distant enemy of compassion is cruelty, the close enemy is a kind of self-pity filled with worldly sorrow." Wh ile a deep sense of compassion has a power to transform a person spiritually, worldly sorrow bind s him more insidiously to the wheel of sa'!tSQra. Sorrow, grief and lam enta tion are all facets of dukkha and in Buddh ism ca n be overcome only by grasping the phi losoph y of the

Motivation and Emotions

57

' u agic'. " Mourning and weeping are not effective ways of.d.ealing with the tragic. We should unde rstand th e ca uses and condlllOI~s of suffering and work out a therapy to remove the .caus~ o~ su~enng . T he Buddhist attitu de demands a sense of reality; this IS different from either excessive mourn ing or the use of diversions to drown one's sorrow . Dukkha is a universal feature of samsaric exis ten~e, along with imp ermanence a~d egole:ssness. T he.Buddh ,a has sal~: 'What is impermanent, that ISsuffering. Wha t IS suffering, that IS void of an ego.' To think that there is a n ego where ther~ .IS only a changing psycho-physical co";lp le.x is to crea te the conditions that genera te sorrow, grief and dejection . . . , T he Bud dhist ph ilosoph y of tra gedy IS contal.ned m the f? ur ~obl e truths: the tru th of suffering, the origin of'suffering, th e exu ncuo n of suffering, and the eightfold pa th leadin g to the exti~ction .of suffering. Birth , decay, disease, death, sorrow , l a m en ~ tl.on , pa~ n , gr ief and despa ir are suffering, says the Budd ha . To be joined With the unpleasant a nd to be separ~ted fro~ the pleasant is ~u~ering, th e failure to get what one wan ts IS suffen ng . In short, clingi ng to the five groups of men ta l and ph ysical qualities that go to make up the ind ividual constitu tes suffering. It is the last par t of the form ula tha t gives a sense of depth to the meaning of trage dy in Buddhism. If the nature of the Buddhi st analysis of dukkha is und erstood, within that sett ing the confrontatio n of genuine tragic situations in life may ha ve a positive role to play: it could break thro~gh nat ~ral slumber a nd complacency a nd crea te a sense of urgency m the mind of the Buddhist. Aut hentic tragic experience (saqlVtga) should ~ a spur to the religious life a~d strengthen o~e's fait~ in. the ~octrme . The wa y in which the Impact o,r genuine . t ra~c Situations may bring about a spiritua l alertness Without falling ll1 ~0 the un.whole. some extreme of morbidi ty is bro ught out clearly in the A ngu tta~a N ikay a.4'l. A cer tain person hears that in a village or to:wn someone IS afflicted or dead and stirred in this way he realises the trut h; a nother beholds with his own eyes . . . a nd realises the tru th; the third person sees a kinsman amict~ and ,realises th e,tru th; an~ finally the person himself is stricken with pam and su~eTlng a,:d. this situa tion stirs him to a rea lisation of the truth of suffering. T his JS by a nalogy compared to a steed that is stir,r ed wh,en the stick is see~, one stirred when the stick touches the Skill, a third when the flesh IS pierced and a fourth when the very bone is pierced by a stick: T~ere is an element of stirring (which th e tra nsla tor renders as agitation ) which awakens a person to the tragic sense ofl ife and the emergence

An lntroduttwn to Buddhist Psychology

Motivation and Emotions

of faith in the doctrine. Even if we call this a sta te of 'agita tion', it is di fferent from that of a person whose fear, a nger or grief has been a roused. Even the sense of the tragic in life ca n turn ou t to be a crea tive emotional response.

the basis of a healthy society." In a society where adu ltery a nd other for ms of sexual misbehaviour (KamtslJ miahiiciira) become ra mpant, society will rela pse into a ba rbaric sta te. T hus the v~ry base ofa healthy social ethics gives a vital role to conj uga l love, filial piety and pa rental respect. . While what we have discussed is an eth ical argument for conj ugal love, there is also a significant psychological argument . If someone seeks the satisfac tion of sexual greed as an end in itself, the dialectic ofdesire points out that it is bound to Rou nder on the very basis of its founda tion . If a person ca nnot visualise a higher level of existence which goes beyond the level of immcdiacy a nd novelty, he is bound to become enmeshed by the very distressing experience of boredom a nd ennui. T his type of self- ind ulgence ma y give some temporary satisfaction, but th e law of diminishing returns soon sets in . The beh aviou r patterns of sex addicts merely mirror the destructive lifestyles of the many who att empt to satisfy a spiral of needs which they have ar tificially crea ted to sta ve olf boredom . we have elsewhere discussed the Buddhist concept of emo tional ma turity when examining the 'critique of pleasure' in Buddhism a nd Soren

l.t>w and ComJHlllWn So far we have discussed three negative emotions: fear, hatred and sorrow. However, we found tha t unl ike the case of ha tred, bot h fear a nd sorrow ha ve a positive aspec t. Now we shall focus a tte ntion on the positive emotions of love a nd compassion. Love and compassion in the Buddhi st context fall within a continuum of emotions some of which shade off into eac h other: erotic love, sexual love, a tta chment, fondness, affection, motherly love, sympathy, concern for one's fellow-beings, compassion, etc . An ethical stance cuts across this analysis, recomm endi ng the wholesome emotional sta tes only. In th e Greek language, (he word eros refers to the sensual aspect of love a nd agape to the spiritua l aspect of love. In English, we use the one word. 'love', which if not qua lified by a prefix would remain vague. Sexual pleasure has to be viewed from two sta ndpoints: the sta ndpoint of the la yman and tha t of the monk." T hose who ta ke to the holy life (brah11UKariy a) ca nnot enjoy sexual pleasures, whereas the householder (galwpatl) is per mitted to enjoy pleasures of a sensua l or KXUal na ture within a legitima te limit. T he five precepts to which the la yman adheres emphasise chastity, while the eight religious vows of the holy life aim at celibacy. While the Buddh a condemns the unchaste life of the married man , the sa nctity of family life and the value of conj ugal love are upheld in Buddhism . Negatively, Buddhi st la ymen are expected to refrain from un lawful sexua l rela tions, a nd positively the homily to Sigala la ys dow n the basic duties of people that will ensure do mestic ha ppin ess.w T he homily gives a cha nning code of domestic relati ons, a nd describes th e mutual d uties between husband and wife as well as those between parents and children, serva nts and masters, teachers and pu pils, friend s and compa nions, la ymen and recluses. J t is within such an ethical fram ework and spir itual qu est that conj uga l love finds its du c place within the Buddhi st theory of hum an rela tions. I mmoral lust (adhammariiga), inordinat e craving (visamalobha) and perversion of the moral sense (mKchiidhamma) are evils tha t lead to the degeneration of society, whereas filial and religious piety form

59

Klerkegaard ."

From the sta nd point of the 'homeless life' even health y fa mily rela tions have to be given up for the sake of the spiritua l quest. Compa nionship (samsagga). fond ness for children (.rintha) and love (perna) have to be given up , for they are 'ties' which will lead a person to neglect his spiri tual qu est. It is also said th at love a nd affection bring about anxieties a nd sorrow. The DMrntrUJpada describes this in an often quoted sta nza: From affection springs grief From affection springs fea r For him who is wholly free from affection T here is neither gr ief nor fea r .s" The four sublime sta tes provide a stro nger dim ension for a crea tive emotional response. Not only does compassion form the basis for a wholesome dim ension of emotional warmth a nd positive concern for others, but it is specifically advocat ed as a corrective to the presence of hatred , fear and allied sta tes. But it has its own alluring disguises and, as sta ted ea rlier, it must be saved from its near enemies: worldly sorrow, pseudo-love a nd superficial a ttachments. The four sublime sta tes (the Brah mavihara) are melld (loving

60

Motivalion anti Emolio1lJ

An lntrodu£tion 10 Buddhist Psyd wlog,

kindness) , Karu?o . (co mpass!on), mudilii (sym pa thetic joy) a nd ~pekkk~ (eq u~~HY) , T heir pot ential to deal with cont licts, j ealousies, prejudice a nd hatred is immense. They ha ve been referred .{(~ removers of tension and build ers of harmoni ous com m um.(u::" T hese sta tes a rc considered boundless, since they arc ~10t li~ t~ . and narrowed d own by being d irected towards partlcul~ indi viduals. T hese aTC not merel y princip les o f co nd uct but s~bJects of methodical meditation . It is thro ugh medita tive pracu ce that they' sink deeply into the hea rt and lat er emerge as spo n taneous e~otJo ns . ~ n these four su blime stat es we see the finest base ~or a crea uve emotional response , a nd a response rela ted to th e emcuo n of nalU~1 sym pa thy and concern for one 's fellow-beings. II has even bee n pointed ou t that one type of mora ljustifica tio n used bh'y the .Buddha was the appeal to sympathetic feelings .. Ap . n,at r~ ~ . t IS point we see the rel evan ce of the psycho logy of emo tions for moral ~essmen t. Whet her we concentra te o n the negative or the positive . emotion~, it seems tha t the study of psychological ph~nom~na m .Buddh~sm ca n not be com pletely sepa ra ted from the ethical dimension wh ich cuts th rou gh it.

a:8

THE P SY C H O L O C Y O F C RAV IN G

In disc~ng feelings and emo tions it was mentioned tha t feelings can be dl~ussed und er the ca tegory of uetlona (hedonic tone). It was a lso .m en tlon~ tha t there is no generic term for emotion s bu t that spe cific ~motlons are d iscussed in the disco urses of the I Buddha . CI~ly tied to these feelings a nd emotions is the Buddhist conce p t of cra ving. T he psychology of emo tions has to be unde rstood ag ainst the ~ac~und of~e three form s of craving: cra ving for sensuous gra~fi~at~on , cra vmg for self-p reserv a tion and cra vin Ii an m hila tlon . g or

T~e conce p t of craving (I.tu!kii) is hard to translate into the temllnolo~ of western psychology for a number of reaso ns. Western PSyc~OI~slS have ~sed theoreti cal constructs like ' instinct', 'd rive' , mo u~es ~tc . , as a ids to expla in behavio ur, and the use of these ter';?s 1~ dl~~rent systems.of psycho logy is not un iform . A 'd rive' or an insti nct IS ~o t som et hing concre te like a pen or a pencil: they are C?~cepts 3SSOCJated v.:iLh certai n theori es whi ch attempt to explain VISible fo~ms ofbehaVlour . Bearing this qualification in m ind , it may be me nti oned that a n umber of psychologists in the west have

6.

sea rched for some primary d eter minan ts of be havi our or fundamental bases of be haviour. Independ ent of sema n tic ba ttles (as to wh ether we sho uld use the word 'd rive', ' instinct', etc.,) the searc h for the primary bases of behav iour is also found in the psychology of Buddhism . In the psychology of the west , some , like M cDougal , have in troduced a la rge n um ber of di fferent instincts to accou nt far diverse types of activi ty. O thers, like Freud, suggest two or three basi c instincts to explain the varied manifestati ons of behaviour . In this respect, the three forms of cra ving in Buddhism - for sensua lity, self-p reservation an d an nihila tion - offer sign ificant simi lar ities to the libid o, ego instin ct and d eath insun ct o f'Freud .w In this sect ion, we shall di scuss the nature of sexual ity and sensua lity, the manifestations of th e instinct of self-p reserva tion and the na ture of aggress ion as found in the psychology of Budd hism.

Sexuality T he concept of KamlJ-1Qf}M has a very broad usage whi ch goes beyo nd mere 'sexua lity' as such; it is basically the cravi ng for 'sensuous gratification' ra ther tha n 'sexua l gratification ' . The su nas refer to two significa nt terms, pamakiimaguFJ.a and kama-raga: pfJ"cakomaguna refers to the five types of pleasure obj ects ob ta ined by the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, kama-raga refers to the d esir es and passions of a sensual nature . T hu s the term jJtJN.akamogunikaraga refers to the fact that in a human bei ng there is a d eep-seated p roclivit y for the enjoyme nt of the five senses. In a still broad er sense, k6m(J ·la~ha may be regarded as the 'pleasure principle', as the term used in, for instance, the work of Fre ud : the na tural proneness in man to seek pleasure and be repelled by pain .w It is important to emphasise that the drive for sensuo us gratification goes beyond genital o r ot herwise specifically sexua l pleas ure a nd acco unts for such manifestati ons as the need for d iversion , the craving for excitement and the search for novelty. Kama in the co ntext of Budd hism is the enjoymen t of the five senses, and 'sexuality' is only one of th e expressions of man 's sensuo us na tu re . T he lu re of the senses is constan tly discussed by the Buddha and on nu merous occasions he emp hasises the need to restrai n and control the senses. Apart from the specific manner in which the word kamo is used , the et hico-religious dimension tha t cuts across the critiq ue of pleasure is important . There are two basic sta nd points to the

62

An l ntroduaio n

to

Buddhist PJY'lwloD

enjoyment of pleasure in Buddh ism. From one sta ndpoint , the Buddha describes the ills besetting the pu rsuit of pleasure in genera l, but fro m a nother standpoint he distingu ishes pleasures obta ined by legitimat e mea ns and those obtained by illegitima te means, pleasures obtained within the legitima te restraints of a limit and the excessive cravi ng for them, between harmless pleasures a nd perverted lust, and SO on.:.2 For the layman , an a ttempt is mad e to work out a via media between complete suppression of sexuality a nd complete permissiveness. Sexual contro l in the sense of perfect celibacy and abstinence is limited to the monks. T here is, however, one thi ng common to both stand points - the sea rch for pleasure as the only idea l in life is not possible within either standpoint. A life of pure sensuality without a ny ethical considera tion is wha t the Buddh a condemns as t amasux.haJljlciinuyoga (the way of sensuality) . This is referred to as low, pagan practice a nd is compa red with an equa lly pagan extreme, the way of self-mortification. T he Buddha reco mmends the eightfold pa th as the middl e way. In the beginning of this cha pter, it was sta ted that the main focus of Buddhist psychological a nalysis was hu man suffering a nd that the Buddha was direc tly concerned with the factors that lead to huma n unr est, tension and anxiety. h is in this context that the deep-roo ted instinct for sensuous gratifi cation has to be analysed. Sensuality as a n expression of cra ving is the very base a nd source of suffering (dulclcha). The origin of suffering (duklcha-samudaya) is traced to craving (tarJhii). Crav ing is a factor leadin g to rebirth (ponobhavilca), it is acco mpa nied by lust a nd self-ind ulgence (nandi-riiga), it seeks for temporary satisfaction 'now here, now there' (tIllra tatriibkinandan'i) .u In the DialoglJ.u of t.he Buddha , there is a detailed a nalysis of the factors in which craving is roored ." The question is raised as to where 'craving takes its rise' an d where it 'has a dwelling' . First it is said thai crav ing has iu rise a nd dwellin g in the ma terial things which a re pleasa nt a nd dear to us: the sense of sighI, sense of hearin g, sense of smell, taste, touch and imagination ; things seen, hea rd, smelt, tasted , touched a nd reca lled in memory a re dear and pleasant . T his discussion of the excita tion of the senses made in term s of rUpa (material things) is continued in terms of consciousness, sensory stimuli, feeling, percept ion , intent ions, conceptual a nd discursive thinking.&& This a nalysis is not limited to sensuous gratification bu t holds true of the other forms of craving. However , in the fina l ana lysis, it is not the existence of the sense-

MolioGtwn and Emotwns

63

organs or th e impact of sense irnpressions tha t is em phasis~, bu t the persistence of desire and lust, The eye is not the bond of'objects nor are obj ects the bond of eye, but desire a nd lust that atl~ OWIfl~ to these two. T he concepts of tamil -raga (sensuous passion ), ko. ma rtpiidiina (sense clinging) and kama-iisaua (the canke~ of sensuous desire) refer to the persistence a nd upsurge of the.crav.m~ for ~nse­ gratification . Man 's craving may t>c: exc~ted by stimuli either til the form of soma tic factors or sensory stimuli, but ItS roots a re of a deep. rooted psychological nature. When a person's passions are mused, there emerges a kind of tenacity to hold on to these pleasures. This ~s the emerg~nc~ of clinging (upiidaM ). Unless there is the persistence o~ cl~n~lIlg, excitation of the sense organs is not suffici ent to rou,se the m~lvld ual to acti vity, Though clinging emerges always With cravmg as a cond ition, clinging as such works on a far deepe r level a nd onc~ a person clings to so pleasure-giving objects, some la tent tendencl~ (anuso.y a) will already have been excited . T he pu rsuit of pleasure IS fed by such und ercurrents. . . Wh en one is und er the spell of the dri ve for senSUOUS gratl~ catlon , one can never get out of the vicious circle of 'want, tension a nd satisfaction' . The word 'ttJJJhii', as implied by the metaph or of 'thi rst' with which it is often associated , implies a constant sta te of strivin~ . ln spite of intermiltent states~fsatisfa~tion, th~ unquen~h­ a ble thirst re-emerges. Wh en obstrucucn sets 10 t~el'"C IS fru~tratlon nd anger and if society lays down taboos th ere IS retreat mto the : ealms of ~hantasy. But deeper than all these ramifica tions of the pleasu re dri ve is the sense of boredo m a nd ennui tha t overco~es the man who has succumbed to the sea rch for pleasure as his one domina ting goa l. Pleasures also contain within them the seeds of decay and loss, and thus within the incessant searc h.for pleasure, deligh t turns into melan choly. T he deeper psychological aspects of boredom, melan choly, dissatisfaction and restlessness are all contained within the Buddh ist concept of du**ha. The psychol~y of tanhii cannot be separa ted (rom the concept of dtJ.klcha ~suffenng) . \ Ve have referred to the meaning of kiima as sensua lity, then to th e ethico-religious dimension regard ing acceptable and un accept abl e pleasures, then ro the deeper dynami cs of the psychology ?f pleasure and fina lly to the predicamc~l of th~ pure pleasure lover III the form of boredom, ennui and empn ness. N~w we tur n to a nother facet of crav ing, th e instinct of self_preservatIon.

64

An Introduction 10 Buddhist PsycholoJ!.Y

Seif-prtstToo/ion The second aspec t of craving - the instin ct for self-preserva tion involves greed (lobha), gene rates the desire to gratify the senses through kama-raga a nd kama-/a,yw. , and also the egoistic dri ves of bhaoo·raga a nd bhooo-ta"ha. T he egoistic dri ves we discuss here arc fed by false beliefs a nd illusions referred to as dq#Zi, a nd these fa lse beliefs a re fed in their turn by the egoistic desires, so tha t they eme rge as ra tional isations. The ego desires ca n be a nalysed in terms of the cravi ng for selfpreservation (bhooo-la1J/tQ) . T he craving for diverse selfish pursu its is deeply roo ted in the beliefs a nd ideological components referred to under the blank et head ing of the dogma of personal immorta lity (s/JJSata-diuJII) . We lend to believe in a pure ego existing indepe nd entl y of the psycho-physiological processes that consd ture life. T his ' pure ego' is believed to exist as an enti ty which conti nues even after the decay of the bod y. The ' bias towards egccent riciry'w (rooted in wro ng belief in an abiding ego-e ntity) manifests itself at various levels - lingu istic, emo tiona l, intellect ual, ethical, and so on. The acq uisitive and possessive pe rsonality struct ure of the egocentric person has a threefold base in craving (tQJ!ha) , conceit (mana) and false views (JiUhl) . This erroneous concept of the self is ind uced by craving manifesting itself in the linguistic form, 'This is mine', co nceit manifesting itselfi n the linguistic form 'This I a m' and false views in the form of 'This is my self'. Such fa lse views, cra ving and conceit ca n eme rge in relation to bod y, feeling, pe rception, dispositions and consciousness. From this process of the mutua l nourishm en t of the imell ecutua l a nd the affective roots of egocentr icity emerge the diverse man ifestati ons of egoistic beha viour -Ihe desire for seJfpr eservat ion , self-continuity, self-asserti on (power), fame, self. display, etc. These egoistic dri ves a re often woven into the daily run of life, so that they become clear ly manifest only in d ramatic situa tions such as a threa t to one's life. Dormant traits, like the d isposition to cling to existence (bhavariigiinusqya), will be excited on such occasions. T he d ividing lim: betw een a healthy self-regarding attitud e an d violent self-aggrandisement, q uiet egoistic pursuits a nd spiritua lly enha ncing self-tra nscending activities, etc., is a n issue relevant to the Buddh ist dimensions of persona lity study.!" In wha t follows we shall d iscu ss three facets of man 's egoistic nature -his craving, his conceit and his ego illusions. We hav e a lread y referred to thr ee aspects of crav ing in discussing

Motivation and Emotions sexuality: that it is a factor leading to rebirt h, that it is accompanied by lust and self-ind ulgence, a nd that it seeks for temporary satisfaction ' now here' ' now there' . It must clearl y be mentioned that the driv~ for self-pr~rvation has both physiological ~ nd psycho logical elements; some basic needs like the need for fresh air, water, food a nd sleep are necessary for surviva l. T o rem ain alive a penon needs water, food a nd rest and these are nOI considered by the Buddha as an expression of craving. Even in the perfected araha t (sain9 . the need for food is recogn ised. In condemning the way of asceucrsm, the Buddha was stri king a midd le path accord ing to which basic human needs should not be neglected . O n the whole, the recornmende uons for the monk are more str ingent than for the layman , bu t even for the monk the val ue or' ph ysical well-be ing as a pr erequ isite for th e developm ent of the mind was accepted by the Budd ha . However the need for food ma y be converted into an excessive greed for it: and glutto ny can be both bod ily and psycho~ogic~ly harmful. Fu nctio ns like ea ting an d drinking are natur al biological functio ns, but if they are a bstracted from their basic biological functions and pursued as sole ends , man becomes a slave to them. T od ay, in the world in which we live, the satisfaction of such ~ ic desires is vitia ted by false and destru cti ve pa tterns ofconsumpuon -. the factor of ever-increasing consumption intensifies ma n's need for a never-ending spira l ofdesires. Artificia l and pseudo desires are not in keeping with a healthy life-style accord ing to the Budd ha . ~he Buddha does not discussin detail biological dri ves like hunger, thirst an d sleep, hut mak es a persist.ent a tte mpt t ~ ~~i ng OUI the TOO LS. of inordinat e greed , pseudo desires and acq um uveness that tarnish o ur a bility to distingui sh betw een needs a nd grecds. . The concept of bluJva-ta!JlW is a lso linked ~it h ?ther s ~r~)J1.g d e~l res like the d rive for power, sta tus a nd prestige. [he dividi ng lines bet ween a healthy achievement mo tive and the goa ls of co mpensation, inferiority feelings a nd self-conceit ca n be worked o ut ou the classifi ca tion of psychological states mad e by the Buddha. Self-conceit according 10 the Buddh a ca n tak e three forms : ' 1 am super ior to e thers ' (sqyo 'ham asmitimana), ' I a m eq ual to others' (sadiso 'ha m as m i ti ~ii na ) . ' I am inferior t~ ot hers' (hino .'ham asmit imiina). Mana IS one of the fett ers tha t bind ma n to the ills of existe nce, and it va ries from a crude feelin g of prid e to a subtle feeling of distin cti veness tha t prevails un til the a ttain ment of ara hats hip (sainthood ).

66

An Introduction

to

A person can be proud of his ph ysical ap pearance o r his H e might also feel infuriated when someone la ughs at Ius appeara nce o r loo ks d own on his position a nd Sta tus. If a pe rson underestima tes his a tta inments or becomes disgusted with his o wn 'image of himself', feelings of inferiority a re excited. The phen om eno n referred to in clinica l situa tions as 'depressio n' is a lso rela ted to a feeling of 'la ck of wo rt h' on the pa rt ofa perso n. T he ego is a lso like an easily tipped ca noe a nd an egoistic person is highly sensitive to remarks or actions ca lcula ted to belittle him . In fact ' wound ed narcissism' has the po tential to rouse a person's aggressive an d hostile nature. In general the d isturbance of a person's va nity can give way to either ego co llapse a nd depression or a nger a nd fury. Wh en on e' s anger canno t be ven ted on an o bject or person in the external world, it ca n be di rected agai nst oneself an d eme rge in some of the su bt le manifesta tions of self-ha tred . The- roo ts of co nceit exist a t a subterra nea n level in the fo rm of a donnan t procl ivity: we are subject to the lat ent conceit described in the lingu istic form ' I am the doer' a nd ' this is m y doi ng' ( aha ~kii ra ma ma rrtkii ra miiniinusqya). T his insidio us tend ency to vain conceits can tak e five- fo rms: in rela tion to 111e bod y, feelings, perceptions, d ispositio ns a nd consciousness. Pride and conceit a rise from a false valua tio n of oneself based on measuri ng on eself with others. Both supe riority a nd inferiori ty co nceits are a dua l manifesta tion of the sa me roo t, a n inflated sense of va nity (mona-madd) . A person su bj ect to consta nt feelings of van ity a nd pri de ma y be described in the termino logy of'Freud as a ' na rcissistic person'. As H orn ey points out, the roo t of the narcissistic cha rac ter-structure is a sense of self-infla tion rather than self-love, wit h a need not for love but for the ad mira tion of o thers. In the fina l a na lysis the po tential for sensory, ver ba l a nd ideat iona l stim uli to exci te a sense of 'egoinju ry' or 'ego-ela tion' will be there as lon g as the dormant proclivit y to va in conceits a nd pr ide (mananusqra) exists. . T~l e fa lse views pe rta ining to the ego are referr ed to as sllkkaya dzUh, (twenty forms of er roneous personality be liefs). Wh er e th ere is a mer e com plex of co rporea lity, feeling, percepti on , dispositions and co nsciousness, the ind ividu a l being subj ect to the ego-illusion assumes the existence of an ego: 1- 5 ego is identified with corporea lity, feeling, perceptions, d isposition a nd consciousness th e individua l being subject to the ego-illusion assuming ' the existen ce of an ego in terms of these five by a process of identifica tion . a ~ ta i n me nlS .

Motivatwn and Emotions

Buddhut Psy d wlog]

ego the individ ual is contained in th~m ego the indi vidu al is ind epe nd ent of them 16-2 0 ego the indi vid ua l is their ow ner

6- 10

1 1- 15

The breakd own of ego-illusion into twent y compo?en~ does not mean that the ego is merely an intellectu al construcu?n . J be roots of ego-illusion are strong a nd it is fed by deep affective pr~esses. Most of the va rieties of ego-identifications (if not a ll) found 111 the writings of philosop hical and psychologica.1 reA~ctions may be explained on the basis of these twenty maru~estat~ons of the e~o­ illusion . A materialist view of the self would identify the self w~th corporeality, a hedon ist view of life w.0uld .id entify the s~lf With feeli ng, a 'sensa tionist' view wou ld Iden tify ~he s~lf with the perceptions, a vitalist wou ld identify the .self With wi ll and som.e ideal ists wo uld identify the self wit h co nscio usness, a nd so on . It IS not me rely the false view itself tha t ma tters, ~ut a strong attac hmen t to it . Thus the instinct fo r self-asser tion, power and selfaggra nd isemen t as well as self_pe rpetua tio n would feed the eterna list view of th e self. To cite a n exa mple from psycho logica l writings, an identification of the body with self can be illustra ted with the m~th of N arci~us, a beautiful youth in mythology who loved no o ne ull he saw his own bod y reflected in wa ter . T his conce pt of ' na rcissism' developed by Fre~d was o rigina lly the idea of Paul Na cke, who used the term t~ describe a perversion where a n ad ult ind ividu al lavishes upon hIS own bod y a ll the ca resses expended o nly upon a sexual object ot he r tha n himseJr .n A more su btle id enti fica tio n wi th the bod y wo uld b:e seen in the opposite case of inflicti ng tortu~ on the ~y '. Th~ wo uld be und erstood in the lig ht of the cravm g for a nnihila tion ', T he corpo rea l overto nes of the ego-illus ion a re described thus In the su u as: those people who arc untrained in the doctrine of the Buddha , 'rega rd bod y as the self (alla, Sankri r: ii/man ), they r~ga~ the self as ha ving a bod y, bod y as bei ng in the self, theselfas bei ng In the bod y. " I a m the body" , say they, " bod y is min e" , and ~re possessed by this idea .'80The Budd ha a lso says tha t du e to excessive a ttachment to the bod y, when it a lters a nd cha nges, sorro.w a nd gr ief set in, th us bringing out a link b~twet:n the doctrines of egolessness and suffe ring. Wh a t ~as be~n sal? a bout the bod.y ca n be sa id a bo ut the feelings, perceptio ns, dispos itio n a nd CO ns,ecause . it is nou rished by rhe man ifestati on s of cravmg: T ? c:re IS a re~lduum ~rom the psychological disposition s of the ind ivid ua l which by ItS d ynamic nature no urishes the co ntin uation of the indivi d ual or of phe nomenal existence in gen era l. It is also sai~ ? f the 'st r~am c:'f conscio usness' of a living person, that ~ part of It IS presen t 10 this world (idhalolu pa/iUhi/am) a nd a part 10 the world beyond (pa ratokt patiUhitam); this strea m of consciousness has two components, a conscious a nd an uncon scious facet . T he pa rt of the strea m of consciousness of which the individu.a l is ?~t aware ma y be the d ynam ic unconscious com prism of the d ispositions (sa~.tha ra) that deter mine the cha racter of the next birt h." Kn owledge of this strea m of consciousness wi th a conscious a nd unconsciou s component is o nly within the reach of those who develop the practi ce of meditation, and in the context in whi ch this is discussed in th e DiaioglUs of t~ Buddha it is sa id tha t wh en a person enters into the third stage of meditatio n such know ledge is accessible. T his d irect knowledge of unconscious processes would be superior to whatever inferences we make on

but

Motivotion and Emotions

77

reasoning, the behaviou r of others a nd the limited introspective study of our own minds. The co ncept of sa1}khiira (d isposition) is im porta nt here. Because such dispositions funct ion bot h a t a conscious and a n unconsciou s level, it is said in the GradlUll Sayings, in a context which d iscusses four methods of knowing the mind of another , that a yogi n is able to d iscern the mind of a not her person a nd develop an insigh t in to the ~enta.1 .d ispositions of an oth er person. Accor ding to the mental dispositions of a no ther person, he is a ble to predict tha t the person ~ iIl a t a cert~ i n time have 'such a nd such a lbou ght ' .81 As the person 11 not CO nsciO US of the mental dispositions (maM-sankhara) which subsequentl y influence his process of tho ught, they are not presen t in his consciousness when the y are discerned by others. The suuas also mak e specific reference to asampaja-mano-sariJcnara (menta l dispositions of the mind of whic h we are not aware ) .83 In the concepts of the d ormant procli vities (anusa)'os), corrod ing ca nkers or intoxi ca nts (osavas) , the d ynam ic dispositio ns (sanA-hara) connecti ng two lives, mental d ispositions of which we a re no t aw are QSam/J4jdna·mallfHDJikMra ). erc., we have an authen tic base for the developmen t of a notion of unconscious ac tivity . Two o ther co ncepts often referred to in Budd hist wri tings, those of altJ.)'avynana (storehouse conscio usness) and bhavanga sota (strea m of existe nce), do not belon g to the psychology of the sunas . T he former is a concept fou nd in M aha yan a works and the la tter belongs to the Abhidham ma literature."

C01l41ivt Aclivi!] (San.tltDra) T here are two sig nifican t facets to the psychology ofmotiva tion: the affecti ve and the conative facets of hum an behav iour. Co n. tempo ra ry psychologists do not accep t the tripa rti te psychological di visions of conative, affective a nd cogn itive, but would rather consider them as facets of integra ted acti vit)' which ma y be found in a particular acti on . As we hav e already mention ed , for the purposes of study and a na lysis, by a process of abstraction vtdanii ma y be consid ered as the basic concept for affecti ve experience , while co na tive ac tion an d volition a re centred on the concept of sankhdra, It has been maintained that there has been a paucity of stud ies pertai ning 10 the psychology of will in Buddhism." It has a lso been men tion ed that some of the early western scholars of Buddhism ~a t ed 'wiIJ ' with ' thirst' (Ja"ha), and such strong desires were co nsidered as bad a nd deleteri ous . ' Thus the possibili ty of develop-

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M otivation and E motions

iog a positive psychology of will (as a factor to be developed rat her tha n repressed) was neglected by Buddhi st scholars. This certain ly is an impo rta nt a rea to be explored. But the word 'will' is seman tically troubl esome. In keeping with the psychology of Buddh ism we ma y spea k of a broad conative dim ension of behav iour, und er which we could study specific concepts like effort, volition, aspira tion, etc. T he sema ntic position here is importa nt: the term 'will' is so vague that it ca nnot be ident ical with the more d iversified, specific a nd analytical Buddhi st terms . T hus without using the broad term 'will' , we sha ll exa mine specific facets ofefTort, volition, aspira tion, etc., against the background of the concep t of sailJdUira. SatiJdliira ma y be described as 'motiva ted a nd purposeful ac tivit)" which also has mor al consequences." However, as was menti oned in Cha pter " there a re two psychologica l aspects to .ftJillijra: deliberation and volition on the one hand, and dynam ism, persistence a nd habit on the other. T he word 'ctlaJlii' , with which the word sQitJrhiirQ is often used synonymously, suggests the idea of volition. The concept of abhisankltiira brings out the element of dy na mism which emphasises the mea ning of saitJcltiira as karma form ation: 'T he wheel kept rolling so long as the impulse that set it movin g lasted (abhisaitkhiirossQgalt) . Then it circ led round a nd fell to the ground .w T his graphic image from the Aitguttara Nikiiya refers to the idea of moment um and dynam ism that the concept of saitJcM ra ind icat es as a link in the wheel of depend ant originat ion . T he fusing of concepts like delibera tion a nd habit-beha viou r is not foreign to western psychology. Flugel, for insta nce, cites the concept of 'orexis' which brings together the cona tive a nd affective elements. T hus 'cona tive disposiuons' appea rs to be a fittin g tra nslation of the wor ld soriJchiira.88 T hese cona tive d ispositions ma y be divi ded into wholesome a nd unw holesome d ispositions, as well as conscious a nd unconscious dispositions. T he elimina tion of passions a nd the con trol of the senses rest on the development of wholesome cona tive dispositions. As the passions and the defiling elements are strong, a grea t deal of effort is necessary LO go against the current (paluotagiimi). Righ t intention, effort, energy and persistence are the qua lities tha t help peop le to withstand the strength of defiling impu lses, as well as to develo p more positive aspira tions towa rds the path s of spiritual growth . In the Anguuara N ikii)"a it is said that there ar e four kind s of efforts:

the effort to restrain , the effort to a bandon, the effort to make become and the effort to wa tch over. n The effo rt to restrain implies that a person gu ard s his senses without letting either co nvetocs ness or dejection disturb his mind . In the effort to a bandon, if an evil thought emerges in a person's mind , either a sensual though t or a cruel a nd malign one, it is expelled and eliminated . The effort to make become is the a tte mpt to let positive spiritua l sltills emerge, such as mindfu lness, investigation of the dbamm a, zest, tranquillit y, equanimity, etc. The effort to watch over concentra tes on repulsive objects a nd signs tha t wiU destroy a ny emerging lust and greed .

79

Cet ana and tire VocabuJary of COM/ion u tmtii is a key term that gives special significance to the actions of people. But it cannot in all COntexts be adequatel y rendered by the English words 'will' or 'volition' . It is a ment al factor (cd asikll) common to all sta tes of consciousness, karmically neut ral ones a nd even the weakest among them. Its function , valid for all sta tes of consciousness, is said to be the co-ordi na ting, organising and d irecting the other conjoined men tal propert ies. It is the presence of some of these co-nascent factors that d etermin es the specific a nd 'developed' functions of celonii. For instan ce, if ku.saJa or akusaJQ though ts are present, celanii becomes moral or immoral karmic volition, a nd ma y even prod uce rebirth . It becomes iruensifed by the presence o f uiriya (energic effort); when vilakJra·viciira is presen t its 'thought organising' fu nc tion becomes int ensifcd; etc. This anal ysis of the na ture of cetand ma y be concluded by mentioning that in the psychology of Buddhism representati ons of all four mental khandhas are present in all stales of consciousness. Thus mental factors like volition a re not separa te ent ities, but are insepa rabl y associated with other factors. They a re j ust functions in a dynami c un it of consciousness. T hey are as insepar ab le as the shape , colour a nd flavour of a man go . T hus, though we ha ve for the sake of analysis spoken of the cognitive, conative and affective dim ensions of behaviour, the psychology of Buddhism ca nnot strictly up hold traditional trip arti te faculty psychology. T hey a rc really aspects found in all states of consciousness and behaviour .

Personali!J

4 Personality P SY C H OLO G I C AL P ER SPE CTI V E S OF PE R SONALITY STU DY AND TilE BUDD H IS T C O NC E P T OF TH E H U M A N PER SO N

I n the di scourses of th e Bud d ha th e philosophical and psych ologi ca l aspects of the ' person' conce pt are often intermingled and even inte rwoven, and it is only by a process of dissection a nd abstraction th a t the mat eria l ca n be separated for purposes of study. Le t us fi r5( tak e a look at the psychological perspect ives of pe rsonality study. The ter m ' perso nality' has a distincti ve meaning within the field of psychology: for the psychologist the ter m implies

the study of the chara cteristic and distinctive tra its of an individual, the sta ble and shifting patterns of relatio nship s between (hoe tra its, the o rigin of the traits, an d the wa ys the traits int eract to help or hinder the adjustm ent of a perso n to other peop le and siwa cions. ' Such a stud y has two facets: a str uctura l aspec t rhat dea ls with the description of trai ts and their relationship, a nd a d ynamic aspec t tha t deals with the motiva tiona l influence oftra its upon adj ustmen t. T hus the a nalysis of emo tions and mo tiva tion which we ha ve made in the preced ing cha pter is directly rela ted 1.O the study of perso nali ty. In fact, o ut or the ma ny areas ofstud y in conte mporary psychology, the triad ofmo tiva tion, emo tion a nd persona lity ta kes a central place in the psyc 0 ogy 0 u cUrisnJ. { In dealin g with persona lity cha racteristics , one does not get at 'cccasicnat events like 'A was an gry yesterday morn ing' , but whether A is cha rac teristica lly a hostile perso n or a pe rson with a calm disposition . It ca n be said ora person with a ca lm disposition th at even if you pass irritati ng comments or abuse him, it is not easy to excite him . Also, the aspects of perso nality tha t we choose from must be distinctive. T o sa y that a certa in perso n works for a living ma y not be very signifi ca nt (as there are large numbers who do so) , 80

81

com pared with statements like ' A is industrious' , ' B is lazy' or ' C is self-assertiv e', etc., which pinpoint distin guishin g persona lity cha rac teristics. T hus the psychology of perso nal ity study directs a ttention o n to aspects which a re characteristica nd diuinaioe. A trait is a n aspect of perso nality tha t is both cha rac teristic a nd distinctive of ( a person . Becau se of the large va riety of tra its found in peo ple, some ( ha ve tr ied to pu t the traits toget her by find ing clusters of related traits. There ha ve also been a ttempts to focus attention on the more d ram a tic and outsta nding qualities of peo ple and group them accordi ng to ' personality types' . But suc h rypclcgies migh t lead to excessive generalisation an d simplifica tion. Persona lity typologies migh t be used for a specific purpose tied to a limited context. The psycho logy of Buddh ism ofTers ma terial for the study of both traits a nd tyJNs of personality . However , in keepi ng with the fra mewo rk with in which Buddhist psychological analysis eme rged. both trait and type analysis are rooted in a basic ethical and spiritual concern about man . This mea ns tha t th e discourses of the Buddha focus attention on psychological q ualiti es which are of ethical and spiritual conce rn. T here is a reference to pe rsonali ty types in AtiguUaraNikiiya' a nd the Sang'iti.su/tilofthe DigJuJ:N ikiiya,' a nd a more systema tic analysis in the Puggala-PaMaui (H uman T ypes) . The subject is a lso given stimulating d iscussion in the Visuddhimagga. Since the ma terial in tbe suu as is d ispe rsed, the other works may be consulted with a certai n amount of caution." T he classificati on of the types of people d iscussed there cent res on ethica lly wholesome a nd unwholesome psychologica l tra its, as well as on levels of spiritua l development. T he perso nality types are linked up with aspects of thera py and techniques of medi tati on . Due to the strong ethical flavou r in the psychology of hu man personality in Budd hism the ' psychology of conflict' ta kes a significa nt pla ce. Conflicts between specific desires as well as the mo re genera l conflict be tween ' the flesh an d spirit' need discussion. Thus the world of turbulent passions on one side and their control, restrai nt , elimination, redi rection , etc. , on the other side arc of central importance in the d ynami cs of person ality stud y within the doc tr ine. T he primi tive desires (asava), which we ha ve a lready referred to as being simila r to the Fr eudian Id , are regul ated by the stren gth of one's own conscien ce (auiidhipaUyya), concern for what the world says (lQkiid1lipal9)'a) and respect for the dhamma (t/hammiidkipateyy a). This pictu re has a certain resemblance to the

82

All Introduction to B uddhist Psychology

Personali!),

Freud ian notio ns of ld, Ego a nd the S upe r-ego, the difference being that Buddhism brings o ut both the da maging as well as the hea lthy facets of the Super-ego . In the study of emotions we ha ve a lread y mentioned tha t the Budd ha req uires man to develop a hea lth y a nd prod ucti ve sense of sha me and fear (hiri-ouoppa ), as distinct from pa thological guilt a nd worry, which ca n be a hindran ce to one's spiritua l development . In this manner the psycho logy of co nflict would form a significa nt problem for the stud y of persona lity. Fina lly, in the suuas probl ems rela ting to individ uality, uniq ue. ness of personaliry, self a nd continuity a re given a n an alysis which is more philosophical tha n psycho logical. But the ph ilosop hica l perspectives throw a co nside ra ble am ount ofl ight on the texture of th e co ncepts an d terminology of Budd hist psychology.

in the history of human tho ugh t Budd hism began to 'psychologise without a soul' and the doctrine's view of huma n experience as a process falls in line with accepted d yna mic psychology in the west. T he Budd ha rej ected an etern a lly a biding pu re ego (alta) a nd described the uni verse in terms of the a rising, decay a nd d issolution of a ll things. He ma intained. tha i all things, including both mind and bod y, are subj ect to change a nd tra nsient , T he doc tr in es of egcless ness (amm o) and of tra nscience (onitca), a long with tha t of sufferi ng (dukkhlJ) , form the centra l base of the philosophy of the human perso n in Buddhism . Within the psychologica l a nal ysis of Budd hism, it will be seen tha t there is no substance, but a continuous flux of mat erial and men ta l pr ocesses a rising from particu lar conditions. T he mind is a d ynam ic continuum which is d escribed by the Budd ha by mean s of a num ber of an a logies. Sometim es, it is compa red to a flame, whose existence depends upon a num be r offac rors : i.e . the wick, oil, etc .; sometimes it is compared to a strea m (sota ), a nd again the movem ents of a monk ey j umping from bra nch to branch, Ieu ing go ofo ne branch only aftcr it clings to a nother, etc., are used . One sign ifica nt poin t on which the Budd hist an al ysis ma y differ from western psychology is tha t this d ynamic conti nuum is not limited to one life-spa n; it consists of a conscious mind as well as an unconsc ious in which is stored the residu e of emotionally charged memories going back not only to childhood, bu t also to past lives, A perso nality stud y within such a d ynam ic psychology sounds plau sible a nd int eresting, a nd what we ca n do in this cha pter is 10 do some clea ring of the g round regarding the possibility of such a project. T he more philosophica lly o riented questions have cent red on the q uestion of 'persona l identity' . The ethics of Buddhism has a concept of responsibility, whic h ca lls fo r a sense of -continuity ' as far as the person is concerned. If I a m to be responsible for my acts , ' I must continue 10 exist a nd be ca pable of ac knowledging that I am the sa me individ ua l who performed them .. . ' & Thus in philosophica l discussions, the centra l qu estio n is, Wh at a re the necessary a nd suffi cient logical criteria for iden tifying persons? Attempts ha ve been made La pr esent logicall y adeq ua te criteria for re-ide nt ifying persons in terms of co nsciousness, mem ory and body ." Strawson' s position on this is very instru cti ve: persons are distinct from ma teria l bodi es, tho ugh this docs not imply tha t they a re the refore immat erial bod ies. A person has sta tes of consciousness as well as physica l a ttributes a nd it is not merely to be

PHILOSOPHICAL

JlER SP E C Tl V E$

Philosophers use the term 'perso ns' to specify a n a rea of study, an d the psychologists use the word 'persona lity' to deal with a parallel probl em area, a lthoug h, in the work ofhuman istic psychologists like M aslow a nd Rogers a nd existentially o riented psychologists like Rollo M ay, the word ' person' is used . In fac t, today pr oblems such as the 'crisis in iden tity' a nd a basic concern wi th the human pe rson have pa ved the wa y fo r refreshing interdisciplina ry discussion a mong philosophers, psycho logists a nd sociologists, In some of the emerging inter-disciplinary as well as cross-cultura l studies, there is a cutt ing a cross thro ugh ' well-fenced' prob lem a reas a nd methodologica l sta nces. T his trend has nOI tak en place in a chao tic man ner, but ra ther is a persistent yet ca utious a ttempt 10 search for new horizons in human istic as well as social science studies. In the context of Buddhism, the psychological perspect ives o n persona lity stud y ca nno t be complett!! sepa ra ted from the more philosophica lly oriented (or ' meta -psychological') a na lysis of the person concept. O n the one hand , there is a significant ana lysis of the psychology of mo tivationa l factors and personal ity tr a its in Buddhism , bu t o n the o the r there is a highl y critica l and susta ined ana lysis of such ph ilosophi cal problem -creators as 'soul', 'consciousness', ' mind ', 'self", etc. T he question ofhow a religion which denies a permanent self ca n ma ke provision for personality stud y has often been put in an a lmost polemica l forrn. Ju this conte xt, it ma y be men tioned that very ea rly

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An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology

Pm onali!J

iden tified with one or the o the r . T his co ncept of the hu ma n pe rson as a psycho-physical being fits in well with the Buddhist a na lysis. T he co ntent ion tha t in rejecting the existence of a perm a nent soul, the Buddha is not also reject ing the existence of a continuous person is important.1 T he Budd hist doctrine requiressome sense of a 'co nt inuing pe rson' as a n agent of mora l action and responsibility. T he same req uirement wou ld be need ed for a study of the psychology of perso na lity . In some recent studies on the human person there a re few relevant observa tions mad e in this connec tion. Budd hism accepts ma t there is a conti nuous perso n a nd that the perso n consists of o rganic fac tors which an: causally interdependent and subject to change .' T hough the Buddha does no t acce pt a pers isting substra tum, the word ' pe rson' is used in a co nventiona l sense to 'd istinguish one seria l process from anothe r' .' Against the background of this analysis persons will ha ve pu rposes of their own, and they a re the sources of the valu es the)' ge nerate; they are ca pa ble of takin g decisions an d accepting responsibility for th eir acts. T hey will have rights and d uti es and are ca pa ble of being punished . In general , they are age nts who can be both ra tional a nd irr ationa l, but basically always responsible for their ac tions. Psychologicall y, it is of significan ce to say tha t pe rsons have memories, thought , feeling and comm unicat e with o the rs. In a psychologica l sense, the word ' persona lity' has merely co nventiona l usage, referring to a certai n unit y of functions - fo r exam ple, wa lking, sta ndi ng, pe rceiving, thinking, deciding, a pron eness to get a nnoyed , etc. As the pa rts of a chario t work toget her, so do the body, feeling, conscio usness a nd dispositio ns co mbine .!" R une J ohan sson feels tha t in this ana logy we find a fun ct io nal concept of persona lity:

J ohan sson feels tha t this concept of perso na lity is somet hing tha t ' modern psychology ca n only ap plaud." ! Now that we ha ve cla rified the import ant aspec t's of rhc logical , eth ica l and psychologica l framework of th e concepts of ,person' a nd 'persona lity' , il sho uld be possible 10 wo rk out in detail the ma terial in the d iscourses of the Budd ha pe rtai ning 10 the psychology of persona lity.

Here the func tional unity of persona liry is reall y what contem porary psychologists call ' personality' . T he car has clearly some sort of primitive persona lity, a n individ ua l conste lla tion of pa r ts; it is ca pa ble of functio ning only when all the pa rts are th ere , None of the parts ca n be ca lled 'car ', not even all the pa rt s togeth er, if the y a re not combined in a very special way . . . A persona lity is a lso not the bod y, not the perceptual function , not the feeling erc. , but the proper co mbina tion of them . I I

85

P E R SO N A LI T Y T RA ITS A ND T YP E.S

T here is a discussion in the Ariguttaro nikQ)'a regarding the ways of knowing a person's characrer .P It is sa id tha t a person's q ualities cannot be fo und out cas ually but requ ire co ntinuous contact. The four qualities of cha rac rcr discussed a rc virt ue, integrity,!or itud and wisdo m . It is said that to find out w et er a person-is virtuous hVlllg with that perso n is necessa ry: Living toget her with a person, one comes to know him thus: For a long time the act ions ofthis worthy hav e shown weakness, defects. taints and blemishes as to his mora ls; and he was, mora lly, no t consisrem in his actions a nd cond uc t. This w orthy is a n immoral person, he is no t virt uous . f or a long time the actions of this .....o rt hy have shown no wea knesses, defects , taints or blemishes as to his mo ra ls; he is morally consistent in his actions and cond uct. This w orthy is virtuous, he is not a n immora l perso n . In this manner q ua lities of charac ter may be discovered over a long period . Of course, wha t has been said about the virtuous and the immoral at a very high level of genera lity, ma y be do ne with mo re specific aspects of virtue or its o pposite like lying, stea ling, etc. In th e sa me manner it is sa id that a m;uD integritY-BIl,.hc. .£hcc kcd by ha ving dealings with him . ¥.Q!!_ha .\[email protected] his earl behaVIOur lalls mlinc With hi s lat er behaviour and.wh erbcr the wa he d ea ls wit h one person IS simila r 10 or dissimilar from tbe .a e ca 'ld crs. I t is then said that at times of crises or when misfort une tails, it is possible 10 test one's fortit ude. I( qp.e has-,lo face ~i w.a t io ns like the loss of someone-dear to him, loss of wea lth or fal . . to si4;-kncss- a man of fo rt itud e will not be l?!rt~ r bed in facin ch

86

A" Introduction 10 Buddhist Psychology

Personali!}

situations. H e will_u mk.r stand tha t 'gain an d fame a nd disre ute raise d blame•..ha pp.lo..css andU'Ohap~ e~ par i o na a l-worldl ' vicissitude (aUha. lokodhammii). ITiC"" opposite of this t ype of person is the one who will be d ist urbed by such situa tions a nd will lamen t, grieve a nd be worried a bout th em - l ilt" a nxiety-p rone person. Finally, it is said that lhroug~~. nd o ut " 'heth er a ma n h ~m._ From the wa y he exa mines . ormula lcs a nd presents a probl em , it is possible to discuss whet her wand he is a wise ma n; the words thai he utters rna ' be sh su perficia l or loaded ~\'i l h~su bl!,e..an P[ ounclQ!!::ani ng. This discussion is si nificaru for tw easocs; jl examinq four w a)'s of disco vering the tru e nature ofpeop1E.z and at the sa~ti m c indi ca tes the kind _ot~rsona l i t y trai lS-whieh-are-£t'mW1Ll.o...J ht, psychology of Buddhism, revealin g that it is basically qual ities 01 ara cter w iCli a re im portant within the ethical sca ffoldi ng of Budd hism . T hese are somew ha t different from the kind of ' personality traits' stud ied by modern psycho logists, and even traits wh ich are psychologica l in na ture are presented within the same ethical fra mework. Wh a t is more, some of the qualities are so gen eral in nature that they ma y ha ve to be furth er split into com po nents wi th more specific meanings iflhey a re to be ca pa ble of em pirica l delinea tion. However this shows that apa n from the usc of introspection , which ho lds a central pla ce as a way ofo btai ning selfknowledge, the Buddha recognises the value of certa in behavioura l tests to find o ut the qua lities of people and their disposit ions. a y Anot her si ificant aspect of1.hese 'character trai J ' c1!U!cr.oss the d isposition s of peopl e ovese numbe£-Ofbi rJbs andabus * m mu bd i.l!lits or child bood experienc.e. This, too, is a concept that has not been a bsor6c'ifby conrem porary psycho logy in the west. Co nside r the fo llowing:

T his person w ho bears the traits of being ill-tempered , j ea lo us, revengeful and not-generous will ca rry these trai ts wit h her to the next life:

. . . a certa in woman is ill-tempered , of a very irr itable na tur e. On very lillie provocat ion she becom es cross an d agitated. She is upset and beCO Tn of passion (raga) and hatred (dosa) a nd Ignorance from delu sion (moha). In the therape utic setting ,tr anq ~ i l ~ ty is advoca ted for th.C man of the 'craving temperamen t a nd insight for the man who IS intellectually confused . T his falls in line with two forms of meditation found in Budd hism: develop ment of tranquilli ty (sama/ha) and development of insight (lJipassana) . . . T houg h there is a dom inating therapeutic stance III the philosophy and psychology of Buddhism, there are , when it is ~o m.pa red with the ot her systems of therap y presented here, significa nt differences of emphasis a nd goals of therapy. T he Budd~a was I~ ot directly concerned \....ith a limited nu mber of maladju sted 10 divid uals but with the basic hum an predicament . T he Buddh a remarked tha t diseases could be div ided into bodily disease (kay ikarogo) and mental disease (celasikarogo). We suffer from bodily d iseases from time to time, but mental disease will not be extinguished unt il the anainment of sainthood . Continuous u nr~t , discon tent tension and an xieties are caused by the roots of craving and ignora nce. However , the Budd ha offered two idea ls of ha ppiness and concept s of'anxiet y. There is the pa th of renu nciation of the monk in search of complete peace and quietude , and there is that of the layman who has made a compromise with life. In the dia logues of the Buddh a, th e higher ideal of lIibbiina , signifying ca lm and quietude, is compared . With. the hum a n predi camen t of suff ering (dukkha). The other Idea l IS that of the righteo us householder. While the recluse .~ eek ing ~ ltim a t~ release from suffering will obtai n inner peace (allhattasan/l) the nght eo~ s householder's aim is harmonious living (samacar!)'ii) . T he latter IS ' the concept of the well-adju sted man , who seeks a balanced life, avoids excess, exercises a degree of restraint and is conte nt with the sa tisfaction of limited wan ts. He pract ices regular self-a nalysis, helps other people and genera tes the seeds of peace a nd harm ony necessary for health y comm unity life. T he develop ment of a therapy based on the psychology of Buddhism has to recognise these two ideals of ment al health , but the dic hotomy need not be rad ica l since the era dica tion of lust, ha tred a nd delusion ar e common to bo th. T he difference is that while the recluse takes an immed iate plunge and hopes to mak e swift progress, the- layma n aims at a mor e gradua l prog ress. . . . . In the final a nalysis the developm ent of a spiritual dimension,

An Introdut:lion to Buddhist Psyclwlogy

Buddhist Psychology and flu Wesl

where meditational practice aim s at a higher level of consciousness, has not been a bsorbed by western psychologists, T hough some of th em are int erested in measu ring the impact of meditation on man's bod ily pr ocesses as well as th e psychological condition, no significant impact has yet been seen in the field of psychothe ra py . Buddhism mak es a distinction betw een norm al conscio usness (saniiasann'i) a nd th e consciousness of a ne urotic (kkitla-ciua), of a psychotic (unmattaka), and of one who has an abnormal 'disj ointed consciousness' ( Visanna-saiiiii) . But the Buddha also spea ks of a developed consciousness ( vibkii ta-sa.iini") . ~ T his mystical dimension regard ing the development of higher consciousness is foreign to the psych ology of the west.

some amazing similarities to the Fre udian libido, ego ins,tinct and death-instin ct . O f course, in the case of the destru ctive urge, Buddhism considers destruction of unpleasant objects as a basic drive and self-destr uction as a reacti ve instin ct. The Freudian concep t of self-love described in the concept of narcissism offers a significant point of convergence be~ een the ,two. th~ri es . l () . T he re is also a concept of uncon sciou s mouvanon III Buddhism which we discussed in a previous cha pter .II It was seen tha t the crav ing for pleasurable excitement is fed by deeper under~urrent s . Pleasurable feelings induce an attachm ent to pleasant objec ts, for the y rouse lat ent sensuous greed; painful feelin gs rouse lat ent.an ge.r; false complime nts can excite laten t conceit; a thr ea t. to life will excite a dorman t proclivity to cling to existence; an d so ~m. T hese dormant undercurren ts provide the base for ever-recurring greed, an ger, prid e, jealousy and varying types of a nxiety. Th ~ m i~d is not a n unchanging soul, but a d ynamic continuum In which IS sto red the residue of emo tionally cha rged memories going back to child hood as well as past births. The Buddha considers the ego as the seat of anxiety and the att achment to a false sense of th ~ ego nou rished by uncon scious procliviti es as a base for the ge~eratlO~ of tensions and unrest. This ego-a nxiety linkag e offers an mt eresung point of int ersection , not merely .fo~ the BU~dhist. a nd Fr eudian therapi es, bu t also for the huma nistic a nd existential systems. Buddhism offers a more positive path for grow th based o,n a spir itual and ethica l idea l, It also c:'ff~rs t?e ideal of ha,rmoOlous living for th e household er a nd the,eh.rnmatlOn of al! canflie,ts to the reclu se. Freud sought only a limited a nd attainable Ideal of happiness, In fa ct, he even says that his aim was to 'tra nsform hysterical misery into common unhappiness' , a nd.also says t ha~ he was not devising a scheme to rub away all conflicts an d passions from a person's min d . Analysis, accordi ng to Freud , does not make pathological reactions impossible but stimula tes the freedom to develop personal autonom y which w ill mak e the emergence of pathologica l reactions unlikely. Rogers's claim (hat people a re responsi ~l e for their d est~ny ; make their own future and have a sense of choice and responsibilit y a re premises tha t accord with the psychologica l and ethica l ou tl~~ of Buddhism , The Buddha rejected va rio us forms of determi nism which existed a t his tim e-natural det erminism (svabhiiw -vada), theistic determinism ( i~'sa ra -kii ra1J.a -viida ) and karmic deter minism (pu bba-kamma-viida ). While a person's psychological past , heredity

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B UDDHI SM AN D TH E THERAPE UTJ C SYS TE MS OF THE WE ST

In genera l, Buddhism offers significant poin ts of conve rgence with psychoanalysis, humani stic psychology a nd existentia l therapy, whereas the model of beh aviouri sm offers some significant points of' difference. T he ga p between Buddhism a nd be haviour therapy rests on a num berof factors: Buddhism accep ts 'introspec tio n' as a techniq ue for self-understand in g; it is also not a piecem eal the ra py attacking specific symptoms but focu ses auenu on on the general conditions which lie below all specific symptoms. While accepting th e claim that cond itioning is a powerful factor in the growth of habit- boun d behaviour, Buddhism prefers insight and self-unders ta nding to processes like counte r-conditioning an d desensitisation . Howe ver, in the phil osoph y of Buddhism there is a significant empiricist sta nce, emphasising observation a nd verifica tion. Buddhism a lso cri ticises metaphysical theories of mind which uphold pure-ego theories. The stimulus response rela tion is one of the ave nues that according to the Buddha excites man 's animosity and conceit. Ne vertheless, he felt tha t the stimulus response works on de epsea ted proclivities in man which extend beyond one life-span , to innumerabl e birth s, Freudian psychoan al ysis, which has not been understood co rnpletely by men of religion , offers interesting insights. The psychology of Buddhism hold s that there are three significa nt manifestations of craving: th e craving for sense gra tifica tion, the desire for selfish pu rsuit s and the desire for de stru ction, T hese ha ve

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An Introduction to Buddhist Ps,yclwlogy

Buddhist Psychology and the West

and the social enviro nm ent ma y condition a man's actions, they do not de termine them . T hus the clement of ' psychic determin ism' in Freud will not fall in line with Buddhi sm. T hough the Buddha ~ ffered a systema tic pat h for liber ation from a nxieties, it is nOI Imposed on individua ls as in cliem -cem red therapy. Unlike di em centred therapy there a re more positive guide lines and a way of life in Budd hism. The term 'client-centred' thera py would remain somewha t ambiguou s in this context, as the Buddha was not a therapi st in the full sense of the word . Also, there is no Budd hist thera py as a competing techn ique, as is the case with the other systems we ha ve men tioned . T he psycho logy of Buddh ism in its th era peutic out look emphasises the world of decisions a nd rcsponsibiliry as the hum anistic school d